V22 N2 Spring 2005

Editor-in-Chief
AbdulHamid AbuSulayman
Editor
Katherine Bullock
Assistant Editor
Soha Srour
Copy Editor
Jay Willoughby
Book Review Editor

Jasmin Zine
Editorial Board
Mumtaz Ahmad Sulayman S. Nyang Anas al-Shaikh Ali Dilnawaz Siddiqui M. A. Muqtedar Khan
International Advisory Board

Ibrahim Abu-Rabi Khurshid Ahmad Akbar Ahmed Manzoor Alam Taha J. al-Alwani Zafar Ishaq Ansari Khaled Blankinship Charles Butterworth Louis J. Cantori Ahmad Davutoglu Abdulwahab M. Elmessiri John L. Esposito Mehdi Golshani M. Kamal Hassan Aziza Y. al-Hibri Mohammad H. Kamali Enes Karic Clovis Maksoud Ali A. Mazrui Seyyed Hossein Nasr Ibrahim Ahmed Omer Mustapha Pasha James P. Piscatori Anne Sofie Roald Tamara Sonn Antony Sullivan Sayyid M. Syeed Ahmad Yusuf
A joint publication of:

The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) & The Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS)
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VOLUME 22 SPRING 2005 NUMBER 2
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL SCIENCES
ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT
Note to Contributors
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The International Institute of Islamic Thought ISSN 0742-6763
CONTENTS
Editorial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Articles
The Jundishapur School: Its History, Structure, and Functions Mehmet Mahfuz Sylemez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Paths toward an Arab Knowledge Society Dieter Weiss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Seyyed Hossein Nasr and the Study of Religion in Contemporary Society Haifaa Jawad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Islamic Banking and Finance in Theory and Practice: The Experience of Malaysia and Bahrain Abdus Samad, Norman D. Gardner, and Bradley J. Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Reivew Essay
Mazrui and His Critics Paul Banahene Adjei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Book Reviews
Islamophobia Issues, Challenges, and Action: A Report by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamaphobia (by Hugh Muir and Laura Smith, researchers; Robin Richardson, ed.) Zubeida Saloojee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism (by Bobby S. Sayyid) Anas Malik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Transnational Political Islam: Religion, Ideology, and Power (by Azza Karam, ed.) Anas Malik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century (by Mark Sedgwick) Ali Hassan Zaidi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Islam in the African-American Experience (by Richard Brent Turner) Aneesah Nadir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War against Iraq (by Paul Rutherford) Ayesha Ahmad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Muslims in America: Race, Politics, and Community Building (by Mbaye Lo) Shaza Khan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Fundamentals of Rumis Thought: A Mevlevi Sufi Perspective (by Sefik Can; ed. and trans. by Zeki Saritoprak) Mahdi Tourage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 All American Yemeni Girls: Being Muslim in a Public School (by Loukia K. Sarroub) Amani Hamdan Alghamdi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Confessions of an Economic Hit Man (by John Perkins) Jay Willoughby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Forum
Al-Qaeda: A Nontraditional Movement Pedro Brieger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Conference, Symposium, and Panel Reports

Islam in Higher Education Conference Abdul-Rehman Malik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Fifth Seminar on the Middle East Pedro Brieger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 International Seminar on Islamic Thought Muhammed Haron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Abstracts
Doctoral Dissertations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Editorial
As Mehmet Mahfuz Sylemez documents in his The Jundishapur School: Its History, Structure, and Functions, Southwest Asia has long been a site for a cross-fertilization of ideas that have led to productive societies. Although Jundishapurs excellence as a medical center predates the coming of Islam, it nevertheless played a key role in transmitting knowledge to Muslim physicians as well as contributing to Baghdads development as an up-and-coming center of excellence. In an open and welcoming climate, the scholars and physicians of Jundishapur and Baghdad fostered a learning environment that allowed Muslim civilizations to flourish. Todays Muslims often look back to such golden ages with wistfulness, admiration, and frustration. Given the constant defeats and subjugation faced by Muslim countries since western colonization, this wistfulness is not surprising. In order to bolster their identity to defend themselves against this continuing subjugation, Muslims often offer this glorious past to an Islamophobic world: We are not barbarians! See what Muslim civilization was capable of! And in the face of Eurocentric curricula that largely deny any role to a non-European civilization in the history of ideas since Plato, such reminders are crucial. But as Dieter Weiss Paths toward an Arab Knowledge Society inadvertently highlights, such wistfulness is underscored by an ignorance of just what it takes to produce a golden age. For a society to flourish, it must create the conditions that enable its inhabitants to engage in knowledge creation: the freedom to think, debate, and discuss. While he focuses only on the Arab world, one would have to be blind to reality not to realize that the same deplorable situation can be found in most Muslim countries today. Imagine what kind of Muslim cultural and political society must have existed for Ibn Sina, who produced great medical and philosophical works while denying the resurrection of the body. Compare that with the assassinations, death threats, and the like facing contemporary writers who engage in independent thought about Islam and the modern world. Think of the role of caliph Mamuns bayt al-hikmah (House of Wisdom), where Christians, Muslims, and scholars who followed other religions worked side-by-side to
ii
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2
translate the great works of Greek philosophers and doctors; the collection of manuscripts from China, India, and Persia; the gatherings of philosophers, artists, and so on at a rulers court. Compare such an environment with what we see today in the Middle East, where Christian communities and sometimes even fellow Muslims are attacked for being unbelievers. Compare todays rulers, who isolate themselves from society and watch it suspiciously through the secret police, with their predecessors. The corollary of the bayt al-hikmahs intellectual climate and the patronage of ideas that it represents in the modern capitalist world is a free academia, an unfettered press, and an independent civil society. And yet, as Weiss documents through his discussion of the Arab development reports, these are the very freedoms that are feared and kept at bay by authoritarian political structures and the cultural and educational systems that support them. So, while Muslims may long for the golden age, they are not proactive in re-creating the conditions that helped produce it. Haifaa Jawads article on Seyyed Hossein Nasr only cements this point. As Jawad states, his parents library contained philosophical, literary, and medical books from both the Islamic and the western traditions. In addition, having been educated in both western and Islamic societies, he was able to use his varied experiences to formulate his own deeply spiritual approach to the world an approach that has touched many people with its profound analysis of the crisis of modernity and its recommendations for improvement. Thus, Weiss article should be read with those of Sylemez and Jawad as a kind of triple analysis of the Muslim worlds current paralysis, along with some prescriptions. A great many Muslims need to learn that an environment in which thinking is cultivated need not be one that ensures or even represents the end of Islam as a living faith tradition. In fact, as Weiss points out, just the opposite is true: How, one might ask, can a society survive the lack of relevant thought and the ensuing knowledge acquired, for such a condition hampers its ability to respond to the ever-fluid circumstances of life. As we can see today in the Muslim world, the end result of such a policy is stagnation, if not outright backwardness. Muslims need to learn that they should not feel threatened by different and novel ideas. We do not have to agree with all of our fellow Muslims arguments; we simply need to engage them in reasoned dialogue. Naturally, this holds true for our interaction with non-Muslim individuals and civilizations as well. Ùmar ibn al-Khattab (may God be pleased with him) once advised Muslims to criticize and appraise [your]selves before [you] are criticized
Editorial
iii
and appraised on the Day of Judgment, and weigh out [your] deeds before they are weighed out for [you]. Self-criticism is only possible in a society that allows the freedom of thought and expression. The Muslims ongoing post-colonial inferiority complex prevents them from embracing this attitude (or, more specifically, re-embracing it), for self-critical thinking only arises from people who are self-confident and have a high (yet realistic) opinion of themselves. Of course, we also need to be leery of any international institutional body, as Weiss documents in the Arab Development reports, that targets child-rearing practices as the solution to a nations problems. After all, that was one of the ultimate goals of western colonialism. We need to be selfcritical, open to knowledge and insights from all sources, and to be able to sift them through the prisms of the Quran and the Sunnah. This was the brilliant achievement of the early Muslims, who did not display the same kind of fear and siege mentality that we often see today among Muslims. The article by Abdus Samad, Norman D. Gardner, and Bradley J. Cook, Islamic Banking and Finance in Theory and Practice, is an empirically based case study of two Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain. The authors show us precisely how this kind of openness, when combined with a commitment to core values, can be achieved by modern Muslim institutions. Founded on the prescriptions of the Shariàh, Islamic banking offers a sustainable investment and banking alternative to the globally dominant interest-based system of capitalism. Their paper highlights that, despite the conclusions of detractors, Muslims are capable of rising to the challenges of modernity without compromising their core religious and social values. Pedro Briegers article on al-Qaeda, in our forum section, shows us a possible alternative world to one of open dialogue, cross-cultural exchange, and mutual respect the Manichean world promised us by alQaeda, and its western counterpart, courtesy of the neo-cons of President Bushs administration. Both groups seem to believe that terror and violence are the foundational ingredients for a blessed way of life. Bush endorses killing in the name of spreading freedom and is blind to the giants trampling of different opinions in its arrogant belief that only it knows how to lead the good life. And for its part, al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers are blind to their termite-like destruction, eating away at the foundations of the global civilizations that sustain us all. This issue of AJISS is unique because we have translated two articles from European languages into English: Weiss article was originally published in German, in the journal Orient, and Briegers fourm piece and
iv
conference report were originally written in Spanish. Through this translation effort, we hope to open up new vistas by, in the tradition of the bayt alhikmah, bringing into our conversation those who are writing in other languages about topics relevant to AJISS and its readers. Due to scheduling conflicts and other professional obligations, our assistant editor, Layla Sein, is stepping down from her post. We would like to thank her for her years of dedication and commitment to improving the academic quality of the journal. May Allah grant her success in her future endeavors. It seems like something of a new tradition, one unplanned but perhaps unavoidable, to close the editorial of each issue with an obituary. Mention must be made here of the passing away of Pope John Paul II, a truly historic moment, especially for the worlds Catholics. As Muslim organizations have noted in their condolences, Pope John Paul II was a Muslim-friendly Pope. He promoted interfaith dialogue with all of the worlds great faith traditions, including Islam. In addition, he was the first Pope in history to set foot inside a mosque when he visited the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, Syria, in 2001. In his autobiography, Crossing the Threshold of Hope (Knopf: 1995), the Pope, while naturally disagreeing with Islamic theology, expressed his admiration for the Muslims devotion to prayer. He also strongly promoted justice for all oppressed peoples, spoke out specifically about Palestinian suffering, and condemned the American invasion of (and subsequent war in) Iraq. His call for mutual respect and dialogue can only be admired and appreciated. Many Muslims have expressed the hope that his successor will pick up where he left off. Katherine Bullock
The Jundishapur School: Its History, Structure, and Functions

Mehmet Mahfuz Sylemez
Abstract Located in the region of Alam (modern Khuzistan), Jundishapur was founded by the Sassanid emperor Shahpur I in 260. This city was home to the Jundishapur school (madrasah), one of the most important science centers in history, that harmonized within itself classical Greek philosophy, Indian culture, and the Persian scientific heritage. This fact becomes clear when one looks at its rich curriculum, which ranges from medical science and pharmacology to philosophy. This complex consisted of several sections, such as a medical school (bimaristan), a pharmacology laboratory, a translation bureau, a library, and an observatory. It also had a deep influence on Islamic culture and civilization through its professors, who, in the early years of Àbbasid rule, began to settle in the capital city of Baghdad and eventually established a similar school modeled on their school in Jundishapur. From that point on, these professors made a significant contribution to Muslim medical science and philosophy.
Introduction
The city of Jundishapur was not always the desolate place that it is today. In its prime, it was one of the worlds most important science centers. From its earliest days, this institution functioned according to the statement engraved upon its portal: Knowledge and virtue are superior to sword and biceps. However, its real brilliance only existed during the early days of the Àbbasid dynasty. From the reign of Harun al-Rashid (d. 809) onward, the Àbbasid rulers made it an official policy to bring scholars trained at
Mehmet Mahfuz Sylemez has a Ph.D. in Islamic history and currently teaches Islamic history at Gazi University, Faculty of Theology, orum, Turkey.
Jundishapur to Baghdad. For instance, Baghdads bimaristan (medical school) and bayt al-hikmah (House of Wisdom) were established by Jundishapurs professors and graduates. In this article, we will investigate the Jundishapur school. But before doing so, lets examine the city. Jundishapur city, founded in 260 by the Sassanid emperor Shahpur I, was located in Khuzistan (called Ahwaz in early Muslim sources). Although it fell outside the geographical borders of Mesopotamia, it was, nonetheless, influenced by Mesopotamian civilization. Shahpur I defeated the Roman army near Edessa (present-day Urfa) and settled the captured Roman soldiers, among them Emperor Valerianus as well as the refugees from Antioch, in this newly founded city. 1 Despite its official name of Wah ez Andu Shahpur, the city was known by its inhabitants as Gunda-Shapur. Ever since its founding, it had been one of the important Sassanid cities. Fifty years later, Shapur II proclaimed it the capital city of the Sassanid Empire. 2 When Shapur IIs successor moved his court to Madain (Ctesiphon), Jundishapur retained its importance and remained the administrative center of the Khuzistan district.3 However, it gradually surrendered this function to Sus, a city located a couple of posts away that, with the passage of time, not only became Khuzistans administrative center, but also the empires second capital. Thus, just like the Roman Empire, the Sassanid Empire had two capital cities: Madain for the summer and Sus for the winter.4 Even though it was no longer Khuzistans administrative center, Jundishapur remained a center of science and culture, and was recognized as such by Khusraw I. Its administrative structure was similar to that of modern federal states. For instance, its local governors were elected by the native residents.5 Thus, we can say that it provided as much freedom and opportunity for its residents as did Athens, its contemporary, in every field. The citys population consisted of various ethnic and religious ele ments, two features to which it owed much of its fame. No doubt, its earliest residents were Roman, for the city originally had been built for the captured Roman emperor Valerianus and many of his defeated soldiers. 6 After the seizure of Antioch, its residents were removed and settled in Jundishapur. 7 We do not know the exact number of the exiles or whether they were included in the population figure mentioned above. However, with the people settled by Shahpur II and Khusraw I, we can say that the city had a relatively sizeable population. Among these people were the scholars of the Academy of Athens, who made their way to Jundishapur in 529, right after Emperor Justinian closed their academy. 8 The citys second largest ethnic
Sylemez: The Jundishapur School
component was the Pahlawis. We have no adequate information about their numbers, but we can estimate that they eventually became the citys largest ethnic group. Another ethnic group was the Syriacs. We do not know their number, nor do we have any information about exactly when they settled in Jundishapur. But since the war between Shahpur I and Valerianus took place in the densely Syriac-populated region, some of Jundishapurs Syriac population possibly settled there while the city was being built. We believe that a considerable number of them came to Jundishapur in the fifth century AD, because some of the Syriac settlers were medical doctors from Urfa, which was home to the leading medical centers of that time. The followers of Nestorius (the Nestorian Christians), the bishop of Constantinople, whom the Catholic church branded as heretics at the Council of Ephesus (431), also settled in Edessa. After Emperor Zenon (d. c. 491) expelled them in 489, many of them scattered throughout the Sassanid Empire and settled particularly in Nusaybin, 9 while some moved on to Jundishapur.10 The Urfa school was one of the leading Nestorian cultural and intellectual centers. After it was shut down, its heritage was transferred to Jundishapur, an infusion that allowed Jundishapur to achieve a higher intellectual level. The Syriacs, most of whom were Christian, represented the citys most civilized class after, of course, the Romans. 11 They also played a prominent role in the citys cultural history, since most of their families (e.g., the Syriac Buhtishu` family) were engaged in medical science during the late Sassanid times in Iran and during the Umayyad and early Àbbasid periods. 12 In addition, they initiated the first translation projects. An Indian community also lived in Jundishapur, apparently having settled there during the late Sassanid period. According to the sources, Khusraw I dispatched his vizier Barzawayh to India, from which he returned with the chess game, Baydabas Kalima wa Dimna, some medical books,13 and possibly some Indian families. 14 This supposition is supported by the existence of Indian scholars at Jundishapur, such as Mankah, who translated Sanskrit texts into Pahlawi and conducted research on poisons. His Kitab al-Sumum (The Book of Poisons) was used as a textbook in the Jundishapur medical school for years to come. Mankahs translations and scholarly writings were later translated into Arabic. Harun al-Rashid once asked him to come to Baghdad, at the request of the Barmaki family. In Baghdad, Mankah translated the famous Indian doctor Susturas work into Arabic for Khalid, a member of the Barmaki family. It is related that this
translation was used later by Jundishapurs doctors and professors.15 The fact that Jundishapur and India were connected by a trade route also suggests that both scholars and traders had settled in Jundishapur. The Khuzis were another ethnic component of the city. As noted by alMaqdisi, the population of the Khuzistan region, and especially the residents of Jundishapur, Sus, and Askar, was made up of Khuzis.16 Supposedly the remnants of the Alamis, the Khuzis are thought to have settled in the city immediately after its founding. Giving their nations name to their homeland, the Khuzistan region, the Khuzis were considered an independent nation that was distinct from the Arabs, Persians, Jews, and Syriacs, even though there is some dispute over their language.17 As in the case of Shiryashu` bin Kutrub of Jundishapur, Khuzi scholars used Syriac, instead of their native language, in their scholarly endeavors.18 This suggests that they adopted Syriac as a literary language because they had no literary language of their own. Perhaps this is why the Khuzi language disappeared soon thereafter. In our own day, the Persian dialect spoken around Khuzistan contains some loan words from Khuzi, the only remaining traces of that particular language. The Khuzis might have used Syriac because it was the liturgical language of the Nestorian church, just as the Muslims, particularly the Persians and Turks, used Arabic as the language of religious literature instead of their native language. The Khuzis, who called Jundishapur Nilat or Nilab,19 constituted another intellectual class of the city. Among them, we can mention Shiryashu` bin Kutrub and Shapur bin Sahl. We know that the Lurians lived in Jundishapur and its neighboring district during the second Islamic century, and that they played a major role in destroying it.20 This fact suggests that the Lurians had settled in Jundishapur and the neighboring district at an earlier time. The region located to the southeast of Dizful and Shushtar, near which Jundishapurs ruins remain, was known as the Sahara of Lur during the early Middle Ages.21 Though the Lurians had not lived in Jundishapur and the neighboring district, the distance between the region (Luristan) and Jundishapur was only a couple of posts. 22 Therefore, we can say that there was a strong socioeconomic and commercial relationship between the two. Almost all of Jundishapurs residents were multilingual. One also needs to keep in mind that along with Pahlawi, Greek, and Syriac, such languages as Lurian, Hebrew, and Khuzi were spoken in the markets. These multilingual peoples of various ethnic and religious backgrounds managed to coexist in peace, developed good relationships with each other, and pro-
vided history with an enviable example of peaceful and tolerant social interaction. Now, I will examine the famous scientific institution that these people built.
The History of the Jundishapur School

There are different views as to when this school was established. While some scholars claim that it was built at the same time as the city, others assert that it was founded during the reign of Shahpur II. Although the existing evidence does not allow us to correlate the date of the schools founding with that of the city, one can easily say that the scholarly activities for which Jundishapur was famous began at a very early time. As stated by Manfred Ulmann, Jundishapurs population contained numerous Antiochan scholars and artisans, among them medical doctors and philosophers, as well as the captured Roman emperor Valerianus. Therefore, we can assume that Jundishapur entered upon a cultural and intellectual flowering, especially in the positive sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics), at that time. 23 Although Jundishapur had been acquainted with the positive sciences since its foundation, it only became known for its knowledge of them at a much later date. If we believe Ibn al-Nadim, we can say that the city became famous for medical sciences and philosophy only after Thodoros, the Greek philosopher and medical doctor, moved there.24 Thodoros, who was no ordinary physician, served as a royal doctor to Shahpur II and composed several books on medical sciences, one of which was eventually translated into Arabic. Shahpur II held Thodoros in respect, built a church for him in the city, and assigned some Christian captives to serve him.25 Thodoros very scholarly pursuits provide grounds for the claim that the Jundishapur school was built at the time of Shahpur II. Among the scholars who share this opinion are the famous Orientalist George Sarton, Muhammad Muhammadi (who relied upon Sarton), and Seyyed Hossein Nasr.26 Nasr claims that Shahpur II not only enlarged and adopted Jundishapur as his capital city, but that he also built therein a large school that included a medical school.27 Likewise, Nakhai claims that it took 7 years to build the school and that it was inaugurated by Shahpur II. Shortly after that event, about 5,000 students from Persia, Rome, Greece, Syria, Arabia, and India enrolled in the school, a development that transformed Jundishapur into an important regional center of medical science. 28
Although there is insufficient proof to support the above claims, the fact that the scholars who came from regions to the west during the reign of Khusraw I were settled in Jundishapur suggests that a school already existed in that city. If this were not the case, why would he settle them there? Settling these scholars in Jundishapur and having the citys school rebuilt should have caused Khusraw I to be known as the schools first builder. Khusraw Is interest in philosophy made him famous in the West. The scholars at the Academy of Athens made their way to Jundishapur after their academy was closed, in 529, by Emperor Justinian. Khusraw I welcomed such celebrated scholars and philosophers as Damascius, Siplicius, Eulamius, Priscianus, Isidore, Hermias, and Diogenes. 29 After settling them in Jundishapur, he provided them with whatever they needed to continue their scholarly pursuits and teaching. These scholars reconstructed and revitalized the citys schools and enjoyed great freedom in their studies. 30 A champion of scholars, the emperor himself took a great interest in their activities and engaged in philosophical discussions and debates with them. Furthermore, he recorded both these discussions and the philosophers answers to his questions in many books, one of which was translated into Latin and incomplete translation of which has survived to our own time. 31 After defeating Justinian, Khusraw I, who followed Neoplatonic philosophy, stipulated in the peace treaty that all of the philosophers living in Jundishapur would be allowed to return to their homelands whenever they wished.32 Just after this agreement, the scholars taking refuge in Jundishapur availed themselves of this chance to go home. However, the students they had educated during their 4-year sojourn in Jundishapur ensured that the school would remain a hallmark of education. In ancient times, there was no clear-cut distinction between philosophy and medicine. The belief maintained by such philosophers as Galenos [a.k.a. Galen] that a medical doctor should be a philosopher at the same time was quite common. Since Khusraw I held the same view, he paid a great deal of attention to the medical sciences and transformed the Jundishapur school into one of the Sassanid Empires most important medical centers. At least once a year, a medical congress was convoked and led by the schools head doctor (dorostbed).33 One should keep in mind that this congress, in which the emperor himself participated, was attended by doctors from other countries as well. Such an event enabled them to exchange knowledge about medical inventions and methods.
The Jundishapur school was well-known in the East and in the West, as well as among the mostly nomadic Arabs of that time. Students came from the Hijaz to acquire a medical education at Jundishapur and then returned to their homelands to serve their people. One of these men, known during the pre-Islamic period as that lands greatest philosopher and physician, was Harith bin Kalada. 34 After him, his son Nadr became one of the Hijazs most celebrated doctors.35 Jawad Àli says that Nadr bought some books in Iran, where he acquired his medical education, and read them out to the Quraysh tribe.36 Qifti relates that Nadr had held an important position in Jundishapur, but that he went back to Taif because he was so homesick. He eventually became one of the most famous doctors of his time.37 After Khusraw I, the Sassanid Empire experienced several serious setbacks. On the one hand, it was defeated several times by Byzantium, and, on the other, became embroiled in ruthless dynastic struggles. During this period, many institutions were either damaged or destroyed. Surprisingly, the Jundishapur school survived until the empires collapse. After the Arab Muslims conquered Iran,38 they quickly realized the importance of this educational institution and sought to maintain its previous splendor.39 They preserved all of the citys institutions (e.g., its hospital, library, medical school, and temples) and provided jobs for the doctors who had been educated at Jundishapur. For example, Ibn Isal al-Tabib al-Nasrani served as Muàwiyahs royal doctor, and Abu Hakam Damascene and Tayazuk were also employed.40 The school lost its previous splendor under the Àbbasids, because its doctors migrated to the capital city, Baghdad, where they found jobs in the newly founded institutions. For a while, the Jundishapur school strove to survive by means of its own revolving fund, but eventually could not compete with Baghdad and crumbled. 41
Sections of the Jundishapur School

Having familiarized ourselves with the school, I will now examine its sections: the medical school and hospital (bimaristan), the pharmacology laboratory, the translation house, the library, and the observatory.
The Medical School and Hospital

We have no information about the bimaristans physical structure, nor do we know exactly where it was located in the city, because no archeological
excavation has taken place in the region so far. Therefore, we must be content with explaining how it operated. The archeological research to be performed in Shahabad village, the site of Jundishapurs ruins, will both shed light on the citys design and architecture as well as enable us to describe the school. The bimaristan was directed by a head doctor known as a dorostbed or an Iran dorostbed. This doctor was not only the director of the school, but also the head of the bimaristan. Ibn Muqaffa, who recorded some information about Barzawayh, its famous head doctor, translated the above Persian title into Arabic as ras al-atibba al-fars (i.e., the head of the Persian physicians). 42 A dorostbed was regarded as the countrys wisest and leading physician. At the same time, he was the emperors personal doctor and the courts head doctor. A dorostbed enjoyed extensive authority in the bimaristan and was responsible only to the emperor. He had the absolute authority to use the bimaristans revolving fund, appoint and dismiss staff members, and to take other actions that he considered necessary. As was seen under the Sassanids (i.e., the case of Barzawayh) and, later on, under the Muslims (i.e., the case of Jabrail), these doctors sometimes intervened in the empires political affairs. A considerable degree of specialization is evident in the Jundishapur bimaristan. According to the sources, every doctor was authorized to treat the diseases in which he specialized. If a given case required more than one specialist, the doctors applied a method that bears a striking resemblance to the modern medical practice of consultation. This system was applied by Jabrail and other doctors in the Baghdad bimaristan, which was patterned after the Jundishapur bimaristan.43 The hospital also had dormitories for its patients and offered medical service 24 hours a day. The sources inform us that there was also a sort of rotation system similar to what we see in our hospitals today. 44 In addition, many doctors of different ethnicities and religions worked together in the hospital.
THE C URRICULUM . Although we have no direct information as to how many
years the Jundishapur schools education program lasted, we can make a reasonable guess: approximately 3 years. We base this on the fact that the education program followed by the Nusaybin school,45 which is known to have influenced the Jundishapur school, lasted for 3 years. In addition, other schools in the Muslim world that were modeled after the Jundishapur school offered 3-year education programs. The first year of education was
similar to todays preparatory class. Students studied mathematics, geometry, 46 logic, 47 and other courses. Mathematics and logic were two basic classes of the first year. 48 In the later years, students were taught such books as Hippocratess eleven books, Galenos nine books, and Discorides Kitab al-Hashashish (The Book of Hashishes).49 The students had to study these three fields because they needed to know how to prepare medicines and, if required, set up their own hospitals. How, it was asked, could a doctor who was ignorant of mathematics establish the correct proportions of the ingredients needed to make the necessary medicine, or a physician who was ignorant of geometry build his own hospital? As for logic, it was considered one of the foundations that would ensure correct and scientific thinking.50 In addition to logic, philosophy was also taught, for both the Jundishapur medical school and the other medical schools modeled upon it were deeply influenced by Galenos, who held that a medical doctor should be a philosopher at the same time. Furthermore, his treatise on this issue deeply influenced the doctors of that era and encouraged them to study philosophy. 51 A cursory look at these doctors biographies will show that all of them were interested in philosophy, and that some of them even established philosophical systems. We ought to note that the schools scholars and students paid so much attention to Hippocrates works that Jundishapur became known as the city of Hippocrates.52
THE LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION. Researchers disagree as to which language
was used as the language of instruction in the Jundishapur school. Some maintain that it was Aramaic or Greek, while others say that it was Pahlawi. For instance, Ahmad Ìsa Beg, departing from the citys large Syriac population, asserts that a sizeable number of courses were conducted in Syriac.53 The existence of professors of Greek origin and their teaching, mostly medicine and philosophy, has led some scholars to believe that the language of medical sciences was Greek. 54 Moreover, the fact that the Persian teachers were mainly interested in pharmacology has led to the claim that this part of the students education was most likely conducted in Pahlawi.55 It is known that Khusraw Is vizier brought some books and scholars from India, and that these scholars taught in Jundishapurs schools. But whether they taught in Sanskrit or Pahlawi is in dispute.56 What causes researchers to think that these Indian professors taught in Pahlawi is the fact that the pharmacology books translated into Arabic include Pahlawi terms, rather than Sanskrit or other Indian-language ones. According to the
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researchers who support the latter claim, if the Indian professors taught in Sanskrit, it would be logical to expect that some Sanskrit terms would have survived in them. I think that this debate over the language of instruction can be resolved only by focusing on the courses taught. As mentioned above, teachers in Jundishapur taught such courses as logic, philosophy, medicine, geometry, and pharmacology. In the medical classes, Hippocrates and Galenos books were usually taught. Though some of their books were translated into Syriac and Pahlawi, others remained in their original Greek. This fact raises the possibility that students studied the original Greek texts. Many people in Jundishapur knew at least some Greek, because it had been used in the city from the beginning of the Sassanid period. This view is supported by the fact that Greek was used in inscriptions that have been dated to the time of Ardashir, the founder of the Sassanid dynasty. 57 The citys demography shows that many members of the elite were acquainted with Greek culture and language.58 Given this fact, we can say that the Jundishapur medical schools language of instruction was mainly Greek. Besides, the fact that many medical books were translated from Greek into Syriac at the time of Khusraw I Jundishapurs teachers were also among the translators demonstrates a serious demand for Syriaclanguage textbooks. This means that Syriac might have been used in some sections of the school. Most probably, those students who knew Greek studied the above books in the original Greek, while everyone else used the Syriac translations. As for Pahlawi, we can say that it was possibly used mainly in pharmacology, for the books in this field were either composed in or translated into Pahlawi. In conclusion, the language of instruction at the Jundishapur school seems to have depended upon which field one was studying. For example, medical education was offered largely in Greek but occasionally in Syriac. Relying upon the abundance of Pahlawi words in the later Arabic translations of pharmacological texts, one can safely say that Pahlawi was used especially in pharmacology.59
THE STUDENTS. We have no information about the exact identity of
Jundishapurs students or of their number and living conditions. However, we do have some information about these matters in the Nusaybin school, a contemporary of Jundishapur. We think that this information can be applied to Jundishapur, because this school was founded by the very teachers who were expelled from Edessa and then settled in Jundishapur. 60
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Hussein Sultanzade informs us that there were about 800 students, that they had to obey certain rules, that they had to obtain permission to go anywhere, that the courses lasted all day, that the students lived in small cells in groups of ten, and, finally, that the program of education lasted for 3 years.61 Taking this information into account, we can accept Nakhais claim that the school accommodated approximately 5,000 students from many lands. The fact that the students accompanied their teachers on patient visits62 demonstrates that the student dormitories were near, or next to, the bimaristan and that they interacted with the patients while pursuing their theoretical studies. Some sources say that the students took care of the patients by turn. Thus, there seems to have been a rotation system similar to the one we see today in modern hospitals. All of this means that the students practiced what they learned in the classroom. We ought to touch on the claims made by Edward Browne, who uncritically accepts Qiftis information. Relying upon Yuhanna bin Masawayhs dismissal of Hunayn bin Ishaq from the Baghdad bimaristan, Browne asserts that Jundishapurs scholars avoided imparting their medical knowledge to foreigners.63 But one can hardly derive such a conclusion from Ibn Abi Usaybiàs account or the quotation provided by Browne himself. On the contrary, even though Hunayn was from Hira, he was allowed to enter the bimaristan, where he worked as a pharmacist and attended Ibn Masawayhs classes. This invalidates the above-mentioned claim. However, Hunayn was not an ordinary student. His inquisitive character and unceasing questions finally disturbed Yuhanna so much that he told Hunayn to stop studying medical science and, like other Hirans, attach himself to the trade of precious stones. But this should be considered nothing more than an angry statement, for the Jundishapur school trained many foreigners, among them Harith bin Kalada al-Thaqafi. Harith, a pagan Arab from Taif, spent many years in Jundishapur studying medical sciences and eventually established himself as a skillful physician. As a result, he was allowed to enter the court of Emperor Khusraw Parwiz. If the people of Jundishapur had taken a hostile attitude toward foreigners, why would they have allowed Harith to stay with them? In addition, although Hunayn was not originally from Jundishapur, he was a Syriac Christian. It is known that the Syriacs supported each other, as is common with ethnic minorities even today. In addition, Ibn Abi Usaybiàs words regarding Hunayns biography that the people of Jundishapur
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refused to teach their medical arts especially to the merchants hints that this was a special situation.64 In spite of this all, Browne reckons Hunayn to be one of Jundishapurs translators.65 This also demonstrates the invalidity of such a claim. The citys spirit of scientific liberty is also seen in the fact that many Nestorian Christians, Mazdakite Iranians, and Hindu or Buddhist Indians studied together peacefully. This indicates that the students did not study theology, and that their professors treated them equally, regardless of their ethnic or religious background. In this respect, we can say that the Jundishapur school, despite its being 1,500 years old, could compete with modern institutions of education.
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES . Those students who completed the 3-year
medical program had to take a comprehensive examination before they graduated. Those who passed it were given the certificate that attested to their qualifications to work as physicians throughout the land.66 Muhammadi says that this qualifying examination was quite difficult and that only the most competent candidates could pass it.67 As al-Razi reported, the Jundishapur hospital system was adopted and preserved by other institutions in the Muslim world. According to his accounts, the qualifying examination was twofold. The candidate was first tested on the preliminary sciences (e.g., the importance of surgery and human physiology knowledge, logic [syllogisms in particular], and literature). If he passed this text, he was then tested on the knowledge of the field in which he had specialized. 68 All physicians who had graduated from the Jundishapur school were well-respected by both the Sassanid rulers and the subsequent Muslim rulers. Given this, they were in high demand by both groups and served mostly as imperial doctors.69
The Pharmacology Laboratory

The school also featured a pharmacology laboratory. Ibn Masawayh, one of the schools leading pharmacists, is practically the only person who wrote anything about this section. Under the Àbbasids, he was brought to the Baghdad bimaristan to direct its pharmacology laboratory.70 The handbooks (vade mecum) related to medicine are important proofs of the high level of knowledge and competence attained by the pharmacologists. Composed by the physicians of Jundishapur themselves, these books were known as akrabazin in the medical literature of that time. They have been used for
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centuries as reference books in the various bimaristans and pharmacies in the Muslim world.71
Dar al-Ìlm (The House of Knowledge) or Dar al-Tarjamah (The House of Translation)
As pointed out above, the Jundishapur school also contained a section that devoted itself to translation. Known as the dar al-ìlm in the late sources, it was adjacent to the bimaristan. In fact, many translators also were physicians in the bimaristan. The information provided by Ibn al-Nadim confirms that the translation movement begun under the Sassanids was not confined to the scientific activities conducted at Jundishapur especially in later times. He relates that Ardashir and his son Shahpur I sent officials to India, Byzantium, and Syria to acquire books that would later be translated into Pahlawi. Given that these accounts are accurate, this movement goes back to ancient times. 72 AlMasùdi calls attention to this matter and concludes, as do I, that the views of Aristotle and Plato were popular mainly because of these translations. 73 Despite these earlier Pahlawi translations and the exclusive use of Pahlawi in all state correspondence and Mazdakist scriptures until Khusraw I, Pahlawi could not become a language of science. Later on, however, the Nestorian church made a huge contribution to Pahlawis transformation into a literary language. It seems that the Nestorian church, which had a well-organized network throughout the empire, attached great importance to Pahlawi and tried to make the clergy learn it. Of course, this was part of their investment in Christian missionary activities. Some records from that time prove that Pahlawi developed into the religious language of the Nestorian church, which operated throughout a vast territory that extended into southern India.74 Thanks to its efforts, Pahlawi became such a rich and developed language that it could express complex ideas and be used to write scientific books. Arabic also became a language of science due to the Nestorians efforts. Given this, it should be no surprise that these Christians produced the first Arabic translations of Pahlawi texts. In addition, they were the first ones to coin technical terms and use them in Arabic. It may be claimed that the Nestorians engaged in this activity to further their missionary prospects. Or, perhaps they did this in an attempt to defend the Christians scattered all over the Muslim world and to ensure an environment in which they were free to live and practice their faith. After the
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Sassanid Empire collapsed and Mazdakism was replaced by Islam, Pahlawi, the Sassanid language of religion and science, was replaced by Arabic, the language of Islam and Islamic science. In the Islamic era, nothing was really written in Pahlawi, and Pahlawi texts were seldom preserved. Therefore, only Arabic translations of these texts, which are quite poor, have survived until our own time. During Pahlawis period as a language of science, many books were translated into it. Almost every researcher in this field, especially Ulmann, places special emphasis on this issue and says that most of the translations made during Khusraw Is reign were related to medicine and philosophy. 75 However, they offer no satisfying information about the translators names. Of these translations, Ulmann cites the following ones: Cassianus Bassus Scholasticus (sixth century AD) books on agriculture, Vettius Valens (second century AD) books on astrology, Ptolemys Al-Majist, and Galenos Peri Antemballomenon (Adab al-Adwiyah [The Ways of Preparing Medicines]).76 Translations from Sanskrit also appeared during this period, among them Shanaks Kitab al-Sumum (The Book of Poisons), which was translated into Pahlawi with the aid of Abu Hatim al-Balkhi. Afterwards, the same book was translated into Arabic through the intermediacy of Àbbas bin Saìd al-Jawhari. This book, which explains medicines and poisons, was published much later as Kitab al-Shanak fi Sumum wa al-Tiryaq (The Book of Shanak on Poisons and Medicines), together with its German translation (Berlin: 1934). 77
The Library
According to Sultanzade, the Jundishapur schools library contained thousands of books written in different languages. Both students and teachers used these books,78 some of which were brought to the library by the Neoplatonist philosophers who moved from Urfa (Rakha) to Jundishapur after their own academy was closed. Muhammadi notes that some of the translations made at the time of Khusraw I were quoted from these books. In addition, they were used as reference books in education.79 In addition to the clerks who maintained and took care of the books, a class of scribes (koshtah daftaran) was entrusted with copying books on medicine, astronomy, and philosophy. In his Mu`jam al-Buldan, Yaqut alHamawi says that the city of Rayshahr was known for its book copiers. 80 As Muhammadi points out, these scribes most likely had some kind of rela tionship with the Jundishapur school and its library, because Rayshahr was
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located in Khuzistan (viz., near Jundishapur). 81 Rayshahr was probably chosen to perform this task because it produced paper or papyrus. Finally, we note that many of the librarys books were taken to Baghdad after its bayt al-hikmah (House of Wisdom) was established, and that the scholars working there relied upon them heavily for their first translations.
The Observatory
The schools observatory82 functioned not only as a place for observing astral bodies, but also as a place where astronomy and mathematics were taught.83 Although it was established as a continuation of the dar al-ta`lim (House of Education), it fulfilled a greater function and strongly influenced later astronomical research. 84 For example, Wajizak, a book on astronomy that was composed by Bozorgmahr, Emperor Khusraw Is vizier, was available during the Islamic era. Another one of his books, Kitab fi Masail alZic (The Book on the Matters of Zigzag), was used as a textbook in Isfahans schools even under the Safavids.85 But we cannot say the same for research conducted by the Alexandria school. Above all, the Jundishapur observatory collaborated with the Baghdad observatory, which had been modeled after it, and with the observatory located on top of Mount Qasiyum in Damascus. The zigzags were drawn by relying upon the measurements made in each of these three observatories. 86 We should add that Abu Ma`shar Muhammad bin Ja`far al-Balkhi, one of the most famous Muslim astrophysicists, drew his zigzags 87 by relying upon the measurements made in the Jundishapur school.88
The Graduates of Jundishapur in Baghdad

The interaction between Baghdad and Jundishapur dates back to the establishment of the Àbbasid dynasty. As related by the sources, in 765 the Àbbasid caliph al-Mansur was afflicted with a stomach illness. He asked Rabi`, his vizier and court secretary, to summon the court physicians. When they failed to cure him, he ordered them to find a more skilled physician. Upon being informed that Curcis, the dorostbed of Jundishapurs medical school, was the most skilled doctor of that time, al-Mansur summoned him to Baghdad. At first, this well-known physician did not want to go; however, he could not resist the insistence of Jundishapurs luminaries, including that of the governor and the archbishop.89 He eventually went to Baghdad, accompanied by his students Ibrahim and Ìsa bin Shahla, who stayed there permanently as court physicians. 90
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This event led to the creation of a strong relationship between Jundishapur and Baghdad, as well as to the transmission of Jundishapurs centuries-long medical tradition to Baghdad. The achievements of Jundishapurs scholars contributed to the dissemination of its fame in Baghdad. For example, in 810, Harun al-Rashid decided to establish a hospital in Baghdad modeled after that of Jundishapur. Jabrail bin Buhtishu`, who was then serving as a head doctor in the hospital, was put in charge of this task. In addition to establishing this new hospital,91 Jabrail imported doctors, teachers, and pharmacologists from Jundishapur and put them to work.92 He installed Dahishtak, a professor in Jundishapurs medical school, as manager of Baghdads medical school. However, Dahishtak resigned after complaining about the hospitals low budget, and was replaced by his brother Mihail.93 But Mihail also resigned shortly thereafter and returned with his elder brother to Jundishapur. Subsequently, Masawayh, father of the famous philosopher Yuhanna bin Masawayh, was appointed head doctor. Undoubtedly, Jundishapurs scholars made a significant contribution to the blossoming of technical and philosophical sciences in the Muslim world. For example, in order to transmit Pahlawi, Indian, and classical Greek scholarship and culture to the Muslim world, they established a bayt al-hikmah near the Baghdad hospital and modeled it after Jundishapurs dar al-ìlm.94 In this institution, many scholars, both professors at Jundishapur and their students, translated works into Arabic. For example, al-Mansurs court physician Curcis translated Pahlawi, Syriac, and Greek books into Arabic.95 Max Mayerhof notes that these translations were done not only by those Jundishapur scholars who settled in Baghdad, but also by those who remained in Jundishapur. He further claims that members of the latter group produced the earliest translations.96 In addition to translating numerous works, these scholars also taught and trained students. The most important and largest teaching sessions established by Jundishapurs scholars was that of Yuhanna bin Masawayh. Some of his students, among them Thabit bin Qurra, Kusta bin Luka, Hunayn bin Ishaq, Ishaq bin Hunayn, and Hajjaj bin Yusuf bin Matar, later became known as the first Muslim philosophers. Most of these students, who were from Harran, first mastered Greek and Syriac and then started to translate Hippocrates and Galenos works into Arabic. No doubt, these translations provided a foundation for the development of Muslim philosophy and medical science.
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The scholars of the Jundishapur school established a bayt al-hikmah and managed it for many years. They assigned the books to be translated and completed a sizeable amount of the work by themselves. While carrying out this task, they benefited a great deal from the tradition of translation started by Khusraw I , the wise Sassanid ruler. Some of the texts that were to be translated into Arabic had already been translated into Pahlawi and Syriac by Sassanid scholars. The existence of numerous Pahlawi books in the bayt al-hikmahs library can be explained by the translation activities led by Khusraw I.97 In addition, the fact that the Barmaki family of Daylam, which was seriously interested in Greek philosophy and science, seized control of Baghdad boosted the engagement of Jundishapurs scholars in translating books dealing with the positive sciences into Arabic.98 In addition to their services in translating books on medicine, pharmacology, philosophy, and logic, Jundishapurs scholars made a significant contribution to the development of medical sciences by writing innovative medical books. For example, such works as Curcis Kitab al-Kunash, Ìsa bin Chaharbakhts Quwa al-Adwiyah al-Mufradah, and Shahpur bin Sahls AlAkrabazin (considered the first encyclopedia of medical science and pharmacology) enjoyed a long usage as reference books in the Muslim worlds medical schools and pharmacies. Yuhanna bin Masawayhs Nawadir alTibbiyah was used as a textbook for centuries.99 Moreover, his Dagha alÀyn, which deals with diseases of the eye, served as a source for later studies. 100 In addition, if they had the economic means to do so, the doctors of Jundishapur hired scholars to translate medical books for them. Among the active translators and sponsors of translators were the following people: Shirashu` bin Kutrub hired translators who worked in Baghdads bayt al-hikmah. For instance, he requested Hunayn bin Ishaq to translate Galenos Fi al-Firaq, a book that discusses the different views about the subject of genus. 101 Yuhanna bin Masawayh hired Hunayn to translate the following Greek books into Syriac: Fi al-Izam,102 Fi Nadb,103 Fi al-Buhran,104 Kitab fi ma Waqaà min al-Ikhtilaf fi al-Tashrih,105 Kitab fi Tashrih Alat al-Sawt,106 Kitab fi Tashrih al-Àyn,107 Kitab fi Harakat alSadr,108 Kitab fi al-Sawt,109 Kitab fi al-Adwiyah al-Mufradah,110 and Kitab fi al-Akhlaq.111 Yahya bin Masawayh, who translated Kitab fi Tartib al-Adwiyah.112
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Hunayn, who translated Galenos Fi al-Istiqsat àla Rai Bukrat into Syriac at Buhtishu` bin Jabrails request.113 He also translated Fi Quwa al-Tabiìyah,114 Fi Ìlal wa Fi Ta`rif Ìlal al-A`da al-Batiniyah,116 Fi al-Imtila,117 Kitab fi Marat al-Sawda,118 Kitab fi Afkar Aristotales fi Mudawat al-Amrad,119 Kitab fi Tadbir al-Amrad alHaddat àla Rai al-Bukrat,120 Kitab fi al-Hillat li Hifz al-Sihha,121 Tafsir Galenos li Kitab al-Fusul,122 Kitab fi Tajrubah al-Tibbiyah,123 Kitab fi Mihnet Afdal al-Atibba,124 and Kayfa Yataàrraf al-Insan Dhunubahu wa Ùyubahu.125
Jabrail bin Buhtishu`, who translated Fi al-Nadb,126 Fi Asnaf alHamiyat,127 and Fi Ìlaj al-Tashrih.128 Yuhanna bin Buhtishu`: Of these translations, Hunayn mentions Kitab fi Adwiyat al-Muqabilat li al-Adwa.129 As pointed out earlier, the Jundishapur school consisted of several sections. Likewise, Baghdads bayt al-hikmah complex, which was built on the Jundishapur model, also consisted of several sections. Most likely, the medical section was included in the complex.130 The fact that the bayt alhikmah and the Baghdad hospital were administered by Jundishapurtrained scholars makes this assumption quite likely. Likewise, Jabrail and Yuhanna were the managers of both the bayt al-hikmah and the hospital. So, we can infer that although these two institutions were not the same, they were built within close proximity of each other. The teachers at the Jundishapur school were well compensated by the Àbbasid rulers. For instance, Jabrail bin Buhtishu` was paid 10,000 dirhams per month, was provided with paper and cloth, and was given a considerable amount of good-quality textiles. In addition, he received an additional 50,000 dirhams per year at the beginning of Lent and was given special gifts on Christian holy days. 131 In his article, which seems to have been written without seeing Ibn Abi Usaybiàs Ùyun al-Anba (one of the most important reference books in the history of Islamic medical science), A. Habib Khan notes that the Àbbasid caliphs invested huge amounts of money in the medical sciences. However, he states that the head doctors received a salary of only 1,000 dinars per year. 132 Yet, as stated above, Ibn Abi Usaybià relates that the doctors, especially the head doctors, were paid far more than that. In addition, although the title of Khans article is Early Hospitals in [the] Muslim World, the author provides no information about the first medical school that the Jundishapur doctors set up during the reign of Harun al-Rashid,
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and only traces Muslim medical science back to the early years of Islam. 133 In contrast to this claim, the sources are almost in complete agreement that if the hospital set up by Walid in Damascus is exempted, the earliest Muslim medical school was founded in Baghdad by the famous doctor Jabrail bin Buhtishu` at the request of Harun al-Rashid.
Conclusion
To sum up, the story of Jundishapur began with the battle in which the Sassanids defeated the Romans and captured Valerianus, the Roman emperor, and many of his soldiers. The founder of Jundishapur, Shahpur I, settled them, along with Antiochan migrants and refugees, in Jundishapur. This marks the beginning of the citys intellectual flourishing. The Neoplatonist philosophers who came later revived and reconstructed Jundishapurs education and research institutions and made an important contribution to its becoming a regional intellectual center. Consisting of five sections (viz., a hospital, a house of translation, a library, a pharmacology laboratory, and an observatory), the Jundishapur school preferred knowledge and virtue over everything else. As a result, it fulfilled an important mission by extending and developing scientific knowledge, which is part of humanitys shared heritage. Even after Baghdads establishment, its teachers continued to settle in Baghdad. Although their continued immigration led to Jundishapurs decline and eventual disappearance, its accumulated knowledge and experience continued to flourish in Baghdad. In addition, this brain drain from Jundishapur boosted the rise and development of Muslim philosophy. Endnotes
1. For further information on the foundation of Jundishapur and its first inhabitants, see Mehmet Mahfuz Sylemez, Bilimin Yitik Sehri Cndisapur (Jundishapur: The Lost City of Science) (Ankara: Arastirma Yayinlari, 2003), 24-28, 43-55. Edward G. Browne, Tibb-i Islami, trans. into Farsi by Masùd Rajabniya (Tehran: 1351 AH), 53; Mahmud Najmabadi, Tarikh-i Tib der Islam pes ez (al-Zuhur-i Islam ta Hamlah Moghol) (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1375 AH), 50; Muhammad Muhammadi, Farhang-i Irani pish az Islam wa Athar-i an dar Tamaddun-i Islami wa Adabiyyat-i Àrabi (Tehran: 1374 AH), 231; Badiullah Debirnejad, Jundishapur der celesat-i munazare-i danishmendan, Honer ve Mardum (Tehran: 1351/1972), 119-20:8.
2.
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3.
4. 5.
6.
7.
8. 9.
10.
11. 12. 13.
14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.
Ali Sami, Gundashapur, Honer ve Mardum (Tehran: 1349/1970), 90:10; Husayn Karacanlu, Jundishapur, Dairetul-Maarfi-i Tashayu (Tehran: 1375 AH): 5:474. See Muhammed Yahya Hashimi, Davru Jundishapur fi sakafat alÀrabiyah, Al-Dirasat al-Adabiyah (Beirut) 2, no. 2 (spring 1960): 190. See Hussein Àli Mumtahin, Nahdat-i Ìlmi wa Adabiyi Irani dar Ruzigar-i Kusraw Anushirwan, Barrasihay-i Tarikhi (Tehran) 10, no. 56 (FarwardinOrdibahisht 1354 AH): 136. See Hussein Nakhai, Pishine-i Tarikh-i Shahr-i Gondi Shapur, Berresiha-i Tarikhi (Tehran) 16, no. 2 (June-July 1978): 1. Al-Tabari claims that Shahpur besieged and conquered Antioch shortly after Nusaybin and took the Roman emperor captive there. Afterwards, he took the emperor and the other captives to the newly founded city of Jundishapur and settled them there. However, alTabari does not relate the number of prisoners. Consult Al-Tabari, Tarikh alRusul wa al-Muluk (Beirut: 1987), 2:140. Ibn Athir relates that when Shahpur conquered Antioch, the Roman emperor was there and taken captive. Then, he and most of the citys residents were deported to Jundishapur. See Ibn Athir, Al-Kamil fi Tarikh, translated into Turkish by Ahmet Agiraka (Istanbul: 1991), 1:351. However, in fact, Valierianus was captured during the battle that took place near Urfa. So, Antioch was conquered by Shapur I after Valerianus had been taken prisoner. See Muhammad Muhammedi, The University of Jundishapur, Journal of the Regional Cultural Institute (Beirut) 2, no. 3 (1969): 157. See Henry Corbin, Islam Felsefesi Tarihi Baslangitan Ibn Rsdn lmne Kadar, trans. into Turkish and notes added by Hseyin Hatemi (Istanbul: 1994), 51. See Max Mayerhof, Islam Medeniyeti Tarihinde Fen ve Tip, trans. into Turkish by mer Riza Dogrul (Istanbul: 1935), 7-8; Sami, Gundasapur, 7; Muhammedi, The University of Jundishapur, 157. See Hashimi, Davru Jundishapur, 189. Najmabadi, Tarikh-i Tib, 66. For more information, see Muhammedi, The University of Jundishapur, 154; Seyyed Hussein Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam (Cambridge: 1987), 189. See Najmabadi, Tarikh-i Tib, 66. Ibid., 70; Sami, Gundashapur, 8. Ibn al-Bashari al-Maqdisi, Ahsan al-Taqasim, ed. by Muhammad Mahzumi (Beirut: 1987), 310. See Ibn Hawqal, Surat al-Ard (Beirut: n.d.), 230. See Ibn Abi Usaybià (d. 668/1268), Ùyun al-Anba fi Tabaqat al-Atibba, ed. by Nizar Rida (Beirut: n.d.), 283. See Dinawari, Akhbar al-Tiwal (Cairo: 1960), 46. See Nakhai, Pishine-i Tarikh-i, 140.
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21. See G. Le Strange, Cografya aI-Tarikhi serzeminhayi khilafati tarikhi, trans. into Farsi by Mahmud Irfan (Tehran: 1337/1959), 258. 22. Al-Maqdisi, Ahsan al-Taqasim, 321. 23. See Manfred Ulmann, Islamic Surveys II (Edinburgh: 1978), 17. 24. Ibn al-Nadim, Fihrist (Egypt: n.d.), 422; Dhabihullah Safa, Tarikh-i Ùlum-i Àqli der Tamaddun-i Islami (Tehran: 1329 AH), 22; Najmabadi, Tarikh-i Tib, 72. 25. For further information, see Ibn al-Nadim, Fihrist, 421; Najmabadi, Tarikh-i Tib, 72. 26. Sarton bases his claim on the information that the famous Greek doctor of Shahpur II, Thodosius, taught medical sciences in Jundishapur. See Muhammedi, The University of Jundishapur, 154. 27. See Nasr, Science and Civilization, 189. 28. See Nakhai, Pishine-i Tarikh-i, 143. 29. Mehmet Bayraktar says that these scholars left Athens for Jundishapur in 529 and returned to Athens in 533. Thus, they spent around 4 years in Jundishapur. See Mehmet Bayraktar, Islam Felsefesine Giris (Introduction to Islamic Philosophy) (Ankara: 1988), 40. 30. One of Damascius works, which he composed during his stay in the East, has survived until today. See Mumtahin, Anushirwan, 139. 31. This book was translated into Latin as Prician Philosophi Solutions corum de quibus dubtavit chostrotes persarum at an unknown date. A copy of this translation is recorded under number 1314, found among the Latin collections in the Paris Saint-German Library. This work was also published as Dubitationes et Solutiones (Paris: 1890). 32. Najmabadi, Tarikh-i Tib, 74. 33. Hussein Sultanzade, Tarikh-i Madaris-i Iran ez Ahda Bastan ta Tasis-i Dar al-Funun (Tehran: 1364 AH), 31; Muhammad Muhammadi, Farhang-i Irani pish az Islam wa Athar-i an dar Tamaddun-i Islami wa Adabiyyat-i Àrabi (Tehran: 1374 AH), 234. This custom was preserved in the Baghdad bimaristan, which periodically held medical and philosophical conferences. Nahide Bozkurt says that these conferences were held once a week during Mamuns reign. See Nahide Bozkurt, Mutezilenin Altin agi Memun Dnemi (The Golden Age of the Mutazilites: The Period of al-Mamun) (Ankara: 2002), 121. 34. For more information on Nadr bin Harith, see Ibn Qutayba, Al-Maàrif, ed. by Tharwat Ùqqasha (Egypt: 1992), 288; Ibn Abi Usaybià, Ùyun al-Anba, 161. 35. See Ibn Abi Usaybià, Ùyun al-Anba, 167; Browne, Tibb-i Islami, 43; Ahmad Ìsa Beg, Tarikh Bimaristanat fi al-Islam (Dar al-Raid al-Àrabi), (Beirut: 1981), 63. 36. See Jawad Àli, Al-Mufassal fi Tarikh al-Àrab qabla al-Islam, vols. 1-9 (Baghdad: 1993), 8:320.
22
37. See Qifti, Jamal al-Din Abu al-Hassan Àli bin al-Qadi Yusuf, Kitab Akhbar al-Ùlama bi Akhbar al-Hukama (Egypt: 1326 AH), 111; Ibn Abi Usaybià, Ùyun al-Anba, 161. 38. The actual conquest of Jundishapur is an interesting story: After conquering Sus, Abu Sabra led his army toward Jundishapur and surrounded the city. During the barricade, the city gates were suddenly opened and the people of the city, as if nothing extraordinary was happening, went about their daily activities. The people soon informed the bewildered Muslim soldiers that they had been given protection. But the armys commanders told the people that they did not give such protection. The people then brought to the commanders an arrow, which had been shot to the city from the Muslim front, upon which was written that they had been given protection. The commanders denied any knowledge of this arrow and avoided giving them protection, despite the peoples insistence upon the truth of their story. After an investigation, the Muslim commanders discovered that the arrow had been shot by Mukaththaf, a Muslim slave. They then claimed that any protection given by a slave was meaningless. However, the people insisted that they had had no knowledge of whether the arrow had been shot by a slave or a master. Moreover, since the Muslims had extended their protection, they had to honor their promise. After discussing the problem, the Muslim commanders decided to inform Caliph Ùmar of the situation. Upon being informed of this event, the caliph ruled: The slaves of the Muslims are included in themselves. This established that protection, even if given by a slave, binds all Muslims. For more information, see Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam fi Tawarikh al-Muluk wa al-Umam, 12 vols., ed. by Suhayl Zakkar (Beirut: 1995), 147; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh (trans. into Turkish by Ahmet Agiracka) (Istanbul, 1991): 2:505-06; Yaqut, Mu`jam al-Buldan, 2:171; Himyari, 173-74. 39. See T. J. De Boer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, trans. into English by Edward R. Jones (New Delhi: 1983). 40. For further information, see Ìsa Beg, Tarikh Bimaristanat, 63. 41. For more information on the scholars from Jundishapur who worked in Baghdad, see Sylemez, Bilimin Yitik, 108-28. 42. See Muhammedi, The University of Jundishapur, 154. 43. Najmabadi relates that these doctors always came together to discuss diseases. See Najmabadi, Tarikh-i Tib, 90. 44. See Nurullah Kisai, Adab wa Amuzash-i Pazashki der Iran-i Islami, Majalla-i Maqalat wa Barrasihayi Danishgah-i Tehran Danishgada-i Ilahiyat wa Maàrif-i Islami (Tehran), nos. 49-50 (1369/1411): 103. 45. See Sultanzade, Tarikh-i Madaris-i Iran, 33. 46. In geometry, the main textbook was Euclids book, which was later translated into Arabic as Usul al-Handasah. 47. In the logic class, principally Aristotelian logic was taught. Aristotles book of logic was translated into Pahlawi during the Sassanid period, and the first Arabic translation was made from this Pahlawi translation.
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48. See Nicholas Rescher, The Development of Arabic Logic (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), 16-17. 49. See Suleiman Kataya, Al-Ta`lim al-Tibbi ìnda al-Àrab, Al-Bahith (Paris), nos. 4-5 (1979): 118. 50. Ibn Sina, who was also a physician, says the following about logic: That is because logic is a tool that prevents our mind from falling into error while attaining the true conviction (i`tiqad-i haqq) by giving the reasons and methods in our conceptions and confirmations. Except being supported by God, human nature cannot dispense with the help of this tool in making progress. Ibn Sina, Al-Najat, 3 and 5; Mesut Okumus, Kuranin Felsefi Okunusu: Ibn Sina rnegi (The Philosophical Reading of the Quran: The Case of Ibn Sina), (unpublished study, orum [2003], 30). 51. This treatise, considered to be very important, was translated into Arabic several times during the early Àbbasid period. First, Ayyub al-Rakhawi translated it into Syriac, and then Hunayn bin Ishaq retranslated it into Syriac for his son. Later on, he translated it into Arabic for Ishaq bin Sulayman. At roughly the same time, Ìsa bin Yahya also translated it into Arabic. More recently, Mahdi al-Muhaqqaq translated it into modern Farsi and published it as Mutun wa Maqalat der Pazashkiyi Islami (Tehran: 1995). For Galenos views on this subject, see Nbahat Trker-Kyel, Bilimin Felsefeye Dayandigi grs ve Galenos (Galenos and the View That Science Relies upon Philosophy), Trkiye I: Felsefe, Mantik, Bilim Tarihi Sempozyumu Bildirileri, ed. by Kenan Grsoy-Alparslan Aikgen (Istanbul: 1991), 301. 52. Browne, Tibb-i Islami, 56; Najmabadi, Tarikh-i Tib, 73. 53. See Ìsa Beg, Tarikh Bimaristanat, 62. 54. See Àli Sami, Gundashapur, Hunar wa Mardum (Tehran), no. 90, (1349/1970): 7. 55. Najmabadi, Tarikh-i Tib, 73. 56. Sami, Gundashapur, 7. 57. For more information on these inscriptions, see Sylemez, Bilimin Yitik, 25-28. 58. Jundishapur did not have a homogenous population, a feature that eventually made it famous. Almost all of its inhabitants were multilingual. In addition to Pahlawi (the official language), Greek and Syriac were used as literary languages. We should also mention Lurian, Hebrew, and Khuzian. The citys polyglot population coexisted and interacted peacefully, and made their city a unique center of culture and science. See Sylemez, Bilimin Yitik, 43ff. 59. See Browne, Tibb-i Islami, 55 60. See Sami, Gundashapur, 7. 61. See Sultanzade, Tarikh-i Madaris-i Iran, 33. 62. See Kisai, Adab wa Amuzash-i Pazashki, 107. 63. See Browne, Tibb-i Islami, 57. Qifti is the source of this information, used by Browne, for Qifti said that the doctors of Jundishapur reveal their knowledge to no one who is not one of them.
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64. For further information, see Ibn Juljul, Abu Dawud Suleiman bin Hassan alAndalusi (d. 377), Tabaqat al-Atibba wa al-Hukama (together with Ishaq bin Hunayns Tarikh al-Atibba wa al-Falasifah), ed. by Fuad Seyyed (Beirut: 1985), 54; Ibn Abi Usaybià, Ùyun al-Anba, 258. 65. See Browne, Tibb-i Islami, 59; Bernard Lewis also considers Hunayn to be a Christian doctor of Jundishapur. See his Tarihte Araplar, trans. into Turkish by Hakki Dursun Yildiz (Istanbul: 2000), 184. 66. See Sultanzade, Tarikh-i Madaris-i Iran, 32. 67. See Muhammadi, Farhang, 233. 68. For further information, see Kataye, Al-Ta`lim al-Tibbi, 120. 69. The doctors of Jundishapur enjoyed great prestige, particularly under the Àbbasid dynasty. For example, see al-Jahiz, Al-Bukhala, ed. by Taha alHajiri (Cairo: n.d.), 102. 70. See Sylemez, Bilimin Yitik, 119. 71. Ibid., 118-19. 72. Ibn al-Nadim, Fihrist, 333-34; and see Ismail Hakki Izmirli, Islamda Felsefe Akimlari (Istanbul: 1995), 62; Safa, Ùlum-i Àqli, 17; Bozkurt, Mutezilenin Altin agi, 116; Nurullah Kisai, Iran, Diyanet Islam Ansiklopedisi (DIA) (Istanbul: 2000), 22:427-28. 73. See Mesudi, Abu al-Hasan Ali bin al-Hasan bin Ali (d. 346/957), Murucuzzeheb ve meadinu al-cevher, 4 vols. (Qom: 1984), 1:210. 74. For more information on these records, see Àli Asghar Hikmat, Naqsh-i Parsi ber Ahjar-i Hind, 9-10; Muhammed Muhammedi How The Pre-Islamic Literature Passed to the Arabs, Berresihayi Tarih 27, no. 1 (Tehran 1396): 6. 75. For further information, see Ullman, Islamic Surveys II, 17. 76. Ibid., 17. 77. See Sami, Gundashapur, 9-10. 78. See Sultanzade, Tarikh-i Madaris-i Iran, 32. 79. See Muhammadi, Farhang, pp. 232-3. 80. See Yaqut al-Hamawi, Shihabuddin Abi Àbdillah bin Àbdillah (626/1229), Mu`jam al-Buldan, 5 vols. (Beirut: 1979), 3:112-13. 81. See Muhammadi, Farhang, 238. 82. Noting that the measurement was made in the Jundishapur observatory, Philip Hitti implies that this institution was not very developed. See Hitti, Islam Tarihi, 1:572. 83. See Reynold A. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs (Cambridge: 1965), 17; Muhammadi, The Universty of Jundishapur, 158. 84. Mumtahin, Anushirwan, 154. 85. Ibid., 156. 86. See Sigrid Hunke, Avrupanin zerine Dogan Islam Gnesi, trans. into Turkish by Servet Sezgin, (Istanbul: 1972), 98-99. 87. Zij, the Arabized version of the Pahlawi word zik, means zigzag. See Hitti, Islam Tarihi, 1:570.
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88. For further information, see Mumtahin, Anushirwan, 154-55. 89. Ibn Abi Usaybià, Ùyun al-Anba, 183; Sami, Gundashapur, 8; Najmabadi, Tarikh-i Tib, 52-53. 90. Ibn Abi Usaybià, Ùyun al-Anba, 184 91. See Ziya Kazici, Islam Messeseleri Tarihi (Istanbul: 1991), 243 and 257; Arslan Terzioglu, Bimaristan, DIA (Istanbul) 6 (1992): 164. 92. Najmabadi, Tarikh-i Tib, 94. 93. Muhammedi, The Universty of Jundishapur, 156-57. 94. Bayt al-Hikmah was designed after the model of the Jundishapur school. See Bozkurt, Mutezilenin Altin agi, 121. 95. See Safa, Tarikhi Ùlum-i Àqli, 22-23; Muhammedi, The University of Jundishapur, 156. 96. See Mayerhof, Islam Medeniyeti, 11. 97. See Abdulhusayn Zerinkub, Tarikh-i Iran ba`d az islam (Tehram: 1343 AH), 516. 98. For further information, see Hashimi, Davru Jundishapur, 191. 99. See Muhammedi, The University of Jundishapur, 162. 100. Ibid., 163. 101. This work was translated into Syriac by Ibn Shuhada, a translator from Karkh, before Hunayn. However, because it was a very poor translation, Hunayn compared the Greek copies of the text and then translated it into Syriac (at the request of Shirashu`) and then into Arabic (at the request of Abu Ja`far Muhammad bin Musa). Hunayn bin Ishaq, Risala-i Hunayn, 217-18. 102. Sergios had already translated this work into Syriac. Hunayn rendered it into Syriac along with his own notes and explanations. Hunayn also translated it into Arabic for Abu Ja`far Muhammad bin Musa. Ibid., 220. 103. Ayyub al-Rahawi had already translated part of this book for Jabrail bin Buhtishu`. Hunayn translated the full text into Syriac at the request of Yuhanna bin Masawayh. Afterwards, Hunayn translated the first chapter into Arabic for Muhammad bin Musa. Later on, Hubaysh completed the Arabic translation drawing upon Hunayns Syriac translation. Ibid., 224. 104. This book was first translated by Sergios into Syriac and then Hunayn revised it at the request of Yuhanna. Afterwards, he translated it into Arabic at the request of Muhammad bin Musa. Ibid., 225. 105. At the request of Yuhanna, this work was translated into Syriac and then summarized by Hunayn. Afterwards, Hubaysh (one of Hunayns students), translated it into Arabic. Ibid., 227. 106. This work was translated into Syriac in the pre-Islamic period. Afterwards, at the request of Yuhanna, the translation was either revised or completely redone. Ibid., 230. 107. Ayyub al-Rahawi had already translated this book into Syriac. However, Yuhanna requested that it be retranslated into Syriac. Ibid., 230.
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108. Istaf bin Busayl translated Galenos work from its original Greek into Arabic. Afterwards, at the request of Muhammad bin Musa, Hunayn revised the Arabic text. Then, Yuhanna bin Masawayh asked Hubaysh to translate it from Arabic into Syriac. Ibid., 231. 109. Vizier Muhammad bin Àbd al-Malik had this work translated from its original Greek into Arabic. Later on, Yuhanna requested Hubaysh to translate it into Syriac by relying upon his teachers Arabic translation. Ibid., 231. 110. Yusuf al-Khuzi translated the first chapter of this work into Syriac. Afterwards, Ayyub al-Rahawi translated the full text. Hunayn then summarized and translated it for Salamawayh. Then, at Yuhannas request, he revised the texts second chapter. Ahmad bin Musa asked him to translate the whole text into Arabic. Ibid., 234. 111. Hunayn translated this work into Arabic at the request of Muhammad bin Musa. Afterwards, Yuhanna had it translated into Syriac, while relying upon Hunayns translation. Ibid., 252. 112. Sergios had already translated this work into Syriac. Afterwards, Hunayn translated it into Syriac for Yahya bin Masawayh during the reign of Caliph Mutawakkil. Afterwards, Hubaysh translated it into Arabic for Muhammad bin Yahya. Ibid., 242. 113. Ibid., 221. 114. Hunayn relates that he translated this from its original Greek when he was 17 years old and that this was his second translation. Ibid., 222. 115. Being translated twice into Syriac by Sergios, Hunayn translated it during his youth for Buhtishu`. Afterwards, Abu al-Hasan Àli bin Yahya had it translated into Arabic. Ibid., 222. 116. Sergios had already translated this work into Syriac twice, once for Teyador, the archbishop of Karkh, and once for Yasu`. However, Hunayn retranslated it because the earlier translations were so poor. Then, Hubaysh translated it into Arabic. Ibid., 223. 117. Hunayn translated this work into Syriac for Buhtishu`. Later on, Stephanos translated it into Arabic. Ibid., 234. 118. Ayyub al-Rahawi translated it from Greek into Syriac for Buhtishu`. Then, Stafanos translated it into Arabic for Muhammad bin Musa. Ibid., 238. 119. Ishaq bin Hunayn bin Ishaq translated this book, as well as Aristotles views on medicine, into Syriac for Buhtishu`. Ibid., 241. 120. Hunayn translated this work into Syriac for Buhtishu` and into Arabic for Muhammad bin Musa. Ibid., 241. 121. Yusuf al-Rahawi first translated this work into Syriac. Hunayn states that this book was retranslated due to the poor quality of the previous translation. Afterwards, it was translated twice into Arabic, once by Hubaysh for Muhammad bin Musa, and once by Ishaq bin Hunayn for Àli bin Yahya. Ibid., 243. 122. Ayyub al-Rahawi translated this work, then Hunayn, at the request of Buhtishu`, revised it. Ibid., 244.
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123. Ibid., 249. 124. Ibid. 125. At the request of Buhtishu`, Hunayn commisioned Tuma al-Rahawi to translate this work, after which he revised the text. Ibid., 251. 126. Ayyub al-Rahawi translated the first several chapters of Galenos book for Jabrail bin Buhtishu`. Ibid., 224. 127. Having been previously translated by Sergios, Hunayn then translated it into Syriac for Buhtishu`. Hunayn relates that this was the first translation he had done, and that he was still a child at this time. Later on, he revised and perfected it. Afterwards, he translated it into Arabic for Muhammad bin Musa. Ibid., 224-25. 128. Ayyub al-Rahawi translated this work for Buhtishu`, and Hunayn revised the translation for Yuhanna bin Masawayh. Ibid., 227. 129. Ibid., 243. 130. See Aydin Sayili, The Emergence of the Propotype of the Modern Hospital in Medieval Islam, Studies in the History of Medicine 4, no. 2 (New Delhi: 1980): 114-15. Narrated by Aydin Sayili, this information was repeated verbatim by Nowsheravi in his article. Ibid, 55-56. 131. For more information, see Ibn Abi Usaybià, Ùyun al-Anba, 198-99. 132. See A. Habib Khan, Early Hospitals in the Muslim World, Studies in the History of Medicine 7, nos. 3-4 (New Delhi: 1983): 198. 133. For further information, consult ibid., 197-208.
Paths toward an Arab Knowledge Society

Dieter Weiss The Arabic Science and Technology Gap and Its Economic Consequences in the International Development Race
During the first third of the twentieth century, self-critical Muslims asked themselves two critical questions: Why do Muslims remain behind, and why are others progressing? 1 The cause of this dilemma was the confusing experience of the Muslim worlds decline and subsequent colonial domination by the West, which hit the Arabs sense of self-worth in its core. Their repeated military defeats by Israel and dependency on foreign technical and financial development aid demonstrated their own deficits. They could barely tolerate these humiliations, particularly since they were in striking contrast to the Quranic revelation, which promises Muslims the leading role in the world. The history of Islams expansion during the first century of the Islamic era seemed to support this belief. However, its gradual decline was repressed,2 and a fatal apologetic tendency (viz., the passionate attempt to prove to oneself and others that ones own inferiority does not exist) became characteristic of the debates on how to find a suitDieter Weiss studied industrial engineering at the Technical University of Berlin (1955-60), conducted field research in Egypt on industrial development strategies (1960-62), served as professor of political science (1962), worked in the Ministry of Economic Cooperation in Bonn (1962-65), and from 1980 until retirement in 2001, was professor of Near East economics at the Free University of Berlin. This article originally appeared in Orient , published by the German Orient Institute in Hamburg (www.duei.de/doi), vol. 45, no. 1 (2004): 75-90. As a result, the format is somewhat different from our usual style. It was translated from the original German by Sonja Adrianovska.
Weiss: Paths toward an Arab Knowledge Society
29
able way out of the crisis, as well as in the case of vital questions concerning socioeconomic development.3 In the 1960s, a central category of the Arabic worldview appeared in the highly emotionalized unity of the West and colonialism. This narrow perspective of the Arabs and the West obstructed the Arab worlds view of the Far Easts economic and technological dynamics. Up until the 1980s, few Arab economists in science and administration had any concrete idea of the education, research, and technology-based4 growth dynamic of the Asian tiger states and why they had been so spectacularly successful. This was largely due to the lack of personal vision, because the countries of East and Southeast Asia had little interest in those regions that were lagging behind in the development race. Nor did they feel obligated to offer seminar events, well-paid according to western examples, in order to remedy Arab perception deficits. In other words, Arab economists only became aware of the [Asian] periphery countries dynamic by accident. Certainly, no learning processes designed to help the Arab world catch up (e.g., conducting case studies of specific countries, which could be done by students working on their university theses) took place. The responsible political leaders did not grasp the necessity of such studies, and, therefore, no research means were made available. The result was a second self-isolation that, in the 1970s, was becoming even greater. After the industrialization strategies of staving off world markets and import substitution, this self-isolation now appeared in the form of a technological gap. The full extent of the R&D5 gap caught the attention of Arab governments only because of the oil-boom, when the OAPEC6 countries, in particular, unexpectedly found themselves exposed to a massive presence of East Asian periphery countries while building up infrastructural and large-scale industrial investments. However, oil revenues concealed the urgent need for massive investments in education and research in order to catch up with other regions. It was deemed sufficient to expand educational opportunities quantitatively, without regard to quality and job market requirements. 7 Growing budgetary demands in the face of the OAPEC countries finite oil resources, as well as the unavoidable economic and political pressures for reform in the non-oil Arab states after the Soviet Unions collapse, raised questions about a fundamental strategic reorientation. Added to this was the increasing international pressure from low-wage Asian countries to compete on the global level (particularly in such technologi-
30
cally undemanding sectors as textiles and food processing). Despite multiple stabilization and structural adaptation programs under the umbrella of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, no Arab country has succeeded in restructuring itself as an internationally competitive modern economy. Moreover, the West classified certain Arab countries as important international partners and therefore, in essence, rewarded them with geostrategic pensions. This strategy, however, reduced their sense of urgency to undertake institutional and technological reforms. This was especially true when these long-term subsidies led to the political establishments independence, as well as that of its security apparatus (viz., the army and the secret service), from the taxable earning potential of their national economies. Internationally agreed-upon economic reforms were not seriously implemented,8 and no substantial steps were taken to establish a qualitatively high-grade educational system and efficient R&D capacities. The results are reflected in the World Banks socioeconomic cross-section indicators9 : The Arab world occupies the second-to-last position of the worlds development regions, the lowest one being sub-Saharan Africa.
The Arab Human Development Reports: Breakthrough toward a Self-Critical Stocktaking

The Arab Human Development Reports of 2002 and 2003 broke the pattern of resigned silence and diplomatic considerations by naming the central barriers to development in the Arab world in a previously unheard-of manner. Rima Khalaf Hunaidi, the reports main initiator, as well as assistant secretary general of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and director of the Regional Bureau of Arab States (not to mention a former member of the Jordanian cabinet), made several interesting points at an international political gathering.10 For example, he illustrated how the drafting of such reports, and their subsequent worldwide publication, would have been impossible if individual Arab governments had had any say in the matter. The UN organization conducting this study was required to give its protection to the team of authors, all of whom were of Arab origin. Blocking reform is also associated with solidifying an authoritarian power structure in the area of economic policy. Meanwhile, we can observe dynastic succession patterns not only among monarchies (e.g., Jordan and Morocco), but also in formerly socialist presidential systems, where sons
31
are groomed to succeed their fathers (following the Syrian model: Egypt, Libya, and Yemen). The first report, Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations (hereinafter AHDR 02), provoked widespread discussions in the Arab world, ranging from vehement rejection to euphoric agreement. As unconditional prerequisites for releasing the Arab worlds blocked creative energies, AHDR 02 specifically mentioned freedom, knowledge, and womens empowerment. Encouraged and confirmed by the resulting resonance, the UNDP (like AHDR 02, with Professor Ferghany in charge) followed up with its Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society (hereinafter AHDR 03). In this report, the authors further elaborated on the knowledge factor already mentioned in AHDR 02. Two further reports on empowering women, as well as on reform and good governance, are planned, although considerable political resistance is already making its presence felt. The former DSE (Deutsche Stiftung fr Internationale Entwicklung [German Foundation for International Development]), now part of InWEnt (Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung [Capacity Building International, Germany]), has developed a specific form of political dialogue. Its open-forum nature 11 offers the opportunity for the Arab participants, in particular, to candidly discuss among themselves, both on neutral ground and away from the otherwise unavoidable constraints and diplomatic considerations, the results and problems facing practical political implementation.
An Analysis of the Central Barriers to Development in the Arab World

AHDR 02 analyzed, in fascinating precision, what Arab regimes have demanded for decades but have denied just as persistently. As with previous promises by Arab members of the American-led anti-Saddam coalition during the Gulf war of 1990-91, none of the promises were honored. However, neither were they insisted upon by the western coalition partners. The Arab world considers its human capital to be its wealth and hope. What is at issue is releasing this human capital from multiple handicaps, allowing free and fair elections, empowering the female half of the population, and maintaining freedoms within a frame of good governance. 12 The wave of democratization that caught on in most Latin American and East and Southeast Asian countries in the 1980s, and that has transformed the
32
Eastern bloc countries since the 1990s, has not yet reached the Arab world. As a result, effective democratic controls are missing.13 The demand for equal rights for women still meets with resistance. Opportunities for their political and economic participation, therefore, remain far below the international average. More than 59% of Arab women are illiterate, and maternal mortality is double that of Latin America and quadruple that of East Asia. Ten million Arab children do not attend school, a number that may rise by 40% by 2015. The low quality of education provided leads to the lack of a qualified workforce. Only 1.2% of the population owns a personal computer. In addition, the Arab worlds expenditures for R&D just 0.5% of the gross national product are far below the average rates for the Asian periphery countries.14 Corresponding modernization deficits also impede economic development. The Arab worlds participation in world trade with technologically more sophisticated products and services is overdue. Economic and sociopolitical concepts of [social] control are outdated. The result is a lack of accountability, transparency and integration along with ineffectiveness, inefficiency and unresponsiveness to the demands of peoples and development.15 Such findings are familiar.16 What is new is that the deficits of AHDR 02 and 03 are presented in an undisguised manner to a wide international audience. The necessary strategy is clear: At issue is building a knowledge society, along with its general conditions in regard to freedom, gender equality, and the development orientation of the actions of the government. Such an undertaking, if successful, will enable the Arab world to open up to the global scientific-technical exchange arena and to develop a sound global value system. 17 AHDR 02 mentions the Arab worlds need to catch up with international standards:
[H]ow much still needs to be done to provide current and future generations with the political voice, social choices and economic opportunities. ... It underlines how far the Arab states still need to go in order to join the global information society and economy as full partners. 18
According to Hunaidi:
Lagging human development constitutes a major obstacle that prevents the Arab region from confronting the challenges of globalization. ... Bold thinking holds the key to realizing, as opposed to only conceiving of, grand visions for the future.19
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The Goal of an Arab Knowledge Society

There has been no lack of grandiose visions by Arab states in the past decades, only of visions of a sober orientation toward their implementation. In this respect, AHDR 02 was a unique provocation that forced upon the ruling elites a debate, the likes of which had never been conducted in their part of the world.20 The protection afforded by the UNDPs umbrella and the Arab authorship of the report made it more difficult to dismiss the documents critical findings along the usual apologetic lines of argumentation.21 As a result, critical Arab intellectuals felt supported. 22 AHDR 03 goes into even more detail about the three essential components emphasized in AHDR 02. At issue is overcoming the Arab knowledge deficit, a frank diagnosis of which has been published for the global public and has hit the Arabs sense of self-worth the hardest. Once again, the Arabs technology gap was made clear to many people due to the American military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.23 The authors did not give in to any reflexes to repress:
At this precarious juncture, some observers questioned the wisdom of issuing further Reports, while others worried that special interest groups might exploit their outspoken approach, to the detriment of Arabs. The majority, however, argued forcefully that to leave the initiative to others would be the more ominous choice. Self-reform stemming from open, scrupulous and balanced self-criticism is the right, if not the only alternative to plans that are apparently drawn up outside the Arab world for restructuring the area and for reshaping the Arab identity. Turning a blind eye to the weaknesses and shortfalls of the region, instead of decisively identifying and overcoming them, can only increase its vulnerability and leave it more exposed.24
Herein lay the central weak spot of the prior political reform programs in many Arab countries over the past decades, beginning with their rejection of constructive self-criticism as the first step toward problem solving.
The missing links are either buried in dust or smothered by ideologies, societal structures and values that inhibit critical thinking, cut Arabs off from their knowledge-rich heritage and block the free flows of ideas and learning.25
AHDR 03 demands a strategic vision for a creative Arab renaissance based on five pillars:
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1. Allowing freedom of expression and assembly in the name of good governance. 2. Implementing a qualitatively sophisticated education with a 10-year mandatory attendance for girls, as well as creating a system of adult education for both life-long learning and regular quality controls at all levels. 3. Embedding science into Arab society, expanding R&D capacities, and creating an all-Arab creativity and innovation network with connections to the international academic arena. With public welfare as its model, the states responsibility for higher education should be supported. While the institutions do not have to be in the states hands, they should not be at the mercy of unregulated profit seeking. One possibility would be to support partnerships among science, the economy, the state, and civil society in connection with an independent certification as regards quality assurance. 4. Shifting the economy in the direction of knowledge-based, technologically high-grade, and value-added goods and services for differentiated and sophisticated markets, as well as establishing stimulating structures that award the acquisition and application of know-how for productive purposes. At this time, income is often tied to favors dispensed by powerful people within the framework of patronage structures. Without their own knowledge base, Arab countries will remain passive consumers of the international knowledge society. 26 Presently, most Arab products are not competitive on the international market. 27 In fact, the entire gross national product of all Arab countries [when oil revenue is removed] lies below that of Spain or the Netherlands.28 5. Developing an enlightened Arabic model of knowledge based on the open intellectual tradition of the cultural Arabic heritage. This heritage encourages cognitive thinking, problem solving, and creativity, and also advances the Arabic language, cultural multiplicity, and exchange with other cultures29:
returning to the civilised, moral and humanitarian vision of pure religion; restoring to religious institutions their independence from political authorities, governments, states and radical religious-political movements; recognising intellectual freedom, activating interpretative jurisprudence, [and] preserving the right to differ in doctrines, religious schools and interpretations.30
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A particular issue is developing an Arabic scientific terminology. 31 Furthermore, AHDR 03 calls for promoting cultural diversity within the Arab world. Finally, there are calls for an Arab opening toward other cultures also toward Asian cultures32 through promoting translations and cultural exchange, the use of networks belonging to regional and international organizations, and increased Arab participation in the reform of the world order.
Knowledge closely approaches a religious obligation that Arabs ought to honour and exercise.33
At stake, therefore, is liberating religion from political instrumentalization,34 as well as recognizing and appreciating knowledge and exploratory research (ijtih ad) in connection with the elementary human rights of freedom.
A climate of freedom is a necessary condition of a knowledge society,35
and
There are no guarantees for freedom without the rule of law.36
The roots of the Arabs knowledge deficit are located in the phase of early childhood conditioning:
The most widespread style of child rearing in Arab families is the authoritarian mode accompanied by the overprotective. This reduces childrens independence, self-confidence and social efficiency, and fosters passive attitudes and hesitant decision-making skills. Most of all, it affects how the child thinks by suppressing questioning, exploration and initiative.37
Compared to other development regions, the school system lags behind due to continued high illiteracy rates for women, the lack of access to primary schools, diminishing enrollments for higher education, and declining national expenditures for education since 1985. The central problem is the decline of quality. 38 Further obstructions to knowledge diffusion result from the decreased distribution of media (e.g., 53 newspapers per 1,000 inhabitants, as opposed to 285 in developed countries39 ), and even more pressing from media censorship. The limited perception of international intellectual trends is also reflected in the number of translated publications. Between
36
1980-85, very few translated books were published in the entire Arab world to be precise, one book per million inhabitants, as opposed to 519 books in Hungary and 920 in Spain. Moreover, 17 percent of all Arabic book production contains religious content.40 National innovation systems of the East Asian type are also missing. The importation of everything from technological goods to industrial plants that are ready-made, but quickly become obsolete without further domestic technical development, leads to a dead-end. Furthermore, Arab countries are unattractive to outside direct investment.41 The authors emphatically point to the Arab worlds golden age of intellectual openness, 42 as well as its high appreciation of knowledge and science, and assert that this tradition needs to be carried on:
An alliance between some oppressive regimes and certain types of conservative religious scholars led to interpretations of Islam, which serve the government, but are inimical to human development, particularly with respect to freedom of thought, the interpretation of judgements, the accountability of regimes to the people and womens participation in public life.43
The challenges are laid out clearly:

Arabic culture, like other cultures, finds itself facing the challenges of an emerging cultural homogeneity and related questions about cultural multiplicity, cultural personalities, the issue of the self and the other, and its own cultural character. These and similar questions raise apprehensions, fears and risks in the minds of its people. Concerns about the extinction of the language and culture and the diminution and dissipation of identity have become omnipresent in Arab thought and culture. The truth is that Arab culture has no chance but to engage again in a new global experiment.44
The Arabs, so the message implies, cannot escape back into their glorious past and their inherited culture while trying to exist in a globalized world that penetrates all aspects of life. Some Islamic movements call for a policy of retreat, a hostile rejection of this global cultures values, ideas, and practices. But such a program can only lead to a weakening of Arab culture, not to its strengthening and further development.45 A dissolution of inherited values also takes place from the inside. During the oil-boom, old values and achievement incentives were eroded, in particular, along with the appreciation of knowledge. The social standing
37
of scientists and scholars plummeted, and personal wealth, regardless of how it was acquired, became the determining factor. As AHDR 03 states: Perhaps worst of all, the values of independence, freedom and the importance of a critical mind were also buried, 46 and Power and wealth weaken the ethics of knowledge. 47 The general repression and frustration caused the most innovative people to emigrate. For example, during 1995-96, one-quarter of the 300,000 graduates of Arab universities who had earned their bachelors degree emigrated; during 1998-2000, more than 15,000 doctors left their Arab homeland. 48 Arab countries cannot afford to lose any more time, given the increasing speed of global scientific-technical processes. Reform apparently has to begin with the political systems. However, Arab ruling elites have a tendency to crush any criticism regarding the primacy of preserving their own power.
The Experience of a Political Dialogue The Institutional Arrangement

Dialogue is by now part and parcel of development policy activities. Such events offer protected space for an unofficial exchange of ideas between representatives of politics, science, the economy, and civil society from developing countries and from Germany. The goal is to explore future developments, challenges, room for maneuver, and political opinions independently of the political pressures of the day and from all protocol constraints. As a result, informal discussions among representatives from developing countries are particularly stimulating and fruitful. The authors of AHDR 03 also requested open dialogue and constructive criticism in their foreword. The Development Policy Forum of InWEnt picked up on this request and organized, in collaboration with the Bundesministerium fr wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development [BMZ]) and the UNDP, an international policy dialogue on Building the Arab Knowledge Society: The Arab Human Development Report 2003: Consequences for International Cooperation, held in Berlin on February 9-10 2004. The German side wanted to explore what role the German Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (Cooperative Development [EZ]) could play in building an Arab knowledge society. 49 On what level should the EZ start: the national, the regional, or the international? Where should foreign aid never be offered due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, such as in
38
the social, cultural, or religious fields? How can the Arab countries resources be bundled together and brought into international networks, especially in the areas of higher education, science, and R&D? The dialogue was roughly structured in a way designed to address the three areas of primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Thematic guidelines that were too strict, it was thought, would limit the chances of an open communication process.
Basic Education, Literacy, and the Stimulation of Intellectual Curiosity

The main questions were: What political and practical conditions are necessary to eliminate illiteracy? What methods can disseminate education in the family and early childhood spheres? How should the relationship between the Arabization of education and the learning of foreign languages be shaped? The discussion did not strictly limit itself to such suggestions by the organizers. Short prepared lectures dealt with the specific problems of reforming education, increasing quality, and introducing modern curricula according to case studies from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Furthermore, the difficulties of transitioning from the teaching and learning styles of mechanical memorization to those of encouraging independent and innovative thinking were also discussed. The decisive role of the political will to reform so that all of society can be mobilized in the struggle against illiteracy was emphasized as well. The notoriously bad quality of teacher training and continuing education was debated, as was the necessity of enabling the Arabic language to develop a scientific-technical specialist terminology that can be understood throughout the Arab world; encouraging girls to attend school; and also prioritizing expenditures for building schools and producing qualified personnel.
Secondary Schools and Vocational Training

The organizers main questions were: How can the secondary school system adequately prepare its graduates for the job market? Should informal training or extracurricular practical vocational training replace the secondary school system? What points of departure for foreign technical cooperation do the problem areas of teacher training, low teacher wages, missing teaching aids, and curricula offer?
39
In Arab countries, the proportion of secondary school students in relation to their age group in its entirety lies far below the average obtained in the Asian periphery countries. The problem of quality presents itself here as a preliminary stage of university education in a particular way. Secondary school graduates who are considered brilliant due to their excellent report cards, which is the result of their ability to memorize barely understandable material, fail when they enter institutions of higher education that expect intellectual curiosity, problem-solving skills, and independent and innovative thinking. The Arab world is slowly becoming aware of the fact that East Asias successful development is based on its systematic cultivation of education, research, and development. Arab countries have neither taken care of their human capital nor undertaken any reforms of the economy and the job market to encourage highly qualified employees to move into the highest productivity sectors. Attempts at moving toward the qualitative aspect were introduced by participants from Saudi Arabia and Syria. A notorious weak spot in the education system of Arab countries is vocational training in the field of intermediate qualification. Generally, this is a branch of the secondary school. Aside from a few exceptions, such as the KohlMubarak initiative, 50 the secondary vocational school curricula are impractical and bear no relation to the realities of the job market. On the one hand, these students are not considered talented enough to attend the public secondary schools that qualify their graduates to enter a university. On the other hand, they are not particularly appreciated by the business sector and thus frequently find themselves in a qualifications trap. In one survey, 44 percent of them expressed concern over their future chances in the employment market. Completing a secondary vocational school generally does not entitle one to enter an institute of higher technical study. For the latter, completing the public secondary school is, as a rule, required. Therefore, secondary vocational school graduates see themselves as losers. A broad discussion arose about opening up the education system to such nongovernmental institutions as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). However, newly established private enterprises for profit-making purposes, often without quality control from independent certifying agencies, frequently do not uphold their promises. In this regard, AHDR 03 calls for governments to be held responsible however, without the requirement for governmental organizations, and with case-to-case nongovernmental carriers from the sphere of civil society minus private enterprise profit orientation.
40
According to the Syrian participant, the most important responsibility is undertaking a radical change in educational culture: moving from an educational culture of memorization to one of intellectual curiosity, analytical thinking, critical scrutiny, and creativity; in other words, one oriented toward problem solving and innovation. But such an undertaking would involve reeducating an entire generation of teachers along with replacing the curric ula both of which seem impossible to realize within a short period of time. However, if this is not done, an Arabic knowledge society will remain no more than an idealistic dream. The exchange of ideas, especially among the Arab participants themselves, concentrated on the following problem areas: redesigning the curricula to prepare students for future challenges that cannot be anticipated at this time; negotiating adjustment flexibility; arranging general theoretical foundations as a basis for life-long learning; designing clear policies on teacher salaries, social status, and promotion prospects; discussing career perspectives for qualified personnel without formal high school graduation or post-secondary diplomas; and changing the list of qualifications that will be required in the future as a result of new information technologies. Which of the previously conventional product lines in Arab countries (e.g., textiles and food processing) will survive in the world markets changing conditions? How will the push into producing more knowledgeintensive products and services succeed? The Gulf states have specific problems in regard to their dependency on oil revenues, the low inclination of their younger generations to accept blue-collar jobs, and the companies preferences for cheaper and, in many cases more qualified, foreign workers. The reorientation of Egypts professional training system on the basis of the KohlMubarak initiative seems to be successful. So far, 7,200 graduates are enrolled in 1,100 training companies in 24 Egyptian cities. The necessary legal, administrative, and entrepreneurial adjustments, which were considerable, should be informative when other Arab countries begin to make similar reforms. The question of redistributing responsibilities in the education system between the state, the economy, NGOs, and foreign development cooperation remains open. The latter have to consider that education concepts represent a highly sensitive sphere that is interwoven with cultural traditions, values, and issues of power. Stable and acceptable reform concepts have to emerge from an internal process of discussing all of the social powers (e.g., culture, science, civil society, business, industry, and chambers of com-
41
merce), and, therefore, cannot be enforced externally. Generally, such reform concepts should reflect conceptual coherence and not just be an addition of diverse uncoordinated offers made by a given donor.
Higher Education, Research, and Transfer of Technology

The main questions were: How can cooperation between the higher education sector, the private sector, civil society, and the state be improved? What role can small- and mid-scale industries play in the area of R&D and as seekers of knowledge? What duties fall to private educational institutions today and in the future? What can we learn from countries that have implemented sponsorship policies for research and innovation (e.g., fiscal policy and other tools)? The Arab Science and Technology Foundation (ASTF), located in Sharjah, UAE, offers an innovative beginning with its monitoring program. The Arab world contains 175 universities that boast more than 5,000 professors who have trained about 10 million graduates about 700,000 of them engineers. Tens of thousands of them successfully work and conduct research abroad. However, the research output within the Arab countries is abysmal. The reasons for this are known: insufficient financing, desolate work conditions, the oppressive climate of intellectual restrictions, the arrogance of political power, and the lack of farsighted national and all-Arab research strategies even in the most inherently Arab areas of requirement (e.g., water supply and distribution, seawater desalination, environmental protection, the petrochemical industry, and international climate policies). Despite their occasional enormous oil incomes, the oil states as well showed little interest in developing first-class R&D clusters because they did not grasp their strategic significance. The tolerance, not to mention the resolute promotion, of exceptionally intellectual minds met with resistance, given the more comfortable siphoning off of oil revenues without having to grapple with intellectually independent scientists and their demands. A further weakness consists of the continued lack of any connection between the research activities in one Arab country to an all-Arab network, beginning with a binding scientific terminology that can be understood by all Arabs. For example, a lecturer from Damascus who is teaching information technology in Bahrain cannot make himself understood if he uses his personal translations of specialized English terminology. There, Arabic with English-based specialized terminology is in use. In Tunisia he would
42
also be misunderstood, for in that country, teaching occurs in French. But miscommunication could occur even in Aleppo, because even within Syria itself a unified Arabic IT-specialist language has not caught on, and everyone applies his or her own translations. In addition, joint publications emerge almost exclusively between Arab scientists and non-Arab colleagues in the same specialist community, instead of between co-authors from within the same Arab subregion (e.g., North Africa, the eastern parts of the Arab world, or member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council), and even less between these subregions, which are, furthermore, inhibited by the EnglishFrench language barrier. Moreover, there is a lack of communication between Arab researchers and potentially interested parties, among others in the economy, of strategic considerations for common R&D programs as well as cultivating scientific societies and professional journals. An Arabic R&D Internet portal would be important. Poorer countries, such as Yemen, are thinking about the extent to which foreign education and research institutions can be successfully won over for cooperation. However, there is an awareness that the intellectual climate and predominant culture of bureaucratic control is not very attractive. The German University in Cairo (GUC) represents a successful example of foreign engagement. It was established due to a new legal leeway in Egypt,51 in participation with the Ulm University, Stuttgart University, the Ministry of Education and Research, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the GermanArab Chamber of Commerce, and the Foreign Ministry, as well as private Egyptian sponsors. In 2003, it was formally opened by President Hosni Mubarak and Chancellor Gerhard Schrder.52 While the natural and technical sciences in Arab countries are mainly handicapped by a lack of financing, the social sciences, arts, and humanities are subject to a special political control that leads to an anticipated selfcensorship in the selection of research topics. Innovative questions arouse the governments suspicion. For example, an investigation of 2,000 Lebanese diploma exams concluded that only 16 percent of them reached international university standards. The majority avoided independent themes and restricted themselves to repeating familiar insights. As some of these graduates become teachers, a self-perpetuating process of blocking creativity is created and continues to spread. Constructing a new education system in Iraq represents an acute problem, one which UNESCO and such bilateral science and cultural-political institutions as the DAAD and German universities are trying to solve. With
43
respect to the EuroMediterranean partnership, the TEMPUSMEDA program for cultivating university cooperation should be mentioned. Unlike the East Asian states with their long-term R&D strategies, Arab countries are making no effort to offer attractive incentives to entice these highly qualified personnel and engineers who are working abroad to return home. During the discussion, it was pointed out that a fundamental political change took place in Eastern Europe, and that these nations concentrated on the problems associated with the technical conversion of transforming the system. However, in the Arab world there is a struggle for reform in certain areas and a lack of progress in the area of indispensable political reforms. In the absence of the latter, the paradigm shift toward an Arab knowledge society is blocked. Universities are considered dangerous places by the rulers, who view them as meeting places for mostly young, rebellious troublemakers. As a result, they are subjected to especially strict governmental supervision. For example, a leading Egyptian social scientist was put on trial because he had accepted research funds from the EU. Furthermore, a university president was relieved of his job because one of his publications dealt with poverty, an issue that is publicly denied. This raises the question for Arab intellectuals of how to achieve reform without major upheaval. In the Gulf states, there exist material and mental problems related to transitioning from a neo-patrimonial state of revenue distribution to a decisively achievement-oriented and internationally competitive economy. These problems stem from raising an entire generation in an environment in which the level of income is not strictly tied to individual performance. As stressed in AHDR 03, social status must be reconnected to education and professional qualification. In the past, the cultural dimension was underestimated within the framework of EuroMediterranean cooperation as well. The focus was on creating a free-trade zone across a network of bilateral association agreements. Only in recent years has the significance of scientific and cultural cooperation been recognized, 53 and partially implemented, as in the TEMPUS MEDA program. At issue is the resuscitation of the entire Mediterranean environment with its long phases of intensive cross-fertilization. The Arab discussion participants consider the need for European assistance to be mainly in the form of helping NGOs in order to strengthen civil society and to work toward good governance. On the other hand, the governments often impose strict controls on local NGOs and prohibit them from initiating direct contacts abroad without official approval. How, then, can NGOs be strengthened from the outside if they are kept weak within their own countries?
44
Conclusions for International Development Cooperation

AHDR 02 and 03 have caused intense debates in Arab countries about future political options. Despite their almost nonexistent personal knowledge of the more successful Asian periphery countries and the strategies that they follow, Arab countries are becoming aware, with considerable delay, of the necessity to reorient themselves. The increasingly privatized economy senses, on a wide front, the decrease in their capacity to compete internationally, especially with the Asian periphery countries. Both AHDRs offer a clearly structured outline for the pending steps needed to initiate reform. At the same time, it is becoming clear that the reforms would have to begin within the core of the political systems, although the ruling elites hesitate to allow any room for the degree of freedom that is indispensable for a knowledge society. Thus, statements of intent in this regard remain no more than lip service. In those Arab countries where a new generation has taken over, even the new young guard holds on to the primacy of maintaining power. The opportunities to be influenced by donors are limited, especially in such sensitive areas as education. The Arab participants point to strategic EZ mistakes and changing EZ donor modes. On many occasions, grave social consequences were said to have been overlooked. Nevertheless, such problems as the growing unemployment of young people in North Africa and the lack of future prospects evade foreign aid. In addition, honoring the demand for wide-spread literacy programs for rural women and girls is a priority for the leadership of the partner countries that they have neglected for decades. Both are sensitive fields in which bilateral donors have no comparative advantages. The demand for a more generous European immigration policy was also expressed in connection with the allusion that the West continuously siphons off highly qualified Arab human capital via the brain drain. A good starting point here, obviously, would be the attractiveness of work conditions in the home countries. A strong middle class, which could support the process of development, has not yet appeared in the Arab countries. The German EZ requires an invitation by the partner country, which names its contextual priorities and decides which sectors and subsectors will be opened to foreign cooperation. Choosing the cooperating countries is done according to a catalogue of criteria. 54 Country-specific aid programs are arranged with the partner countries. One sign of a deepening EuroArab relationship is the report, commissioned by EU Commission president Romano Prodi: Dialogue between
45
Peoples and Cultures in the EuroMediterranean Area. This report deals with the manifold tensions (e.g., globalization, EU expansion toward the east, EuroArab partnership agreements, migration problems, and a security policy). Prominent representatives of European and Arab cultural circles, from Fatima Mernissi to Umberto Eco, were called upon as authors to study the issue of a EuroMediterranean identity. The report suggests a wide intercultural dialogue that includes such questions of the day as upbringing, the role of women, the image of Arab migrant families in Europe, and so on. Mutual relations are becoming more problematic due to, among other reasons, media-distorted perceptions and the withholding of rights, freedoms, equality, and dignity. The Prodi initiative is geared toward focusing the EuroMediterranean partnership on the human and cultural dimension, which represents the third and weakest hive of the Barcelona process (aside from the political and economicfinancial areas). The significance of culture is misjudged and marginalized. The report contains 20 concrete suggestions in three areas. The first issue is upbringing, which is taken as a starting point for mutual relationships and openness. An educational theory of diversity is required. A BraudelIbn Khaldun network is supposed to link the universities around the Mediterranean together. A second group of initiatives wants to strengthen the daily dialogue. For this, a study group is supposed to collect advice from all interested persons and initiate a dynamic process. A third group of suggestions seeks to protect the right of media freedom. However, at the same time the media have to be held accountable for providing accurate commentary and not serving as vehicles for negative stereotypes. Endnotes
1. 2. 3. Arsalan (1939). Smith (1959), 47; Braune (1960), 166; and Buettner (1979), 24. Smith (1959), 76. This is also manifest in the Arab countries economic development plans of the 1950s and 1960s, which refused to undertake a self-critical and sober assessment of their own weaknesses, and instead based their planning on illusory and optimistic source values, which greatly contributed to their failure. Compare Weiss (1964), 190 f. and 252 f. An equivalent attitude resulted in the military misjudgments before the beginning of the 1967 war against Israel. For example, South Koreas building of about 20 technology cities, specialized by sector, in corresponding association with the relevant industrial sector. Research and Development. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. Compare to the interior view of Arab universities. See Weiss (1986), 377 f.; Weiss (1990).
4. 5. 6. 7.
46
8. 9. 10.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
18. 19. 20. 21. 22.
23.
24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.
Mller et al. (1980), 1 f.; Weiss and Wurzel (1998), 189 f.; and Wurzel (1990), 204 f. Compare World Bank (2003). Development Policy Forum, Building the Arab Knowledge Society, The Arab Human Development Report 2003, Consequences for International Cooperation, organized by InWEnt (merged from the former Deutsche Stiftung fr Internationale Entwicklung [DSE] and the former Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft [CDG]) in collaboration with the Bundesministerium fr wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Berlin, 9-10 February 2004. Compare Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim BMZ, Islamische Bewegungen und deutsche Entwicklungspolitik, BMZ aktuell, Bonn, November 1991. AHDR 02, 1. Ibid., 2. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 5. Compare, among others, Mller et al. (1980). AHDR 02, 8: Traditional culture and values, including traditional Arab culture and values, can be at odds with those of the globalizing world. Given rising global interdependence, the most viable response will be one of openness and constructive engagement. Ibid., iii. Ibid., viii. AHDR 02 was downloaded from the Internet about 500,000 times. For example, with the accusation of Zionism or Orientalism. AHDR 02 was introduced at several international conferences, among others, in Germany in July 2003 by Professor Ferghany at the Zentrum fr Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF) in Bonn. In this regard AHDR 03, p. iii states: The region has recently encountered grave threats, and the dignity and rights of Arabs, especially the right of selfdetermination, have been grossly violated. Ibid. Ibid., iv. Ibid., 163. Ibid., 170. Ibid., 173. The influx of oil revenues has cemented such achievement-limiting structures. Ibid. Ibid., 12. Among other things through binding linguistic commitments and the development of specialized encyclopediae as well as appropriate linguistic foundations of scientific instruction. This is supposed to ease the transfer of knowledge into the sphere of ordinary speech. Ibid., 12.
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32. Ibid., 177. 33. Ibid., 13. 34. Ibid., 173. The exploitation of religion for objectives removed from its sublime purpose and soul, can no longer be tolerated if Arab society is to free itself and build a living knowledge society. In Arab countries where the political exploitation of religion has intensified, tough punishment for original thinking, especially when it opposes the prevailing powers, intimidates and crushes scholars. Ibid., 165. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., 166. 37. Ibid., 3. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid., 4. 41. Ibid., 6. 42. Ibid., 8. Openness, interaction, assimilation, absorption, revision, criticism and examination cannot but stimulate creative knowledge production in Arab societies. 43. Ibid., 6. The authors united against the increasing pressure of Islamic fundamentalism: Some political movements identifying themselves as Islamic have resorted to restrictive interpretations and violence as means of political activism. They have fanned the embers of animosity towards both opposing political forces in Arab countries and the others, accusing them of being enemies of Islam itself. This has heightened the tempo of conflict and friction with society, the state and the others. Ibid., 7. 44. Ibid., 8. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid., 10. 47. Ibid., 9. 48. Ibid., 10. 49. Compare Weiss (1996); Weiss (2000a), 2 f.; and Weiss (2000b). 50. In the framework of the KohlMubarak initiative, the German dual education system (practical training in a company in connection with vocational school attendance) was introduced in Egypt. 51. Law 101/1992 allowed for private, but not profit-oriented, universities. 52. Initially in pharmacy and biotechnology, material sciences, information technology, media technology and administrative management. 53. Weiss (2000a), 2 f. 54. The German EZ has developed an elaborate catalogue of criteria that, among other things, is geared toward respect for human rights, the rule of law, democracy, a market economy, and the development orientation of state actions.
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Bibliography
Arab Human Development Report 2002, Creating Opportunities for Future Generations (2002): United Nations Development Programme, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. New York. Arab Human Development Report 2003, Building a Knowledge Society (2003): United Nations Development Programme, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. New York. Arsalan, A. S. (1939): Li-madha taakhhar al-muslimun wa li-madha taqaddama ghayruhum? Cairo 1358 H. par i. Braune, Walther (1960): Der islamische Orient zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Bern. Bttner, Friedemann (1979): Die Krise der islamischen Ordnung Studien zur Zerstrung der Ordnungsverstndnisses im Osmanischen Reich (1800-1926). Munich. Mller, Alex, et al (1980): Proposals for the Solution of the Most Important Structural, Economic and Financial Problems of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Report to the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Anwar El Sadat. Deutsches Institut fr Entwicklungspolitik. Berlin. Smith, W. C. (1959): Islam in Modern History. New York. Weiss, Dieter (1964): Wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsplanung in der Vereinigten Arabischen Republik. Kln, Opladen. Weiss, Dieter (1986): Die Arabische Welt vor einer neuen wissenschaftlichtechnologischen Kommunikationskrise? In: Orient 27, no. 3, 377-93. Weiss, Dieter (1990): Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Dialog als Auswrtige Kulturpolitik in den arabischen Lndern. In Orient 31, no. 2, 207-26. Weiss, Dieter (2000a): Zur Verstrkung der wissenschaftlichen Kooperation mit Entwicklungslndern. Diskussionspapiere am Fachbereich Volkswirtschaft des Vorderen Orients , Freie Universitt Berlin. Weiss, Dieter (2000b): Prioritt fr wissenschaftliche Kooperation. berlegungen angesichts knapper werdender Mittel. In: E+Z 41, no. 5. Weiss, Dieter and Ulrich G. Wurzel (1998): The Economics and Politics of Transition to an Open Market Economy Egypt (French: Environnement conomique et politique de transition vers lconomie de march LEgypte). OECD Development Centre, Paris. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fr wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (1991): Islamische Bewegungen und deutsche Entwicklungspolitik, BMZ aktuell, November. Bonn. World Bank, World Bank Atlas (2003): Washington, DC. Wurzel, Ulrich G. (1999): gyptische Privatisierungspolitik 1990 bis 1998. Mnster, Hamburg, London.
Seyyed Hossein Nasr and the Study of Religion in Contemporary Society

Haifaa Jawad
Abstract Seyyed Houssein Nasr is one of the main proponents of the traditional religious perspective, including the traditional Islamic point of view. His work is notable for many reasons, among them the following: its in-depth analysis of contemporary societys spiritual poverty; its profound treatment of Islamic matters,1 particularly in the context of the debate between Islamic modernism vs. Islamic traditionalism; its solid understanding of western philosophical thought and culture; its ability to present a compelling, critical appraisal of the modern predicament, boldly stating that which is perceived to be the truth, irrespective of whether or not it is fashionable or palatable as regards current opinion; and, lastly, its view of religions role in contemporary society. Having said that, however, given that Nasrs work has a metaphysical nature, his writings, with few exceptions, are said to be demanding in terms of language, style, and expression, as well as of knowledge of other religions and philosophies, that they assume on the part of the ordinary reader.
Introduction
Nasrs approach to the study of religion in contemporary society is worthwhile investigating for two reasons. First, it encompasses and accepts all
Haifaa Jawad is a senior lecturer in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Department of Theology and Religion, University of Birmingham, UK.
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revealed religions and their sacred quality, an approach that contrasts with current approaches in religious studies. He believes that this approach
... has more in common with the essence of religion. It wants to give absolute value to anything that is sacred. Hence, it is able to create a sacred atmosphere in which the uniqueness as well as the diversity of all traditions can be acknowledged.2
Second, it addresses and deals with how Islam and Muslims can accommodate the existing reality of other religions, an approach that could lead, ultimately, to a peaceful religious world community. But first, it is important to look at Nasrs life, education, career, and achievements.
Family Background and Early Childhood

Nasr was born to a respectable family of scholars and physicians in Tehran, Iran, in 1933. His grandfather traced his descent from a family of seyyeds (descendants of Prophet Muhammad). One of his grandfathers ancestors, Mulla Majed Hossein, was a famous religious scholar in Najaf who was invited by the Persian ruler Nadir Shah to come to Persia in the eighteenth century. However, as he died on the way, his family eventually settled in Kashan. Nasrs grandfather, a celebrated court physician at the Qajar court, was given the title of nasr al-atibba (victory of physicians) in recognition of his long service. This title is the source of the family name. His grandmother was related to the Barmakids, a famous Shiàh family whose members served as viziers during the Àbbasid caliphate in the ninth century. 3 Nasrs father, also a celebrated physician, had additional interests: philosophy, literature, and education. After leaving the formal practice of medicine in order to pursue his interest in the field of education, Nasrs father gradually became the head of Persias educational system from the end of the Qajar dynasty to the Pahlavi era. He was involved in drafting the constitution and the first Parliament after the constitutional revolution in 1906, and was elected to Parliament as a representative for Tehran. When Persia officially became Iran, he was among the founders of its modern educational system, a rector of the Teachers College, and dean of several faculties at the University of Tehran. According to Nasr, his father was a prominent philosopher, especially in ethics, and the author of well-known works in Persian. Apart from Persian, he spoke Arabic and French, as well as some Latin and English. He
Jawad: Seyyed Hossein Nasr and the Study of Religion
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possessed a major library that contained not only classical Islamic books, but also the works of such western authors as Michel de Montaigne, Charles-Louis Montesquieu, Ren Descartes, Blaise Pascal, Franois Voltaire, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as well as Plato and Aristotle. Hence, his father was well-acquainted with both the Islamic tradition and the western philosophical and scientific traditions, as well as with other religions and traditions. Thus, the atmosphere in which Nasr was brought up, while being deeply Persian, was also open to both Western ideas and religions and intellectual ideas of other traditions.4 He stresses: Universalism in its most positive sense permeated the atmosphere in which I was nurtured without in any way weakening the foundations of traditional Persian culture in which I was bought up.5 His mother, also from a respectable religious family, received her education in the only institution of intermediary and higher learning for women at that time, and was one of its first graduates. Among the first group of women to receive a modern education in Iran, she was known to have had a keen interest in the intellectual and religious aspects of life and to have participated in work that served womens rights. In addition, she was wellversed in Persian and Arabic poetry. Since Nasr was the eldest of two sons, great care was taken to secure his education. At an early age, his parents began to teach him Quranic verses, Persian poetry, and history, especially sacred history. By the time he was 3, he was already beginning to read and write. His father used to take him to gatherings of eminent people who would recite verses of Persian poetry and contemplate their philosophical and spiritual meanings. The ambience in which he grew up, therefore, exposed him at a tender age to philosophical, theological, and spiritual discourses. 6 The effect of this early traditional education on his intellectual development is immense, as he explains:
A classical and Persian traditional education in my early years left an indelible mark upon my mind as stories from the Holy Quran and the poems of Sadi and Hafiz became engraved upon the deepest layers of my soul during this period. At the same time, even these early years brought me face to face with the presence of another world view, that of the modern West, which appeared at that time at once enticing and threatening.7
Such childhood experiences apparently kept him in constant contact or union with his roots, namely, traditional Islam, which he set out to defend and continues to do so until the present day. 8
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Education and Learning

Nasr s pattern of life and early education were interrupted suddenly by his fathers illness. Out of concern for the welfare of young Nasr, who was very attached to his father, the family decided to send him to the United States so that he would not be near his father at the moment of his death. In 1945, at the age of 12, he embarked on a long 3-month journey to his new home. Upon his arrival, he enrolled at the Peddie School in Hightstown, New Jersey, one of the best preparatory schools on the East Coast. He stayed there for 4 years, graduating in 1950. His years at Peddie helped him to acquire a good knowledge of English, western culture, American history, science, and, most importantly, Christianity, especially Protestantism. 9 At the age of 17, he became the first Iranian student to enroll at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he decided to pursue an undergraduate degree in physics. Although he soon began to doubt if physics could answer his quest for understanding the nature of physical reality, since his interest lay in theoretical physics and mathematics rather than in experimental physics, he remained in the department until he graduated with honors in 1954. But by this time, his interest was no longer in physics; rather, he was interested in the humanities and philosophy. While at MIT, his teacher Giorgio de Santillana exerted a great influence upon his education, especially in the field of Hinduism and modern western thought. He also introduced Nasr to the writings of Ren Gunon (1886-1951), which helped him to define his worldview. Along with the work of Gunon, the writings of Ananda Coomaraswamy (1877-1947), the Sinhalese (Sri Lankan) metaphysician, art historian, and main advocator of the traditional philosophy, were to become Nasrs main guide in this field. By sheer coincidence, Nasr was able to use Coomaraswamys library, which introduced him not only to the writings of the latter, but also to other propagators of the perennial philosophy. After graduating from MIT, Nasr pursued his graduate studies at Harvard University, earning a masters degree from the Department of Geology and Geophysics and graduating with honors in 1956. He then transferred to the Department of the History of Science and Learning to do his doctorate on the history of science with a special concentration on Islamic science. He completed his studies in 1958. At Harvard, he came under the influence of such figures as Bernard Cohen, who taught him the general history of science; Harry Wolfson, who taught him Islamic philosophy and theology; and Hamilton Gibb, with whom he studied general Islamic civiliza-
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tion and history. At Harvard, he also became closely associated with and interested in Catholic thought. Nasr mentions that he had an encounter with Henry Kissinger, professor of government at Harvard at that time, but that he was not attracted to the intellectual message of his courses. His years at Harvard, moreover, enabled him to form strong contacts with such prominent European intellectuals as Louis Massigon and Henri Corbin. In fact, he became a friend and close associate of Corbin. Most importantly, in Europe he met the representatives of the perennial philosophy and tradition, among them Frithjof Schuon, an outstanding metaphysician; Titus Burckhardt, who influenced him in the fields of traditional cosmology and the traditional philosophy of art; Marco Pallis, who guided him to the metaphysics of Tibetan Buddhism; and Martin Lings, the main propagator of traditional Islam and Sufism, with whom has had maintained a close association until the present time. These figures, along with Gunon and Coomaraswamy, exercised a great influence upon Nasrs intellectual formation and shaped his worldview for the rest of his life. Nasr expresses his debt to them in this way: I can hardly over-emphasise the influence of these figures on my intellectual formation.10 While at Harvard, he decided to spend the summers of 1957 and 1958 in Morocco. During his stay, he embraced Sufism intellectually as well as existentially in a form linked especially to the spiritual lineage of Shaykh Ahmad al-Alawi and Shaykh Isa Nur al-Din Ahmad. His intellectual and spiritual experiences in Morocco rooted his mind and soul in the world of tradition, intellectual certitude, and faith. In addition, it led him to discover an inner light combined with an intellectual rigor and affection for the truth and beauty. 11 Describing his Harvard years, Nasr states:
These years set my gaze more fully upon the horizon of universal and global truth in the traditional sense of the word, embracing not only the Islamic tradition which was my own, but also the Western, both GraecoAlexandrian and Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Far Eastern and primal, and also including esoteric Judaism associated with the Kabbala, and Zoroastrianism and other Iranian religions.12
Career and Achievements

In 1958 and after completing his doctoral work, Nasr returned to Iran. There, he began his career as associate professor of philosophy and the history of science at Tehran Universitys Faculty of Letters. He remained in that position until the Iranian revolution of 1979. During those years, he had a fruitful career. For example, he quickly became the youngest person (30 years
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old) to hold a full professorship at the university. Nasr used his position to expand and strengthen the teaching of Islamic philosophy as a basis from which all other philosophies would be taught. In addition, he expanded the study of western philosophy in order to include more recent German and AngloAmerican schools of thought as well as Indian philosophy. He also lectured on philosophy at other institutions of learning, and was chosen to be a member of nearly all of the important government and academic councils and societies that were active in the realm of philosophy and the human sciences. From 1968-72, he was appointed dean of the faculty and, for a while, as the universitys academic vice chancellor. In 1972, he became the president of Aryamehr University; in 1973, after being elected a member of the Institut International de Philosophie, a prestigious position in the field of philosophical studies, the shahbanou (empress) put him in charge of setting up the Imperial Academy of Philosophy, of which he became the first president. The academy became an important center for philosophical activities and managed to survive the Iranian revolution. In fact, it continues to fulfill this role until the present day. 13 Apart from the above philosophical activities, Nasr embarked on a process to re-educate himself concerning the Illuminationist school of philosophy (hikmah). To this end, he came under the influence of three prominent traditional teachers of Islamic philosophy and gnosis ( ìrfan): Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Assar, who taught him theoretical Sufism (gnosis); Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai, who taught him various texts of Islamic philosophy, Sufism, and comparative philosophy, including works of other traditions (e.g., the Tao Te Ching [Taoism] and the Upanishads [Hinduism]); and Sayyid Abul Hasan Qazwini, with whom he studied the philosophy of Mulla Sadra, especially his Al-Asfar al-Arbaàh (The Four Journeys). While in Iran, he managed to establish close contacts with Henri Corbin and collaborated with him on many projects dealing with Islamic philosophy, as well as with Toshihiko Izutsu, who introduced him to Far Eastern philosophy and the aesthetics associated with Japanese culture. Beyond Iran, and during the years 1958-79, Nasrs intellectual activities spread far and wide. Within the Islamic world, he forged extensive contacts with Pakistan, where he visited, lectured, and published many works. This was followed by Morocco, Egypt, the Gulf States, and Lebanon, where he spent the whole academic year of 1964-65 as the first Aga Khan professor of Islamic studies at the American University of Beirut. He also traveled to Turkey and met with Turkish scholars in the
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fields of history, the history of science, and literature, as well as with some Sufi authorities. Outside the world of Islam, his intellectual contacts brought him into contact with India, which he visited many times, especially in 1975, when he delivered the Azad Memorial lecture in Delhi. His lecture was published in India as Western Science and Asian Cultures. In 1970, he visited both Japan and Australia and lectured on Islamic philosophy and Sufism. Within the context of the West, his intensive contacts during the same period were with the United States. For example, he was a visiting professor at Harvard University in 1962. He also lectured extensively in other American universities. In Europe, he visited and lectured throughout Britain, France, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, and Germany. 14 In 1979, at the peak his intellectual career, Nasr was forced to leave Iran for Britain. Later on, he settled permanently in the United States. Initially, he was offered a distinguished visiting professorship at Utah University and then a full professorship at Temple University. He stayed there until 1986, when he moved to George Washington University, where he remains a professor of Islamic studies. In the United States, his intellectual activities have focused on teaching, lecturing, and writing. Nasr has lectured in various American and European cities. Chief among them were the Gifford lectures at Edinburgh University (1981) and the Cadbury lectures at the University of Birmingham (1997). He has also been actively writing on various topics of his own personal interest, such as traditional Islamic thought, Islamic philosophy, Islamic art, the history of science, and the environment. Moreover, he continues to be an active member of many institutions, societies, and foundations concerned with traditional philosophy and Islamic studies. Nasr is considered a very prolific writer. In fact, it is difficult to give the precise number of his academic writings. It has been said that he has written about 20 books and over 200 articles on a wide range of issues and mainly from a traditional perspective. But he has also dealt with specific topics related to traditional metaphysics and the perennial philosophy. His writings have followed his intellectual development and have reflected his interest in the subjects about which he has written. The majority of his works are written in Farsi and English, but some are in Arabic and French. Nasrs works have been translated into many other languages, making him one of the most widely read authors of our time. Among his most influential works that were either written or translated into English are An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (1964), Three Muslim Sages (1964), Ideals and Realities of Islam (1966), The
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Encounter of Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man (1968), Islam and the Plight of Modern Man (1975), Sufi Essays (1973), Science and Civilization in Islam (1968), An Annotated Bibliography of Islamic Science (1976), Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study (1976), Knowledge and the Sacred (1981), Islamic Art and Spirituality (1987), Traditional Islam in the Modern World (1987), and A Young Muslims Guide to the Modern World (1993).15 To summarize, Nasr is a scholar who has a profound and universal appreciation for intellectual, philosophical, and spiritual matters, and who combines intellectual and scholarly excellence with deep piety. A careful reading of his books cannot but lead to this conclusion. He is a philosopher, a scientist, and a poet as well, and is intimately acquainted not just with the Sufi path but also with the school of hikmah,16 the traditional Shiàh school of mystical philosophy (ìrfan). Moreover, he has a broad classical education, wide-ranging cross-cultural experiences, and is well versed in western physical and social sciences, history, and philosophy, as well as classical and modern Christian doctrines and theologies, not to mention having a good knowledge of the mystical traditions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Judaism.
Religion and Contemporary Society

Nasrs approach to the study of religion in contemporary society appears to be a response to the following two factors: the spirits degradation in the modern world, and the interpenetration of religious forms.
The Spirits Degradation in the Modern World

While others launch their critiques of the rampant materialism and widespread atheism that characterize the modern world, Nasr looks at the underlying causes of these visible symptoms of spiritual malaise. He stresses that one must turn to the sources of tradition in order to evaluate these underlying causes, and then mount an effective response to the intellectual challenges posed by the modern world. The modern world, as Nasr sees it, lacks clarity, purpose, and principle. Therefore, it is cut off from the transcendent, the immutable principles that govern all things and that are made known to humanity only through divine revelation in its most universal sense. Being alienated from the intellectual certainty that comes from revelation alone, the modern world is compelled to formulate a science that is based on doubt, a philosophy that is capable only of interminable change, and a culture that
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has no connection with lifes ultimate purpose. In the midst of such chaos, modern humanity has lost the capacity to appreciate the sacred and has lost sight of the essential and the eternal in the quest for attaining modernitys transient and superficial trappings.17 Within the context of the Muslim world, Nasr sees modernisms assault18 as threatening not only Islam, but also that which remains of the civilization created by Islam over the centuries. The Wests continuous philosophical, cultural, artistic, political, economic, and social domination of the Muslim world has weakened not only the traditional Islamic institutions, but also, in his view, the fundamentals of its own tradition. In other words, western modernism has entered both the culture and the religion of Islam. Nasr holds that Islam itself has been distorted in the perception of those who, consciously or unconsciously, have assimilated western paradigms of modernism and progress. According to him, such distortions have enabled the worst forms of communist thinking to find refuge in certain brands of fundamentalism, the most apologetic forms of secular liberalism to insinuate themselves into a pseudo-Islamic framework, and the most slavish and unthinking scientism to distort the perceptions of both the state and the opposition elite in the modern Muslim world. Troubled by this tendency and the impact of modernism on Islam and its civilization, he set himself the task of defending all of the sacred traditions, including Islam. Nasr believes that an adequate Islamic answer or response must be provided to meet the intellectual challenges posed by the modern world a world that, in his view, is no longer tied to the transcendent and the immutable principles of it own tradition, a world in which westerners and their imitators in the East can no longer appreciate the sacred. By the same token, there is an urgent need to assert the traditional Islamic view on contemporary issues that are currently being debated. Contemporary interpretations of Islam have been added to those of the classical Orientalists and, in the process, caused confusion and distortion. In this context, Nasr considers himself the first Muslim scholar to provide an Islamic response to the challenges of modernism. He says:
It might not be too audacious to say that I was perhaps the first Islamic thinker rooted completely in the Islamic intellectual tradition in all of its major facets who set out to provide an Islamic response to modernity on the basis of first-hand knowledge of the sources of both modern and western thought. The hands of destiny allowed me to gain this knowledge through long years of study in the West and also provided me with the opportunity to study the intellectual and spiritual aspects of Islam with
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some of the greatest masters of these subjects in my home country of Persia and elsewhere.19
Thus, Nasr mounts a consistent challenge to the principal elements of this modernist outlook throughout his writings, attacking not just atheism and secularism, but also their underlying motive forces (e.g., progressivism and evolutionism). All of these false ideologies must be identified and rejected, root and branch, if one is to be liberated from the false deities of our age as well as from the idols made of ideology that modern humanity worships. He does so on the assumption that these -isms have the potential to destroy Muslims and Islam. 20 For him, one of the principal roots of the modern western mentalitys predicament is its excessive reliance on rationalism:
This is not to deny the importance of human reason or to negate the Islamic understanding of man as an intelligent being or of knowledge as (a crucial) means of salvation. It is, however, to lament the fact that the intellect is commonly limited to its reflection, (which is reason). Ultimately the danger of rationalism, evident in the fate of Western Christianity, is that it leads so directly to what he calls a fatal dichotomy between faith and reason. Western mans rational faculties have become separated from what gives stability and permanence.21
Stability and permanence is the real issue of Nasrs stance. He consistently opposes change, reform, or anything that would dilute or negate the transcendent and immutable (Traditional) principles, for it is in the light of these principles alone that one can judge whether a particular form of activity or period of human society is decadent, deviated or resurgent, with the characteristics of a true22 spirit of a rebirth, a return to the original inspiration of a given tradition. For him,
... the structure of reality is unchanging, only human vision and perception of it change. In other words, Western philosophy has lost a sense of the permanence of things. Reality has been reduced to a temporal process, which he identifies as a desacralization of knowledge and a loss of the sense of the sacred.23
This loss of the sacred aspect of knowledge means that in every significant domain of human activity and thought, a choice presents itself: either to choose a form of knowledge and a way of thinking that focuses on change, multiplicity, and outwardness, or to choose one that integrates change within the eternal, multiplicity within unity, the outward facts within inward princi-
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ples. One obvious example of this choice is that today, people have to choose between a type of creationism that appears sacred but irrational, and the Darwinian theory of evolution that appears rational but is utterly opposed to the essential idea of the spirit having priority over matter. For Nasr,
... the whole modern evolutionary theory is a desperate attempt to substitute a set of horizontal, material causes in a unidimensional world to explain effects whose causes belong to other levels of reality, to the vertical dimensions of existence.24
Nasr, then, sets out to expose the illegitimacy of all the -isms that characterize our times.25 One key aspect of this undertaking is to reverse the process whereby desacralized reason has been brought to bear on sacred traditions and then to revive an awareness of the sacred quality of knowledge. Such sacred knowledge, according to him, is not the exclusive preserve of Islam, but is to be found wherever there is fidelity to the sacred origin of any revealed tradition. Therefore, he asserts that while traditional Islam provides the structure for assimilating the sacred, that which is traditional in other religions also offers an appropriate structure. Even though it differs outwardly from Islam, it gives access to the sacred in itself, which is one with Islam in its essence.26 Aware of the pressure placed by modernism on tradition, he suggests that the only way out of this predicament is to understand the modern world in depth and to respond to its challenges not through emotionalism, but through the knowledge of the tradition in its fullness. In other words, the intellectual challenges posed by modernism can only be answered intellectually and not juridically. According to him, traditions successful engagement with modernism will not happen simply because its proponents express their anger with modernism and display their own self-righteousness. Rather, a successful engagement can occur only when modern thoughts roots and ramifications are fully understood, and the tradition, in its fullness, is brought to bear on solving the problems that modernism poses for tradition. At the center of this task lies the revival of the wisdom lying at the heart of each sacred tradition.27 This is termed the perennial philosophy (or perennial wisdom), which not only underlies all expressions of sacred knowledge, but, according to Nasr, offers the best antidote to modernisms pretensions. Where modernism claims to have discovered new and better ways of living, acting, thinking, and being, the perennial philosophy replies by saying that, on the contrary, the supreme ideals of life and thought are beyond time and space, being situated in the eternal wisdom of the Divine,
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a wisdom that is made accessible through revelation and its prolongation in tradition. Therefore, it is tradition, not modernity, that opens up the path to progress inward, moral, and spiritual progress for that is the only progress there is. As a result, the modern world is revealed as nothing more than a sophisticated form of degeneration.
The Interpenetration of Religious Forms

In a world of discourse formed by the ever-intensifying transmission of knowledge and information, the boundaries that previously separated religions from each other have gradually been dismantled. People now know far more about the people of other faiths than they did in the past, and different belief systems are confronted on a much wider scale than ever before. The question of how to relate to other faiths thus assumes major significance.28 Secularists say that all religions are relative, and thus none are either absolute or true. Dogmatists assert that their particular religion alone is true and thus absolute, meaning that all others are false. Nasr advocates another view: All religions are relative when compared with the Absolute, of which they are just different expressions, and thus lead one back to the Absolute. Given this, they are absolutely necessary, despite their relativity. 29 And so one is compelled to acknowledge not only the validity of her/his own religion or belief system, but also to be tolerant and open to the values revealed by other religions:
[Nasr] argues that for traditional man other religions appear to be alien worlds. Because of the traditional orientation in earlier times, there was no need to move into these worlds. But because of the conditions of the modern world where the bounds of both the astronomical and religious universe have been broken, one is suddenly faced with the dilemma of acknowledging the validity of ones own tradition while attempting to be open to the truths revealed by another.30
Or, in other words:

The dilemma of wishing to be able to remain faithful to ones own religion and yet come to accept the validity of other traditions is one of the result of the abnormal conditions that modern man faces and is a consequence of the anomalous conditions in which he lives. Yet it is a problem that he must face on pain of losing faith in religion itself. For a traditional Muslim living in Fez or Mashhad it is not necessary to be concerned with the verities of Buddhism or Christianity. Nor is it urgent for a peasant in the hills of Italy or Spain to learn about Hinduism. But for a person for
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whom the homogeneity of a religious culture has been ruptured by modern secularist philosophies or, alternatively, affected by contact with the authentic spirituality of foreign traditions, it is no longer possible to ignore the metaphysical and theological implications of the presence of other religions. If he does so, he falls into the danger of either losing his own religion or having a conception of the Divinity which, to say the least, places a limit upon the Divine Mercy.31
In this context, Nasr asserts that there is a need for a science that can do justice to the study of religion. For him, this science is the perennial wisdom lying at the heart of all religious traditions,32 which he defines as
... a knowledge which has always been and will always be and which is of universal character both in the sense of existing among peoples of different climes and epochs and of dealing with universal principles. This knowledge which is available to the intellect is contained at the heart of all religions or traditions, and its realization is possible only through those traditions and by means of methods, rites, symbols, images and other means sanctified by the message from Heaven or the Divine which gives birth to each tradition. The Philosophia perennis possesses branches and ramifications pertaining to cosmology, anthropology, art and other disciplines, but at its heart lies pure metaphysics (or what the perennialists call) the science of Ultimate Reality. Metaphysics, they assert, is a veritable divine science and not a purely mental construct which would change with every alteration in the cultural fashions of the day or with new discoveries of a science of the material world. It is a knowledge which lies at the heart of religion, which illuminates the meaning of religious rites, doctrine and symbols and which also provides the key to the understanding of both the necessity of the plurality of religions and the way to penetrate into and understand other religious universes.33
Nasr does not claim to be the originator of this perspective. In fact, he refers repeatedly to the traditionalist school, whose first expositor in the West was the French metaphysician Ren Gunon (1886-1951). Gunon believed in the essential unity of tradition underlying the diversity of more or less outward forms, which are really no more than different garments clothing one and the same truth: the great primordial tradition. This tradition is not historically corroborated, but rather seems to refer to what Hindus call the Golden Age, a time when formal outward religion was not yet necessary, for each soul was still attuned to that inward illumination from which both men and women benefited in the paradisiacal state. Formal, outward
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religion becomes necessary only at a certain point in the degeneration of humanity, when all people need to be reminded of the higher realities that they have forgotten. The Quran refers to itself repeatedly as a reminder.34 He stressed that intellectual intuitions premier role is to acquire the profound knowledge underlying the dogmatic formulations in different religions that express the same wisdom, but in different forms. 35 While Gunon may have been the first western advocate of the Traditionalist school, Frithjof Schuon (1907-98) 36 is regarded as having completed the doctrines of this perspective. It is to Schuon that Nasr acknowledges the greatest debt for the development of his thought, especially his adoption of the perennial philosophy. Schuons impact on Nasrs thought is so great that his writings, as a whole, might even be seen as so many extended commentaries, in academically more rigorous terms, on Schuons ideas. For Nasr, Schuon
... seems to be endowed with the intellectual power to penetrate into the heart and essence of all things, and especially religious universes of form and meaning, which he has clarified in an unparalleled fashion as if he were bestowed with that divine gift to which the Quranic revelation refers as the language of the birds.37
In his writings, Nasr stresses that the issue of religious pluralism can be solved for Muslims within the context of Sufism. As for the adherents of other faiths, it can be facilitated within the context of the perennial philosophy. Thus, he attempts to solve the problem for religious diversity by suggesting that all religions are forms of the everlasting truth which has been revealed by God to humankind through various agencies. In other words, he sees the reality of religions as different manifestations of the immutable and everlasting truth within the context of the perennial philosophy.38 This is based on his conviction that no form can totally express or define the essence of the Absolute, and that every true, revealed religious form expresses something of the Absolute. Thus, for Nasr, humanitys salvation becomes possible only when the values of tradition are rediscovered. As such, he claims that the perennial philosophy constitutes a proper ground for the study of religions, because it is able to give full consideration and appreciation of each religions sacred qualities, since it believes the sacred is the highest value.39 Hence, it is more appropriate than any other approach. It also possesses a unique quality: It speaks of knowledge that can change or transform a person. He asserts that the sacred knowledge contained within the perennial philoso-
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phy40 requires a sacred quality in the knower and, therefore, seeks to have an impact upon the existential life of the seeker after truth.41 Here, it might be useful to state what Nasrs approach is not. First, it is not pseudo-esoterism, a point of view that sees all religions as being the same, thus overlooking their formal differences and belittling what pseudoesoterists usually refer to (in a derogatory manner) as theological dogmas, all in the name of a supra-formal essence that they believe they can attain without the need to submit to a particular religion. Second, he does not advocate antinomianism (viz., that moral laws are relative in meaning and application), for the law is always upheld. If there is one principle that all traditional authors repeat, it is that each religions orthodoxy is not limited to the exoteric level, but applies to the esoteric level as well. Third, Nasrs approach cannot be considered syncretic, defined as putting different religious elements together and claiming that a new religious way has been discovered. For him, even though truth is perceived distinctly by each religion, it is still the same truth. Thus, he says that
... to have lived any religion fully is to have lived all religions and there is nothing more meaningless and even pernicious than to create a syncretism from various religions with a claim to universality while in reality one is doing nothing less than destroying the revealed forms which alone make the attachment of the relative to the Absolute, of man to God, possible.42
The perennial philosophy is not, as we stressed earlier, evolutionism (always emphasizing the primordial fitrah) or liberalism, for a strict criterion of divine origin is applied to any religious belief or practice. Therefore, it can speak of authentic religion and pseudo-religion without falling into either narrow dogmatism or secularist indifference to truth in the name of tolerance. Moreover, it opposes any view that sees a particular manifestation of the truth as the Truth as such. Hence, it insists that only the Absolute is absolute. All else is relative, even though some relativities lead to the Absolute and others lead to nothingness. In other words, he combines a reverence for sacred forms as pathways to the Absolute while maintaining a rigorously metaphysical distinction between the absolute and the relative. We should note that Nasr has been severely criticized on certain issues. For example, it has been alleged that: His emphasis of an esoteric/exoteric dichotomy in Islam and bias toward esotericism does not correspond to the traditional Islamic
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viewpoint of Sufism, which requires strict adherence to the Shariàh in order to achieve closeness to God; His attempts to link Sufism with Shiìsm, by asserting that the former has its essential origin in the latters concept of hidden esoteric knowledge, exhibits a pro-Shiàh bias; His reliance on Neoplatonism43 to provide a basis for his esotericism and perennialism, and supporting its use by asserting the divine origin of Greek philosophical concepts. This contrasts with the refutation of those concepts by some classical Islamic scholars; and
The concept of the perennial philosophy to which he adheres leads, when he combines it with Sufism, him to the conclusion that all religions are esoterically true, something that orthodox traditional Islam would find difficult to accept. There does not seem to be much basis to these allegations, although it is true that the thesis of the transcendent unity of religions needs to be defined more carefully in terms of the Quran and the Sunnah, taking into account the reasons why orthodox Muslims will find such a thesis unacceptable. Regarding the question of the Shariàh, there is no doubt that Nasr upholds it in principle and in practice, for he stresses that there can be no authentic pursuit of the esoteric path outside of the exoteric framework of the Shariah. As for Nasr being a Shiàh, this is clearly one dimension of his identity. However, it neither determines the principles he expounds in his writings nor produces any prejudice, for he asserts that Islams esoteric values come not from any particular branch of the religion, but exclusively from the Quran and the soul of the Prophet. He regards everything else as peripheral. As for his appreciation of Neoplatonism, he is certainly not the first Muslim to consider that the knowledge acquired by the classical Greeks had its origins in revelation. This is an arguable point, which is difficult, historically, to prove one way or the other. The criterion here, as with so much of the perennial philosophy, is provided by ones own intuition combined with a careful reading of the Greek philosophers.
Conclusion
It is important to stress that Nasrs approach to the study of religion in contemporary society stems from two factors: the challenges posed by
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modernism to traditions, including Islam, and the need to respond positively to these challenges. Nasr believes that modernisms assault on tradition is so serious that the response needs to be intellectual rather than judicial. In addition, there is a need for a science that can do justice to the study of religion. In his opinion, this science is the perennial philosophy lying at the heart of all revealed religious traditions. The underlying argument for this assumption is as follows: In a world dominated by the power of communication technology and the rapid increase in knowledge and information transmission, the boundaries of religions have been broken. As such, one is compelled to acknowledge not only the validity of ones own religion or belief system, but also to be tolerant and open to the truths revealed by other religions. What makes this approach so important, especially in the current situation, is that it is the only one that can do justice to the study of religion as such, and to religions in relation to each other. In this context, Nasr seems to have an important role to play in interfaith dialogue, as well as in an intra-Muslim dialogue. Moreover, what he has to say ought to be taken seriously, at least as starting points for any discussion of the study of religion from a principled and intellectually challenging point of view. Endnotes
1. See, for example, his The Encounter of Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968) and Islam and the Plight of Modern Man (London: Longman, 1975). Adnan Aslan, Religious Pluralism in Christian and Islamic Philosophy: The Thought of John Hick and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Surry: Curzon Press, 1998), 117. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Intellectual Autobiography, in The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, eds. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Randall Auxier, and Lucian Stone (Open Court Publishing Comany: 2001), 4. Ibid., 5. Ibid. Ibid., 5-11. Aslan, Religious Pluralism, 13. See, for example, John Voll, Changing Western Approaches to Islamic Studies and Seyyed Hossein Nasrs Vision in Beacon of Knowledge: Essays in Honor of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, ed. Mohammad H. Faghfoory (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2003), 79-97.
2.
3.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
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9.
10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
17. 18.
19. 20. 21.
22. 23. 24.
The Peddi School was a Baptist school, and Nasr was required to attend church service on Sundays. Those years helped him to gain direct knowledge of Christian rites, preaching, singing of hymns, and ethics. It also familiarized him with the Bible, especially the Psalms and the Gospels. See ibid., 14. Cited in Reza Shah-Kazemi, Reflections on the Philosophy of Nasr, Dialogue (August 2003): 7. See Nasr, An Intellectual Autobiography, 10-27. Ibid., 27. Ibid., 32-53. Ibid., 30-71. Ibid., 34-37, 58-59, and 77-85. The Ishraqi School, founded by Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi in the twelfth century, revises Neoplatonism in terms of light or illumination. Thus, light pours out from the One and forms the universe. At varying levels, this universe lacks light and becomes dark. This darkness is physical matter. In other words, illumination is a revision of Neoplatonism that solves some of the problems inherent in the earlier system. See Majid Fakhry, A Short Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Mysticism, rev. ed. (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Pubs., Ltd., 1997), 111-20, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds.), History of Islamic Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 465-96. See, in particular, part 1 of his Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 1-24. Modernism (or modernity) came into existence with the French revolution of 1789. The main ideas of the French revolution, now known as the Enlightenment, grew in the eighteenth century and became the foundational principles of modernity. Central to these ideas is the supremacy of reason, expressed in scientific enquiry and giving birth to technological progress. See Gerard Kelly, Get a Grip on the Future without Losing Your Hold on the Past (London: Monarch Books, 1999), 133. It was believed that science would solve all social problems and create an ideal society. However, this assumption has proved to be nothing more than just another utopian promise. Modernism opposes all religions, including Islam, and its worldview is diametrically opposed to the Islamic view of sacred life. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, A Young Muslims Guide, 240. Shah-Kazemi, Reflections on the Philosophy of Nasr, 6. See Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, chapter 11. Jane I. Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr: Defender of the Sacred and Islamic Traditionalism, in The Muslims of America, Yvonne Y. Haddad (ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 83. Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 125. Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 84. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred (Edinburgh University Press: 1981), 169-70.
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25. Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 130-50. 26. On this point, see Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred, 280-308. 27. On the conflict between modernism and traditionalism, especially Islamic traditionalism, see his Traditional Islam in the Modern World (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1987) and A Young Muslims Guide, 239-52. 28. See Aslan, Religious Pluralism, 98-129. 29. On this issue, see Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature (Oxford University Press: 1996), 9-28. 30. Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 87. 31. See Nasr, Sufi Essays (London: Allen and Unwin, 1972), 125-26. 32. On the merit of the perennial philosophy in contemporary situations, see Aslan, Religious Pluralism, 44-46. 33. See Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science (Curzon Press: 1993), 54. 34. See Quran 7:2: a Book revealed unto you. So let your heart no longer be oppressed by any difficulty on that account, that with it [the Book] you might warn (the erring) and teach the believers.; Quran 6:90: Those were the (prophets) who received Allahs guidance. Copy the guidance they received. Say: No reward for this do I ask of you. This is no less than a message for the nations.; Quran 12:104: And no reward do you ask of them for this. It is no less than a message for all creatures. See also Quran 11:20 and 54:17, 22, 32, and 40. 35. See Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred, 65-92 and 280-308. 36. Frithjof Schuon, a main advocator of the perennial philosophy, was born in Basle, Switzerland, in 1907 to a German family. He studied Arabic and Islamic calligraphy, traveled extensively in North Africa and the East, and established close links with Sufi, Hindu, and Buddhist authorities as well as representatives of the spiritual legacy of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches. For a while, he lived in Switzerland. In 1981, he migrated to the United States, where he remained until his death in 1989. See Frithjof Schuon, Islam and the Perennial Philosophy (London: World of Islam Festival Pub. Co., 1976). 37. Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred, 107. 38. Aslan, Religious Pluralism, 22-23. 39. Ibid., 44. 40. On the relationship between Islam and the perennial philosophy, see Schuon, Islam and the Perennial Philosophy. 41. Ibid., 44. 42. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and Reality of Islam, rev. and updated (London: Aquarian, 1994), 16. 43. Neoplatonism started with the teaching of Plotinus, who was at the center of an influential circle of intellectuals and men of letters in third-century Rome. Its essential characteristic is that the contingent universe is an outpouring from the One, rather than being His creation, and therefore shares the divine
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nature to some extent. Neoplatonism was taken into Islamic philosophy under the guise of Aristotelianism, and forms the basis of the systems developed by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. For them, the universe, as an outpouring from God, is eternal with God but dependent on Him. They also taught that the human mind survives death, since only the mind is endowed with the divine outpouring from God. Essentially, Neoplatonism emphasizes the unity of all of the different levels of existence as outpourings from the Divine. For more, see M. Sharif (ed.), A History of Muslim Philosophy (Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1983), 118-23; Majid Fakhry, A Short Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, 30-60; and Nasr and Leaman (eds.), History of Islamic Philosophy, 165-78 and 231-47.
Islamic Banking and Finance in Theory and Practice: The Experience of Malaysia and Bahrain
Abdus Samad, Norman D. Gardner, and Bradley J. Cook
Abstract This papers primary objective is to identify the relative importance of various Islamic financial products, in theory and in practice, by examining the financing records of the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad) and the Bahrain Islamic Bank. Currently, seven available Islamic financing products are considered viable alternatives to interest-based conventional contracts: mudarabah (trust financing), musharakah (equity financing), ijarah (lease financing), murabahah (trade financing), qard al-hassan (welfare loan), bay` bi al-thaman al-ajil (deferred payment financing), and istisna` (progressive payments). Among these financial products, mudarabah and musharakah are the most distinct. Their unique characteristics (at least in theory) make Islamic banks and Islamic financing viable alternatives to the conventional interest-based financial system. The question before us is to determine the extent of mudarabah and musharakah in Islamic financing in practice. The data are as follows: the average mudarabah is 5% of total financing, and the average musharakah is less than 3%. The combined average of mudarabah and musharakah for the two Islamic banks is less than 4% of the total finance and advances. The average qard alAbdus Samad, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the Department of Finance and Economics, Utah Valley State College, Orem, Utah. Norman D. Gardner, Ph.D., is a professor in the Department of Finance and Economics, Utah Valley State College, Orem Utah. Bradley J. Cook, Ph.D., is vice president of Acadmic Affairs, Utah Valley State College, Orem, Utah. All authors are grateful for the comments of the reviewers, which have added to the quality of this article.
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hassan is about 4%, while istisna` does not yet exist in practice. Murabahah is the most popular and dominates all other modes of Islamic financing. The average use of murabahah is over 54%. When the bay` bi al-thaman al-ajil is added to the murabahah, the percentage of total financing is shown to be 82.68%. This paper also explores some possible reasons why these two Islamic banks appear to prefer murabahah to mudarabah and musharakah.
Introduction
Islamic banking and finance are emerging as viable alternatives to conventional interest-based banking and financing. According to the General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions, there are currently 275 institutions worldwide that follow Islamic banking and financing principles, collectively managing in excess of $200 billion. These institutions are spread throughout 53 countries, including Europe and the United States. Twenty institutions now offer a variety of Islamic financial services in the United States. In most of these countries, Islamic banking institutions must compete with conventional interest-based banking institutions. Their successful operations, along with the increasing number of Muslims in Europe and North America, have attracted western attention toward Islamic banking and finance. As a result, an increasing number of western financial institutions now offer Islamic investment products to Muslim investors. In 1996, for example, Citi Islamic Investment Bank, a wholly owned subsidiary of Citi Corp., opened in Bahrain; Chase Manhattan has an Islamic window in Frankfurt, Germany; and several multinational corporations, among them IBM and General Motors, have raised funds through an Americanbased Islamic leasing fund at the United Bank of Kuwait. Due to the growing interest in Islamic banking in the West, a closer look at the Islamic banks operations and characteristic features is warranted. This is the primary focus of this study. Islamic banking in Malaysia differs in several ways, and for various reasons, from Islamic banking in the Gulf and the rest of the world. A comparison of Islamic banking in Malaysia and Bahrain, therefore, is valuable for two reasons: First, Bahrains Islamic banking system is representative of the best practices of Islamic banks in general, and second, Bahrain and Malaysia are currently vying for recognition as the capital or hub of Islamic banking worldwide.
Samad, Gardner, and Cook: Islamic Banking and Finance
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Islamic banking, which became established in the 1970s, currently consists of a variety of financial instruments or products. These include mudarabah (trust financing), musharakah (equity financing), ijarah (lease financing), murabahah (trade financing), qard al-hassan (welfare loan), and istisna` (progressive payments). The relative significance of these products in the Islamic banking system has yet to be studied. An additional objective of this paper is to determine the extent to which these two Islamic banks currently utilize these products. This information will be important to all participants in the Islamic banking and financing systems.
Review of the Literature

The extent of past scholarly research on modern Islamic banking and financing include studies by Siddiqi,1 Khan, 2 Mannan,3 Iqbal and Mirakhor,4 Ahmad,5 Zineldin,6 Saeed,7 Al-Omar and Abdul-Haq,8 and Kahf. 9 These authors discuss the institutional issues, including Arabic concepts and principles of finance that are subject to interpretation. ElAshker,10 Wilson, 11 and Kazarian12 provide financial comparisons that are useful in understanding the Islamic financial system. Maniam, Baxely, and James 13 analyze the perception of Islamic financing in the United States and also discuss the problems of applying Islamic financing tools. Bacha14 attributes the low growth of mudarabah financing by Islamic banks to the agency problem. Although few empirical studies are available, Akkas15 compares Islamic banking with conventional banking in Bangladesh, and Kazarian16 compares it with conventional banking in Egypt. Samad17 and Samad and Hassan18 compare the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad)s performance with various conventional Malaysian banks. De-Belder and Hassan,19 as well as Hamwai and Aylward,20 address some aspects of Islamic financing and its relative success. Samad21 compares the performance of interest-free Islamic banks to that of interest-based conventional banks with respect to profitability, liquidity risk, and credit risk. The paper finds no major differences with regard to liquidity risk and profitability. However, a significant difference was observed in credit performance. This study will contribute to the existing literature on Islamic banking by providing data on the extent to which the various modes of Islamic financing are actually being utilized.
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Overview of Islamic Finance and Banking Principles of Islamic Banking

Islamic economics and financial institutions are guided by the Shariàh, the precepts of which are founded upon the Quran, the Sunnah (the practices and sayings of Prophet Muhammad [pbuh]), and fiqh (jurisprudence, the opinion of Muslim legal scholars). According to the Shariàh, Islamic financial institutions and modes of financing are based strictly on the following principles: Transactions must be free of interest (riba). Goods and services that are illegal (haram) from the Islamic point of view cannot be produced or consumed. Activities or transactions involving speculation ( gharar) must be avoided.
Zakat (the compulsory Islamic tax) must be paid. Following is a discussion of these four principles, which make the Islamic banking and financing system unique.
INTEREST (RIBA). Quran 2:185 explicitly prohibits riba and permits trade,
but does not state clearly whether it is to be understood as interest or as usury. This lack of clarity has led to controversy among Muslim scholars in the past. However, there seems to be a general consensus that riba includes all forms of interest, that is, any amount charged over and above the principal. The Islamic financial system bans interest in all transactions. Thus, the payment or receipt of interest, which is the cornerstone of modern conventional banking, is explicitly prohibited in Islamic banking. Financial instruments and products that deal with interest are also prohibited. In other words, the prohibition of paying or receiving interest is the nucleus of Islamic banking and its financial instruments. However, it should be stated that an Islamic financial system does not simply mean the avoidance of interest. An Islamic financial system or institution is much more than that, for it is supported by other principles of Islamic doctrine advocating risk sharing, individuals rights and duties, and the sanctity of contracts. 22 By banning interest, Islam seeks to establish a just and fair society (Quran 2:239). The return of a predetermined amount of fixed income by the lender, irrespective of the outcome of the borrowers venture, is considered unjust.
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Fairness and justice demand that the owner (supplier) of capital has the right to be rewarded, but that this reward must be commensurate with the degree of risk associated with the project for which funds are supplied. Hence, what is forbidden is the predetermined fixed charge in financing a loan, an investment, or a commodity exchange. But there is more to the Islamic banking or financial system than just interest-free financing For example, one must consider such factors as gharar, haram, zakat, and qard al-hassan, all of which are explained below.
G HARAR. Islam prohibits all games of chance and gambling: They will ask about intoxicants and games of chance. Say: In both there are great evil as well as some benefit for man, but the evil which they cause is greater than the benefit which they bring. (Quran 2:219)
In Quran 5:90, games of chance and gambling are prohibited because they cause enmity and hatred and also involve consuming property (bay` albatil), which is a kind of oppression. The question is whether gharar, which involves uncertainty or speculation, is halal (permitted) in business. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, if the sale contains gharar and devours the property of others, it is equivalent to gambling and, as such, haram (forbidden). Pointing to the phrase devours the property of others, Kamili23 opines that speculative risk-taking in commerce, which involves the investment of assets, skill, and labor, is not similar to gambling. In business, participants engage in transactions designed to maximize profit through trading, not through any dishonest appropriation of other peoples property. Similarly, according to El-Ashkar, speculation in business is not the result of turning over a card or throwing the dice, but rather is
the practice of (a) using available information to (b) anticipate future price movements of securities so that (c) [the] action of buying and selling securities may be taken with a view to (d) buying and selling securities in order to (e) realize capital gains and/or maximize the capitalized value of security-holdings.24
Islam allows risk-taking in business transactions, but prohibits gambling. Maniam, Bexley, and James comment:
The main idea is that investors should spend their effort searching for projects that are sound, that adhere to the Shariàh, and share in the success or failure of that project.25
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I SLAMIC I NVESTMENT ETHICS . Investing in production and consumption is
guided by a strict Islamic ethical code. Muslims are not permitted to invest in any production, distribution, and consumption enterprises involving alcohol, tobacco, pork, pornography, gambling, illegal drugs, and other harmful products, even though these enterprises may be profitable. In addition, Islam does not permit Muslims to invest in activities that are considered harmful for the individual or society. Thus, the scope of investment opportunities by Islamic banks is somewhat restricted when compared with the scope of financing open to conventional banks.
ZAKAT. Zakat is a compulsory religious tax payable to the poor by those
who have acquired a certain amount of wealth (nisab). Each Islamic bank must establish a zakat fund and pay this tax if the level of its earned profits reaches the level of nisab. Paying zakat does not exclude Islamic banks from paying any business-related income taxes. Thus, Islamic banks face a dual constraint: the payment of a religious tax (zakat) as well as a regular business income tax.
PRODUCTS OF ISLAMIC BANKS AND THEIR KEY ELEMENTS. The prohibition of
interest has led Islamic banks to create various Islamic financial instruments as alternatives to conventional financing methods. Based on the nature of the contracts, these Islamic financial products may be classified into two broad categories: equity-type contracts and mark-up price (debt)type contracts. Equity-type contracts. Mudarabah (trust financing) and musharakah (partnership), based on the profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) principle, are the only two products that fall into equity-type contracts.26 Under a mudarabah contract, the two parties the supplier of capital (rabb al-mal) and the entrepreneur (trustee of the venture) share the profits according to an agreed-upon PLS ratio. It may be 70:30 or 80:20, depending upon the agreement. The first key element of a mudarabah contract is that the lender is not guaranteed a specific return. There also is no fixed annual payment. This is in direct contrast to conventional interest-based lending/financing, in which a loan is not contingent upon the profit or loss outcome of the enterprise and is normally secured by collateral. Thus, any losses must be borne by the debtor and not the lender. The second key element concerns losses that may arise from the business venture. According to Maniam, Bexley, and James:
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The financier or investor is not liable for losses beyond the capital he has contributed, and the entrepreneur or trustee does not share in financial losses except for the loss of his time and efforts.27
According to the Shariàh, the supplier of capital bears the financial loss, not the trustee (mudarib) who runs the business. The third key element is that a financier (i.e., the Islamic bank) has no control over how the entrepreneur or trustee manages the business venture. A musharakah underaking is a partnership contract between two or more parties, each of which contributes investment capital. In a conventional sense, it is a joint business contract. The first element of a musharakah contract is that both parties contribute capital investment and that profits are shared by a prearranged agreement, not necessarily in proportion to their invested capital. In case of loss, both parties share in proportion to their capital contribution. The second ele ment is that both parties share and control how the investment is managed. Thus, the Islamic bank has the right to examine the enterprises books and supervise its management. The third element is that liability is unlimited. Therefore, write Maniam, Bexley, and James, each partner is fully liable for the actions and commitments of the other in financial matters.28 Given the above factors, both mudarabah and musharakah have elements of equity financing. The Islamic bank, as a supplier of funds, undertakes joint ventures with individual customers. Such a relationship is prohibited in the conventional banking system. Mark-up price (debt)-type contracts. The basic principle of mark-up contracts is that the bank finances the purchase of assets in exchange for a negotiated profit margin. Two of the five instruments in this category are widely used. Murabahah (Cost-plus-profit margin). Murabahah (bay` bi al-thaman al-ajil) is a cost-plus-profit margin contract whereby the Islamic bank purchases an asset on behalf of an entrepreneur and resells it to him/her at a predetermined price. This latter price includes the cost of the asset plus a negotiated profit margin. Under this contract, payment is made to the bank in the future either in a lump sum or in installments. The key characteristic of a murabahah contract is that ownership of the asset remains with the bank until all of the payments have been made. This is a popular substitute for interest-based conventional trade financing.29 From an economic point of view, murabahah financing and interest-based trade financing appear quite similar, except in their contractual features.
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Ijarah (Lease financing). Ijarah involves acquiring the financing needed to use a particular asset. In such a contract, the Islamic bank purchases an asset on behalf of the entrepreneur and allows him/her to use it for a fixed rental payment. In ijarah bi tamlik or ijarah wa iqtina` (lease financing toward eventual ownership) financing, the Islamic bank buys an asset and leases it to the entrepreneur, who eventually opts to buy it at a previously agreed-upon price. The key characteristic of ijarah is that ownership of the asset remains with the Islamic bank or is gradually transferred to the entrepreneur as the lease payments are made. The Islamic bank has other financial products, such as bay` bi al-thaman al-ajil (deferred payment financing) and istisna` (progressive payment). These debt-like products fall into the category of a cost-plus contract. A key characteristic of these contracts is that ownership of the asset unambiguously remains with the bank until all of the payments have been made. Qard al-hassan (Benevolence loan). Qard al-hassan, a unique product of the Islamic bank, is a zero-return loan (a negative investment). All Islamic banks are urged or required to make these benevolence loans to needy and poor people. There is no financial return on this loan, for the borrower is obligated to repay only the principal. We will now discuss the relative importance of these instruments in practice by examining the financing records of two Islamic banks: one in Bahrain and the other in Malaysia. We examine how they use the funds as they provide financing to their customers.
Data and Methodology

We have selected two Islamic banks for study: the Islamic Bank of Bahrain and the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad). These two banks were selected for several reasons: Both Bahrain and Malaysia provide relatively open access to bank information. Both banks operate in well-developed financial markets and compete with conventional financial centers and offshore banks. 30 Both banks operate according to the Shariàh and compete with conventional banks, some of which also offer Islamic financial instruments to their customers but are not bound by the Shariàh. While the relative importance of the various Islamic financial products may well differ in banks operating in Iran and Sudan, where all busi-
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nesses and banks must comply with the Shariàh, the two Islamic banks examined here are considered more representative of banks that are competing with conventional banks throughout the rest of the Muslim world. The data for the Islamic Bank of Bahrain and the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad) were obtained from their 2002 annual reports. We have simply calculated the relative percentages of the various modes of financing used by them.
The Uses of Funds

The asset side of the balance sheets of the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad) and the Bahrain Islamic Bank, as presented in table 1, demonstrates the importance of the various Islamic financing modes. As we can see, total Islamic financing and advances by the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad) is only 50.65% of the total assets. On the other hand, the total Islamic financing by the Bahrain Islamic Bank is 78.57%. On average, the total Islamic financing for the two Islamic banks was 64.61% of assets.
Table 1. Allocation of Funds under Finance and Advances.
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Earlier in this paper, we established that mudarabah (trust financing) and musharakah (equity financing) are the pillars or foundations of the Islamic banking system. When the breakdown of the total allocation presented in table 1 is examined, it appears that both of them play virtually no role in these two Islamic banks, as compared to other modes of financing. For the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad), mudarabah accounts for only .66% of total financing; for the Bahrain Islamic Bank, it constitutes 9.33% of total financing. On average, mudarabah in these two Islamic banks is only 5%. The other distinguishing Islamic financing instrument is the musharakah contract. In these two Islamic banks, as the data show, this financing mode is also insignificant: It is 3.53% (Malaysia) and 2.16% (Bahrain), respectively. On average, it constitutes only 2.85% of total Islamic financing. Even though musharakah appears to be very significant in principle, in practice it constitutes an insignificant proportion of Islamic financing in these two banks. Adding together the two banks average mudarabah and musharakah financing, the total is only 3.92% of total financing. Thus, the two most notable Islamic products are seen, in practice, to constitute less than 4% of their total Islamic financing instruments. With regards to murabahah (debt-like financing contracts), the data in table 1 show that such financing in Malaysia and Bahrain is 24.16% and 84.16%, respectively. On average, murabahah financing is 54.41% of total finance and advances. It should be noted that if the figures for murabahah and bay` bi al-thaman al-ajil are added together for the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad), the percent of total financing is 81.2%. This percentage compares favorably with that listed under murabahah for the Bahrain Islamic Bank (84.16%). No amount is shown under bay` bi al-thaman alajil for the Bahrain Islamic Bank. Aggregating the figures for these two types of financing is understandable, since their characteristics are quite similar. The average of total financing of these two Islamic banks under murabahah and bay` bi al-thaman al-ajil is 82.68%. From the point of view of some critics, murabahah is not a pure Islamic product; Nevertheless, the data show this mode of financing is dominant in the Islamic banks of Malaysia and Bahrain. Qard al-hassan (benevolence/philanthropic) financing is another cornerstone of Islamic finance, for helping the poor and needy is a fundamental Islamic teaching. The extent of participation in this mode of financing was considered and found to be 8.09% in Malaysia and only 0.08% in Bahrain. This difference is probably due to the larger proportion of needy
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people in Malaysia and the increased availability of governmental assistance for the needy in Bahrain. The average qard al-hassan financing by the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad) and the Bahrain Islamic Bank is only 4.09% of the total finance and advances. The data on ijarah (general lease financing) show that the average ijarah financing of the two Islamic banks under discussion is 2.59% of their total finance and advances. With regard to the new Islamic financing instrument of istisna` (progressive payment), their balance sheets indicate no allocation. This suggests that they have not yet participated in this mode of financing. Given this, we can say that this new instrument appears to exist in theory but not yet in practice. Zakat, a compulsory religious tax, is one of the five pillars of Islam that both individuals and businesses are required to observe. Therefore, Islamic banks are obligated to pay it as an integral part of Islamic finance. An examination of these two Islamic banks income statements reveals that the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad) and the Bahrain Islamic Bank pay a zakat of RM 1,125,000 (6.13% of the total profit) and BD 1,341,555 (1.69% of the total profit), respectively, from their operating profits. It should be noted that both of these banks operate under the conventional business laws of their respective countries and thus pay this religious tax in addition to the conventional income tax. In theory, mudarabah and musharakah constitute the foundation of the Islamic financial system. Nevertheless, the data presented here seem to indicate that they are utilized far less than other forms of Islamic financing, such as murabahah. Some possible explanations as to why these instruments are not utilized to a greater extent are discussed below.
Agency Problem
When a business is run by professional managers, as opposed to the owner or supplier of capital (debtholder or shareholder), a conflict of interest may arise. A manager is the business owners agent. As the utility increases, managers will seek to maximize their own utility instead of maximizing the wealth or utility of the shareholders or the business owners. They have an incentive to increase their own salaries, fringe benefits, and other perks, all of which represent a conflict of interest that may lead them to place personal interest ahead of such corporate goals as maximizing the shareholders profit margin. 31 This conflict is the most common problem in all businesses or corporations managed by agents rather than the shareholders or debthold-
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ers themselves.32 Given its prevalence, it is important to see how it applies to mudarabah and musharakah.
IN M USHARAKAH FINANCING . Earlier in this paper, musharakah was described as essentially a joint venture profit-sharing business of two or more parties in which the Islamic bank is an important partner or shareholder. Under musharakah, the bank relies on the other partner(s) to manage the business and make the day-to-day decisions. Even though the bank could monitor the management of the business by hiring external auditors and consultants, such measures would incur additional costs. Therefore, the bank must rely on professional managers or other partners to manage the businesses, even though these managers may have an incentive to maximize their own utility at the business owners expense.
THE A GENCY PROBLEM
THE AGENCY PROBLEM IN M UDARABAH FINANCING. As Bacha states: Muda-
rabah financing is really a hybrid. It is neither equity nor debt, because it has important features of both.33 This type of financing has elements of equity financing, since the Islamic bank receives no fixed annual return. In fact, such a return from the business is similar to a dividend, which the business pays only if it earns a profit. On the other hand, mudarabah has elements of conventional debt financing, because in the event of dissolution, the bank has a fixed claim on the venture equal to the initial capital provided, plus its share of any profits. Under mudarabah, the Islamic bank does not participate directly in management decisions. Rather, it relies completely on the business ventures trustee or entrepreneur. This trustee is clearly an agent of the Islamic bank and, therefore, is inherently subject to the agency conflict of interest. Thus, under both musharakah and mudarabah, the Islamic bank experiences the agency problem with its associated costs. Islamic banks operate primarily in developing countries, where there is a high degree of financial market imperfection and a prevailing presence of inefficiency and corruption.34 The agency problem becomes more acute when banks have little access to dependable accounting information, due to a lack of standardized financial reporting requirements and procedures. The difficulties presented by this agency problem, together with the lack of verifiable financial data, complicate the profit-sharing characteristics of these forms of Islamic financing and actually encourage debt financing (e.g., murabahah and ijarah) over equity financing (e.g., musharakah and mudarabah).35
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To some extent, the agency problem in musharakah and mudarabah can be reduced by carefully specifying the sharing of profit and performance bonuses between the entrepreneur and the bank. Also, in the case of musharakah, the bank participates in the election of the companys board and officers, a factor that should further reduce the agency problem.
IN ASSETS OWNERSHIP. In mudarabah and musharakah, some ambiguity exists concerning the title to assets in case of default or dissolution of the business. Under murabahah and ijarah, there is no such ambiguity. In these debt-type contracts, title to the assets clearly remains with the bank until all payments have been made. Under a PLS contract, however, banks have no direct claim on the financed assets. As a result, it is rational for banks to opt for murabahah and ijarah contracts instead of mudarabah and musharakah contracts. In order to partially offset the increased risk of musharakah and mudarabah contracts, the business assets could be registered under the joint or co-ownership concept provided by a partnership or corporation arrangement. It should be noted here that a western debt contract contains a considerable amount of ambiguity over just who controls the assets in the case of default. In western countries, default triggers bankruptcy proceedings, during which the entrepreneurs and the managers may continue to control the assets of the business. In contrast, there is no such ambiguity in the case of murabahah and ijarah contracts: The bank may seize the assets immediately.
A MBIGUITY
C ONTRACT MATURITY. Contrary to mudarabah and musharakah, mura-
bahah financing constitutes a shorter term, lower risk investment for the bank. This form of financing involves buying goods at a low price and selling them immediately at a higher price. Such contracts require a specific payment schedule with known maturities. In contrast, the equity nature of mudarabah and musharakah contracts results in longer term, more uncertain maturities for these investments. These differing risk characteristics may bias the Islamic bank against mudarabah and musharakah financing. Primary data collected by Samad and Hassan36 from the Malaysian Islamic Bank (Berhad) support this finding.
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY. Entrepreneurs are, in general, independent,
free-spirited people who jealously guard their proprietary information. Since joint management and supervision are important characteristics of musharakah financing, entrepreneurs may not view such requirements pos-
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itively. Nevertheless, both mudarabah and musharakah require that the bank be given detailed knowledge of how the businesses they finance operate and be allowed to participate in all management decisions. This situation is likely to cause concern among those entrepreneurs who prefer to keep the details of their business operations private. Information on operating procedures and the degree of profitability is not usually shared willingly by entrepreneurs, who are concerned about competitors entering the marketplace. Such concerns may well decrease the demand for mudarabah and musharakah financing.
BIASED BANK PERSONNEL. Another possible impediment to a more rapid
growth of mudarabah and musharakah may lie with the Islamic bank managers themselves. Islamic banks are currently managed by people who have been educated and trained in the conventional banking system. Thus, more time may be required for the unique characteristics of Islamic financial instruments to be completely accepted and understood by both bank personnel and customers. A similar observation is found in the study by Maniam, Bexley, and James.37
I NVESTMENT CONSTRAINTS. As noted earlier, the Shariàh restricts the type of
businesses for which Islamic banks can provide financing. For example, they are not permitted to participate in certain prohibited investments or joint venture projects considered to be detrimental to the individual, society, or the environment. As a result, the scope of mudarabah and musharakah for Islamic banks is somewhat more limited than it is for conventional banks.
A L ONG R ECORD OF ESTABLISHED RELATIONS . Even though Muslims through-
out the world could be expected to prefer to deal with an Islamic bank for purely religious reasons, the fact is that prior to the 1970s, when no Islamic banks were available, they dealt with conventional banks. Thus, banking relationships have already been established and, except for that segment of the banking community that is so religious that its members could be expected to transfer all of their banking transactions to the first available Islamic bank, others who would prefer the Islamic bank (if all else were equal) may base such decisions more on the relative economic advantage to them as consumers. Therefore, it would seem incumbent upon Islamic banks to price their instruments in a way that the customers net position is as current and com-
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petitive as it is in the conventional banks. When the net economic consequences of being a customer of an Islamic bank are substantially the same as those associated with conventional banks, it could be expected that the religious preference of the majority of banking customers would attract them to Islamic banks and their Islamic financing instruments.
FROM C ONVENTIONAL B ANKS . Islamic banks compete with conventional banks in both the deposit and credit markets. Some conventional banks, such as the Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad, have introduced Islamic deposit instruments, thereby increasing the competition for funds. As a result of this increased competition, Islamic banks are finding it difficult to attract significant funds in the form of mudarabah deposits, a factor that further limits the growth of mudarabah and musharakah financing. Available data on the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad) reveal that of the total customer deposits of RM 11,056,355, the amount of mudarabah deposits was only RM 250,992 a mere 2.27% of total deposits.
C OMPETITION
Conclusion
The above examination of the balance sheets, finance and advances, and income statements of two Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain discloses that Islamic banks follow the Shariàhs injunction to pay zakat and finance economic activities through Islamic contracts. Among these financial contracts, mudarabah, musharakah, qard al-hassan, and istisna` are the most distinguishing products in the theory of Islamic finance. However, the data indicate that for the two Islamic banks studied here, mudarabah, musharakah, and qard al-hassan financing are the least significant financial instruments. The average level of mudarabah financing engaged in by these two Islamic banks is only 5%, and for musharakah it is less than 3%, making the combined average less than 4% of total finance and advances. The average financing under the qard al-hassan (benevolence) mode is about 4%. Istisna` (progressive) is not yet used by these two Islamic banks. Mark-up products, such as murabahah and ijarah, appear to be the most popular, for they dominate all other modes of Islamic financing. The average murabahah financing for these two Islamic banks is over 54%. When bay` bi al-thaman al-ajil and murabahah are considered together, the average financing of these two Islamic banks is 82.68%. These figures are significantly higher than the combined mudarabah, musharakah, and qard al-hassan financing (less than 12%). Further research should be conducted
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to investigate the extent to which mudarabah and musharakah are utilized in other Islamic countries. It is understandable that, during the initial development of the Islamic banking system, musharakah and mudarabah financing should be deemphasized due to the increased risk associated with them. Nevertheless, we can expect that these Islamic financial instruments will increase in importance as the Islamic banking system continues to mature. Endnotes
1. 2. 3. M. N. Siddiqi, Issues in Islamic Banking (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1983). S. R. Khan, Profit and Loss Sharing: An Islamic Experiment in Finance and Banking (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987). M. A. Mannan, Islam and Trends in Modern Banking: Theory and Practice of Interest-Free Banking, Islamic Review and Arab Affairs (November/ December 1998): 73-95. Z. Iqbal and A. Mirakhor, Progress and Challenges of Islamic Banking, Thunderbird International Business Review 3 (1999): 381-403. Ausaf Ahmad, Development and Problems of Islamic Banks (Jeddah: Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Research and Training Institute, 1987). M. Zeneldin, The Economy of Money and Banking: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Islamic Interest-free Banking (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1990). M. Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest (Leiden, the Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1996). F. Al-Omar and M. Abdel Haq, Islamic Banking: Theory, Practice and Challenges (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996). M. Kahf, Islamic Banks at the Threshold of the Third Millennium, Thunderbird International Business Review 3 (1999): 445-59. A. A. El-Ashker, The Islamic Business Enterprise (New Hampshire: Croom Helm Ltd., 1987). R. Wilson, Islamic Financial Markets (New York: Routledge, 1995). E. G. Kazarian, Islamic Versus Traditional Banking: Financial Innovation in Egypt (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993). B. Maniam, James J. Bexley, and Joe F. James, Perception of Islamic Financial System: Its Obstacles in Application, and Its Market, Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal 4, no. 2 (2000): 22-36. Obiyathulla Ismath Bacha, Conventional versus Mudarabah Financing: An Agency Cost Perspective, Journal of Islamic Economics 4, nos. 1-2, (1995): 33-49; De Belder, R. K. and M. Hassan, The Changing Face of the Islamic Banking, International Financial Law Review 1 (1993): 23-26.
4. 5. 6.
7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
14.
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15. Ali Akkas, Relative Efficiencies of the Conventional and Islamic Banking System in Financing Investment (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Dhaka University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1996). 16. Kazarian, Islamic Versus Traditional Banking. 17. Abdus Samad, Comparative Efficiency of the Islamic Bank vis--vis Conventional Banks in Malaysia, Journal of Management and Finance 7, no. 2 (1999): 1-24. 18. Abdus Samad and M. Kabir Hasan, The Performance of Malaysian Islamic Bank during 1984-1997: An Exploratory Study, Thoughts on Economics 10, nos. 1-2 (2000): 7-26. 19. R. K. De Belder and M. Hassan, The Changing Face of Islamic Banking, International Financial Law Review 1 (1993): 23-26. 20. B. Hamwi and A. Aylward, Islamic Finance: A Growing International Market, Thunderbird International Business Review 3 (1999): 407-20. 21. Abdus Samad, Performance of Interest-free Islamic Banks vis--vis Interestbased Conventional Banks, IIUM Journal of Economics and Management 12, no. 2 (2004): 115-29. 22. Z. Iqbal and A. Mirakhor, Progress and Challenges, 397 23. M. H. Kamali, Islamic Commercial Law: An Analysis of Futures, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 13, no. 2 (1996): 197-224. 24. A. F. El-Ashkar, Towards an Islamic Stock Exchange in a Transition Stage, Islamic Economic Studies 3, no. 1 (1995): 89. 25. Maniam, Bexley, and James, Perception, 25. 26. Hamwi and Aylward, Islamic Finance. 27. Maniam, Bexley, and James, Perception, 26. 28. Ibid. 29. M. Josh, Islamic Banking Rises Interest, Management Review 2 (1997): 2529. 30. Laubon and Manana are important centers of offshore banking in Malaysia and Bahrain, respectively. 31. Jensen and Meckling have identified significant costs associated with the agency problem. M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976): 305-60. 32. In a landmark study, Lewellen found that in the American financial system, this agency problem has been largely mitigated by the use of executive stock options. These stock options provide the incentive for managers to maximize shareholder wealth, and thus significantly reduce the agency problem. Wilbur G. Lewellen, Management and Ownership in the Large Firm, Journal of Finance (May 1969): 299-322. 33. Bacha, Conventional versus Mudarabah Financing, 40. 34. Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, (1995): 618-712.
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35. Oliver Hart and John Moore. Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt, Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (1998): 1-41. 36. Samad and Hasan, Performance. 37. Maniam, Bexley, and James, Perception.
Review Essay
Mazrui and His Critics

Paul Banahene Adjei
This work is a review essay of two books: Africanity Redefined: Collected Essays of Ali A. Mazrui, edited by Ali Alamin Mazrui, Ricardo Rene Laremont, Tracia Leacock Seghatolislami, Michael A. Toler, and Fouad Kalouche (Africa World Press: 2002) and Governace and Leadership: Debating the African Condition: Ali Mazrui and His Critics, edited by Alamin M. Mazrui and Willy Mutunga (Africa World Press: 2003) These are the first two volumes in a three-volume work dealing with the correspondence among Ali Mazrui and his opponents, as well as his supporters, on issues relating to Africa. Mazrui, a Kenyan scholar, is currently Albert Schweitzer professor in humanities and director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, State University of New York. An Oxford scholar, he is also Albert Luthuli professor-at-large in humanities and development studies at the University of Jos, Nigeria, as well as Andrew D. White professorat-large emeritus and senior scholar in Africana studies at Cornell University (www.islamonline.net). In addition, he has authored many publications and television and radio documentaries. Perhaps his best-known work in the West is his BBC radio and television documentary series The Africans, which was co-produced by the BBC and the public television station WETA. Writing on Mazrui, Sulayman Nyang of Howard University states:
Ali Mazrui is a controversial but independent and original thinker. He is a master word-monger and certainly does not belong to that class of men who lament that words fail them. It is because of his conjurers ability to negotiate between the realm of serious issues and the province of
Paul Banahene Adjei is completing his M.A. program at the Ontario Institute of Education of the University of Toronto, Canada, and will begin his Ph.D. in September 2005 at this same institution. His research interest is decolonizing knowledge in Africa and anti-racism in education.
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provocative words and concepts, that divide his readers between those who take him seriously, and those who take him lightly.1
Africanity Redefined
Making a similar point in the opening chapter of the first volume, co-editor Alamin Mazrui, associate professor of Africana Studies at Ohio State University and nephew of Ali Mazrui, describes Mazruis writings as a double-edge sword that cuts across every political divide, be it social, ideological, gender, racial, political, or religious (pp. 5-16). Such controversial stands have drawn many critics, as well as admirers, to his work. In fact, the strong opinions held by both his opponents and his supporters is what gave birth to these two volumes. Is Mazrui an independent thinker, or does he simply enjoy being controversial? Do his critics have genuine issues to grind with him, or are they, as Mazrui describes them, professional Mazrui bashers due to professional rivalry? The subsequent chapters of the book give readers the opportunity to draw their own conclusions. In chapter 2, Mazrui presents Africa as a product of the confluence of indigenous, Islamic and Western civilization[s] (pp. 21-25) and juxtaposes the contributions of Islam and Christianity to Africa. This raises an interesting debate as to which religion is more appropriate for Africa. Using the position of Edward Blyden, a member of the African diaspora and a Presbyterian minister, the book concludes that Islam, as opposed to Christianity, is more appropriate because it strengthens and hastens certain agencies and self-reliance (ibid.). The next issue worth noting is the sentiments of Mazruis critics and admirers as regards his above-mentioned television series The Africans. Many western scholars criticized the series for frequently degenerat[ing] into anti-Western diatribe (p. 28). Mazrui and his admirers, however, defended it on the grounds that Africans have the right to tell their story from their own perspective and not that of the West (pp. 47-59). In fact, this position reminds one of the Aboriginal scholar James M. Blauts articulation of decolonization:
[The process of decolonization is in two parts]; the need to resurrect ones own history and its contributions to the history of the world; and secondly, to re-write colonial history to show how it has led to poverty rather than progress.2
By telling Africas history as it is, Mazrui is resisting what Michel Foucault referred to in his writings as the amputation of the past and
Adjei: Mazrui and His Critics
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troubling the dominant discourse, which attempts to place Africas crisis at its doorstep while ignoring the colonizers complicity. Therefore, one should view this series as an academic revolt by African scholars who seek to challenge the sense of comfort and complacency in the dominant discourse, which validates the Eurocentric historical account of Africa as the only one worth telling. If western scholars are not happy with the presentation of both sides, it is because their historical and contemporary roles in Africa have not been positive. Another insightful subject discussed in the chapter is the influence of the Arab and Jewish cultures on black Africa, such as Nigeria and Ethiopia, respectively. According to Mazrui, Arab cultural influence can be seen in intermarriage, linguistics (Arabic words in such neo-Semitic African languages as Hausa, Amharic, and Kiswahili), and architecture (pp. 69-82). However, the Africanist Hailu Habtu criticizes Mazrui for portraying Africa as a cultural bazaar where a wide variety of ideas and values, drawn from different civilizations compete for the attention of African buyers (p. 86). In other words, Mazrui articulates the influence of other civilizations on Africa, but surprisingly leaves out Africas contributions to other civilizations. Adding his voice to the critics, Wole Soyinka, the 1986 Nobel Laureate prize winner in literature and African English literature condemned Mazruis Triple Heritage 3 theory for overglorifying Islam and Christianity as superpowers, while simultaneously denigrating authentic African spirituality (pp. 120-27). By limiting the search for an antidote to various debilitating phenomena (e.g., corruption in Africa and many other problems) to only Christianity and Islam (pp. 21-25), Mazrui is academically suffocating, trivializing, and misrepresenting the potency of Africas indigenous legacy in favor of these religions. Even though Mazrui denies ever attempting to denigrate indigenous African legacies (pp. 106-07), Soyinka wittingly likened these exonerating efforts to a local fable about an African rodent that blows soothing air on the wound of its human victim after every bite (p. 122). Such rodently efforts are not enough to salvage the festering tooth marks that Mazrui leaves after offensively biting into Africas indigenous religions and spirituality. In any case, before the advent of Christianity and Islam, such indigenous beliefs as the ability of lesser deities and ancestors to punish criminals were enough to police society. Only when Christianity and Islam derogated and labeled these beliefs as superstition and fetishization did the pillars holding these moral contours together collapse.
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Another interesting aspect is the section on Salman Rushdies The Satanic Verses (Viking: 1988), a swipe at the Quran that caused Ayatollah Khomeini to pass a death-sentence fatwa on him (pp. 143-71). Mazrui honestly explains his dilemma in dealing with this issue, giving his position as a believer in Islam and a believer in the open society a believer in the Shariàh and an opponent of all forms of capital punishment (p. 146). However, such sentiments did not prevent him from condemning the book and showing his sympathy with the Muslim community and Khomeini. In fact, he used the occasion to attack western society, especially Britain, the United States, and France, for condemning Khomeini and offering their support and protection to Rushdie. Mazrui centered his condemnation on both historical and contemporary examples, which suggest that if the shoe had been on the other foot, the response would have been outrage. To Mazrui, such a hypocritical stand by the West not only confounds logic, but also confirms its continued ethnocentric views in matters of ideology, religion, politics, and race. Mazruis concern raises a serious question as to whether the West crossed the line in protecting Rushdie. To be fair to Mazrui, however, he was not against this protection; rather, he was quite worried by the promotion and support accorded to Rushdie and his book. The next chapter is devoted to issues of gender and sexuality in Africa. Using historical and contemporary examples, with an occasional comparative analysis between the West and Africa, Mazrui categorizes issues of gender in Africa as benevolent, benign, and malignant (pp. 21121). He cites the matrilineal system of inheritance and bride wealth paid by African men to women as examples of benevolent sexism. According to him, such practices could sometimes translate into real power for women. Even though Mazrui is not against this practice, he reduces its relevancy by equating this African traditional custom to such western male niceties as opening doors and carrying heavy suitcases for women (pp. 211-14). On the issue of benign sexism, Mazrui contends that the dominant gender (man) is not being gallant and chivalrous to the disadvantaged gender (woman), even though various subcultural traditions could sometimes be to the advantage or disadvantage of women (ibid.). Malignant sexism is defined as the most pervasive and most insidious; [because] in most cases [it subjects] women to economic manipulation, sexual exploitation and political marginalization (p. 218). Beneath sexism is the paradox of gender. Here, women are seen as mothers and men are seen as warriors.
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Unfortunately, the power of destruction has given men dominion over women as their rulers. Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, a professor in the Department of English and Modern Languages at Albany State University and a feminist activist, problematizes Mazruis analysis by insisting that such a paradigm draws the discourse backward while obscuring the crucial fact that sexism is not a joking matter (p. 237). To her, trivializing sexism by constructing a hierarchy of benevolent, benign, and malignant sexism, although intellectually innovative, downplays its intrinsic and inherent destruction. Earlier on, Naira Sudarkasa, a former professor of anthropology as well as African and African-American studies at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, raised the alarm bells on Mazruis analysis: Given the basic contrast in the meaning attached to the term sexism, it was predictable that Mazruis paradigm of benevolent, benign and malignant sexism would be challenged by scholars in the area of Womens Studies (p. 202). In addition to the issue raised by Ogundipe-Leslie and Sudarkasa, I feel uncomfortable with Mazruis generalization of the matrilineal system of inheritance as an example of benevolent sexism. From my position as a male Ashanti of Ghana, this system of inheritance is far from benevolent, for it is designed to ensure that the familys inheritance does not go to a person whose blood is not related to that of the family. After all, it is a well-known fact that only mothers can truly know the fathers of their children. On the issue of same-sex marriage, Mazrui eloquently and rightly posits that since such unions are the result of individual actions, they [should] be matters of the church, but not for the head of states The Almighty may judge, but not the state (p. 261). He insists that the challenges facing African families today should not be blamed on same-sex marriage: We can defend our African families without using our gay brothers [and lesbian sisters] as scapegoats (p. 263). The volumes last chapter deals with issues of race and reparations.4 Mazrui and the Group of Eminent Persons on Reparations contend that the West is by far the greater culprit in African enslavement than either Arabs or Africans (p. 277). Thus, it is fair to make the West compensate Africa for its role in, and the benefits derived from, slavery and colonialism. When asked if the Arab world also should pay reparations to Africa, Mazrui responded that even if it were to do so, it should not follow the same criteria as the West. His position is centered on the notion that the issue of where an Arab ends and an African begins is a continuum; whereas, the issue of where the West ends in [the] US [and] the black man begins is a dichotomy (p. 299).
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Mazrui has been criticized for allowing his loyalty to his Islamic faith to cloud his position (pp. 290-91). Indeed, his argument that Arab slaves were treated better than their counterparts in the West, and thus for the issue of the Arab worlds reparations to Africa being treated differently, is neither here nor there. The notion of reparations does not depend on how slaves were treated, but on the fact that both the Arab world and the West benefited from this slave trade to the detriment of Africa. Hence, the call for reparations. Bethwell Ogot, director of the Institute of Research and Postgraduate Studies at Kenyas Maseno University College, reinforces this idea:
To recognize [the role of Arabs in the slave trade] is not to lessen the guilt of Western nations; and in order to understand the nature of the African enslavement we should avoid hunting for historical villains. We should acknowledge the shared guilt between Muslims and Christians, between the West and the Middle East, and the moral blindness that led to centuries of immeasurable sufferings for Africans. (pp. 291-92)
Contrary to Ogots position, other critics like J. Covington in his letter to the editor of Nairobis Sunday Nation, criticized the concept of reparations because, in his opinion, slavery is a dead issue or should be (p. 319). Ironically, Covington and others who share this view see nothing wrong with Germany compensating the Jews for what the Nazis did to them during World War II. If what is good for the goose is equally good for the gander, then I do not see why Africa should be treated differently unless the lives of Africans are not of equal value as the lives of other people.
Governace and Leadership

The second volume analyzes governance and leadership in Africa. The first chapter is devoted to leadership. Mazrui paints a dismal picture of the leadership style of Kwame Nkrumah (1909-72), Ghanas first prime minister and one of the early proponents of Pan-Africanism. He presents Nkrumah as a man who sought to carve a name for himself as the Lenin of Africa but instead, unfortunately, became the czar of Ghana. Mazrui sees his tragedy as one of excess, rather than one of contradiction, because he tried to be too much of a revolutionary monarch (p. 12). After relating Nkrumahs political career in Ghana and Africa, Mazrui concludes that he was a great Gold Coaster and African, but fell short of becoming a great Ghanaian (p. 30).
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Perhaps the harshest criticism of Nkrumah comes from Russell Warren Howe, a former recipient of an American Press award and a Ford fellow in advanced international reporting. Seeing Nkrumah as a hypocrite who preached virtue and practiced vice, Howe welcomed his overthrow as an event that would help Africa progress. Many of Nkrumahs admirers responded to this criticism by castigating Mazrui for his parochial analysis of Nkrumah and questioning his academic loyalty to Africa, since he created a platform that enabled a person like Howe to tarnish Nkrumahs hard-won image as one of Africas greatest sons (pp. 44-59 and 62-65). As Ama Ata Aidoo, the renowned African writer, sarcastically wrote in her postscript letter to Transition:
We are also grateful to our own Professor Ali Mazrui and all other objective and non-partisan African intellectuals and journalists who make the writing and publication of papers like Mr. Howes possible. (ibid.)
As a person born and raised in Ghana, I know for a fact that the name Nkrumah evokes passion and anger among Ghanaians. Even though I have been very sympathetic to those who suffered under his bad policies, I still concede and many Ghanaians would agree with me that no Ghanaian head of state could equate or surpass Nkrumahs achievement. What, then, disqualifies him from being a great Ghanaian, as postulated by Mazrui? Indeed Nkrumah, like any other leader, has his own shortcomings. Nevertheless, this does not make him a poor leader. Howes comments are not only insulting to history, but also an example of the intellectual dishonesty of western writers who tend to misrepresent African history. For instance, Africas historical contribution to the production of knowledge has been negated and appropriated by the Wests knowledge system without any recognition. Such intellectual dishonesty continues to allow western scholars to present themselves as the civilizers, saviors, initiators, mentors, and arbiters of Africa. 5 Mazrui also writes about President Julius Nyerere (1922-99) of Tanzania. He claims to respect Nyerere for his intellectual stature, originality of thought, consistent support of the pan-Africanist dream, and for not creating a personality cult as many of his peers in Africa did. However, he accuses Nyerere of stabbing other intellectuals in the back and describes him as a traitor to his class (p. 88). The last comment attracted critics (pp. 92-117) who said that Mazrui was crying wolf when there is none and challenged him to substantiate his charges.
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This chapter concludes by comparing Nkrumah with former president J. J. Rawlings, who ruled Ghana from 1981 to 2000 (pp. 132-34). According to Mazruis assessment, by leading Ghana through a peaceful transition toward democratization, Rawlings left a better legacy to Ghanaians than Nkrumah did (ibid.). This position attracted mixed reactions from Ghanaians (pp. 142-57). As a Ghanaian who experienced Rawlings 19-year rule, I can neither comprehend how Mazrui could compare his achievements to those of Nkrumah, nor how he could place the former above the latter. Rawlings committed more human right violations in Ghana than any other leader of the country. For instance, he executed three military heads of state and four top-ranking military officers for staging a coup dtat, and yet later on overthrew a constitutional government. He claimed not to believe in multiparty democracy, and yet for some reason contested and won two multiparty elections to be a constitutionally elected president for 8 years. In his opinion piece in a local Ghanaian newspaper, Amamoo describes Rawlings 19-year rule as:
a military dictator and a most brutal one ... for eleven long nightmarish years and for eight more years, with the country under a quasi-democratic state of government, he presided over. This period unleashed the most violent abuses of human rights in the history of this country. Neither he nor his colleagues have, to date, ever accounted for their stewardship to the people of Ghana.6
In the face of such overwhelming evidence and other stories of brutality and atrocities under the Rawlings administration, it confounds logic for our learned professor to place his rule alongside that of Nkrumah. In fact, doing so even edges the former above the latter. Unless Mazrui is writing as a politician rather than as a political scientist, there is no way such a blatant misjudgment can be justified. Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe, Jr., from Nassau Community College of the State University of New York, Garden City, argues:
[When] Professor Mazrui curiously declared President Nkrumah, along with the swashbuckling and sanguinary Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, as the greatest leader Ghana had ever had, it came off as quite an amusement. Some of us even felt that Professor Mazrui was up to something hardly noble; perhaps he wanted to insult the intelligence of Ghanaians, presuming these putatively mild-mannered and affable Africans to be woefully amnesiac. Or perhaps the aging Kenyan scholar felt that it
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would be rather too dangerous to attempt to malign the man who had just then been fittingly and refreshingly rehabilitated by his very own detractors during the course of the preceding decade. In sum, Professor Mazrui must have been trying to act politically correctly.7
Chapter 2 analyzes issues of policy and governance in Africa. Mazrui, like Jesus in his Sermon on the Mount, advises some countries about various prudent measures that need to be taken in order to ameliorate instances of political upheaval, a well-known historical problem in Africa (pp. 16671). He categorizes African countries into coup prone (i.e., Uganda) and coup proof (i.e., Senegal). He then suggests what policies and governance styles should be adopted in these countries to avoid future coups. Perhaps what most stands out in this chapter is the paper that Mazrui delivered in Nigeria, one in which he sought to portray the imposition of the Shariàh in northern Nigeria as politically motivated. According to him, power has been fairly balanced in Nigeria: Historically, the southerners were economically powerful while the northerners controlled political power. Nevertheless, the 1999 election of a southerner, Olusegun Obasanjo, as president has ruptured this arrangement. In other words, the south has now taken both the crown and the jewels (pp. 201-09, 231-34, and 26176). Therefore, the north invoked the Shariàh in its quest for internal identity and ancestry to solve its sense of marginalization (ibid.). Besides, the Shariàh was a bargaining chip used to express the norths displeasure (ibid.). As expected, this position attracted a lot of criticism for ignoring the norths minority Christian community and unnecessarily fueling the existing tensions between the two regions (pp. 209-56). In fact, Mazrui would have saved himself a great deal of trouble if he had just articulated the Shariàhs strengths as an alternative to Nigerias conventional legal system. But by being very political and openly declaring his sympathy with the north, he was sending a wrong and dangerous signal that could instigate the military in the north to rise up against the elected southern president. Beyond that, his analysis could wrongly justify the actions of Ibrahim Babanginda (Nigerias northern military ruler from 1985-93), who annulled a fair election won by Moshood Abiola in 1993, a southerner an action that has prolonged Nigerias crisis. Chapter 3 talks about Pan-African solutions. Mazrui suggests that the large African countries should recolonize or engage in self-colonization in order to put the young and weaker countries on the right path (pp. 339-55). He believes that recolonization could be benevolent, benign, and malignant.
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For example, benevolent recolonization occurs when the colonized benefits more than the colonizer, while benign recolonization means that both countries receive equal benefits. In malignant recolonization, however, the colonizer benefits more than the colonized. An example of benevolent recolonization occurred when Tanganyika took over Zanzibar in the 1960s during a period of upheaval in the latter. Tanzanias brief occupation of Uganda after invading it in 1979 to topple Idi Amin, who had invaded Tanzania in 1978, is an example of benign recolonization. An example of malignant recolonization happened when Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia tried to annex Eritrea after its liberation from Italian colonial rule in 1941. According to Mazrui, benevolent or benign recolonization will ensure stability in Africa. Not surprisingly, this position started a heated debate between Mazrui and Archie Mafeje, a professor at the Department of Anthropology at American University. The latter saw Mazruis suggestion as a recipe for disaster (pp. 357-74 and 425-30). Although the truth is that Mazruis concept of large countries supporting weaker ones is noble, the content within which it was put could be dangerous and send the wrong message. Like the concept postcolonial, the term recolonization rightly evokes anger and protest, no matter how one explains and uses it. Mazrui, once again, fails to recognize that by using such loose terms he is opening a Pandoras box of misinterpretation on the part of his readers. For instance, should one view the American invasion of Iraq as benevolent or benign recolonization? After all, is it not a case of a big brother checking a younger ones failure to behave? In any case, if the recent efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to find a lasting solution in the crises in Cote dIvoire and Togo are what Mazrui means by recolonization or self-colonization, then he needs to find a better term. The book ends with an epilogue on Ali Mazrui. The editors provide a thorough summary of all of the chapters in the two volumes under review. They rightly acknowledge that writing about Mazrui could be an easy task, for there is a great deal of available material. However, analyzing him could be very challenging because of how he postulates his ideas (pp. 431-50).
Conclusion
Both volumes provide a fair platform for Mazruis critics and supporters to air their views. Such intellectual tolerance provides readers with sufficient information to draw their own conclusions about the debate. In general, the books are very sympathetic to Islam. From issues relating to Salman
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Rushdie to reparations for Africa, Mazruis responses display his loyalty to his Islamic faith. In addition, he cleverly uses his work to rally support for issues affecting the Muslim community. For instance, juxtaposing The Satanic Verses to Mein Kampf (pp. 164-68) is an example of how he tries to elicit support from other communities on issues affecting the Muslim world. However, his effort to establish anti-black racism in The Satanic Verses (pp. 164-67) was academic overkill and a fruitless exercise. The debate between Mazrui and Soyinka, as well as the one with Mafeje (1:10144 and 2:342-74) could be considered as the lowest points. I thought that these debates went beyond productive academic discussion and egaged in a personal and historical war between Mazrui and both of these critics. In short, it was a disservice to the readers. In spite of that, these volumes are very informative and educative for students who are interested in understanding the politics of Africa, especially the impact of the West and the Arab world on the continent. They also have the capacity to elicit discussion and whip up strong sentiments, passions, and anger among their readers. The collections herein place these books among the few available works that can boast of a wide range of scholarly knowledge on Africa. These volumes could be said to be the epitome of Mazruis work, and therefore should be a bonus for anyone interested in his scholarly endeavors. In addition, the editors should be commended for making sure that the relevant correspondence was discussed under each theme, as indicated in the chapters. In fact, Mazruis writing style and analytic skills always manage to provoke both his critics and his admirers to respond to his claims. Even though the essence of these volumes is to bring out the correspondence between Mazrui and his critics and admirers, I would not be surprised if this series creates yet another forum for further responses from his readers. In all, these volumes are must-reads for all African students and anybody interested in studying Africa. In my opinion, two things are consistent throughout Mazruis writings, at least in these two volumes: his passionate defense of any issue affecting his Islamic faith or the Arab world, and his ability to generate controversy on every issue that he explores. Earlier on, I mentioned Nyangs comment that Mazrui is a master word-monger and certainly does not belong to that class of men who lament that words fail them. While this assessment is true, it also tends to be his Achilles heel. His masterly control of English sometimes influences him to evoke certain words that generate controversy. Such situations tend to shift the discussion away from the noble idea to the political correctness of the
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word. There were instances in these two volumes in which Mazruis choice of words generated a debate that painfully shifted the discussion from the noble concept being analyzed. In short, whether Ali Mazrui is an independent thinker or just a controversial one, history will always place him where he belongs: an intellectual both loved and hated by many people for what he stands for, speaks for, and talks against. Endnotes
1. 2. 3. S. S. Nyang, Ali Mazrui: The Man and His Works (Lawrenceville, VA: Brunswick Publishing Co., 1981), 36. F. J. Graveline, Circle Works: Transforming Eurocentric Consciousness (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1998). This concept views Africa as having been influenced by indigenous or traditional African practices, as well as by the western (Christian) and Arab (Islamic) cultures. Reparations is a new debate that Africans should be compensated for the pains and suffering inflicted upon Africa during the slave trade and colonialism by the West and the Arab world. For more information on the Group of Eminent Persons on Reparations, see www.arm.arc.co.uk/abujaProclamation.html. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Harmondworth: Penguin Books, 1967); V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge (London: James Currey, 1988); and F. B. Nyamnjoh, A Relevant Education for African Development Some Epistemological Considerations, African Development 29, no. 1 (November 2004): 161-84. Published by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). J. G. Amamoo, Ex-President Rawlings lets down the nation, Ghana, again, The Ghanaian Chronicle, 1 April 2005. www.ghanaian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?id. K. Okoampa-Ahoofe, The Enduring Legacy of Dr. J. B. Danquah - Part II, 15 March 2005. www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomepage/News/Archive/article.phd?.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Book Reviews
Islamophobia Issues, Challenges, and Action: A Report by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia
Hugh Muir and Laura Smith, researchers Robin Richardson, ed. Stoke on Trent, UK: Trentham Books, 2004. 92 pages. This report is actually a comprehensive and highly informative two-part report put out by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, which was established by the Runneymede Trust in the United Kingdom in 1996. In 1999, Dr. Richard Stone (vice chair of the Runneymede Trust) was appointed chair of the commission. The first part details the issues and challenges Muslims face in Britain, while the second part focuses on the actions taken to deal with and combat Islamophobia. As a report, its applicability is limited to the socioeconomic and political conditions prevailing in Britain and, in particular, that countrys urban areas. However, the substantial issues raised (namely, a broader discussion of the concept of Islamophobia; the relationship of Islamophobia to racism; and whether racism as a concept ought to include intolerance, bias, stereotyping, and discrimination on the basis of religion) have a greater resonance. The backdrop to the report consists of the events of 9/11 and the growing intolerance displayed in the media, governmental institutions, and society at large toward Muslims, both individually and collectively. Centrally, the report asks how a secular society like Britain can provide a safe space, one that is free of discrimination, disrespect, and intolerance, in which Muslims can observe and practice their faith. In addition, the authors also ask two vitally important questions: Why is the anti-racist movement so reluctant to address prejudice, hate, and discrimination based on religion? and concomitantly: Should Islamophobia be defined as a form of racism, in much the same [way] that anti-Semitism clearly is, and should the full force of race relations legislation be brought to bear to defeat it?
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In the first chapter, the authors identify progress in the positive measures taken by the government and the work done by Muslim organizations. Their conclusion is that while the government deserves some credit for combating and reducing Islamophobia since 2001, the real credit goes to Muslim organizations at all levels of British society. The war in Iraq, the Terrorism Act (2000), and the Anti-Terrorism Crime Security Act (2001), as well as the increasing abrogation of the Muslims civil liberties in Britain, however, have all led to increased Islamophobia. Chapter 2 adopts a historical perspective, arguing that Islamophobia has been present in western societies for centuries and that its manifestations have changed as the sociopolitical circumstances have changed. Chapter 3 traces the demonization of Islam post-9/11 and during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It links this process to the neo-conservatism of Margaret Thatcher, who claims that Islamism is the new Bolshevism (p. 17). Chapter 4 concentrates on the argument that the very use of the term Islamophobia injects a chill into the discourse and thus stifles debate and discussion. The authors note that there are two predominant views of Islam: open and closed. Open religious communities seek alliances and partnerships, while extremists of the closed tendency form cliques, factions, and sects that can resort to militant action (p. 23). Open conceptions of Islam are more inclusive, while closed conceptions infer the other; Islams [presumed] inferiority and backwardness when compared to Christianity; Islam and aggression; and the stereotyping of Muslims in predominantly Christian societies. The open/closed debate is present within and among Muslims and Muslim scholars as well (both with respect to Islam and to conceptions of western secular societies). The chapter ends by calling for the development of an inclusive open-mindedness within the media and in mainstream society (p. 26). Chapter 5 presents interesting data on the socioeconomic circumstances of Muslims in Britain. Demographic data are linked to data on unemployment, youth unemployment, levels of poverty, and levels of urbanization and religious concentration. This chapter is closely linked to chapter 7, which looks at the challenge of unemployment among Muslims, as well as the barriers to entering the labor market and accessing services. The chapter points out that it is now illegal in Britain to discriminate on the basis of religion, and that a reasonable accommodation must be reached in the case of religious differences, as well as a reasonable adjustment to the needs of Muslim entrants in and to the labor market.
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Chapter 6 assesses the treatment of Muslims when they are victims of hate crimes, harassment, and religious hatred. The authors note that although the treatment of Muslim offenders has improved in recent years, the public perception remains that the law is soft on Muslim fundamentalist terrorists. Chapter 8 looks at identity formation, particularly among Muslim youths post-9/11, while chapter 9 analyzes the British governments social cohesion agenda. At a theoretical level, the report seeks to situate the concept and reality of social cohesion in the discourses around community and conflict. The report notes that despite some initial challenges, the social cohesion agenda does hold promise as long as it is explicit (in policies and programs) in dealing with the multiple manifestations of Islamophobia and Westophobia, criminality and drug use among Muslim youths, and leadership and authority among certain Muslim communities. Chapter 10 provides concrete ways for combating the negative stereotyping of Muslims in the media. Essentially, the question posed is who holds the media accountable for how they reproduce negative images of Muslims. The authors discuss the role of the Press Complaints Commission and strongly argue for the adoption of a professional code of ethics among journalists. They reproduce a very useful set of guidelines for journalists seeking a more balanced portrayal of Muslims. The final chapter assesses the progress made on the 60 recommendations contained in the 1997 report authored by the Commission on British Muslims. The review is mixed. The authors conclude that some progress has been made, despite the increased level of anti-Muslim prejudice in both the media and society. The overall conclusion is that the most pressing priority is for the British government and the Commission on Racial Equality to actively encourage all public bodies to incorporate a commitment to avoiding religious discrimination in their race equality schemes and policies (p. 80). This would require a concomitant duty to accommodate and promote respect between members of different faiths. Several other shortto medium-term priorities are identified, including priorities for the media, public institutions, and service delivery agencies. While the report is extremely useful and informative, the various chapters need a tighter structural organization of the material. The conceptual chapters (namely, 2, 4, and parts of 9) could have been more closely aligned, and the chapters that look at data, demographics, and indicators of exclusion could have been more readily integrated. In addition, the report weaves together both anecdotal evidence of Islamophobia and data from a variety of official sources. The latter point to manifestations of exclusion
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from the labor market and from society, to the higher rates of impoverishment faced by various Muslim communities, and to the alienation and disaffection among Muslim youths. While the data sections are very strong, the sections detailing anecdotal evidence are correspondingly weak. There is a place for narrative and anecdotes, but the authors owe it to the readers to be more analytical. If they conclude that incidents of Islamophobia are on the rise, is the evidence anecdotal? Are there human rights complaints? Are there more anecdotes now than there were before 9/11? Interestingly, the authors cite Ahmed Versi, editor of The Muslim News, who noted that even though the war in Iraq triggered fewer cases of abuse than 9/11, concern remains high (p. 31). Certainly, the anti-Muslim climate contributes to heightened fears, but it is not clear from the report that this climate has resulted in quantitatively more cases of Islamophobia than before. The report did not address these questions adequately. Overall, the report makes a very useful contribution to identifying the issues and challenges faced by Muslims in Britain. This report will be of interest to government, the anti-racism movement, Muslims individually and collectively, as well as mainstream society in Britain.
Zubeida Saloojee Professor, Child and Youth Worker Program, Community Services Division The City College George Brown, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism

Bobby S. Sayyid London: Zed Books, 2003, 2d ed. 212 pages. A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism uses critical theory to examine the Islamists political projects and their depictions. Scholars are divided between those who believe in a religious or national essence to the Muslim community (essentialists) and those who reject this assumption (anti-essentialists). In regards to a Muslim essence, Sayyid identifies two existing scholarly camps: Orientalists assume an ahistorical, acontextual Islamic essence that drives and shapes Muslim society and activity through most places and ages. Anti-Orientalists, as manifested in such writers as Hamid El-Zien, assert that there is not one Islam, but only many Islams. According to this view, Islam and indeed all religion
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cannot exist as an analytic category having a self-sustaining, positive, fixing, universal, and autonomous content; rather, religion is only manifested through particular contexts. While acknowledging an intellectual debt to Edward Said, whose critiques fed the anti-Orientalist camp, Sayyid argues for a middle path between Orientalist and anti-Orientalist understandings. Orientalists claim that the relationship between Islam and Islamism is direct, whereas antiOrientalists claim that the relationship is merely opportunistic Islam is what Marxists might call superstructural (a surface action over deeper, more real material contests) and is driven by a false consciousness. Picking theoretical fruit from writers who explored signs, ideas, and language, among them Slavoj Zizek, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Lacan, the author asks Zizeks general question: What creates and sustains the identity of a given ideological field beyond all possible variations of its ideological content? (p. 44). Analysts typically find themselves unable to answer this question without reasserting a new Orientalism. Sayyid asserts that despite the malleability of Islamic symbols and Islamist programs, Islam has retained its specificity, a term by which he means the traces of its original meaning articulated at the foundation, traces that have been invoked repeatedly. Islam is a crucial nodal point, la Jacques Lacan, retrospectively giving meaning to other elements, be they Sufi discussions, debates on fiqh, or other discourses (p. 45). Sayyid argues that the relationship between Islam and Islamists is constitutive: Both are transformed as Islamists try to articulate Islam in light of their project (p. 46). Islam can hold multiple meanings simultaneously, while retaining its position as master signifier (a term Sayyid borrows from sign theory). Within that master signifier, a struggle for nativist authenticity occurs. This produces contested constructions of meaning, which, if they are miniminally acceptable, are enacted in practice by political forces. If there are unconstrained Islams proliferating in every place and time, then it would not be necessary to invoke Islam repeatedly. But how successful is this attempt to navigate to a third understanding, one that accepts the anti-Orientalist critique of an Oriental Islamic essence while insisting that Islam matters? The author claims that the Orientalists are wrong in their simplistic and sometimes racist essentialism, while the anti-Orientalists, by depriving Islam of all positive meaning independent of political whim and exigency, are throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Some will likely critique this work as simply a quilt patched together from disparate sources, each cherry-
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picked to better support the authors favored conclusion. But that would be a shallow critique, for the text clearly aims at rigorous transparency and relies on thoroughly detailing its train of logic. When first presented as a response to the two camps, the statement Islam matters stands out rather baldly as an assertion and a polemical response. However, this book represents a serious effort to engage the literature and produce a rationale for this assertion. Despite diverse discourses, Islam has something that makes people feel that it has something in it (p. 45). That itness is Zizeks real kernel, which escapes signification and unifies and holds members of a community together as long as they believe in it (p. 46). The nation in European societies is an analogue. The communitys limit separating those who belong from those who do not is contested, yet the nations itness remains. Sayyid argues that the Kemalist moment in the Muslim world came when master signifiers other than Islam were deliberately chosen. The Islamists, who were created within this context, seek a political order in which Islam is that master signifier. Kemalism become hegemonic after the caliphate was abolished and remained so until the early 1970s. Post-colonial regimes in the Muslim world were Kemalist in that Islam was reduced from master signifier to just another element in the political order (Sayyid finds Kemalist to be more specific than secular, modernizing, or nationalist, all of which are other commonly applied labels). Kemalist authority is now in crisis, and Islamism is the main beneficiary. The great antidote to Kemals legacy was Khomeini, who, by achieving political power, demonstrated that Islamism could be more than just a politically futile articulation of protest. Not coincidentally, Islamisms rise has accompanied the erosion of Eurocentrism and the global process of the provincialization of Europe (p. 155). Eurocentrism is a project struggling to maintain its political-cultural hegemony, and Europe is becoming less exceptional, less the undisputed development model. This perceptual and tangible shift marks a more level playing field for political contestation between and among global actors. In these times, nation-building has become an accepted policy activity. If the European nation is an analogue to the Muslim religious community, and Napoleon could intentionally seek to build French national identity, why not build religion and manipulate its political consequences? Surely political leaders and revolutionaries would like to transform religious meaning in ways that further their goals. Even fundamentalists are often innovators, who introduce novel interpretations into traditional religion.
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They cannot be assumed to follow the Shariàh only, despite their early rhetoric. Sayyids work implies that there are limits to such intentional manipulation. His language is a little cluttered and can be hard to follow. To be fair, however, rendering linguistic and semantic theory intelligible to the nonspecialist is a difficult task and may lend itself to such density. This slim volume packs complex reflections, and sets out on a journey that takes the reader through many theoretical islands. The author is erudite and can be sardonic, even polemical, thus livening up the readers experience.
Anas Malik Assistant Professor of Political Science Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio
Transnational Political Islam: Religion, Ideology, and Power

Azza Karam, ed. London: Pluto Books, 2004. 157 pages. Amid the escalating conflicts and polarizations separating Muslim from Westerner, the book under review is a helpful contribution to the academic and policy literature. Prominent anti-immigrant right-wing movements, such as those led by Pim Fortyn (the Netherlands) and Jean-Marie Le Pen (France), have seen their perspectives enter and influence mainstream politics. Recently, Dutch movie director Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Muslim on the grounds that he had demeaned Islam. Demonstrations against the brutal murder and attacks on Muslim institutions followed. The alreadyoverheated climate of antagonism has risen by several degrees. These developments are echoed in other clashes in Europe revolving around identity politics, such as the hijab issue in France. Western states are coping with the dual demands posed by integration and police work: seeking to integrate Muslims into European and American societies while simultaneously pursuing terrorist cells and networks. Azza Karams edited volume considers such questions as the relationship between political Islam and violence, distinguishing extremism from moderate Islam (often presumed to be mainstream Islam), and how Muslims in the West relate to these. Karams volume includes articles covering France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands (all described as non-English speaking countries with less English scholarly literature on these topics),
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and Albania (featuring an Islamic population but not necessarily an Islamic culture). Diversity within the Dutch, French, German, Swedish, and Albanian Muslim communities is a key theme noted by the contributing authors. In the Netherlands, such diversity makes a mass Muslim political movement difficult to create and then sustain. While Islamists have appealed to EuroMuslim communities for logistical and financial support, so have other actors, such as secular Turkish authorities who train imams to serve Turks in Germany. Sweden is faced with integrating its Muslim minority into Swedish society. Muslim organizations that engage in politics risk losing state subsidies. Jan Hjarpe argues that political Islam has become marginal to the integration process, commensurate with the general privatization of religion and the replacement of collective social norms with individualistic ones. Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) becomes absorbed as an individual choice rather than as a moral or social order. An immigrant generation gap is causing a significant rift among immigrant Muslims. Karams volume also includes an intriguing chapter by Amr Hamzawy on Al-Manar al-Jadid (The New Lighthouse), an Islamist periodical that may be compared to the original Al-Manar, published by Rashid Rida in the early twentieth century and then in 1939-40 by Hassan al-Banna, the founder of Egypts Muslim Brotherhood. Despite its failure to live up to its proclaimed goal of genuine dialogue with non-Islamist intellectual currents, it contains rich internal dialogues among Islamists and, in particular, the modernizers questions. Hamzawy notes what may be the most significant development in Al-Manar al-Jadid: the interrogation of previously sacrosanct Islamist premises. One such premise is the traditional distaste for political parties, which are opposed for embodying hizbiyah (divisive factionalism). Inside this periodical, a prominent record of Islamist ideological discourse, intellectual challenge, and self-critique has taken root. This both enriches and complicates the effort to reach definitive conclusions about Islamisms policy platform. There are some theoretical oddities: Karam makes the grammatically curious claim that the name Al-Qaida is neither a noun (such as al-Ikhwan [the Brotherhood]) nor a verb (Karam gives islah [reform] as an example, but this is the noun form of the verb to reform.). Karam offers the insight that al-Qaeda means more than simply the base, as it is usually translated, and can mean the rule, principle, or norm according to which thinking and planning are organized, and which apparently recognizes no nation or boundary (p. 4). But the name was a label quickly adopted and reified by
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media reports, and its choice might be more a reflection of western fears and perceptions than a thoughtful decision by Islamists. Any attempt to discuss political Islam, Muslim political consciousness, and fundamentalists inevitably includes some effort to classify and categorize. Karam chooses a Venn diagram featuring three intersecting circles. The circles are labeled Islamists (politically engaged Muslims who seek to make governance and society more Islamic), fundamentalists (who hold literal interpretations of sacred texts, are less creative in interpreting religious understanding, and may or may not be politically engaged), and average Muslims, who are, presumably, the rest of the identifiably Muslim community. Why and how these circles intersect is unexplained; as defined, the categories appear to be mutually exclusive. Karam describes Islamist thinking as a continuum ranging from moderate to radical/extremist/militant tendencies, and acknowledges that where movements belong is controversial and greatly affected by the analysts prior politicial proclivities. Moderate Islamists, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, are gradualists who participate in elections and seek peaceful change and social transformation; radical Islamists, such as the Islamic Jihad in Egypt, see violence as a legitimate means to an end. Radicals may veer toward moderation on some issues at some times, such as Hizbollahs participation in Lebanese parliamentary elections. Conversely, moderates may become radicalized, as happened to Algerias Islamic Salvation Front after the military annulled its 1991 election victory with its 1992 intervention. Such structural changes as the disintegration of social bonds and emergent hostile attitudes contribute to polarization, a situation that mirrors the youre either with us or against us thinking that has prevailed in the United States since the 9/11 tragedy. As conflicts escalate, they are accompanied by such structural changes as disintegrating social bonds between groups, increasingly hostile attitudes, and new militant leaders. The result is polarization, where being pro-West is tantamount to being anti-Islam. The potential for mass political engagement grows as individuals are forced to identify their allegiances to one of the two camps. Karam does note the impact that blowback (viz., misinformation resulting from the recirculation into the source country of disinformation previously planted abroad by that countrys intelligence service) has on transnational Muslim communities. However, considering a wider class of structural changes could enrich this books predictive component. Several voices in the American policy arena (e.g., the RAND Corporation and the Defense Science Board among them) have suggested that the
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United States should support the moderates in order to undermine the radicals. Karam elegantly advocates strategic alliances between westerners and moderate Islamists framed around international social justice, for moderate Islamists have more legitimacy than the existing governments in important Muslim countries. This volume provides insights into who these moderates might be, while noting the popular support for anti-American, pro-Islam platforms in election campaign tickets and using the religious coalition Muttahida Majlis-e-Amals rise in Pakistan as an example. Karams work refuses to adopt a simplistic generalized understanding of the transnational Muslim community. Given a context in which crude and superficial punditry dominates popular perceptions, this is a valuable and timely contribution.
Anas Malik Assistant Professor of Political Science Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio
Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century
Mark Sedgwick New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 370 pages. One effect of 9/11 has been that Muslim voices, which until then had been mostly ignored, are increasingly reaching a wider audience of other Muslims and non-Muslims. In Europe and North America, this has meant that selfidentified progressive Muslim scholars who emphasize social justice, as well as traditional Muslims who emphasize Islams spiritual or esoteric dimension, have been contributing in a much more vocal manner to the contemporary interpretation of what it means to be Muslim. Since most of the leading figures presented herein are Sufi Muslims of a particular strand of esoteric Islam, this book helps fill an important lacuna concerning the development of the traditionalist position a position that has been voiced by such Muslim scholars as Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Martin Lings. Sedgwick promotes the book as a biography of Ren Gunon (18861951) and an intellectual history of the traditionalist movement that he inaugurated in the early twentieth century. Gunons movement combines elements of perennial philosophy, which holds that certain perennial problems recur in humanitys philosophical concerns, and that this perennial wisdom is now only found in the traditional forms of the world religions.
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More specifically, Gunon started a movement that turned to particular Sufi orders as the best expression of that perennial wisdom. But while billing the book as a biography in fact, Sedgwick is done with Gunon in the first half of the book and an intellectual history (in other words, rather dry academic stuff), the book reads very much like a spy novel from the days of the cold war. Moreover, the author appears very much as a sleuth seeking out far-flung, but secret, connections and influences. The tone of the book is thus conspiratorial and, in many instances, sensationalistic. Such a tone may be partly justified by the secretive and elitist aspects of Gunons own approach. However, the sensationalism with which Sedgwick presents much of the material, particularly on the irregularities in the understanding and practice of traditionalism by Frithjof Schuon, a follower of Gunons movement and later a dissenter in some important respects, seems unbecoming for an academic work published by a respectable university press. The Prologue is written in an impressionistic narrative style that highlights two puzzles that drive Sedgwicks investigation of traditionalism: How many western Muslims could follow the traditionalist movement, in particular the Maryammiyah tariqah, given Schuons irregularities; and how Baron J. Evola extended traditionalist philosophy into European fascism. The rest of the book sets out not so much to explain these puzzles as to lead the reader in what is clearly meant to be an exciting, if somewhat dark and detective-like, historical reconstruction. The rest of the book is divided into three parts. Part 1 (chapters 1-3), The Development of Traditionalism, sketches the cultic milieu (e.g., Freemasonry, the Theosophical Society, and other western forays into eastern spirituality) of the early twentieth century that partly influenced Gunon and to which he also reacted by turning to the esoteric strands of the major world religions, especially Islam and Hinduism. Part 2 (chapters 4-6), Traditionalism in Practice, gradually shifts from Gunons role in traditionalism to Evolas moving it toward fascism (chapter 5) and, more importantly, to Schuons megalomaniacal conceptions and his role in fragmenting the movement (chapter 6). Part 3, Traditionalism at Large, mainly follows the developments of Schuons Maryamiyah tariqah (chapters 7 and 8) and details his deviations not only from Sufism, but also from perennialism and traditionalism. These deviations resulted in highly explosive, if ultimately unproven, charges by disenchanted followers. Part 4 (chapters 11-14), Traditionalism and the Future, reads very much like a dnoument with a discussion of the declin-
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ing role of Gunonian traditionalism in the West and its uptake in such countries as Morocco, Turkey, and Iran through Nasrs continuing legacy there. The concluding chapter, Against the Stream, attempts to give theoretical rigor to what is largely a non-theoretical book and, in so doing, gives it the academic standing that it deserves. As I indicated earlier, Sedgwicks book addresses an important lacuna, and for this it needs to be taken seriously. However, the book is ultimately marred by sensationalism, which is expressed throughout via innuendos and speculative reconstructions, more than is usual in academic accounts. However, the author appears to be scrupulous in acknowledging such reconstructions in various footnotes. If we read the Prologue in microcosm, Sedgwick raises suspicions of a far-flung and somewhat threatening secret network, only to come back to the view of traditionalism as a deeply religious/spiritual movement of intelligent and sensitive people who feel alienated from the modern world. He finally dismisses the connection to fascism as marginal to the movement and regards the irregularities of Schuons practice as rooted in Schuons own practice, rather than in anything inherent to traditionalism as a movement. But the damage to other traditionalists is done along the way, intentionally or otherwise, by the implied associations. My second reservation pertains to Sedgwicks inability or unwillingness to answer some very important questions that he implicitly raises. For instance, whereas traditionalist authors decry the ability of critical, scientific scholarship to understand the fundamental truths of religion, critical scholars decry the traditionalists preconceived notions of truth and unity. Herein lies an important distinction between the concerns of Sedgwicks subjects and the method he uses to analyze them. He is clearly aware of this, for as one of his informants says: What matters is metaphysics, biographies are of little account (p. 133). Sedgwicks book is itself an implicit testimonial to this distinction between universal, eternal categories and contingent historical facts. Too bad he does not address this issue more thoroughly, although given the mode of analysis, we clearly know where he stands. But one is surprised to learn, at the end, that Sedgwick does not entirely dismiss the universalist truths of traditionalism; he merely separates them out as belonging to a different order of reality than the truths of critical, scientific discourse. And in this implicit acknowledgment of the separate orders of reality and of discourse, one can perceive Sedgwicks own residual traditionalism.
Ali Hassan Zaidi Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology York University, Toronto, Canada
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Islam in the African-American Experience

Richard Brent Turner Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003, 2d ed. 312 pages. Islam in the African-American Experience is a historical account of Islam in the African-American community. Written by a scholar of AfricanAmerican world studies and religious studies, this book focuses on the interconnection between African Americans experiences with Islam as it developed in the United States. While this scholarly work is invaluable for students and professors in academia, it is also a very important contribution for anyone seriously interested in Islams development in this country. Moreover, it serves as a central piece in the puzzle for Muslims anxious to understand Islams history in the United States and the relationship between African-American and immigrant Muslims. The use of narrative biographies throughout the book adds to its personal relevance, for they relate the personal history of ancestors, known and unknown, to Islams history in this country. Turners work furthers African-American Muslims journey toward unlocking their history. The main concept expressed in Turners book is that of signification, the issue of naming and identity among African Americans. Turner argues that signification runs throughout the history of Islam among African Americans, dating back to the west coast of Africa, through the Nation of Islam, to many of its members conversion to orthodox Sunni Islam, and through Islamic messages disseminated via contemporary hip-hop culture. According to Turner, Charles Long refers to signification as a process by which names, signs and stereotypes were given to non-European realities and peoples during the western conquest and exploration of the world (p. 2). The renaming of Africans by their oppressors was a method of dehumanization and subjugation. The author argues that throughout the history of African-American Muslims, Islam served to undercut signification by offering African Americans a chance to signify themselves (p. 3). Self-signification is an antithesis to the oppressive use of signification, for it facilitates empowerment and growing independence from the dominant group. In addition, signification involved double meanings. It was both a potent form of oppression and a potent form of resistance to oppression (p. 3). By choosing Muslim names, whether they were Muslim or not, Turner claims that
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African Americans made a statement about their identity political, cultural, or religious. This book, a major contribution to our understanding of the development of African-American Muslim identity formation, is divided into three sections: an Introduction to the Second Edition, Root Sources, and Prophets of the City. The first section explores the impact of the 9/11 tragedy on Muslims in the United States. Turner considers the growth of Islamophobia, the rise of hate crimes, and the use of federal legislation to legitimize civil rights violations against Muslims and promote the erosion of civil liberties by exploring how African-American Muslims have been impacted. This introduction also explores Islams impact on contemporary culture among African Americans. Jazz and hip-hop culture have been influenced by Islam and, conversely, these musical genres have served as an impetus for the spread of Islam in this country and throughout its urban centers. Additionally, it acknowledges the divide between African-American and immigrant Muslims, which was highlighted as a result of the 2001 election of George W. Bush and the post-9/11 era of discrimination faced by immigrant Muslims. Such a situation, however, has been a long-standing experience for all African Americans regardless of their religion. The next section, Root Sources, provides a comprehensive and detailed history of Muslims of African descent in the United States from the trans-atlantic slave trade through the twentieth century. In this section, Turner tells the stories of such African Muslims as Estevan, the Moroccan guide, interpreter, and explorer who is the first identifiable Muslim in North America. We learn how Muslim Africans maintained their religious and ethnic identities during slavery from the stories of Abd al-Rahman Ibrahima, Omar ibn Said, Lamine Kaba (Kebe), Yarrow Mamout, Bilali Mohamed, and Salih Bilali. Turner suggests that preserving their African names, religious clothing and practices, and ethnic/tribal identities helped African Muslims maintain their identity and resist the institution of slavery. The final section, Prophets of the City, tells the stories of AfricanAmerican Muslims who coexisted with immigrant Muslims in American urban centers. Here, Turner looks at urbanization, migration, and immigration as key factors that helped sensitize African Americans to Islam in the early 1900s. First, he argues that the Great Migration from the South to the northern urban centers during the first half of the twentieth century served as a link to global Islam because urbanization is a context for understanding signification and identity in West Africa and Black America (p. 73). Second, because the first African-American-based Islamic movements orig-
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inated in the cities, urbanization is an important factor. And third, it is in the urban centers that immigrant Muslims and African Americans converged and forged the link to global Islam and opportunities, missed or taken, to reintroduce African Americans to Islam. This section also discusses the little-known role of the Ahmadiyah Mission in introducing African Americans to Islam and presenting a multiracial model of Islam in the United States. Turner also discusses signification and identity as it relates to Marcus Garveys Pan-African movement, Noble Drew Alis Moorish Science Temple, the Nation of Islam, the Darul Islam community, Sufi paths, and Warith Deen Muhammads community. Key figures in Islams development among African Americans (e.g., Elijah Muhammad, El Hajj Malik El Shabazz [a.k.a. Malcolm X], Warith Deen Muhammad, Wali Akram of Cleveland, and Sheik Daoud Ahmed Faisal of Brooklyns State Street Mosque) are also shared with readers. Islam in the African-American Experience is a well organized, yet fluid, account of the early historical background necessary to prepare readers to understand the more contemporary issues of signification among AfricanAmerican Muslims. Turner weaves the concepts of signification and identity throughout the book, masterfully making the connection to historical periods and personalities. His book is a valuable contribution to the literature about Islam in the United States and, more specifically, to our understanding of the historical and contemporary identity formation and maintenance of religious identity among Muslims of African decent in a society that has institutionalized racism and vilified Islam. Turner has successfully connected global Islam, Islam in the United States, and the experience of African-American Muslims in this cutting-edge historical piece.
Aneesah Nadir Assistant Professor, Department of Social Work, College of Human Services Arizona State University at the West Campus, Phoenix, Arizona President, Islamic Social Services Association U.S.A.
Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War against Iraq

Paul Rutherford Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Inc., 2004. 226 pages. The concept of a public body deluded into believing whatever its leaders assert as truth might seem to recall Marxist theories of media and society.
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But this is an element of the reality painted by Paul Rutherford in his Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War against Iraq, in which he examines Washingtons promotion of the war and its effectiveness in winning public support despite misinformation. Public opinion has been key to maintaining support for the war and the tremendous amount of money that it continues to pull out of the American economy. Rutherford investigates the marketing strategy, illustrates its effects, and explores the significance of the experiment. His analysis provides an insightful look into how Washington was able to convince the American people of the false threat of weapons of mass destruction and raises important questions about what the Bush administrations persuasion experiment means for American democracy. The author dedicates the first three chapters to analyzing how the weapons of mass persuasion were deployed. However, the heart of his study lies in the effects of those weapons on individuals and society. His research is centered in Canada and draws from its government and press. This makes it difficult to discern who is the focus of his analysis is it Canadians, Americans, the Middle East, or the world at large? At the start, the reader is introduced to a panel of 20 Canadian citizens of varying backgrounds, living in and around Toronto, whom Rutherford has interviewed for consumer voices. These voices offer a sense of the impact of translating huge events and decisions into personal experience. But as they are Canadian (not American) consumers of media products, this becomes a little problematic when discussing the effects of propaganda. After all, the most significant target of Washingtons pro-war propaganda is American public opinion. His fifth chapter relies almost entirely on consumer voices to illustrate how people construct their own meanings from what they see and read about the world. On an individual basis, this is effective mass media scholars have theorized endlessly about how a viewer receives a mediated message and forms a perception of reality based on his or her experience, culture, and time frame. Rutherford explains, for instance, how one viewer relied on his personal knowledge of the Middle East to filter what he saw on television, and another read widely before the war on the American case for invasion. But these consumers are all Canadians, and their views, even of CNN or Fox News, will differ because of their cultural distance. His panel saw those networks messages as particularly American, and therefore manipulative a panel of American voices might tell a different story and paint a more accurate picture of the effects of such marketing.
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But even for his panel, the seduction of such repeated messages as liberate Iraq and spread democracy was strong enough to sway some of them, thereby showing the effectiveness of the marketing campaign, which Rutherford explores earlier. Marketing is an apt metaphor for a campaign designed to sway a body politic toward a certain goal, and Rutherford takes the time to explain it fully. He describes the nature of effective marketing advertising, for example, that entertains, titillates, and appeals to familiar, pop-culture storylines and sets the stage for explaining the marketing of Iraq the movie as propaganda, an assertion of supposed facts rather than an argument. Polls taken well after the war began revealed that a majority of Americans still believed the Bush administrations earlier assertions of, for instance, an Iraqal-Qaeda link or the imminent threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). In fact, Rutherford discusses these key selling points in chapter 2: the threat that Iraq posed to the United States and to peace in the Middle East and to the world, and the liberation of Iraq from Saddams tyranny. This was the fall and winter of 2002-03, when American airwaves were thick with the debate over weapons inspections. Although the United Nations was not swayed by Colin Powells February 2003 attempt to gain its support, much of the American public considered his assertions that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons legitimate. The success of the propaganda, as the author explains in chapter 3, was due to the role played by the mainstream media, which co-opted such Pentagon terminology as shock and awe, regime change, and several other military phrases. Embedded reporters, as well as analysts and anchors, served as what author and media critic Norman Solomon called, during the October 2001 strike on Afghanistan, stenographers for the Pentagon rather than true journalists. They served the purpose of the Pentagons war plan, which, Rutherford argues, was to make the war appealing by whitewashing negative aspects while increasing the publics fear of a credible enemy. Here, he begins to examine the marketing campaigns effects. With the 24hour availability of Pentagon-scripted news coverage exciting, movie-like, and untainted by such downers as civilian casualties viewers were shunted away from the full story and lured into the story that the Bush administration wanted them to see. The authors analysis of the weapons of mass persuasion culminates in the ominous-sounding propaganda state, in which insidious marketing measures are paraded as popular culture in order to manage the publics fears and desires while maintaining the illusion of true democracy. He states that
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the propaganda state receded with the April 2003 fall of Baghdad and the capture of Saddam, but a little more hindsight by early 2005 shows otherwise. If the Bush administration had to engage in damage control after its failure to locate any WMDs and the loss of thousands of Iraqi and American lives, it did so successfully enough to ensure it another 4-year term in office. It has fought back in the public arena by pointing to the January 30, 2005, Iraqi elections as a sign of success and asserting that it does not matter if there were no WMDs because the world is now safer. Rutherfords postscript in the summer/fall of 2003 details the effect of the collapse of Washingtons marketing exercise, but Bushs November 2004 victory shows that its efforts were not in vain. At the very start of his book, Rutherford declares his own anti-war perspective, based on the international illegitimacy of the Iraq invasion. Although this view, as well as the mostly informed and generally anti-war perspectives of the panel, colors the book, his analysis can still serve as a pertinent contemporary examination of relationships between the government, the media, and the public. It would be intriguing to follow the same analysis after some major policy or administration change perhaps after the end of the so-called war on terror, if an end is possible. Such a study might be better able to illuminate the true effects of mass persuasion on a democracy.
Ayesha Ahmad Community Reporter, The Gazette Prince Georges County, Maryland
Muslims in America: Race, Politics, and Community Building

Mbaye Lo Beltsville, MD: amana publications, 2004. 152 pages. To date, most of the literature on Muslims in the United States has discussed the formation and growth of this population from a national perspective. Few studies, however, examine the dynamics of specific Muslim communities from a local, city-specific context. Mbaye Lo attempts to fill this gap through his research on the history of Muslims in Cleveland, Ohio, in his book Muslims in America: Race, Politics, and Community Building. This book aims to present a comprehensive historical assessment of Muslim communities in Cleveland by providing a detailed examination of their history, their faith and the challenges they face as they establish mosques, develop Islamic centers, and create a multiethnic community (p. 2). Using
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various sources of data, such as oral histories of influential figures in the Cleveland area and local and national surveys conducted on Muslims in the United States, Lo discovers that the history of Islam in Cleveland is a local phenomenon with both national and global derivations (p. 3). American immigration policies, the civil rights movement, and new interpretations of Islam are some of the factors that affected the growth of Muslim populations throughout the nation and in Cleveland. Lo traces the genesis of the Muslim community to Ahmadi missionaries who arrived in the city from India in the early 1900s. Shortly after their arrival, Ahmadis found great success in inviting African Americans to convert to Islam, creating the foundation for what was to become a burgeoning Muslim community. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the arrival of immigrant Muslims and members of the Nation of Islam to Cleveland helped the community expand, while also introducing new versions of Islam to the citys resident Muslims. Ironically, this influx of Muslim outsiders to Cleveland resulted in both the growth and the division of its Muslim population. Some of the most interesting sections in Los book include excerpts from the speeches and diaries of influential individuals who affected both the national and local development of Islam in the country and in Cleveland. For example, Lo shares a quote from a famous speech given by Malcolm X in Cleveland in April 1964, entitled The Ballot or the Bullet. During this speech, Malcolm X discussed two characteristics that Lo feels were essential elements in the formation of African-American Muslim communities: political activism and black nationalism. In addition to Malcolm Xs speech, Lo also quotes from the diary of Imam Wali Akram, who was reportedly the second American citizen to have completed the pilgrimage [Hajj] to the Holy Land [Mecca, Saudi Arabia] (p. 66). Lo identifies Akram as one of the first African-American converts in Cleveland and the first convert in the city to lead a mosque. Similar to his discussion of Malcolm X, Lo draws a clear link between Akrams significance to the history of Muslims in the United States to his more direct importance to Muslims in Cleveland, proving his earlier assertion that the history of Islam in Cleveland is a local phenomenon with both national and global derivations (p. 3). In addition to speeches, diaries, and other sources of qualitative information, chapter 6 contains a survey that Lo used in his research. He states that this survey was developed and distributed to 500 Muslims in Cleveland in order to answer questions that would otherwise remain unanswerable (p. 2), such as current trends in Clevelands present-day Muslim population. In a brief description of the methods he used, the author relates that
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the survey was distributed through area mosques during Friday prayers, the Cleveland Community Islamic School, the Muslim Student Association of a local university, stores selling Muslim products, and friends and students who tried to reach less observant Muslims (p. 113). The survey includes 17 questions about the participants ethnicity, gender, educational and religious backgrounds, and religious affiliation. In his discussion of the survey, Lo explains each of the analytical units used and supplements his discussion with charts and graphs depicting the survey results. While survey information always has the potential to complement historical and qualitative data, the design and analysis of Los survey are problematic. Of prime concern is the absence of a discussion on the survey results possible limitations. For example, although he finds that only onethird of the respondents were female while two-thirds were male (p. 119), he does not discuss the possible causes of the resulting outcome (e.g., his method of survey distribution) or its effects (e.g., skewed findings). Additionally, not all of the charts and graphs are adequately labeled. For instance, a line graph on page 125 does not include any units of measure on the vertical axis, making it difficult, if not impossible, to understand. Finally, although Lo identifies Ahmadi and Nation of Islam Muslims (two groups often positioned outside of Islamic orthodoxy) as having a large impact on the development of Clevelands Muslim community in the earlier portion of his book, he provides no explanation for the surveys exclusively orthodox Muslim (p. 117) sample in this chapter. The language, structure, and focus of Muslims in America appear to speak to a general readership. For most readers, the basic introduction to Islam and Muslims and the insights into the politics of community building will be the most informative aspects of this book. However, the books title misleads readers into believing that it also includes an extended discussion about Muslims in the broader American context, when, in fact, such discussions are limited. More significantly, with no references to important female figures who actively participated in the development of Clevelands Muslim community, Los historical account is incomplete and risks inaccuracy. Lastly, the numerous spelling and grammatical mistakes are a distraction. With a little extra editorial care and a more reflective scholarly practice, this book could have been all the more enriching.
Shaza Khan Ph.D. Candidate, Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development University of Rochester, New York
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Fundamentals of Rumis Thought: A Mevlevi Sufi Perspective

Sefik Can (ed. and trans. by Zeki Saritoprak) New Jersey: The Light, 2004. 317 pages. Is there room on the shelf for another book about Jalal al-Din Rumi, the thirteenth-century mystic of Persia? Considering the great depth of his genius, the answer has to be yes. Sefik Cans Fundamentals of Rumis Thought is one of the latest books on the subject, and is distinguished from others in that its author is the current head of the Mevlevi order, the Sufi order established after Rumis death and based on his teachings. In his biography, the author is introduced as the most authoritative spiritual figure of the Order and the latest living Mesnevihan (Mesnevi reciter) who received his ijazah (special certificate in the recitation of the Mesnevi) from his spiritual master Tahir al-Mevlevi. This book thus reflects the Mevlevi tradition as it is understood within its Turkish milieu today. Neatly organized into four chapters, it deals with the political and historical background of Anatolia during Rumis lifetime (chapter 1), Rumis Personality and Views (chapter 2), his influence (chapter 3), and Rumis Sufi Order and His Approach to Orders (chapter 4). A short bibliography and an index are also provided. Throughout many passages, one can feel the authors love and compassion for Rumi. His sincerity and enthusiasm compel one to set aside academic concerns over historical accuracy and critical analysis in order to view Rumi from a Mevlevi perspective. The book offers insight into a living devotional approach to Rumi that often translates into an uplifting joy, which is the hallmark of Rumis poems and which has animated the life of many of his devotees. The reader will benefit from the relevant spiritual insights offered. The section entitled Beauty is a good example of explaining Rumis views and relating them to contemporary experiences. The author writes:
According to Rumi, beauty takes us from ourselves, frees us from the prison of the body, and brings us closer to another realm, to God. Thus we find God within the impact of the fine arts on sensitive people. (p. 191)
The heart of this book is chapter 2, which features the authors interpretations of Rumis personality and views (pp. 97-246). Although a small portion of this chapter is devoted to Rumis life and characteristics, most of it
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deals with such issues as asceticism and ecstasy, love, belief and disbelief, salvation, reason, beauty, poetry, music and whirling ceremonies, sorrow, free will, and reincarnation. The section subtitled Women immediately catches ones eye, because it is rare to find an exposition of this topic in studies on Rumi. However, there are no groundbreaking interpretations here, only conventional and apologetic explanations of Rumis views. The author generalizes Rumis views by explaining the differences between the sexes through a recourse to scientific facts, then compares the improved status of women in Islam to other religions and societies. A questionable saying of Prophet Muhammad is left without a footnote reference: There is no doubt that women are counterparts, similar, and equivalent to men. Mentioning a few degrading stories about women in the Mesnevi, he notes that Rumis goal is not to belittle women, but to point out that women are created with more sensitivity than men so that human beings could multiply and populate Earth:
God has put more love and affection into womens hearts than into the hearts of men. God has created women with this nature so that they may endure the difficulty of childbirth and motherhood. (p. 198)
All in all, there is a far greater depth to the mystical importance of Rumis views of women and sexuality than is apparent in this brief section. A distinguishing strength of this book is its refusal to betray the truth of Rumi as a Muslim and a Sufi. It is a common error of many irresponsible expositions of Rumis views and ideas to remove him from his Islamic context, as if he were somehow an exception to the norm. Rumi is one of the better-known figures of a Sufi tradition that emulates the Prophets example. This is a prophetic tradition of embodying sincerity, compassion, and the wisdom of inner meanings even as it uncompromisingly defends Islams principles and diligently upholds its external forms. From all indications in this book, Sefik Can himself is a good representative of this tradition. At opportune moments in the book, he is quick to point out that the message of transcendent love, acceptance, and diversity, which characterize Sufism in general and Rumi in particular, are products of Islamic civilization and reflective of Islams true essence. He writes:
In this book, I have tried to explain Rumis views on various issues with examples from his works so that one does not have the impression that his holiness has brought new, innovative ideas to religion. This great saint cannot be outside of the Muhammadi path. (p. 194)
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Scholars of contemporary expressions of Sufism should find this book very interesting. Contrary to its back-cover endorsement that promises an astonishing level of engagement with all of the classical Persian sources, this engagement is kept to a bare minimum. This book remains a devotional work. True to its subtitle, it is A Mevlevi Sufi Perspective. On a more academic note, the author has a somewhat uncritical approach to historical sources or facts of common knowledge. For example, Khorasan is not a city in modern Iran it is a province. The bibliography is meager, the editorial work rather careless, and the translator has kept the Turkish spellings, thereby saddling the reader with the task of deciphering many names and terms that have traveled from Arabic to Persian to Turkish and then to English. The reader might be well advised to read the epilogue first, where the author humbly refers the reader back to Rumi, whom he describes as: This great person that we love, this great saint whose ideas we cannot quite understand, this sultan of lovers of God.
Mahdi Tourage Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada
All American Yemeni Girls: Being Muslim in a Public School

Loukia K. Sarroub Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005. 158 pages. In her book, Loukia Sarroub offers an ethnographic account of the lives of six Yemeni-American girls by following them through public schools from 1997-2002 to obtain a deeper and richer understanding of their day-to-day lives at home and at school (p. 19). By observing them in the school, home, malls, and mosque, as well as at their communitys social occasions, Sarroub investigates the tensions between their lives and identities in the American public school system and their family lives at home, both in the United States and in Yemen, their land of origin. In the first chapter, Sarroub details the theories behind her ethnographic research, introduces the research background, reviews the research methodology, and gives an overview of the participants. In chapter 2, she chooses Layla, one of the Yemeni-American girls, as a representative of the group. As Sarroub explains, Layla struggled to find a space for herself, because it was not always clear to her whether she was
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an American or a Yemeni, and her attitude toward her home and school lives reflected her consternation with both identities (p. 30). Being an Arab Muslim woman myself and living as a minority in a western society, I can relate to the struggle between gender roles. The girls roles are prescribed by culture and traditions, and their gender identity is constructed in ways that have been influenced by American society. Therefore, I expected the author to provide a more detailed analysis of how adolescents construct their gender identity in both Arab Muslim Yemeni and secular American cultures. In addition, I found Sarroubs description of the participants as living as sojourners to be powerful. This expression was used to highlight the fact that many Yemeni-American girls remain geopolitically, linguistically, religiously, and culturally isolated from American life while maintaining those same ties to their homeland (p. 22). This, in turn, explains the struggle of constructing, negotiating, and sustaining their identity as both Yemeni and American. However, the tension these girls live as a daily reality, which was analyzed in most of the authors discussion, cannot be described only as that belonging to a sojourner, but more as conflict and brutal struggle. In Sarroubs own words, their lives illustrated the irreconcilability of the spaces they inhibited (p. 29). Indeed, the lives that these young women live are, in a way, contradictory to one another. They live in a small Yemeni village, with all of its traditions and values, within the borders of the United States. Another way to describe this ethnographic research is as a struggle between modernity and the traditions of young Yemeni-American immigrants, which is the greatest challenge facing Muslims families and youths who live in a western culture. In chapters 3 through 6, Sarroub examines many points that reflect the complexities in the Yemeni-American girls lives. One of these is the meaning of success. The author stresses that these girls struggled and thus managed to succeed beyond many of their parents expectations. According to Sarroub, a lot of research says that if children are disadvantaged by being poor or having little emphasis on education at home, they will not do well. However, as Sarroub notes, the Yemeni-American students main informants of this research were an exception to this stereotype. My concern here is the success that Sarroub noted, and if it only applied to the six informants or to all Yemeni-American girls. I found that her explanation of the success of Yemeni-American girls was contradictory, for she concluded that they are unlikely to benefit from or contribute to American society (p. 117).
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Sarroub also describes how Yemeni-American girls classroom experiences were liberating; however, the high school experience remains fragmented because of incompatible differences between home and school. Did these Yemeni girls use their marginal status in both worlds the American and the Yemeni? Did they use the home and school to fashion a place of value and meaning for themselves, a place in which to construct their identities? These questions were left unanswered. Another important aspect of Sarroubs research involved interviews following the 9/11 tragedy. She writes: Both before and after September 11, 2001, the girls were torn between American norms and their religious beliefs as well as traditional expectations of their parents and peers (p. 127). Even though she did not elaborate on the consequences of 9/11 as a tragic event for the already struggling Yemeni-American girls, she provides her personal reflection as being a member of the other in the United States new racial profiling policies. In the final chapter, the author provides personal accounts not only of the ethnographic research, but specifically of her position as the researcher of Dearborns Yemeni-American community before and after the 9/11 tragedy. Her analysis would have benefited from an examination of what Homi Bhabha refers to as the hybrid third space of identity formation as a way of addressing the complexity of negotiations of identity in a diasporic context. Despite a lack of detailed discussion on cultural values and religious teachings, and the differences between the two, this ethnographic research is a valuable tool for western and Muslim educators and researchers who want to understand young immigrants. The book highlights the struggles of minority youth in the public education system in North America. More specifically, it gives an insiders examination of the dualistic nature of what it means to be a young Arab Muslim woman in a secular society. Several interesting questions are raised, and answers are attempted. The book All American Yemeni Girls: Being Muslim in a Public School may be mistitled. The research it describes cannot claim to represent the experiences of all Yemeni-American girls in the United States. In the authors own words: They are not representative of all schools or teachers or students or communities across the United States (p. 2). Thus, a more fitting title for the book could be American Yemeni Muslim Girls Negotiating Their Identity between Two Worlds. This would reflect clearly the YemeniAmerican girls struggles. Overall, the book provides an exploration of
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many aspects and challenges faced by some young minorities in North American society, particularly in the United States.
Amani Hamdan Alghamdi PhD Candidate, Education Studies, Curriculum Studies and Pedagogy Gender, Equity and Social Justice University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada
Confessions of an Economic Hit Man

John Perkins San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2004. 250 pages. Confessions of an Economic Hit Man is the story of why the so-called developing never seems to develop, as seen through the eyes of John Perkins, who was involved in developing several oil-rich nations. The opening chapters deal with his childhood, which was permeated with elitism and ideas of how only the right people really mattered, his subsequent rebellion by defying his parents plan for his life, his initial contacts (through his wife) with government employment, and a 2-year Peace Corps stint with an indigenous Indian tribe in Ecuador. While there, he was recruited by the National Security Agency. After his time was up, he was hired by Chas. T. Main, Inc. to devise a 25-year forecast of seriously inflated electricity needs for Indonesia so that it would agree to take out an enormous loan. He did so, albeit with some misgivings, and his career as an economic hit man (EMH) was launched. Claudine, his handler, made his task perfectly clear:
Were a small, exclusive club, she said. Were paid well paid to cheat countries around the globe out of billions of dollars. A large part of your job is to encourage world leaders to become part of a vast network that promotes U.S. commercial interests. In the end, those leaders become ensnared in a web of debt that ensures their loyalty. We can draw on them whenever we desire to satisfy our political, economic, or military needs. In turn, these leaders bolster their political positions by bringing industrial parks, power plants, and airports to their people. Meanwhile, the owners of U.S. engineering and construction companies become very wealthy. (p. 17)
Praised for his success, he was given the opportunity, something few men ever receive, even at twice your age (p. 57): to bring on board Panamas popular president, Omar Torrijos, who wanted all Panamanians, instead of only the small elite, to benefit. Torrijos assertion that sovereign
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Panama could pursue its own interests, just as the United States did, was considered unacceptable. Panama mattered not because it has oil, which it does not, but because it hosted vital sovereign American territory: the Panama Canal and the surrounding Canal Zone. Torrijos and Perkins worked out a deal whereby Torrijos would funnel contracts to American companies and, in exchange, would be allowed to keep his campaign promises. Perkins claims that this all changed when Reagan became president, and that he was not surprised when Torrijos died in a plane crash within 3 months of the death of Jaime Rolds, the popular president of oil-rich Ecuador who had similar views and was trying to implement precedentsetting changes with Texaco, in a helicopter crash. According to Perkins, if the EHMs fail to bring such people into line, the CIA-sanctioned jackals (pp. ix, xxi) are summoned. In the mid-1970s, as outlined in chapter 14, Entering a New and Sinister Period in Economic History, a new issue arose: How could the oil-rich nations be captured? The test case was Saudi Arabia. According to Perkins, the deal was simple: Washington will bring Saudi Arabia into the modern age and guarantee Saudi rule, and Saudi Arabia will ensure that another oil embargo never occurs and that it will purchase American government securities, the interest on which will pay for Saudi Arabias development. This approach was also devised for Iran, which was to be a showcase of how nations could benefit from American aid and expertise, and Iraq. In 1980, citing growing unease, he quit and became a highly paid witness for electric utility companies that wanted to build new power plants. After that, he set up Independent Power Systems, an alternative energy company that he believes benefited from his past contacts, performance, and continued silence. Years later, he was hired by Stone & Weber Engineering Corporation with a clear understanding that he would never write a book about his real activities. In chapter 31, An EMH Failure in Iraq, the author analyzes what happened in Iraq. Besides the usual charge of Big Oil, he mentions waters increasing political and economic importance and the desire of multinationals to privatize it (as in South America); Iraqs common borders with several nations and ability to reach Israel and the former Soviet Union with its missiles; and a potentially vast new market, given that Iraq might have more oil than Saudi Arabia. But since Saddam did not play by the rules and Bush the Elder was suffering from the wimp factor, something had to be done. Saddam sealed his own fall from American favor by invading Kuwait.
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Perkins also deals with Venezuela, the third largest supplier of oil to the United States. Washington welcomed democratically elected president Hugo Chvezs apparent overthrow in January 2003 coup, as was quite dismayed when he returned to power within 72 hours due to the militarys loyalty to him. Perkins claims that this was a rerun of CIA agent Kermit Roosevelts overthrow of Iranian prime minister Mossadegh in 1951. Moreover, he posits that Chvez remains in power only because Washington is busy with Afghanistan and Iraq. The book ends with his return to Ecuador, where the indigenous Indians are still threatening to go to war against Shell Oil Company if the status quo does not change. Overall, this book is an easy read and quite interesting, for Perkins fills in the background needed to place events in their proper context. However, his constant self-analysis of how and why he is being led further and further away from his heroes (e.g., Tom Paine and Thomas Jefferson) and how his own weaknesses and needs continually convince him to stay in the game eventually get in the way. Also, given that he learned Spanish and quite a bit of Bahasa (Indonesian), became friends with disgruntled people in those countries and Iran who explained their views to him, and professed sympathy with them, one wonders why he always managed to find excuses for keeping his job for so long. Given his background, an analysis of what is going on in the oil-rich states of Central Asia would have been very interesting. Also, his insights into several areas of current concern would have been helpful: the continued Halliburton and other scandals going on in Iraq, the desire of neo-cons to privatize Iraqs oil industry, the privatization of operating jails and of various previously official or military responsibilities so that Washington can claim plausible deniability, and laying Iraqs new economic foundation upon imported economic concepts without seeking any significant input on the part of the Iraqi people, would have been helpful. In his Epilogue, he launches into a sermon about the need for personal confession and redemption. It seems really out of place, as if by engaging in these activities we can somehow atone for this horrific and extremely destructive paradigm that Washington unleashed upon an unsuspecting world soon after the end of World War II and colonialism. However, these concerns are minor when compared to the first-hand information that he has provided to the reading public.
Jay Willoughby AJISS Managing Editor Herndon, Virginia
Forum
Al-Qaeda: A Nontraditional Movement

Pedro Brieger
The outrages carried out in recent years in diverse places of the world bear something that can only be called the mark of al-Qaeda. The planes that crashed into the Twin Towers, the bombs that exploded in Madrid, or the attack against American naval ships in Yemen were attributed to an international network led by Osama bin Laden, located somewhere in Afghanistan. Although the existence of this network is not clear and its structure remains part of the unknown, it differs from the political parties and movements known until now in two particular ways: It has demonstrated its willingness to attack anywhere in the world, and there do not seem to be too many requirements for joining it. In order to determine if this network of networks called al-Qaeda exists, we must first understand the rise and subsequent fall of the earlier Islamic movements that evolved out of the fervor of Irans Islamic revolution of 1979. Second, we must realize the significance of adhering to a movement that has no partisan structure or links based on a strict ideological affinity, given that many political parties exclude all who do not agree with their own definite ideological set of rules.1
The Radicalization of Islam

For the first time in the twentieth century, the revolution led by Imam Khomeini enabled a mass political movement rising aloft the political banner of Islam to assume political and state power by means of revolution. In
Pedro Brieger is chairperson of the Department of Middle East, Masters Degree Program in International Relations, Institute of International Relations, University of La Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina. This article was translated from the original Spanish by Jay Willoughby (AJISS) and Roberto Marn-Guzmn (University of Costa Rica).
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the aftermath of the Ottoman Empires collapse, Europes colonial occupation of most of the Arab world and subsequent coronation of imposed monarchs in the wake of its departure, the failure of Arab nationalism to govern and its later quasi-disappearance, the Arab opening toward the United States initiated by Anwar Sadat and the consolidation of an Arab elite totally dependent upon the West, the Iranian revolution inaugurated a period of political radicalization in the Arab and Islamic worlds with its clear antiimperialist ideology. As a result, movements brandishing the banner of Islam in their political operations developed with extraordinary speed and strength in the main Arab urban centers and began to compete with traditional political parties for the populations support. Without going into the details of what happened in each Arab country, 2 analyzing particular cases will enable us to understand this development. This is important, especially for the insertion of the masses in countries that have no accountability to a long theologicalpolitical tradition, as in the case of Egypts Muslim Brothers, who inherited a movement born in the 1920s. Algerias Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) converted itself into a real alternative to the historical National Liberation Front (FLN) and defeated it in the nations first free national elections, even though soon afterwards a state-inspired coup prevented it from ruling. The Lebanese Party of God (Hizbullah) replaced the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in its struggle against Israels occupation of southern Lebanon, shortly after the PLO administration was driven out and resettled in Tunisia in 1983. After achieving legitimacy, 3 Hizbullah extended its political strength to the heart of the country and converted itself into a legal party that participates in the electoral process. Furthermore, its armed wing caused Israel to leave the occupied south in 2000, after 18 years of uninterrupted occupation. Hizbullahs success inspired a sector of the Palestinians in their struggle against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), since its appearance in 1987 as the leader of the Intifada, has become an inescapable political factor inside the territories administered by the Palestinian Authority. In less than 20 years it undermined the PLOs leadership, once unquestionable for the reconstruction of a Palestinian identity due to its struggle against Israel. What characterizes these movements (and the large majority of Islamic movements) is their intention to lead the countrys masses in order to acquire political power within what is considered to be their country/territory, without any intention of extending their sphere of influence beyond what they
Brieger: Al-Qaeda: A Nontraditional Movement
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identify as a national/state identity, even though, in theory, Islam rejects nationalism. 4 The armed struggle initiated by the FIS soon after it was stripped of its electoral triumph; the outrages attributed to Hizbullah against American, French, and Israeli troops; or the violent attacks of Hamas in Israeli territory reaffirm this conception. All of this implies that the struggle is against foreign occupation within the framework of an ongoing conflict.5 Beyond the anti-imperialist or specifically anti-American rhetoric, none of these movements has ever been involved in armed actions against the United States per se. In fact, they always denied their participation in acts of violence that occurred outside their natural territory.
The 1990s
Iraqs invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the later American intervention in the Gulf at the head of a large coalition, which included most of the Arab countries, marked a change in the regional and global political situation. Saddan Husseins attempts to justify his annexation of Kuwait, as well as the ensuing war, accelerated the erosion of the bases of Arab nationalism. Although Iraq was the last Arab state with the capacity to demonstrate important economic gains, its was extremely fragile in political terms and had lost its legitimacy by invading Iran in 1980. The expulsion of the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991 and the Soviet Unions disintegration that same year allowed the United States to design a new strategy: acquiring a strong military presence in the Arab world, one that would be even greater than the one obtained after the first Gulf war. So, under the pretext of a possible Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi monarchy allowed American troops to be stationed in the land in which Islam and Prophet Muhammad were born, and in which is located the Muslims most important sanctuary (the Ka`bah), the place of pilgrimage for millions of believers each year. The new international situation allowed Washington to elaborate a strategy of dual containment directed at Iran and Iraq6 in order to simultaneously isolate the two countries that had been the main opponents of the American presence in the Middle East and of Israel, although such opposition was no more than verbal. At roughly the same time, several other important events took place. For example: The Islamic revolution in Iran, which had had such a positive impact throughout the Islamic world and which had helped develop a mili-
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tant current, began to lose the revolutionary strength of its first years. As Olivier Roy indicated, even if its influence is important, one cannot perceive a direct Iranian influence on the majority of contemporary Islamic movements.7 Irans image of radical confrontation with the United States (and support for Cuba and Nicaragua) decayed, among other reasons, because it failed to spread its revolution to other countries or to provide any concrete aid (beyond rhetoric) to the Afghanis fighting the Soviet occupation of their country. In addition, most Islamic movements (generally Sunni) distanced themselves from the Iranian leadership due to the revolutions strong IranianShiàh stamp. In a complete turnabout, Israel recognized the PLO, which then agreed to convert itself into a partner of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in order to sign the Oslo Peace Accords. According to the PLOs interpretation, this accord had to conclude with the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. The civil war among Afghanistans various political and ethnic groups ended in the Taliban taking of power in one part of the country, including Kabul. The Taliban, who were totally rejected by the immense majority of the Islamic political and theological currents due to their particular interpretation of Islam, were nevertheless broadly perceived to be a continuation of the resistance and expulsion of the Soviets. The blockade of Iraq and the suffering of the Iraqi population provoked a general discontent in the Arab-Islamic world and feelings of solidarity with Iraq. However, this emotional solidarity did not translate into support for the regime. This was clearly demonstrated during the Gulf war when Saddam Hussein, facing the American-led military offensive, sought to rebuild his leadership in three ways: appealing to Arab nationalism, already in open decline; attacking Israel in order to involve it in the war, fully aware of the Arabs general rejection of Israel; and later appealing (in vain) to religious rhetoric. The wellknown phrase uttered by Madeline Albright, then serving as the American secretary of state, in an attempt to justify the blockade that had caused the death of more than 500,000 Iraqi children8 and the destruction of one of the regions richest countries as well as the cradle of civilization, incited the Arabs and Muslims to rebel and increased their dissatisfaction with the Arab regimes that did nothing to get the sanctions lifted.
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The Afghanis
The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which occurred shortly after the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran, produced what was probably the high mark of the nascent revolutions anti-imperialistic rhetoric and its inflamed discourse against both Washington and Moscow. Both events drove thousands of young Arabs and Muslims to join the resistance movement that arms in hand fought the communist regime and the Soviet military presence. Even if the participation of these international brigades was little more than symbolic, it established the generation of the Afghanis. Recognized and admired for their active role in the jihad against the Soviets, they were reincorporated into their respective political movements after they returned to their respective countries. Beyond the participation of foreigners in guerrilla warfare and battles, Afghanistans complicated ethnic-tribal-religious texture was exploited by the Saudi regime, which supported diverse sectors as part of its intent to prevent the influence of revolutionary Irans political-religious postulates from spreading. But this political and financial support to drive out the Soviets was eclipsed as soon as the Soviet troops withdrew and the Americans intervened in the Gulf. The decision of many Islamic groups to distance themselves from the Saudi monarchy began the moment the infidel American troops were allowed to install themselves in Saudi Arabia to protect the holy places. This was perceived as an affront to Islam. Roy points out that already in 1992, the masses of the Islamists have shifted over to the opposition to Saudi Arabia.9 Saudi Arabia, moreover, supported the Taliban regime, which had taken power in 1995. In fact, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan were the only countries that had official diplomatic relations with the Taliban. However, negotiators from various business enterprises were talking with the Taliban, among them American businessmen during the presidency of Bill Clinton.
The Development of al-Qaeda

In the mid-1990s, the former Soviet Union could no longer serve as a counterbalance to American hegemony. Arab nationalism was a vague memory,10 Iran was not a beacon of revolutionary inspiration, various Islamic movements had been repressed to the point of disintegration, and the PLO was negotiating with Israel. In addition, the United States was not only blockading Iraq but was finally realizing a long-held goal: establishing a concrete military presence in Saudi Arabia at the invitation of the Saudi royal fam-
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ily. This is the context in which al-Qaeda developed as the sole visible factor of global opposition to the United States. An analysis of Bin Ladens discourse, based upon the interviews he has granted to diverse Islamic and non-Islamic media outlets, reveals that he centers his attacks within the Arab and Islamic worlds as a popular and deeply felt revindication. From condemning the American military presence in Saudi Arabia (a central point of his discourse) and Israels occupation of Palestine and the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, he goes on to mention the massacre of Muslims in Chechnya and Bosnia as well as the American blockade against Iraq, which by then had caused the death of more than 500,000 Iraqi children. The hatred toward the United States and Israel is real, and Bin Laden only gave expression to that which the immense majority of Muslims feel. Anyone could perceive this in any given cafe in Cairo, Tehran, or Karachi. His discourse is candid, bordering on the simplistic, and contains no grand theoretical speculations. In November 1996, he declared:
[T]he evidence shows that America and Israel kill the weakest men, women, and children in the Muslim world and in all places. Some examples of this can be seen in the recent massacre of Qana in Lebanon; the death of more than 600,000 Iraqi children due to the lack of food and medicines because of the boycott and the sanctions against the Muslim Iraqi people; and preventing the arrival of arms for the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, thereby abandoning these unarmed people to the hands of the Serbian Christians, who violated and massacred them in a manner that contemporary history had not seen. 11
From an Islamic perspective, the Palestinian question always appears surrounded by a generalized consensus concerning its liberation struggle. In his book Jihad in Islam: How to Understand and Practice It, Muhammad Saìd R. al-Buti, professor of theology at the University of Damascus, devotes an entire chapter to Palestines salvation. 12 Even though the author intends to explain jihads various peaceful aspects, in the above-mentioned chapter he states clearly that Palestine, in terms of Islamic law, belongs to the Islamic environment, no matter how the Jews have settled in its land all Muslims have to practice jihad in order to regain Palestine. 13 Al-Buti is not Bin Laden, but he also reflects the general feeling. The difference between them is that al-Buti embodies the theological-theoretical discourse, whereas Bin Laden embodies the theological-practical discourse, which includes concrete action. Bin Laden always emphasizes that his
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actions are a response and that the Americans, Jews, and Christians have to feel the suffering that all Muslims have felt for many years. Referring to the attack on the American embassy in Nairobi, Bin Laden stated:
Thanks to God, the attack was successful and grandiose. They deserved it. The attack made them feel what we have felt with the massacres of Sabra, Shatilla, Dier Yassin, Qana, Hebron, and in all other parts.14
Organizing deeply rooted social movements that can challenge the existing power structures could take many years, regardless of whether they are Islamic, Marxist, or of some other ideological orientation. They have to acquire a profound practical and ideological penetration and fight in the terms of an established state (or to question its bases). History has demonstrated that many mass parties or movements have disappeared after having acquired wide popular support. Beyond the significance of violence (which this essay does not pretend to judge), it is easier to recruit groups of activists ready to carry out terrorist acts than to develop a mass movement with long-term objectives, not to mention the difficulties that Muslims face when they engage in clandestine activities. However, the concept of taqiyah allows them to adapt to their surroundings and recruit activists into a very intimate circle. 15 The outrages at the Twin Towers or those at Madrid clearly do not represent any intention to convince the local population to fight against the government or the owners of financial capital. In fact, when Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan after his expulsion from Saudi Arabia and Sudan, he found a country governed by the Taliban, with whom he identified and found refuge. Except for the beginning of the 1990s, when he expressed his rejection of the American military presence, neither in Sudan nor in Afghanistan did he work to build a social movement that could respond to the challenges or oppose the government. This did not happen in Afghanistan against the Soviets, because at that time the objective was to fight foreign occupation. It is not by chance that Bin Laden found support among the widely rejected Taliban and that none of the Arab worlds powerful Islamic movements (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizbullah, or FIS) have joined his network. Despite this, however, he has managed to create an ambivalent discourse concerning all of the major outrages. He praises them as if they were part of his network or if the planning came out of his network, but then denies any relation to them and praises only those who carried them out. Gilles Kepel, in his Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam
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(Belknap Press: 2003), asserts that Bin Laden, on more than one occasion, expressed his happiness regarding the outrages, but shortly afterward claimed responsibility only indirectly or denied any supervisory role at all.16 The emphasis on Bin Laden as a symbol leads many analysts to understand the phenomenon of Bin Laden from a strategy tied together with terrorism per se, instead of with social movements. However, given that this phenomenon is fed back by Bin Laden himself, it is not clear how and why al-Qaeda was born or if it really exists. Some analysts, among them Richard Shultz and Ruth Margolies Beitler, even believe that it is more of a nonconventional war and counterintelligence between al-Qaeda and the United States.17 For Roy, jihads significance is related to the fact that it does not recognize a political space or state. 18 Given this, he asserts that modern war does not have a space of its own or a space that is neither geographical nor social.19 In his opinion, since a jihad does not have to obtain a result, the attacks have only some characteristics of a demonstration of power. In other words, they are almost exhibitionist actions. 20 However, Jonathan Spyer (an advisor to various Israeli governments) and other analysts write that al-Qaeda (the base) formed itself mainly to maintain the bonds between the veteran Afghanis, so that at a later date they could convert themselves into an organization dedicated to fighting the American military presence in Saudi Arabia. In addition, after this they could weave the network of networks, which would include Islamic movements throughout the world. 21 But it is not easy to make this network clear, because it is hard to believe that Bin Laden, still thought to be in the mountains of Afghanistan, could maintain a centralized and hierarchical structure that determines which actions are to be carried out, as well as where and when. No element allows us to believe in such a degree of centralization, for it is impossible that the necessary decisions could come from a country watched over by Americas most sophisticated technology. In addition, there are no political elements that really indicate or prove the existence of such a centralized office. Bin Laden plays with the ambivalence of his declarations, a technique that allows us to believe that he is behind every outrage, regardless of its location. Yet he often suggests that he has no relation to some of them and only praises those who have carried them out. This laxity allows the mass media and the intelligence community to quickly attribute any outrage to al-Qaeda and to conclude that any group could form part of this immaterial and inorganic network.
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Given the lack of a traditional partisan structure with a recognized political leadership, anyone could be al-Qaeda or identified as one of its members. It seems to be very simple. For example, anyone could pick up the telephone, make a threat, and state that he/she or the group is a member of al-Qaeda, for there is no centralized office to deny such a claim. Thus, it is impossible to attribute any terrorist act to al-Qaeda even if its perpetrator claims responsibility. Bin Ladens ambivalent discourse has converted him or he has been converted by the mass media into a respected and feared symbol. However, Milton Bearden, a CIA employee for 30 years who was stationed in Afghanistan and Sudan, maintains that tying Bin Laden to every terrorist act that has happened during the last decade is an insult to the majority of Americans. 22 It is very easy to place within this network any active movement whose objective is global jihad, such as the insurgents in Mindanao (the Philippines), Bangladesh-Myanmar, Yemen, Somalia, Chechnya, Georgia, as well as the unknown Jemmah Islamiya (Southeast Asia), al-Ittihad alIslami (the Horn of Africa), al-Ansar Mujahidin (the Caucusus), as Spyer maintains as part of his conspiracy theory. 23 What is very clear is that this network does not attract the large Islamic movements (mainly Arab) with a political tradition. On the other hand, why would the Muslim Brotherhood, FIS, Hamas, or similar groups need to obtain military training in order to hijack airplanes or place bombs in boats?
Conclusion
In a little over 10 years of its public presence, it remains quite difficult to define al-Qaeda exactly and to determine whether it represents a new type of movement in general, and an Islamic one in particular. In this sense, we agree with Lamin Benallou, who maintains that as a pyramidal, structured, and operative organization, al-Qaeda has never existed, for it is more a current influenced by Bin Laden.24 This vision also would reaffirm Kepels belief that al-Qaeda emerged only as a database, from whence it acquired its name (al-Qaeda literally means the base of data). Benallou also asserts that the thesis of an organized, transnational, and global alQaeda leads us to agree with the thesis of a global threat, a world danger. Thus, there must be a global response. If Bin Laden and al-Qaeda are everywhere, American soldiers must be stationed everywhere.25 This vision undoubtedly provides the pretext for American intervention in the Middle East.
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The general changes that have occurred in the world recently, the changes of discourse and contradictory claims, and the outrages in the United States and Spain allow us to think in the following terms: The original al-Qada, which sprang up in Afghanistan while fighting the Soviets, appears to have evolved into a network of networks that allows any Muslim who wants to fight, primarily against the United States, to announce that he/she belongs to it. In this puzzle, the only missing part is whether this makes al-Qaeda a terrorist group or a new type of Islamic movement. Endnotes
1. We have expounded upon this point in Pedro Brieger; Guerra Santa o lucha poltica? Entrevistas y debate sobre el islam (Buenos Aires: Ed. Biblos, 1996), 23-53. 2. Ibid. 3. See Kristian Alexander, Mobilizations of the Shiite Community in Lebanon: A Multidimensional Analysis (paper presented at the Middle East and Central Asia Conference, University of Utah, 17-18 October 2003). 4. See Ali Muhammad Naqavi, Islam y nacionalismo (Buenos Aires: Ed. Alborada, 1987). 5. After the outrage against a hotel in Taba (Egypt) that killed and wounded tens of Israelis in October 2004, Mushir al-Masri, the spokesman for Hamas, stated: Hamas did not do this (...) Our strategy is clear. We fight for independence and the end of the [Israeli] occupation, but only inside the Palestinian territories. www.elpais.es (9 October 2004). 6. See Leonardo Balmaceda, Pedro Brieger, and Carmen Sfrgola, Los Estados Unidos y la contencin dual (paper presented at the Third Seminar of the Middle East conference, La Plata, Argentina, 9-10 November 2000). 7. For more on this, see Olivier Roy, Sous le turban, la couronne: la politique exterieure in Thermidor en Iran, eds. Fariba Adelkhah, Jean Francois Bayart, and Olivier Roy (Brussels: Ed. Complexe, 1993). 8. Lesley Stahl on the American sanctions against Iraq: We have heard that a half million children have died. I mean, thats more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it? Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: I think this is a very hard choice, but the price is worth it (60 Minutes, 12 May 1996). 9. Olivier Roy, Lechec de lIslam politique (France: Ed. Seuil, 1992), 155. 10. Sri Lankas Thalif Deen maintains that al-Jazeera has converted itself into a new symbol of Arab nationalism. See his Is Al-Jazeera the New Symbol of Arab Nationalism? www.antiwar.com (13 October 2004). 11. Interview published in Nidaul Islam (www.islam.org.au), October-November 1996.
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12. Muhammad Saìd R. al-Buti, Palestine and the Only Way To Save It, Jihad in Islam: How to Understand and Practice It (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1995), 167-88. 13. Ibid., 181-82. 14. See www.terrorism.com/terrorism/BinLadinTranscript.shtml. 15. The concept of taqiyah refers to dissimulation concerning ones religion, especially during times of persecution and danger. See Ian Richard Netton, A Popular Dictionary of Islam (London: Curzon Press, 1992), 245. 16. Gilles Kepel, La Yihad, expansin y declive del islamismo (Barcelona: Ed. Pennsula, 2001), 499-513. 17. See Richard Shultz and Ruth Margolies Beitler, Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al-Qaidas Operations, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) 8, no. 2 (June 2004). http://meria.idc.ac.il. 18. Roy, Lechec de lIslam politique, 193. 19. Ibid., 187. 20. Ibid., 197. 21. Jonathan Spyer, The al-Qaida Network and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) 8, no. 3 (September 2004). http://meria.idc.ac.il. 22. See www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/interviews/bearden.html. 23. Spyer, The al-Qaida Network. 24. Lamin Benallou, Mitos y realidades, El Pais (Spain), 11 April 2004. 25. Ibid.
Islam in Higher Education

Since 9/11, there has been a remarkable growth in the study of Islam in higher education. Whereas a decade earlier many universities were eager to close down or at best amalgamate their Islamic studies programs into larger departments, there is now an urgency on the part of academic administrators to begin teaching about and encouraging research on Islam. Not only is there a demand from students, but there is also an understanding that Islam, as a religion and a social force, will continue to have an impact on global and domestic realities for the foreseeable future. However, there has been little discussion about how to approach the study of Islam, given the current political climate. The Islam in Higher Education conference, organized by the Association of Muslim Social Scientists UK (AMSS-UK) in conjunction with the Centre for the Study of Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations (CSIC) at the University of Birmingham and the Higher Education Academy Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies, was held on 29-30 January 2005. It encouraged participants to engage in a critical analysis and dialogue concerning the status of the study of Islam in higher education, employability and recruitment, academic standards and pedagogy, the depiction of Islam and Muslims in higher education, and comparative international approaches to Islam in higher education. In opening the conference, CSICs Bustami Khir, senior lecturer in Islamic studies, spoke of the critical role that such events could play in shaping the future of the study of Islam and Muslims in the United Kingdom. Michael Clarke (vice principal, University of Birmingham) discussed the city as a historical space of interaction between religion and modernity in an industrializing world. He added that with over 140,000 Muslims residing in the city, Birmingham was set to become the first majority non-white city in the United Kingdom and that the city could not be understood without reference to its faith communities.
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Shearer West (School of Historical Studies, University of Birmingham) spoke about the interdisciplinary interest in Islam and how the coming together of theological and religious studies within the School of Historical Studies enabled an exploration of global religious cultures borrowing from anthropology, sociology, and theology. Gary Bunt (subject co-ordinator, Higher Education Academy Subject Centre for Philosophical Studies and lecturer in Islamic Studies, University of Wales, Lampeter) stressed that the conference was a culmination of a series of efforts, including a workshop sponsored by the Higher Education Academy. He noted that the academy was particularly interested in recruitment and employability issues facing Islamic studies graduates. Anas Al Shaikh Ali, chair of the AMSS-UK (www.amssuk.com) and lead organizer of the conference, welcomed participants, mentioned that he looked forward to the beginning of a fruitful, multidisciplinary dialogue on Islam and higher education, and stressed that it would lead to a series of workshops and seminars. The period since 9/11 has been characterized by increased conflict as well as increased dialogue, for many people have realized that awareness and engagement with the other is critical to dispelling ignorance. Those who advocate potential civilizational conflict and interpret Islam as a green threat engender global instability. However, he also noted that the Islamic camp must assume its fair share of responsibility, namely, the rise in a cynical interpretation of religion. It is time, he said, to separate the faith from its practitioners. One particular area of concern that Al Shaikh Ali noted was issues of translation. A sophisticated approach is needed to promote standards and excellence in translation, as poor translations of Islamic language texts is central to poor scholarship. He also noted that the sexing up of translations has caused a great deal of damage not only to the translation of textual material but has also caused several security problems and foreign policy blunders. The first session examined approaches to the study of Islam in higher education. Mallory Nye (Al Maktoum Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies, Dundee), in his Mapping an Agenda for the Development of Research and Teaching in the Study of Islam and Muslims, cited Orientalism as the dominant philosophical trend in the study of Islam and Muslims. He challenged its binary premises and investigated its upholders claims that they are open and committed to academic inquiry. In addition, he called for a shared academic, post-Orientalist Islamic studies (based on the March 2004 Dundee Declaration) that is decidedly multicultural and cross-cultural, post-traditionalist and interdisciplinary one that accepts a range of method-
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ologies and acknowledges a distinction between the study of theology (faith based) and religious studies (examining human expressions of faith and the experiences of Muslims). Gary Bunt spoke on Approaches to the Computer-Mediated Study of Islam in Higher Education, exploring how academicians can best use the Internet to teach and research Islam and Muslims. He discussed questions of representation, information overload, referencing, the online proliferation of polemical views, and the rise of plagiarism. Furthermore, he stated that there are few guidelines on the use and construction of web-based materials on Islam and Muslims, and that many sites, among them sites dealing with the Quran, do not provide any context or interpretation. Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim (International Islamic University of Malaysia) spoke on The Experience of the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) in Higher Education. He posited that since its inception 1983, IIUM has transformed the study of Islam by being the first modern institution to combine a study of Islamic revealed sciences and human sciences. He also discussed how IIUM differs from other Islamic universities. The second session, entitled Access, Recruitment, and Employability Issues, was chaired by Gary Bunt. Ian Williams (University of Central England), in his Muslim Identities, Higher Education, and Access to the Teaching Profession, examined the strategies for recruiting Muslims into the teaching profession in areas with high levels of unemployment and marginalization. He opined that such recruitment benefits from high levels of minority applications to higher education, and that religion can become a gateway for young Muslim men (in particular) who are interested in teaching, by stressing its cultural value and its long-term values as a profession. Adrian Brockett returned the discussion to a quantitative analysis of Islamophobia and Arabophobia in English Adolescents, a study conducted in Newcastle to measure the negative attitudes of 15 to 18 year-olds toward Muslims and Arabs, and young Muslims experiences of negative attitudes and victimization. The findings clearly indicate considerable ignorance and high levels of vicimization. Julie Gallimore (consultant, Higher Education Academy Subject Centre for Philosophy and Religious Studies) spoke about the subject centers role in promoting good learning experiences as well as providing the skills and knowledge for students to move into teaching at institutions of higher education. The subject centers present work is focused on developing a broader academic faith literacy, finding roles for religious studies students and graduates in their community as well as in academia, and engaging in consultancy projects.
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The following session picked up on some of the major challenges facing the study of Islam in higher education. Pierre Lory (Ecole Pratiques des Hautes Etudes, Paris) commented on Orientalisms profound impact on French higher education, which, over time, assumed the form of two major trends: One was scholarly and endeavoured to describe a classical, fixed, non-evolutive culture (in theology, literature, the arts, and so on); and the other tried to analyze societies in terms of how they functioned in order to help the West penetrate the economic and political interests of the East. Since the end of colonization, the main centers of Islamic studies are trying to escape from this old Orientalist model; however, they face many obstacles, because the debate over Orientalism is not yet closed. Charles Butterworth (University of Maryland, College Park) argued in his Islam on Its Own Terms: A Plea for Understanding that the starting point for teaching Islam in higher education should be the Quran as a source text, and that students should be able to engage with the text with only a minimal interpretive framework imposed on them. This view is based on seeing the Quran (like the Bible) as literature and that its study should be based, in the first instance, on self-discovery. Furthermore, any overarching philosophical approach must be based on a meeting of reason and faith. Jorgen Nielsen (University of Birmingham) questioned the conventional wisdom about what exactly was being taught in Islamic studies and called the continuing discussion over Orientalism a red herring. He criticized Edward Saids deconstruction approach on the grounds that when it is applied to Islam, it leaves no coherent sense of what Islam is. Yahya Michot (Oxford University) used his study of Ibn Taymiyyah to speak about the Myth of the Great Baddy: Ibn Taymiyyah and the New Orientalists? He posited that the great Mamluk theologian is in serious need of a scholarly reappraisal as the most malevolent and erroneous statements are now made about his so-called political thought. Instead of questioning the misuse of some of his writings by various extreme Islamist movements or writers, new Orientalists give them a surplus of pseudoscientific legitimacy and thus become their best allies. Such synergies are very unhealthy. The discussion about Challenges Facing the Study of Islam in Higher Education continued with Tariq Ramadans (University of Freiburg) appraisal of Western Approaches to the Study of Islam in Higher Education. Although Orientalism is problematic, it is best not to generalize, since there is a great Orientalist legacy that must be acknowledged one that was based on text and its translation into European languages. The move from text to social science, particularly political science, has opened up Islamic
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studies to the influence of media and global political interests that direct it and undermine the scientific approach to religion. Muslim scholars need not be excluded from the mainstream because they hold certain axiomatic views (like the Quran is revelation), but ought to be included in the broad academic discourse. Muslim scholars need to adapt their methods, integrate their environment, and address subjects of importance to them within the methodological principles of mainstream Islamic studies in the West. Zahid Bukhari (Georgetown University) presented the initial report of his survey The State of Islamic Studies in American Universities, which was conducted by the Center for Islam and Public Policy. The survey has found 225 Islamic studies programs and has collected 75 syllabi; 186 books are being utilized. However, there is no center of gravity in the field and no coherence between courses and programs. As the survey continues, it will also look at the contribution of Muslim communities in supporting and building these programs. Providing a contrasting perspective, Mehmet Pacaci (Ankara University) traced the development of Islamic studies in Turkey. Reform after Ataturks period linked Islamic studies in higher education to service in mosques and religious administration positions. This has begun to change, especially as Turkish education adapts and adjusts to the European standards as part of the EU negotiation process. Among the creative developments in Turkish education has been the linking of fiqh and citizenship, which shows the possibilities of the current discourse in Turkey. The next morning, the conference focused on the state of higher education in Britain specifically. Sean McLoughlin (Leeds University) reflected on the Study of Islam and Muslims in Britain in UK Higher Education by looking at the emergence and development of the interdisciplinary study of Islam and Muslims in Britain. Amjad Hussain (Lampeter University) addressed Islam: Why Is There a Need To Study It in Higher Education? He drew on the position of Muslims in mainstream education, positing that only 3 percent of Muslims go to faith schools, meaning that the vast majority of their ideas about the world are shaped through educational systems not embedded within the community. The complementarity of Christian seminaries or Jewish colleges with academic departments in higher education have few parallels in the Muslim context. Islam in higher education and the active participation of Muslims in it creates a class of scholars and potential educators who will be better able to teach Islam to children than imams trained at Muslim seminaries that are unconnected to universities. Furthermore, Islam in higher education is born
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within a United Kingdom experience of religion, while imams are often linked to cultural forms of Islam and disconnected from young Muslims. Hussains concerns were addressed in the final session, which looked at Private and New Initiatives. Mehmet Asutay (Markfield Institute of Higher Education [MIHE]) spoke about MIHEs development and its range of courses and programs. He highlighted innovative aspects of MIHEs approach, which has included the development of international distance learning, presently being pursued at Imam Sadiq University, Tehran. Validated by Loughborough University, MIHE is in the process of becoming part of the academic mainstream and developing joint program with other higher education institutions. Abas Ridha (European Institute of Human Sciences [EIHE]) also spoke about his institutions development into a United Kingdom-based center for Muslims to study Islamic sciences in a rigorously academic way. He noted the links between EIHE and IIUM and the International Islamic University in Islamabad. The emphasis on competence in Arabic and the degree and diploma granting programs has added choice to the higher education options available to Muslims in the United Kingdom. Sophie Gilliat-Ray (Cardiff University) discussed the September 2005 launch of the Centre for the Study of Islam in the United Kingdom at Cardiff University. The center will launch a masters degree program in Islam in Britain, the first program of its kind in the United Kingdom. It will have strong focus on research methods and encourage the training of researchers in the field. Finally, Johan Meuleman (Oxford University) concluded by exploring the Netherlands Islamic University of Europe project, which is being organized to meet the needs of a diverse community by training Dutch-speaking imams who are sensitive to the changing circumstances of Dutch Muslims. The university has been operating for 4 years and has 100 students. Courses are taught in both Arabic and Dutch, and the social sciences are merged with the sciences of religion (ùlum al-din). The decidedly multiethnic initiative is working with government agencies for certification and has entered negotiations to create a national representative body for Dutch Muslims. The training of imams will involve social work education, language proficiency training, and social sciences all taught at the masters level. The Islam in Higher Education Conference was a landmark gathering because it reflected the very best principles on which contemporary Islamic studies is based: It was multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and dialogical, and avoided polemics in favor of spirited debate based on mutual respect. It is critical to understand how the teaching of Islam and Muslims is being
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developed and influenced in academia as a way of ensuring that that the discourse is both sound and fair. The conference was a brave, self-reflexive start to a process of discussion that must be a central aspect of our discussions for the considerable future.
The reports full transcript, prepared by Abdul-Rehman Malik (London School of Economics, UK and AMSS UK EC member) is available at http://iiit.org/aaiiit/en/Islam%20in%20Higher%20Ed-report.pdf.
Fifth Seminar on the Middle East

Studies of the Middle East and the Islamic world have developed considerably in Argentina over the last 10 years because, among other reasons, this country was targeted twice by terrorists who still remain unknown: The Embassy of Israel was bombed in 1992, and the central headquarters of the Jewish community (AMIA) was bombed in 1994. Given that even today we do not know who carried out these attacks and why, the topic of the Middle East has acquired a public dimension that it did not have before. In fact, these actions led to the creation of university study centers and chairs dedicated to the study of the Arab and Islamic worlds. 1 However, their academic output is still in the initial stage. On 10-11 November 2004, the Fifth Seminar on the Middle East conference took place at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP), in La Plata, Argentina. The Department of the Middle East of the UNLPs Institute of International Relations organizes this conference every 2 years, since it is one of the few universities that has a specific department dedicated to Middle Eastern studies. Moreover, it is the only one that has, since 1997, consistently managed to bring Argentine academics together to share ideas and discuss the contemporary reality of the Middle East and the Islamic world. During this conference, articles were presented on a wide range of themes, always searching for the best way to link together the most relevant events of contemporary reality. For this reason, in 2002 the focus was on the implications of the 9/11 tragedy. The current conference concentrated on the war in Iraq, a logical continuation of the discussion in 2002. Professors from 14 Argentine universities, as well as from Spain, the United States, and Mexico, participated in the panels. The first panel analyzed Islamic thinking and practice after 9/11. Augustn Galli (University of Buenos Aires [UBA], Argentina) laid out the evolution of Islamic movements in Algeria. Damin Setton (UBA), who is investigating the various
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religious communities in the cities of Iguaz, Foz De Iguaz, and Ciudad del East (where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet in the Triple Border), explained that all accusations that these locales are centers of Islamic terrorist activity are false claims based more on political considerations than on reality. Enrique Herszkowich (UBA) focused on the debates that have taken place, ranging from the collision of civilizations and multiculturalism to the universal understanding of human rights. Pedro Brieger (UBA/UNLP) explained the development of al-Qaeda as a nontraditional Islamic movement that has clearly differentiated itself from those Islamic movements that, as political formations, seek political power through mass popular support within the borders of one country. Two panels discussed AmericanIraqi relations and the process of Iraqs post-war reconstruction, a topic that has raised quite a few debates about the American intervention and the real chance of establishing democracy there. As was also the case in the 2002 conference, the participants adopted a critical tone toward American political unilateralism in the Middle East, the doctrine of preventive war, and the ensuing demonization of Islam. James Quirk (Loyola College in Maryland, USA) raised the point that coercive democratization by means of foreign occupation has not been a novel idea since the days of post-World War II Germany and Japan. Professor Dergghoukassian (Universidad de San Andrs, Argentina) argued that the Greater Middle East project is, in essence, neo-Wilsonian and needs to include an economic and military compromise on the part of the United States. However, given the international situation, it will fail. These statements were criticized by several presenters, who questioned the doctrine of preventive war and the unipolar design of the premier global power, because, as Rene Isabel Mengo (Universidad de Crdoba, Argentina) pointed out, unilateralism and military power cannot reproduce their models of society and culture. According to Patricia Kreibohm (Universidad de Tucumn, Argentina), since 1941 the United States has undertaken three grand global crusades (viz., against Nazism, communism, and terrorism), the last one of which has the least amount of legitimacy and has provoked questioning about its global leadership. Juan Anbal Gonzalez pointed out that the geostrategic objective of invading Iraq was part of a global project designed to assert control over the regions petroleum resources. Susana Adamo and Miriam Jaime (both of Universidad de Salta, Argentina) insisted that the United States has started an era of permanent war and infinite justice by ignoring international conven-
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tions and laws. Zidane Zeraoui (Instituto Tecnolgico de Monterrey, Mexico) presented an article on the Kurdish problem, in which he asserted that the next Iraqi regime will also have authoritarian characteristics and will disregard the Kurds aspirations for a federal or even an independent state. One of the most outstanding panels was the one on the PalestinianIsraeli conflict and the new international reality produced by the American invasion of Iraq. According to Emanuel Pfoh (UNLP), reinterpreting the history of both peoples is key to establishing their legitimate claims to the disputed territories. Nevertheless, Julia Hoppstock (Universidad de San Andrs) stated that the negotiations depend upon the existence of a mutually hurting stalemate that strengthens the leaders acceptability. Valeria Frediani (UNLP) analyzed the conflict from the perspectives of the wall being built by Israel, a legal opinion based upon international law, and the intervention of the International Court of Justice. The final panel consisted of two reports that analyzed Iran and Shiìsm as being at the root of the American invasion of Iraq. Luciano Zaccara (Universidad Autnoma de Madrid, Spain) suggested that the government in Tehran has benefited the most from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by its neutral posture and collaboration with the United Nations. He discussed the paradox that the declared enemy of the Islamic revolution has eliminated two political regimes that, at that time, were also at odds with Iran. Pable Wehbe (Universidad Nacional de Ro Cuarto, Argentina) analyzed the American invasion of Iraq in light of the expectations of the Shiàh majority to shape a government based upon the western idea of one man one vote and the illusion of devising a political system similar to that of Iran. In the concluding session, the participants agreed on the necessity of maintaining, on a regular basis, these sessions organized by the Institute of International Relations Department of the Middle East, as well as the importance of increasing communication with academics in other countries, especially with those in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Endnote
1. See Pedro Brieger and Enrique Herszkowich, The Muslim Community in Argentina, The Muslim World 92, nos. 1 and 2 (spring 2002): 157-68.
Pedro Brieger Chairperson, Department of the Middle East Institute of International Relations, Universidad de La Plata, La Plata, Argentina (trans. by Jay Willoughby [AJISS] and Roberto Marn-Guzmn [University of Costa Rica])
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International Seminar on Islamic Thought

Islamic thought has received a great deal of attention since the 9/11 tragedy and the American-led invasion of Iraq. As a result, the conference organizers considered it timely to invite selected individuals to discuss this topic at the International Seminar on Islamic Thought, which was held at the National University of Malaysia (UKM) on 7-9 December 2004. The conference attracted a sizeable number of participants from within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations region and beyond. The large contingent of presenters (100+) was placed on thematic panels designed to cover the following topics: ethics, psychology, education, the environment and technology, theology, philosophy, the Shariàh, gender, social development, economics, civilization, and Quranic studies. The organizers divided the panels into specific time-slots. The languages of presentation were Bahasa Melayu, English, and Arabic. Given the large number of presenters, it is difficult to highlight all aspects of this conference. Therefore, interested readers are advised to get hold of the CD that contains all of the papers that were presented or sent for inclusion. These papers were edited by Ahmad S. Long, Jaffary Awang, and Kamaruddin Salleh, and the digital publication was titled Islam: Past, Present, and Future. Prior to the seminar, the organizers invited Minister of Higher Education Dato Shafi to give his input and support. This was then followed by contributions from the dean of the Faculty of Islamic Studies, which is an integral part of UKM, and two of the organizers. The seminar was officially opened with an important public forum on Islam and Globalization, chaired by Abu Bakr Ibrahim, who is a member of the Department of Usulud-Din (UKM). This forum was addressed by the two keynote speakers: Irfan Abdul-Hamid Fattah, who hails from Iraq and is attached to the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), and Azizan Baharuddin, director of the Centre for Civilizational Dialogue at the University of Malaya (UM). Fattah argued for replacing globalization with universalism, which he considered to be more suitable because the latter term is not beset with problems and has no negative connotations. Azizan addressed the issues of science and technology, as well as economics in relation to globalization.
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She emphasized the importance of acquiring fard kifayah (collective duty) knowledge as opposed to fard àyn (individual duty) knowledge. The first day featured six parallel sessions. I attended the panel on Islamic thought. Abdul-Fattah Haron Ibrahim (UKM) discussed Kitab Siyar as-Salikin by Abdul Salam al-Falimbani Megelirukan. He questioned the authorship and debated the type of scholarship and the nature of the work. His critical remarks came under heavy attack from Muhammad Uthman El-Muhammady (IIUM). Idris Zakaria (UKM), in his co-authored paper, defined kajian masa hadapan (future studies) and connected this to issues of uncertainty about the future. He then focused on Muslim scholarship and the necessity to address future studies, referring to Ziauddin Sardars and Kalim Siddiqis writings in support of his views. The last speaker, Nik Rahimin Nik Wajis (Brunei University), summarized his ideas on Jihad vs. Violence in the Islamic Perspective. He defined jihad and terrorism and demonstrated the prophetic understanding of jihad and the nonaggressive stance adopted by Muslims in situations of conflict. In a parallel panel on ethics, Mohsein Javadi, an Iranian scholar, looked at Mu`tazilite rationalism and Àshàrite voluntarism. Afaf Abdul Hamid (Kolej University Islam Malaysia [KUIM]) spoke on the ethical foundations of work in Islam, and Kyoichiro Sugimoto (IIUM) discussed The Variance of Muslim Attitudes towards Western Modernity: A Worldview Discourse. He introduced the worldview framework, which explains the enduring social phenomenon in general and the relationship between Islam and the West in particular. On the second day, the participants discussed the following themes: social issues, the economy, education and language, information and communications technology (ICT) and science, and theology and Sufism. I attended the latter one. Ali Asghar Bayani (Azad Islamic University, Iran) undertook a comparative study of al-Ghazalis and Mowlavi Rumis views regarding Gods existence and knowledge were compared and interrogated as a way of understanding and appreciating the different viewpoints. ElMuhammady (IIUM) presented The Concept of the Muhammadan Light in the Malay-Islamic Discourse in the Context of Sunni Sacred Narrative: An Early Observation, in which he explored the texts of Shaykh Nur-ud-Din Ar-Raniri (d. 1657) to demonstrate how he and others understood the concept. He was acutely aware of the fact that Salafi theologians have considered these thoughts to be deviationist in nature. As expected, members of the audience voiced their disagreements.
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The next session concentrated on Islamic law and jurisprudence, Islamic thought, psychology, management, and gender and human rights. The last-mentioned panel addressed gender issues in Muslim societies, women in Achenese society, the interdependence of human rights and human development (a comparative study of Indonesia and Malaysia), and religion and gender. M. Hasbi Amiruddin (Institut Agama Islam Negri Raniry, Acheh, Indonesia) gave a fascinating historical account of Achenese womens positive role. This insightful sketch contradicts many feminists who believe that Muslim women have always been and remain oppressed in Muslim societies. Al-Haq examined the concepts of human rights and human development from both the secular and the Islamic perspective, and argued that they are inseparable, based on how they are practiced in Indonesia and Malaysia. The afternoon sessions dealt with the Shariàh, history and politics, civilization and politics, and the Muslim world, among other themes. Adil M. A. Al-Kurayni (KUIM) addressed Israels influential role in ArabAfrican relations. Ayman Saleh (Brunei University) concentrated on important legal issues that need constant scrutiny in the light of social change. Muhammed Haron (University of Botswana) critically assessed South African Muslim thought by comparing a representative from the conservative group of theologians with a representative from the progressive voices within the theological fraternities. The third day of the conference concluded with a plenary discussion on the conferences shortcomings and strengths. The CD containing all of the papers presented and sent for inclusion was a welcome addition. The papers were divided into two categories: those that were written in Arabic were placed in one file, and those that were penned in Bahasa Melayu and English were placed in another. It would have been helpful if the editors had arranged them under specific themes or headings in order to make it more user-friendly. For example, one needs to go through the list of 123 papers that appear in the two Latin-scripted languages before finding the desired article. Another minor criticism is that the page numbers on the content page do not tally with the actual location of the papers.
Muhammed Haron Department of Theology and Religious Studies University of Botswana Gaborone, Botswana
Abstracts
The dissertation titles and abstracts contained here are published with the permission of ProQuest Information and Learning, publishers of Dissertation Abstracts International, and may not be reproduced without its prior permission. Copies of the dissertations may be obtained by addressing your request to: ProQuest Information and Learning, 300 N. Zeeb Road, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346. Tel: 1-800-521-3042; Website: http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations. Morality in the Context of Belief: An Islamic Perspective (Imam Ali). Saghaye-Biria, Mohammad Nasser, Ed.D. University of Houston, 2004. 298 pages. Adviser: Hooker, Richard. Publication Number: AAT 3137856. The objective of this study is to introduce an Islamic doctrine concerning morality in the context of belief as derived from several authoritative Islamic sources. The result is not expected to provide scientific facts, but rather to introduce a doctrine, propose a theory, and discuss its pedagogical aspects. The approach in this study is focused on how Islam conceives of itself. The universally acknowledged Islamic texts are used as the high point of tradition. The author addresses morality in the context of belief as understood from Muhammad Radis (969-1015) compilation of Imam Àli ibn Abi Talibs (579-650) sermons and addresses, Nahj al-Balaghah (Path of Eloquence). The researcher obtained information from hadiths (narratives) ascribed to Imam Àli concerning morality in the context of belief. The emphasis of the study is on the hadith that elaborates on the pillars of belief, which contain several moral elements. Elaborations on relevant verses of the Quran, especially if they are quoted in the body of the hadiths, are included in the study. In conclusion, a theory about morality and belief and its pedagogical aspects is presented. This examination opens alternative perspectives and conceptual frameworks in order to enhance the scholarship and discourse about morality. Pedagogical aspects of the proposed theory in this research may have some applications in moral education programs. In addition, this inquiry provides insight regarding an Islamic doctrine from the popular early works that have guided the thoughts of many Muslim thinkers, such as Muslim mystics. This study uses textual and contextual analysis. The latent and manifest content of the texts are analyzed. The meaning of the text is interpreted in the light of the Quran, exegesis of Nahj al-Balaghah and the commentaries of past and present scholars. For the first time such a detailed examination has been made
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of the reciprocal effect of belief and morality in Islam. Such an understanding has not been made in any language whatsoever including in Arabic and Persian. An entirely original contribution of this dissertation is evolving a number of tables and diagrams which facilitate the comprehension of the theme. Why Do People Support Political Islam? A Comparative Study of Eight Muslim Societies. Huang, Min-Hua, Ph.D. University of Michigan, 2004. 415 pages. Adviser: Tessler, Mark A. Publication Number: AAT 3138176. This dissertation investigates the reasons behind the support of political Islam in the eight Muslim societies. Three main arguments are tested at the individual level. The result shows that the explanations of religious attachment and premodernist predisposition are much more powerful than the explanation of socioeconomic perceptions. However, if the behavioral support is differentiated from the attitudinal support, the explanation of socioeconomic perceptions is corroborated and stronger than the other two explanations. In a nutshell, people with greater personal piety or premodernist attitudes are more supportive of political Islam, but when it comes down to voting behavior, they are very rational to hold the incumbent government responsible, no matter whether Islamist parties are part of it. Another research goal is to build a unifying two-level theory to explain how societal changes would affect the individual-level causal relationships. Contrary to the conventional wisdoms, country-level religiosity countervails the positive individual-level relationship between personal piety and support of political Islam. Level of modernization reinforces the individual-level relationships of personal piety and premodernist attitudes on the attitudinal support of political Islam. However, the most important finding is that the worse the socioeconomic situation, the stronger the above two individual-level relationships. Overall, religiosity and socioeconomic situation are inversely related to the support of political Islam at the country level, but level of modernization has mixed effects, depending on whether the attitudinal or behavioral support is referred. The entire findings challenge the liberalist argument at the individual level that personal piety and premodernist predisposition are not associated with the support of political Islam, but meanwhile they support the liberalist argument at the country level that a religious or premodern society is not associated with stronger support of political Islam. The above conclusions indicate that past studies all suffer the level of analysis problem. In this case, the three explanations work at different levels: socioeconomic situation is a country-level explanation; but religious attachment and premodernist predisposition are individual-level explanations. Early Islamic Hermeneutics: Language, Speech, and Meaning in Preclassical Legal Theory. Vishanoff, David R., Ph.D. Emory University, 2004. 281 pages. Adviser: Martin, Richard C. Publication Number: AAT 3123369. The opening chapters of Islamic legal theory manuals offer extended discussions of the language of the Quran, and principles for its interpretation. This discourse
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takes the form of detailed analyses of specific verbal constructions for example, when a command has the form if A then do B, must one do B every time condition A is met? Taken as a whole, this discourse constitutes a sophisticated theory of language and hermeneutics addressing basic linguistic issues such as ambiguity, reference, scope, the classification of speech acts, and verbal implication. This dissertation tentatively reconstructs the emergence of this theory, in relation to the various theological models of divine speech that informed it, during the formative period of debate that preceded the crystallization of classical Sunni legal theory in the late 5th/11th century. Chapter 2 identifies early discussions of key hermeneutical concepts in early exegetical, theological, and legal discourses, and then shows how al-Shafì (d. 204/820) integrated these concepts into a hermeneutical theory that reconciles conflicting revealed texts and laws by systematically exploiting the ambiguities of Arabic, thus making it possible to ground Islamic law in revelation. Chapter 3 shows how Mu`tazili theologians such as Àbd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1025) resisted alShafiìs emphasis on the ambiguity of revealed language, and formulated an alternative legal hermeneutics based on the principle that all Gods speech functions as a perfectly clear, created indicator of the intrinsic goodness or badness of human actions. Chapter 4 interprets the work of al-Baqillani (d. 403/1013) as a theoretical vindication of al-Shafiìs hermeneutics of ambiguity, based on the Ashàri doctrine of the uncreatedness of the Quran. This dissertation demonstrates that the fierce debates of early Islamic legal hermeneutics were not mere quibbles about the fine points of interpretation; they were a central part of an interdisciplinary struggle over the nature of the Islamic canon and its role as a source of knowledge and practice for the Muslim community. In addition to providing the first historical overview of this arcane discourse, the dissertation seeks to make it accessible to students of hermeneutics in contemporary Islamic thought and in other religious traditions. Bridging the Global Digital Divide: Internet Diffusion in Muslim Countries. AL-Fahad, Mohammad Y., Ph.D. George Mason University, 2004. 101 pages. Adviser: McNeely, Connie L. Publication Number: AAT 3134213. The Internet has been described as having the potential to ameliorate social and economic disparities among countries and to lead to greater democratization throughout the contemporary world. However, despite references to it as the World Wide Web, a vast technological gap is apparent between developed and developing countries in accessing and using the Internet. In fact, bridging this digital divide has become a central objective of several national and international policy initiatives. These initiatives have typically stressed greater democratic liberties, enhanced economic conditions, privatized telecommunications bodies, advanced telecommunications infrastructures, and investment in human capital as the requisite conditions that must be present to facilitate Internet diffusion, and have featured them in generalized prescriptions for developing countries to guide their efforts in bridging the
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digital divide. However, questions have also been raised as to the actual effectiveness of these universal prescriptions, with suggestions that developing countries might be better served by more individualized approaches. This study has engaged this debate through an analysis of Internet use in predominantly Muslim countries, which encompass highly diverse social, political, and economic conditions and, thus, represent particularly interesting sites for investigating related issues. While the above factors may be relevant, findings suggest that the one size fits all approach by which they are usually prescribed may not, in fact, be suitable for bridging the digital divide in developing countries. Indeed, Internet diffusion efforts in countries at different levels of development would be better served by approaches that explicitly take into account prevailing social, political, and economic differences. Àli Àbd Al-Raziqs Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm: A Modern, Liberal Development of Muslim Thought (Egypt). Ali, Souad Tagelsir, Ph.D. The University of Utah, 2004. 155 pages. Publication Number: AAT 3137298. This dissertation is a study of a monumental work written in 1925 by the Egyptian writer Àli Àbd al-Raziq and entitled Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm: Bahl fi-al Khilafah wa al-Hukumah fi al-Islam (Islam and the Basics of Governance: Research on the Caliphate and Government in Islam). The book deals with the subject of Islam and politics, repudiates the Caliphate system, and calls for a separation of religion and state. This idea aroused rage among many Muslim scholars of Àbd alRaziqs time who responded aggressively and assailed the author bitterly. This study situates Abd al-Raziqs ideas in a broad historical context, comparing them to the classical Sunni theories of the Caliphate advocated by such Muslim jurists as al-Mawardi. This project also discusses the importance of the book as a modern and liberal development of Muslim thought. Although other contemporary studies dealt with the issue of Islam and politics, most, if not all, of these works discussed the separation between religion and politics as a Western idea foreign to Islam. This study explores an alternative way of looking at this concept, the way articulated by Àbd al-Raziqs study, who argued it is an intrinsically Islamic concept and drew evidence for that contention from Islams original sources (usuli) the Quran, Sunna, ijma` (consensus of religious scholars), and qiyas (reasoning by way of analogy). The significance and urgency of this investigation resides in the challenge it poses to the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, an Islamist ideology arguing for the idea of al-hakimiyah li Allah (sovereignty is to God) as the basis of the state and authentic governance. This idea has influenced Islamist groups such as the Egyptian Tanzhim al-Jihad and the al-Qaìda organization. These groups believe in reinstating the perfect Islamic community and restoring their own perception of the Shariàh (the divine law) as the only law governing the Muslim community, a point of view that stands categorically in contrast to Àbd al-Raziqs advocacy of a secular state and a separation of state and religion. Àli Àbd al-Raziqs thought
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constitutes a significant contribution to the debate over Islam and politics. This study shows that as long as Àbd al-Raziqs argument challenges existing Islamists ideas, the book will remain an important and pivotal factor in contemporary Muslim discourses. Islam and Democracy: An Empirical Examination of Muslims Political Culture. Abdel Fattah, Moataz Bellah Mohamed, PhD. Western Michigan University, 2004. 247 pages. Adviser: Butterfield, James. Publication Number: AAT 3142201. This dissertation focuses on the following empirical puzzle: Do the attitudes of ordinary educated Muslims stand as an obstacle toward the adoption of democracy? This research question calls for empirical/behavioral methodological tools that bring into focus contemporary Muslims attitudes rather than ancient jurists contributions. In other words, the dissertation shifts attention from ancient Islamic texts to contemporary Muslims mindsets through written and web-bases surveys in 32 Muslim societies. At the aggregate level, Muslim societies perplex with two types of sub-cultures: the culture of dictator, but… and the culture of democracy-as-amust. The former is the sub-couture of two groups of Muslims: (1) Traditionalist Islamists who argue that a just autocratic ruler who abides by sharia/Islamic legislation and defends its tenets is the most legitimate ruler ever. (2) Autocratic secularists who argue in favor of a Hobbeseman ruler who maintains the states sovereignty and defends it against its foreign enemies. In both cases, Muslims behave as rational actors who find that the advantages of having an autocratic ruler outweigh having a democratically elected one. The democracy-as-a-must sub-culture is the one that is adopted by modernist Islamists and liberal secularists. Modernist Islamists find democracy consummating Islamic teachings that fight dictatorship and ensure pluralism in society. Liberal secularists find democracy as the core component of modernity that should be adopted on secular grounds. At the individual level, the dissertation finds that Muslims are too heterogeneous to be studied in a lump-sum way of thinking. Not all secular Muslims are liberal and not all Islamists are anti-democracy. Some Muslim countries political cultures are compatible with democracy while others are clear obstacles to democratization. Seemingly unrelated regression models suggest that socio-economic, demographic and cultural factors have different types of impact on Muslims attitudes toward democratic hardware and software across societies. Civilizing Peasants: The Public Sphere, Islamic Reform, and the Generation of Political Modernity in Egypt, 1875-1919. Gasper, Michael, Ph.D. New York University, 2004. 438 pages. Adviser: Lockman, Zachary. Publication Number: AAT 3127447. This dissertation examines the development of modern Egyptian identity from the mid-1870s until the 1910s. In the 1870s, Egypts increasing incorporation into the
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western-centered global network of production and consumption spawned a new kind of urban intelligentsia comprised of teachers, lawyers, engineers, clerks, accountants and journalists. This increasingly self-conscious social formation reconfigured religiously-informed notions of the self and of the social order through their adaptations of modern secular ideas of individual moral autonomy and transcendent notions of universal citizenship. Throughout this period these literate urbanites endeavored to create an illusion of societal consensus and unity around their own narrow corporate interests and political aspirations. They articulated their vision of Egypts future, and they also positioned themselves socially and politically in Egypts present, through their representations of marginal groups in particular through gendered representations of the peasant. The attention they lavished on the peasantry generated new knowledge about conditions in the countryside. This knowledge enabled them to depict themselves as standing between the backward and ignorant peasants and the tyrannical and despotic traditional elites. Consequently, it was instrumental in their self-coronation as the ideal moral and political subject. In the 1870s their reflections on collective identity still coalesced around urban and rural registers. Peasants were superstitious, gullible and only nominally Muslims. By the 1890s, however, new kinds of representations of civilized peasants began to make their way into print. The advent of a thoughtful peasant whose political consciousness seemed to overlap with that of the urban intelligentsia coincided with the crystallization of a new kind of societal vision. Urban literate groups increasingly understood Egypt as an integrated economic, political and moral totality no longer definable only according to a rural/urban divide. Then, over the course of the first decade of the twentieth century this group increasingly placed both peasant and city-dweller into the same sociopolitical category, Egyptian. This was first expression of something recognizable as modern Egyptian nationalism. Religion and State-building in Post-colonial Southeast Asia: A Comparative Analysis of State-building Strategies in Indonesia and Malaysia. Arakaki, Robert Ken, Ph.D. University of Hawaii, 2004. 226 pages. Adviser: Neubauer, Deane. Publication Number: AAT 3139751. The dissertation attempts to answer the following questions: Why has religion been a persistent and significant factor in Third World politics? How did Third World countries address the challenge of religious pluralism? How can development theory be reformulated so that religion can be treated as a significant variable? The competing nationalisms thesis argues that managing religious pluralism is an integral part of the post-colonial state-building project and that states seek to manage religious pluralism by imposing a particular metanarrative on society. The competing nationalisms thesis functions both as a typology of nationalisms and as a model of the state-building project. As a typology it argues for three forms of nationalism: secular, theocratic, and semi-secular/ethnic. As a model it draws upon
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Ian Lusticks three stage model of state-building: incumbency stage, regime stage, and ideological hegemony. It also draws upon James Scotts argument that statebuilding consists of the imposition of standardization of practice on society. The research design consists of the macro-social comparative history approach applied to the two case studies: Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesias metanarrative was secular. Although the Pancasila Indonesias official ideology professed belief in God, it committed the Indonesian state to no one particular religion; the result being a de facto secular state. Malaysias metanarrative was semi-secular/ethnic. Malaysias constitution designated Islam the religion of the core ethnic group (the Malays) the official religion. A comparative analysis of the two case studies resulted in several findings. One, confirmation of the availability of all three national trajectories for both countries. Two, both states achieved the incumbency stage and the regime stage of state-building, but failed to reach the third stage, ideological hegemony. Three, in both case studies the attempt to impose the metanarrative on society, in conjunction with the disruptive effects of modernization, resulted in the emergence of Islamic nationalism as a rival narrative. The dissertation closes with (1 a discussion how the findings challenge the secular assumptions of major theories of nationalisms, e.g., Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson; and (2 a discussion how the findings can enrich and expand the Weberian understanding of the state. The Elusive Quest for Statehood: Fundamental Issues of the State, Political Cultures, and Aliran Politics in Indonesia. Lanti, Irman G., Ph.D. The University of British Columbia (Canada), 2004. 374 pages. Adviser: Mauzy, Diane K. Publication Number: AAT NQ90212. This thesis discusses the difficulties faced by the Indonesian state in its attempt to achieve a stable statehood. Three fundamental and unresolved issues have vexed the Indonesian state since the inception of the nationalist movement at the turn of last century: the state foundation (the choice between a secular arrangement or an Islamic state), regionalism (a governmental arrangement dominated by the center or a devolution of power to the regions/districts), and the degree of political competition (an authoritarian state or an open political system). Indonesia is a plural society, with hundreds of ethnic groups, speaking hundreds of languages and dialects. But throughout its history, the ethnic fault line has generally been drawn between the Javanese and the (seberang) outer islanders. The geographic distinction between the agricultural Javanese and the maritime seberang, coupled with the different extent of influence of Hindu-Buddhism, as well as Islam later on, have created divergent politico-cultural traits among these groups. These ethno-religious groups eventually manifested themselves into political groups. Earlier scholars of Indonesian studies, such as Clifford Geertz and Herbert Feith, called these groups the political aliran. There are three major aliran in Indonesia: the nationalists (Javanese-based nominal Muslims), the modernist
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Muslims (seberang-based purist, reformist Muslims), and the traditionalist Muslims (Javanese-based pious Muslims). Each of these groups has a major political party, supported by a network of mass social institutions, and each holds a distinctive view on the fundamental issues of statehood. Indonesian history has seen the ebb and flow of the aliran. After the heyday of aliranism in the 1950s, Sukarno and Suharto carried out de-aliranization measures in the name of national unity, which lasted until the outbreak of Reformasi. The reform movement that helped push Suharto from office brought about a resurgence of aliran politics that had been in a state of hibernation for almost four decades. All of the important political parties that have arisen since 1998 have had an aliran cast or shape. The resurgence of the aliran has also marked a return of the debates on the three fundamental issues of the state mentioned above. This thesis has found some reasons why the resurgence of these aliran has complicated the efforts at democratization in Indonesia. All three aliran and their parties profess to want democracy. But their respective understandings of democracy are different when it comes to the three key issues that have vexed Indonesia throughout its history. Attitudes toward Technology in Saudi Arabia: An Analysis of Quranic, Other Islamic, and Saudi Sources. Al-Shehri, Ali Mohammad, Ph.D. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 2004. 296 pages. Adviser: Fontaine, Jeannine M. Publication Number: AAT 3137066. Many countries today use technology as a part of the process of teaching. However, such technologies are not widely used in some Muslim countries for various reasons. Many people around the world assume that Islam in itself is the obstacle that prevents the application of technology in the field of education and teaching English as a second language in these countries. This research explores this assumption. Does Islam represent an obstacle to technological development? Is the use of technology in the field of teaching English as a second language antiIslamic? Are there other factors in Islamic countries that have led to the inefficient use of technology? What are the real factors that have led to this problem? The research follows a historical methodology in presenting the main features of Islam, and also looking into the position of Islam on education. The research also looks at the introduction of technology in the Saudi educational system and studies the factors that have affected the implementation of technology in education. In the course of the study, I develop a comprehensive picture of both the religious background and the actual practices taking place in Saudi Arabias social context. The main sources of Islam (the Quran, the Sunnah, and Islamic scholarly opinion) in this study show that Islam stresses the importance of education. As such, the religion of Islam cannot be seen as absolutely opposed to the use of technology as a tool in education, whether it is in the field of teaching a language or any branch of the sciences, as long as its application does not oppose Islamic
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principles. The basic goals, which Islam shares with other faiths, focus on ensuring peoples physical, mental and intellectual well being. The study finds that the control of the Internet in Saudi Arabia through the ISU is rooted in a complex series of causes, and that Islamic sources do not provide a clear mandate to justify this control. It is important for this statement to be understood, as the current limits on technology may be doing a great disservice to the Saudi educational system in the content of the modern worlds demands. God Has Willed It: Religiosity and Social Reproduction at a Private Muslim School in New York City. Cristillo, Louis Francis, Ph.D. Columbia University, 2004. 291 pages. Adviser: Bond, George C. Publication Number: AAT 3128938. This study examines one of the newest models of faith-based schooling in the United States. In the past fifteen years, approximately two hundred full-time private Muslim schools have been established across the country, catering to the educational and religious needs of an estimated 20,000 Muslim children. Although anthropologists have given a good deal of critical attention to the role played by public schools in shaping ethnic, racial and gender identities in the context of social inequality, faith-based private schools have, by contrast, been largely ignored. That such an omission is the rule rather than the exception is ironic since religious day schools Catholic, Protestant and Jewish preceded by many decades the first of the so-called free schools of the 1830s from which developed the modern public school system in the United States. This study therefore represents a modest effort towards redressing this gap in the anthropology of schooling in the United States. Based on participant-observation at Al Noor School, a private K-12 Muslim school in Brooklyn, New York, the study examines the rules and resources that structure the schools self-described Islamic environment. Specifically, the study examines how actors at the school utilize language (Arabic as lingua sacra), symbolic knowledge (of the Quran and Sunnah), and religious norms (halal vs. haram) in the production and reproduction of Muslim religiosity and community. The theoretical goal of the study is to contribute to the anthropological discourse on agency, religiosity and education as they relate to the dynamics of social reproduction in a plural society. Muslim Women Reflecting on American Education: Exploring the Question of Educational Identity. Rida, Zeena Tabbaa, Ed.D. Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick, 2004. 370 pages. Adviser: Lugg, Catherine A. Publication Number: AAT 3130844. Researchers have paid particular attention to the complex interrelationships between race, gender, culture, and social class, and how these social variables influence students educational experiences, understandings, and identities (Lee, 1996; Gibson, 1988; Banks, 1997). Introducing religion as an analytical variable provides the research with a new lens to look at the educational experiences of students. Parks (2000) emphasized the importance of studying faith during young adulthood.
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This study explored the role of religion in shaping the educational identities and future aspirations of 14 female Muslim college students. It applied a combination of methodological approaches: case study and oral history. Each interview was tape recorded and transcribed. The questions guiding this study developed from readings in the fields of sociology in general and the sociology of education in particular. These questions were categorized into: self-identity, home, school life, and future aspirations. Referring to Bourdieu (2000), I explored whether Islam is part of a toolkit that these young Muslim women used in forming their educational identities. Given the paucity of research on Muslim students, this study suggested important implications for educational researchers as well as practitioners in the school system. The findings indicated that (a) there is a variation among this group of Muslim women in terms of their religiosity and understanding of their identity, (b) these stories emphasized the identity formation is an open-ended process, (c) These young Muslim women turned to their teachers, parents, friends and counselors in shaping their identities and future aspirations, (d) there is a need to globalize the scope of teacher education, (e) American schools tend to have pervasive cultures, yet they are not as sensitive as they should to students needs, (f) more research is recommended to address the needs of Muslim students from the perspective of school staff and personnel, (g) and these interviews can be analyzed by future historians who will view them from new, yet to be developed, perspectives. Girls Education and the Paradoxes of Modernity and Nationalism in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic. Aksit, Elif Ekin, Ph.D. State University of New York at Binghamton, 2004. 332 pages. Adviser: Quataert, Donald. Not Available through PQDD. The Girls Industrial Schools (1865) of the Ottoman Empire and the Girls Institutes (1929) of the Turkish Republic are successive institutions of education that allege continuity. They have overlapping characteristics such as the education of orphans as a legitimization of their initiation and education of Muslims without an accentuation of Islam in particular, and their emphasis on young, urban women as an indispensable part of modernist state-formation in general. Nevertheless, they have a major difference: As opposed to the minority schools and the foreign colleges the Girls Industrial Schools took in working class clientele. In contrast, the Girls Institutes that aimed to reproduce the newly formed national state claimed to serve a middle-class Turkish family. Nevertheless, practice diverted from purpose, firstly in the ethnic differences between the students in Eastern and Western Turkey and secondly in the class differences of full-time and part-time students. As a result, the demanding ideals of nationalism proved impossible, even for the students of the Girls Institutes who were central to the processes that building a new nation-state required.
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Popular Knowledge and School Knowledge: The Relationship between Newspaper and Textbook Images of Arabs and Muslims. by Sensoy, Ozlem, Ph.D. University of Washington, 2004.Adviser: Banks, James A. Not Available from UMI. The presence of Arabs and Muslims in media is often a response to a political, terrorist or military event. Previous studies of textbook representation of Arabs and Muslims suggest that this kind of presence is often reinforced rather than challenged in textbooks. This dissertation compared the representation of Arabs and Muslims in media and school curricula. It was a visual content analysis of images of Arabs and Muslims in four newspapers and four social studies and world history textbooks. The data were limited to textbooks and newspapers published between 19931997. A total of 183 images were identified and coded for eight categories: group size, gender, dress style, activity type, degree of activity, world location, era, and setting. Tables showing the frequency of each of these codes, the formal and compositional components of images (such as cropping, spatial organization, and gaze) were each described and compared. Results revealed a representation pattern that demonstrated an incompatibility between Arab/Muslim-ness and Western/American-ness. The pattern manifested as symbolic binaries that regularly featured particular visual elements assigned to Arab/Muslim-ness (crowds, disorder, the veil/kefiyye, oppression, and lack of modernity), and implied the opposite to Western/American-ness (individual agency, civility, modernity, hard work, and order). Such binaries were found to reinforce an ideological and geographical distance between Arabs and Muslims and the West. Ideological distance was identified as representations that reinforced ideas about the oppression of Arab/Muslim women, the sedentary nature of Arabs/ Muslims in domains such as work, education, and government, and the very active nature of Arabs/Muslims in domains such as religion and conflict. Geographical distance was identified as representations that depicted a virtual exclusion of Arabs and Muslims in Westernized and U.S. settings. Westernized settings refer to settings in which urbanization, technology, and the resources of modernity are visually presented. There were cases of images that did not conform to this pattern. Implications for further understanding the role of media as multicultural educator are also discussed.

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VOLUME 22 SPRING 2005 NUMBER 2

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL SCIENCES

ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT

The International Institute of Islamic Thought ISSN 0742-6763

Conference, Symposium, and Panel Reports

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

The Jundishapur School: Its History, Structure, and Functions

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

The History of the Jundishapur School

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

Sections of the Jundishapur School

The Medical School and Hospital

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

The Pharmacology Laboratory

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

The Graduates of Jundishapur in Baghdad

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Sylemez: The Jundishapur School

Paths toward an Arab Knowledge Society

Weiss: Paths toward an Arab Knowledge Society

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

The Arab Human Development Reports: Breakthrough toward a Self-Critical Stocktaking

Weiss: Paths toward an Arab Knowledge Society

An Analysis of the Central Barriers to Development in the Arab World

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Weiss: Paths toward an Arab Knowledge Society

The Goal of an Arab Knowledge Society

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Weiss: Paths toward an Arab Knowledge Society

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

The challenges are laid out clearly:

Weiss: Paths toward an Arab Knowledge Society

The Experience of a Political Dialogue The Institutional Arrangement

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:2

Basic Education, Literacy, and the Stimulation of Intellectual Curiosity