Political 2006 2007 CASE UPDATES

PRE-WEEK BAR REVIEW Version 2007
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Personal Collection
of
Supreme Court
(COURT NEWS)
2006-2007 Highlighted Cases

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Labor; Mapuas Change in Ranking of College Faculty Voided (2007).......................................................................................................................11 Labor; Reinstatement for Employee Dismissed on AWOL Due to Flood (2007)..........................................................................................................12 Labor; Retired Lieutenants Pension Terminated upon Loss of Filipino Citizenship (2007).........................................................................................12 Labor; School Guilty of Illegal Dismissal (2007)...........................................................................................................................................................13 Legal Ethics; SC Bans Coterminous Employment of Justices Spouses........................................................................................................................14 Legal Ethics; SC Disbars PBA Commissioner for Extra-Marital Affair (2007).............................................................................................................14 Remedial Law; Declaratory Relief; No suspension of telecom stocks public offering (2007).......................................................................................29 Remedial Law; Evidence; Conditions for Discharge of State Witness (2007)...............................................................................................................30 Remedial Law; FPAs jurisdiction only over agri pesticides (2007)..............................................................................................................................30 Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; SC Upholds Textbook Supply Deal (2007)......................................................................................................................30 Remedial Law; PAO Clients Now Exempt from Court Fees (2007)..............................................................................................................................31 Remedial Law; SC Clarifies Rules on Indigent Litigants (2006)...................................................................................................................................31 Remedial Law; SC Decisions to Withhold Names of Women and Child Victims (2006).............................................................................................32 Remedial Law; SC Denies Habeas Corpus Petition for Nida Blanca Slay Suspect (2006)............................................................................................33 Remedial Law; SC Dismisses Petition to Compel Use of Alternative Fuel for PUVs (2006).......................................................................................33 Remedial Law; SC Issues Guidelines on Judicial Solemnization of Marriage (2007)...................................................................................................34 Remedial Law; SC resolves Boracay land dispute (2007)..............................................................................................................................................35 Remedial Law; SC Upholds Search Warrants against Alleged Fake PlayStation Manufacturer (2007)........................................................................35 Remedial Law; SC: Final Judgments of Courts May Not be Disregarded by DAR Secretary (2006)...........................................................................36 Remedial Law; State Prosecutors Cant File Informations Unless Validly Authorized (2007).....................................................................................37 Remedial Law; Validity of the Court Martial Proceedings Against Oakwood Rebels (2006).......................................................................................38 Taxation; BIR: Donations to Society for Judicial Excellence Tax Exempt (2006)........................................................................................................39 Taxation; SC Exempts MIAA from Paraaque Realty Taxes (2006).............................................................................................................................39 Taxation; SC Holds DIGITEL Accountable to Pangasinan for Local Taxes (2007)......................................................................................................40
Social Legislations; Agrarian; Exemption of Livestock Farms from CARP (2007) Lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry, and swine-raising are classified as industrial and, therefore, excluded from agrarian reform coverage. The Court reiterated the unconstitutionality of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 9 which sought to regulate livestock farms by excluding them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. The Court had held in DAR v. Sutton that the DAR exceeded its authority in issuing the said AO as it had no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. The Court also said that a perusal of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission confirms the intent to exclude from agrarian reform all lands used exclusively for livestock, swine, and poultryraising which are classified as industrial activities. The Court likewise cited the cases of Luz Farms v. Secretary of the DAR and Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR where it categorically ruled that lands devoted to residential, commercial, and industrial purposes were exempted from agrarian reform without any other qualifications. The Court also pointed out that the passage of RA 7881 which amended certain provisions of the 1988 CARL changed the definition of terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swineraising. The Court held that this significant modification showed that Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.(GR No. 169277,
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Vicente K. Uy, February 9, 2007)
Network, Inc. (GMA) in 2000 for airing sans a permit Muro Ami: The Making on EMC Channel 27. However, it affirmed the MTRCBs jurisdiction to review Muro Ami: The Making prior to its broadcast. The Court said that Memorandum Circular 98-17, MTRCBs basis for its January 7, 2000 suspension order, was not binding on GMA since the subject memorandum circular has yet to be registered with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center at that time. Citing Sec. 3 of the Administrative Code of 1986, the Court said that all agencies are required to file with ONAR three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced, the Court added. The Court, however, ruled that MTRCB has jurisdiction over GMAs subject program which was advance publicity for the Cesar Montano-starrer Muro Ami, a movie depicting one of the worst forms of child labor in the illegal fishing system. Section 3 of PD 1986 (MTRCB Charter) empowers the MTRCB to screen, review, and examine all motion pictures and television programs, subject only to the exemptions expressly mentioned in Sec. 7. The program in question did not fall under these exemptions, the Court said. On January 7, 2000, the MTRCB issued a suspension order against GMA for airing Muro Ami: The Making without first securing a permit from the MTRCB as provided in Sec. 7 of PD 1986 (MTRCB Charter). GMA then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was merely noted by the MTRCB. The CA affirmed in toto MTRCBs suspension order prompting GMA to elevate the case to the High Court.
(GMA Network, Inc. v. MTRCB, GR No. 148579, February 5, 2007)
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Administrative Law; Validity of Administrative Issuances; MTRCBs Jurisdiction (2007) The Supreme Court has declared null and void the suspension order issued by the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) against GMA
Administrative Law; PNP Chief has Jurisdiction to Try Civilian Complaints vs. PNP Members (2007) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief can act upon complaints of private citizens against any of the PNPs officers. Thus stressed the Supreme Court when it upheld the August 17, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals holding that the PNP Chief had
jurisdiction to try the civilian complaint against respondent P/Senior Inspector Jose J. Asayo and that the respondents failure to exhaust the administrative remedy of filing an appeal with the National Appellate Board was fatal to his cause. Respondent, who was accused of obstructing police officers from arresting his brother, argued that his case fell under the jurisdiction of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). The Court cited Section 42 of the Republic Act No. 6975, or the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, stating that the PNP Chief and regional directors are vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring PNP members if any of the causes for summary dismissal enumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus, the power to dismiss PNP members is not only the prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and regional directors, the Court said. Asayo before the Office of the Inspector was charged by one Delia Bun General of the PNP for obstructing the arrest of his brother. According to records, the suspects in the shooting of Bun respondent even gave refuge to the suspects in the shooting of Bun of witness. The Court said that his son and intimidated and harassed Bun these acts constitute conduct unbecoming a police officer, a ground for summary dismissal against RA No. 6975, Section 42. In his defense, Asayo insisted he was not given the opportunity to and her witnesses. However, the Court noted the crossexamine Bun testimony of the summary hearing officer, S/Insp Ermilando O. Villafuerte, revealing that respondent was indeed given the opportunity to crossexamine his accusers but that he chose to waive it. The Court said that the assistance of counsel is not imperative in administrative proceedings so that respondent can waive the right to crossexamine even without counsel. (GR No.
154243, Deputy Director General Roberto Lastimoso, et al. v. P/Senior Inspector Jose J. Asayo, March 6, 2007)
Thus ruled the Supreme Court recently as it dismissed a petition that sought the reversal of the rulings of a Makati City Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals ordering a carrier to reimburse an insurance firm for the amount it paid when the ship carrying the insured shipment sank. The SCs First Division held that petitioner Cebu Salvage Corporation (CSC) was a common carrier and therefore should be responsible for the lost shipment unless it can prove that the ships sinking was brought about by the causes specified in Article 1734 of the Civil Code (flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; act of the public enemy in war, among others). A common carrier is one engaged in the business of carrying and transporting goods for compensation, and which offers its services to the public. The Court noted that CSC failed to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent such loss or that it was due to some casualty or force majeure despite the contract of carriage of goods. It also noted that CSC had control over what vessel it would use. The fact that CSC did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the contract of carriage did not negate its character and duties as a common carrier, it added. To permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility for the goods it agreed to transport would radically derogate from the carriers duty of extraordinary diligence. It would also open the door to collusion between the carrier and the supposed owner and to the possible shifting of liability from the carrier to one without any financial capability to answer for the resulting damages, cautioned the Court. (Cebu Salvage
Corporation v. Philippine Home Assurance Corporation, GR No. 150403, January 25, 2007)
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Civil Law; Carriers liable for cargo loss (2007) A CARRIER is liable for the loss of cargo resulting from the sinking of the ship it used but did not own.
Civil Law; Damages; Mercury Drug Liable for Selling Wrong Medication (2007) The Supreme Court recently ordered Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) to pay Php50,000 and Php25,000 in moral and exemplary damages, respectively, due to its employees error in selling the wrong medicine to a customer. As a result, the
customer fell asleep on the wheel and had an accident. The SCs First Division found that respondent Sebastian M. Baking would not have fallen asleep and lost control of his car had the employee of Mercury Drug issued the correct medication. Thus, the Court found Mercury Drug liable for the resulting injuries as its employees negligence implies that there has also been negligence on its part. Baking, who was diagnosed with high blood sugar and triglyceride in November 1993 was sold Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet, instead of the prescribed Diamicron, in an Alabang branch of the Mercury Drug Corporation because the latters sales representative had misread his prescription. Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine, Baking took one pill of Dormicum for three consecutive days. On the third day, he fell asleep on the wheel, causing his car to collide with another vehicle. (GR No.
156037, Mercury Drug Baking, May 25, 2007) Corporation
more appropriately, medical negligence, the Court said. Citing Ramos v. CA, the Court said that PSI was liable since an employer-employee relationship exists between PSI and Dr. Ampil. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and publicly advertising his qualifications, the hospital created the impression that Dr. Ampil was its agent, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients, it added.
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(Professional Services, Inc v. Agana and Agana, GR No. 126297; Agana, et al. v. Fuentes, GR No. 126467; Ampil v. Agana and Agana; GR No. 127590; January 31, 2007)
Civil Law; Damages; Mercury Drug to Pay Damages to Paraplegic (2007) The Supreme Court ordered Mercury Drug Corporation to pay more than Php40 million in damages to a vehicular accident victim who became paralyzed for life when his car collided with the companys delivery truck. Stephen Huang, whose sedan-type car collided with Mercury Drugs six-wheeler truck, suffered massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lungs. Despite a series of operations, he is now paralyzed from the chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. The compensatory damages amounting to more than half of the damages are for the life care cost of Huang and for the loss of his earning capacity. The SC affirmed the Court of Appeals ruling finding the Mercury Drug truck driver liable during the accident in which Huangs car was totally wrecked. It found that the Mercury Drug truck suddenly swerved and rammed into the right side of Huangs car while the two vehicles were traversing along the C-5 highway in Taguig, Metro Manila. The Court thus held Mercury Drug liable for the irreparable injuries suffered by Huang after the company failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over its employees, particularly its driver. The Court also noted that the driver didnt have a drivers license during the accident and only had a Traffic Violation Receipt for being previously apprehended for reckless driving. Moreover, it was also observed that petitioner Mercury Drug did not provide for a back-up driver for long trips; and at the time of the accident,
v.
Civil Law; Liability; Hospital; Doctor liable for medical negligence (2007) THE SUPREME COURT has upheld the SOLIDARY LIABILITY of the owners of the Medical City General Hospital and Dr. Miguel Ampil, a member of its surgical staff, amounting to over Php3 million for medical negligence for leaving behind two pieces of gauze inside a cancer patients body during surgery in 1984. The Court held both the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, and Dr. Ampil liable for the injury sustained by Natividad Agana. The Court said Dr. Ampils negligence was the proximate cause of Natividads injury, which could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. It found that Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the two missing pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she experienced after the procedure was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Natividad died in 1986. To our mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patientThis is a clear case of medical malpractice or
the driver had already been out on the road for more than 13 hours without any alternate. (GR No. 172122, Mercury Drug v.
Spouses Huang, June 22, 2007)
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Criminal Law; No Crime of Frustrated Theft (2007) Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of theft does not have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. The Supreme Court upheld a conviction for consummated theft, stating that theft can never be frustrated as its element of unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Explaining that the difference between a frustrated and consummated crime lies in whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution completed by the offender, the Court concluded that the statutory definition of theft under Article 308 cannot admit of a frustrated stage as theft is produced upon the completion of the element of unlawful taking. This ruling lays to rest the controversy surrounding the existence of frustrated theft as created by the 1948 and 1964 Court of Appeals rulings of People v. Dio (No.
924-R, 18 February 1948, 45 O.G. 3446.) and People v. Flores (6 C.A. Rep. 2d 835 (1964)),
Criminal Law; Penalties; SC Clarifies Effects of RA 9346 on Graduation of Criminal Penalties (2006) The penalty of death as provided for in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code will no longer be included in the graduation of criminal penalties. Thus the Supreme Court, affirming with modification the conviction of Alfredo Bon for the rapes and attempted rapes of his two minor nieces. The Court ruled that it cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in our laws. Bon was found guilty by the trial court of eight counts of rape and was given eight death sentences. The Court of Appeals upheld six of the eight death sentences and downgraded the other two rape convictions to attempted rape for which the penalties were reduced to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count. On review, the Supreme Court had to determine the proper penalty to be given Bon: whether he should be sentenced to prision mayor, the penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, which is now the highest remaining penalty with the removal of the death penalty by RA 9346. The Court reduced Bons penalty for each of the six counts of rape to reclusion perpetua while his penalty for each of the two counts of attempted rape was reduced to a minimum two years, four months, and one day to a maximum eight years and one day of imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay the victims civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages. The Court said that the negation of the word death as previously inscribed in Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent with our penal laws. It maintained that if RA 9346 was to be interpreted in such a way as to limit its effects only to matters concerning the physical imposition of the death penalty, there would be an
which deemed the crimes frustrated theft.
involved as
While the Dio/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim, the Court said. Valenzuela and his cohort, Jovy Calderon, were convicted of consummated theft by Branch 90 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court in February 2000 for filching Php12,090-worth of detergent from the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA. They had finished loading the stolen merchandise onto a taxi cab when they were apprehended by SM security forces before they could leave the complex
anomalous situation where the penalties for the principals and accomplices are equalized in certain felonies but not in others. The Court pointed out that had Congress explicitly stated in the law that the proscription of death penalty caused the modification of other penalties, the Court would have acknowledged that the illustrated inconsistencies formed part of the legislative intent. But given that there is no such thing expressed in RA 9346, the Court maintained that section 1 of the law is susceptible to a reading that would harmonize its effects with the precepts and practices that pervade our general penal laws, and in a manner that does not defy the clear will of the Congress. The Court also clarified that the prohibition against the death penalty did not result in the reclassification of those crimes previously defined as heinous. It underscored the fact that the amendatory effects of the law pertain only to the application of the death penalty and not to the classification of felonies. Thus, the Court held that it does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes. While the Court conceded that it had no choice but to adhere to Article 22 of the RPC and extend the retroactive benefits of the enactment of RA 9346 to persons previously convicted of capital offenses (except habitual criminals), it stressed that this decision does not make operative the release of such convicts as there are other remedies under the law which could be utilized to secure the reasonable release of such prisoners. (GR No. 166401, People v.
Alfredo Bon, October 30, 2006)
In a unanimous 10-page decision of the Courts First Division penned by Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, the Court held that then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing for lack of legal and factual basis the complaint of the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Disini et al. The complaint had alleged that Disini, a personal friend and golfing partner of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, gave to the latter shares of stock of Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation (VIMC) and The Energy Corporation (TEC) worth Php40 million and Php 25 million, respectively, in the name of Herdis in violation of RA 3019. In finding probable cause against Disini et al., the Court held that the Ombudsman has ignored vital evidence, i.e., the stock certificates of VMC and TEC found in Malacaang when the late President fled the country in 1986 and the affidavit presented by Manahan, one of the trusted men of Disini, stating that there was divestment plan to turn over those certificates to the late President. It therefore reversed the resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the PCGGs complaint and denying the latters motion for reconsideration, respectively. The resolution of dismissal is not based on the evidence presented and is not warranted by the facts thus far available to [the Ombudsman], the Court noted. (GR
No. 135123, Republic v. Desierto, January 22, 2007)
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Criminal Law; SC Oks Graft Charge against Herminio Disini et al. (2007) The Supreme Court recently gave the goahead for the filing of an information for violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices, against Herminio T. Disini, Vice-President and General Counsel of the Herdis Group of Companies (Herdis), and the members of Herdis Board of Directors, namely, Jesus T. Disini, Angelo V. Manahan, Domingo O. Borja, Rodolfo Jacob, and Jerry Orlina.
Election Law; Election Protest; Jurisdiction of SC over Interlocutory Orders of the COMELEC (2007) Maintaining its June 7, 2006 status quo ante order allowing Mayor Noel E. Rosal to continue performing the functions of mayor of Legaspi City pending the resolution of the case before it, the Supreme Court directed the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to determine with utmost dispatch and all due regard for the parties right to be heard, the true result of the 2004 elections for mayor of Legaspi City. The SC En Banc granted the petitions filed by Rosal to declare null and void the order of the COMELECs Second Division denying the request of petitioner Rosal to present evidence disputing the authenticity of the ballots contained in 441 out of 520 boxes,
as well as the COMELEC En Bancs orders declaring private respondent Michael Victor Imperial as the winning candidate and directing petitioner Rosal to vacate the contested office. Likewise, the Supreme Court directed the Comelec to exclude from the recount ballot boxes found in such a condition as would afford a reasonable opportunity for unlawful access to their contents. Under the circumstances, the question as to who between the parties was duly elected to the office of mayor cannot be settled without further proceedings in the COMELEC. In keeping with the precepts laid down in this decision, the COMELEC must first ascertain, after due hearing, whether it has before it the same ballots cast and counted in the elections. For this purpose, it must determine: (1) which ballot boxes sufficiently retained their integrity as to justify the conclusion that the ballots contained therein could be relied on as better evidence than the election returns and (2) which ballot boxes were in such a condition as would afford a reasonable opportunity for unauthorized persons to gain unlawful access to their contents. In the latter case, the ballots must be held to have lost all probative value and cannot be used to set aside the official count reflected in the election returns, the Court said. The Court found that the COMELECs Second Division adopted a manifestly unreasonable procedure when it refused to allow petitioner Rosal to present evidence that the ballots being revised had been tampered with, and insisted on its own authority to determine the ballots authenticity. In delineating the procedure in addressing post-election fraud, the Supreme Court held: The integrity of the ballots and therefore their probative value, as evidence of the voters will, are contingent on the integrity of the ballot boxes in which they were stored. Thus, it is incumbent on the protestant to prove, at the very least, that the safety features meant to preserve the integrity of the ballot boxes and their contents were installed and that these remained in place up to the time of their delivery to the COMELEC for the revision proceedings. If such substantial compliance with these safety measures is shown as would preclude a reasonable opportunity of tampering with the ballot boxes contents,
the burden shifts to the protestee to prove that actual tampering took place. If the protestee failes to discharge this burden, the court or the COMELEC, as the case may be, may proceed on the assumption that the ballots have retained their integrity and still constitute the best evidence of the election results. However, where a ballot box is found in such a condition as would raise a reasonable suspicion that unauthorized persons would have gained unlawful access to the ballots in it and the official count reflected in the election return must be upheld as the better and more reliable account of how and for whom the electorate voted. Private respondent Imperial had repeatedly assailed the earlier petition under Rule 65 by citing the doctrine under Repol v.
Commission on Elections (GR No. 161418, April 28, 2004) that the Supreme Court has no
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power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or final resolution of a Division of the Comelec. In addressing this procedural issue, the Supreme Court said that A sensible reading of our decision shows that Repol was not a negation or repudiation of this Courts jurisdiction over pertitions for certiorari from interlocutory orders rendered by a Comelec division Rather, this Court in Repol merely applied the rule that a petition for certiorari must be justified by the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court pointed out that the situation in the present case differed from that in Repol as petitioner Rosal filed a motion for reconsideration of the Second Divisions order. When that failed, no other speedy and adequate remedy against the unpardonable vices attending the Second Divisions treatment of the election protest was left to him except recourse to this Court under Rule 65. Under the circumstances, he was without the shadow of a doubt justified in taking it, the Court said. Petitioner Rosal was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Legaspi City, having received 44,792 votes, over private respondents 33,747, in the May 10, 2004 elections. On May 24, 2004, the latter filed a petition to annul the proclamation and subsequently filed an election protest contesting the results of the election in all
520 precincts on the grounds of alleged irregularities. Justice Antonio T. Carpio wrote a concurring opinion wherein he opined that there is no need to rule on the propriety of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the interlocutory order assailed in GR No. 168253 as its consolidation with the main case, as decided by the Comelec En Banc and elevated to the Supreme Court under Rule 64, rendered the issue moot and academic. (GR Nos. 168253, 172741, Mayor
Noel E. Rosal v. Commission on Elections Second Division and Michael Victor Imperial, March 16, 2007)
several years beforehand and that these absences should also be considered. The Court held that Velascos last string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently explained. These cannot be considered together with her previous infractions as gross and habitual neglect. Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the CA found that respondent Velasco was able to justify her absences in accordance with the company rules and policy and that she attempted to file leaves of absence but Del Montes supervisor refused to receive them. Velasco suffered from urinary tract infection during pregnancy while being one of Del Montes field laborers in 1994 and was even advised by the companys doctor to have rest-inquarters for several days. (GR NO. 153477,
Del Monte Philippines, Velasco, March 6, 2007) Inc. v. Lolita
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Labor Law; Reinstatement of Employee Dismissed on Account of Pregnancy (2007) It is illegal to terminate an employee on account of her pregnancy. Thus ruled the Supreme Court when it denied the petition for review of Del Monte Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the July 23, 2001 decision and May 7, 2002 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), which held that absences due to a justified cause cannot be a ground for dismissal. The Court held that respondent Lolita Velascos absences are justified even if the dates of her absences do not correspond to those in her medical certificates because pregnancy is a long-term condition accompanied by an assortment of related illnesses. It can be safely assumed that the absences that are not covered by, but which nonetheless approximate, the dates stated in the Discharge Summary and Medical Certificate, are due to the continuing condition of pregnancy and related illnesses, and hence, are justified absences, the Court said. The Court also agreed with the CA in concluding that the respondents sickness was pregnancy-related and that terminating Velasco would be a violation of the Labor Code, specifically Article 137, which states that it is unlawful for any employer to discharge a woman on account of her pregnancy, while on leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy. The Court ruled that Del Monte had no legal basis to terminate Velasco on the ground that the latter had an alleged long history of unauthorized absences committed
Labor Law; SC Junks Company Ban on Employees from Marrying Co-Workers (2006) Thou shall not compel an employee to resign by reason of his or her marriage to a colleague. The Supreme Court has affirmed a Court of Appeals ruling that declared invalid a companys policy requiring employees to resign in the event they get married to a co- worker. The SCs Second Division ruled that that the questioned policy of Star Paper Corporation (Star Paper), a firm engaged in trading of paper products, is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Under the said policy, which had been in effect since 1995, new applicants will not be allowed to be hired if he or she has a relative, up to the 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company. In case two single employees develop a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decide to get married, the policy requires one of them to resign. The CA had ruled that the assailed policy was violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of article 136 of the Labor Code. It also held that the resignations of its employees were far from voluntary. The Court found lame petitioner Star Paper, et al.s sole contention that the company did not just want to have two or more of its employees related between the
third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity. It added that the company failed to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity to justify such a policy. The Court stressed that the protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive. The questioned policy may not facially violate Art. 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit, disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company, the Court said. The Court noted that the 1987 Constitution states the policy towards the protection of labor. Article II, sec. 18 provides that the state affirms labor as a primary social economic workforce and that it shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare while Art. XIII, sec. 3 provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunity for all. The Court also noted Art. 136 of the Labor Code which states that it shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage. Due to the said company policy, respondents Ronaldo Simbol and Wilfreda Comia were forced by Star Paper to resign subsequent to their respective marriages to co-workers. A third respondent, Lorna E. Estrella, was forced to resign after she was impregnated by a married co-worker. Estrella said she was forced to submit a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay when she was barred from work after going on leave.
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The respondents filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter who dismissed the same for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. When NLRC denied their motion for reconsideration, the respondents brought the case to the appellate court. Concurring were Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Renato C. Corona, Adolfo S. Azcuna, and Cancio C. Garcia. (GR No. 164774, Star Paper
Corporation, et al. v. Simbol, et al., April 12, 2006)
Labor Law; Security of Tenure vs. Management Prerogative and Police Power (2007) ISSUE: Ultimately, the issue raised by the parties boils down to whether petitioner Santos was illegally dismissed by private respondent SLMC on the basis of her inability to secure a certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology. HELD: While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. The most concrete example of this would be in the field of medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has been closely regulated by the State. It has long been recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. The same rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic and x-ray technology. The clear and unmistakable intention of the legislature in prescribing guidelines for persons seeking to practice in this field is embodied in Section 2 of the law: Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the State to upgrade the practice of radiologic technology in the Philippines for the purpose of
protecting the public from the hazards posed by radiation as well as to ensure safe and proper diagnosis, treatment and research through the application of machines and/or equipment using radiation. Indeed, complainant-appellant cannot insist on her sterling work performance without any derogatory record to make her qualify as an x-ray technician in the absence of a proper certificate of Registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology which can only be obtained by passing the required examination. The law is clear that the Certificate of Registration cannot be substituted by any other requirement to allow a person to practice as a Radiologic Technologist and/or X-ray Technologist (Technician). No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation of petitioner Santos was undertaken by it conformably to an existing statute. It is undeniable that her continued employment without the required Board certification exposed the hospital to possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to operate. Certainly, private respondent could not be expected to retain petitioner Santos despite the inimical threat posed by the latter to its business. This notwithstanding, the records bear out the fact that petitioner Santos was given ample opportunity to qualify for the position and was sufficiently warned that her failure to do so would result in her separation from work in the event there were no other vacant positions to which she could be transferred. Despite these warnings, petitioner Santos was still unable to comply and pass the required exam. To reiterate, the requirement for Board certification was set by statute. Justice, fairness and due process demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had no participation or control. While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. Labor laws, to be sure, do not authorize interference with the employer's judgment
in the conduct of the latters business. Private respondent is free to determine, using its own discretion and business judgment, all elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. None of these exceptions is present in the instant case. The fact that another employee, who likewise failed to pass the required exam, was allowed by private respondent to apply for and transfer to another position with the hospital does not constitute unlawful discrimination. This was a valid exercise of management prerogative, petitioners not having alleged nor proven that the reassigned employee did not qualify for the position where she was transferred. In the past, the Court has ruled that an objection founded on the ground that one has better credentials over the appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications for the position. Furthermore, the records show that Ms. Santos did not even seriously apply for another position in the company. St. Luke's
Medical Center Employee's AssociationAFW vs. NLRC , March 7, 2007
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Labor; Mapuas Change in Ranking of College Faculty Voided (2007)

The Supreme Court recently declared null and void the Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT)s unilateral change in the ranking of its college faculty from 19 levels to 23 levels and the computation of the salary of its high school faculty from a rate-per-load to a rate-per-hour basis. In a decision penned by Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, the Courts Second Division reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the ruling of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators that the new faculty ranking and evaluation system of its college faculty proposed by respondent MIT is an unauthorized modification of the 2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by petitioner Faculty Association of MIT (FAMIT) and MIT. It is made up of a faculty classification that is substantially different from the one originally incorporated in the current CBA between the parties, the Court said. As such, it ruled that the proposed system contravenes the existing provisions of the CBA which constitutes the law between the parties.
Likewise, the Court ruled that since it is clear from the parties CBA that the salary of a high school faculty member is based on a rate-per-load and not on a rate-per-hour basis, there is no room for the change in formula by MIT. The Court stressed that in cases of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. (GR No. 164060, FAMIT v.
CA and MIT, June 15, 2007)
a fortuitous event outside of petitioners control. The Court also ruled that Navarro had no wrongful, perverse, or even negligent attitude when he absented himself. The Court said that a worker cannot be reasonably expected to anticipate times of sickness nor emergency. Hence, to require prior notice of such times would be absurd. He can only give proper notice after the occurrence of the eventwhich is what petitioner did in this case, the Court explained. (GR No. 162583,
Navarro v. Coca-Cola, June 8, 2007)
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Labor; Reinstatement for Employee Dismissed on AWOL Due to Flood (2007)

The Supreme Court ordered Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Coca-Cola) to immediately reinstate an employee who was terminated for not reporting to work and for failing to file a leave of absence before the said absence. In a decision penned by then Acting Chief Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, a former Secretary of Labor himself, the Courts Second Division also ordered Coca-Cola to pay the employees full backwages, allowances, and other benefits from the time of his dismissal up to his reinstatement, as well as attorneys fees equivalent to 10 percent of his total monetary award. Alberto Navarro, a forklift operator for CocaCola for more than a decade, was not able to report to work on August 11, 1997 because of heavy rains which flooded his entire barangay. Though failing to file a leave of absence before his absence and only doing so a day after the same, he was able to submit a written explanation accompanied by a Certification from his Barangay Captain stating that his absence was due to flooding on the day of his absence. Despite these, Navarro was terminated. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which the Labor Arbiter dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Reversing the CA, the Court held that Navarros application for leave after his absence should have been allowed by the company because his absence was due to
Labor; Retired Lieutenants Pension Terminated upon Loss of Filipino Citizenship (2007)
The Supreme Court en banc denied the petition of Salavador Parreo, a retired Lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary, for the continuance of his monthly pension which the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stopped releasing when Parreo became a naturalized American citizen. Parreo filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) for the continuance of his pension, contesting the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638 or the AFP Military Personnel Retirement and Separation Decree, as amended by PD 1650, which provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and consequently have his retirement benefits terminated. Citing lack of jurisdiction, COA denied Parreos petition and advised him to file his claim with the court authorized to rule on issues of constitutionality of provisions of law. In his motion for reconsideration, Parreo argued that since his pension involves government funds, it is within COAs jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. COA dismissed his appeal, reiterating its lack of jurisdiction over the case. It ruled, however, that even if it assumed authority over his claim, its ruling would still be a dismissal of the petition. Parreo then brought his case to the Supreme Court. In a decision penned by Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the High Court affirmed the COA ruling, underscoring that the jurisdiction of COA over money claims, defined as demand(s) for payment of a sum of money, reimbursement or compensation arising from law or contract due from or
owing to a government agency under Commonwealth Act No. 327 or An Act Fixing the Time within which the Auditor General shall Render his Decisions, does not include the power to rule on the constitutionality of laws. Citing Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, the Court further emphasized that the power of judicial review is vested by the 1987 Constitution in the Supreme Court and all Regional Trial Courts. Citing Section 11 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7077 or the Armed Forces of the Philippines Reservist Act, which provides that citizen soldiers or reservists include ex-servicemen and retired officers of the AFP, the High Court ruled that as retirees remain a part of the Citizen Armed Forces even when no longer in the active service, [t]he state has a right to impose a reasonable condition that is necessary for national defense [as] [t]o rule otherwise would be detrimental to the interest of the state. The requirement imposed by Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is thus not contrary to public policy and welfare, neither is it oppressive and discriminatory, the Court held. It further held that the AFP, in stopping Perraos pension upon the change in the retired Lieutenants citizenship, was only acting in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Perrao was given the chance to contest his pensions termination before the Judge Advocate General. Thus, there was no violation of due process. The High Court, however, clarified that should Parreo re-acquire his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he will again be entitled to the benefits and privileges of Filipino citizenship starting from the time of its re-acquisition. On whether Section 27 of PD 1683 is retroactive or prospective in application, the High Court agrees with Parreo and the OSG that the provision should apply prospectively. However the High Court disagrees with their interpretation that the law applies only to those who joined the service after the effectivity of the Decree. Rather, the High Court ruled that PD 1683, which was signed on 10 September 1979, citing Section 2 of the Decree, as amended, appl[ies] to all military personnel in the service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Parrea, who joined the service in 1950 and retired in 1982, long after the effectivity of PD 1638, as
amended, is thus covered by the Decree.
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(GR No. 162224, 2nd Lt. Salvador Parreo, represented by his daughter Myrna P. Caintic v. Commission on Audit and Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, June 7, 2007)
Labor; School Guilty of Illegal Dismissal (2007)

The Supreme Court recently found Catholic school guilty of illegal dismissal. a
Petitioner Rodelia S. Fungo, former secretary of the Rector of Lourdes School of Mandaluyong Fr. Servillano B. Bustamante, was forced to resign in 1996 after 15 years of service when Fr. Bustamante claimed that she breached the trust he reposed on her. Fungo, who had authorized access to all the confidential documents of Fr. Bustamante, looked into the files and retrieved the summary of efficiency ratings of all the teachers after her husband was fired due to a low rating. In a 10-page decision penned by Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, the Courts First Division reinstated with modification the decision of the Labor Arbiter and held that the appellate court erred when it affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission ruling that petitioner had voluntarily resigned from employment. The Court found that after Fungo asked Fr. Bustamante the reason for her husbands low performance rating, she was summoned to the school treasurers office and was threatened that if she did not resign within 30 minutes, her separation pay would be forfeited. Given her husbands unemployment and her familys financial problems, Fungo was compelled to resign. As such, the Court said that Fungo was constructively dismissed from her employment because the circumstances clearly showed that respondents wanted to terminate Fungos employment, but made it appear that she voluntarily resigned. The Court also held that Fungo did not breach the trust and confidence reposed on her by Fr. Bustamante since she did not show the subject documents to any other person except to Fr. Bustamante himself, and it was established that Fungo did have authorized access to the files from the beginning of her job as his secretary.
The Court also held that resignation is a voluntary act and is not consistent with the absence of petitioners intention to leave the school and the way she pursued her complaint against the respondents. Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. However, the Court considered that Fungos working relationship with Fr. Bustamante as having been already strained and thus ordered the payment of separation pay and other benefits in lieu of reinstatement. (GR
No. 152531, Fungo v. Lourdes School of Mandaluyong, July 27, 2007)
Legal Ethics; SC Disbars PBA Commissioner for ExtraMarital Affair (2007)

For carrying on a different ballgame outside his marriage, Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) Commissioner Atty. Jose Emmanuel Noli M. Eala was disbarred by the Supreme Court. In an 18-page per curiam decision, the Court annulled and set aside Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dismissing the disbarment case against Eala for lack of merit, and instead disbarred him for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canons 1 and 7 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, effective immediately. The Court found that Eala, a married man, in carrying on an extra-marital affair with a married woman prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage was null and void showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law and betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer. Joselano Guevarra filed a complaint for disbarment before the IBP-Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) against Eala on the ground of gross immorality, alleging that the latter carried on an adulterous relationship with complainants then-wife, Irene Moje. Guevarra alleged that he found in their conjugal home a love letter dated on the day of their wedding from Eala to Moje, where Eala wrote, BE MINE.AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE! I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE! Guevarra also alleged that right after Moje abandoned their conjugal home, he soon saw Ealas and Mojes respective cars constantly parked at a place where, he later found out, Moje was already residing. Complainant also learned that on February 14, 2002, Moje gave birth to a baby girl whose father she identified in the preparation of the birth certificate as Eala. Eala, in his Answer, denied both flaunting an adulterous relationship with Moje, alleging that their relationship was low profile and known only to members of their respective families, and having personal
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Legal Ethics; SC Bans Coterminous Employment of Justices Spouses

Starting April 1, spouses of incumbent justices are banned from working as coterminous employees in the Judiciary. In AM No. 07-3-02-CA, the Supreme Court issued a prohibition against the employment of spouses of Justices in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals. Spouses presently employed and covered by the rule are deemed resigned at the close of office hours on March 31. The Court found it necessary to control and regulate the employment of the spouses of Justices to enforce the letter and the spirit of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary calling for an ethical judiciary that is above suspicion. The New of Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Court noted, is premised, among others, on the fact that public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern democratic society; and it is essential that judges, individually and collectively, respect and honor judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system. (AM
No. 07-3-02-CA, In re: Rule Banning the Employment of Spouses of Justices in the SC, CA, Sandiganbayan and CTA as Coterminous Employees, March 6, 2007)
knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth of Mojes daughter. He countered that under the circumstances, his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene (Moje) is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be ground for disbarment. Eala later moved to dismiss the disbarment complaint due to the pendency of a case filed by Guevarra for annulment of marriage, which was later granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and a criminal complaint for adultery also filed by Guevarra against him and Moje. The IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner recommended that Eala be disbarred for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the said decision of the IBP-CBD and dismissed the disbarment case for lack of merit. The Court, adopting the finding of the IBPCBD Investigating Commissioner, held that the Ealas statements in his Answer, taken with the Certificate of Live Birth of Mojes daughter, sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene (Moje) which resulted in the birth of the child. The Court emphasized that Eala did not deny carrying an adulterous relationship with Moje; what he denied was having flaunted such relationship. Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence the evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer, held the Court. The Court said that it was immaterial whether Eala carried out his affair discreetly as the case involved a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It added that While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative action for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. The Court further stressed that it was also of no consequence that the marriage between Guevarra and Moje was eventually declared void ab initio as the acts complained of occurred before such declaration of nullity. As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and woman deporting themselves to be husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (AC No. 7136,
Guevarra v. Eala, August 1, 2007)
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Local Government; Mayor & Councilors are liable for Demolishing Public Market (2007) A municipal mayor and his councilors cannot take the law into their own hands and demolish a project funded by the government without proper authorization. Thus the Supreme Court stressed when it recently sentenced a municipal mayor and his four councilors to imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than 15 years. The Court also disqualified the mayor and his councilors from holding public office for life for violating various provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The five officials were previously found by the Sandiganbayan to be guilty of bad faith and to have caused undue injury to the government by demolishing a public market construction. The Court affirmed the decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan that found the petitioners Mayor Robert Tayaban and Councilors Francisco Maddawat, Artemio Balangue, Francisco Mayumis, and Quirino Pana of the Municipality of Tinoc, Ifugao, liable to reimburse Php134,632.80 to the government, which the latter disbursed for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market. The group demolished the half-finished Tinoc Public Market in August 15, 1999 on the impression that the market was being constructed on the wrong location by contractor Lopez Pugong, who was awarded the project by the funder, Cordillera Executive Board (CEB).
The Court said that the Sandiganbayan did not err in finding Tayaban and his councilors guilty of bad faith in causing the demolition because the municipal resolution that allowed the demolition was adopted without due notice given to the CEB and the private contractor. More proof of the officials bad faith was provided by Pugongs testimony that the site where his laborers began construction of the demolished public market was pointed out by Tayaban himself when he asked the mayor where the market was to be erected. Moreover, the Court found that the petitioners failed to present any evidence of having informed the CEB of their objections regarding the projects location. Thus, the Court said that Pugong and his men cannot be blamed for ignoring the memorandum issued by petitioner because the CEB is the legitimate owner of the project and its plans and specifications should be the ones followed. Additionally, the petitioners admitted that the blueprint they had prepared for the project was completed only in August 1989 but the market construction had started in June 1989. The Court also emphasized that the petitioners cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. The petitioners had claimed that the public market would pose danger to the safety and health of school children if it were built on the place being contested. The Court pointed out that the petitioners never made known their concerns either to the Governor or to the CEB and simply acted on their own accord.
(GR No. 150194, Robert Tayaban, et al. v. People of the Philippines and the Honorable Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2007)
Article VI, sec. 21 grants Congress the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Certainly, a mere provision of the law cannot pose a limitation to the broad powers of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis, the Court said. The Court also held that sec. 4(b) is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability under Article XI, sec. 1 of the Constitution since it places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress, and other administrative bodies. It likewise held sec. 4(b) as contrary to Article II, sec. 28 (policy of full public disclosure of all government transactions involving public interest) and Article III, sec. 7 (right of the people to information on matters of public concern). By virtue of Article XVII, sec. 3 of the Constitution, which states that only those laws and issuances existing at the time of its effectivity not inconsistent with its provision were to remain operative, sec. 4(b) of EO 1 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, the Court ruled. The High Court likewise upheld the authority of the Senate and any of its Committees to conduct legislative inquiries and all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge, including the power of contempt. On the other hand, the Court also dismissed the petition of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers which alleged that the Senate inquiry violates their right to privacy and selfincrimination. The Court said that the subject of the Senate inquiry concerns the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the corporation and as such, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices where the government has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information.(GR No. 174340, In the Matter of
the Petition for Issuance of Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio; GR No. 174318, Hon. Sen. Richard Gordon et al. v. PCGG, et al.; GR No. 174177, Philcomsat Holdings Corp, et al. v. Senate Committee on Govt Corp. and Public Enterprises, et al., October 17, 2006.)
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Political Law: PCGG Members Not Exempt from Testifying before Senate (2006) The Supreme Court has dismissed the petition for habeas corpus of PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio for being moot, as well as the petition of his fellow Commissioners and the PCGG nominees to Philcomsat. The Court ruled that Section 4(b) of Executive Order No. 1 which exempts PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry is directly repugnant to Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution.
Election Law; Probationers not disqualified from running for Local Elections (2006)
THOSE WHO HAVE not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation are not disqualified from running for local elective office. The Supreme Court ruled that the disqualification under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to probationers because the two-year period of ineligibility does not even begin to run. Section 40(a) of the LGC provides those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. The Court said that the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. (Moreno v. Comelec and Mejes, GR No.
168550, August 10, 2006)
demonstrate that certain supervening and legal circumstances [have] transpired to justify the retesting of the automated counting machines (ACMs) allegedly to confirm claims of the Department of Science and Technology that these were 100% accurate. The Court said that to allow Macalintals motion would effectively overturn its findings and conclusions in its final and executory Decision. The Court also reiterated in its August 22, 2006 resolution that the contract entered into by Comelec was void because of clear violations of law and jurisprudence. The Court found that the poll body entered into the contract without adequately checking and observing the mandatory financial, technical, and legal requirements and in reckless disregard for its own bidding rules and procedures. (GR No. 159139,
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines et al. v Comelec et al.)
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Political Law; Congress Inquiries in Aid of Legislation vs. Question Hour (2006) The Supreme Court upheld the right of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials in congressional inquiries in aid of legislation by partially voiding Executive Order No. 464. However, the Court, speaking through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, declared constitutional EO 464 insofar as it bans executive officials from appearing during the question hour. In making a distinction between congressional investigations in aid of legislation and investigation during the question hour, the Court said that the former should be untrammeled because it is co-extensive with the power to legislate of Congress. On the other hand, investigations relating to the QUESTION HOUR do not relate to specific legislations but are directed merely to congressional oversight over the implementation of laws. Section 1 of EO 464 required all heads of departments in the Executive branch to secure the consent of the President before appearing in an inquiry conducted by either House of Congress, pursuant to Art. VI, sec. 22 of the Constitution. On the other hand, sec. 2(a) enumerates the types of information covered by the order.
Political Law; COMELEC; Decision Against Use of COMELEC Machines Final and Unalterable (2006) The validity of the contract between the Commission on Elections and Mega Pacific Consortium and the use of the machines subject of this contract is already a closed issue. This according to Assistant Court Administrator and Public Information Chief Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr. who said the Courts January 13, 2004 decision on the case has been final and executory for over two years. The motions for reconsideration of the Courts decision were denied with finality on February 17, 2004 and the decision recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on March 30, 2004, Atty. Khan said. In the Courts August 22, 2006 resolution, it stressed that its ruling is already immutable and unalterable and may no longer undergo any modification. Atty. Khan explained that the Court found that Atty. Romeo Macalintal had failed to
The Court invalidated Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464, thus resolving the major issues raised in six petitions filed against the order. It can be recalled that on September 28 last year, the President issued the questioned executive order banning the appearance of heads of departments and other officers of the executive branch in congressional inquiries without the prior consent of the President. Under sec. 2(b), officials within the coverage of EO 464 are: senior officials of executive departments; generals, flag officers, and other officers of the Armed Forces; Philippine National Police officials with the rank of chief superintendent or higher and other PNP officials; senior national security officials who in the judgment of the department head, Chief of Staff, PNP Chief, and National Security Adviser, respectively, are covered by executive privilege, as well as such other officers as may be determined by the President to be likewise covered. Sec. 3 states that all such officials should first secure the prior consent of the President before appearing in a congressional inquiry. The infirm provisions of EO 464allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated, the Court said. The Court held that only the President can invoke executive privilege. She may also authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the act is By order of the President, which means that he personally consulted with the President, it added. The Court also held that the claim of privilege under sec. 3 of EO 464 in relation to sec. 2(b) is invalid per se for being so broad as to allow even implied claims of privilege by lesser officials. The proviso requiring the President to give her prior consent, the Court explained, means only that the she may reverse the prohibition which already exists by virtue of EO 464. This may allow the President to authorize
claims of executive privilege silence, the Court said.
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mere
by
It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes EO 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case, the Court said. It emphasized that a claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must therefore be clearly asserted. Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination, the Court stressed. The High Court also reminded Congress that although the power of legislative inquiry may be broad, it is not unlimited. It explained that in order to avoid conflicts, Congress should indicate in its invitation the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, in addition to stating the subject of the inquiry and questions relative to and in furtherance thereof. It explained that there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. However, to the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, any issuance to unduly limit disclosures in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which are presumably a matter of public concern. In that sense, EO 464 directly impairs the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Political Law; PCGG Chair Cant Be Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Simultaneously (2006) The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) chair cant serve as
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) at the same time. Thus ruled the Supreme Court as it declared unconstitutional the then concurrent appointments of Magdangal B. Elma as PCGG Chair and CPLC by deposed President Joseph E. Estrada. The Courts First Division held that Article IX-B, sec. 7 of the Constitution prohibits the concurrent appointments of respondent Elma as PCGG Chairman and CPLC inasmuch as they are incompatible offices. The general rule contained in Art. IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more than one office only if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. An incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC, the Court said. As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible offices, it added. The Court, however, said that Article VII, sec. 13 of the Constitution, the other constitutional provision regarding multiple offices, was not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions. Even if sec. 13 is applicable, the Court said, Elma still could not be appointed concurrently to the said offices because neither office was occupied by him in an exofficio capacity, and the primary functions
of one office do not require an appointment to the other post. Moreover, even if the appointments in question are not covered by sec. 13, said appointments are still prohibited under Article IX-B, sec. 7, which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The Court noted there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved since the appointees of Estrada were replaced by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in 2001. The present PCGG chairman is Camilo Sabio while the position vacated by the last CPLC, now Solicitor General Antonio Nachura, has not yet been filled. However, the Court still decided the case since it raised a significant legal question as yet unresolved whether the PCGG Chairman can concurrently hold the position of CPLC. (GR No. 138965,
PublicInterestCenter Inc., et al. v. Elma and Zamora, June 30, 2006)
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Political Law; Peoples Initiative Petition; Dismissed (2006) The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a Peoples Initiative to amend the 1987 Constitution by shifting the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Court affirmed the Commission on Elections August 31, 2006 resolution denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the Constitution by petitioners Raul Lambino, et al. This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the peoples sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Courts raison detre, the Court said. Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its decision, the Court and each of its members shall be judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a
hundred years or even a thousand years -- from now, what the Court did here, and how each justice opined and voted, will still be talked about, either in shame or in pride. Indeed, the hand-washing of Pontius Pilate, the abomination of Dred Scott, and the loathing of Javellana still linger and haunt to this day.Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be known throughout the nation and the world for its independence, integrity, industry and intelligence, Chief Justice Panganiban said. The dissenters led by Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno argued for a remand of the Lambino Petition to the Comelec for verification of the over six million signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. No one voted to grant the Lambino prayer to reverse the Comelec and subject the proposed constitutional changes to a plebiscite. The Court said that Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and not an amendment. As such, it violated sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a peoples initiative to Amendment to this Constitution. The Court ruled that the Lambino Groups initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition. It noted that the Lambino Group itself admitted that their peoples initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to change the Constitution. It stressed that the ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, which the Lambino Group used as basis in their petition, specified that ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency PGMA for constitution reforms. The Court noted that the Lambino group submitted to the Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition only after the September 26 oral arguments when they subsequently filed their memorandum. It stressed that the signature sheet did not show to the people the draft of the proposed changed before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the petition that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, it said. The Court further ruled that the present initiative violated sec. 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least 12 per centum of the total number of registered voters as signatories. It noted that the over six million signatories did not sign the petition nor the amended petition filed with the Comelec. In contrast, the Court noted that the an overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast approved our Constitution in the 1987 plebiscite. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the peoples sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution, the Court said. The Court said that the Comelec did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the Lambino Groups initiative on the basis of the Courts ruling in Santiago and Peoples Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action v. Comelec. The Court stressed that the Constitution being the fundamental law of the land deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation, adding that no one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself. The Court further stressed that to allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country. The Court said that incantations of peoples voice, peoples sovereign will, or let the people decide cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as
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prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution the peoples fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nations stability. (GR No. 174153,
Lambino and Aumentado v. Comelec; GR No. 174299, Binay, et al. v. Comelec, et al.; October 25, 2006)
In deciding the case, the tribunal recognized the Philippine Supreme Courts decision of December 19, 2005, holding the writ of possession issued by a Pasay City Regional Trial Court in abeyance, pending proof of actual payment of the proferred value of three billion pesos to the claimant. The writ was issued on the government by the late Pasay Judge Henrick Gingoyon on December 21, 2004. The tribunal also took note of the fact that in answering a question posed by Pryles, Solicitor General Eduardo Nachura conceded that the (government), through the MIAA (Manila International Airport Authority), purported to enter Terminal 3 in reliance upon the writ of possession. It is now clear from the Supreme Courts ruling in the Gingoyon case that the writ of possession should not have been issued and that it is effectively in abeyance until the proferred value of 3 billion pesos is paid, the tribunal said. Mr. Nachura also stated that the MIAA was still present in Terminal 3 together with personnel from the contractor Takenaka. He sought to justify the continued presence of personnel from MIAA on the basis of police powers which were not clearly established to the satisfaction of the tribunal, the ICC added. The government had continually deferred payment of the three billion pesos to PIATCo on one pretext or another, despite averring that the money was in an escrow account in Land Bank. The government, through the MIAA, on August 24 finally moved to pay PIATCo the P3 billion. Payment was withheld, however, after the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order against MIAA and the bank on a petition of Rep. Salacnib Baterina. The following day, PIATCo lawyer Eduardo de los Angeles wrote Nachura saying PIATCo should still be paid the three billion pesos. De los Angeles said that PIATCo and its authorized representatives shall enter into occupation and take up possession of NAIA 3 on Aug. 31, or within five days of receipt of the letter. We expect that you will properly advise GRP (Government of the Republic of the
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Political Law; PIL; International Court rules in favor of PIATCo (2006) AN INTERNATIONAL arbitration court in Singapore has ordered the Philippine government to give up possession of Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Terminal 3 to its builder, the Philippine International Air Terminals Co. Inc. (PIATCo), until a valid writ of possession is issued by a Philippine court. The respondent, its officers and agents, are ordered to cease occupation and give up possession of Naia Terminal 3 and not to obstruct the claimant in entering into occupation and taking up possession of Naia Terminal 3, the Singapore-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Arbitration Tribunal said in a 14-page decision dated August 23. The decision was signed by tribunal chair Prof. Michael Pryles. The tribunal, nevertheless, said that nothing in this order is intended to prohibit or restrain the respondent from entering into occupation or taking up possession of NAIA Terminal 3 pursuant to a valid and enforceable writ of possession issued by a court in the Philippines authorizing the same. The respondent is the Philippine government, while the claimant is PIATCo, the consortium that built and originally owned NAIA 3. PIATCo filed an arbitration case in the tribunal seeking interim measures to maintain the status quo, following the governments expropriation of NAIA 3 in 2004. A Pasay City court had ordered the government to pay PIATCo three billion pesos for NAIA 3. For its part, the government, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, questioned the jurisdiction of the ICC.
Philippines), its officers and agents and its authorized representatives not to obstruct PIATCo and its representatives in doing so, De los Angeles said. MIAA general manager Alfonso on Monday Cusi told reporters government lawyers will file today a motion to quash the TRO so that the three billion pesos payment to PIATCo could proceed. Cusi also said that PIATCo should bring before Philippine courts the Singapore tribunals decision if they want that enforced. The ICC decision has no jurisdiction here, Cusi said, echoing the governments stand. Political Law; President, as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (2006) Whether or not the Presidents directive preventing military officers from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent as unconstitutional (characterizing the same as a gag order that interferes with Congress power of investigation in aid of legislation.) The Supreme Court ruled that the President, as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), has the right to require military personnel to obtain prior consent before testifying in a legislative inquiry. The Court, however, held that the President has constitutional authority to prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before Congress and any military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Outside explicit constitutional limitations the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces, the Court said. This authority includes the ability of the President to restrict travel, movement, and speech of military officers, it added. The Court distinguished its ruling from that in Senate v. Ermita. In the latter, the Court has held that the President could not impose, through Executive Order No. 464, a blanket prohibition barring executive and military officials from testifying before
Congress without the Presidents consent on the account of executive privilege. In this case, however, the Court ruled that the Presidents ability to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. When a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the Court added. The Court also held that Congress was not without recourse should the President not consent to the appearance of military officers. It held that members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries, even if the President desires otherwise, through a judicial order. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiriesAnd once the courts speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to comply with the decision of the courts, it held. In this case, it noted that the impasse [between the Congress and the President] did not come to pass, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Gudani and Balutan were invited to appear before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security in its inquiry into alleged cheating during the 2004 elections. The day before they were to testify in the senate inquiry, they were given orders by Gen. Senga, per instruction of the President, that no AFP personnel shall appear before any congressional or senate hearing without [the Presidents] approval. Nonetheless, Gudani and Balutan appeared at the hearing and testified on the conduct of the 2004 elections and were subsequently charged with violating Articles of War 65 and 97.
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While Gudani had compulsorily retired on October 4, 2005, the Court ruled that the military justice had already fully attached to him inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred beforehand. (GR No.
170165, BGen. Francisco V. Guadani and Lt. Col. Alexander F. Balutan v. Lt. Gen. Generoso Senga, et al., August 15, 2006)
Political Law; SC affirms constitutionality of national ID system (2006) THE SUPREME Court has declared constitutional President Gloria MacapagalArroyo's plan to set up a nationwide identification card system, clearing the way for its implementation. Arroyo in April 2005 issued an order for the creation of one unified ID card. But opposition and civil rights groups petitioned the Supreme Court to reject this, saying it was a violation of privacy and would lead to abuse. But the information required for the cards "are the usual data required for personal identification by government entities, and even by private sector," the Court said. It added that the system "will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID databases of government entities." Under the plan, people will not be required to apply for the cards, the court noted. It said one unified ID card would replace existing cards such as social security and health system cards issued by government agencies. The high court said there was no usurpation of legislative authority when the President issued Executive Order 420 or the Unified Multi-Purpose ID system in February 2005, saying, the EO "is well within the power of the President to promulgate." "EO No. 420 is nothing more than the President's exercise of the power of control over the executive branch of the government," the high court said. It said that under the EO, the government would not collect individual data other than the standard information being collected from every citizen when applying for a government ID. In fact, the information that will be required from executive officials and employees is less than the information being given when applying for an ID from agencies like the Land Transportation Office (LTO), the high court noted. "Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and making their ID formats uniform, will admittedly achieve substantial benefits, the high court said. These benefits are savings in terms of procurement of equipment and supplies, compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the user-
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Political Law; Seizure of Equipment Owned by Unauthorized Seller (2007) The Supreme Court upheld the seizure under search warrants of the equipment and steel cylinders used to illegally refill and sell Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) products using Petron GASUL and Pilipinas Shell Shellane LPG tanks. The Courts Third Division upheld the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Cavite City orders denying the motions to quash the search warrants which led to the equipment seizure. The Court held that Cavite City RTC Presiding Judge Melchor Q.C. Sadang had sufficient basis in finding probable cause of an infringement of Petron and Pilipinas Shells intellectual property rights due to the use of their trademarks to justify the issuance of the search warrants. The Court said that the questions of Judge Sadang to National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent Ritche N. Oblanca, who applied for the search warrants, and Private Investigator Bernabe C. Alajar were sufficiently probing. The testimonies of Oblanca and Alajar were consistent with each other and their narration of facts, regarding their two test-buys from the refilling plant in which they were able to buy Petron GASUL and Pilipinas Shell SHELLANE LPG cylinders and their contents, was credible, ruled the Court. The Court likewise ruled that there is nothing in the provisions on search warrants under Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which specifically command that the applicant law enforcer must be a member of a division that is assigned or related to the subject crime or offense, shooting down a contrary allegation posited by petitioner William C. Yao, Sr., against whom the search warrants were issued.(GR No. 168306, Yao, Sr. v. People,
June 19, 2007)
friendliness of a single ID formal for all government entities," the high court said. The high court even pointed out that EO 420 was not a national identification system which would require legislation as it only covered executive offices. "The EO does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID that is compulsory for all branches of government," it noted. On allegations that it would violate privacy rights, the high court said the petitioners failed to show proof that the system would be used to spy on citizens. "Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording, and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards," the high court said. The petitioners maintained that the EO was unconstitutional because it was basically the same as the ID system that then president Fidel Ramos tried to enforce in 1996 through Administrative Order 308. On July 23, 1998, in the case of Ople vs. Torres, the high court declared as unconstitutional Ramos AO 308, calling it a clear and present danger that would infringe on the peoples right to privacy. Respondents in the petition were Ermita, National Economic and Development Authority Director-General Romulo Neri, and the administrator of the National Statistics Office. Political Law; SC Allows Dual Citizens to Vote (2006) Filipinos abroad with dual citizenship can now vote and register as absentee voters. As such, they may vote for the position of President, Vice-President, Senators, and Party-list representatives. The Court granted the petition by Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et al to compel the Commission on Elections to allow them to exercise their voting rights. Petitioners have dual citizenship having reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.
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Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, the Court said. In effect, they are likewise exempt from the residency requirements prescribed under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. The Court said that there is no provision in the dual citizenship law, RA 9225, requiring duals to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under RA 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that RA 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. The Court noted that no less than the COMELEC itself admits that RA 9225 expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and RA 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of RA 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that duals may now exercise their right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters, the Court stressed. The petitioners had sought registration and certification as overseas absentee voter during the 2004 national elections. They, however, were barred from exercising their voting rights. (GR. 162759, Nicolas-Lewis, et al.
v. Comelec, August 4, 2006)
Political Law; SC declares Calibrated Preemptive Response unconstitutional (2006) THE SUPREME Court, in a unanimous decision, has declared as unconstitutional the Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) policy of the government but upheld Batas Pambansa 880 or the Public Assembly Act as legal.
Voting 13-0, the high court said the CPR, which bans street protests without permits, "served no valid purpose" if, as admitted by Solicitor-General Eduardo Nachura during oral arguments on the issue, it only meant maximum tolerance. "CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely maximum tolerance," the high court said in a 36-page decision penned by Associate Justice Adolf Azcuna. The so-called CPR policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. At the same time, the high court upheld BP 880, a 21-year-old law on public assemblies, which requires organizers to secure a permit for rallies in public places. The high tribunal also gave local governments 30 days to designate "freedom parks" where demonstrations could be held without a permit under the same 1985 law. It said BP 880 could not be condemned as unconstitutional because it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms but merely regulates the use of public places as to time, place, and manner of assemblies." "Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent," the high court said. "There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of speech is not relevant to the regulation," the high court said. The high court also asked the Department of Interior and Local Government to adhere particularly to Section 15 of BP 880, which allows every city and municipality nationwide to designate at least a suitable freedom park. "Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable freedom park or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within
the poblacion [town center] where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit, according to the same section. In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act, otherwise all their public parks will become freedom parks it added. Political Law; SC Dismisses Petition Questioning Article V, par. 6 of VFA (2007) The Supreme Court has dismissed the petition questioning Article V, paragraph 6 of the Visiting Forces Agreement on the custody of United States Military personnel being tried for offenses in the Philippines and the one-year period prescribed to complete judicial proceedings. In a three-page En Banc resolution, the Court ruled that the petition has become moot since the trial of the case, which took place within the one year period prescribed in the VFA, has been terminated and judgment has been rendered on December 4, 2006. Consequently, the issue of whether the obligation of the United States under the VFA to present the accused for the trial continues even after the one-year period is now merely academic in this case, since the one-year period was not exceeded, the Court said. As to the issue of the custody of Daniel Smith, who was found by the trial court guilty of raping the complainant known as Nicole, the Court said that this has been raised by petitioner in a new petition filed on January 8, 2007 and would be more properly addressed in that case. In June last year, Nicole filed a petition for certiorari in the High Court to annul and set aside three orders issued by Judge Benjamin T. Pozon, Presiding Judge of the Makati City Regional Trial Court, Branch 139. The three orders are: (1) the order denying petitioners Omnibus Motion for the declaration of Article V, par. 6 of the VFA as unconstitutional, for the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest, and for the deferment of the arraignment until questions of custody and jurisdiction are settled and the denial of the motion for reconsideration thereof; (2) the order denying petitioners Supplemental Arguments and Motion; and (3) the order denying petitioners Motion for clarification
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which had asked to clarify when the oneyear period under Article V, par. 6 shall have started by construing the term judicial proceedings. (GR No. 172884,
Nicole v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al., February 6, 2007)
Political Law; SC Orders Marcos Cronies to Pay Php2M in Damages (2007) The era of the final judicial reckoning for the Marcoses and their associates has begun. Thus said the Supreme Court as it ordered a longtime associate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the formers son to pay Php2 million in damages plus litigation costs in connection with an ill-gotten wealth case filed against them for alleged illegal logging activities in the 1980s. The Courts Second Division granted the petition of the Republic of the Philippines and reversed the Sandiganbayans May 23, 2001 resolution dismissing the ill-gotten wealth case instituted in 1988 by the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The anti-graft court had sustained the demurrer to evidence filed by respondents, Marcos Presidential Executive Assistant Juan C. Tuvera, his son Victor, and Twin Peaks Development Corp. (Twin Peaks), where the younger Tuvera is a major stockholder. The PCGG had alleged the elder Tuvera, using his influence on and connection with Marcos, secured Timber Licensing Agreement (TLA) No. 356 on behalf of Twin Peaks despite existing laws expressly prohibiting the exportation of mahogany of the narra species and Twin Peaks lack of qualification to be a grantee thereof for lack of sufficient equipment to engage in the logging business. The Court said that there were several factors that taint Twin Peaks backdoor application for a TLA. It said that the forest area covered by the TLA was already the subject of a pre-existing TLA in favor of Felipe Ysmael, Jr. and Corp. It added that Twin Peaks directly wrote Marcos to request for a permit and Marcos made a marginal note indicating his approval. Likewise, the elder Tuvera, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistance, penned a memorandum to the Director of Forestry informing him about Marcos approval.
In sum, the backdoor recourse for a hugely priced favor from the government itself, and more in tandem with other brazen relevant damning circumstances, indicates the impudent abuse of power and the detestable misuse of influence that homologously made the acquisition of illgotten wealth a reality. Upon the facts borne out by the evidence for the Republic and guideposts supplied by the governing laws, the Republic has a clear right to the reliefs it seeks, the Court said. The Court further said that the Sandiganbayan erred in granting Tuveras and Twin Peaks demurrer to evidence purportedly since the recovery case was barred by res judicata (a matter settled by judgment). It stressed that the principle of res judicata could not be applied as there was no identity of parties and no identity of causes of action between the present case and that of Ysmael v. Secretary of Environment and National Resources. The Republic, however, cannot recover actual damages which could have amounted to Php48 million. The Court expressed its frustration over PCGGs failure to present any proof of actual damages that would have had established the amount to be restituted to the State by reason of the illegal acts committed by the respondents. It said that actual damages must be proven, not presumed. The Court found it severely unfortunate that the Republic did not exert its best efforts in the full recovery of the actual damages caused by the illegal grant of the Twin Peaks TLA. If only the Courts outrage were quantifiable in sums of money, respondents are due for significant pecuniary hurt. Instead, the Court is forced to explainwhy respondents could not be forced to recompensate the Filipino people in appropriate financial terms. The fault lies with those engaged by the government to litigate this case in behalf of the State, the Court said. The Court instead ordered the Tuveras and Twin Peaks to jointly and severally pay to the Republic Php1 million temperate damages, Php1 million exemplary damages, and the cost of litigation.
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Temperate or moderate damages avail when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, a showing that the plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages allows the award of exemplary damages. Organized in 1984, Twin Peaks engaged in logging operations pursuant to the 1984 TLA granted by Marcos to operate on 26,000 hectares of forest land located in the Municipality of Isabela, Quirino with an annual allowable cut of 60,000 cubic meters of timber and to export 10,000 cubic meters of mahogany of the narra species. A year after the ouster of the Marcoses in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino created the PCGG to go after the alleged ill-gotten wealth acquired by the Marcoses and their associates. The ill-gotten wealth case against the Tuveras and Twin Peaks was filed in 1988. From 1988 to 1993, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were delayed owing to the difficulty of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of President Marcos, who was by then already in exile. Subsequently, the Tuveras were granted a separate pretrial/trial from President Marcos. After the Republic rested its case in 1994, respondents filed a demurrer to evidence arguing that the Republic failed to present sufficient affirmative legal evidence to prove its claim. On May 23, 2001, the Sandiganbayan sustained the demurrer to evidence and did not give credence to the Republics allegations concerning respondents abuse of power and/or public trust. The Sandiganbayan effectively held the validity of TLA. The long-term campaign for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife Imelda, and their associates, has been met with many impedimentsthat have led to doubts whether there is still promise in that enterprise. Yet even as the prosecution of those cases have drudged on and on, the era of their final reckoning is just beginning before this Court. The heavy hammer of the law is just starting to fall, the Court said.
Political Law; Authority of the President to Re-organize the Executive Branch (2007) The President has the power to effect organizational changes in departments and agencies under the executive branch provided the reorganization is done by reason of economy or to increase efficiency in the bureaucracy. Thus the Supreme Court held anew when it affirmed the dismissal of the Court of Appeals of the petition of Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) for the nullification of EO 102, Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health (DOH), issued by then President Joseph E. Estrada on May 24, 1999. The High Courts First Division upheld the validity of EO 102 underscoring the executive power and control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices given to the President under Article VII, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Further, the Court, citing Larin v. Executive Secretary, held that, in the absence of a law amending or repealing PD 1416, Granting Continuing Authority to the President of the Philippines to Re-organize the National Government, as amended by PD 1722, the President has the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. Finding MEWAPs arguments as illogically and unduly restrictive and lacking of legal basis, the Court denied the groups petition. The High Court also found the implementation of the presidential issuance to be in good faith, in the absence of any showing that circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith as provided under RA 6656, An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization. MEWAP, a union of employees in the Malaria Control Service of the DOH affected by the re-organization policy, claimed Estrada was guilty of a lack or grave abuse of discretion in issuing EO 102, alleging that it violated EO 292 or the Administrative
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(Republic v. Tuvera, et al., GR 148246, February 16, 2007)
Code of 1987 and RA 8522 or the 1998 General Appropriations Act. MEWAP argued that the President has the power to reorganize only the Office of the President and not the departments, bureaus, or offices within the executive branch. The group further claimed that re-organization under EO 102 is unauthorized under RA 8522 as Sections 78 and 80 of the said law refer only to changes in organizational units or key positions in any department of agency and scaling down and phasing out of activities within the executive department. (GR No. 160093, Malaria
Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc, et al. v. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., July 31, 2007)
to the delegated police power of local government units to promote the order, safety, and health, morals, and general welfare of the society. Ordinance No. 8027, approved by Manila City Council on November 28, 2001 and effective December 28, 2001, reclassifies portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directs the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the ordinances effectivity. Among the businesses in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of Caltex, Petron, and Shell. On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option. The Manila City Council ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97 but declared the MOU effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Subsequently, the Council adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Subsequently, the petitioners filed with the High Court an original action for mandamus praying to compel Atienza to enforce said ordinance and to order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of that September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed, the Court said. (Social Justice
Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052, March 7, 2007)
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Local Government; SC Directs Removal of Pandacan Oil Terminals (2007) The Supreme Court today ordered Manila City Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassifies portions of the Manila districts of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directs certain business owners and operators, including Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the ordinances effectivity date. The Courts First Division granted the original action for mandamus filed by the political party Social Justice Society (SJS) and Manila residents Vladimir T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and to immediately remove the terminals of the said oil companies. The Court held that there is nothing that legally hinders [Mayor Atienza] from enforcing Ordiinance No. 8027. The Local Government Code imposes upon Atienza the duty, as city mayor, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so, the Court added. The Court described Ordinance No. 8027 as a measure enacted pursuant
Political Law; SC Orders Dismissal of Rebellion Charges against Beltran, et al. (2007)
For want of probable cause and due process, the Supreme Court has ordered the dismissal of the criminal cases for rebellion against six party-list representatives and four private individuals implicated in an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo administration on February 24, 2006 on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The Courts Second Division granted the consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to stop the prosecution for rebellion of Representatives Liza L. Maza, Joel G. Virador, Saturnino C. Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casio, Rafael V. Mariano (known as the Batasan 5), Crispin B. Beltran, and private individuals Vicente P. Ladlad, Nathanael S. Santiago, Randall B. Echanis, and Rey Claro C. Casambre. The Court ruled that the inquest proceeding against Beltran was void for failure of the latters panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with the rules on preliminary investigation in cases involving lawful warrantless arrests as provided for by the Rules of Court and by DOJ Circular No. 61. The High Court also alluded to the obvious involvement of political considerations in the actuations of Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez concerning the rebellion charges, stressing the partiality of the prosecutors after the Secretary stated in an interview that We [the DOJ] will just declare probable cause, then its up to the Court to decide x x x. The Court said this clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause. The Court found that in the case of Beltran, none of the arresting officers saw him commit in their presence the crime of rebellion, nor did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances sufficient to form probable cause to believe that Beltran had committed rebellion. It also ruled that there was no probable cause to indict him for rebellion as none of the affidavits executed by members and some civilians presented as evidence before the panel of prosecutors that conducted the inquest stated that Beltran committed specific acts of rebellion.
The High Court also held that the preliminary investigation conducted against the petitioners was tainted with irregularities for the failure of the respondent prosecutors to comply with the rule which provides that the complaint be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. (GR Nos. 17207072, Ladlad v. Velasco, June 1, 2007)
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Remedial Law; Declaratory Relief; No suspension of telecom stocks public offering (2007)
THE SUPREME COURT has denied the petition of Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) to suspend the requirement imposed by RA 7925 on telecommunication entities with regulated types of services to offer to the public 30 percent of its aggregate common stocks within five years from the effectivity of said law or the commencement of the entitys commercial operations, whichever date is later. In a decision penned by Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, the Courts Second Division affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and denied for lack of merit the petition for declaratory relief filed by Bayantel against the Republic of the Philippines and the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). The Court held that the requirements of an action for declaratory relief have not been met as Bayantel was merely anticipating the risk of possible sanctions, which does not, by itself, give rise to a justiciable controversy. It said, Rep. Act No. 7925 does not provide for a penalty for noncompliance with Section 21, and as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there are yet no implementing rules or guidelines to carry into effect the requirement imposed by the said provision. Whatever sanctions petitioner fears are merely hypothetical. Bayantel had sought to defer the aforesaid requirement imposed by RA 7925 (An Act to Promote and Govern the Development of Philippine Telecommunications and the Delivery of Public Telecommunications Services), claiming that it was not possible
for it to make a legitimate public offering at the time of the filing of the petition because its financial situation, the national economy, and the stock market were not favorable for a successful public offering. (Bayan
Telecommunications Inc. v. Republic and NTC, GR No. 161140, January 31, 2007)
January 8, 2004 resolution. The CA ruled that FPA, an attached agency of the Department of Agriculture, did not have jurisdiction or regulatory power over the acts and business operations of the Manila Pest Control Company (MAPECON). The Court said that PD No. 1144 sets the parameters of the powers and duties of the FPA. The Court stressed that FPAs purposes limit its jurisdiction to agricultural pesticides. It noted that FPA was created for the purpose of assuring the agricultural sector of adequate supplies of fertilizer and pesticide at reasonable prices, rationalizing the manufacture and marketing of fertilizer, protecting the public from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides, and educating the agricultural sector in the use of these inputs. Likewise, the Court stressed that PD No. 1144 uses the term pesticides always in conjunction with fertilizers or with the phrase fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals/chemical inputs or the phrase other agricultural chemicals. Urban pest control or pesticide used in households, offices, hotels, and other commercial establishments has nothing to do with agriculture, it said. The Court further said that the various provisions of PD No. 1144 show its consistent intent to apply the term pesticides only to agricultural use. Thus, urban pest control operators and their urban pesticides are excluded from its coverage. (Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority v. Manila Pest Control Co. and Woodrow, GR No. 161594, February 8, 2007)
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Remedial Law; Evidence; Conditions for Discharge of State Witness (2007)

The testimony of a prospective state witness is not required to be substantially corroborated by other prosecution witnesses who are not among the accused in the same criminal case. Otherwise, the condition that there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness will be rendered nugatory. Thus the Supreme Court First Division, through Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, clarified when it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals discharging accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the information in a murder case to become state witnesses. The Court held that the corroborative evidence required by rules on the discharge of an accused to be a state witness does not have to consist of the exact same evidence that will be testified on by the anticipated state witnesses. We have ruled that a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other methodEven if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects. It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence, the Court said. (GR No. 143093,
Salvanera v. People, May 21, 2007)
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; SC Upholds Textbook Supply Deal (2007)

Voting unanimously, the Supreme Court En Banc recently upheld the validity of the award of the Department of Education (DepEd) to Vibal Publishing House, Inc. (Vibal) and Watana Phanit Printing and Publishing Co., Ltd. (Watana) of the World Bank-funded supply and delivery of some 17.5 million copies of social studies textbook Makabayan and teachers manual. In a 16-page decision penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia, the Supreme Court nullified and set aside the order dated
Remedial Law; FPAs jurisdiction only over agri pesticides (2007)

ONLY AGRICULTURAL PESTICIDES and not urban pest control products fall under the jurisdiction of the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). Thus the Supreme Courts First Division held recently in a decision penned by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno affirming the Court of Appeals July 31, 2003 decision and
December 4, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, which granted a petition for injunction filed by losing bidder Kolonwel Trading (Kolonwel) to enjoin the DepEd and the Department of Budget and Management Procurement Service (DBMPS) from awarding the project to Vibal and Watana. The Court said that Kolonwel failed to meet the requirements prescribed by Section 55 of RA 9184, or the Government Procurement Reform Act, which provides that decisions of the DBMs Inter-Agency Bids and Awards Committee (IABAC) may be protested by submitting a verified petition paper to the head of the procuring entity and paying a non-refundable protest fee. It stressed that Kolonwel sought judicial intervention even before completing the protest process. Hence, its filing of SP Civil Case No. 06116010 was precipitate. Or, as the law itself would put it, cases that are filed in violation of the protest process shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales were on leave, while Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part as he participated in the case when he was still Solicitor General. (GR No.
instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original proceeding or on appeal. It also provides that the costs of the suit, attorneys fees and contingent fees imposed upon the adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be deposited in the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special allowances of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO. Acting upon the Courts directive, the OCA has issued OCA Circular No. 67-2007, providing guidelines on the implementation of the exemption in accordance with the conditions prescribed under Section 19, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court. (AM
No. 07-5-15-SC, Re: RA 9406, Exempting Clients of PAO from Payment of Docket and Other Fees, June 12, 2007; OCA Circular No. 67-2007, Re: Exemption of the Indigent Clients of the Public Attorneys Office from the Payment of Docket and Other Fees, July 12, 2007)
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Remedial Law; SC Clarifies Rules on Indigent Litigants (2006)

Even if an applicant for exemption from the payment of docket and legal fees does not meet the salary and property requirements under Rule 141, sec. 19, i.e., the applicants gross income and that of his immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and the applicant does not own real property with a market value of more than Php300,000, the applicant may still be exempted if he can prove that he has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family under Rule 3, sec. 21. Thus ruled the Supreme Court in a 19-page decision penned by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Antonio T. Carpio, and Conchita Carpio Morales. Justice Dante O. Tinga concurred in the result. The Court therefore set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City disqualifying spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura as indigent litigants and ordered the RTC to set for hearing the spouses motion to litigate as such. Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property
175608, Department of Budget and Management Procurement Service and the Inter-Agency Bids and Committee v. Kolonwel Trading, June 8, 2007)
Remedial Law; PAO Clients Now Exempt from Court Fees (2007)
All clients of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) are now exempt from paying court fees. The Supreme Court has recently ordered the exemption of all PAO clients from court fees following the enactment of RA 9406 (An Act Reorganizing and Strengthening the Public Attorneys Office) last March 23. The Court directed the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the Office of the Clerk of Court, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to disseminate this information to all concerned. RA 9406, sec. 16-D provides that clients of PAO shall be exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to
requirements under Sec. 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the applicant should not be denied outright; instead the court should apply the Indigency Test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption, the Court held. The Court noted that access to justice by the impoverished is held sacrosanct under the Constitution and that it is a priority and imperative under the Courts Action Program for Judicial Reform initiated by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and the judicial philosophy of Liberty and Prosperity of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban. Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which may be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged, and the marginalized, it added. The RTC of Naga had disqualified the Algura spouses as indigent litigants and dismissed on the ground of non-payment of legal fees their suit for damages against the Naga City Government for the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house. The RTC had done so on the ground that the gross income or total earnings of Antonio Algura exceeded the income requirement under Rule 141. This prompted the Algura spouses to file a petition for review on certiorari on pure question of law to the Supreme Court. (GR No. 150135,
Spouses Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, et al., October 30, 2006)
Thus held the Court in a 20-page decision penned by Justice Dante O. Tinga affirming the conviction of Melchor Cabalquinto on two counts of rape against his eight-year old daughter. Pursuant to its ruling, the victim was referred to as AAA in the decision. The Court said its ruling effectuates the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610, the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and its implementing rules; RA 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and its implementing rules; and the Courts own Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children. These enactments, the Court pointed out, unequivocally express the intention to maintain the confidentiality of information in cases involving violence against women and children. The Court also took into account separate comments from the Office of the Solicitor General, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, National Press Club, Philippine Press Institute, Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas, and the Department of Social Welfare and Development. The case stemmed from a sworn statement filed by AAA, assisted by her mother ABC, Cabalquintos common-law wife, saying that AAA was raped by Cabalquinto on November 8 and 13, 1998 inside their house. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Cabalquinto guilty and sentenced him to death. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court sentenced Cabalquinto to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordered him to pay AAA Php 75,000 civil indemnity damages, Php75,000 moral damages, and Php 25,000 exemplary damages. Giving full credence to the contemporaneous and subsequent conduct of mother and child that reveal the veracity of the rape charge, the Court said, Persons who witness an event may perceive it from different points of reference, hence they may have different accounts of how the incident took place. What is important is that their testimonies reinforce each other on the essential fats and that their versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole.
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Remedial Law; SC Decisions to Withhold Names of Women and Child Victims (2006)
To respect the dignity and protect the privacy of women and child victims, the Supreme Court has recently resolved to withhold their names and instead use fictitious initials in its decisions. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victimsurvivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed.
It may be recalled that in its February 14, 2006 resolution, the Court has resolved to refrain from posting in the Court website the full text of the decisions in cases of child sexual abuse. Concurring in the decision are Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, and Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo YnaresSantiago, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia AustriaMartinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. Adolfo S. Azcuna, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Cancio C. Garcia, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (G.R.
No. 167693, People of the Philippines v. Melchor Cabalquinto, September 19, 2006)
Martinez mother and wife had filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 78 against then PNP Director General Leandro Mendoza, CIDG Chief Nestorio Gualberto, Sr., Senior Superintendent Leonardo Espina, Sr., Senior Superintendent Jesus Versoza, and the members of Task Force Marsha, which was investigating Blancas death. It was alleged that Martinez was abducted and later seen at Camp Crame. The RTC ordered respondents to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus should not issue. Respondents submitted a return denying any involvement in Martinez disappearance. However, the RTC directed respondents to produce the body of Martinez. They appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which gave credence to respondents assertion that Martinez is not and was never in their custody. Thus Martinez wife, Estrelita, filed the petition for habeas corpus before the High Court. Concurring in the decision are Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Minita V. Chico-Nazario. (GR No. 153795,
Ma. Estrelita D. Martinez v. Dir. Gen. Leandro Mendoza, et al., August 17, 2006)
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Remedial Law; SC Denies Habeas Corpus Petition for Nida Blanca Slay Suspect (2006)
The Supreme Court has denied a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to produce the body of Michael Martinez, a suspect in the killing of movie actress Nida Blanca. In a 13-page decision penned by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the Courts First Division found that petitioners had not established by competent and convincing evidence that Martinez is indeed under the custody of respondents. When respondents making the return of the writ state that they have never had custody over the person who is the subject of the writ, the petition must be dismissed, in the absence of definite evidence to the contrary, the Court said. The Court said that while the matter of Martinez disappearance has been established, the writ still could not be issued as the grant of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated on the disappearance of a person, but in his illegal detention. It added that when forcible taking and disappearance not arrest and detention have been alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus, but criminal investigation and proceedings. This proceeding for habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for a thorough criminal investigation, it said.
Remedial Law; SC Dismisses Petition to Compel Use of Alternative Fuel for PUVs (2006)
The Supreme Court recently dismissed a petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus by private individuals asserting their right to clean air to direct the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG), an alternative fuel. In a 14-page resolution penned by Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, the Court said that the plain, speedy and adequate remedy sought by the petitioners which is the WRIT OF MANDAMUS is unavailing because it is available only to compel the performance of an act specifically provided for by law as a duty. The petitioners were unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ, the Court said. It added there is no law
that mandates respondents LTFRB and DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. The Court added, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. To remedy this environmental problem, the Court said that the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken. CNG, petitioners claim, is a colorless and odorless natural gas comprised mostly of methane and considered the cleanest fossil fuel. It produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum, produces up to 90 percent less carbon oxide compared to gasoline and diesel fuel, reduces nitrous oxide emissions by 50 percent, and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half, petitioners said. (GR No.
2. personally interview the contracting parties and 3. personally examine the documents submitted to ascertain if there is compliance with the essential and formal requisites of marriage under the Family Code, as well as the presented marriage license to determine its authenticity, completeness, and validity. 4. There shall not be less than two individuals of legal age to witness the marriage when the parties take each other as husband and wife. In cases when either or both of the contracting parties is a foreigner, the solemnizing officer must also examine the certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage issued by the concerned diplomatic or consular officials attached to the marriage license. Chief Justice Puno reiterates the general rule that a marriage shall be solemnized publicly at the chambers of the judge or in open court, except in instances when it is contracted at the point of death or solemnized in a remote place under Article 29 of the Family Code or when both parties submit a written request to the solemnizing officer that the marriage be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement. The Guidelines also reiterate that the legal fees for solemnization of marriage and issuance of marriage certificate by justices or judges is in the amount of Php300, regardless of who will be the solemnizing officer. These must be paid in Philippine currency and must be properly receipted. A demand for excess amounts shall subject the solemnizing office to administrative disciplinary measures. After every solemnization of marriage, the solemnizing officer shall ensure that the marriage certificate is properly accomplished and contains the complete entries (i.e., declaration that the contracting parties take each other as husband and wife; the true and correct information and statements required under Art. 22 of the Family Code; among others). The solemnizing officer shall also ensure that a record book of all marriages solemnized shall be kept. Judges of the Sharia District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts shall have the authority to solemnize marriages within the
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158290, Hilarion M. Henares, Jr., et al. v. LTFRB and DOTC, October 23, 2006)
Remedial Law; SC Issues Guidelines on Judicial Solemnization of Marriage (2007)

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno yesterday laid down guidelines on the solemnization of marriage by the members of the Judiciary to address the spate of controversies in connection with alleged irregular solemnization of marriages by judges. The Guidelines take effect immediately. Earlier, the Chief Justice had placed under preventive suspension four Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) judges in Cebu City and a Makati Regional Trial Court Judge for alleged irregular solemnization of marriages. Similar charges have also been made against some trial court judges in Mindanao. Under the Guidelines, the solemnizing officer shall be duty-bound to do the following before performing a marriage ceremony: 1. ensure that that the parties appear personally and are the same contracting parties to the marriage;
courts jurisdiction should the proper wali (guardian for marriage) refuse without justifiable reason to authorize solemnization. Marriages shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of the Sharia judge, office of the District or Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by parties. Marriages among Muslims sans marriage license may be performed validly if solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites, or practices. Likewise, the Guidelines state that appropriate administrative disciplinary proceedings shall be taken against any judge or court employee, who, alone or with the connivance of other court personnel or third persons not employed by the court, shall intervene so that the marriage of contracting parties is facilitated or performed despite the lack of or without the necessary supporting documents, or performs other acts that tends to cause the solemnization of the marriage with undue haste. Judges are also required to indicate in their monthly report of cases all marriages solemnized by them. In the case of the suspended Cebu judges, copies of the marriages certificates and other supporting documents for marriages solemnized by the judges concerned were found in the custody of other courts than their own. Documents, including logbooks for marriages, invariably show the names of court employees who have been identified as fixers or facilitators for marriages as well as the names of runners or assistants who facilitate the application for marriage license. Two individuals had also issued affidavits confirming that in Cebu City, package fees for marriage solemnization go from Php1,500 to Php15,000. (Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary,Administrative Order No. 125-2007, August 9, 2007)
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In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., the Courts Second Division denied the petition of Vicente delos Santos et al. and affirmed the May 11, 1999 decision and January 31, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed on a technicality their appeal concerning four adjoining Boracay lots based on a compromise agreement and considered their respective appeals withdrawn. With the loss of their right of appeal to the CA, we see no need to resolve the issue of ownership. Such issue should have been first resolved by the CA, but it was not able to do so because of the dismissal of the appeal. Thus, the claim of ownership is a non-issue before this Court, it said. The Court noted that petitioners delos Santos et al. failed to file their motion for reconsideration before the CA within the 15day reglementary period which begins to run upon receipt of notice of the decision or final order appealed from pursuant to sec. 1 of Rule 37, in conjunction with sec.3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. It said that the 15day period ran from May 24, 1999, when Atty. Napoleon Victoriano, counsel of petitioners, received a copy of the assailed CA decision and not from June 2, 1999 when petitioners claimed to have received their copy. The Court stressed that service upon the parties counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their lawyers. The Court stressed that petitioners were guilty of inexcusable negligence, noting that they did not even know that Victoriano failed to file an appellants brief on their behalf during the more than 180 day extension that he sought from the CA, aside from their failure to learn of the CA decision. (Delos Santos, et al. v. Elizalde, et
al., GR Nos. 141810 & 141812, February 2, 2007)
Remedial Law; SC resolves Boracay land dispute (2007)

THE SUPREME COURT recently wrote finis to the 21-year-old dispute involving 14,771 sq.m. of land in Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan.
Remedial Law; SC Upholds Search Warrants against Alleged Fake PlayStation Manufacturer (2007)
The Supreme Court has granted the petition of Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc.
(Sony) to declare valid the warrants issued by the Manila City Regional Trial Court (RTC) to search the premises in Cavite of an alleged manufacturer of counterfeit PlayStation consoles, joy pads, housing, labels, and game software. In a seven-page decision penned by Division Chair Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, the Courts Second Division set aside the Court of Appeals June 30, 2003 decision and January 16, 2004 resolution. The CA rulings had denied the petition for certiorari and subsequent motion for reconsideration assailing the Manila RTC, Branch 1s order of October 5, 2001 quashing warrants to search the premises of Supergreen Incorporated (Supergreen) in Cavite while upholding those concerning Supergreens premises in Paraaque City. The CA had held that the Manila RTC had no jurisdiction to issue search warrants enforceable in Cavite and that lack of jurisdiction was not deemed waived by Supergreen. The Court, however, partly modified the Manila RTCs October 5, 2001 order by declaring valid the subject search warrants to be enforced in Cavite. (Supergreens) imitation of the general appearance of (Sonys) goods was done allegedly in Cavite. It sold the goods allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. The alleged acts would constitute a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, clearly, under Section 2(b) of Rule 126, Section 168 of Rep. Act No. 8293 and Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner may apply for a search warrant in any court where any element of the alleged offense was committed, including any of the courts within the National Capital Region, the Court said. The case stemmed from the complaint filed with the National Bureau of Investigatin (NBI) by Sony against Supergreen. The NBI found that Supergreen engaged in the reproduction and distribution of counterfeit PlayStation game software, consoles, and accessories in violation of Sony Computers intellectual property rights. PlayStation is among the video game products of Sony. The NBI applied with Manila RTC, Branch 1 for warrants to search Supergreens premises in Paraaque City and Cavite. Armed with warrants issued by the Manila
RTC, the NBI in April 2001 simultaneously served the search warrants and seized a replicating machine and several unit of counterfeit PlayStation consoles, joy pads, housing, labels, and game software. In June 2001, Supergreen filed a motion to quash the search warrants, but the RTC denied the motion. Supergreen filed another motion, and this time, the RTC upheld validity of search warrants in Paraaque City but quashed the search warrants in Cavite City. Sony then brought case to CA, which dismissed Sonys petition for certiorari, ruling that the Manila RTC had no jurisdiction to issue search warrants to be enforced in Cavite. When the CA also denied Sonys motion for reconsideration, the latter brought the case to the SC. The Court gave weight to Sonys contention that the case involves a transitory or continuing offense of unfair competition under Section 168 of RA 8293 (Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines) where it may apply for a search warrant in any court where any element of the alleged offense was committed. (Sony Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Supergreen, Incorporated, GR No. 161823, March 22, 2007)
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Remedial Law; SC: Final Judgments of Courts May Not be Disregarded by DAR Secretary (2006)
The Supreme Court recently sustained the primacy of final judgments of the courts over orders emanating from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. In a 26-page decision penned by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., the Courts Third Division directed the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform to respect and recognize the February 8, 1972 Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in CAR Case No. 266Bataan 69, which ordered the conversion of a 26.5-hectare parcel of land into a subdivision project and the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents or Land Transfer Certificates over the said property in Samal, Bataan. According to the Court, the belief of public respondent Secretary that the aforementioned Decision should be declared null and void for want of jurisdiction is considered an affront to the
Court and the entire judiciary. It added that the DAR Secretary is supposed to be aware of the immutability and inalterability of final judgments of the courts. Citing the case of Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, the Court said that a decision that attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or the highest court of the land. The Court added that if any DAR official is allowed to revoke or annul final judgments of the courts of lawthen such acts trench on judicial power of the courts under the Constitution. Without doubt, such abuse and misuse of authority on the part of the DAR and its officials constitute serious and grave abuse of discretion. The assailed DAR order, issued by then Secretary Ernesto V. Garilao in 1995, stated that the Decision of the Court in CAR Case No. 266-Bataan 69 was null and void because the jurisdiction to hear and issue the said Decision was originally vested in the Court of First Instance (CFI) where the land is located and not in the CAR. Garilao likewise opined that even if the CAR had jurisdiction over the case, the power of the CAR under RA 3844 was to rule on the dispossession of the tenants but not to order the conversion of the landholding for non-agricultural purposes. The case involved a parcel of land in Samal, Bataan, owned by petitioners Rodrigo and Elisa Coloso. They sought to expand their subdivision project by converting a portion of their property occupied by a group of agricultural leasehold tenants. The petitioners entered into negotiations with the tenants for the payment of the requisite disturbance compensation but were not able to reach an agreement on the matter. Thus, on September 8, 1969, petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment with the then Balanga, Bataan Court of First Instance Branch IV, acting as a CAR, against the leasehold tenants. They prayed that the tenants be ordered to vacate the subject property after receiving the required disturbance compensation to be fixed by the CAR. The CAR ultimately rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioners. The tenants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which was denied as the CA affirmed in toto the CAR Decision. (GR No.
129165, Spouses Rodrigo Coloso and Elisa Coloso v. Hon. Sec. Ernesto V. Garilao, et al., October 30, 2006)
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Remedial Law; State Prosecutors Cant File Informations Unless Validly Authorized (2007)
As provided in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, state prosecutors cannot file an Information unless authorized by the provincial or city prosecutor, chief state prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Thus reiterated the Supreme Court as it dismissed for lack of merit the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino, et al. against a Regional Trial Court (RTC) judge who annulled an Information against an employer who allegedly failed to pay his employees Social Security System (SSS) premiums. The petition prayed for the nullification of the quashal of the Information charging employer Benedict Dy Tecklo, the owner of Qualistronic Builders, of violation of Sec. 22(a) in relation to Sec. 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282 (The Social Security Act of 1997). In a decision penned by Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, the Court found that Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. of RTC Branch 23, Naga City, did not gravely abuse his discretion in quashing the Information filed by Tolentino because the latter is not duly authorized to file the same. Tolentino contended that he had the authority to file the Information since he was designated Special Prosecutor for SSS cases and authorized to investigate, file the necessary Informations, and prosecute SSS cases by Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan. The Court, however, ruled that under the law (PD 1275), the functions of the Regional State Prosecutor do not include that of approving the Information filed or dismissed by the investigating prosecutor. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve the filing of Informations of the investigating prosecutor under sec. 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the Information under Sec. 3(d), Rule 117 of the said Rules, the Court said. (GR No.
150606, Tolentino v. Paqueo, Jr., June 7, 2007)
because the same had been declared by the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 148 in its 2004 order as not serviceconnected, but rather absorbed in the alleged crime of coup d etat. The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over service-connected crimes or offense.Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void, the Court held. On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP mostly from the elite units of the Armys Scout Rangers and the Navys Special Warfare Group entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments in Makati City. The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed coup detat charges against the Oakwood participants before the Makati City RTC. Subsequently, respondent Abaya, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers. During the DOJ inquiry, Abaya created a pre-trial investigation panel to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408 (The Articles of War) against the Oakwood rebels. Of the 321 accused before the RTC, 243 filed a motion praying for the Makati City RTC to assume jurisdiction over all charges filed with JAGO. Subsequently, the JAGO recommended that only 29 of the officers involved be prosecuted for violation of Article 96 before a general court martial. In 2004, the Court already held that General Court-Martial has jurisdiction over the charges of violations of the Articles of War in connection with Oakwood rebellion. The Court held that the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus prayed for by the petitioners must perforce fail and that as a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court that has jurisdiction to do so. It clarified that the term court includes a General CourtMartial. It added that the writ of habeas
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Remedial Law; Validity of the Court Martial Proceedings Against Oakwood Rebels (2006)
The Supreme Court cleared the way for the prosecution by the general court martial, for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War, of the 29 junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) who forcibly took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City in 2003 in a bid to overthrow the Arroyo administration. The Supreme Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War, the Court said. Named as respondents were Gen. Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, and B. Gen. Mariano M. Sarmiento, Jr., Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO). The Court held that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected as expressly provided in sec. 1, paragraph 2 of RA 7055, An Act Strengthening Civilian Supremacy Over the Military By Returning to the Civil Courts the Jurisdiction Over Certain Offenses Involving Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Other Persons Subject to Military Law, and the Members of the Philippine National Police, Repealing for the Purpose Certain Presidential Decrees. It stressed that there was no dispute that petitioners, being AFP officers, are subject to military law. [T]he charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the serviceconnected nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from service imposable only by the military court, the Court said. The Court dismissed the petitioners contention that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War
corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released has been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. The Oakwood rebellion prompted President Arroyo to declare a state of rebellion which was subsequently lifted on August 1, 2003 through Proclamtion No. 435. (GR No.
164007, Gonzales, et al. v. Abaya and Sarmiento, Jr., August 10, 2006)
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Among its donors are the Madrigal Abad Santos and Avancea families, who are sponsoring the Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos Award and Chief Justice Ramon Q. Avancea Award for outstanding trial court judges, respectively. This year, the Society also received donations from Don Emilio T. Yap, the Manila Bulletin Corporation, and the Euro-Med Corporation. All such donations are intended to cover the expenses incident to the Judicial Excellence Awards such as cash prizes, plaques, costs of seminars, testimonials, and researches on the improvement of the administration of justice, explained SJE Chair Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez. No part of the donations goes to administrative expenses because this is assumed by the Supreme Court, she added. (BIR Ruling No. DA-50206, August 16, 2006)
Taxation; BIR: Donations to Society for Judicial Excellence Tax Exempt (2006)
The Bureau of Internal Revenue has declared that donations to the Society for Judicial Excellence (SJE) are exempt from donors tax and that all such donations shall be fully deductible from the donors gross income. The SJE is a non-stock, non-profit organization aimed primarily for the improvement of the judicial system and the professional advancement of its members. It is composed of past winners of the annual search for outstanding first and second level judges and clerks of courts. Its functions were previously lodged with Supreme Courts Committee on Judicial Excellence. In January 2006, then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban devolved the committees tasks to the then newly organized SJE, which now serves as a regular committee of the SC. The BIR upheld the SJE as both a charitable institution and an entity of the government. As such, donations to the SJE are exempt from donors tax. It said that under the Tax Code of 1997, gifts in favor of charitable institutions are exempt from the payment of donors tax, provided that not more than 30 percent of the gift shall be used for administration purposes. The Tax Code also provides that donations to the national government or any entity created by any of its agencies not conducted for profit, or to any of the governments political subdivision are exempt from payment of donors tax. The BIR likewise opined that donations to the SJE are fully deductible from the donors gross income. Under section 34(H)(2)(a) of the Tax Code of 1997, donations to the Philippine government or any of its agencies are deductible in full, the BIR said.
Taxation; SC Exempts MIAA from Paraaque Realty Taxes (2006)

The Supreme Court, voting 11-3, granted the petition of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) to exempt its Airport Lands and Buildings from paying the City of Paraaque Php624.5 million in real estate tax and penalties for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. In a 43-page decision penned by Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the Court also declared void all the real estate tax assessments, including final notices of real estate tax delinquencies, issued by the City of Paraaque on MIAAs Airport Lands and Buildings, except for the portions that MIAA has leased to private parties. Likewise, the Court declared void the assailed auction sale, and all its effects, of the Airport Lands and Building of the MIAA. In 2001, the Paraaque city government issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on MIAAs Airport Lands and Buildings for its failure to pay real estate taxes plus penalties amounting to Php624.5 million for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The city government then put the subject properties up for sale at a public auction. Thus, MIAA brought a case for prohibition to the Court of Appeals against the City of Paraaque. The CA, however, dismissed the petition, prompting MIAA to file a petition in the SC, which was eventually granted.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, being devoted to public use, are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Article 420 specifically mentions ports constructed by the State, which includes public airports and seaports, as properties of public dominion and owned by the Republic. As properties of public dominion owned by the Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Airport Lands and Buildings are expressly exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC). This Court has also repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale, the Court ruled. The Court held that MIAA is a government instrumentality and not a governmentowned or controlled corporation (GOCC) as defined under sec. 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. Citing sec. 133(o) of the LGC, the Court said that MIAA, as a government instrumentality, is not subject to [t]axes, fees or charges of any kind by local governments. The Court added that the only exception is when MIAA leases its real property to a taxable person as provided in Section 234(a) of the LGC, in which case the specific real property leased becomes subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of Paraaque, the Court said. Concurring were Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, and Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Cancio C. Garcia, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. Justice Dante O. Tinga wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He was joined by Justices Ma. Alicia AustriaMartinez and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna was on leave. Justice Tinga argued that sec. 133 of the LGC was not intended to be so absolute a prohibition on the power of local
government units to tax the National Government, its agencies, and instrumentalities. He said that Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Hon. Marcos and a long line of succeeding cases have already settled the rule that under the LGC, all natural and juridical persons, even those GOCCs, instrumentalities and agencies, are no longer exempt from local taxes even if previously granted an exemption. The only exemptions from local taxes are those specifically provided under the Local Government Code itself, or those enacted through subsequent legislation. He also said that under sec. 232 of LGC, instrumentalities, agencies, and GOCCs are generally liable for real property taxes. Make no mistake, the majority has virtually declared war on the seventy nine provinces, one hundred seventeen cities, and one thousand five hundred municipalities of the Philippines, Justice Tinga said in his 82page dissenting opinion. (GR No. 155650,
MIAA v. CA, et al., July 20, 2006)
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Taxation; SC Holds DIGITEL Accountable to Pangasinan for Local Taxes (2007)

The Supreme Court recently found Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (DIGITEL) liable to the Province of Pangasinan for the payment of provincial franchise and real property taxes. Furthermore, the Court said that DIGITEL is liable for the corresponding interests, penalties, and surcharges of its tax liabilities. In a 21-page decision penned by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, the Court affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 in holding that the tax exemption in Republic Act No. 7925, the Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines, stating that any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall be made part of previously enacted franchises and made automatically applicable to the grantees thereof, does not work to exempt DIGITEL from payment of provincial franchise and real property taxes. Citing the 1991 case of PLDT v. City of Davao, the Court held that there is nothing in Section 23 of RA No. 7925 which shows that it contemplates the grant of tax
exemptions to all telecommunications entities, including those whose exemptions had been withdrawn by the Local Government Code (LGC). The Court noted that the exemption in 23 of R.A. No. 7925 could contemplate exemption from certain regulatory or reporting requirements. It thus held DIGITEL liable for the payment of the provincial franchise tax. However, it held that in view of the passage of Republic Act No. 7716 abolishing the franchise tax imposed on telecommunications companies effective 1 January 1996 and in its place imposing a 10 percent Value-Added-Tax (VAT) from 1 January 1996, petitioner DIGITEL is liable for only 10 percent VAT starting January 1, 1996.
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On the issue relating to the payment of real property taxes, the Court ruled that the exemption in DIGITELs franchise (R.A. No. 7678) only applies to those real properties actually, directly and exclusively used by it in its franchise. As such, Pangasinan can still levy real property tax on the remaining real properties of the grantee located within its territorial jurisdiction, the Court added. The Court thus directed the recomputation of DIGITELs tax liabilities in accordance with its decision. (GR No. 152534, Digital
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Province of Pangasinan, February 23, 2007)

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2006-2007 Highlighted Cases

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which deemed the crimes frustrated theft.

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Labor; Mapuas Change in Ranking of College Faculty Voided (2007)

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Labor; Reinstatement for Employee Dismissed on AWOL Due to Flood (2007)

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amended, is thus covered by the Decree.

Labor; School Guilty of Illegal Dismissal (2007)

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Legal Ethics; SC Disbars PBA Commissioner for ExtraMarital Affair (2007)

Legal Ethics; SC Bans Coterminous Employment of Justices Spouses

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claims of executive privilege silence, the Court said.

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(Republic v. Tuvera, et al., GR 148246, February 16, 2007)

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Remedial Law; Evidence; Conditions for Discharge of State Witness (2007)

Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; SC Upholds Textbook Supply Deal (2007)

Remedial Law; FPAs jurisdiction only over agri pesticides (2007)

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Remedial Law; SC Clarifies Rules on Indigent Litigants (2006)

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Remedial Law; SC Issues Guidelines on Judicial Solemnization of Marriage (2007)

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Remedial Law; SC resolves Boracay land dispute (2007)

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Taxation; SC Exempts MIAA from Paraaque Realty Taxes (2006)

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Taxation; SC Holds DIGITEL Accountable to Pangasinan for Local Taxes (2007)

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Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Province of Pangasinan, February 23, 2007)

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