Economic Policy Program

Policy Brief
September 15, 2011

Summary: Given the bewildering set of issues and large number of players involved in the transatlantic relationship, the question arises: How do we identify countries that, by their actions, have shown they are committed to the European ideal and to strengthening transatlantic relations? How can we tell who has most reliably answered the call to promote a positive agenda in support of Europes role in the world? Or, we could ask ourselves, would it be possible to suggest criteria that could help identify those who belong to a loosely defined core of Europe?

The Core of Europe A New Way to Look at It

by Miguel Rodrigues

This is a time of change in Europe and flux in the United States as threatened defaults and credit rating downgrades flank both sides of the Atlantic. Increasing uncertainties prevail in Europe born of rising euro-skepticism and doubts about euro-accession in some quarters. Especially during a time like this, the transatlantic relationship serves as a solid anchor and path forward to achieving the common goal of the transatlantic community greater security and prosperity for Europe, the United States, and the world. But the fact is that the European Union is a club of 27 members, soon to become 28, and decision-making on the range of issues comprising the transatlantic relationship can be slow and cumbersome. After all, the relationship runs the gamut from political and military matters such as deployments in Afghanistan, peacemaking in the Middle East and protection of civilian populations in Libya to important work in addressing climate goals, economic stability, and development assistance. And if anything, the unfolding Greek/Eurodebt crisis has served to elevate the role of the member states in the public percep-

tion, even as the EU seemed otherwise headed toward greater integration with its post-Lisbon arrangements and the expanded powers (pending ratification) that enable the European Financial Stability Facility to buy sovereign debt on the secondary market and help restore financial stability to eurozone members in distress. Given the bewildering set of issues and large number of players involved in the transatlantic relationship, the question arises: How do we identify countries that, by their actions, have shown they are committed to the European ideal and to strengthening transatlantic relations? How can we tell who has most reliably answered the call to promote a positive agenda in support of Europes role in the world? Or, we could ask ourselves, would it be possible to suggest criteria that could help identify those who belong to a loosely defined core of Europe? Through the ages, geography has suggested where Europes core lies from Charlemagnes realm through the Holy Roman and Hapsburg empires, to the modern-day coal, steel and other European communities, set up as a result of Jean Monnets vision and

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sustained through the engine of Franco-German cooperation. Certainly, when Louis XIV, Frances Sun King, famously remarked Letat? Cest moi and Les Pyrenees nexistent plus, he left us with no doubt as to where he thought the core of Europe lay. Since even before the times of Prussias Otto von Bismarck and Frances Cardinal de Richelieu, countries have pursued their core national interests through shifting alliances and Realpolitik. And although the British and Romanov empires were situated, one might say, at the periphery of Europes territory, they played anything but a peripheral role in Europes affairs. More recently, consideration has been given to a multispeed Europe, a two-speed Europe, Schauble and Lamers Kerneuropa, and former French President Chiracs pioneer group of states, all aimed at achieving greater integration in order that a widened Union may still be compatible with an ever closer Union of Europes countries and peoples. But this paper is not about who is most committed to greater European integration or is willing to participate in a twospeed Europe, or even about the enlarged EUs institutions not being particularly well-suited to its size, which is how the question of Europes core has traditionally been framed. Rather it invites consideration to be given to a different sort of core one based on common principles and contributions. It does not seek to define which countries may be in and which may be out. It merely tries to present a different framework for looking at Europe, one that does not undermine bilateral cooperation but goes beyond the limitations to multilateral cooperation in an EU at 27. The parameters for defining who might belong to a core of Europe could be several, just as the issues bringing the transatlantic community together are numerous. This paper reflects in part a discussion of some suggested parameters at a recent roundtable gathering of experts and embassy representatives held under the Chatham House rule at the German Marshall Fund. We could suggest political, economic, and hard security-based criteria; criteria may be related to the promotion of key issues on the transatlantic agenda or demonstrated commitment to core European values or ideals. A key criterion must surely be active support for the eurozone and its constituent members, because a failure of the eurozone would have major spillover effects on other European efforts to accomplish greater coordination of policy interests. Here, then, are some suggested parameters in each category:

The parameters for defining who might belong to a core of Europe could be several, just as the issues bringing the transatlantic community together are numerous.
Political
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Keeping the core of the Schengen space border-free Assistance to promoting development in countries located in Europes neighborhood Contributions to maintaining stability within Europe, for instance in Bosnia- Herzegovina and Kosovo Policies to integrate minorities and combat extremism Efforts to promote Europes cyber security Peacekeeping in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere Favorable ranking on well-known international surveys such as Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Index, an indicator of coreness because it demonstrates a commitment to the European values of transparency and accountability Public support for Europe, as measured in Eurobarometer and other polls Knowledge and interest in the EU, as measured in public opinion surveys

Economic, including Social Policy

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Active support for financial bailout packages and generous contributions toward the European Financial Stability Facility, both aimed at assisting eurozone members in distress during the sovereign debt crisis Maintenance of sound public finances

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Overseas development assistance, an illustration of the core European value of generosity toward the less fortunate and a desire to help build a more stable and prosperous world Efforts to promote a good business climate Support for innovation Climate/greenhouse gas emission goals Efforts to promote Europes collective energy security Use of renewable energy as a percentage of total energy consumption, an indicator of coreness because, once again, it exemplifies commitment to a European value, in this case Europes collective responsibility for protecting the environment, a common good for all Protections for intellectual property rights

this sense these influential countries could be affiliated with the core, although they may not have a primary interest in the issue, per se. Defining the core is all about individual country leadership. The core of Europe is a topic of much interest to both academics focused on Europe, as well as policymakers engaged with Europe. When looked at in the way outlined by this paper, we might even imagine responding to Henry Kissingers famous quip about the need for a single phone number for Europe by observing that a group of key European phone numbers may in fact be of greater utility to policymakers. It is our hope that the criteria and approach suggested here will serve as a functional tool for academics and policymakers alike as they consider what it takes to belong to the core of Europe.

Hard Security
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Extent of deployments in Afghanistan Support for protection of civilians in Libya Support for the EUs Common Security and Defense Policy Size of budget commitments to NATO

About the Author

Dr. Miguel Rodrigues is a visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund on detail from the U.S. Department of State. The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. government, or the German Marshall Fund.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

The above list is by no means exhaustive. A country does not have to qualify on all parameters to belong to the core. The Atlantic community is held together by a vibrant, dynamic relationship, and enhanced cooperation may in fact already be taking place in Europe on some issues, such as the Schengen space. This paper suggests a systematic approach to energizing that relationship by using issues to identify countries that may be counted upon to advance the transatlantic policy agenda in interactions with nonEuropean interlocutors. It is also a way of ensuring that the smaller countries dont lose out, for they can be expected to be out front in promoting a given issue, depending on how deeply it resonates with their central national interests. It is good to appreciate that putting together a core need not be a divisive process after all, the majority of member states may not have strong views on some issues. Further, it may be important to have an influential country weigh in to deliver other member states on an issue of interest, and in