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P 261811Z JUL 08 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8518 C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002330 SUBJECT: BAQUBAH SUNNI LEADERSHIP FEAR

ARREST IN UPCOMING IRAQ OPERATIONS Classified By: ePRT Diyala South Team Leader Michael Thurston for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary. Sunni political figures in the Diyala Provincial capital of Baqubah have expressed strong reservations about upcoming Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) led operations in Baqubah. In conversations with Diyala ePRT they expressed their belief that the operations are a pretext for the arrest of leading Sunni political figures ahead of anticipated provincial elections. Many Sunni leaders are convinced that the national government is determined to maintain Diyala Province as Shia led in spite of its Sunni majority. End Summary. 2. (C) The Iraqi government has announced plans for offensive operations in Diyala Province. Planning and preparations for Operation Benevolent Diyala are well underway and could begin in early August. In the Diyala River Valley and surrounding areas, operations will target the remnants of AlQaeda in Iraq (AQI) terrorists, while in the south they will be targeting Shia extremists such as

Jaish al Mahdi (JAM)factions which refuse to comply with directions to disarm and Iranian supported Special Groups criminals. 3. (C) Baqubah is about 75 percent Sunni and 9 of 14 council members are Sunni. Both the council chair and Qa'im Maqam are Sunni. Most council members expressed concerns to the ePRT that the government will target them and other Sunni leadership under the cover of going after AQI. They also discussed this openly in council meetings. They believe the July 15 arrest of council chairmen Ra'ad in his office by the National Police, with a warrant reportedly signed by the Governor (a Shia) and charging him with harboring suicide bombers and assisting AQI, is the beginning. Details of the arrest were provided by the Qa'im Maqam. The ePRT governance officer arrived shortly after the arrest and was met by upset Sunni council members. On July 20 the Qa'im Maqam reported that he had been informed that the council chair Ra,ad would soon be released. However, he is concerned that even if he is released his arrest will have a chilling effect on other Sunnis and serve to taint Ra'ad's reputation. CF (Coalition Forces) are typically informed of this type of high profile arrest ahead of time; however, in this instance, CF received no prior notification. Iraqi press releases incorrectly said that CF participated in the arrest. 4. (C) Coalitions Forces in Diyala were initially concerned that the Iraqi forces, which will include the Shia-dominated National Police, might also confront Sons of Iraq (SOI) groups which can be

found throughout the city and have been instrumental in maintaining security and significantly reducing the threat of AQI in Baqubah. If the ISF confronts the SOIs in hostile actions, neighborhood security may be jeopardized. Sunnis in the city have no confidence in the ability or willingness of the Shia-dominated Iraqi Police to provide unbiased security, according to Sunni councilmen and other leading Sunnis who regularly talk to ePRT members. (Note: To prevent this confrontation, Maj Gen Barrons, MNC-I DCG-ISF, MG Hertling CG MND-N, BG Boozer DCG MND-N met with LTG Ali (IGFC) and 12 tribal sheik and SOI leaders on 24 July. After much discussion an accommodation was made that CF leaders believe will prevent ISFSOI confrontations. End Note.) 5. (C) Comment. CF officers in Diyala have discussed what events in the province might cause Sunnis to give up on peaceful involvement with the political process in Diyala. They identified as the most dangerous threat to sustainable security an election outcome that would leave Diyala's Sunnis feeling they have been disenfranchised. The majority of Sunnis are convinced that in a free and fair election they will take over the leadership of the Province. There are scenarios in which the Shia and Kurdish minorities could support one another to overcome a Sunni majority and keep control of the Province. The removal of key Sunni leadership by ISF during Operation Benevolent Diyala could be such an unhinging event. Undoubtedly there are AQI members and sympathizers among Sunni political leadership, but the perception among Sunnis will be that the Government, no matter the legitimacy of the

charges, is trying to gain an unfair advantage ahead of provincial elections. They will follow closely the actions taken against Shia leadership in Diyala who are seen as JAM or JAM Special Groups extremists as part of Operation Benevolent Diyala, to see whether ISF are as tough on Shia criminals and terrorists as on Sunni ones. End Comment. CROCKER (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of

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