Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Susan Athey, Emilio Calvano & Joshua Gans November 2011 FTC Microeconomics Conference
O n l i n e
Reactions
a d v e r t i s
A l l o w
Policies
n e w s o r g a n
Our hypothesis
The Internet has disrupted the operation of advertising markets Need to understand this and focus on how to improve their operation
Economic fundamentals
Attention is still scarce ... and advertisers still want to access that attention.
The Internet has facilitated consumer switching between outlets There is imperfect tracking between outlets
Switching
Our contribution
0 $ and/o or r
$ $
?
a n d
Choice of ad supply: Anderson-Coate: competition reduces supply (increase ad prices) Ambrus-Reisinger: when middle consumers multi-home may increase supply
Market
Focus on matching rather than ad quantity Sensitive to technology (esp: tracking) Care regarding allocation of consumer attention
Price
Supply
2a Quantity (Impressions)
Puzzles
Evidence that competition reduces per reader ad prices Outlets claim mergers will improve ad revenue For-profit outlets object to lifting of ad restrictions on public broadcasters Larger outlets earn higher ad revenue per consumer
Advertising supply
Two attention periods. Two outlets with ad capacity per unit of attention, ai. If they have opportunity to choose, consumers select outlet i with probability xi. In a given period, the probability that a consumer can choose is .
D il = x i x i ( 1 x i ) D s = 2 x1x2
i 's ad n i vn o et y r = D il 2 a i + D s a i
Advertiser demand
Advertisers want to impress each consumer once over the two periods and have heterogeneous values (v) on impressing consumers with distribution F(v); assumed to be U[0,1].
Morni ng
Afterno on
Outlet 1
Wasted Impression s
Custom analysis of data provided to authors by ComScore of 30 recent large, cross-outlet campaigns
Advertiser demand
To impress loyals, want to multi-home at the cost of wasted switcher impressions To impress switchers, want to increase frequency at the cost of wasted loyal impressions Higher value advertisers more willing to bear costs
Quantity (Advertisers)
No switching
v =1
Pric e
Suppl y
Multi-homers (1 impression)
v= p 2 a Quantity (Impressions)
More switchers
v =1 Multi-homers (1 impression)
Singlehome on 1 Singlehome on 2
Pric e
Suppl y
Ds p
p
v= p
2 a Quantity (Impressions)
High switchers
v =1
MH 2 on 1 MH 2 on 2
Pric e
Suppl y
Ds p
if a high
p
Multi-homers (1 impression)
Singlehome on 1 Singlehome on 2
v= p
2 a Quantity (Impressions)
Profit s
Imperfe ct Trackin g s
Profit s
Perfect Trackin g
Ds
Mergers
Merge only if a and Ds not too high Neutral unless can price discriminate between single and multi-homers
Blogs and other non-ad content decrease available ad capacity in the market and reduce adverse effect of switching Causing impression prices to rise.
Pric e
Suppl y
Quantity (Impressions)
L a r g e r o r b e t t e r
Policies
T h e o r y
Conclusion s
r e q u i r e s