Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping
in Cambodia
Khlok Dara
Matrikel-Nr: 733676
darakhlok@yahoo.com
State Failure, Crisis and Conflict Management

Dr. Markus Lederer
MPM/MGPP Summer term 2006

University of Potsdam
September 2006
Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia
Table of contents
Abbreviations...…………..……………………………….….……………….…ii
1- Introduction…………………………………………………………………1
2- Elements of Successful UN Peacekeeping…………………………………3
a. Background ………………..……………………...………………….3
Peacekeeping Concept …………………………………………….…3
Peacekeeping Development……………………….………………….4
b. Elements of successful peacekeeping ……………..…………………8
Internal Factors…………………………………….………………...8
External Factor…………………………………….………………..10
Clear Mandate………………………………………………………11
Available Resource………………………………………………….12
3- Analysis of UN Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia ……………...…14
a. Paris Peace Agreement Background………………………………...14
b. Successful Operation ……………………………………………….16
c. What Other Factors?...........................................................................19
Strong Legal Framework……………………………………………19
Strong Commitment of UN…………………………………………..20
Active Participation of Cambodian people …………………………20
4- Conclusion………………………………………………………………….21
References…………………………………...………………………………….23
Appendix 1………………………………...……………………………………24
Appendix 2…………………………………...…………………………………29
i
Abbreviations
FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and

Cooperative Cambodia
IPA International Peace Academy
JIM I First Jakarta Informal Meetings
JIM II Second Jakarta Informal Meetings
KPNLF Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
KR Khmer Rouge
MNF Multinational Forces
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU Organization of African Unity
ONUC United Nations Operation in Congo
ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
PDK Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PRK People’s Republic of Kampuchea
SNC Supreme National Council of Cambodia
UK United Kingdom of England
UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNEF UN Emergency Force
United Nations UN
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority
UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization
UNUMOZ UN Operation in Mozambique
US United States of America
ii
Successful United Nations Peacekeeping
in Cambodia
Khlok Dara
1. Introduction
Cambodia is a country that had many historical wars since the collapse of ANGKOR
Empire from seventh to Fourteenth century. The most bed situation in Cambodia was
happened in 1975 to 1979. The country was ruled by People’s Republic of
Kampuchea (PRK) 1 called Khmer Rouge regime (KR). During their four years in
power, KR killed at least one million of their own countrymen. The trauma they
inflicted is still evident in every facet of life in Cambodia. After the invasion of
Vietnam military in 1979 (Ratner, R. Stever, 1995, p. 140), the civil war was
happened between the four factions of Cambodia: PRK and the three other resistance
factions along Thai border such as KR, National United Front for an Independent,
Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and Khmer People’s
National Liberation Front (KPNLF).
With invaluable supports of the United Nations (UN), the Paris Peace Agreement
was signed by all parties in the conflict with supports from 18 countries 2 . This is a
historical successful of UN and other countries like Indonesia and France who are the
leading role in finding peace for Cambodian people. The Paris Peace Agreement
provided more mandate to UN to form up their agency making cease-fires,
repatriation, organizing democratic election and reconstructing Cambodia. In the
Paris Peace Agreement, Peacekeeping is one of the crucial roles of UN goal which
aims at making cease-fire and organizing the democratic election. United Nation
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is a well-organized unit of UN in
peacekeeping in Cambodia. With their mandate provided by the Paris Peace
Agreement and the resolution form both Secretary General and Security Council of
1
It is a government assigned by the Vietnam government after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1997.
The name of the People ‘s Republic of Kampuchea was changed in 1989 to State of Cambodia
(SOS) and by that time, economical policy of the government have been changed from planned
market to free market.
2
Eighteen countries who participated in the Paris Peace Agreement are Australia, Brunei Darussalam,
Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Russia,
Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam and Zimbabwe.
Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 1

UN, UNTAC did their job very well in conforming to the peacekeeping plan process.
UNTAC provided peaceful election and formed up the new coalition government
with democratic ideas. UNTAC peacekeeping missions have helped assure a stable
situation, enhance emerging democracies, protect human rights, end conflicts, and
prevent the spread of war. This is a successful peacekeeping operation of UN in the
second generation of their mission. In this regard, what are the factors leading UN
successful peacekeeping operation in Cambodia?
This paper will try to find out the reason why UN gets successful in peacekeeping in
Cambodia. The argument is that UN had played a very good role in the Cambodian
peace process. In this regard, UN mandate in bringing peaceful resolution for
Cambodian people and their democratically elected leader, their primary
responsibility for peace, stability, national reconciliation and construction had been
fulfilled. The four main hypotheses to test are: (1) Internal supports contributed to
the successful of the UN peacekeeping in Cambodia; (2) the supports from other
countries involving in the Cambodian conflict especially the main actors of
superpower assisted the UN peace process to fulfill its mandate; (3) the clear and
practicable mandate of UNTAC brought its mandate to achieve the goal of
peacekeeping; and (4) with the sufficient and available human, logistic and financial
supports to the whole peace process in Cambodia, UN fulfilled their peace mandate
for Cambodia.
These four hypotheses lead UN got success in their peacekeeping. With these four
hypotheses, the paper will study the experiences of the peacekeeping of UN
operation and analyze the situation in Cambodia when UNTAC operated their
mission for peacekeeping. Paper will illustrate more why UN got successful
peacekeeping in Cambodia situation. Are there any other factors that lead UN getting
successful in their operation in Cambodia?
The paper will provide researchers to get more information on the UN successful
peacekeeping operation in the world on one hand, and on another hand, the factors of
successful peacekeeping in Cambodia as a good experience and lessons learned for
other peacekeeping operation. Moreover, this is a very useful for other internal or
international organization to learn from the experiences in order to form up or

modify the peace implementation process for other places of the world. In addition,
the paper will provide more knowledge for interested researchers and students as
well in their field of study.
In order to get more realistic, the concept and the development of the peacekeeping
will be illustrated in order to find out the concept of peacekeeping and the elements
of the successful peacekeeping of UN peacekeeping operation in other countries. To
do this, many books and documents from different sources were collected to study, in
particular, from library. The information from internet was used as well to get more
update information and documents related to the topic like UN and other peace
institutions websites.
To make paper easier to understand, the research will divide into three main chapters.
The first chapter will define a very brief historical background of Cambodia situation
before the peacekeeping and some methodology of the research. The second chapter
will study on the literature of the successful experiences of peacekeeping operation
of UN in other countries. Indeed, the paper will define a brief concept of
peacekeeping and some key words in order to make clearer. The third chapter will
analyze why UN get successful peacekeeping in Cambodia. In this regard, the paper
will reflect the four hypotheses of successful peacekeeping operation of other
countries with the Cambodian situation. This chapter will define also a brief
historical background of the roles of UN in peace finding in Cambodia. The last
chapter is the conclusion part. Some lesson learned will be raised also for other UN
operation.
2. Elements of Successful UN Peacekeeping

a. Background
Peacekeeping Concept
Before we go deeper into the core analysis of the topic, it is very important to
understand the main key word meaning of “peacekeeping”. The term “peacekeeping”
was defined by many meaning according to the context or the intention of the
implementer.

Peacekeeping defined by the UN is “a way to help countries torn by conflict creates
conditions for sustainable peace. UN peacekeepers—soldiers and military officers,
civilian police officers and civilian personnel from many countries—monitor and
observe peace processes that emerge in post-conflict situations and assist ex-
combatants in implementing the peace agreements they have signed. Such assistance
comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing
arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and
social development.” All operations must include the resolution of conflicts using
force to be considered valid under the charter of the UN
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_UN_peacekeeping_missions, checked on 19
August 2006).
In this regard, “peacekeeping” was defined by the Agenda for Peace as “the
deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all
the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police
personnel and frequently civilians as well” (UN, 1992, website:
http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html, checked on 20 August 2006). The agenda
presented many steps of the peacekeeping. Peacekeeping cannot define clearly. The
meaning is very broad. According to the agenda for peace, it was said that
peacekeeping term is interrelated to other terms like preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking, and post conflict peace- building.
The implementation of peacekeeping should follow some guidelines or principles.

According to Diehl (1993), there are five conceptual components of distinguishing
feature of peacekeeping operation. Each peacekeeping operation should follow the
five features. Those five components are (1) non-enforcement, (2) limited military
capacity, (3) neutrality, (4) permission of the hosted countries, and (5) proper
function of the peacekeeping forces including task observation, detection of violation
of cease-fire, supervision of troop withdrawal, law and order maintaining,
interposition force, and humanitarian activities (Diehl, F. Paul, 1993, p. 5-10).
Peacekeeping Development
Peacekeeping was established by international organizations for many years ago
before the establishment of UN. However, it is not really the peacekeeping. It is just

like observation operation when there was conflict. It was happened before the
World War II by an initiative of the League of Nations which is the first initiative of
the world security. By noticed that in the world, there were a lot of conflict in both
internal and international arenas, perception of peacekeeping for secure peace and
security was established in that time by the League of Nations. After the League of
Nations failed, the United Nations followed the ideas of the world security. There are
many peacekeeping operation forms since then. Beside the operation of the League
of Nations, there are 60 peacekeeping operation of UN from its establishment in
1945 (see appendix 1). The peacekeeping operation was divided into three phases as
followed.
The first phase of the peacekeeping was happened before the second Word War. It
was in the time of the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920. The legal
instruments covers to the conflict resolution were derived from the two principles
constitutive sources of the League of Nations. First, the covenant created pronged
schemes, under which members agreed to: “(a) respect and preserve the territorial
integrity and political independence of all members against external aggression, (b)
submit all disputes to either arbitration, judicial settlement, or inquiry by the Council
of the League (the League’s analogue of the Security Council, with permanent and
non-permanent members), the latter of which would try to settle the matters; and (c)
impose economic sanctions and recommend military measure against any member of
the League that waged war in disregard of its Covenant obligation”. Second, the
treaty of Versailles composed of many components of peace ending the Great War.
These were given the League of Nations to take responsibilities (Ratner, R. Stever,
1995, p. 90-91)
According to the covenant of the League of the Nations in article 1, most of the
operation of the organizations for peace was implemented only to the members. This
was mostly conducted in the way to observe conflict rather than to use force. In that
time there were some operations for peace like in 1920-1921, there was a military
forces and civilian commission supervise plebiscites in Schleswig, Allen stein and
Marienwerder, the Klagenfurt Basin, Upper Silesia and Sopron (Chopra, Jarat, 1999,
p. 32).

The League of Nations did not achieve their mission to establish world organization.
Since the League of Nations was abolished, UN was replaced this role as a world
peace security organization in 1945. However, the League of Nations left many
experiences and lesson learned for UN peace operation. According to Diehl said that
there are four lessons learned for successful peacekeeping operation. First, there was
a successful peacekeeping when there is no direct involvement of major power in the
operation; second, it was much easier to arrange a ceasefire at a lower level of
military conflict; third, the support of all disputant parties is crucial factor leading the
League of Nations successful; and fourth, the neutral troops should be deployed in
the conflict (Diehl, F. Paul, 1993, p. 20). The first lesion learned is not appropriated
with the new peacekeeping generation because in order to operate peacekeeping in
one country, it need unanimous agreement from all permanent member of the
security Council who are all super power states. It cannot be applicable with UN
peacekeeping.
The second phase of the peacekeeping was beginning from the experiences of
League of Nations. It was called traditional peacekeeping which started from 1948 to
1989. During that time, there are fifteen UN operations in providing the
peacekeeping to different countries in the world (see appendix 1). Historically, UN
established two peacekeeping institutions in the beginning of its operation: (1) UN
Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) which was responsible to stabilize the
region in the time of cold war, and (2) UN Emergency Force (UNEF) which was the
first UN peacekeeping forces (UN, 1996, p. 4). This peacekeeping review of UN said
that “this model is classical peacekeeping which required the protagonist,
impartiality on the part of the UN forces, and resort to arms only in self-defense”.
Theoretically, the full concept of the peacekeeping operation was derives from the
UN Charter, which has been signed by more than 180 independent states since it was
drafted in 1945. Article 1 of UN charter clearly states that the primary purpose of the
UN is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations

which might lead to a breach of the peace" (http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/,
checked on 20 August 2006). This being said, there is no explicit reference in the UN
Charter to either peacekeeping or peace support operations.
The traditional tasks or first generation of UN peacekeeping operations as they

evolved during the first phase from 1948 to 1989 of the UN's existence, included
monitoring and enforcing cease-fires; observing frontier lines; and interposing
between belligerents is mostly influenced from the cold war. These tasks were
generally carried out based on three key principles: “the consent of the parties; the
impartiality of the peace keepers; and the non-use of force in most circumstances”
(Malan, Mark, 1997, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/6No1/Malan.html, checked on 20
August 2006). UN forces can use the force only for self-defense.
The third phase of the peacekeeping operation was starting from 1989. This is the
new era of the peacekeeping operation called second generation of UN peacekeeping.
Mostly of scholar said that the third stage of the peacekeeping operation is a consol
dative stage of the UN (Chorpra, Jarat, 1999, p. 32). This stage of the peacekeeping
operation is different from the first and second stage of the peace operation of the
initiator of UN and League of Nations. This stage focuses very much on the
peacekeeping operations, which are multifunctional, with political, humanitarian,
social and economic components requiring civilian experts, and relief specialists to
work in paralleled with soldiers. In this regard, to implement peacekeeping in
Mozambique, El Salvador, UN peacekeepers helped to regroup and mobilize the
combatants, destroy weapons, coordinate massive humanitarian assistances program
and monitor human rights (UN, 1996, p. 5).
The core objective of the third stage (second generation of UN peacekeeping) is to

make all parties in the conflict to move from violence to political reconciliation,
democracy consolidation and reconstruction for the nation (UN, 1996, p. 5). In order
to reach the goal, UN, usually, used forces provided by its members to deploy in the
area where conflict erupted. Nevertheless, some UN peacekeeping operation was not
getting its objective. Some operation is an incomplete operation like Palestine
peacekeeping operation. The operation was starting from the setting up of UN in

1945 until now. Some is a complete operation like peacekeeping operation in
Namibia and Somalia.
The second generation is a multifunctional operation, which were starting when the
cold war was finished. It was associated with the ending of proxy Cold War conflicts
through negotiated settlements, in which the UN or other multinational organizations
guided the adversaries to political settlements based on compromise like the case in
Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Angola. The UN process for the
peace operation after finishing cold war became involved in ending internal conflicts
through multi-dimensional processes which included activities such as: “
- the separation of combatants;
- the disarmament of irregular forces;
- the demobilization and transformation of regular and irregular forces into
a unified army;
- the establishment of new policing systems; and
- the monitoring of elections for new governments” (Malan, Mark, 1997,
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/6No1/Malan.html, checked on 20 August
2006).
b. Elements of successful peacekeeping

Since its establishment, UN played very important roles in peace process. UN
provided peacekeeping operation for many countries where international and internal
conflicts erupted. Historically, UN got many successful experiences in its
peacekeeping operations like in Namibia and El Salvador. The successful of UN
peacekeeping provides more opportunity for those countries to develop their socio-
economy and promote of human rights. Practically, According to the scholar and
many reports on previous UN peacekeeping operation, the most important successful
of the UN in peacekeeping is detecting violation of ceasefire. To get successful in
peacekeeping operation, there are many features to complete. However, this paper
will define four important core factors variable leading UN success in the
peacekeeping since the beginning of the operation of peace process in 1945. The four
successful factors are (1) Clear mandate of UN operation, (2) External factor, (3)
Internal factor, and available and resource.
Internal Factor
Internal factor is a crucial factor in supporting the UN successful in peacekeeping.
The successful of the peacekeeping depends on strong commitment of all parties in

the conflict in supporting its operation for peace. As said by Boutros Boutros Ghali,
former Secretary General of UN that
“The United Nations can serve as catalysts, framework and support

mechanisms for parties to seek peace and can help when hostile
factions are prepared to work toward this common goal. However,
viable political structures or institutions cannot be imposed from
outside. Ultimately, no instrument can bring about peace without the
will of the parties to the conflict to achieve peace” (UN, 1996, p. 7).
Indeed, Ouellet (2003) agreed also that the internal factor is one crucial element of
the successful peacekeeping operation. If no parties in the conflict agreed to commit
their will in supporting the peacekeeping operation of UN peace operation process,
the peace agreement does not happen then the conflict is still going on (Ouellet,
Julian, 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/peacekeeping/, checked on
21 August 2006). The internal parties are a core element in the making ceasefire and
supporting peacekeeping. They will assist UN in forming all suitable legal
instruments for their country. Moreover, those parties in the conflict in the country
know clearly the real situation of their country conflict. They knew what the
obstacles of the peace finding process are. They will provide clear recommendation
to UN operations agencies on how to solve the problems.
To see more clear on UN successful peacekeeping operation, there was a case in El

Salvador where the two parties in the conflict gave very strong commitment for
peace process. They provided more supports for the United Nations Observer
Mission in El Salvador (UNUSAL) mission to operate proper peace process. The
commitment of the two parties brought many opportunities for UN to finish their
mandate. Practically, they agreed to signed and took part actively six agreements in
implementation process of peace operation. The six agreements are: “(1) All parties
establish common framework for negotiation under the auspices of Secretary General
in Geneva agreement in order to end arm conflict, promote human rights and reunite
El Salvadoran society, (2) Caracas Agreement dealing with peace negotiation
process, (4) Mexico Agreement dealing with constitutional reform, judicial system
reform, guarantee the neutrality of election authority, (5) New York Agreement
dealing with reduction of arm force in all two parties, and (6) Chapultepec
Agreement dealing with establishment of the National Civil Police, Judicial Reform

and the election system”(Doyle, W. Michael, Johnstone, Ian, and Orr, C. Robert,
1997, p. 257-281)
Another successful peacekeeping operation of UN operation is Mozambique

peacekeeping process. Lesson learned of UN raised Mozambique government played
an active diplomatic role with others to make them supporting peacekeeping
operation. This action provided many critical political supports for Ajelio 3 with his
home office and his Mozambique parties. UN peacekeeping review clarified “this is
no doubt whatsoever that we would not today be hailing success of UN Operation in
Mozambique(UNUMOZ) if on the critical nights when Dhlakama had pulled out of
election process Ajelio and a few diplomat had not shifted into overdrive outside
normal channels to put the process back in and on track” (UN peacekeeping Best
Practices website: http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/mozambiq.pdf, checked on 22
August 2006).
The internal factor is a crucial role in providing all peacekeeping agencies operating
their mission. If there is no agreement or commitment to settle the conflict by the
internal parties in the conflict, there is no agreement or legal biding to allow UN
mission for peace operation.
External Factor
The success of the peacekeeping in one country depended on the assistance of the
external factors especially from the developed countries and the neighboring
countries, in particular, those countries that supported the factions during the
conflict. In experimental case, very strong supporting country friends of the peace
process in El Salvador played very important roles in peace process. There are four
friend states where provided more support to the peace process and let UN played a
crucial role as the facilitator in peacekeeping in El Salvador. They provided UN as an
apex of their triangle in negotiation for peace process (Doyle, W. Michael,
Johnstone, Ian, and Orr, C. Robert, 1997, p. 248).
3
Mr. Aldo Ajello, Italy, Special Representative of Secretary General of United Nations for ONUMOZ
from December 1992 to January 1995 in Mozambique

Another successful case was the case of Mozambique which used the donor
coordination as an external factor. The donor coordination in Mozambique is a main
factor in bringing the successful peacekeeping in UN mandate. They established a
commission to be responsible for donor coordination. Donor coordination was helped
to bringing all the donors into the process and multilayered commission also
established to oversee it. The commission comprised United States of America (US),
France, United Kingdom of England (UK), Portugal, Germany, Italy and the
Organization of African Unity 4 (OAU). Commission had regularly met with Ajelio
on the peacekeeping process to ensure the operation being on track. As well as, in the
peace process, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working in human rights
and conflict resolution in the country played very crucial role in engagement as a full
partner to support and assist the peacekeeping operation process in Mozambique
(Jett, C. Dennis, 1995, http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/mozambiq.pdf, checked on
22 August 2006).
The successful peacekeeping of UN demands the strong support and commit by all
relevant external parties in the conflict. The most important one is supports from
those countries supported all internal parties in the conflict and supports from the
five permanent members of Security Council of UN.
Clear Mandate
Clear mandate is another factor leading peacekeeping operation successful. The
mandate here is focuses on clear mission, goal, strategy, action plan and business
plan for the peacekeeping operation. According to the International Peace Academy
(IPA) and the Best Practices Unit of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(UNDPKO) seminar report stressed that the successful of UN peacekeeping
depended on the importance of establishing a clear, credible, and achievable mandate
which a key in their operation for ceasefire and reconciliation (seminar report, 2002,
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/DPKO%20Seminar%20Report%202002.pdf,
checked on 21 August 2006). A confusing mandate only leads to confusion on the
4
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 in Addis Abeba. From 32
independent Member States in 1963, the independent Member States of Africa are now 53. The
OAU is entering from political liberalization to phase two by focusing on the economic integration.
It has therefore a new mandate and new responsibilities, which will by no means make it, abandon
its political character and its resolve to sustain peace and security in the continent, which are crucial
for the socio-economic development process.

ground. It is very important to set up the clear mandate and mission of UN operation
in order to achieve the ultimate goal of the peacekeeping. The mandate must ensure
unity of effort, of vision, and of political control. In order to achieve its goals, it must
be able to count on the availability of adequately equipped troops. It was noted that
some Member States, especially the most powerful one, do not seem willing to
accept the same risks for their troops that they do for their civilian personnel.
The clear and detail mandate will influence to different ways of the peacekeeping
operation of UN. Diehl (1993) said that it would cause to (1) set more expectation
from the involving actors in the peacekeeping operation and (2) ensure more public
supports to the operation because they knew exactly what the UN peacekeepers do.
In contrary, the vague mandate will create many problems when different actors have
variety expectations about its scope and implementation (Diehl, F. Paul, 1993, p. 72).
This case was happened in the mandate of the several deployment of Multinational
Forces (MNF) to provide interposition forces at agreed location and thereby provide
the MNF presented requested by the government of Lebanon to assist in the Beirut
area. Each of the fours states (United States, France, Britain and Italia) contribute
troop to MNF send separated letters to Lebanon’s government. This was interpreted
in differently. Therefore, each state found difficult to justify the continued
deployment of peacekeeping troop when it did not appear to serve national interest
and when troop seemed to be exposed target for hostile action (Diehl, F. Paul, 1993,
p. 73).
Clear and detail mandate is a very important factor in the UN peacekeeping operation
because it will provide more clear responsibility and duties of all components of UN
agencies in the peacekeeping mission to take action. Indeed, it provided more trust to
others supporters to continue their willing in the peace process due to the clear goal
and mission.
Available Resource
The available resource to spend in the peacekeeping is a crucial factor in all
operation to get success even in the small operation or big operation. All the policy
implementation needs the available resources to run their project in order to complete

the polity implementation. The peacekeeping operation is like a program
implementation or policy implementation. Policy implementation was failed because
of lacking of resources. It is a crucial factor in implementation of the policy in order
to achieve it (Hogwood, W. Brian, and Gunn A. Lewis, 1984, p. 200). The same,
resource is very important for the peacekeeping to gain success in their mandate.
Resource was identified like finance, human and logistic. Experimentally, it was
happened in Mozambique. Mozambique was a successful peacekeeping operation of
UN. This success depended on the available resource for operation. Although the
expense of the resource is more or less wasted in place but the resource is available
whenever needs finance process (UN peacekeeping Best Practice website:
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/mozambiq.pdf, checked on 22 August 2006).
Diehl (1993) agreed also that the financial matter is rather important in the
peacekeeping operation of UN. But in contrary, he described that the unavailable and
insufficient fund for operation will affect to the peacekeeping in three aspects. Fist is
the operation of the peacekeeping will end permanently; second, some area or troop
of the peacekeeping operation will decrease because of lacking of financial support;
and finally maybe the operation is still implementing but the peacekeeping forces
may go without equipments or supports essential to detecting violence or ensuring
the confidence of the disputants. There was happened also in UN Operation in Congo
(ONUC) operation during 1960 to 196. Several states withdrew their contribution for
the operation. In that time it caused a serious financial problem. Therefore, it caused
to uncompleted mission (Diehl, F. Paul, 1993, p. 75-76).
The financial support is a general factor for achieving success of all program or
policy implementation. If there is no financial support, the process of all program or
peace operation cannot work and UN cannot operate their peacekeeping process.
As mentioned above, those four elements of peacekeeping operation are core factors
leading UN peacekeeping operation successful. Historically, most of the successful
peacekeeping of UN operation depends on very much on the four factors. The four
factors are interlinked together. When there is a clear mandate, it requires other three
factors to complete in peace operation. Experimentally, all the successful
peacekeeping operation of UN requires the contribution of the four main factors. So

what is the situation of peacekeeping, in Cambodia, comparing to these four main
factors? Are there any other elements leading UN successful in its operation?
With the four factors of successful peacekeeping of UN operation, the paper will
reflect these factors to the real situation of peacekeeping operated by UN in
Cambodia during 1991-1992.
3. Analysis of UN Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia

a. Paris Peace Agreement Background
The Paris Peace Agreement was singed by the four political factions in the conflict in
1991 in Paris. The result of the very important peace agreement, which Cambodian
people waited for many years, was coming from the huge efforts of the all parties in
the conflict, international communities and regional supports and especially from the
efforts of UN since the year 1980’s. The Agreements, also known as the Paris
Agreements, invited the Security Council to establish UN Advance Mission in
Cambodia (UNAMIC) and UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and to
provide it with the mandate set out in the Agreements. The Council fully supported
the Paris Agreements in its resolution 718 (1991) of 31 October 1991 and requested
the Secretary-General to prepare a detailed plan of implementation of peace process
(http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamicbackgr.html#one, checked
on 24 August 2006).
Before signing the vital peace agreement along with 18 countries, Cambodia took
many years of internal conflict in the country since Cambodia got independence from
the colonization of France in 1953. From that time, Cambodia just got a short
peaceful time. Unfortunately, Cambodia fall into the Vietnam War again during
1960’s and 70’s including the bombardment of the American forces. From 1975-79,
Cambodia was governed by the Democratic of Kampuchea regime called KR regime
which killed a lot of their own people for more than one million. In 1979, the KR
regime was finished by the invasion of Vietnamese forces and they install new puppy
government called People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (Ratner, R. Stever, 1995,
p. 140). The civil war continued in Cambodia between PRK and the other three
factors along the Cambodian-Thai border. The three resistance parties are the Party

of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) known as KR, FUNCINPEC, led by Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, and KPNLF (Doyle, W. Michael, Johnstone, Ian, and Orr, C.
Robert, 1997, p. 54). In 1982, the three factions formed a Coalition Government of
Democratic of Kampuchea, later called the National Coalition Government of
Cambodia led by Prince Sihanuk. The coalition occupied seat reserved for Cambodia
at the UN from 1982 until the singing Paris Peace Agreement (UN, 1996, p. 449).
In 1981, there were seventy-nine states participated including Democratic

Kampuchea in the international conference organized by UN but the conference was
boycotted by Soviet-bloc states. However, UN issued many resolutions for
Cambodia conflict resolution in the annual General Assembly during the year 80’s.
The resolutions reflected the key element settlements like: “(a) withdrawal of
Vietnam forces, (b) creation of interim administering authority, (c) national
reconciliation under Prince Norodom Sihanuk, (d) restoration of Cambodia’s
independence and territorial integrity, (e) the rights of Cambodian to determine their
own destiny free of outside intervention, (f) effective guarantee to achieve these
ends” (Ratner, R. Stever, 1995, p. 141).
The negotiation process for Cambodian conflict settlement was beginning. The first
fruitful result of the negotiation was a cocktail meeting that was taken place in Paris
suburb of Fere-en-Tardenois in December 1987 between Prime Minister Hun Sen of
PRK and Prince Sihanuk. Then, two Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) for settlement
of Cambodia conflict were organized by Indonesia (JIM I in July 1988 and JIM II, in
February 1989). These meeting leaded the interests from many countries in the
region, in particularly, Vietnam agreed to withdraw their troops form Cambodia by
September 1989 (Ratner, R. Stever, 1995, p. 143). Then, the Paris Peace Agreement
was signed by all parties in the conflict including other 18 countries.
During that time, UNAMIC was also created by Security Council resolution 717
(1991) of 16 October 1991 before the official signing ceremony in Paris. The
UNAMIC is a first mission of UN in assisting the Cambodia for ceasefire before
creating UNTAC. The mandate of the UNAMIC was just only 2 year from 1991 to
1992. At the same time, Supreme National Council (SNC) was also established to
control over all the four conflict factions and to coordinate between UNTAC. The

authority is a highest authority in the transitional period. It was lead by Prince
Sihanuk (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamicbackgr.html#one,
checked on 24 August 2006). In February 1992, UNTAC was created by the Security
Council with the vital mission for ceasefire and organization of peaceful and
democratic election in Cambodia. UNTAC comprises of between 15,000 and 20,000
UN personnel, including human rights, civil administrative and military components,
as well as a police component of some 3,600 police monitors
(http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr1.html, checked on 24
August 2006).
b. Successful Operation
UNTAC played very important roles in Cambodia in bringing peace and
development. The effort of UNTAC was noticed that it was the successful
peacekeeping experiences of the UN peacekeeping operations. According to the
literature review mentioned above, there are four elements leads UN successful in
their peacekeeping operations in others counties.
In term of Clear mandate factor, UNTAC in Cambodia worked smoothly with their
specific and detail goal mentioned in the Paris Peace Agreement (Appendix 2) signed
by all parties in the Cambodian conflict including the other 18 countries in region
and super powers countries. Clear and specific of UNTAC mandate is the leading
role in the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. In their operation, UNTAC divided
seven distinct components: human rights, electoral, military, civil administration,
civilian police, repatriation and rehabilitation. Each component had their own clear
mission for their operation in keeping peace in Cambodia.
The Accord of the Paris Peace gave very clear and strong mandate to UNTAC
playing role in the peacekeeping in Cambodia. Its executor and guarantor
responsibilities flowed from the Paris Accord’s clauses delegating from the SNC to
UNTAC “all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this agreement.”
Moreover the Accord gave UNTAC the role of active mediator. The special
Representative of UN had the power to decide in the absent of consensus (Ratner, R.
Stever, 1995, p. 153).

UNTAC can not reach their goal in ceasefire if all parties in the conflict did not
cooperate closely in their operation. This will leading to the failure of the
peacekeeping process. The internal factors are very important in the successful
peacekeeping process in Cambodia. Each party has to participate actively in the
peace process. As Ratner (1995) said that UNTAC could not make their
peacekeeping in successful if State of Cambodia withheld support as the Khmer did.
It needs the closed cooperation within all factors (Ratner, R. Stever, 1995, p. 158).
With the good and closed cooperation, building trust is also important in the
peacekeeping operation. Trust will bring the smooth operation of all parties
especially the implementers like UNTAC which got the powers and responsibilities
from the Paris Peace Accord in 1991 and the resolution of the Security Council of
UN. The success of UNTAC in peacekeeping in Cambodia was a good legacy of
trust. The cooperation without level of mutual trust and political, between all parties
especially from the leaders of those parties, (Hun Sen, Sihanuk, Son San, and Kiev
Samphan) will not getting success in the operation (Doyle, W. Michael, Johnstone,
Ian, and Orr, C. Robert, 1997, p. 65).
Beside the internal factor, it needs the strong support from all relevant parties in the
conflict. The External factor is more important to make peacekeeping achievable
their mandate. The factor requires all parties beside the four parties in the conflict
participating actively in supporting the peace process. According to the background
mentioned above, there are many external actors actively supporting from the peace
settlement finding to the peacekeeping process. There are 18 countries which are the
signatory of the Paris Peace Accord supported the entire peace process plan from the
beginning of the peace negotiation to the end of peace process. Extended permanent
five in Phnom Penh and the Core Group in New York including the Permanent Five
Members of the Security Council participated actively in supporting the peace
process in Cambodia (Doyle, W. Michael, Johnstone, Ian, and Orr, C. Robert, 1997,
p. 161).
According to the Doyle (1997), UNTAC enjoyed a very huge support from many
other countries like Japan, Indonesia, France, Australia, United States, Malaysia,
Vietnam and China. In this framework, the military for peacekeeping and civil

mandate were send by member states deployed most rapidly, with 10.000 troops by
early June 1992, 14.000 by July and nearly entire 15.900 by September. The troops
were coming from 11 countries (Bangladesh, Bulgaria, France, Ghana, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Netherland, Pakistan, Tunisia and Uruguay) and including
small contingent from other 32 countries served as military observer, construction
engineering, demining instructors, communication, logistic and transportation. There
are other support personnel, the repatriation unit also arrived quickly (Ratner, R.
Stever, 1995, p. 166). Furthermore, they had been supporting UNTAC through
different aids like peacekeeping troops including financial and materials for
peacekeeping operation. The total country supported the Cambodian peacekeeping
operation comprised of 37 countries 5 (UN, 1996, p. 481).
Beside those three factors mentioned above, successful peacekeeping operation

requires the available resource for implementation. It is logic in the implementation
of the any program or project. In order to fulfill the program, it needs the available
and sufficient resource, otherwise the Operation without available and sufficient
resource or financial support, it will not achievable. The resource is very important in
all implementation. In total, the expenditure of the UNTAC operation for keeping
peace is nearly two million US dollars. Cambodia is a lucky country where got he
priority for the financial supports form the UN before other country where UN
deployed their troops for peacekeeping at the same time with Cambodia. According
to the Ratner (1995) said that budget for Cambodia peacekeeping was provided early
than other countries that had the same problem in peace process. Those countries are
Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and El Salvador. Furthermore, he added that the promise
of UN in financial support for the peacekeeping in Cambodia is not limited even
there was a budget plan (Ratner, R. Stever, 1995, p. 193). Therefore, all the activities
and program for peacekeeping was working smoothly.
Are these four factors mentioned above sufficient to make UNTAC successful in its
peacekeeping operation?
5
37 countries supported in the Cambodian peacekeeping operation are Algeria, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway,
Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United
Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.

c. What Other Factors?
The four factors mentioned above are the main factors in the successful
peacekeeping operation launched by UNTAC in Cambodia in 1991 to 1993. Most of
the documents and report on the peacekeeping in Cambodia determined that UNTAC
played very vital roles in the Cambodia settlement conflict, especially, in the time of
the peacekeeping, to assure the peaceful polling and reconstruction after the conflict
finished. However, the four vital factors mentioned above are not enough to lead
UNTAC successful in peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. There are more factors
supported the successful peacekeeping in Cambodia. Next, the paper will illustrate
more elements for UN successful peacekeeping in Cambodia.
Strong Legal Framework

The efforts of all relevant parties to settle the Cambodian conflict established the
peace agreement for Cambodia. This Peace agreement is strong legal instruments to
establish major institutions and UN agencies for peace operation like SNC,
UNAMIC and UNTAC. This is a final act for peace agreement in Cambodia. There
are three main legal framework supported to the peace process in Cambodia. The
three main legal frameworks lead UNAMIC and UNTAC successful in their work in
peacekeeping. The three main legal documents are (1) Agreement on Comprehensive
Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict; (2) the agreement concerning the
sovereignty, independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and
National Unity of Cambodia; and (3) the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction of Cambodia (UN, 1996, p. 454). The Paris Peace Agreement in 1991
is the core legal framework in ceasefire in Cambodia. It is clear and strong basic
legal instrument in settlement of Cambodia conflict. This Accord was signed by all
parties in the conflict and other 18 countries including the strong supports from all
super power counties (United States, China, and Russia who are the supporter of
those parties in the conflict in Cambodia). According to the Accord the mandate of
UNTAC was said clearly in the Accord (see appendix 2). All parties in the conflict
respected to the Accord even big country like Russia that used to support Vietnam in
supervision Cambodia from 1979. Beside the core legal instruments, there are ten
resolution of the Security Council, which supported the peace process in Cambodia.

Practically, all parties in the conflict did not violate the core agreement (UN, 1996, p.
454). All parties in the conflict, including those countries that supported all the four
parties in the conflict (China, US, Soviet Union, and ASEAN 6 countries), agreed to
respect to the agreement which defined in article 9 that “the cease-fire shall take
effect at the time this Agreement enters into force. All forces shall immediately
disengage and refrain from all hostilities and from any deployment, movement or
action which would extend the territory they control or which might lead to renewed
fighting. The Signatories hereby invite the Security Council of the UN to request the
Secretary-General to provide good offices to assist in this process until such time as
the military component of UNTAC is in position to supervise, monitor and verify it”.
Strong Commitment of UN
UN played very important role in the peace process in Cambodia from the beginning
of the year 80’s. UN actively supports the peace plan process and encourages all
parties in the conflict to solve the problem as mentioned in their Secretary General
Resolution in the year 80’s on peace process in Cambodia (Ratner, R. Stever, 1995,
p. 141). Even the Paris Peace Agreement did not yet sign, UN prepared their peace
process plan already by focusing to establish UNAMIC and UNTAC in order to
ceasefire and organize election and restoration of Cambodia from the long term of
civil wars. Diehl (1993) recognized the strong commitment of the UN in Cambodian
peace process. He added that UN committed very strong efforts to finding peace,
facilitating, sponsoring negotiation and representing on in series of diplomatic
triumphs (Diehl, F. Paul, 1993, p. 196).
Although KR did not join the election, but UNTAC organized peaceful election
dating from 23-25 May 1993. It is a great work of UNTAC in that time. It was very
surprise for most of the foreign observers. There was no violence marred the
election. As a result nearly 90 percent of registered Cambodian turned out at fixed
1.400 and 200 mobile polling election stations (Ratner, R. Stever, 1995, p. 180).
Active Participation of Cambodian People

6
ASEAN is Association of South East Asia Nations. It composed of 10 countries located in South
East Asia. The ten country members are Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, and Singapore. Recently, ASEAN country have been
discussing on adding one more country in ASEAN. This country was just get independence from
Indonesia. This country is East Timor. ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok

The strong support from the Cambodian people is a constructive factor in the
successful peacekeeping operation conducted by UNTAC in Cambodia. Cambodia
people participated actively in peacekeeping with UNTAC operation. There are more
than 90 percent of number of full rights for voting people was registered for election
and 90 percent of them voted. Furthermore, peacekeeping and election process were
gotten many supports from all people around the country even people in the KR area
(Doyle, W. Michael, Johnstone, Ian, and Orr, C. Robert, 1997, p. 199).
UNTAC won the sympathy, supports and trust from Cambodian people who saw
itself as a protector at the time when they had not faith in their own leader (Lao, M.
Hay, 1994, p. 218). Cambodian people considered UNTAC as a new authority in
Cambodia to serve them from war and will help their country from destructed
country to developed country. When the UNTAC arrived to Cambodia, many
complaints from Cambodian people on land property were send to UNTAC authority
because they are confident that UNTAC is only one authority can help them to solve
this problem.
4. Conclusion
UN played a crucial role in finding peace for Cambodian people. UN established

international conferences for settlement for Cambodia conflict since 1981. The
Process of peace can’t work without the active and strong supports from invaluable
efforts of UN. Through many supports, the final agreement of peace in Cambodia
was established in Paris in 1991. The Paris Peace Agreement is a fundamental legal
framework to form up all necessary UN agencies, UNAMIC and then UNTAC, and
SNC to make more successful peace operation in Cambodia. The hypotheses of the
paper are true. All the four main elements are the corner stone making UN successful
peacekeeping in Cambodia. In case of Cambodia, however, there are other accessory
factors, as well, achieving peacekeeping in this country. The achievements of UN in
Cambodia are the contributions of many aspects in which the most important factors
are clear and specific mandate and strong commitment of the UNAMIC and UNTAC
in peace operation. Strong support from all actors including Cambodian people
themselves is a factor to push country from conflict to peace including the four

parties in the conflict. However, the legal framework (Paris Peace Agreement) is a
very important element for the success in Cambodian peacekeeping as well.
UNTAC's most notable success was the preparations for and conduct of the elections.
An estimated 89.5 per cent of the population voted in the first real elections ever held
in the country. This democratic election is a first election in Cambodia since the
Cambodia got independence from France in 1953. UNTAC also succeeded in
isolating the Khmer Rouge, beginning the tortuous process of national reconciliation
and giving the Cambodian people for the first time in almost 40 years the opportunity
to choose their government in a comparatively free, fair and democratic manner. A
new constitution was written, a new government formed, and an integrated national
army was established. In addition UNTAC repatriated all Cambodian refugees from
the Thai border and closed the camps there, freed the press, alleviated conditions in
the prisons, started the gargantuan task of mine clearance, imparted new skills to
thousands of Cambodians, fostered the rapid growth of human rights consciousness
and other civic values and began restoring Cambodia's shattered infrastructure.
UNTAC achieved immense success in its 'hearts and minds' campaign and in its use
of civilian volunteers.
The successful peacekeeping in Cambodia established good experiences for other

peace operation of UN in other countries. Among the experiences and lesson learned
from the successful peacekeeping, there are three mains lessons learned. First,
support from all the factions in the conflict is very important factors for UN action to
deploy their troops and make ceasefire. Indeed, Cambodian people support and trust
the operation of UN is a most crucial factor to facilitate UNAMIC and UNTAC more
successful in their operation. Second, support from major power country is a leading
role in making UN more opportunity to get more support in both political and
economical aspects. If there is no support from those major power countries (US,
China, and Soviet Union), the Paris Peace Agreement did not happen. Third, also,
strong commitment and clear mandate of UN mission agency (UNAMIC and
UNTAC) is a vital factor to make the peacekeeping more successful. UNAMIC and
UNTAC completed their duties with strong commitment to ceasefire and organize
peaceful election for Cambodia people.

References
A- Books and legal documents Sources
Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 23
October 1991, Paris, France
Chopra, Jarat, 1999, Peace-Maintenance: The Evolution of International Political
Authority, Routledge Advances in International Relations and Politics,
London and New York
Diehl, F. Paul, 1993, International Peacekeeping: With a new epilogue on Somalia,
Bosnia, and Cambodia, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and
London
Doyle, W.Michael, Johnstone, Ian, and Orr, C. Robert, 1997, Keeping the Peace:
Multidimensional UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador, Cambridge
University Press
Hogwood, W. Brian and Gunn A. Lewis, 1984, Policy Analysis for the Real World:
Implementation, Oxford University Press, London
Lao, M. Hay, 1994, The UNFinished Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Khmer
Institute of Democracy (KID), Phnom Penh
Ratner, R. Stever, 1995, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of
Conflicts after the Cold War, St. Martin’s Press, New York
United Nations, 1996, A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, third edition,
United Nations, New York, NY 10017
B- Internet Sources
Dennis C. Jett, 1995, Lessons Unlearned - Or Why Mozambique's Successful
Peacekeeping Operation Might Not Be Replicated Elsewhere, UN website:
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/mozambiq.pdf, checked on 22 August 2006
Malan, Mark, 1997, A Concise of Conceptual History of UN peace Operation,
African Security Review, vol. 6, No.1, website:
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/6No1/Malan.html, checked on 20 August 2006
Ouellet, Julian, 2003, Peacekeeping, Beyond Intractability website:
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/peacekeeping/, checked on 20
August 2006
Seminar Report, 2002, Past, Present and Future Challenges in Peacekeeping, website:
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/DPKO%20Seminar%20Report%202002.pdf,
checked on 21 August 2006
United Nations, Cambodia UNTAC Background, UN Website:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr1.html, checked on 24
August 2006
United Nations, Cambodia, UNAMIC Background, UN website:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamicbackgr.html#one,
United Nations, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and
peace-keeping, 1992, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the
statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31
January 1992, UN website: http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html,
United Nations, United Nations Charter, UN Website:
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/, checked on 20 August 2006
Wikipedia Website, List of UN Peacekeeping mission,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_UN_peacekeeping_missions,
checked on August 19, 2006

Appendix 1: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations from 1948-2005
Completed missions
Africa
Dates of
Name of Operation Location Conflict Website
operation
1960– United Nations Operation in the
Congo Congo Crisis [1]
1964 Congo (ONUC)
1988– United Nations Angola Verification Angolan War of
Angola [2]
1991 Mission I (UNAVEM I) Independence
1989– United Nations Transition Assistance Namibian War of
Namibia [3]
1990 Group (UNTAG) Independence
1991– United Nations Angola Verification
Angola Angolan Civil War [4]
1995 Mission II (UNAVEM II)
1992– United Nations Operation in
Mozambique Liberian Civil War [5]
1994 Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
1992– United Nations Operation in Somalia
Somalia Somali Civil War [6]
1993 I (UNOSOM I)
1993– United Nations Observer Mission in
Liberia Liberian Civil War [7]
1997 Liberia (UNOMIL)
1993– United Nations Observer Mission Rwanda
Rwandan genocide [8]
1994 Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) Uganda
1993– United Nations Assistance Mission
Rwanda Rwandan genocide [9]
1996 for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
1993– United Nations Operation in Somalia
Somalia Somali Civil War [10]
1995 II (UNOSOM II)
United Nations Aouzou Strip Chad
1994 Aouzou Strip dispute [11]
Observer Group (UNASOG) Libya
1995– United Nations Angola Verification
1997 Mission III (UNAVEM III)
1999 Angola (MONUA)
Sierra Leone Sierra Leone civil war [14]
1999 Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)
United Nations Mission in the Central
1998– Central African
Central African Republic African [15]
2000 Republic mutinies
(MINURCA) Republic
1999– United Nations Mission in Sierra
Sierra Leone Sierra Leone civil war [16]
2005 Leone (UNAMSIL)
Americas
Dates of
operation
Mission of the Representative of the
1965– Dominican
Secretary-General in the Dominican Dominican Civil War [17]
1966 Republic
Republic (DOMREP)
1989– United Nations Observer Group in Central Nicaraguan Civil War [18]
1
1992 Central America (ONUCA) America

El Salvador El Salvador Civil War [19]
1995 El Salvador (ONUSAL)
1993– United Nations Mission in Haiti 1991 coup and
Haiti [20]
1996 (UNMIH) military rule in Haiti
1996– United Nations Support Mission in Stabilizing Haiti's new
Haiti [21]
1997 Haiti (UNSMIH) democracy
United Nations Verification Mission
1997 Guatemala Guatemalan Civil War [22]
in Guatemala (MINUGUA)
United Nations Transition Mission in Training of the Haitian
1997 Haiti [23]
Haiti (UNTMIH) National Police
1997– United Nations Civilian Police Training of the Haitian
Haiti [24]
2000 Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) National Police
1
Shown are the flags of the five countries in which ONUCA operated. They are in this order (sorted
alphabetically): Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
Asia
Dates of
operation
1
1962– United Nations Security Force in West New Indonesian takeover of
[25]
1963 West New Guinea (UNSF) Guinea West New Guinea
1965– United Nations India-Pakistan India Indo-Pakistani War of

[26]
1966 Observation Mission (UNIPOM) Pakistan 1965
United Nations Good Offices Afghanistan
1988– Soviet invasion of
Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan [27]
1990 Pakistan Afghanistan
(UNGOMAP)
1991– United Nations Advance Mission in Fall of the Khmer
Cambodia [28]
1992 Cambodia (UNAMIC) Rouge
1992– United Nations Transitional Fall of the Khmer
Cambodia [29]
1993 Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) Rouge
1994– United Nations Mission of Observers
Tajikistan Tajikistan Civil War [30]
2000 in Tajikistan (UNMOT)
United Nations Mission in East 2 Indonesian invasion
1999 East Timor [31]
Timor (UNAMET) and occupation
The United Nations Transitional
1999– 2 Indonesian invasion
Administration in East Timor East Timor [32]
2002 and occupation
(UNTAET)
2002– United Nations Mission of Support in Indonesian invasion
East Timor [33]
2005 East Timor UNMISET) and occupation
1
The first flag shown is that of the West Papua (West New Guinea), the country that had been
arranged to succeed the Dutch colony. However, the Netherlands, whose flag is the second shown,
was later forced to hand over the territory to Indonesia, whose flag is last.
2
Shown are the flags of the newly independent East Timor and its former occupier, Indonesia (in that
Europe

Dates of
operation
1
1992– United Nations Protection Force Former

Yugoslav wars [34]
1995 (UNPROFOR) Yugoslavia
1994– United Nations Confidence

Croatia Croatian War [35]
1996 Restoration Operation (UNCRO)
1995– United Nations Mission in Bosnia Bosnia and
Bosnian War [36]
2002 and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) Herzegovina
Former
1995– United Nations Preventive Yugoslav Aftermath of the
[37]
1999 Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) Republic of Yugoslav wars
Macedonia
United Nations Transitional
1996– Authority in Eastern Slovenia,
Croatia Croatian War [38]
1998 Baranja and Western Sirmium
(UNTAES)
1996– United Nations Mission of Observers 2 Prevlaka Prevlaka territorial
[39]
2002 in Prevlaka (UNMOP) Peninsula dispute
United Nations Civilian Police
1998 Croatia Croatian War [40]
Support Group (UNPSG)
1
This mission operated within the current successor states to the Former Yugoslavia of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The flags are shown in this order.
2
Prevlaka Peninsula was claimed by both Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) and the flags are shown in this order. Upon resolution, all parties accepted Croatia's
claim to the territory.
Middle East
Dates of
operation
1956– First United Nations Emergency Egypt Suez Crisis, Six-Day
[41]
1967 Force (UNEF I) Israel War
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon crisis of
1958 Lebanon [42]
Lebanon (UNOGIL) 1958
Yemen Civil War
1963– United Nations Yemen Observation
Yemen (See also Yemen Arab [43]
1964 Mission (UNYOM)
Republic)
1973– Second United Nations Emergency Egypt
Yom Kippur War [44]
1979 Force (UNEF II) Israel
1988– United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Iran
Iran-Iraq War [45]
1991 Observer Group (UNIIMOG) Iraq
1991– United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Iraq
Gulf War [46]
2003 Observation Mission (UNIKOM) Kuwait
Current deployment

Africa
Start of
operation
United Nations Mission for the
Western Moroccan occupation
1991 Referendum in Western Sahara [47]
Sahara of Western Sahara
(MINURSO)
United Nations Organization Mission Democratic
1999 in the Democratic Republic of the Republic of Second Congo War [48]
Congo (MONUC) Congo
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia Eritrea Eritrean-Ethiopian
2000 [49]
and Eritrea (UNMEE) Ethiopia War
United Nations Mission in Liberia Second Liberian Civil
2003 Liberia [50]
(UNMIL) War
United Nations Operation in Burundi
2004 Burundi Burundi Civil War [51]
(ONUB)
United Nations Operation in Côte Civil war in Côte
2004 Côte d'Ivoire [52]
d'Ivoire (UNOCI) d'Ivoire
United Nations Mission in the Sudan Second Sudanese
2005 Sudan [53]
(UNMIS) Civil War
Americas
Start of
operation
United Nations Stabilization Mission
2004 Haiti 2004 Haiti rebellion [54]
in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
Asia
Start of
operation
United Nations Military India
Indo-Pakistani
1949 Observer Group in India and [55]
Pakistan Wars
Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
Europe
Start of
operation
United Nations Peacekeeping Force 1
1964 Cyprus Cyprus dispute [56]
in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
United Nations Observer Mission in

1993 Georgia Abkhazian War [57]
Georgia (UNOMIG)
United Nations Interim
2
1999 Administration Mission in Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo War [58]
(UNMIK)
1
The United Nations and all foreign governments but Turkey recognizes the sovereignty of the
Republic of Cyprus, whose flag is shown first, over the whole island of Cyprus. The second flag is
that of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a de facto state, by virtue of controlling the northern

third of the island, which is recognized only by Turkey and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference.
2
There is no official flag of Kosovo. The top flag is the flag of Albania, used by the Albanian-
dominated administration and the vast majority of Kosovo Albanians. The bottom flag is the flag of
Serbia, used by the Serb-inhabited area of north Kosovo. For more see flag of Kosovo.
Middle East
Start of
operation
(Monitors the various
United Nations Truce Supervision
1948 Middle East ceasefires and assists [59]
Organization (UNTSO) 1
UNDOF and UNIFIL)
Agreed withdrawal by
2
United Nations Disengagement Golan Syrian and Israeli
1974 [60]
Observer Force (UNDOF) Heights forces following the
Yom Kippur War.
Lebanese Civil War
United Nations Interim Force in
1978 Lebanon and Syrian occupation [61]
Lebanon (UNIFIL)
of Lebanon
1
There is no officially recognized flag of the entire region of the Middle East. Shown is a map of the
Middle East.
2
Various regions of the Golan Heights have been claimed by Israel, Lebanon, and Syria; all three
flags are shown, in that order.
Source: Wikipedia website:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_UN_peacekeeping_missions, Checked
on 17 August 2006

Appendix 2: UNTAC Mandate
Section A: General Procedures
1. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, UNTAC will exercise the powers
necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement, including those
relating to the organization and conduct of free and fair elections and the relevant
aspects of the administration of Cambodia.
2. The following mechanism will be used to resolve all issues relating to the
implementation of this Agreement which may arise between the Secretary-
General's Special Representative and the Supreme National Council (SNC):
a. The SNC offers advice to UNTAC, which will comply with this advice
provided there is a consensus among the members of the SNC and provided
this advice is consistent with the objectives of the present Agreement;
b. If there is no consensus among the members of the SNC despite every

Endeavour of its President, H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, the
President will be entitled to make the decision on what advice to offer to
UNTAC, taking fully into account the views expressed in the SNC. UNTAC
will comply with the advice provided it is consistent with the objectives of
the present Agreement;
c. If H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of the SNC, the legitimate

representative of Cambodian sovereignty, is not, for whatever reason, in a
position to make such a decision, his power of decision will transfer to the
Secretary-General's Special Representative. The Special Representative will
make the final decision, taking fully into account the views expressed in the
SNC;
d. Any power to act regarding the implementation of this Agreement conferred

upon the SNC by the Agreement will be exercised by consensus or, failing
such consensus, by its President in accordance with the procedure set out
above. In the event that H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of
the SNC, the legitimate representative of Cambodian sovereignty, is not, for
whatever reason, in a position to act, his power to act will transfer to the
Secretary-General's Special Representative, who may take the necessary
action;
e. In all cases, the Secretary-General's Special Representative will determine

whether advice or action of the SNC is consistent with the present
Agreement.
3. The Secretary-General's Special Representative or his delegate will attend the

meetings of the SNC and of any subsidiary body which might be established by it
and give its members all necessary information on the decisions taken by
UNTAC.
Section B: Civil Administration
1. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, all administrative agencies,

bodies and offices acting in the field of foreign affairs, national defense, finance,
public security and information will be placed under the direct control of
UNTAC, which will exercise it as necessary to ensure strict neutrality. In this

respect, the Secretary-General's Special Representative will determine what is
necessary and may issue directives to the above-mentioned administrative
agencies, bodies and offices. Such directives may be issued to and will bind all
Cambodian Parties.
2. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the Secretary-General's Special

Representative, in consultation with the SNC, will determine which other
administrative agencies, bodies and offices could directly influence the outcome
of elections. These administrative agencies, bodies and offices will be placed
under direct supervision or control of UNTAC and will comply with any
guidance provided by it.
3. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the Secretary-General's Special

Representative, in consultation with the SNC, will identify which administrative
agencies, bodies and offices could continue to operate in order to ensure normal
day-to-day life in Cambodia, if necessary, under such supervision by UNTAC as
it considers necessary.
4. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the authority of the Secretary-

General's Special Representative will include the power to:
a. Install in administrative agencies, bodies and offices of all the Cambodian

Parties United Nations personnel, who will have unrestricted access to all
administrative operations and information;
b. Require the reassignment or removal of any personnel of such administrative

agencies, bodies and offices.
5.
a. On the basis of the information provided in Article 1, paragraph 3, of annex
2, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will determine, after
consultation with the Cambodian Parties, those civil police necessary to
perform law enforcement in Cambodia. All Cambodian Parties hereby
undertake to comply with the determination made by the Special
Representative in this regard;
b. All civil police will operate under UNTAC supervision or control, in order to
ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, and that
human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected. In consultation
with the SNC, UNTAC will supervise other law enforcement and judicial
processes throughout Cambodia to the extent necessary to ensure the
attainment of these objectives.
6. If the Secretary-General's Special Representative deems it necessary, UNTAC, in

consultation with the SNC, will undertake investigations of complaints and
allegations regarding actions by the existing administrative structures in
Cambodia that are inconsistent with or work against the objectives of this
comprehensive political settlement. UNTAC will also be empowered to
undertake such investigation on its own initiative. UNTAC will take, when
necessary, appropriate corrective steps.
Section C: Milltary Functions
1. UNTAC will supervise, monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces, the
cease-fire and related measures in accordance with annex 2, including:

a. Verification of the withdrawal from Cambodia of all categories of foreign
forces, advisers and military personnel and their weapons, ammunition and
equipment, and their non-return to Cambodia;
b. Liaison with neighbouring Governments over any developments in or near
their territory that could endanger the implementation of this Agreement;
c. Monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance to all Cambodian
Parties;
d. Locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies
throughout the country;
e. Assisting with clearing mines and undertaking training programmes in mine
clearance and a mine awareness programme among the Cambodian people.
2. UNTAC will supervise the regrouping and relocating of all forces to specifically
designated cantonment areas on the basis of an operational timetable to be agreed
upon, in accordance with annex 2.
3. As the forces enter the cantonments, UNTAC will initiate the process of arms
control and reduction specified in annex 2.
4. UNTAC will take necessary steps regarding the phased process of demobilization
of the military forces of the parties, in accordance with annex 2.
5. UNTAC will assist, as necessary, the International Committee of the Red Cross
in the release of all prisoners of war and civilian internees.
Section D: Elections
1. UNTAC will organize and conduct the election referred to in Part ll of this
Agreement in accordance with this section and annex 3.
2. UNTAC may consult with the SNC regarding the organization and conduct of the
electoral process.
3. In the exercise of its responsibilities in relation to the electoral process, the
specific authority of UNTAC will include the following:
a. The establishment, in consultation with the SNC, of a system of laws,
procedures and administrative measures necessary for the holding of a free
and fair election in Cambodia, including the adoption of an electoral law and
of a code of conduct regulating participation in the election in a manner
consistent with respect for human rights and prohibiting coercion or financial
inducement in order to influence voter preference;
b. The suspension or abrogation, in consultation with the SNC, of provisions of
existing laws which could defeat the objects and purposes of this Agreement;
c. The design and implementation of a voter education programme, covering all
aspects of the election, to support the election process;
d. The design and implementation of a system of voter registration, as a first
phase of the electoral process, to ensure that eligible voters have the
opportunity to register, and the subsequent preparation of verified voter
registration lists;

e. The design and implementation of a system of registration of political parties
and lists of candidates;
f. Ensuring fair access to the media, including press, television and radio, for all
political parties contesting in the election;
g. The adoption and implementation of measures to monitor and facilitate the
participation of Cambodians in the elections, the political campaign and the
balloting procedures;
h. The design and implementation of a system of balloting and polling, to ensure
that registered voters have the opportunity to vote;
i. The establishment, in consultation with the SNC, of coordinated
arrangements to facilitate the presence of foreign observers wishing to
observe the campaign and voting;
j. Overall direction of polling and the vote count;
k. The identification and investigation of complaints of electoral irregularities,
and the taking of appropriate corrective action;
l. Determining whether or not the election was free and fair and, if so,
certification of the list of persons duly elected.
4. In carrying out its responsibilities under the present section, UNTAC will
establish a system of safeguards to assist it in ensuring the absence of fraud
during the electoral process, including arrangements for Cambodian
representatives to observe the registration and polling procedures and the
provision of an UNTAC mechanism for hearing and deciding complaints.
5. The timetable for the various phases of the electoral process will be determined
by UNTAC, in consultation with the SNC as provided in paragraph 2 of this
section. The duration of the electoral process will not exceed nine months from
the commencement of voter registration.
6. In organizing and conducting the electoral process, UNTAC will make every
effort to ensure that the system and procedures adopted are absolutely impartial,
while the operational arrangements are as administratively simple and efficient as
possible.
Section E: Human Rights
In accordance with Article 16, UNTAC will make provisions for:
a. The development and implementation of a programme of human rights

education to promote respect for and understanding of human rights;
b. General human rights oversight during the transitional period;
c. The investigation of human rights complaints. and. Where appropriate,

corrective action.
Source: Extraction from the Paris Peace Accord in 1991

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia

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Successful United Nations Peacekeeping

State Failure, Crisis and Conflict Management

MPM/MGPP Summer term 2006

FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 1

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 2

2. Elements of Successful UN Peacekeeping

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 3

The implementation of peacekeeping should follow some guidelines or principles.

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 4

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 5

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 6

The traditional tasks or first generation of UN peacekeeping operations as they

The core objective of the third stage (second generation of UN peacekeeping) is to

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 7

b. Elements of successful peacekeeping

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 8

“The United Nations can serve as catalysts, framework and support

To see more clear on UN successful peacekeeping operation, there was a case in El

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 9

Another successful peacekeeping operation of UN operation is Mozambique

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 10

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 11

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 12

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 13

3. Analysis of UN Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 14

In 1981, there were seventy-nine states participated including Democratic

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 15

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 16

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 17

Beside those three factors mentioned above, successful peacekeeping operation

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 18

Strong Legal Framework

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 19

Active Participation of Cambodian People

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 20

UN played a crucial role in finding peace for Cambodian people. UN established

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 21

The successful peacekeeping in Cambodia established good experiences for other

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 22

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 23

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 24

1965– United Nations India-Pakistan India Indo-Pakistani War of

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 25

1992– United Nations Protection Force Former

1994– United Nations Confidence

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 26

United Nations Observer Mission in

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 27

Source: Wikipedia website:

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 28

b. If there is no consensus among the members of the SNC despite every

c. If H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of the SNC, the legitimate

d. Any power to act regarding the implementation of this Agreement conferred

e. In all cases, the Secretary-General's Special Representative will determine

3. The Secretary-General's Special Representative or his delegate will attend the

Section B: Civil Administration

1. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, all administrative agencies,

Successful United Nations Peacekeeping in Cambodia Page 29

2. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the Secretary-General's Special

3. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the Secretary-General's Special

4. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the authority of the Secretary-

a. Install in administrative agencies, bodies and offices of all the Cambodian