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PERSONALITY FACTOR IS HIGHLY INSTRUCTIVE IN UNDERSTANDING A NATION STATE FOREIGN POLICY. EXAMINE THIS STATEMENT IN LINE WITH YOUR UNDERSTANDNG OF NIGERIA FOREIGN POLICY UNDER UMARU YARADUA

ABSTRACT This study aims to understand the role personality plays in understanding a Nation-State foreign policy; it analyzes the role the personality of Nigerias immediate past president played in determining his foreign policy objectives. There have been discordant tunes about the ability of President Umaru YarAdua with respect to his personality and how he carried out his foreign policy objectives. People referred to the president as slow and incapable of carrying out his functions, this would also be analyzed in this study. There is no gain saying the fact that the personality of a leader in authority plays an important role in his decision making capability. The Nigerian President was seen as passive, in the sense that he did not take active part in the running of the countrys foreign affairs and this had a negative effect in international comity of Nations with regards to Nigeria.

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TABLE OF CONTENT
COVER PAGE.1 ABSTRACT..2 TABLE OF CONTENT...3 CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION......5 1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY.5 1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM....................................................6 1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.6 1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY6 1.5 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS...7 1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.7 1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATION.7 1.8 DEFINITION OF TERMS...8 CHAPTER TWO- LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK 2.1 NIGERIA FOREIGN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW...10 2.2 NIGERIA IN MAY 2007.11 2.3 PRESIDENCY..13

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2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK-PSYCHOLOGY APPROACH.13 CHAPTER THREE 3.1 YARADUA, PERSONALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY....18 3.2 YARADUA AND NIGERIAS FOREIGN POLICY...19 CHAPTER FOURSUMMARY, RECOMMENDATION AND

CONCLUSION 4.1 SUMMARY.27 4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS.28 4.3 CONCLUSION...28 REFERENCES.3 0

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY The Personality of an individual plays an important role in determining a Nation-State Foreign Policy. There is no gain saying the fact if the personality of a Decision-maker is not studied it would be difficult to understand the rationale behind some rules and decisions. Scholars of old and even present scholars have studied the personality of powerful leaders of old in order to understand the reason why some policy were carried out while others were not, leaders of old like Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Mao Tse Tung, Kim Il Sung and a host of others were analysed in order to understand the rationale behind some decisions. Some people fail to realise that laws are not made by the state itself but by certain individuals in positions of authority, for a law or decision that is attributed to a state to be really understood, the people behind such laws should be analysed. The successes or failures of a particular regime in authority are attributed to the type of person in position of authority. For Nigerias foreign policy under the leadership of Umaru Yaradua to be analysed, the personality of the president would be analysed; the president was referred as a too slow to act and incapable of performing the complex function of running the Nigerian state. Nigerias foreign policy statement under the immediate past president of Nigeria would be analysed in order to understand the role the personality of its past president in performing his functions.

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1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The personality of Nigerias immediate past president in the person of Umaru Yaradua played an important role in his foreign policy statement and this had a negative impact in promoting the interest of the Nigerian state in the International scheme of things. Nigeria was referred as a toothless bulldog due to the inability of the Nigerian president in carrying out his functions when it came to foreign relations. 1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY This study seeks to analyse the relationship between the personality of President Umaru YarAdua and his foreign policy statements. It aims to understand if the personality of Nigerias Yaradua had a role to play in his policy statements and objectives. 1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY The level of Nigerias prominence in International Affairs especially in the African continent has dwindled, and this happened during the emergence of Umaru Yaradua as Nigerias president. There is no better time for this research work to be written than this point in time in which the fortunes of the Nigerian state when it comes to International relations is in shambles. This research work is being written in a crucial period of this democratic dispensation, the timing is apt as the present government is determined to tackle the deep rooted problems.

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1.5 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS For the purpose of this research work, relevant research propositions have been outlined to serve as a directional guide and articulation of the research findings or work. However, these propositions focus more on the major problems to be investigated and could possibly lead to other minor research questions in subsequent research works. The following are relevant and essential instructive to this research work:i. Personality factor is not highly instructive in understanding a NationStates foreign policy. ii. Personality factor is highly instructive in understanding a NationStates foreign policy. 1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY This research work would make use of secondary method of data collection. Content analysis would be made use of, especially the Internet. 1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATION This research work would cover areas in which the personality of Nigerias immediate past president has affected the foreign relations capability of the Nigerian state. This research work s subject to some limitations and the major one is being that of time, the time frame of the research work is short; and also the non-availability of materials is also a limiting factor in writing this research work.

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1.8 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS THE STATE States is defined as political units that exercise ultimate internal authority and that recognize no legitimate external authority over them (Anifowoshe, 1999). States are the most recognized and revered of our political organizations. States are also the most powerful of all political actors, whether large or small, rich or poor, populous or scanty, states share all or most characteristics sovereignty, territory, population, international organization and domestic support. FOREIGN POLICY This is a course of action or a set of principles adopted by a nations government to define it relations with other countries or groups of countries (Saleh, 2003). A countrys foreign policy also set forth its positions on a wide range of international issues. Little wonder why Reynolds defines foreign policy as a range of actions taken with reference to external situation and domestic factors.

POLICY Fredrick (1963) defined policy as a proposed course of action of persons, a group, or government within a given environment proving obstacles

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and opportunities which the policy was proposed to utilize and overcome in an effort to reach a goal or realize an objective or a purpose. The two essential features of this definition are course of action and goal or objectives. These are essential elements of every policy. DIPLOMACY Diplomacy had been defined as the management of international relations by negotiations the method by which these relations are adjusted or managed by ambassadors and envoys, the business or act of the diplomat. Implicit in this definition is the fact that the international system is far from being. Perfect and this arises out of the competing demands which nation states make on it.

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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 2.1 NIGERIA FOREIGN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW May 29, 1999 heralded a new era in Nigeria, ending an unbroken stretch of 15 years of authoritarian Military rule. The return to democracy had long been anticipated by both Nigeria and wider International communities for many reasons. Nigerias status in the International world had been darkened with its expulsion from the Commonwealth for years earlier in 1995. The dramatic turn of events was in sharp contrast to the golden era of the Nigerias foreign policies when the country was the toast of Africa and when it also championed the cause of African Liberation. As the continents foremost freedom fighter, she was christened a frontline state, an honor otherwise reserved for southern African countries. During this period if Nigeria had estranged relations, with any country it was the as a result of its pursuit of a worthy cause, the fight against apartheid and external domination of African territories by the Europeans.

This had also taken place under Military rule. The difference in the 1990s was the growing record of the human rights abuses, corruption and a chain of broken promises manifested in the rendering useless of one transition programme after the other. The General Sani Abacha model

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was even more worrisome as he planned to perpetuate his stay in office by moving from the military to an elected Civilian head of state. The expulsion of Nigeria from the commonwealth dealt a big blow to her ego as it was, Nigeria whose view on any issue was respected from being the toast of the continent and from serving as chair of the United Nations (UN0 special Committee against apartheid for well over two decades, to become a byword, an object of scorn in the global scene. One point this era underscores is the impact of domestic conditions on foreign relations. The domestic conditions inhibited Nigerias relations and leadership role to the extent that she sought friends, among the other untouchables of the international community like North Korea. Abachas demise in office in June 1998 paved way for yet another junta, which nevertheless moved to restore Nigerias thoroughly battered image and international relations generally. This they achieved by announcing and executing a transition programme that culminated in the swearing in of an elected government a little over a year later.

With the return of Democracy after 15 years of military rule, the countrys image had been severely battered abroad, and its economy in bad shapes. Thus it had become palpable that a new approach was necessary to address the place in the community of nations. Since the experience of a country at a certain point in time determines its attitude towards the outside World, Nigerias foreign policies over a long period had lost its focus and became entangled in internal problems.

Its primary goal however, was to attract a deluge of foreign investors to take advantage of the countrys abundant human and material

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endowments. This is the background against which the President Olusegun Obasanjo led administration underpinned its new foreign policy thrust which revolves around economic diplomacy. 2.2 NIGERIA IN MAY 2007 The Federal Republic of Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa with an estimated 146 million inhabitants living within an area slightly more than twice the land area of California. With a GDP of over $296 billion and huge reserves of crude oil, Nigeria is the second largest economy in the Continent, the leading oil exporter and 37th largest economy in the World. Nigeria is located in the Gulf of Guinea in the Western part of Africa. Nigeria was created by the amalgamation of what were known as the Protectorates of Northern Nigeria, Southern Nigeria and the Colony of Lagos into one nation in 1914. The nation was granted independence in 1960 in what was considered by Time magazine as a model of negotiated self-rule. Nigeria in May 2007 was in high spirits we were about to successfully transfer power democratically from one elected government to another, handing over a sound economy that is almost debt-free with healthy reserves of over $45 billion. For the first time since Nigerias first republic was terminated, there was a window of opportunity to break from the past. The world was watching with interest, with good reason. According to Rotberg in a report prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations: For policy makers everywhere, Nigeria should be the central African question. No countrys fate is so decisive for the continent. No other

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country across a range of issues has the power so thoroughly to shape outcomes elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. If Nigeria works well, so might Africa. For some people in President Obasanjos government, the elections were disappointing but the best candidate won. Nigerians elected a University graduate as President for the first time, a person Nigerians were convinced was a decent man, and raised the possibility that Nigeria will break the vicious cycle of bad leadership that has defined our nation. We were optimistic about the future. 2.3 PRESIDENCY In the presidential election, held on 21 April 2007, Yar'Adua won with 70% of the vote (24.6 million votes) according to official results released on 23 April. The election was highly controversial. Strongly criticized by observers, as well as the two primary opposition candidates, Muhammadu Buhari of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) and Atiku Abubakar of the Action Congress (AC), its results were largely rejected as having been rigged in Yar'Adua's favour. After the election, Yar'Adua proposed a government of national unity. In late June 2007, two opposition parties, the ANPP and the Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA), agreed to join Yar'Adua's government. On 28 June 2007, Yar'Adua publicly revealed his declaration of assets from May (becoming the first Nigerian Leader to do so), according to which he had 856,452,892 (US$5.8 million) in assets, 19 million ($0.1 million) of which belonged to his wife. He also had 88,793,269.77 ($0.5 million) in liabilities. This disclosure, which fulfilled a pre-election promise he made, was intended to set an example for other Nigerian politicians and discourage corruption.

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2.4

THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK-

PSYCHOLOGICAL

APPROACH The psychological method of political inquiry would be made use of as the theoretical framework in this paper in order to the able to understand the role the personality of Nigerias immediate past president in the person of Umaru Yaradua played in his foreign policy statements. Foreign policy is the product of human agency, that is to say, individuals in a leadership position identifying foreign policy issues, making judgments about them and then acting upon that information. It is this fundamental insight the product of the critique of rationality in decision making that initiated a concentrated study of the impact of individual psychology on foreign policy. Underlying this approach was the recognition that individual leaders of states exercised a seminal influence over the foreign policy process by dint of their experience, outlook and limitations, and were therefore worthy of special attention. Among the diversity of psychological factors said to play a role in shaping foreign policy are the influence of individual perceptions, human cognition, a leaders personality and the dynamics of group decision making. For proponents of the psychological approach, foreign policy decision makers operate in a highly complex world and their decisions carry with them significant risks. These include linguisticcultural barriers, stereotypes and high volume of, yet incomplete, information. Hence through processes of perception and cognition, decision makers develop images, subjective assessments of the larger operational context, that when taken together constitute the definition of the situation. These

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definitions are always a distortion of reality, as the purpose of perception is to simplify and order the external environment. Policy makers can therefore never be completely rational in applying the maximisation of utility approach to decisions.

The role of perception In dividing the setting of foreign policy decision making between the operational and psychological environments, Harold and Margaret Sprout, among the first scholars to address FPA concerns, opened up the possibility of FPA scholars investigating the interior life of the mind of individual foreign policy makers. Robert Jervis produced one of the most Influential studies in this area on the role of misperception on foreign policy decisions, which he says stems from the fact that leaders make foreign policy based upon their perceptions rather than the actual operational environment. For Kenneth Boulding, this suggests that foreign policy decisions are largely the product of images which individual leaders have of other countries or leaders and, therefore, are based upon stereotypes, biases and other subjective sources that interfere with their ability to conduct rational foreign policy. Both scholars see leadership as bringing its particular experience and outlook, perhaps shaped by individual and societal prejudices or media imagery, to the foreign policy process and thus introducing distortions to definitions of the situation. The role of cognition

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Another dimension of the psychological approach that affects foreign policy is cognition. Cognition, the process by which humans select and process information from the world around them, introduces important problems to the decision-making process. Indeed, the limits that cognition when coupled with the role of perception introduces to a rational account of foreign policy are such that it is difficult to describe these decisions as anything but the product of an incomplete (and therefore unsatisfactory) process. According to Alexander George, an eminent diplomatic historian, the international environment is filtered by decision makers through their own operational code, that is, a set of rules and perceptions that have previously been established within their minds and which are used to assess new situations and develop policy responses to them. Robert Axelrod, an international relations scholar, suggests that this process leads to the development of a cognitive map that combines perception, prejudice and an understanding of historical lessons, and applies these to the task of decision making. Moreover, his research findings suggest that foreign policy makers tend towards those policy choices that involve the fewest trade-offs, not necessarily the best or optimal policies that rational choice theorists would have us believe, but the ones that involve taking the path of least resistance. Indeed, some have characterised this sub-optimal decision making as satisfying, that is the decision makers impulse to choose a policy option that addresses the immediate pressures and concerns rather than weighing the merits of a given policy. Building upon these insights, other behaviourist scholars in FPA have highlighted the distortions on rational foreign policy imposed by the search for cognitive consistency by individual leaders. The academician, Leon Festingers concept of cognitive dissonance, that is, the effort by

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which a decision maker deliberately excludes new or contradictory information, in order to maintain his existing image or cognitive map, is one example of this. Jervis investigation into cognitive consistency points out that foreign policy makers habitually screen out disruptive effects by finding a logical way of incorporating it into the rationale behind a given foreign policy choice. The role of personality In addition to perception and cognition, FPA scholars have sought to assess the impact of a leaders personality on foreign policy. They note that different leaders bring their own biases to office and this is most evident in the removal of one leader and the installation of another can exercise dramatically different influences over their countrys foreign policy. For example, Anthony Edens harkening back to Britains imperialist past was a major factor in his ill-advised intervention into Suez in 1956, while John Kennedys inexperience and youth caused him to respond aggressively to the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, also Yaraduas personality also played a determining factor in his foreign policy from the year 2007-20o9. Psychological profiling of leaders, analysing the origins of their patterns of behaviour as a clue to their possible actions, became a priority activity. All of these individualistic and deeply personal elements are said to affect leadership and ultimately foreign policy outcomes. In their study of personality, Irving Janis and Leon Mann introduced a motivational model of foreign policy decision making that emphasised the fact that leaders are emotional beings seeking to resolve internal decisional conflict. The role of emotions is most pronounced in a crisis and at this point stress intervenes, causing a lack of ability to abstract and tolerate ambiguity, as well as an increased tendency towards aggressive behaviour. Tunnel

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vision, a fixation on single solutions to the exclusion of all others, may also ensue.

CHAPTER THREE
3.1 YAR ADUA, PERSONALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY Umaru Yaradua was a passive leader and he was very slow in making decisions, people were of the opinion that his being slow in making decisions was such that he would be able to tackle problems as they come and not in a rushed manner, but after two years and no impact when it comes to foreign policy, President Yaradua could be referred to as a man who was not actively involved in taking part in Nigerias foreign policy. As for Yar'Adua's personal style, there has been some iota of evasiveness in some decisions taken so far. Further, Yar'Adua appeared inscrutable to Nigerians and this quality caused uncertainty in some quarters regarding his readiness for the presidency. An Inclusive Leader? YarAduas limited knowledge of Nigeria and the world (for instance - he had never visited more than a handful states in Nigeria before joining the presidential race, and never been to the USA until he came to visit President Bush in December 2007) and his introverted nature made him easy to capture by a small clique (K-4) now called the Katsina Mafia. Since he came into office, he appointed a disproportionate number of Northerners to virtually all the important ministries, departments and agencies. This drew the ire of other parts of

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the country, particularly the South-West and the Niger Delta. YarAdua therefore failed to show he can be a universalist and came across as sectional, or even worse, clannish. Nonetheless, finding the much needed but elusive answers to Nigerias foreign policy weaknesses must begin with President YarAdua himself. If on the other hand, he had no desire to engage personally in active foreign policy making and forays as former President Olusegun Obasanjo did, then, he made it worse by appointing a man that was incapable of handling the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the person of Ojo Maduekwe. It can never be overemphasized, that effective foreign policy is about personality, visibility and packaging, as it is about substance. The world is awash with various demanding issues, and most pertain to Africa. The attention these matters deserve warrant seriousness and not levity; and Nigeria is well suited for that leadership role. Perhaps, it was this realization of the need for a hands-on approach in grappling with evershifting foreign policy priorities that led Cyrus Vance to declare that giving primacy to entrenched policy goals is baloney. Surely, his was an authoritative voice and one that spoke from the wisdom of lessons learned. 3.2 YARADUA AND NIGERIAS FOREIGN POLICY From the very outset of her independence from Britain, Nigeria made Africa the centerpiece of her foreign policy. In that regard, there has been a semblance of continuity in her foreign policy focus. Inherent in that doctrine has been the supposition that Nigeria would always have a leadership role to play in Africa and that whatever was in Africas interest was invariably in Nigerias interest. Under various Nigerian administrations -- military and civilianefforts were made to toe such

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guidelines and policy constructs, sometimes more faithfully, at other times not. Even the internationally embattled Abacha regime found a worthy external role for itself in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the area of foreign relations, YarAduas administration was virtually off the African radar. He visited the USA early in his tenure in December 2007 where he expressed the desire to partner with the US on Africom. Upon return to Nigeria, he denied making such a commitment. He showed a preference for economic relations with Russians (Gazprom), Iranians (Nuclear Energy Power MoU) and Germans (Energy Partnership for non-prosecution of Siemens bribes) than most other advanced nations of the world. He addressed the South African Parliament in June, 2008 and avoided most international forums since then. There are unconfirmed speculations that the state of his health did not allow for long trans-continental flights, but the health of our President was the nations most closely guarded secret. Yet despite Nigerias nascent democracy, the nation stands at a discordant inflection point in its foreign policy. Rarely has Nigerias international voice and foreign policy lost so much lustre as it has under President Umaru YarAdua and Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe. As foreign minister, Maduekwes tenure has so far proven distinctively unremarkable and his so-called Citizen diplomacy vacuous. At a time, when Nigeria is touting its re-branding ethos, her foreign policy is in its most lethargic state. Yet the challenges confronting the nation at home and abroad were ever more self-evident. Painfully, there seems to be no recognition of the worrying situation; or indeed how to remedy it. President Yaradua had no grand vision of foreign policy because opportunistically extrapolated to the apex political position through a

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most discredited electoral process; he had been largely dogged and concerned with legitimacy. To complete his embattlement, he was thoroughly vitiated by political creditors, who invented him from relative obscurity to prominence. The grand rhetoric of the foreign minister, Mr. Ojo Maduekwe about a nebulous concept of citizen diplomacy lacks any theoretical coherence and even practical use. A weak and frail tautology Mr. Maduekwe defines his citizen diplomacy as one concerned with Nigerians anywhere in the world. This is neither foreign policy nor diplomacy. Foreign policy essentially consists in set priorities and other critical agenda: identified as the core component of a nation, external interests, whose impact must reinforce the nations strategic internal aggregates, and needs. Effective diplomacy is largely derived from articulate and coherent foreign policy and this itself rest on national power.

The

strength

and

stability

of

national

institutions,

capability,

predictability and transparency of domestic political process, responsive, inclusive and participative structure all in various degrees and measures constitute the critical benchmark of national power. Nigeria foreign policy in the past two years remained in the shadows of the stalemated internal political process. Mr. Ojo Maduekwe, Nigerias foreign minister brought more grandstanding to the conduct of foreign policy, than any meaningful substance. In Prosecuting his largely amorphous citizen diplomacy, his most outstanding achievement have been to summon diplomatic representatives to his office and lecture them on how to treat Nigerians

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in their home countries. Last January, he took his political swagger to Washington, where he clashed with an equally uncouth Nigerian ambassador to America. Their mutual spat resulted in the recalling of the ambassador. At the peak of former U.S President Bush project of Africa Command Mr. Maduekwe and his boss spoke at cross purposes. However, since the inauguration of President Obama, the Africa command has gone into cold. A calmer and level headed foreign minister would have anticipated that most of the militarist policy of the widely loathed former President Bush would have taken a back stage as any of his prospective successors would have shelved it. But our impulsive foreign minister would grab anything for Nigeria even if it were a bag of thorns. After the coup in Guinea, following the death of that countrys long reigning ruler, the federal government appointed envoy, former military President, General Babangida and Mr. Maduekwe spoke at cross purpose. While Babangida said that the junta that easily ebbed away the weak institutions left by the late ruler, were patriots, who deserved to be heard, Mr. Ojo Maduekwe, a civil rule puritan, who made his name and fortune in the service of Nigerias worst military kleptocrat, late Gen. Abacha said that Guinean junta or any of their ilks are not desirable in any part of the continent. Besides rhetoric and grandstanding, Nigeria foreign policy did not fare any better since the past two years. Foreign policy results are measurable and could be well assessed. In how many international foray is Nigerias voice clearly heard and discernable? In how much global institutional architecture is Nigerias mark clearly discernable? At the meeting of

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Group 20 and other countries that met in Washington to discuss the global economic meltdown, Nigeria was conspicuous by its absence. President Yaradua later bemoaned Nigerias fate, which himself and his ilk was largely responsible. Since the past two years, Nigerias foreign policy, relations and diplomacy has been characterized by topsy-turvy and has absolutely nothing to show for it. The bribery scandal involving high state officials and some multinational firms has largely been swept under the carpet, even when these companies have been punished in their home countries. At the break-up of the corruption scandal involving the German Siemens, the government took an initial commendable measure by blacklisting the German company from further participating in contract tender in Nigeria until such a time when all issues relating to the bribery is resolved. Less than a year after that, the government reversed itself and President Yaradua claimed recently, that the government change of mind was as a result of a meeting he had with the German Chancellor, Mrs Angela Merkel at the sideline of European Union/Africa Union meeting in Lisbon Portugal. According to him, the German leader begged him to restore the company in Nigerian good books and he did so, after a guarantee that the company would behave properly. This incredibly is before the Nigerian cohorts in Siemens scandal are made to answer. Infact, the alleged culprits are lumbering in visible limelight. Also the related bribery scandal involving Halliburton and some former high state officials was equally bottled in a cooler inspite of a panel constituted to ostensibly bury it than to throw any light in it.

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And in all these, the message to the world is clear. A weak institutional framework coupled with shoddy process, all demonstratable of a failing state, than any one capable of taking any serious international responsibility. When a state lacks capability and capacity to enforce its laws and is visibly unable to rein in the excesses of vested interest whether within the state apparatus or outside, then such state cannot claim any effectiveness. Recently, the state traffic police in Paraguay arrested an offending vehicle whose occupant is the president of the country, Mr. Fernando Lugo and slapped a fine, which the president promptly paid.

Nothing could demonstrate the rule of law when high state officials are themselves subjected to the rigours of the law. The international community and especially the business community would not need elaborate lecture to realize that Paraguay, once an elaborate court yard of junta dictatorship is renewed. Within Africa, Nigeria stands far more diminished after the neighbouring Ghana and South Africa conducted a universally acclaimed fair and free elections. With the announcement that the U.S President, Mr. Obama was going to Ghana, Nigerias ruling party, the honey pot of the big men turned paranoid. They accused the U.S embassy in cohort of opposition parties and civil society groups of plotting to destabilize Nigeria. Foreign policy and diplomacy deals with both perceptions and realities. The world perception of Nigeria is a country brutally misgoverned by its elites and worst, whose national wealth is routinely pilfered by its governors. Mr. Ribadu, former EFCC chairman graphically illustrated the point, when he recently told the Washington Post that, the man he

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prosecuted for theft and looting of about 700 million U.S dollars is influential inside operator within the Yaradua administration and asked the world to discountenance the pretence of anti-corruption which the regime has repeatedly said. The true situation of Nigeria foreign policy in the past two years is that it has become a hostage of regime stalemate and crises of legitimacy. The world that is still engaged to Nigeria, does so in the hope of a new Nigeria beyond the former regime clay foot, dogged in incompetence and corruption. It was widely believed that when the chained giant held down by her rapacious elites awakes, the world would be moved. There are clear indicators that Nigerias status as a regional hegemony and bellwether for Africa may have gone burst. Nigerias non-invitation to the last G-20 Summit capped the diminution of her erstwhile status and foreign policy panache. Also, observers continue to ponder Nigerias evident non-engagement in Somalia; its loud silence on the crisis in Darfur and Zimbabwe facts that bespeak her fading influence. Furthermore, her huge human, financial and political investments in West Africa, especially in Sierra Leone and Liberia, are rarely acknowledged these days, when others scramble to take credit for rescuing both countries. This pattern, however, is not new, as similar events transpired in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia, where Nigeria played key roles in their respective independence struggle, a fact forgotten once the nations respectively achieved independence. Nigeria faced a stiff opposition from Sierra Leone and Togo, for the nonpermanent seat of the UN Security Council for the 2010-2011 terms. The two smaller and less influential countries were unyielding. However, it was the policy inertia in Abuja and the failure to engage the two

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countries assertively that most observers found confounding. This fact, speaks also to the overall foreign policy inertia and dissonance. Evidently, there is stark policymaking and policy implementation disconnect, a fact further compounded by domestic politics and policy dissemblance. However, Nigerias problem seems to stem more from YarAdua administrations preoccupation with the management of its domestic political, economic and financial situation. Understandably, the prevailing global economic downturn has also not been Nigeriafriendly. By any measure, Nigeria has played numerous critical Africa-centered foreign policy roles over the years. These have not been without material, financial and political costs. However, as leader, she is clearly slacking off. As a country, it seems that her leadership gravitas suddenly deserted her. The evidence lies in the fact that many African nations no longer consult Nigeria, as they once did, talk less of following her lead in continental matters. Hence, when recently President YarAdua posed the question: Is it lack of will? vis--vis Nigerias exclusion from the G-20, many took that to be an eminently rhetorical question.

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CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 4.1 SUMMARY With the above analysis it is pertinent to note that the administration of Umaru/Goodluck failed in carrying out the foreign policy objectives of the Nigerian state and this can be traced to the personality of the administration. Nigeria was not acknowledged as the giant of Africa in terms of political and economic power, rather she was referred to as the most populous country in Africa. This can be seen due to the fact that the President of the United States of America- which Nigeria supportedvisited other countries in Africa but did not visit Nigeria, instead, he sent his Secretary of state to the country. Nigerias past president was not actively involved with the countrys foreign policy, maybe it was due to his illness, we cannot tell, since he is no more, but it is pertinent to note that Nigeria under President Umaru YarAdua had the worse showing when it came to foreign relation, Nigeria was not represented in various international meet in the world. It is really unfortunate that President Umaru YarAdua did not round up his tenure, even if he had finished it, Nigeria would still be seen as a crippled giant, although Goodluck Jonathan was part of the YarAdua administration, he is already making waves in the International scene, this can be seen with his recent visit to the United States of America and his interview with C.N.N. For the past 2 years, Nigeria has lost her place in the International arena; Nigeria is now seen as the sleeping giant of Africa.

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Nigeria now has a new president, although the present president was part of the last administration, it is hoped that he performs well in terms of his foreign policy, Nigeria has come of age, and it is time for her to take her rightful position when it comes to the issue of foreign policy. 4.2 RECOMMENDATION Nigeria should ensure that there is a policy framework that would guide the affairs of Nigerian foreign policy. The framework should not be for a tenure only, but it should be such that subsequent government in place would be able to carry out. A technocrat should be appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whither the time when politicians that dont know any thing about diplomacy would be appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. There should be a re-evaluation of Nigerias foreign policy, it has come to fore that Nigeria is not held in high esteem in Africa, even countries that Nigeria helped in fighting for their independence are fighting for supremacy over Nigeria. 4.3 CONCLUSION Ironically, it is today difficult to forecast how Nigeria will act on any global issue. It is also not farfetched to believe that Nigerias foreign policy plodding along is a welcome salve in some quarters. That, however, is not in Nigeria or Africas best interest. Nigeria is too big, too vital and definitely, too important as a global and regional player to be ignored. Her potentialities remain vastly undiminished, even though she seems reluctant to self-actualize as a reliable leader and ally. In addition, it is far too dangerous to allow Nigeria to slip into the mode of irrelevancy. Regrettably, no one can assist an unwilling or incapable Nigeria to play its desirable and optimal foreign policy role.

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If ongoing global trends and realignments are anything to go by, the year ahead will be potentially and diplomatically definitive for Nigeria. There is a vast leadership role and vacuum that needs to be filled. Nigeria, must however, find her lost foreign policy niche and bearing or risk further marginalization in global affairs, as well as in Africa. As things stand, her present foreign policy lethargy is defeatist, and someone should have told President YarAdua so. Perhaps, if the president became aware of this reality, something worthwhile might have emerged out of the crookedness of Nigerias present indolent foreign policy disposition

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REFERENCES
Alade Fawole (1999). The psychological Foundation of Nigerias African Diplomacy: African Journal of International Affairs and Development (AJIAD), Volume 5 (2). Charles Onunaiju (Tuesday, June 2, 2009). Yaradua and Foreign

policy: 2 years after. Daily Trust. David Ray Andersen (2004). FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS. Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Gambari, A (1990). Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making: Nigeria after the second Republic. Humanities Press International Inc, N.J. Hank Eso (Sunday, April 12, 2009). Whither Nigerias lethargic foreign policy. The Imperial Observer Hart, P., E. Stern and B. Sundelius (1999). Beyond groupthink: political group dynamics and foreign policy decision-making. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Holsti, O.R (1976). Foreign Policy Decision Making Viewed Psychologically, in J.N Rosenau (ed) In search of Global patterns. Free Press London.

Jervis,R. (1976) Perception and misperception in international politics. New York:Columbia University Press.
Laolu Akande ( 2nd,February, 2009). Yaradua: He is slow, not slow. Naijaviewpoints.com

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Nasir El-Rufai (Saturday, May 30, 2009). Umaru Yaradua: Great expectation, disappointing outcome. Nigerianvillagesquare.com Ogbu, S.O and Aishatu Quadri, Africa as the Centre Piece of Nigeria Foreign Policy, an overview: in I.I Uke el al (Ed) Journal of Political Studies Volume 1, No1, January-June 2004. Published by Department of Political Science, University of Abuja. Ogbu, S.O and Aishatu Quadri, Africa as the Centre Piece of Nigeria Foreign Policy, an overview: in I.I Uke el al (Ed) Journal of Political Studies Volume 1, No1, January-June 2004. Published by Department of Political Science, University of Abuja. Remi Anifowoshe and Francis Enemuo (1999). Elements of Politics. Lagos, Sam Iroanusi Publications. Rosenau, J.N, (1969) Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, New York, Free Press. Saliu, H.A, (2005) Nigeria under Democratic Rule (1999-2003) Volume 1. University Press Plc, Ibadan. Sulaiman, A. O (2004). Religion in Nigerian Foreign Policy: Reflections of the G8. Zumunta Consult and Publishing Company Ltd, Garki, Abuja.