Final Exam Reviewer 7.

Powers of Congress
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

a.

General Plenary Powers

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines except to the extent reserved to the people under Article VI, Section 32 on initiative and referendum.

b. Limitations on the Legislative Power 1. Substantive limitations

There are certain express and implied substantive limitations on the power to enact laws. The express substantive limitations are found in the Constitution. The Bill of Rights Certain rights and freedoms of individuals are limitations to the power of the Congress to legislate. Thus, several provisions of the bill of rights begin with No law shall be passed

2. Procedural limitations 8. Legislative Process a. Requirements as to bills 1. As to titles of bills

Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The title must fairly indicate the general subject and reasonably cover all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead the legislature or the people.

Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208

The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE.

Lidasan vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 479 (1967) Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)

Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994)

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675. "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

2. Requirements as to certain laws a. Appropriation laws

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The General Appropriations Act

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. Section 25. 1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. 2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. 3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. 4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein. 5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized toaugment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. 6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.

7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

Demetria vs. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987)

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch on constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. Transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings form another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.

Guingona vs. Caraque, 196 SCRA 221 (1991)

"What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inequity must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which legislative process can go forward . . . To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy . . . The standard may be either express or implied . . . from the policy and purpose of the act considered as whole . . ."

Philconsa vs. Enriquez, G.R. 113105, August 19, 1994 b. Tax laws
As a general rule, the power to tax, being an essential aspect of sovereignty, is inherently legislative and is therefore non-delegable. The 1987 Constitution, however, provides for two exceptions. The first is the delegation of tariff powers to the President to enable him to act promptly on matters affecting the national economy. The second is delegation of taxing powers to local in the pursuance of the policy on local autonomy, subject only to limitations that may be imposed by Congress.

Constitutional Provisions.
1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. 4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, G.R. 115455, Aug. 25, 1994

Lung Center v. Q. C., G.R. No. 144104. June 29, 2004 (Tax Exemption)
The Court held that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, the character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use and occupation of the properties. In the legal sense, a charity may be fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds and hearts under the influence of education or religion, by assisting them to establish themselves in life or otherwise lessening the burden of government. It may be applied to almost anything that tend to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man. It embraces the improvement and promotion of the happiness of man. The word "charitable" is not restricted to relief of the poor or sick. The test of a charity and a charitable organization are in law the same. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage. What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes. The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen. Further, a portion of the land is being leased to a private individual for her business enterprise under the business name "Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center." The Court held that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

Tan v. Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324 (2000)

Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" in that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. The contention clearly forgets, however, that such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496.

Section 6 of Revenue Regulation No. 2-93 did not alter, but merely confirmed, the above standing rule as now so modified by Republic Act No. 7496 on basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual income taxpayers on their non-compensation income. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general professional partnership.

Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 (1992) John Hay PAC v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003 c. Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998 b. Procedure for the passage of bills

No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. The Secretary reports the bill for first reading, which consists of reading the number and title of the bill, followed by its referral to the appropriate Committee for study and recommendation. On second reading, the bill shall be read in full with the amendments proposed by the committee, unless copies thereof are distributed and such reading is dispensed with. Then, the bill will be subject to debates, pertinent motions, and amendments. After the amendments, the bill will be voted on second reading. A bill approved on the second reading shall be included in the calendar of bills for third reading. On third reading, the bill as approved on second reading will be submitted for final vote. Exceptions to three readings and printed copies there are two exceptions to the rule that three readings must be made on several days and that a printed copy of the bill must be given three days before third reading, as follows: When the president certifies to the necessity of the immediate enactment of a bill to meet a public calamity or emergency. When Congress convenes to call a special election to elect the President and Vice-President.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra

The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Valued-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law: Art. VI, 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Id., 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenuestatute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filingrevenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the publicdebt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitutionbecause the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra Gonzales vs Macaraig. G.R. No. 87636, Nov. 19, 1990 Bengzon vs Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992) Miller vs. Mardo, 2 SCRA 898 (1961) Approval of the President
Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

Veto Power of the President

The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

No pocket veto a pocket veto is one by which the President secures disapproval of a bill of Congress by mere inaction after the adjournment of Congress. In the Philippines an inaction by the President for 30 days will result in the Passage of the Bill. If the Congress is not in session, the President must still act in order to veto the bill. No Selective Veto The President is limited to approving the bill or disapproving it. He cannot choose only the parts that he likes and veto the rest. Thus, when the President approves one part and vetoes another, the veto is ineffective. However, in the case of appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, the President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items, without vetoing the other item or items to which he does not object. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as "item," which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27 [2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item. A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. (Philconsa vs. Enriquez) Overriding the Veto After consideration of the objections raised by the President in his veto message, the House from which the bill originated may reconsider the bill. Two-thirds of all the members of such bill must agree to pass the bill. Thereafter, it shall be sent, together with the objections of the President, to the other house likewise for possible reconsideration, if approved by two-thirds of all members of the other house, it shall become a law.

c. Effectivity of laws Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) Executive Order No. 200, June 18, 1987 c. Question Hour
Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

d.

Legislative investigation

Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.

Armault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)

1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000. 2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. 3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.

HELD: 1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question. 2. NO Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed. 3. NO Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown. "Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable."

 Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.

Armault vs., Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 (1955) Bengzon vs. Sen. Blue Rib. Comm., 203 SCRA 767 (1991) Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006 Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. 174340, October 17, 2006 Neri v. Senate, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008 Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, Dec. 23, 2008 9. Other Powers: a. Act as board of canvassers for presidential election
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

Pimentel v. Joint Com., GR163783, June 22, 2004 b. Call a special election for Presidency
The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice- President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

c. Decide on disability of the President

Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his

office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

d. Legislative veto or extension for suspension of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

e.

Presidential amnesties
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

f.

Concur in treaties

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

g. h.

Declaration of existence of war Delegation of emergency powers

1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. 2. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

i. Utilization of natural resources j. Amendment of Constitution AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: 1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or 2. A constitutional convention. Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition

k. Power of Impeachment
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

B. Executive Department 1. The President The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. a. Qualifications, election, term and oath
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President. The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or VicePresident or Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." [In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted].

b. Privileges and salary Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003 c. Succession
The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms. If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the Presidentelect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified. If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President. Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified. The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the VicePresident shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified. The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.

1. In case of vacancy at the beginning of term 2. In Case of vacancy during term 3. In case of temporary disability Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001 d. Removal Removal by Impeachment A discussion on the subject can be found under other Powers of Congress. e. Prohibitions
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

f. Exceptions to prohibition from holding another office:

1. Vice-President as member of the cabinet

There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.

2.

Sec. of Justice as member of Judicial and Bar Council

A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Article VII, Section 8) provides for the exception that allows a cabinet member from holding another office

CLU vs. Exec. Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

Fast facts Petitions are assailing the constitutionality of EO 284. EO No. 284 It adds exceptions to Article 7, Section 13 of the Constitution. It allows officials of the Executive Department, in addition to their primary position, to hold not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations Contention c/o petitioners EO 284 runs counter to the provisions of Article 7, Section 13. Any exception to this provision shall be expressly stated in another Constitutional provision. Article 7, Section 13 Executive Department shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract Article 9-B, Section 7 Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision Issue Does the prohibition in Article 7, Section 13 insofar as Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants are concerned, admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Article 9-B, Section 7? Held & Ratio No. EO 284 is null and void. On intent of framers. A Constitutional provision must be interpreted with reference to the intention underlying it. It has been held that the Court in construing a provision should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The provisions were constructed with the distinct objective of disallowing abuse of multiple positions held by an individual from the executive, including appointees, as it was prevalent in the Marcos regime.

 On simultaneous interpretation of Sections 13 and 9B. Article 9B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Article 7, Section 13 is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, VP, Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants. This is illustrative of a stricter mandate as regards the President. On taking the provisions of the constitution together, not separately. Interpreting Article 9-B as broad exceptions as directly referred from Article 7, Section 13 would render certain Constitutional provisions inoperative. No one section is allowed to defeat another. On valid references made by Article 7, Section 13. The phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself: Article 7, Section 3; Article 7, Section 7 and; Article 8, Section 8. Ex officio Article 7, Section 13 does not cover those positions held in ex officio capacity. Ex officio refers to an authority that forms part as one of the duties that stems from a position and not a separate position. Only the additional functions and duties required, as opposed to allowed, by the primary functions may be considered as not constituting any other office.

Cruz v. COA, G.R. No. 138489, Nov. 29, 2001 NAC v. COA. G.R. 156982, September 8, 2004 2. Powers and Functions of the President
The executive function is essentially the duty to implement the laws within the standard imposed by the legislature. As the executive authority, the President has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and order. The President is however, not just the Chief Executive but also the administrative head of the government. As such, it is his duty to see that the government office is managed and maintained properly by the persons in charge of it, in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations.

a. Executive Power Marcos vs. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760 (1989)

Fast facts The wish of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, after having been exiled, has been barred by President Corazon Aquino, in exercise of her executive power. Article 7, Section 1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. Article 7, Sections 14-23 Powers (executive) expressly provided for the Constitution. Issue (WON) The President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines

Held & Ratio

Yes. The President, who has been expressly granted powers by the Constitution, also has implied residual powers inherent to the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution. She did not act in grave abuse of discretion. As long as there is some factual basis for the presidents decision, there is no grave abuse of discretion. Notes in class Exclusive list of powers there are inherent limitations. Executive power is what the president can/cannot do, restricted by the doctrine of separation of powers. Supreme court proved that Aquino can prevent Marcos from returning by defining and establishing that the president has residual powers Residual powers Inherent powers exercised by the President in accordance with her position, derived from the oath she has taken during her inauguration. All powers that is not under judicial or legislative. There should be no gap in the exercise of power.

Province of North Cotabato v. Government, supra DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees, G.R. No. 149725, August 19, 2003
Fast facts A Memorandum was issued by the Regional Director of the DENR pursuant to AO 99-14. The Memorandum set forth for the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. DENR employees that were going to be affected by the enactment of the said Memorandum filed a petition to enjoin such enactment. Contention c/o DENR employees The power to transfer the Regional Office of the DENR is executive in nature. Thus, the Regional director/office of DENR cannot enact said Memorandum as it is beyond its powers. Qualified political agency All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Departmentdemand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the President are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed, and promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively the acts of the President. Application of qualified political agency doctrine. The power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department Held & Ratio The DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR, by virtue of the qualified political agency doctrine.

b. Control of executive departments

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Blaquera v. Alcala, G.R. 109406, September 11, 1998

Background: RA 6791 enacted pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative code of 1987 provided for productivity incentives to some employees of certain Government agencies (GOCCs in particular). A number of employees who were given such incentives but from whose salaries such were deducted as a refund by the President because he says the same were given by their departments without his consent as required by the RA brought this action to the SC. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the refund. The Government agencies from whose employees deductions were made were not covered by the RA which only included GOCCs with Original Charters. And the President has Control over all Government agencies and GOCCs. RD: There are generally two types of GOCCs: o Those incorporated under the General Corporation Law are covered by Labor Laws and have the right to bargain collectively, strike, and other such remedies available to workers of private corporations. Functions are mainly proprietary. o Those with Special/Original Charters which are subject to Civil Service Laws, have no right to bargain. Incorporated in pursuance to State Policy. The President of the Head of Government. His/her power includes control which means the power to alter what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Art IX Sec 5 - Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Hutchison Ports vs. SBMA, G.R. No. 131367, Aug. 31, 2000 One of the issues raised and submitted for resolution was whether or not the Office of the President can set aside the award made by SBMA in favor of plaintiff HPPL and if so, can the Office of the President direct the SBMA to conduct a rebidding of the proposed project. The President may, within his authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of Directors for justifiable reasons. It is well-established that the discretion to accept or reject any bid, or even recall the award thereof, is of such wide latitude that the courts will not generally interfere with the exercise thereof by the executive department, unless it is apparent that such exercise of discretion is used to shield unfairness or injustice. When the President issued the memorandum setting aside the award previously declared by the SBMA in favor of HPPL and directing that a rebidding be conducted, the same was within the authority of the President and was a valid exercise of his prerogative.

NEA v. COA, 377 SCRA 233 (2002) c. General supervision over local governments/autonomous regions
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. (Art. X, Sec. 4) The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. (Art. X, Sec. 16)

Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. 132988, July 19, 2000

"SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. . . ."

This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms supervision and control differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows: ". . . In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." In Taule v. Santos, the court further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"

d. Power of Appointment
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Bermudez v. Torres, G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999

Power of appointment Discretionary (Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v Intermediate Appellate Court, Flores v Drilon). The one who holds the power has the option which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is the best qualified individual for a given post. The President is the head of the government whose authority includes the power of control ever all executive departments and bureaus. The President has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau, or office. Held & Ratio The recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, as regards the appointment of the Provincial Chief Prosecutor, dispensable. It is to be construed as mere advise, exhortation, or endorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. Only advisory in nature. The President, as the head of the

executive department, may do away with this particular action because appointment is discretionary and he has the power to control the department. The doctrine in San Juan v CSC cannot be used in the case at bar because, in that case, the DBM had local autonomy. That being, the President shared its power on appointment with the DBM. In the present case however, there is no sharing of power.

Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987)

Fast facts Petitioners question the constitutionality of the appointment of Salvador Mison as par t of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. Contention c/o pet Guillermo Carague, Secretary of the Department of Budget, cannot effect disbursements in the payment of the salaries of Mison, with the latter being appointed without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, hence unconstitutional. 4 groups a President may appoint 1. Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers 2. All other officers of the government, the appointments of whom are not specifically provided for by the law 3. Those whom the President may be authorized to appoint 4. Officers lower in rank 1935 v 1975 Constitutions: on role of CA 1935 virtually all appointments of the President had to be subjected to the confirmation and approval of the CA. This cultivated a culture of horse-trading and other corrupt practices. 1975 power of appointments was vested solely in the President, with the role of the President being reduced to nearly nothing. This posed the danger of abuse on the part of the President as his prerogatives will not be subjected to checks and balances the CA provides. Held & Ratio Mison was duly appointed to the Bureau of Customs and, thus, entitled to receive salaries and perform his duties as such. The appointment can be made only with the approval of the President alone, that is, even without submitting the nomination for the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The court reviewed the transcripts of the 1986 Constitutional Convention and it revealed that the framers intentionally left out the last three (3) groups of individuals the President may appoint from the CA confirmation requirement. Only those encompassed by the first group shall be subjected for confirmation, as a requirement for strict compliance. The 1987 Constitution intentionally made these distinctions as a middle-ground between the provision of 1935 and 1975 constitutional provisions on the same matter. Moreover, the 1987 constitution, based on the transcripts of the constitutional convention, intentionally left out heads of bureaus from the first group.

Concepcion-Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160 (1989)

Bautista was appointed by President Aquino, from an ad interim appointment, as the Chairperson of the CHR. She took her oath and assumed the duties and responsibilities of the position. Her appointment was questioned by the CA because she was appointed without having the CA confirm her nomination. Contention c/o Bautista

CA does not have the jurisdiction to question her appointment. Held & Ratio The position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first group of presidential appointees, as enumerated in Article 7, Section 16, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CA. The appointment of the Chairman of the CHR is not specifically provided in the constitution itself, unlike the Chairpersons and members of the COMELEC, CSC, and COA, whose appointments are expressly vested by the constitution in the President, with the consent of the CA. The President shall validly appoint the Chairman of the CHR, without the confirmation of the CA, pursuant to the abovementioned constitutional provision. Calderon vs. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992 Fast facts President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public workers and employers sectors. It was stated that the appointees may qualify and assume the duties and responsibilities of their appointed seats. RA 6715 Section 13 Provides that the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC shall be appointed by the President upon the confirmation of CA. Doctrines from jurisprudence (Mison, Quintos-Deles, and Concepcion-Bautista) 1. Confirmation from CA is only required when the appointee involved in the first group, including those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the constitution itself in the President (i.e. sectoral reps to Congress and members of the CSC, etc.) 2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint 3. Confirmation is not required in the appointment of those from inferior offices, because it shall be construed as those officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law Issue WON Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CA of appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in Article 7, Section 16 fo the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation from the CA Contention c/o pet Section 13 of RA 6715 must mandatorily be complied with. Held & Ratio As to the constitutionality of the appointments. The President is within her authority to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC without the prior confirmation of the CA. The aforementioned officials are not included in the first group of appointees, as clearly explained in Mison. As to the constitutionality of RA 6715. Unconstitutional. It amends legislation by adding to the first group provided in Article 7, Section 16, additional officers which it requires to be appointed by the President upon the confirmation of the CA. It appears that the legislature is not happy with the lessened role of the CA in the appointment process, as compared to the 1935 Constitution.

Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. 107369, August 11, 1999

Fast facts The case at bar deals with the validity of the disbursements made as payment of the salaries of officers of the PNP. These officers were appointed by President Aquino without subjecting such appointments to the confirmation of the CA. Contention c/o Pet There is illegal disbursement of public funds because the payments of salaries and other emoluments were made to PNP officers who were not validly appointed, as their appointment lacks confirmation from the CA. There must be compliance with RA 6975. RA 6975 Empowers the CA to confirm the appointments of public officials, particularly those who are from the rank of superintendent and higher. Held & Ratio As to the validity of the disbursements. Valid. The payments were made to legitimate officers of the PNP whose appointments were valid as well. The appointments of the respondents to their respective positions are not contemplated within the first groupthat which requires the confirmation by the CA. Officers from the PNP differ from those from the AFP. If those from the latter require the confirmation by the CA in order for them to finally be appointed by the President, those from the PNP need not abide the same process. As to the Constitutionality of RA 6975. Sections 26 and 31 of the RA are unconstitutional as they provide additional legislation. Congress cannot, by law, expand the power of confirmation of the CA and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first group provided in Article 7, Section 16.

Soriano v. Lista, G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003

Fast facts The case at bar deals with the appointment of the respondents to different positions in the Philippine Coast Guard and their subsequent assumption of office. Contention c/o Soriano III The aforementioned appointments are illegal and unconstitutional for failure to undergo the confirmation process in the CA. The respondents should be prohibited from discharging their duties and functions as such officers of the PCG. Moreover, they should not be entitled to receiving salaries for their positions. Held & Ratio The appointments are legal and constitutional. The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Article 7, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain refers to military officers alone. Moreover, the PCG is under DOTC not the Philippine Navy. Since it is not included in the first group, the appointments of the respondents need not be subjected for confirmation by the CA.

Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. 164978, October 13, 2005

Nature of power to appoint Executive in nature. The legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the

legislature. Legislature can only prescribe the qualification for the position. It cannot appoint someone in the guise that it is prescribing qualifications to that office. Contentions c/o petitioners PGMA should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because only an Undersecretary can be designated as an acting secretary No appointments can be made while congress is in session, whether regular or acting, without the approval of the Commission on Appointments Held & Ratio Appointments are constitutional. The President has the right to appoint the person of her choice into a vacant position temporarily before there is a permanent replacement because the department secretary is her alter ego. An alter ego calls for the trust and confidence of the president. Being such, it entails for the personal choice of the president, not simply the assumption of the undersecretary of the vacant position. The law expressly allows the president to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that the president may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.

In Re Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9, 1998

Facts: - The Resolution of the Court En Banc, handed down on May 14, 1998, sets out the relevant facts. - Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed by the President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. - received at the Chief Justice's chambers on May 12, 1998 - view by Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Consultant of the Council, who had been a member of the Committee of the Executive Department and of the Committee on the Judicial Department of the 1986 Constitutional Commission: that on the basis of the Commission's records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. Without any extended discussion or any prior research and study on the part of the other Members of the JBC, this hypothesis was accepted, and was then submitted to the President for consideration, together with the Council's nominations for eight (8) vacancies in the Court of Appeals - April 6, 1998: Chief Justice received an official communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of eight (8) Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals all of which had been duly signed on March 11, 1998 by the President - In view of the fact that all the appointments had been signed on March 11, 1998 - the day immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution - which impliedly indicated that the President's Office did not agree with the hypothesis that appointments to the Judiciary were not covered by said ban, the Chief Justice resolved to defer consideration of nominations for the vacancy in the Supreme Court created by the retirement of Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco - May 4, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from the President, addressed to the JBC, requesting transmission of the "list of final nominees" for the vacancy" no later than Wednesday, May 6, 1998," in view of the duty imposed on him by the Constitution "to fill up the vacancy . . . within ninety (90) days from February 13, 1998, the date the present vacancy occurred."

- May 5, 1998: Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III requested the Chief Justice for "guidance" respecting the expressed desire of the "regular members" of the JBC to hold a meeting immediately to fill up the vacancy in the Court in line with the President's letter . The Chief Justice advised Secretary Bello to await the reply that he was drafting - May 6, 1998: the Chief Justice sent his reply to the President-- stating that no sessions had been scheduled for the Council until after the May elections because of the "need to undertake further study of the matter," prescinding from "the desire to avoid any constitutional issue regarding the appointment to the mentioned vacancy"; delivered to Malacaang May 6, 1998, and a copy given to the Office of Justice Secretary Bello - Justice Secretary and the regular members of the Council had already taken action on May 6, 1998 they came to an agreement on a resolution: they drew attention to Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution (omitting any mention of Section 15, Article VII) as well as to the President's letter of May 4, with an appeal that the Chief Justice convene the Council for the purpose "on May 7, 1998 - CJ convoked the Council to a meeting at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of May 7, 1998 - May 7, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from President: "the election-ban provision applies only to executive appointments or appointments in the executive branch of government," the whole article being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.'", "firmly and respectfully reiterate(d) . . . (his) request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit . . . the final list of nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy." - May 8, 1998: Chief Justice replied: --Section 15 of Article VII imposes a direct prohibition on the President which is the general rule, the only exception being only as regards "executive positions"(judicial positions are covered by the general rule) - Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, unlike Section 15, Article VII, the duty of filling the vacancy is not specifically imposed on the President - normally, when there are no presidential elections Section 4 (1), Article VIII shall apply but when (as now) there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the President shall not make any appointments - requesting the regular Members of the Judicial and Bar Council to defer action on the matter until further advice by the Court - May 8, 1998: another meeting was held; closed with a resolution that "the constitutional provisions be referred to the Supreme Court En Banc for appropriate action - May 12, 1998: Chief Justice received from Malacaang the appointments of two (2) Judges of the Regional Trial Court mentioned above; places on the Chief Justice the obligation of transmitting the appointments to the appointees so that they might take their oaths and assume the duties of their office (trouble is that in doing so, the Chief Justice runs the risk of acting in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution) - the Court Resolved that pending the foregoing proceedings and the deliberation by the court on the matter, and until further orders, no action be taken on the appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta which in the meantime shall be held in abeyance and not given any effect and said appointees shall refrain from taking their oath of office and the Judicial and Bar Council is INSTRUCTED to defer all action on the matter of nominations - Valenzuela took his oath on May 14, 1998 -- In his "Explanation" he stated that he did so because on May 7, 1998 he "received from Malacaang copy of his appointment . . ." which contained the following direction: "By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office" - The Relevant Constitutional Provisions Section 15, Article VII:

"Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein prejudice public service or endanger public safety." Section 4 (1), Article VIII: "The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof ." Section 9, Article VIII: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list." Issue: WON during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII Held/Ratio: The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Such appointments come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. Reasoning - While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban. - Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. - journal of the commission which drew up the present Constitution discloses: desire to make certain that the size of the Court would not be decreased for any substantial period as a result of vacancies, the insertion in the provision of the same mandate that "IN CASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF." was proposed - Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments - the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be made by the outgoing President - The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban. - Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this Court's view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter

- the Constitution must be construed in its entirety as one, single instrument; instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. - concerning Valenzuela's oath-taking and "reporting for duty"-Standing practice is for the originals of all appointments to the Judiciary to be sent by the Office of the President to the Office of the Chief Justice, the appointments being addressed to the appointees "Thru: the Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Manila." It is the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, in the Chief Justice's behalf, who thereafter advises the individual appointees of their appointments and also of the date of commencement of the pre-requisite orientation seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for new Judges.

De Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001 Matibag vs. Benipayo,. G.R. No. 149036 , April 2, 2002
Facts: - The Case: Petition for Prohibition w/ prayer for a writ of prelim injunction and TRO. Petitioner questions the appointment and the right of respondents to remain in office as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC - On Feb.2, 1999, Petitioner Ma. Angelina Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as Acting Director IV of the Education and Information Dept. (EID), her appointment was renewed on Feb 15, 2000 in a Temporary capacity and renewed yet again on Feb 15, 2001 in the same Temporary capacity. - On March 22, 2001 PGMA appointed ad interim, respondents Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion Borra, and Florentino Tuason as COMELEC commissioners respectively, for a term of 7 years, expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. They took their oaths and assumed their positions with the President submitting their ad interim appointments to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 for confirmation. The Commission on Appointments, however, did not act on their appointments. - On June 1, 2001, PGMA renewed their ad interim appointments with the term and the expiration remaining the same (for 7 years and expiring on Feb 2, 2008). The new appointees took oath a 2nd time and the same was transmitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation on June 5, 2001. The Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on the appointments resulting in the renewal of their ad interim appointments by the President for the 3rd time on June 8, 2001. - Benipayo, acting as COMELEC chairman, assigned a Velma Cinco as officer-in-charge of EID and reassigned petitioner to the Law Dept, a move which she requested reconsideration for, citing Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular no. 7 (transfer of employees prohibited during election period: Jan.2-June 13, 2001). Benipayo denied the request and citing COMELEC Resolution no. 3300. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Dept against Benipayo and while the complaint was pending, she also filed this action. She claims that ad interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, and on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails her reassignment to the Law Dept, the appointment of Cinco as well as the disbursements made by the COMELEC Finance Services Dept officer by way of salaries and emoluments in favor of respondents. - PGMA, on Sept. 6, 2001 renewed once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for a term of 7 years expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. Issue: 1. WON Benipayos ad interim appointment and assumption of office as COMELEC chairman is constitutional 2. WON issue is justiciable

3. If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were indeed appointed lawfully, WON the renewal of their appointments and subsequent assumption of office was constitutional 4. WON petitioners removal and reassignment is illegal (done w/o approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body) 5. WON the Officer-in-charge of COMELEC Finance Services Dept, in making disbursements in favor of the new appointees, acted in excess of jurisdiction. Held/Ratio: 1. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment made by the Pres. in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It is not an appointment in a temporary or acting capacity. It takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the Pres. once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. Reasoning - Although the last sentence of Art IX-C Sec 1(2) of the Constitution says, In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, an ad interim appointment is not a temporary appointment. A distinction was made between the two in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v IAC, where it was held that an ad interim appointment as defined in Blacks Law Dictionary is one that is appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent. But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Phil. law. Ad interim is used to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President, in the meantime, while the body, which is originally vested with the power or appointment, is unable to act. - Although the 1935 Consti did not have the provision prohibiting temporary or acting appointments, this Court then decided such an appointment in Nacionalista Party v Bautista as unconstitutional declaring that, It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily. Likewise, In Brillantes v Yorac, decided under the present Constitution, this Court struck down as unconstitutional the designation by then Pres. Aquino of Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC. - Art. IX-A 1 should be harmonized with Art. VII 16. for to hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointments before the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. - The original draft of Art. VII 16 did not provide for ad interim appointments, however, it was reinstated to avoid interruptions in vital govt services that would result from prolonged vacancies in govt offices. The ad interim appointment has since been practiced by Presidents Aquino, Ramos and Estrada. 2. Justiciability of the case: The Court determined the justiciability of the case by tackling the requisites of judicial review raised by the respondents which they claimed to be lacking (actual case/controversy was not raised) > personal and substantial interest of the party Petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the case. If Benipayos appointment is unlawful, petitioners reassignment is without legal basis; if it is lawful, then she has no cause to complain provided that it was done in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Because of her personal and material stake in the resolution of the constitutionality of respondents assumption of office, she has locus standi to raise it as a constitutional issue > exercise of judicial review must be pleaded at the earliest opportunity It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body.

> the constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case The Respondents claim that the legality of petitioners reassignment from the EID to the Law Dept. is the issue. The Court, however, held that unless the constitutionality of Benipayos appointment is determined, the legality of petitioners assignment cannot be determined, therefore the lis mota of this case is clearly the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. 3. The phrase without reappointment in Art. IX-C 1(2) applies only to appointments by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, regardless of WoN such person appointed completes the term of office. Reasoning The phrase without reappointment does not apply to the renewal of appointments to Benipayo, Tuason and Borra because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. - The renewal of their appointments was by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. It was not acted upon on the merits at the close of the session of Congress. There was no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. It is therefore neither fixed nor an unexpired term. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee as recognized in Sec.17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, their appointments were all for a fixed term expiring on Feb. 2, 2008, clearly not in breach of the 7 year term limit. 4. The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel and the person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. He has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective. Moreover, in COMELEC Resolution no. 3300, the COMELEC en banc, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period. 5. Because Benipayo is held to be the lawful COMELEC chairman, the Officer-in-Charge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction, in the disbursement of their salaries.

Larin v. Exec. Secretary, G.R. 112745, October 16, 1997 e. Executive clemency The Pardoning Power
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the Presidentmay grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. Object of Pardon the object of pardon is to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation and enforcement of the criminal law. Pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is a remission of guilt. Commutation the substitution for a less greater punishment, by authority of law, and may be imposed on the convict without his acceptance and against his consent. Reprieve is the withholding of a sentence for an interval of time. Amnesty a sovereign act granting oblivion or general pardon for past acts, granted by the government generally to a class of persons who are subject to trial and have not been convicted, usually of political offenses (treason, rebellion, sedition)

Probation a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and before serving sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to supervisin of a probation officer. Parole the suspensin of the sentence of a convict granted after serving the mnimum term of the indeterminate sentence penalti, without granting a pardon, prescribing the terms upon which sentence will be suspended and the convict temporarilu released. Distinctions: Pardon and Probation in both cases, there must be a final judgement of conviction, and the convict must be exempted from the service of the sentence. Pardon is given by the Chief Executive for any crime, while probation is granted by the court after investigation by a probation officer only for cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed 6 years and 1 day, where the crime is not against the security of the state, where there was no previous conviction of an offense punished by arresto mayor, and where there was no pevious availment of probation. In absolute pardon, the sentence and its effects including the accessory penalties, are abolished upon grant of pardon. In probation, the restoration of the probationer to his civil rights take place only after his final discharge afte the period of his probation. Pardon and Parole Pardon may be granted by the Chief Executive under the Constitution at any time after final judgement of conviction, even before service; while parole is granted by the Board of Pardons and Parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law only after the convict has served the mnimum term f his sentence. In pardon the convict becomes a free man; in parole, he is not really free because he must submit to periodic examination by the Board of Parole. Thus a parole does not pardon the convict, he still remains in custody. Pardon and Amnesty - Pardon is usually granted for common crimes; amnesty for political crimes. Pardon is given to individuals; amnesty, to a group, class or community generally. Pardon can only be granted after conviction; amnesty may be granted even before trial. Pardon looks forward and relieves the ofender from the consequence of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment. Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, that is, it overlooks and obliterates the offense with which the convict is charged and the person released stands precisely as though he had committed no offense. Pardon is a private act of the President, and so must be pleaded in court. Amnesty is a public act by the President and Congress, and so the court is enjoined to take judicial notice of it.

Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, G.R. L-1278, January 21, 1949

Fast facts Petitioners were charged with murder. Jimenez learned of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with a felony in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against personas aiding the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during December 8, 1941, to the date when each particular area of the country where he offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation. Petitioners submitted their case to the Guerilla Amnesty Commission (GAC), presided by the respondents. The GAC remanded the same to the CFI without rendering a decision on WON the petitioners are entitled to amnesty. Petitioners filed an action to mandate the GAC to proceed with presiding over their application for amnesty. Contention c/o Resp In order for GAC to be able to preside over such cases, it must be held that the petitioners (those who have applied for amnesty) have admitted having committed the offense. As such, petitioners cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty. Proclamation No. 8

 Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946. Issued by the then president Manuel Roxas, with concurrence of Congress Provides among others that in order to determine if the persons who have been charged or will be charged, come within the terms of this proclamation, the GAC shall examine the facts and circumstances surrounding each case and, if necessary, conduct summary hearings of witnesses both for the complainant and the accused Held & Ratio It is not necessary for the petitioners to admit having committed the felony charged to them in order for the GAC to preside over their case and ultimately qualify for amnesty. It is enough that the evidence shows that the offense committed is a felony that qualifies for amnesty as provided in the proclamation. The performance of the summary hearings by the GAC is not dependent on the confession on the part of the accused. The GAC must conduct these hearings regardless of confession, in pursuance of theprovisions of the proclamation. Amnesty is a public act which the courts, including the GAC, must take cognizance of. Dissenting opinion (Tuason) Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. If the accused has not confessed to it, he has no use for amnesty. It is the burden of the accused to prove the existence of certain conditions provided in the amnesty proclamation. The accused has to confess the allegations against him before he is allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action. Unless the defendant admits at the investigation or hearing having committed the offense and states that he did it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy and not for purely personal motive, it is impossible for the court or GAC to verify the motive for the commission of the offense, because only the accused could explain his belief and intention or the motive of committing the offense. Rebuttal to dissenting Motive for the commission of a crime is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or after the commission of the offense. The testimony of a defendant at the time of arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive, cannot generally be considered and relied on. Such a testimony may simply be an afterthought or have underlying interest.

Vera v. People, 7 SCRA 152 (1963)

Fast facts Teofilo Santos (resp) was found guilty of estafa and sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law. He was imprisoned from March 14 to August 18, 1932 and paid the corresponding costs of trial. Despite his conviction and imprisonment, Santos continued to be a registered voter in his municipality and was, between 1934 and 1937, the municipal president of that municipality. He applied for pardon in view of a newly promulgated Election Code which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property. He was granted pardon on December 24, 1939. Miguel Cristobal (pet) filed an action on November 16, 1940 to exclude the name of Santos from the list of voters in their municipality. Effect of pardon granted to Santos Restored his full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility. Contention c/o Cristobal The pardon extended by the President to Santos did not restore the full enjoyment of respondents political rights because: (a) the pardoning power of the President does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the President of a legislative function, and; (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. Limitations on pardoning power of the Chief Executive 1. That the power be exercised after conviction

2. That such power does not extend to cases of impeachment Nature and extent of absolute pardon It not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, it removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. Held & Ratio Santos cannot be excluded for the list of voters since he has already been granted pardon. While the pardon in the case at bar is conditional in the sense that it limits the positions he may occupy or be eligible for, it is still absolute insofar as it restores the respondent to full civil and political rights. Right of suffrage is expressly restored by the pardon. The pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action

Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34 (1941) Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441 (1941) In Re Lontok, 43 Phil 293 (1923) Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 273 (1987) f. Commander-in Chief
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

Authority of Commander-in-Chief 1. To maintain peace and order 2. To call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion 3. To suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 4. To place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law Presidential mandate Deployment of PNP and Marines in malls Joint visibility patrols For crime prevention and suppression Nature of authority of Commander-in-Chief When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. There is textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Thus, should not be subjected to judicial review. Role of Congress (limitation) It may revoke a presidential proclamation or suspension on the matter and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. Calling out of armed forces v Martial Law To validly proclaim Martial Law, the following must be present: 1. There must be an actual invasion or rebellion 2. Public safety must require it These conditions need not be present in order to validly call out the armed forces. It is enough that there is sufficient basis to support such a proclamation. Contention c/o IBP Civilian character of PNP has been violated REBUTTAL: Test: as long as PNP is still in charge, not the marines perfectly okay. Basis of Chief Executive in calling out marines President has sufficient basis. The recent bombings and Mindanao insurgencies, danger in society is prevalent. Calling out of the marines is simply in pursuance of the prevention and suppression of lawless violence. An actual invasion, as IBP contends, does not have to occur because all it (calling out of marines) requires is that there is a necessity in doing so. Held & Ratio It is constitutional. Not a single citizen has complained that his rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the marines. The malls (e.g. SM) have not even complained when they are actually the ones who have standing on this issue (because the marines are deployed in their establishments). The President has enough basis to set out such a proclamation.

Sanlakas v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 159085. Feb. 3, 2004

Proclamation No. 427 & General Order No. 4 July 27, 2003: State of rebellion. AFP to suppress the rebellion. Proclamation No. 435 August 1, 2003: Declaration that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist. Nature of authority of Commander-in-Chief Article 7 Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign. Held & Ratio The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionality of protected rights. The warrantless arrest feared by the petitioners is not exclusive to the declaration of state of rebellion. A person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion WON there is such a proclamation, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present. It is reiterated, based on IBP v Zamora, that the calling out power does not necessitate the same conditions required for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the proclamation of martial law. The only criterion to adjudge the calling out is that whenever such calling out becomes necessary.

Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974) Olaquer vs. MC No. 4, 150 SCRA 144 (1987)
Timeline December 24, 1979: Petitioners were arrested and detained. May 30, 1980: Petitioners were charged for subversion (For violation of PD 885, the revised anti-subversion law) June 30, 1980: Respondent Chief-of-Staff of AFP created the respondent commission Military Commission No. 34 to try the criminal case filed against the petitioners. July 30, 1980: Amended charge sheet was filed enumerating the following offenses: (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Enrile, Tatad, and Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Tangco, Roo, and Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Perez, Valencia, and Generals Espino and Ver; and (7)conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. August 19, 1980: Petitioners filed action enjoining respondent MC from proceeding with the trial of their case. January 17, 1981: President Marcos lifted Martial Law (Proclamation No. 2045). This proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 (creating military tribunals) and provided that military tribunals created pursuant thereto are hereby dissolved upon final determination of cases pending therein which may not be transferred to the civil courts without irreparable prejudice December 4, 1984: Pending resolution on the petition, the MC passed sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty of death by electrocution. February 14, 1985: Petitioners file action in SC seeking to enjoin the MC from taking any further action on the case against them, and from implementing the judgment of conviction rendered by the MC because the same is null and void. Feburary 1986: President Aquino assumed office.

Issue (WON) A military tribunal has jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning. Aquino, Jr. v MC 2 Held that the MC has been lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians. Prompt and effective trial and punishment of offenders have been considered as necessary in a state of martial law, as a mere power of detention may be wholly inadequate for the exigency, martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by military tribunals. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. Military tribunals Pertain to the Executive Department and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and any and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives. Held & Ratio As long as the civil courts in the land are open and functioning, military tribunals will never have jurisdiction over civilians. The power of interpreting laws is a function of the judiciary. It is not the function of the executive, through military authorities. To take cognizance of such a jurisdiction will be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian.

Navales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 162318, October 25, 2004 Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971) In Re De Villa, G.R. No. 158802, November 17, 2004 David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171390, May 3, 2006 g. Emergency Powers
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

h. Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Constantino v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005 i. Foreign affairs
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, Feb. 11, 2009 Peoples Movement for Press Freedom, et al. v. Hon. Raul Manglapus, G.R. No. 84642, En Banc Resolution dated April 13, 1988 Comm. of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961) Go Tek vs Deportation Board, 79 SCRA 17 (1977) j. Legislation 1. Address Congress 2. Preparation and submission of the budget 3. Veto-Power 4. Emergency Powers k. Immunity from suit Beltran vs. Macasiar, G.R. 82585, November 14, 1988
Fast facts Maximo Soliven and Luis Beltran (pets) were arrested for the charge of libel. Issue (WON) The President, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of the complaint-affidavit. Contention c/o Beltran The reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit. If criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial courts jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Privilege of immunity from suit. To assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the President, is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention. Only good during the term of the President. Cannot be used as a shield from criminal proceedings (high-crimes). Held & Ratio The President may initiate criminal proceedings. Privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by her, the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. The accused in a criminal case cannot establish as a defense the privilege of immunity of the President to prevent the case from proceeding against the accused. The President may waive this privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The decision for waiver is solely upon the President, not any other person.

 Issue is premature. There has been no suit filed against the President. Petitioner has been speculating. NOTES IN CLASS: The President can sue, but he cannot be sued within his term. If a public official is sued in his public capacity, a private lawyer cannot represent him. Only the OSC can.

Gloria v. CA, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000

Fast facts Bienvenido Icasiano (private resp) was the School Division Superintendent of QC, as appointed by former President Aquino. In 1994, Secretary Gloria (pet) recommended to the President the reassignment of Icasiano to Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST). The President approved the said recommendation. Director Rosas (pet) informed Icasiano of his reassignment. Icasiano asked for the reconsideration of his reassignment. The CA held that the reassignment was violative of Icasianos security of tenure, and thus enjoined. Contention c/o Pet The petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit. Ramos approved the transfer, thus if someone questions the transfer, the act of the President is questioned. Held & Ratio On the violation of doctrine of presidential immunity from suit. There is no violation of the doctrine. The petition was clearly filed against Gloria and Rosas, not the President. Even so, the acts of the President may still be questioned and tried in the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction (Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, etc). On the violation of the security of tenure. There is violation of security of tenure (Civil Service Laws). The reassignment by Icasiano is indefinite and may be viewed as a demotion or a constructive removal from service. (Bentain v CA)

3. Vice President a. Qualifications, election, term and oath b. Privileges and salary c. Prohibitions d. Succession C. The Judicial Department 1. Judicial Power
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

2. The Supreme Court a. Composition

The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.

b. Mode of Sitting
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

MMDA v. Jancom, G.R. 147465, April 10, 2002

Fast facts The case at bar relates with an assailment of a waste management contract between the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM Environmental Corporation. Contentions c/o MMDA The resort to certiorari was proper There was no valid contract as it never passed the negotiation stage The case should be heard by the Court en banc Held & Ratio on cognizance of SC en banc The case should not be referred to the SC en banc. The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed. A decision of a Division of the Court is a decision of the Supreme Court. The division did refer the case en consulta to the Court en banc, suggesting or inquiring if the Court en banc should take over and whether the case should be re-raffled courtwide due to the inhibition of Justice Carpio. The Court en banc, however, declined to take over the case and returned it to the Third Division with instructions that it be re-raffled among the other members of the Division. Circular 2-89 further pertinently provides that no motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc declining to take cognizance of a referral by a Division, shall be entertained.

People v. Gacott, G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995

Fast facts Eustaquio Gacott (resp) is charged of grave abuse of discretion for erroneously dismissing a case. He was reprimanded a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, information of which will be included in his permanent records. Gacott wants the Court to pass upon his other supplications, arguments, and even his insinuations for that matter. He asks for his erroneous decision to not be included in his permanent records as it would be detrimental to his career. Gacott somehow suggests that the administrative case against him was unfairly raffled to Justice Bidin in the Third Division

Contention c/o Gacott The full court, SC en banc, is the only body which can administratively punish him. The divisions of the SC cannot preside over his case. Held & Ratio Article 8, Section 11 of the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that even divisions can preside over administrative and disciplinary cases of judges. It was never intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity and inefficiency.

c. Appointments and qualifications

The members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar and Council for every vacancy. Such appointment need no confirmation.

Vacancies: Any vacancy (in the Supreme Court) shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the concurrence of the vacancy. For the lower courts, the president shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the submission of the list (from the Judicial and Bar Council). d. No non-judicial work for judges the members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function. Meralco vs. Pasay Trans Co., 57 Phil. 600 (1932)
Fast facts The case at bar relates with a petition of the Manila Electric Company (MEC, pet), requesting the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MEC and the compensation to be paid to the MEC by such transportation companies. Act NO. 1446, Section 11 Relates with the legal act of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Issue Concerns the legal right of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity. Held & Ratio Act 1446, Section 11 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the SC, sitting as a board or arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the MEC. The decisions of the Board of Arbitration shall go through the regular court system (Trial Courts Court of Appeals SC). They will be reviewed by the lower courts and will ultimately be reviewed by themselves. The SC cannot sit as members of the Board of Arbitration because it is not within their jurisdiction to decided on cases on purely contractual situations.

Garcia vs. Macaraig, 30 SCRA 106 (1971)

Administrative charge filed against Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. (resp) for alleged dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge ... gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof, committed (allegedly). Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. It was a newly organized branch which had to establish its operations from scratch. The Municipal Government of Calamba offered to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the court, , to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials and to rely on the national government for the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all these items must be furnished by the provincial government The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so). It took so much time for the branch to become established as it experienced difficulties in finding a place to hold its office and finally use the amount appropriated for its expenses Contentions c/o Paz Garcia (pet) Macaraig has not submitted any monthly reports, certificate of service, period of July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971 Macaraig, despite knowing that he has not been fulfilling his duties as judge, still received salaries for the period in question Held & Ratio Macaraig is not guilty of dishonesty and gross incompetence. He did not violate his oath of office as judge. During the period in question, he simply could not carry out his duties for the simple reason that he had no sala yet. The respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time, made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on his part. Judicial work encompasses only what is mentioned as judicial power in the Constitution. Judges cannot be appointed to positions in other bodies, unless it is provided by the Constitution or created by the SC.

e.Salary The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. Nitafan vs. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987)
1935 v 1973 v 1987 1935 jurisprudence says that deduction of withholding taxes erodes independence of judiciary, exempt from taxation 1973 judges are not exempt 1987 silent WON judges salaries are exempt from taxation, the provision of 1973 was specifically deleted Contention c/o Pet Any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. The 1987 provision should be interpreted the same way 1935 was interpreted.

Held & Ratio The declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary are not exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos (uniformity of taxation). The framers actually intended to include an express provision regarding the non-exemption of judges from taxation. They intended to put it in a separate item, but were not able to follow through on that.

f. Tenure
The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower court shall hold office during good behavior until (i) they reach 70 years, or earlier if (ii) they become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its members.

g. Removal
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

In Re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988)

Fast facts Raul Gonzales forwarded an anonymous letter by Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court to Justice Fernan. The letter was addressed to Gonzales referring to charges for disbarment brought by Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan and asking to do something about this. The action against Fernan was filed in the Tanodbayan. Tanodbayan special prosecutor like a fiscal; ombudsman. Administrative Case No. 3135 Resolution dated February 1988 entitled Miguel Cuenco v Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan in which Resolution, the Court resolved to dismiss the charges made by Cuenco against Fernan for utter lack of merit. The Court resolved to require Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Fernan. Important principles of AC 3135 Article 8, Section 7 (1987 Constitution). A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan. Proscribes the removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Impeachment first, before criminal and other actions. There is fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. The Court is not saying that a Member of the SC is absolutely

immune from disbarment and criminal actions against him. It is just that, this member must first be removed from office via impeachment proceedings before other actions will prosper against him. Should the tenure of the SC Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any misbehavior that may be proven against him. Reason for ruling. Without the rule, Members of the SC would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. Can judges be disbarred during their term? Yes. The only ones who could be disbarred are the impeachable officers.

h. Fiscal autonomy
The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

i. Jurisdiction
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

Santiago vs. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188 (1970)

Fast facts Teodoro Santiago, Jr. (pet) was a student of Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. During graduation, Teodoro was awarded the third honor, with Socorro Medina and Patricia Lingat as first and second honors, respectively. The final list of awardees was deliberated by a board composed of Grade 6 teachers. Contentions c/o Teodoro He has been prejudiced in that Socorro Medina was tutored by one of their teachers, thus giving her an edge in the judgment of awarding of honors The committee which adjudged the awarding of honors were composed of only Grade 6 teachers, in violation of the rule that the committee must be composed of teachers from both Grades 5 and 6. CFI Decision The petition states no cause of action and should be dismissed. One of the grounds is that the committee on the ratings of students for honor whose actions are being condemned in the case at bar is not the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65. Jurisdiction of courts Only with regard those actual cases and controversies that require the interpretation of the law. The issue must be justiciable. Must call for the application of the law.

Requisites for a valid action of certiorari 1. That there must be a specific controversy involving rights of person or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations (Judicial action) 2. The tribunal, board, or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end. 3. The tribunal, board, or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. Judicial function It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within that subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. If the matter in respect to which it is exercised, belongs to either of the other branches, it is not judicial. Involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially. Issue (WON) SC has the jurisdiction over the issue. The committee on the rating of students for honor exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. Held & Ratio No actual case or controversy. The committee composed of the teachers was not engaged in judicial functions. There is no mention that when teachers do sit down as a committee and adjudge the awarding of honors to their students, their acts as such relate with the determination of what the law is. Also citing Felipe v Leuterio.

Felipe vs. Leuterio, 91 Phil. 482 (1952)

Fast facts The case at bar relates with alleged erroneous results of an oratorical contest held in Naga City. There were 8 contestants, among them were: Nestor Nosce, Emma Imperial (resp), and Luis General, Jr. The issue arose when it was found out that there was an arithmetical error in the final scores. Days after the contest has been conducted and the winners announced, one of the judges (pet) confesses he made a mistake, that the ratings he gave the second placer should have been such as would entitle her to first place. The other judges refuse to alter their verdict. Issue (WON) The Courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. Held & Ratio The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. No jurisdiction. Error is contemplated by law as a misapplication of a statute or provision. There could be error in the computation of final scores, but it is not error in context of law. The Court would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar contests. The decision of the board in such contests, although only implied, is final and unappealable.

j. Deliberations
The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for the decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case the case assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate court.

Prudential Bank v.Castro. 158 SCRA 646 (1988)

Fast facts The case at bar relates with the disbarment of Atty. Grecia (resp). Contentions c/o Resp CJ Claudio Teehankee should have voluntary inhibited himself from the proceedings. CJ was prejudicial against Grecia that he rendered a decision against Grecia (disbarment). The Courts decision violates the Constitution in that it lacks certification by the CJ that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. Held & Ratio As to CJ Teehankees voluntary inhibition. Petition denied for lack of legal and factual basis. After a member has given an opinion on the merits of a given case, he may not be disqualified from participating in the proceedings because a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has already been rendered. It should be made of record that at no time during the deliberations on the case did the CJ show any ill will nor any sign of vindictiveness much less any attempt to exact vengeance for past affront against Grecia. As to the lack of certification. This requirement is only present in judicial decisions, not in administrative cases, like a disbarment proceeding. Even if such certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberations and voted attest to that. Per curiam decision opinion of the court as a whole; there is no ponente. For cases where the court does not want to expose the identity of the ponente. Resolution v Decision Resolution does not decide the case; dilatory; i.e. dismissal of a case for lack of merit Decision when the court has given due course; must state facts and law

Consing v. Court of Appeals, 177SCRA 14 (1989)

Fast facts Merlin Consing (pet) sold a house and lot to Caridad Santos. Provided in their contract of sale were particular terms of payment in which the purchase price shall be paid (installment basis, plus interest). In the process, Santos defaulted in her payments. Consing demanded for her payment and had planned to resort to court litigation. Santos expressed her willingness to settle her obligation. However, this is upon the condition that the Consings comply with all the laws and regulations on subdivision and after payment to her damages as a consequence of the use of a portion of her lot as a subdivision road. In response, the Consings submitted a revised subdivision plan. CFI Decision Santos was fully justified in refusing to pay further her monthly amortizations because although Consing submitted a revised plan and may have corrected irregularities and/or have complied with the legal requirements for the operation of their subdivision, he cannot escape liability to Santos for having sold to her portions of the roads or streets denominated as right-of-way. Contention c/o Consing CA did not comply with the certification requirement. Purpose of certification requirement To ensure that all court decisions are reached after consultation with members of the court en banc or division, as the case may be To ensure that the decision is rendered by a court as a whole, not merely by a member of the same To ensure that decisions are arrived only after deliberation, exchange of ideas, and concurrence of majority vote

Held & Ratio The absence of certification does not invalidate a decision. It is only evidence for failure to observe the requirement. There could be an administrative case on the ground of lack of certification.

k. Voting Cruz v. DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Fast facts The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Results of voting Seven (7) voted to dismiss petition. Kapunan, CJ, Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Santiago, Puno (separate opinion), and Mendoza (not justiciable). Seven (7) voted to grant petition. Panganiban, Vitug, Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon. As the votes were equally divide and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. The assumption is the law is constitutional.

l. Requirements as to decisions
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

Valladolid vs. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205 (1992)

Fast facts JRM owned Tropicana and Copacabana hotels. However, it only had controlling interest in Tropicana, as Copacabana was managed by its owners (siblings Yu). The two hotels became direct competitors. Pertinent financial and business information was being leaked from Copacabana to Tropicana. Ricardo Valladolid (pet) was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone switchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collector. He was suspected to be the leak who sends important information to the competitor. Order of May 2, 1979 (December 26, 1979) In response to the application for clearance and Valladolids complaint for Illegal Dismissal, the Regional director issued this order. The Deputy Minister of Labor, in a succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding no sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from. Contention c/o JRM The order of Hon. Amado Inciong (resp) failed to state the facts and conclusion of law upon which it is based, thus unconstitutional. Memorandum decision Only dispositive portion is authored by the SC. The rest is copied from the decision of the lower court. Not prohibited, still valid, but it is not encouraged. Held & Ratio The fact that the Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor issued on December 26. 1979 lacks a statement of facts and conclusions of law does not equate to the violation of the constitutional requirement set forth in Article 8, section 14, which is required of decisions or courts of record. However, the assailed order is not a decision of a court of record. The Ministry of Labor is an administrative agency with quasi-judicial functions, with rules of procedure mandated to be non-litigious, summary, and non-technical. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings of fact and the conclusions of law drawn from shoes facts by the Regional director, there was no necessity of discussing anew the issues raised therein.

Notes in class Only cases that are submitted for decision shall require a full-blown decision. Facts and law must be clearly distinguished

Nunal vs. COA, 169 SCRA 356 (1989)

Contention c/o pet The Resolution of the SC under date of May 11, 1998 is not in accordance with Article 8, Section 14 of the Constitution. Article 8, Section 14 No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Held & Ratio Constitutional. The assailed Resolution was not a Decision within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for certiorari. The assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision.

People v. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 (1996)

Marcelino Bugarin (resp) is found by the RTC guilty of raping his daughter, Maryjane. RTC Decision Guilty beyond reasonable doubt Four counts of consummated rape One count of attempted rape Sentence (dispositive) indicates 3 counts instead of 4 Contention c/o Bugarin The decision of the RTC does not state facts ad law upon which it was based. Rule 120, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure Reiterates Article 8, Section 15 of the Constitution. Provides, among others, that judgment shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which such judgment is based. Held & Ratio The decision of the RTC falls short of the requirement. It disrespects the judicial function. There was no evaluation of evidence and discussion of legal questions Does not explain why RTC considered Maryjanes testimony credible despite the fact that she could not remember the time of the day when she was allegedly raped Decision found him guilty on 4 counts of consummated rape, instead of 6 (there were 6 informations filed against him)the dispositive further adding to the confusion indicating just 3 counts Reasons for the requirement To inform the parties of the basis for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the findings of facts or the ruling on points of law with which he disagrees. An assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. A safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit (a bare assertion resting on the authority of the individual).

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 429 (1993) Yao v. CA, G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000 Dizon v. Judge Lopez, A.M. 96-1338, September 5, 1997 Asiavest v. CA, G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001 m. Petition for Review/Motion for Reconsideration
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

Tichangco v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 150629, June 30, 2004

The CAs Decision is invalid because it failed to mention that a magnetic survey was completed only on November 15, 1905, a fact that they perceive to be crucial to the determination of the case. Issue (WON) The CA complied with Section 14 Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution. Article 8 Section 14 Deals with the disposition of petitions for review and motions for reconsideration. In appellate courts, the rule does not require any comprehensive statement of facts or mention of the applicable law, but merely a statement of the legal basis for denying due course. Held & Ratio There is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a collegiate appellate court, after deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the questions raised are factual or have already been passed upon; or cites some other legal basis. The CA Decision contains the necessary antecedents to warrant its conclusions, the appellate court cannot be said to have withheld any specific finding of facts. What the law insists on is that a decision state the essential ultimate facts. Indeed, the mere failure to specify the contentions of the petitioner and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provision of law and the Constitution. Notes in class Resolution disposition of merits upon due course; does not contain decision

Fr. Martinez v. CA, G.R. 123547, May 21, 2001

Contention c/o Pet The resolution of the CA denying his motion for reconsideration was rendered in violation of the Constitution because it does not state the legal basis thereof. Held & Ratio The Constitutional requirement was fully complied with when the CA, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new. Notes in class SC reversed the decision of the CA. Dismissed for lack of merit sufficient as to the constitutional requirement SC is not required to give due course to ALL decisions.

n. Periods for deciding cases

1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. 2. \A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. 3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period. 4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

Re: Delays in the Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, Nov. 28, 2001
Fast facts IBP filed a resolution (administrative complaint) for serious delays in the decision of cases and in the resolution of motions and other pending incidents before the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan. Issue What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve cases falling within its jurisdiction? Contentions c/o IBP The Sandiganbayan is a trial court, it is required to submit the same reports required of the RTC. The Constitution states that, all lower collegiate courts must decide or resolve cases or matters before it within 12 months from date of submission; however the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is required to resolve and decide cases within a reduced period of 3 months like RTCs, or at the most, 6 months from the date of submission. Article 8, Section 15 Must be resolved within 24 months from date of submission to the SC, unless otherwise reduced by the SC 12 months for all lower collegiate courts 3 months for all other lower courts Presupposes that case is deemed submitted for decision Last pleading Contention c/o Solicitor General 3 months original 12 months - appeal Sandiganbayan Sepcial court of the same level as the CA, possession all the inherent powers of a court of justice, with functions of a trial court. PD 1606 Law creating the Sandiganbayan. Maximum period of determination of cases for the Sandiganbayan = 3 months Held & Ratio Article 8, Section 14 does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. Article 8, Section 5 provides that Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the SC. The Sandiganbayan promulgated its own rules providing that the maximum period to decide cases is within 3 months from the date the case was submitted for decision.

If court exceeds mandatory periods = administrative sanctions

o. Presidential Electoral Tribunal p. Administrative powers

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

1. Supervision of lower courts

The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal, by a vote of a majority of its Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

In re Demetria, A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA, March 27, 2001

Fast facts Justice Demetrio G. Demetria was found guilty on March 27, 2001 of interceding in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, Demetria being in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Demetria, then an Associate Justice of the CA, was dismissed from service with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any government office, agency, or instrumentality, including GOCCs or institutions. All his benefits were ordered forfeited. Among other events, Demetria accompanied a certain Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio Paas to the office of SP Formaran, the public prosecutor handling the Yu Yuk Lai case. Upon meeting Formaran, Go Teng Kok readily asked the prosecutor to withdraw his motion for inhibition, i.e. the unsigned letter of concerned court employees, was not strong. Formaran declined the request and simply said that he would bring the matter to CSP Jovencito Zuo, with Demetria commenting, Iyon pala. Demetria then called Zuo and requested the CSP to order Formaran to withdraw the MFI. Resolution The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming and damning that respondent did intercede for suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. The decision to dismiss Demetria, as promulgated by the retired SC Justice Grio-Aquino. Absent any showing of bias, partiality, flaw or grave abuse of discretion, we shall not disturb the findings of the respected Justice. Personal Note Did not find a discussion within the case of the exact Constitutional provision that relates to the Supervision of lower courts which this case is supposed to be illustrative of. I would suppose, though, that it is about Article 8, Section 11, where it is mentioned that the SC has the power to dismiss the judges of the lower courts.

In re Letter of PJ Vasquez, A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, Sept. 9, 2008 2. Temporarily assign judges to other stations in public interest
The Supreme Court shall have the power to assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.

3.

Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice

Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

People v. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 (1975)

Contention c/o Crisologo His life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are many political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity. Held & Ratio The Constitution expressly empowers the Court to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. What is involved in the case at bar is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of Crisologo. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperiled. Dispositive The municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Crisologos Criminal Case to the city court of Quezon City where it should be redocketed and raffled to any Judge. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and security measures should be adopted in bringing Crisologo to Crame on the occasion of the hearing. Notes in class Applies to criminal cases (civil cases inhibition venue can be transferred but not jurisdiction.) Jurisdiction Subject matter Person Territory

Mondiguing v. Abad, 68 SCRA 14 (1975)

Contentions c/o Mondiquing They could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the CFI of that province is a protg of Governor Lumauig and his brother, former Congressman Romulo Lumaig Their witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals Their lives and the lives of their witnesses and lawyers would be in grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and antagonisms spawned by the case and the political rivalry beteen the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. Issue (WON) Mondiguings plea for a change of venue is justified. Basis of change of venue A change of place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reason. the interests of the public require the, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime. Held & Ratio Petition for change of venue is meritorious. A change of venue is granted as it was shown that the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in the place where the trial was originally scheduled to be held.

People v. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)

Fast facts CFI Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of 7 persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental.

Contentions c/o witnesses in the murder cases They were in fear that if the trial is held at the CFI branch in Himamaylan which is but 10km from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least 2 of the accused are official with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. There have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses. General rule The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. Held & Ratio Change of venue has become moot and academic. However, the case proceeds with this discussion: To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. The witnesses in the case are fearful of their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.

4. Appointment of officials and employees of entire judiciary

Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

5. Promulgate rules concerning the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights 6. Promulgate Rules Concerning Pleading, Practice and Procedure
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

7. Admission to the Practice of Law

Each year, the Supreme Court administers examinations in eight bar subjects for the purpose of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law.

Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)

Fast facts Zaldivar (pet) is one of several defedants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases. Contention c/o Zaldivar Gonzales (resp), as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in the aforementioned Criminal Cases were all null and void. Philippine Daily Globe article Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case Gonzales is quoted in many occasions saying that stopping him from investigating graft cases, like that involving Zaldivar, can aggravate the thought that affluent persons

can prevent the progress of trialWhat I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the SC, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. He continues to accuse that this issue will promote further lack of confidence in the judiciary. While he has been supposedly been assigned by President Aquino to preside over graft cases as Tanodbayan, the SC has been continually preventing him to do so. April 27, 1988 SC Decision Order Gonzales too cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman. Statements in MFR filed by Gonzales on April 28, 1988 1. That he had been approached by a leading member fo the SC and he was asked to go slow on Zaldivar and not be too hard on him 2. That he was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the SC because it will embarrass this Court 3. That in several instances, the respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the SC and was asked to dismiss cases against 2 members of the Court Authority to discipline The SC, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Courts constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Contentions c/o Gonzales Members of the court should inhibit themselves as they were biased and prejudiced against him The issues of the proceeding should be passed upon the IBP because he does not expect due process from the SC, that the SC has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The SC deliberately rendered an erroneous decision when it rendered it Decision on April 27, 1988 That decision was rendered in retaliation by the SC against him for the position he had taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors, and in order to stop respondent from investigating cases against some of the protgs or friends of some SC Justices. The members of the SC have improperly pressured him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends, including dismissal of cases against 2 of its own members. Held & Ratio Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, the SC holds that the statements made by Gonzales clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the SC. The statements, especially the one which mentions that the SC made a deliberately erroneous decision, constitute the grossest disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the SC and, through the SC, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Dispositive Atty. Raul M. Gonzales is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from the SC, the suspensions to take effect immediately.

In re : Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)

Fast facts The case at bar deals with an RA that, when effected, result in the passage and admittance to the practice of law of people who have previously flunked the bar exams. The enactment of the RA will result in the admittance of additional 1,094 candidates.

RA 972 An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955. Those who deemed to have passed by virtue of the RA shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar. OBJECTIVE: to admit to the bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Issue (WON) RA 972 is constitutional. Requirement of legal profession The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparations one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor, and civil liberties. Admission to the practice of law The admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Role of Congress May repeal, alter, and supplement the rules promulgated by the Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the SC. Discussion of the issue The law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individual to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar exams of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70%...be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment revoking those promulgated by the Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned. Although the Court can certainly revoke these judgments, it is no less certain that only the Court, and not the legislative (by virtue of RA) or executive (EO) department may do so. Otherwise, it will be a usurpation of functions. Resolution The RA is partly unconstitutional and constitutional, the latter being caused by lack of unanimity among the presiding justices. Notes in class A law enacted in 1953 (It revoked the judgments the SC has made before as regards the lawyers they have admitted), applied retroactively will in effect give the Congress the power that should have been vested solely in the judiciary: violates separation of powers.

Aguirre v. Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036, June 10, 2003

Fast facts Edwin Rana (resp) was among those who passed the 2000 bar exams. He was about to take his oath when a petition was filed against him, requesting for the denial of his admission to the bar. Pending decision for the charges filed against him, he was allowed to take his oath but was enjoined from signing in the roll of attorneys until judgment has finally been rendered. Contentions c/o Aguirre (pet) Rana is guilty of unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation Rana appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the MBEC of Mandaon, Masbate Rana represented himself as counsel for and behalf of Vice Mayoralty candidate, George Bunan and signed the pleading as Counsel for Bunan.

Practice of law Any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Requisites for the admittance to the practice It is not enough that a candidate passes the bar exams. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-atlaw. It is the signing in the Roll that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. Effectively, there are two (2) requisites, after the passing of the bar exams: (1) taking oath and (2) signing in the Roll. Held & Ratio Rana is denied admission to the Philippine Bar. Affirmed findings of OBC. OBC found Rana to be guilty of misconduct. His behavior casts serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Ranas unauthorized practice of law is a sufficient ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. It was proven that he represented himself as counsel even before he had taken his oath.

8. Integration of the Bar ****Please read the notes given by Atty. Angeles for the topics of admission to the practice of law and Integration of the Bar In re : Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 (1978)
Fast facts Marcial Edillon is subject to an action for his name to be removed from the Roll of Attorneys. Contentions c/o IBP Edillon should be disbarred and whose name should be stricken out of the Roll because of stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP. Section 24, Article 3 IBP By-laws Provides, among others, that continued delinquency in payment of the fees shall authorize the IBP to resort to all appropriate actions, including a recommendation to the SC for the removal of the delinquent members name from the Roll. Section 10 Court Rule Provides, among others, that the effect of the nonpayment of dues shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP and continued default for one year shall be a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent from the Roll. Contention c/o Edillon The abovementioned provisions in the IBP by-laws and Court Rule are null and void as they are violative of his right to freedom of association. He is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. In re: Petition for the IBP, Roman Ozaeta The integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable. Integrated Bar and Integration of the bar Integration of the bar is a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. An integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar. Created by the SC, as the regulator of the practice of law. Integration provides an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.

Reason for the collection of fees In order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services. Held & Ratio On Edillons name and the Roll. Edillon is barred and his name is removed from the Roll. Integration of the Bar in the Philippines is valid as there is a power expressly vested in the SC by the Constitution. The SC has the plenary power over all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law. All legislation directing the integration of the Bar has been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. On Edillons constitutional right of freedom to association. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not violative his constitutional right to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member.

In re : IBP Elections Bar Matter No. 491 (October 6, 1989)

Fast facts There were 3 candidates for the position of IBP President in 1989: Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta Drilon. Drilon won the elections. However, there were allegations that the candidates resorted to unorthodox campaigning practices that further investigation was conducted. IBP The IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. Resolution Elections of 1989 are null and void. All the practices, those which pertain to the campaign of the 3 candidates proving to be overly extravagant and unreasonable, made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole elections process. In addition the Court amended the by-laws of the IBP. The changes included, among others, the shift of the voter participation in the elections from all the delegates of the IBP per region to simply the members of the Board of Governors. The Court has power to amend the by-laws as part of their power to promulgate rules under Article 8, Section 5(5).

9 Legal Assistance to the Underprivileged q. Report on the Judciary 3. Lower courts a. Qualifications and appointment b. Tenure De La Llana vs. Alba, 122 SCRA 291 (1983)
Fast facts De La Llana was a Judge and was allegedly affected by BP 129. He, together with other colleagues, filed an action to enjoin the enactment of BP 129.

BP 129 An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other Purposes". BP 129 mandates that Justices and Judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the Judiciary. The purpose of this act is to promote expediency in decisions and avoid accumulation of pending cases. Issue (WON) BP 129 is constitutional. Held & Ratio The abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the SC and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitation new appointments and commissions. The Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the SC. There is no undue delegation of legislative power if the law is complete and provides for a standard.

5. The Judicial and Bar Council

1. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

2. The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.

3. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

4. The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.

5.

The Council shall have the principal function of reobserved by all lower collegiate courts.

Ex-officio Members: 1. 2. 3. Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman Secretary of Justice Representatives of Congress

Regular Members 1. 2. 3. 4. Representatives of the Integrated Bar Professor of Law Retired member of the Supreme Court Representatives of private sectors Secretary ex-officio 1. Clerk of the Supreme Court

6. Automatic release of appropriation for the judiciary