Early Warning - Delayed Response?

Early Warning –
Delayed Response?
Lessons from IFRC Horn of Africa Appeals 2008–2010
www.ifrc.org
Saving lives, changing minds.
Report by:
Nisar Majid
Food Security Specialist
Independent Consultant
www.ifrc.org
Saving lives, changing minds.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society’s work is guided by
Strategy 2020 which puts forward three strategic aims:
1. Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disaster and crises.
2. Enable healthy and safe living.
3. Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace.
© International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva, 2011.
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International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Project report Early Warning – Delayed Response? Lessons from IFRC Horn of Africa Appeals 2008–2010
Contents
Foreword 5
Introduction 7
Key findings 7
Early warning … delayed response 7
Well organised at point of distribution 8
Capacity and institutional learning 8
Coordination confusion 8
What does the RCRC stand for and do? 9
Strategic clarity 9
Responding to needs and relevance to branch 9
Innovation 10
Emerging issues and recommendations 11
Overarching recommendation 11
The role of food aid (or timeliness and scale)? 11
Recommendation 1 11
Large-scale v small-scale appeals? 12
Recommendation 2 12
Vision, Strategy and Organisational Change 12
Recommendation 3 13
Structural issues 13
Recommendation 4 13
Background to the region 14
Conditions in 2008 15
Analysis of appeals 16
Summary of Intervention 16
Analysis of Appeal 16
Summary of Intervention 17
Analysis of the Assessment and the Appeal 18
Coordination 19
Ethiopia Red Cross 19
The Moyale Intervention 20
Summary of Seed Distribution 21
Analysis of Intervention 21
Summary of Intervention (East Hararghe) 22
Analysis of Appeal 23
Annex 1 List of interviewees 25
Foreword
Between 2008 and 2010, the IFRC launched four international appeals
to respond to drought and food insecurity in the Horn of Africa. The
results were decidedly mixed. In some cases, Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies did manage to use these Appeals to good effect,
and relevant and sustainable support was the result. In other cases, the
relief support was slow to mobilise, and was delivered too late to be of
relevant assistance. For the most part the Appeals themselves failed
to generate significant donor support, and the largest of the Appeals
was only 9% funded.
Some of the challenges highlighted in this review are commonly attrib-

uted to donor fatigue in the Horn of Africa and the inherent logistical
challenges of managing relief operations in the region. While acknowl-
edging these issues are pertinent, this report attempts to dig deeper in
identifying the causes of success and failure in the IFRC response in the
Horn of Africa, and to draw out lessons from the analysis, reasoning
and decisions that motivate the IFRC to launch Appeals in the region.
The lessons are important because we will be faced with these same
challenges again. The first lesson, which is by no means new but under-
lies the consequent recommendations, is that droughts are natural and
recurring in the Horn of Africa, and therefore sudden, large scale relief
operations are often less relevant than addressing the long term chal-
lenge of supporting communities to become more resilient to the cycles
of drought. The challenge for Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
is therefore to focus on the capacity building of Branches and com-
munities in risk reduction relative to drought. Secondly, the review
acknowledges the advances that the wider humanitarian sector (and
some National Societies) have made in the use of early warning sys-
tems and analysing food security trends. The humanitarian response in
the region has become more sophisticated, and so must the Red Cross/
Red Crescent Societies, if their interventions are to remain relevant.
Which leads to a third lesson, that protecting livelihoods should be a
core principle of responding to drought, and food aid is often not the
best option to achieve that end. Therefore more attention needs to
be given to innovating with cash responses, protecting livestock and
addressing health as well as food security threats. A final challenge
that remains prominent for all humanitarian actors operating in the
Horn of Africa is to advocate for increased investment in community
resilience work, even when the rainfall is good, as this can provide
opportunities to engage in long term solutions.
5
Chapter number Foreword
The process of the review itself is worth noting. Although conducted

and written by an independent consultant, the review was motivated
and supported by a consortium of implementing and donor Red Cross
and Red Crescent National Societies, who met regularly during the
review and helped guide its progress. Collectively, we are committed
to taking its lessons into our responses in the future.
Alexander Matheou
Regional Representative for East Africa
6
1
Introduction
This report is based on a review of four international Appeals of the

IFRC in the Horn of Africa, from 2008 to 2010.1 The review took a food
security lens to broadly assess the whole ‘Appeal’ process, from assess-
ment and analysis, project/programme design, resource mobilisation,
coordination, implementation and impact. Over fifty interviews were
conducted with RCRC staff, in Geneva, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia,
as well as by telephone. Branches and beneficiary communities were
also visited in Kenya and Ethiopia.
The scope of this review is broad given the number of issues, actors,
institutional layers and different contexts within the Movement (dif-
ferent branches, NS’s, PNS’s, IFRC and ICRC). As such, and in order to
maximise the potential readership and impact of the report it has been
kept short and with the purpose of attempting to bring out emerging
issues of relevance to the wider Movement. It is structured into 4 sections:
Key Findings; Emerging Issues and Recommendations; Background to
the Region; Analysis of Appeals.
Key findings
Early warning … delayed response
In spite of good early warning signals at the Branch level, the RCRC
emergency responses to periods of community stress are typically
delayed, taking many months (4-6 or more) from first signals, assess-
ments, to the actual response. These delays are not all particular to
the RCRC (many are systemic, reflecting the humanitarian system in
general and the nature of slow onset crises)2. However, this may mean
that the crisis itself has passed by the time of the response or, if the
crisis has not passed an opportunity to intervene much earlier has
been missed. The reasons for these delays vary but include:
1 These were the Ethiopia International Appeal May 2008; the Horn of Africa Appeal December
2008; the Kenya Drought Appeal September 2009; the Ethiopia International Appeal February
2010.
2 For an interesting analysis of these systemic problems as applicable to the region, see HPG
Briefing Note, May 2006, ‘Saving lives through livelihoods: critical gaps in the response to the
drought in the Greater Horn of Africa’ at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.
pdf;
7
1 Introduction
nn Limited food security analytical capacity to anticipate the scale,

severity and seasonality of a crisis
nn Limited contingency funds and institutional options for quick

responses
nn A reliance on slow/delayed assessment and appeal processes (either

internal or external to the Movement)
nn An over-reliance on food aid as the major response
nn Inappropriate administrative procedures
Well organised at point of distribution

At the point of distribution, emergency relief (and recovery) activities
are generally effective, well organised and well implemented and usu-
ally appreciated by communities on the ground. The Movement’s role
at the point of distribution is however subject to the influence of other
actors, e.g. Government or WFP or local community dynamics, which
can be either positive or negative, depending on the local context, and
indicate some limits of NS influence at the local level.
Capacity and institutional learning

Ambitions and motivations of NS’s and the IFRC at the senior manage-
ment levels to scaling up or ‘doing more, doing better, reaching further’,
while laudable, are not fully matched with the required institutional
capacity or the availability of resources to the RCRC in the region. In
this respect a culture of institutional learning, decentralised decision-
making and investment in staff quality and staff retention are impor-
tant organisational issues but are problematic within many parts of
the RCRC. The consultant was hugely impressed by the commitment,
quality and desire to do more at the branch level and recognises the
huge and under-utilised potential that exists there. The consultant
also notes a tremendous interest and desire from the majority of staff
interviewed to discuss and debate technical and organisational issues.
Coordination confusion
The period under review was associated with IFRC restructuring and its
new vision (the 2020 strategy), the development of an unusual regional
Appeal and the creation of an office for the coordination of the Horn of
Africa operation, in Addis Ababa. Time and other pressures to pursue
this vision led to a lack of consultation and buy-in within the move-
ment that ultimately led to considerable tension and confusion within
the IFRC, and in terms of its relations with NS’s and PNS’s. This was
widely commented upon and is detrimental to the IFRC’s potential
role. While it is recognised that this period of restructuring is largely
over and coordination and relations are already much improved, there
remain concerns over the appropriate technical, logistical, coordination
8
and donor relations capacity at the regional level (i.e. Nairobi), and in
support of the Ethiopia Red Cross.
What does the RCRC stand for and do?

There is a lack of clarity within the Movement at all levels about the
distinctive identity and role of the RCRC. These include:
nn Its ‘emergency’ and/or ‘development’ role
nn Its understanding of and commitment to food security; how the

RCRC movement balances smaller-scale, ongoing work in areas such
as Disaster Risk Reduction with capacity and opportunities associ-
ated with larger-scale responses
nn What its niche and community-based position means in practice?

Tensions between the attractions of external funding and internal
priorities
nn In a highly complex region such as the Horn of Africa where there is

a considerable blurring of ‘chronic’ and ‘acute’ issues, where crises
are permanent and hunger is seasonal, and where PNS’s and NS’s are
implementing relief and development programmes, this confusion is
problematic and can serve to undermine a clear strategic direction
Examples of good practice

While the review necessarily adopts a critical lens there are several
examples of good practice to draw upon from throughout the region.
Strategic clarity
At the strategic level the Somalia Red Crescent (SRCS) and the Tigray
branch of the Ethiopia Red Cross (ERCS) stand out as having clear
strategic approaches, recognising their own capacity limitations and
concentrating on building their own capacity. This kind of direction
obliges PNS’s and IFRC support NS or Branch approaches and priorities.
Interestingly, neither used food aid as part of their strategies within
the review period.
Responding to needs and relevance to

branch
The Wolaita, Ethiopia emergency relief and recovery intervention of
2008, provided food and water interventions in a critical and excep-
tional emergency situation, as well as crucial sweet potato and haricot
bean seeds to promote recovery and a successful animal re-stock-
ing programme. The branch has capitalised on this intervention to
hugely increase its visibility, credibility and membership as a result.
9
1 Introduction
Coordination between the ERCS, Austrian and Finnish PNS’s and the
IFRC was relatively good.
Innovation
The Kenya Red Cross (KRCS) was innovative in identifying the potential
of El Nino rain predictions to implement a timely and highly effective
seed distribution in Ukambani areas that were severely affected by a
drought. It is also currently using predictions of poor La Nina rains to
survey borehole capacity in advance of a possible drought.
The KRCS and the ICRC have developed a strategic partnership based
around ICRC’s tracking system (identifying different interventions for
different phases in the crisis cycle). The IFRC in Nairobi is also piloting
disaster preparedness activities with Kenya Red Cross with the sup-
port of ECHO. These initiatives are part of the KRCS’s evolution from
its strong capacity in logistics and emergency relief towards a more
diversified institutional capacity.
The Djibouti Red Crescent implemented a food-for-work programme

in peri-urban areas in partnership with WFP and with funds from the
HoA Appeal. An innovative recovery programme based on cash loans
was developed between the Djibouti Red Crescent and the British Red
Cross, in coordination with the IFRC, and was based on a significant
investment in relationship building.
10
Emerging issues and recommendations
2
Overarching recommendation
The RCRC (NS’s, PNS’s and IFRC) in the Horn of Africa should focus
its activities around a Community Risk Management Approach based
on integrating its technical support areas. This should be done while
strengthening long-term relationships between the various parts of
the movement and prioritising branch development where possible.
The role of food aid (or timeliness and scale)?1

While food aid remains an important option, where availability is lim-
ited and in times of extreme food insecurity, unless it can be delivered
in a timely and short duration fashion, there are also considerable
risks identified in its use. It is part of the political and institutional
context in the region and is subject to corruption and manipulation.
It is a bulky and expensive commodity to source and distribute, which
can contribute to significant delays in its distribution and therefore
in its impact. There is considerable existing capacity – alternative to
the RCRC – within the region to deliver emergency food relief, with
organisations who have stronger internal systems and who are better
known to external donors. It is often difficult for communities on the
ground, as well as agencies, to distinguish the purpose of food aid
between addressing acute and chronic malnutrition.
Recommendation 1
The RCRC in the region should develop regional and country specific
guidance on food security policy and practice (including food aid).
This guidance should link to RCRC global food security thinking in
Geneva.2 Guidance could include discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of food aid, criteria for choosing appropriate responses,
piloting of other options (e.g. cash), integration with other sectors e.g.
nutrition, water and health.
1 See Kenyan Sunday Standard, 3rd October 2010, and KRCS’s Press Release in Response, 4th
October, 2010, for an example of the complications of food aid. This review takes no position
on this particular issue but merely highlights it as an example of the sensitivities and risks
of being involved in food aid in the region.
2 A global food security strategy document is being prepared.
11
2 Emerging issues and recommendations
Large-scale v small-scale appeals?

The large-scale appeals in the region have not been well funded and
significant funding has in the end come from regional or country spe-
cific donors outside of the Appeal process i.e. ECHO. Reasons include:
nn Poor timing of Appeals
nn Competition for limited resources
nn Lack of prior consultation with PNS’s and external donors
nn Differing perceptions of the capacity of NS’s; long periods between

assessments and appeals; the appropriateness of the Appeal docu-
ment to capture short, medium and long-term issues
nn Over-ambitious targets; a lack of evidence (documentation) of the

experiences and impact of RCRC interventions
nn A perception that such appeals have been driven from the top
nn Loss of Movement identity and local relevance as local assessments

are scaled up to more generic national appeals
As a result of this experience as well as the nature of the ‘chronic

crisis’ in the Horn and the current global financial situation, it would
seem safe to assume that such large-scale appeals are not going to be
effective for the foreseeable future. However, there is an opportunity
to develop better packaged appeals (that may be scaled up over time)
which demonstrate a better, locally informed understanding of the
problem, that challenge assumptions and inertia around emergency
responses in the HoA and are better related to branch level strategic
development. This would appear to fit very well with current donor
interest in community-based approaches to Disaster Management and
Disaster Risk Reduction.
Recommendation 2
Develop and expand upon smaller-scale community based approaches
to Disaster Management and Disaster Risk Reduction that exist in the
region and document experience.
Vision, Strategy and Organisational Change

There is a very obvious demand for debate and discussion within the
Movement about the principles and practicalities of RCRC strategy and
direction, as applicable to the Horn of Africa. This applies at all levels,
from Branch to senior management levels within NS’s, as well as within
PNS’s, the IFRC and ICRC. Many organisations within the Horn of Africa
have gone through processes of internal change in order to adapt to
the complex and fluid ‘relief to development … and back’ context.
12
Recommendation 3
The IFRC in the region should develop a discussion document and
training/awareness raising materials to bring out policy and program-
matic issues around operating within the chronic and acute context
in the Horn of Africa for the RCRC. Concepts and linkages between
nutrition, food security, livelihoods, health and sanitation, as well as
between relief and development could be brought out. Exploring a stra-
tegic partnership with ICRC in the region and the Kenya Red Cross may
accelerate this process.
Structural issues
The ending of the newly created HoA operational coordination office
and the arrival of new staff in the regional office signal the start of the
new structures in the region and new relationships that are forming.
There is a clear demand for a strong coordination and technical sup-
port role for the IFRC office in the region. Nairobi is a key hub for both
the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions, in terms of logistical,
technical, coordination and resource mobilisation issues.
Ethiopia is not directly served by the Nairobi regional office yet it is

a huge and hugely diverse country with deep poverty and recurring
emergencies. Food security related issues are complex and are a fun-
damental component of understanding Ethiopia and its policy and
programmatic environment.3 Ongoing technical support based on long-
term relationship building is an important component of supporting
the Ethiopia Red Cross.
Recommendation 4
The RCRC in the region should assess these capacity requirements and
coordination mechanisms, including allocating adequate support to
the Ethiopia Red Cross.
3 See Haan, Majid and Darcy, 2006, for an analysis of Ethiopian food security and livelihood
complexity and implications for assessments and food aid interventions, at http://www.odi.
org.uk/resources/download/602.pdf;
13
3
Background to the region
The Horn of Africa provides an extremely complex developmental

and humanitarian context with which to engage. Political structures
in the region range enormously from stateless Somalia to the highly
centralised Ethiopian state. Political volatility is high and conflict is
recurrent. In terms of livelihoods and food security conditions, the
variability of local conditions is also enormous. There are hundreds of
different livelihood groups each with different combinations of crops,
livestock, market opportunities, social systems, access to markets,
coping strategies, and so on.1 Extremely high levels of poverty and
vulnerability to natural and man-made shocks are evident. Seasonal
hunger and seasonal stress occur to varying extents virtually every
year and many or most large-scale crises have a slow-onset character.
As a result of this extremely volatile and complex environment there

have been large investments in early warning and food security infor-
mation systems across the region. The FSNAU2 of Somalia, the ARLMP3
of Kenya and the LIU4 of Ethiopia are examples of cutting edge informa-
tion systems. These exist partly to manage the misinformation and
politics around emergency related figures in the region as well as to
help prioritise scarce resources.5 There have also been innovative pro-
grammes and projects from the large-scale food and cash Productive
Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia to emergency cash interventions to
pastoralists in southern Somalia. Underlying these investments is a
recognition that crises are recurrent, and emergency (acute) and devel-
opmental (chronic) conditions are often blurred and inter-changeable.
Most major donors and agencies have invested in significant regional
technical and managerial capacity, in Nairobi, in order to monitor and
respond to these conditions, absorb best practice and maintain insti-
tutional memory.
The RCRC is one of hundreds of agencies in the region responding to

both disasters and development needs. It has a relatively low profile and
is not known for generating and documenting best practice in a region
1 See livelihood baselines and outputs of the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit of
Somalia, the Livelihoods Integration Unit in Ethiopia and FEWSNET Regional and Country
offices for examples; http://www.dppc.gov.et/Livelihoods/Livelihoods_Integration_Unit.htm;
http://www.fsnau.org/products/baseline-reports; http://www.fsnau.org/; http://www.fews.
net/Pages/livelihoods.aspx?loc=6&l=en;
2 Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
3 Arid lands Resource Management Project
4 Livelihoods Integration Unit
5 See Haan, Majid and Darcy 2006 again.
14
that produces much institutional learning. The ICRC is the exception

to this general position of the movement in the region.
Conditions in 2008
2008 onwards arguably provided a more complex environment than
usual with a combination of internal and external factors from inter-
national food and fuel price rises (2007-2008; stabilising by mid to late
2008), soon followed by the global financial crisis (September 2008
onwards); post-election violence in Kenya (December 2007); election
preparations in Ethiopia (May 2010) and severe conflict and displace-
ment around Mogadishu, Somalia (2007 onwards). Disruptions to mar-
kets and trade were high in general though there were very different
factors in different parts of the region.6 Food aid pipeline problems
were also occurring in 2008 and 2009 due to production shortfalls in
key areas e.g. Rift Valley in Kenya. This was compounded by poor rains
and disease outbreaks in many areas. These conditions had followed
a severe and widespread regional drought in 2006.7
The four Appeals analysed for the review covered the period 2008-
2010. The Ethiopia Food Insecurity Appeal (Wolaita) of May 2008 was
generated by the Ethiopia Red Cross and the IFRC in Nairobi. It was
a modest response to a clear crisis. The Horn of Africa Appeal was
particularly unusual for the region in terms of its scale and the resul-
tant processes and structures that were mobilised (i.e. the FACT team
and the HoA8 operational coordination office in Addis Ababa). It was
very poorly funded. The HoA Appeal was also significant for affect-
ing country specific resource mobilisation processes. For example, the
Kenya Red Cross was initially part of the HoA Appeal, then had a large
and poorly funded National Appeal in early 2009, followed by a more
modest International Drought Appeal in September 2009. Finally, there
was an Ethiopia specific Severe Food Shortage International Appeal in
February 2010, which was again significant in scale and poorly funded.
The purpose of the review was therefore to try and learn lessons from
this set of unusual internal and external factors within the region.
6 See Food Security & Complex Livelihoods in the Horn, East and Central Africa, June 2008, at
www.ebpdn.org/download/download.php?table=resources&id=2118;
7 See HPG Briefing Note, May 2006, ‘Saving lives through livelihoods: critical gaps in the
response to the drought in the Greater Horn of Africa’ at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/
download/1381.pdf;
8 Horn of Africa
15
4
Analysis of appeals
Ethiopia Appeal
(May 2008; Euros 1.2m; 35% funded through Appeal, 65% funded
through ECHO in-country; increased to Euro 5m, 81% funded, 75,000
beneficiaries).
Summary of Intervention
An international appeal was launched in May 2008 for the Ethiopia
Red Cross to support 40,000 beneficiaries for four months in Wolaita
zone, Ethiopia. This following an assessment by the ERCS and the IFRC
zonal office in Nairobi. Funds were raised primarily by the Finnish
and Austrian PNS’s, as well as from ECHO in-country and through the
IFRC. Food relief distributions began in late June. Water rehabilitation
and seed distributions were also carried out as well as targeted animal
re-stocking in 2009.
Analysis of Appeal
First signals of problems in Wolaita occurred in December 2007 – the
branch sent pictures of malnourished children and a letter to the ERCS
head office in Addis Ababa. Internal ERCS assessments were mobilised
and the zone DM office was called upon and arrived in April 2008. The
food security and nutrition conditions were clearly extremely serious
with a nutrition survey by GOAL confirming this.1 FEWSNET confirmed
the exceptional situation. The Appeal document itself provided detailed
local specific explanations of the nature of the problem and justifica-
tions for a range of responses. The time between the April assessment,
the May Appeal and the late June response was good in comparison
to other examples seen (2-3 months; although this was 6 months after
the branch first reported the situation). The initial response to the
Appeal was limited and the Finnish and Austrian PNS’s found addi-
tional resources through ECHO funds in addition to their own. There
was concern within some ECHO quarters of different PNS’s requesting
resources for the same problem. Coordination through the IFRC was
considered relatively good.
1 12.1% GAM, 2.1% SAM, under-5 mortality of 2.24%, in March/April 2008, in Damot Gale
woreda.
16
The interventions themselves were all appropriate and effectively car-

ried out. All interviewees (community beneficiaries and woreda offi-
cials) had extremely positive feedback. People had clearly been deplet-
ing their assets and reducing their consumption for some time. Water
was also a major problem that was addressed through rehabilitation
of water points. Full rations were received with no specific targeting
criteria (reflecting the widespread nature of the crisis). Water points
were still functioning at the time of the visit. The woreda officials com-
mented that they now ‘knew’ the Red Cross and that they had learned
from the organisation about good distributions.
It is interesting to note that the two woredas targeted are not emer-
gency prone areas and do not usually receive either emergency or
safety net support, therefore food aid has not become ‘institution-
alised’ in these areas. They are woredas of high population density,
with likely chronic food insecurity problems but are not drought prone
(recurrent emergency prone areas are in the lowlands within the zone2).
Supporting this hypothesis is the fact that recovery has been good,
with good rains since then and, for example, all beneficiaries that
had received sheep still had them and were looking to convert them
to milking cows3. The crucial failure of the sweet potato crop was
addressed through distribution of cuttings and haricot beans were also
distributed. They appear to have been highly appropriate and valued.
The branch has significantly increased its membership and profile as a
result, now counting approximately 50% of the population of the zone
as members. This proportion is much higher in the districts where this
intervention has taken place.
Discussions at the branch level suggested that if funds i.e. contingency

funds, were available, they would have been able to respond many
months earlier and would not have had to wait for the government’s
national Appeal, suggesting that early, local level responses can take
place outside of the national level government appeal process.
Horn of Africa Appeal

(December 2008; Euro 72.8m; DREF of Euro 86,000; Exceptional advance
of Euro 6.6m from the Federation; 12% funded)45
Summary of Intervention
The large scale of the Appeal was targeted at supporting 2.2m ben-
eficiaries over 5 years. It signified the activation of the 2020 strategy
of senior management in Geneva and their interest to scale up and
reach out to more beneficiaries. The Appeal was preceded by a large,
multi-disciplinary FACT team which was in the region from October
2 A ‘zone’ in Ethiopia is an administrative area that comprises of several woredas or districts.

3 In the author’s experience, animals provided in re-stocking projects may often be sold again
to generate income.
4 Figure from Operations Update, 19/05/2009.
5 A revised and updated appeal was published in June 2009, with an appeal figure of Euros
50m.
17
4 Analysis of appeals
to December 2008.6 A special HoA operational structure was created to

support a potentially large-scale response. DREF funds and an excep-
tional advance were released - the majority of which was allocated
to food aid. Funding for the HoA Appeal was limited and priority was
ultimately given to Ethiopia. The Moyale emergency relief intervention
was one of the priorities within Ethiopia and interviews were con-
ducted in Addis Ababa and Harar to develop this case study.7 140,000
people, primarily pastoralists received emergency relief, interventions
to control Acute Water Diarrhroea (AWD)8 and water interventions from
April to July 2009.
The Kenya Red Cross and Somali Red Crescent received little money
through the appeal. The KRCS had already prepared an appeal prior
to the Horn of Africa appeal, which was then subsumed within that
Appeal. Djibouti received some funds through the Appeal for a food-
for-work programme with WFP. The HoA assessment and appeal also
catalysed a bilateral initiative from the British Red Cross, to support a
cash-loan recovery programme.
Analysis of the Assessment and the Appeal

The timing of the assessment and the appeal was considered anything
from 6 months to 1 year late in terms of the peak of the problem and
the availability of funds.9 From the middle to the end of 2008, inter-
national and regional food prices were stabilising or coming down,
particularly as much of the regional harvest was coming in to markets,
although prices were still significantly higher than long-term averages.
The assessment and appeal was therefore out of synch with the global
and regional early warning and resource mobilisation processes that
had already taken place. For example, WFP had launched its appeal for
funds to cover global food price rises in March 2008 and had obtained
its target of $755m two months later.10 The process associated with the
HoA Appeal was considered rushed which did not allow crucial time
to generate buy-in within the wider movement. The FACT team itself
did not comprise of many experts with up-to-date knowledge of the
region. The Appeal document drew largely on existing reports reflect-
ing known areas of concern but without adding any level of critical
6 Team composition changed during this time, with many members not continuing for the full
period.
7 In order to cover as many sites as possible within the timeframe, the consultant and ERC
staff agreed to interview staff in Addis Ababa and Harar that had been involved in the
intervention. The long distance (time factor), Ramadan period and uncertainty of finding
beneficiaries contributed to this decision.
8 AWD is used instead of cholera in Ethiopia.
9 For example, in mid-2007, FEWSNET was both reporting on the impact of drought, floods,
Rift Valley Fever (RVF) and conflict (in Somalia) in 2005 and 2006, where 10m people were
reported to have been affected, and at the same time was already predicting worsening
humanitarian conditions in late 2007/early 2008, as a result of a combination of factors,
including rising prices, drought, conflict and disease.
10 US$500m of this came from the Saudi government.
18
analysis.11 Donors in the region are wary of emergency figures and

potentially exaggerated claims for assistance, including those from
the United Nations.12 The majority of DREF/Exceptional funds were
used for the purposes of food aid. In retrospect this was problematic
as it did not signify a commitment to implementing different types
of interventions for some PNS’s and also meant that there was an
ongoing pressure to obtain funding (for food aid) to repay this loan.
Interestingly, the largest contribution to the appeal came through the
Swedish Red Cross and was the result of an end of year under-spend,
available at short notice, from SIDA.
The assessment and appeal document is generally acknowledged for

its attempt to combine short-term, medium term and long-term issues,
however it was neither able to do this persuasively nor was the Appeal
document considered the appropriate place for it. For many donors
the Appeal document is there to raise emergency funds as quickly
as possible. The British Red Cross for example, conducted a second
assessment, mobilising several experts, in order to develop a recovery
proposal.
Coordination
Creating a new operational structure in Addis Ababa was viewed prob-
lematically by virtually all interviewees. While such a structure may
have been considered necessary to support a very large-scale interven-
tion, lines of communication between Geneva, Addis Ababa, Nairobi
and later Johannesburg were unclear, contributing to less than con-
structive relations within the IFRC and poor perceptions by the NS’s
and PNS’s. The Horn of Africa office was left in a very difficult posi-
tion, trying to reclaim advanced funds as well as credibility, following
the rushed start through the initial FACT team and the poor resource
mobilisation that resulted.
Ethiopia Red Cross

The ERCS was the largest beneficiary of funds through the HoA Appeal.
Senior management, the board of the ERCS were apparently interested
to build up capacity to cover up to 10% of emergency needs in-country.
In addition, pipeline concerns at the time were affecting WFP (and
therefore the GoE, its main partner). There was a likely interest by
the GoE in looking for alternative sources of food aid to meet needs
in a pre-election year. Covering up to 10% of the emergency case-load
equated to over 600,000 beneficiaries. It appears therefore that there
11 The author of this report was brought in to the region by a major British NGO in June 2008
in order to conduct an analysis of the situation at the time. The problem was identified as a
complex livelihood crisis with many contributory factors and areas of uncertainty, including
domestic drivers of price inflation, regional trade disruptions, food aid supply problems,
unreliable figures, unclear timing of acute crisis.
12 See Haan, Majid and Darcy, 2006, for an analysis of Ethiopian food security and livelihood
complexity and implications for assessments and food aid interventions,at http://www.odi.
org.uk/resources/download/602.pdf;
19
was an overlapping interest between the IFRC (Geneva), the ERCS and
the GoE that all contributed towards an interest in scaling up.
The Moyale Intervention

Moyale is a politically complicated area of intervention as it sits on the
border of two ethnic groups, the Somali and the Oromiya. It is a drought
prone area, the scene of recurrent emergencies and lies close to the
border of Kenya and Somalia. The ERC had operated there during the
severe regional drought of 2006. The Kenya Red Cross operates on the
Kenyan side of the border. There is no Moyale branch of the ERC and
the nearest branch is in Negelle, several hours drive away. Moyale was
identified as a priority area for intervention by the GoE and the FACT
team was keen to intervene in lowland areas due to concerns about
functioning market mechanisms and food supply. The ERCS generally
follows the GoE’s national system for identifying food insecure areas
which is generally good although ultimately identifies relative needs
and does not distinguish easily between chronic and acute needs. The
IFRC and ERCS were directed to the Somali side of the border by the
GoE, in spite of a reluctance on their side. In terms of the needs at the
time, officials reported that while the situation was difficult it was not
as severe as in 2006. In addition, one of the major issues in the area
is a chronic water problem with a shallow aquifer becoming easily
contaminated, particularly in times of water shortage. At the time of
the interventions most families had moved to the Kenyan side of the
border, coming back when they heard about the relief distributions. A
subsequent assessment resulted in part of the relief being directed to
the Oromia side as well.
The actual distributions took place during the rainy season. The time
of greatest hardship for pastoralists is usually the end of the dry sea-
son and beginning of the wet season. Some trucks were reported to
have become stuck due to muddy roads. These difficulties were recog-
nised by the community who was reported to have asked ERCS staff
why cash was not brought in as it is easier to transport. Distributions
themselves were well organised although ERCS staff generally point out
that targeting and distributing is more difficult in pastoral areas than
agricultural areas due to the strength and salience of the clan system
for managing resource distributions. PHAST and AWD interventions
took place in Moyale urban areas (KRCS frequently requests support
of ERCS in terms of coordination in Moyale, as the town is divided
between Kenya and Ethiopia).
The ERCS had to manage very tense and difficult relations with the
Oromiya side (particularly the woreda administration) as they were
perceived to be biased towards Somalis. Following the relief distribu-
tions, water rehabilitation was planned for both communities. In the
end this was abandoned as the Somali officials claimed that all of the
resources were for their area. Communities in both areas were sup-
20
Box 1. PNS’s - Who funds who, what and why?

PNS’s have different policies and priorities of their own and as a result of their back
donors, which create a confusing resource mobilisation environment. For example,
the German Red Cross has a policy of co-ordinated bilateralism, obtaining funds
from the German Government and the EU and rarely contributes to International
appeals. The Spanish Red Cross are predominantly bilateral and do not have Africa
as a priority area, obtaining funding for the region through some of their own city
municipalities. The Japanese Red Cross only use their own internal funds and have
a policy to support all international appeals based on fixed criteria. The Swedish Red
Cross do prioritise Africa and work multilaterally and were able to mobilise funding
opportunistically due to end of year funds available by SIDA at virtually a day’s
notice. Some PNS’s have formed informal groups to share information with regard
to funding decisions. Some PNS’s acknowledge these different factors and suggest
that there should be more transparency and co-ordination around fund-raising
issues within the movement to transform a fragmented competitive environment
into a mutually supportive one.
portive of the interventions. There was no opportunity to build on the

intervention due to the lack of permanent presence in the area.
Kenya International Appeal

(September 2009; Euros 5.7m; 25 % funded13)
The Kenya International Appeal followed a preliminary National

Appeal of CHF 28m in January 2009. This was not well funded. Funding
received through the HoA Appeal for Kenya was also very limited. The
September International Appeal aimed to cover 1.7m beneficiaries for
6 months, through school feeding, community health care services
and seed distributions.
Summary of Seed Distribution

The consultant visited the Machakos Branch that supported a seed
distribution in Yatta and other districts. The branch carries out a range
of activities and had been involved in local fundraising in response to
the emergency conditions prior to the seed distribution.
Analysis of Intervention
Drought conditions in the Ukambani areas were very severe in 2008
and 2009. Cattle losses were high and a WFP EMOP had started in June
2009, following early interventions supported by the British Red Cross.
Incomes had been stretched and the seed intervention was developed
due to the expected good El Nino rains. The seed intervention was
a highly effective, pro-active, response to aid recovery in light of an
13 The initial appeal was 6% funded within 2 months. The amount sought appears to have been
revised downwards with CHF 2,047,020 received by August 2010 and 100% coverage reported
– this figure is used to provide the 25% estimated coverage.
21
Box 2. The Kenya Red Cross and collaboration

with ICRC
The KRCS has built its reputation around a formidable logistics capacity, to
respond to emergencies, and advocacy around emergencies. It has been, until
recently, responsible for 13 districts that WFP covers (recently reduced to 5). These
attributes while important are different from those required to build de-centralised,
institutional capacity to manage more complex projects. Interestingly, the KRCS and
ICRC have recently developed a close relationship involving considerable capacity
building elements. This includes using the ICRC’s tracking system for identifying the
types of interventions appropriate to the different phases of a crisis. The IFRC office
has also rebuilt its relationship with the KRCS following a tense period in 2008 and
2009. It seems there are now major synergies that could be developed between
the KRCS, ICRC and the IFRC, adopting a community-based approach to Disaster
Management and Disaster Risk Reduction.
exceptional rainy season. The hybrid seeds were expensive in the mar-
ket and beyond the means of most farmers. Farmers were appreciative
of the seeds but did plant their own traditional varieties as well as the
hybrids. Yields of farmers varied greatly in the three sites visited from
3 to 10 bags. Lack of draught power meant that land preparation was
compromised which in turn affected productivity. Yields may have
been better in other districts. Overall maize production in the wider
area was exceptional suggesting that the good rains and the wide-
spread seed distributions contributed to good harvests.
However, it is worth recognising that Yatta is a marginal agricultural

area, not best suited to maize, and the Government is correctly trying
to promote drought resistant varieties of crops. This seed intervention
therefore while having an overall positive impact is perhaps best seen
as an opportunistic response to exceptional circumstances.
Ethiopia International Appeal

(February 2010; $28.7m; 16% funded14)
Summary of Intervention (East Hararghe)

The GoE released a Humanitarian Requirements Report in October
2009 several months after its Belg assessment and seven months
before the May 2010 elections. The IFRC regional food security advi-
sor was requested by the ERC to support an appeal and arrived in
November 2009. A FACT team was mobilised in December 2009 and
the International Appeal was released in February 2010. East Hararghe
was the priority area identified and interventions (food relief and seeds)
were planned to begin in March 2010 arrived in East Hararghe in August
2010.
14 Approximately 50% of funding was obtained from ECHO within the region, therefore not
directly through the Appeal process.
22
Analysis of Appeal
The visit of the regional food security advisor followed GoE/ERC target-
ing procedures to identify Shashamene and Seraro as the priority areas.
The ERC branch in Shashemane was keen to know why malnutrition
was appearing when it had not been seen there before. Discussions
with government staff identified that water was the most important
issue and was a chronic problem. People normally have to buy water
which accounts for 70% of expenditure. When pushed to discuss the
cost-benefit of using funds for water or food, government staff quickly
realised that the greater value was in water interventions. However,
the position of food aid in Ethiopia means that it was agreed that 30%
of a potential budget should go towards food aid. Water interventions
discussed included subsidising water trucking and using food to free up
income for water. Food relief would have been short-term (2-3 months).
Recovery interventions could include water infrastructure expansion.
Soft pledges of approximately $3m were already available according
to the regional food security advisor who felt confident that up to $5m
could be obtained.
Senior management decisions taken in Addis Ababa and Geneva deter-

mined that such an appeal was too small. A target of up to 10% of
national ‘needs’ was again identified equating to approximately 300,000
people. In order to generate a bigger appeal a FACT team was necessary.
In light of the experience of the HoA Appeal, there was an understand-
able reluctance in Addis Ababa to mobilise another large, expensive
FACT team and a more specific skill set was identified including a
nutritionist, and experts in food security, early recover and resource
mobilisation.
However, gathering the right combination of people at the right time

proved difficult and a food security expert was not identified. Finally
four assessment teams were mobilised to Awassa, N Wollo, Tigray and
East Hararghe. Interviewees who were on the FACT assessments raised
concerns about the appropriate expertise on the team, especially in the
area of food security. They also noted that it was very difficult to turn
four different local assessments, with different technical expertise and
with very different local issues into a consolidated Appeal. There was
also a perception that the Appeal would be poorly funded based on the
HoA Appeal experience. In spite of the varied expertise and inputs food
aid was prioritised. The timing of the Appeal was complicated by the
approaching Christmas and New Year holiday period. The launch of the
Appeal in February was preceded by the Haiti earthquake in January.
Distributions have been delayed due to complications around procure-

ment. At the time of the visit 200MT (5 trucks) of food relief were stuck
on muddy roads. Food was being distributed long after a very good
rain season had begun and early harvests were already available. Food
distributions themselves were well organised (logistics team there at
the time confirmed this). People appreciated the food as a free resource
distributed during Ramadan but there was little apparent need or
23
Box 3. ECHO food distributions – North Shoa

(2009/2010)
ECHO funding for food aid obtained in-country accounts for over 50% of the
February 2010 Ethiopia Appeal. ECHO is motivated by its interest in finding
alternative outlets for food aid that are otherwise dominated by WFP and the GoE.
The consultant visited Ankober woreda in N Shoa zone, the site of these food
distributions. Approximately 25,000 people were targeted with full rations. Food
planned for delivery in June and July 2009 became available only in November
2009. Woredas originally planned for distributions were changed due to a changed
situation on the ground by the time food aid was available. Many complaints were
received about the original distribution list drawn up by kebele officials and passed
to the woreda. Follow-ups by the ERCS and the woreda administration before
and after the first distribution addressed some of these complaints. Good storage
facilities were only available in two sites according to woreda officials. These were
in the highland areas some distance away from targeted lowland areas within the
same woreda.
The woreda is a mountainous area and beneficiaries had to walk up and down these
hills for half to one day to reach either of the two sites. Distributions took place over
three days meaning that people had to stay close to the distributions sites, away
from home, for this time. As well as the physical effort involved in this the costs
incurred were estimated to be a minimum of 20Birr/day, for food during the stay.
The consultant was advised that costs in terms of transport and accommodation
would have been subsidised by friends and neighbours in the towns – people would
have ‘begged and borrowed’ for accommodation and for animals to transport their
goods back home. Beneficiaries may have paid for some of this support through
sharing their rations. As well as the physical effort of reaching the distribution site
it is estimated that 10-15% of the value of the ration would have been used to cover
the costs of obtaining it. Distributions themselves were well organised however
there was little relationship to branch strategy or development. This example raises
a number of issues, from delays in the overall process, the dignity of those targeted,
the relative priorities of ECHO, the HoA operational coordination office and the ERCS.
Although not strictly part of the HoA Appeal, all parties agreed at the time of the
review that it would be useful to look at for comparative purposes.
hunger at the time. The Harare office has faced much criticism from
local communities and government officials, none of its own making,
for both failing to deliver on their promises and thereby not allowing
alternatives (e.g. resources, organisations) from being approached at
the time.
From the time of the assessment in late 2009 to the time of actual
distribution was approximately 8 months.
24
Annex 1 List of interviewees
Geneva
Mohamed Omer Head, Disaster Policy and Preparedness Department IFRC

Mukhier
Simon Missiri Head of Resource Mobilisation and Government Relations IFRC
Josse Gillijns Head of Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Department IFRC
Kiflemariam Senior Officer, Food Security IFRC

Amdemariam
Robert Fraser Senior Officer, WATSAN/EH Unit IFRC
Ina Schonberg Senior Officer, Livelihoods, Nutrition & Food Security IFRC
Pierre de Rochefort Senior Officer, Training and Information Management IFRC
Geri Lau Head, OD Department IFRC
Kenya
Juhani Alanko Regional Delegate Finnish Red Cross
Christoph Muller Regional Delegate German Red Cross
Nan Buzard Senior Director, International Response and Programs American Red Cross
Ingrid Kristiansen Regional Programmes Officer Norwegian Red

Cross
Karen Peachey East Africa Representative British Red Cross
Nancy Balfour-Smith Head, Disaster Management, Zonal Office IFRC
Stephen McDowell Food Security Advisor, Zonal Office, IFRC
Brennan Banks Disaster Operations Manager IFRC
Alexander Matheou Head, Regional Office, Nairobi IFRC
Piers Simpkin Regional Livestock Specialist ICRC
Christoph Luedi Head of Nairobi Regional Delegation ICRC
Dr. James Kisia Deputy Secretary General Kenya Red Cross
Abdi Shakur Head Disaster Management Kenya Red Cross
Gerald Bumbe Regional Coordinator, Machakos Kenya Red Cross
John Balu Branch Coordinator, Machakos Kenya Red Cross
Martin Kiilu (Hassler) Volunteer and Relief Coordinator, Machakos Kenya Red Cross
25
Annex 1 List of interviewees
Raquel Fernandez Community Development Delegate in Kenya Spanish Red Cross
Maki Igarashi Health Delegate Japanese Red Cross
Yuji Matsubara Deputy Director, Development Cooperation Division, International Japanese Red Cross
Department, Operations Sector
Gideon Myandiricha Kithueni District Administrator,

Oyagi, Government of Kenya
Beneficiary communities visited in Mamba, Kithueni, Ikombe
Somalia Red Crescent
Dr Ahmed Hassan President Somalia Red

Mohamed Crescent
Ahmed Gizo Somalia Country Representative IFRC
Ethiopia
Fasika Kebede Secretary-General Ethiopia Red Cross
Afework Teshome Head Disaster Management Ethiopia Red Cross
Gedlu Bayene Disaster Response Team Leader Ethiopia Red Cross
Kefay Bey Food Security Officer Ethiopia Red Cross
Sudi Alemu Acting Branch Secretary, Somali Regional Branch (Project Coordinator, Ethiopia Red Cross
Moyale)
Bayu Tadesse Programme Head, Oromiya Regional Office (Field Operation Coordinator, Ethiopia Red Cross
Wolaita)
Beshe Beneburu Branch Secretary, Harar Office, East Hararghe Ethiopia Red Cross
Haile Birhane Relief Coordinator, East Hararghe (Health and Sanitation Officer, Moyale) Ethiopia Red Cross
Seifu Worku Branch Secretary, Soddo Branch, Wolaita Ethiopia Red Cross
Tadess Fekyibellu, Ankober Woreda Administrator, North Shoa Government of

Ethiopia
Niguse Abiye Tefera, Branch Secretary, North Shoa Ethiopia Red Cross
George Gigiberia Ethiopia Country Representation IFRC
Seifu Demeke Dele Project Coordinator Austrian Red Cross
Juergen Herbig Country Delegate German Red Cross
Kai Mikael Kettunen Regional Logistics Delegate, UAE IFRC
Beneficiary communities visited in Damot Pulassa, Damot Gale, Fedis and Mehal Meda.
26
Telephone Interviews
Roger Bracke Regional IFRC

Representative, Indian
Ocean Islands
Gorkhmaz Huseynov Head of Support IFRC

Services, Africa Zone,
Johannesburg, South
Africa
Amin Wais Programme Djibouti Red Crescent

Coordinator
Nina Paulsen Disaster Response Swedish Red Cross

and Preparedness
Staffan Wiking Regional Programme Swedish Red Cross

Coordination (East
Africa)
Johan Kohler Programme Officer, Swedish Red Cross

Swedish Civil
Contingencies
Agency
Mary Atkinson Food Security & British Red Cross

Livelihoods Adviser
Pete Garratt Relief Operations British Red Cross

Manager
Liz Hughes Early Recovery Ex-British Red Cross

Manager
27
The Fundamental Principles of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
Humanity / The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Independence / The Movement is independent. The
Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without dis- National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian
crimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, services of their governments and subject to the laws
in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alle- of their respective countries, must always maintain their
viate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in
is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the hu- accordance with the principles of the Movement.
man being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship,
Voluntary service / It is a voluntary relief movement not
cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.
prompted in any manner by desire for gain.
Impartiality / It makes no discrimination as to nation-
ality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It Unity / There can be only one Red Cross or Red Cres-
endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being cent Society in any one country. It must be open to all.
guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its ter-
most urgent cases of distress. ritory.
Neutrality / In order to enjoy the confidence of all, the Universality / The International Red Cross and Red
Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at Crescent Movement, in which all societies have equal
any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or status and share equal responsibilities and duties in help-
ideological nature. ing each other, is worldwide.
www.ifrc.org Saving lives, changing minds.
FedPub 305800 March 2011 E 0
For Further Information:

Stephen McDowell
Food Security Advisor
E-mail : stephen.mcdowell@ifrc.org
IFRC East Africa Region
BP 41275-00100; Nairobi, Kenya
E-mail: zone.eastafrica@ifrc.org
Web site: www.ifrc.org

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Early Warning –

Cover photo: IFRC.

Some of the challenges highlighted in this review are commonly attrib-

The process of the review itself is worth noting. Although conducted

This report is based on a review of four international Appeals of the

nn Limited food security analytical capacity to anticipate the scale,

nn Limited contingency funds and institutional options for quick

nn A reliance on slow/delayed assessment and appeal processes (either

nn An over-reliance on food aid as the major response

nn Inappropriate administrative procedures

Well organised at point of distribution

Capacity and institutional learning

What does the RCRC stand for and do?

nn Its ‘emergency’ and/or ‘development’ role

nn Its understanding of and commitment to food security; how the

nn What its niche and community-based position means in practice?

nn In a highly complex region such as the Horn of Africa where there is

Examples of good practice

Responding to needs and relevance to

The Djibouti Red Crescent implemented a food-for-work programme

Emerging issues and recommendations

The role of food aid (or timeliness and scale)?1

Large-scale v small-scale appeals?

nn Poor timing of Appeals

nn Competition for limited resources

nn Lack of prior consultation with PNS’s and external donors

nn Differing perceptions of the capacity of NS’s; long periods between

nn Over-ambitious targets; a lack of evidence (documentation) of the

nn Loss of Movement identity and local relevance as local assessments

As a result of this experience as well as the nature of the ‘chronic

Vision, Strategy and Organisational Change

Ethiopia is not directly served by the Nairobi regional office yet it is

The Horn of Africa provides an extremely complex developmental

As a result of this extremely volatile and complex environment there

The RCRC is one of hundreds of agencies in the region responding to

that produces much institutional learning. The ICRC is the exception

The interventions themselves were all appropriate and effectively car-

Discussions at the branch level suggested that if funds i.e. contingency

Horn of Africa Appeal

2 A ‘zone’ in Ethiopia is an administrative area that comprises of several woredas or districts.

to December 2008.6 A special HoA operational structure was created to

Analysis of the Assessment and the Appeal

analysis.11 Donors in the region are wary of emergency figures and

The assessment and appeal document is generally acknowledged for

Ethiopia Red Cross

The Moyale Intervention

Box 1. PNS’s - Who funds who, what and why?

portive of the interventions. There was no opportunity to build on the

Kenya International Appeal

The Kenya International Appeal followed a preliminary National

Summary of Seed Distribution

Box 2. The Kenya Red Cross and collaboration

However, it is worth recognising that Yatta is a marginal agricultural

Ethiopia International Appeal

Summary of Intervention (East Hararghe)

Senior management decisions taken in Addis Ababa and Geneva deter-

However, gathering the right combination of people at the right time

Distributions have been delayed due to complications around procure-

Box 3. ECHO food distributions – North Shoa

Annex 1 List of interviewees

Mohamed Omer Head, Disaster Policy and Preparedness Department IFRC

Simon Missiri Head of Resource Mobilisation and Government Relations IFRC

Kiflemariam Senior Officer, Food Security IFRC

Robert Fraser Senior Officer, WATSAN/EH Unit IFRC