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Sample Answers of Famous Bar Topnotchers!

Justiniano Montano (2nd Place, 1929) Civil Law, 100% Q.- Distinguish between nullity of marriage and divorce. A.- Divorce presupposes a valid marriage while a nullity presupposes a vicious or voidable marriage. In nullity the cause exists before or at the time of the celebration; in divorce the causearises subsequent to the celebration. Q.- Differentiate between mortgage and sale with stipulation for repurchase. A.- 1. Mortgage is an accessory contract while sale con pacto de retro is a principal contract. 2. In sale with. pacto de retro the title is conveyed; in mortgage not. 3. In sale with repurchase possession is transferred; in mortgage it is not transferred. 4. In sale with repurchase, title in the vendee becomes absolute the moment the period for redemption expires; in mortgage, foreclosure is necessary whether judicial or extra-judicial. Hermenegildo Atienza (1st Place, 1932) Civil Law, 95% Q.- A executes in favor of B a promissory note for P10,000.00, payable after two years, secured by a mortgage on a cement building valued at P20,000.00. One year after the execution of the note the mortgaged building was totally burned. Can B demand from A the payment of the value of the note? Reason out your answer. A.- A can demand the payment of the note. Mortgage is an accessory obligation and the payment of the debt in this case is the principal obligation. Loss of the thing due extinguishes an obligation. But the extinguishment of an accessory obligation does not extinguish the principal obligation. The mortgage is lost and extinguished by the destruction of the mortgaged building. But it does not, as an accessory obligation, necessarily bring about the extinction of the principal obligation to pay the note. Arturo Tolentino (2nd Place, 1934) Civil Law, 91% Q.- A built a house on land belonging to B in the belief that the land was his own. The error discovered, B formally notified A that he elected to appropriate the house. All efforts to reach an agreement as to the sum to be paid to A having failed, A began an action to recover the expenditures incurred by him in building the house. The house was destroyed in a fire of purely accidental origin. Do you think that notwithstanding the loss of the house A would be entitled to recover from B the said expenditures? Why? A.- A would be entitled to recover the expenditures incurred by him in building the house. The law provides that when something is built in good faith upon the land of another, the latter shall have the option to appropriate the same upon payment of the expenses to the builder, or to

require the builder to pay the price of the land on which said building was constructed. In the exercise of this option, B elected to appropriate the house. By so doing he incurred the obligation to pay the expenses to A, which is an obligation which does not depend on the continued existence of the house. It may be said that his exercise of the option given by law made the house his own by accession. Res perit domino; hence, he must bear the loss and pay the expenses. Cesar Bengzon (2nd Place, 1919) Commercial Law, 92% Q.- The vessel A collided with the vessel B in Manila Bay. The officers of both vessels were negligent in the performance of their duties at the time of the accident. Has the owner of B any right to recover anything from the owner of A? Give reasons. A.- The owner of B has no right to recover from A any damage suffered by the vessel B. The owner of B however has a right to demand contribution from the owner of A for the amount (if any) which the former has been compelled to pay damages to the cargo of B. Because the law provides that when two vessels collide and both are to blame, each suffers its own damage but they are solidarily responsible for their cargo. And it is but reasonable that this should be the rule; because the shippers or freighters are not to be prejudiced by the negligence of the crew of the respective vessels; and it is also reasonable that each ship should suffer individually for the wrong of its officers. This is to be understood, however, subject to the rule that in collisions the responsibility does not extend farther than the value of the ship and the freightage earned. Estanislao Fernandez (4th Place, 1933) Criminal Law, 97% Q.- A received from B for safeguarding during Bs absence abroad a sealed trunk containing valuable articles. A afterwards broke the trunk open with a hatchet without Bs consent and appropriated its contents to his own use. What crime did A commit? State your reason. A.- This case falls within the intriguing boundary line of cases between theft and estafa. The test whether a crime is one or the other is: was the juridical possession of the thing delivered with it to the offender? If so, then there is estafa; otherwise, theft results. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which, in the words of Judge Albert, the transferee may set up even against the owner. Tested by this rule, it is respectfully submitted that A is guilty of estafa. Estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by any of the following means: (1) with ungratefulness or abuse of confidence, (2) by appropriating money, goods, or other personal property received in trust, for administration or on commission or under any obligation which imposes the duty to deliver or return the thing. In the instant case, A was given the juridical possession over the trunk, namely, the possession of a depositary, thereby imposing upon him by the duty to hold the property in trust and to deliver it to B on demand.

Roberto Concepcion (1st Place, 1924) Criminal Law, 95% Q.- The municipal president of a town, in a fit of anger, mutilated and destroyed a municipal payroll presented to him by the municipal treasurer for approval and signature. This payroll had not yet been signed by the other municipal officials as required by law. What crime, if any, was committed by the municipal president? Reasons. A.- He has not committed any crime, because the papers destroyed were nothing more than some ordinary documents, a kind of rough draft (so we may say), because they were mere documents prepared to be converted into public documents. When they were destroyed, they did not have any value other than what they had materially as paper. At most, the president will be liable for the value of the papers destroyed, which is certainly too insignificant to raise the responsibility of said president to the category of crime. Manuel Roxas (1st Place, 1913) International Law, 100% Q.- Jusara, a Turkish subject, sells to Hatchina of the same nationality, 100 slaves, for which the latter gives a promissory note. The sale is made in Turkey and is perfectly valid in that country. Both come to Manila where Jusara sues Hatchina for failure to pay the note. Will action prosper? Explain the doctrine on this matter. A.- The action would not succeed because, although the contract was perfectly valid where made, yet the consideration for the same is not only illegal and immoral but is discountenanced and condemned by all civilized countries. Our courts cannot let themselves be the instrument for the enforcement of such a contract. It is against our plain public policy and slavery being considered an inhuman practice, our courts would not even entertain a suit for the recovery of the purchase price. Roque Desquitado (1st Place, 1923) International Law, 98% Q.- Is a state responsible for the damages caused to the subjects of another in cases of revolution or civil war? And in cases of local disturbances? A.- A state is not liable for damages caused the other subjects in cases of revolution or civil war. The subjects must suffer the consequences arising from revolution or civil war. A state is not expected to guarantee to other subjects that they shall never be molested in their peaceful residence therein. There are certain events in which a state cannot at times cope with the situation, and revolution and civil war are among those cases. Moreover, the residence of other subjects in the territory is a mere privilege conferred upon them by the state. If the revolution or civil war attains such proportion that other states deem it expedient to recognize their belligerency, then the state where such revolution happens shall with more reason be released from the consequences arising from such state of things. In local disturbances the state is liable as in the case of the Boxer Rebellion in China where China was compelled to pay indemnity to states whose subjects were injured thereby.

Hermenegildo Atienza (1st Place, 1932) Political Law, 100% Q.- Can the judicial power ever exercise any control over the executive or legislative? A.- When the judicial power declares a law unconstitutional, or nullifies an act of the executive, it may be said for practical effect that the judicial power exercises a certain degree of control over these branches. Yet in legal theory, as repeatedly declared by the courts, such acts of the judiciary in no way control the other branches, but simply gives effect to the fundamental law which is of superior obligation. It is the particular province of the courts to declare what the law is, and when a statutory enactment contravenes a constitutional provision, it is for the courts to give effect to the constitution. In the famous case of Marbury vs. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall denied that in the declaration by the Supreme Court that a certain act of Congress was unconstitutional, it was thereby in control of the legislative branch. It was only declaring what the fundamental law is, and to show the way for the legislature. For like any branch of government, the legislative and the executive branches must act within the law, or they are lawless usurpations. Q.- Can legislative powers be delegated? A.- Legislative powers cannot be delegated. This is based on the ethical principle that the power is not simply a right or privilege, but a duty and obligation. It has its constitutional justification in the doctrine, that where the sovereign power has placed a power, there it must remain, and one to whose judgment, wisdom and patriotism a duty has been entrusted should not perform it through the judgment, wisdom, or patriotism of another. However, where the delegation is not of the power to determinewhat the law is, but how it is to be executed, the delegation is proper. (U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho; U. S. vs. Barrias; Inchausti vs. Public Utility Commission). Q.- Define the police power. What are its bases? What are its limitations? A.- Police power has been defined as the inherent power of the state to adopt any measure necessary to protect public interest and promote public welfare. It includes practically the whole field of regulation. (U. S. vs. Pompeya). It extends to everything essential to public safety, health, morals, peace and order and justifies abatement of anything that may be considered a public nuisance. (U.S. vs. Toribio). It is based on 2 well-known maxims: Salus populi est suprema lex (The welfare of the people is the supreme law); and Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas (So use yours that it may not damage your neighbors) The only limitations on public power are that it must be reasonable and not oppressive or discriminatory, and must be for the public benefit or purpose primarily, and not for the benefit of a private person, although the public be incidentally benefited. There must, therefore, be a fair and reasonable necessity and relation between the means employed and the end to be achieved.

Manuel Roxas (1st Place, 1913) Remedial Law, 100% Q.- Upon what ground is hearsay evidence excluded? A.- Hearsay evidence is excluded upon the broad grounds of public policy. It is excluded upon the sound theory that no man can better express his ideas than he himself. A perfect knowledge of human nature must commend this rule, for it is very seldom, if at all, that a man can repeat in court what another has told him regarding a particular fact, and the allowance of the evidence would lead to innumerable frauds and to great difficulty in the determination of facts. Besides, if hearsay is admissible if given by the person who say that he heard another say something, logically, at least, it must also be admissible if told by a third or a fifth, or a tenth person who testifies as to what he had heard the previous man said to what he had heard another previous man saying, and so on, and thus a story of three words may become a thousand. The law cannot allow that. Hearsay is only admitted in very few cases where the law on the ground of necessity or convenience admits it, but well guarded by technical rules. Arturo Tolentino (2nd Place, 1934) Legal Ethics, 94% Q.- What limitation is there upon the right of an attorney to coach his witnesses? A.- The attorney may coach his witnesses in the proper manner of answering questions so that the facts to which they testify may be clearly brought out. The limitation is that he should never teach the witness to state facts which the witness does not know; in other words, he should not manufacture evidence and then make the witness his mouthpiece. He should never induce the witness to commit perjury.


1. a) When may the State invoke its immunity from suit? What is the Restrictive Theory of State Immunity?

Answer: a) The State may invoke its sovereign immunity from suit in the following instances:

i. ii.

When the Republic is sued by name; When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency as the same is so called because it has no separate juridical personality but is merged in the general machinery of the government; or


When the suit is on its face against a government officer but ultimate liability will be on the government as it will require the latter to perform an affirmative act like appropriating public funds for the satisfaction of the judgment.

The Restrictive Theory of State Immunity means that a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. However, the restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. (United States vs. Ruiz)

b) What is the effect of the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution on the political question doctrine?

Ans. The so-called expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court particularly under the second clause of the second paragraph of section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution actually limits the political question doctrine which, heretofore, was forbidden territory for the courts. Under this expanded jurisdiction, a political question is no longer an insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power.

However, this expanded jurisdiction does not do away with the political question doctrine. It was inserted in the Constitution to prevent courts from making use of the doctrine to evade what otherwise are justiciable controversies. The intendment is to stop weak courts and judges from seeking refuge behind the political question doctrine when afraid to displease the powerful.

2. The President proposes amendments to the Constitution advocating a shift from the Presidential system of government to a Parliamentary one and calls for a plebiscite, appropriating public funds therefor, in which to submit said proposal to the people for ratification. Mr. Walang Packy, a citizen and a taxpayer, challenges the Presidential acts aforesaid. In turn the Solicitor General contends: i) that Mr. Packy has no locus standi to bring the action; ii) that the issue is not justiciable; and iii) that there is no law or constitutional provision that prohibits the President from proposing amendments to the Constitution. Decide.

Ans. Mr. Packy has locus standi to bring the action. This involves a valid taxpayers suit. The settled rule is that a taxpayer like Mr. Packy has substantial interest in inquiring into the legality of official acts that involve expenditure of public funds.

The issue raised is legal and justiciable. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested acts, the matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. It does not concern itself with the wisdom of the act of the President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the Constitution confers on the President that power to propose amendments to the Constitution is therefore a downright justiciable question. Since the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of the Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed in proposing amendments thereto is valid or not. (Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections)

While it may be true that there is no law or Constitution provision that prohibits the President from proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is equally true that there is no law or constitutional provision that empowers the President to propose amendments to the Constitution or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Article XVII of the Constitution expressly provides that amendments to the Constitution may be proposed by Congress, acting as a constituents assembly, by a constitutional convention, or directly by the people through initiative. Amendment of the Constitution, being an exercise of sovereignty, must be construed against the existence of the power to propose amendments in a person or entity not authorized by the people. A departure from the procedure laid down by the people is pro tanto the establishment of a new constitution. It is doing for the people what they have not chosen to do for themselves a mockery of our constitutional system.

3. As an aftermath of the Escalante Massacre, the President issued E.O. # 19 which created the Escalante Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation into the incident. The commission recommended that the victims or their heirs be compensated by the government. Based on this recommendation, the victims filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military officers involved in the incident. The Solicitor General moved to dismiss the suit invoking state immunity, consent not having been first obtained. The victims argued that there was waiver of state immunity when the commission recommended the indemnification of the victims or their heirs. a) Was there a waiver of state immunity? b) Is the State liable for damages?

Ans. a) No, there was no valid waiver of state immunity. The recommendations of the commission can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the recommendation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. (Republic vs. Feliciano)

b) The State is not liable for damages. Where a public officer acted beyond the scope of his authority or in bad faith, no liability attaches to the State as the latter only authorizes the legal acts of its officers. The State as a person can do no wrong. (Shauf vs. Court of Appeals)

In addition, the recommendation made by the commission to compensate the victims or their heirs does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The Commission was created merely for the purpose of conducting an investigation into the incident, Thus, its recommendation does not in any way bind the State. (Republic vs. Sandoval)

Furthermore, the State can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. (Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs. Judge Firme)

4. a) Distinguish constituent power from legislative power? b) What is the source and basis of the authority of Congress when it acts as a constituent assembly? c) Are the acts of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, justiciable?

Ans. a) Constituent power is the power to make or amend the Fundamental Law. Legislative power, on the other hand, is essentially lawmaking power. It is the power to make laws and to alter or repeal them. A general grant of legislative power to the legislature under the Constitution does not include the grant of constituent power. Constituent power is part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. (Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections)

b) The source and basis of the authority of Congress when it acts as a constituent assembly is the Constitution itself. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power, unlike the people, when performing the same function, (of amending the Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they are the very source of all powers of government including the Constitution itself. (Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections)

c) The acts of Congress when acting as a constituent assembly are obviously justiciable. Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise. they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution.

In short, the issue whether or not the acts of Congress - acting as a constituent assembly - are legal or constitutional is essentially justiciable and not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.

5. Mr. Lukas Lakatlangit was born in the United States of a Filipino father and a Russian mother on January 16, 1973. He returned to the Philippines when he was eighteen years of age, carrying an American passport and he was registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration. Lukas ran and won in the congressional elections of 1998. Mr. Perde Gana, the losing candidate for Congressman, filed a quo warranto case against Lukas on the ground that the latter is disqualified for not being a Filipino citizen. Decide.

Ans. Whether or not Lukas is a Filipino citizen would depend on whether he is a legitimate child or not.

Assuming that Lukas is a legitimate child, he is a Filipino citizen. All the constitutions (Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987) that governed the Philippines provide that those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines are Filipino citizens. The registration of a Filipino citizen as an alien with the Commission on Immigration does not necessarily amount to a renunciation of his Filipino citizenship. Likewise, the mere use of a foreign passport is not a ground for loss of Philippine citizenship. He is therefore qualified to run for Congressman.

However, assuming that Lukas is an illegitimate child, he is not qualified to run for Congress. An illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his known parent his mother. Since his mother is a Russian, he will also be a Russian citizen, even is his father is a Filipino citizen. (In re Mallare)

6. In 1986, the Republic of the Philippines filed a case against XYZ Corporation to recover alleged ill-gotten assets. Before the case could be set for hearing, Mr. Mando Rugas, together with other stockholders of XYZ Corporation, filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for leave to intervene by attaching their answer in intervention. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and admitted their answer in intervention. The Solicitor General contends that the Sandiganbayan acted erroneously because the Republic being a sovereign state cannot be sued without its consent and the intervention is in legal effect a suit against the state. The Supreme Court invited you as amicus curiae to give your comments on the contentions of the Solicitor General. What will your comments be?

Ans. The Solicitor Generals contention that Mr. Rugas intervention is a suit or counter suit against the State is bereft of merit. Mr. Rugas and the other stockholders merely assumed a defensive position vis--vis the Republics suit against XYZ Corporation, of which they are

stockholders. The fact that they interjected themselves into the case at their own initiative does not alter the essential nature of theirintervention. They intervened merely to unite with the defendant XYZ Corporation in resisting the claims of the Republic, as plaintiff. It would have been different if they were the ones who took the initiative in an action against the Republic by filing a complaint in intervention or a complaint. Therefore, the suit in intervention is not a suit or counter suit against the State that can bring into operation the fundamental postulate of our system of government that the state may not be sued without its consent. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, Feb. 28, 1990)

7. Ms. Wayna Dudla, because of her extraordinary achievement of flunking the Philippine Bar Exams for a record 29 times, was granted honorary citizenship by the State of Utopia, a country where lawyering is considered a crime. Wayna readily accepted such citizenship. Did Wayna lose her Filipino citizenship?


No, Wayna did not lose her Filipino citizenship.

Section 3 of Article IV of the Constitution provides that Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The law governing loss of Philippine citizenship is Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended. The grounds, however, for the loss of Filipino citizenship, as provided in said law, do not include the acceptance of the grant of honorary citizenship in another country. The elementary principle of statutory construction that when the law contains an express enumeration of items, what is not included should be excluded, finds application in this case. Expressio unios est exclusio alterius. As long as Wayna would not expressly renounce her Filipino citizenship or subscribe to an oath of allegiance support the constitution or laws of a foreign country, she would not lose her Filipino citizenship.

8. Mr. Nan Gigil raped Ms. Gin Lugus (not her real name), a pretty girl of tender age. However, before Gin could file criminal charges, she died of cancer of the toenails. Since Gin was a minor who had no known parents, grandparents or guardian, in what capacity may the State help in vindicating the violation of her womanhood?

Ans. The State may, in its capacity as parens patriae or guardian of the rights of its people, help in vindicating the outrage done to Ms. Gin Lugus by bringing her abuser to justice. To the State is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individuals who, because of age or incapacity, are in an unfavorable position vis--vis other parties.

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those

arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarch to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. (Government of P.I. vs. Monte de Piedad)

9. In 19 February 1994, Jane Roe, a victim of rape who was then in the first trimester of her pregnancy, filed a petition to declare Art. 258 of the Revised Penal Code unconstitutional. The said article punishes abortion practiced by the woman herself. She contends that said article violates the equal protection clause for it fails to distinguish between those who became pregnant by being raped and those who are pregnant by their own consented act. However, while Janes petition was pending in the Supreme Court, she had given birth to the son of her abuser. The termination of her pregnancy rendered the case moot and academic as she is no longer exposed to the punitive effects of Art. 258. Will the mooting of the case foreclose the exercise by the Supreme Court of its power of judicial review?

Ans. The general rule in our jurisdiction is that the power of judicial review may not be exercised in vacuo, which means that an actual case or controversy must exist, not only at the time of the filing of the action but more importantly at the time of the rendition of the decision. Thus, it is axiomatic that the mooting of the case ipso facto results in the loss of the jurisdiction over the case, thus foreclosing the exercise by the judiciary of its power of judicial review.

However, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the mooting of the case does not preclude the exercise of judicial review. Even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principles is appropriate for the guidance not only of the parties but others similarly situated. This is referred to as the symbolic function of judicial review. It is the act of conveying to the members of the bench as well as the bar the controlling doctrinal laws or jurisprudential pronouncements of the Supreme Court to serve as guide in deciding cases with parallel circumstances. (Eastern Broadcasting Corp. vs. Dans, Jr.)

It must be noted, however, that the exercise of the Supreme Court of this symbolic function depends entirely upon its discretion. An examination of the cases where it used this function shows that the Supreme Court exercises this prerogative only when the case it involves protection and preservation of basic constitutional rights and guarantees or when the case involves what is styled in American jurisprudence as capable of repetition, yet evading review.

Janes petition, aside from being moot and academic and patently unmeritorious, it does not involve the protection or preservation of basic constitutional rights that would justify the court to exercise the symbolic function of judicial review. The Constitution, far from providing the right to abort, it expressly commands the State to equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

10. Ms. Obra Maestra, in her capacity as a public school teacher, filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 007, prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools. Her school adopted a biology textbook containing a chapter on Darwin. The State, represented in this instance by the Solicitor General, surprisingly posed no objections to the petition. In the course of the proceedings, it was proven that the said law had been enacted during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines and that there was no indication it had ever been enforced, and that the pallid, unenthusiastic, even apologetic defense of the law presented by the State indicates that the State would make no attempt to enforce the said law. a) Is Ms. Maestras petition a proper subject for judicial review? b) May the State question the constitutionality of C.A. No. 007?

Ans. a) The petition is not a proper subject of judicial review for want of an actual case or controversy. The exercise of the courts of the power of judicial review is predicated upon the existence of a genuinely justiciable case or controversy as judicial review may not be exercised in vacuo. (Epperson vs. Arkansas)

An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.

Furthermore, Ms. Maestra does not have the requisite standing to assail the validity of the questioned law. There is no showing that she has suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the enforcement of the putatively invalid law. This is buttressed by the fact that it was proven that the law had never been enforced and that there are indications that the State would make no attempt to enforce said law. (Warth vs. Seldin)

b) The State may properly question the constitutionality of C.A. No. 007. Unchallenged is the rule that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if C.A. No. 007 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegalexpenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. (People vs. Vera)