LINGKOD MANGGAGAWA SA RUBBERWORLD, ADIDAS-ANGLO, its officers and members as represented by SONIA ESPERANZA, Petitioners, vs. RUBBERWORLD (PHILS.

) INC. and ANTONIO YANG, LAYA MANANGHAYA SALGADO & CO., CPAs (In its capacity as liquidator of Rubberworld (Phils., Inc.), Respondents. G.R. No. 153882 January 29, 2007 GARCIA, J.: FACTS: On August 26, 1994, Rubberworld filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Notice of Temporary Partial Shutdown due to severe financial crisis, therein announcing the formal actual company shutdown a copy of which was served on the recognized labor union of Rubberworld, the Bisig Pagkakaisa-NAFLU, the union with which the corporation had a collective bargaining agreement. On September 1, 1994, Bisig Pagkakaisa-NAFLU staged a strike. It set up a picket line in front of the premises of Rubberworld and even welded its gate. As a result, Rubberworld's premises closed prematurely even before the date set for the start of its temporary partial shutdown. On September 9, 1994, herein petitioner union, the Lingkod Manggagawa Sa Rubberworld, Adidas-Anglo (Lingkod, for brevity), represented by its President, Sonia Esperanza, filed a complaint against Rubberworld and its Vice Chairperson, Mr. Antonio Yang, for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal shutdown, and non-payment of salaries and separation pay. The said complaint was referred to Labor Arbiter Ernesto Dinopol for appropriate action. On November 22, 1994, while the aforementioned complaint was pending with Labor Arbiter Dinopol, Rubberworld filed with the SEC a Petition for Declaration of a State of Suspension of Payments with Proposed Rehabilitation Plan. Notwithstanding the SEC's aforementioned suspension order and despite Rubberworld's submission on January 10, 1995 of a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, Labor Arbiter Dinopol went ahead with the ULP case and rendered his decision denying respondents motion to suspend proceedings and declaring respondent Rubberworld Phils., Inc. to have committed unfair labor practice. Its motion for reconsideration of the same Order having been denied by the NLRC in its Resolution 7 of March 29, 1996, Rubberworld directly went to the Supreme Court on a Petition for Certiorari. On April 22, 1998, the SEC issued an Order finding that the continuance in business [of Rubberworld] would neither be feasible/profitable nor work to the best of interest of the stockholders, parties-litigants, creditors, or the general public, xxx Rubberworld Philippines, Inc. was hereby declared as DISSOLVED under Section 6(d) of P.D. 902-A. Accordingly, the suspension Order is LIFTED. Eventually, in the herein assailed Decision dated January 18, 2002, the CA granted Rubberworlds petition in CAG.R. SP. No. 53356 on the finding that the Labor Arbiter had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded with the ULP case despite the SECs suspension order of December 28, 1994, and accordingly declared the proceedings before it, including the subsequent orders by the NLRC dismissing Rubberworlds appeal and the writ of execution, null and void. Hence, the petition was filed. ISSUES: 1) Whether the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or an excess in the exercise thereof when it gave due course to the petition filed by Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. and annulled and set aside the decisions rendered by the labor arbiter a quo and the NLRC, when the said decisions had become final and executory warranting the outright dismissal of the aforesaid petition; 2) Whether the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion and reversible error when it applied Section 5(d) and Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, to the case at bar; RULING: 1. NEGATIVE. CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It cannot be said that the decision of the Labor Arbiter, or the decision/dismissal order and writ of execution issued by the NLRC, could ever attain final and executory status. The Labor Arbiter completely disregarded and violated Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, which categorically mandates the suspension of all actions for claims

against a corporation placed under a management committee by the SEC. Thus, the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the order and writ subsequently issued by the NLRC are all null and void for having been undertaken or issued in violation of the SEC suspension Order dated December 28, 1994. As such, the Labor Arbiters decision, including the dismissal by the NLRC of Rubberworlds appeal, could not have achieved a final and executory status. The Labor Arbiter's decision in this case is void ab initio, and therefore, non-existent. A void judgment is in effect no judgment at all. No rights are divested by it nor obtained from it. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings upon which the judgment is founded are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It accordingly leaves the party-litigants in the same position they were in before the trial. 2. NEGATIVE. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court addressed the more substantial issue in this case, namely, the applicability of the provisions of Section 5 (d) and Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, reorganizing the SEC, vesting it with additional powers and placing it under the Office of the President, which respectively read: Section 5. In addition to the regulatory adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: xxx xxx xxx d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases where the corporation, partnership or association possesses sufficient property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership or association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the management of a rehabilitation receiver or management committee created pursuant to this Decree. Section 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers: xxx xxx xxx c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real or personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the Commission in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors: x x x Provided, finally, That upon appointment of a management committee, the rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships, or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly. [Emphasis supplied] xxx xxx xxx x x x The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions "shall be suspended accordingly." No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. Since the law makes no distinction or exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Allowing labor cases to proceed clearly defeats the purpose of the automatic stay and severely encumbers the management committee's time and resources. The said committee would need to defend against these suits, to the detriment of its primary and urgent duty to work towards rehabilitating the corporation and making it viable again. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to other similarly situated claimants and forestall if not defeat the rescue efforts. Besides, even if the NLRC awards the claims of private respondents, its ruling could not be enforced as long as the petitioner is under the management committee. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.