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K N Ninan Donald Bren School of Environmental Science and Management University of California, Santa Barbara
Theoretical Foundations
CBA is a powerful tool that facilitates policy makers and decisions makers to make resource allocation and investment decisions. It is based on Neo Classical Welfare Economics. CBA is based on the notion of Human Preferences. Preferences are linked to Utility or Well-Being (or Human Welfare) Individual Preferences can be aggregated to derive Social Preference or a Social Welfare Function. Preferences are revealed in market places through decisions to spend or not to spend money.
Theoretical Foundations
Preferences could be gauged through the following two ways: Indirect Approach- Revealed Preference Approach (eg. travel cost method, hedonic pricing) Direct Approach- Stated Preference Approach (eg. contingent valuation method) (These are discussed under the subject Non Market Valuation) Preferences can be measured through Willingness to Pay (WTP) to Willingness to Accept (WTA) Compensation. Preferences can be aggregated through a common measuring rod Money. Efficiency Rule for Maximising Social Welfare or Human Well-Being. The issue of Who Gains and Who Loses Every Project/Policy has Gainers and Losers. Pareto Principle Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Test/Criterion (Potential Pareto Improvement Rule)
Theoretical Foundations
Critiques of CBA:
Since CBA is based on Neo Classical Welfare Economics the criticisms against neo classical welfare economics also apply to CBA. Important Critiques: Arrows Impossibility Theorem Scitovsky Paradox Boadway Paradox Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Function (Socially Consensus Function)
Source: Dixon et al: The Economics of Dryland Management, Earthscan, 1989, p.68
Demand and Supply Curves showing Consumer and Producer Surplus (Total Benefits to Society)
Source: Dixon et al: The Economics of Dryland Management, Earthscan, 1989, p.69
Indifference Map
Each higher indifference curve gives a higher level of satisfaction or utility ( Thus U3 > U2 > U1 )
Indifference Curve
Different combinations of two commodities, say, apples and oranges which give same level of satisfaction or utility to the consumer i.e. he is indifferent between these combinations.
Indifference Curve
Equilibrium of the consumer is attained at that point where the budget line or income is tangent with the highest possible indifference curve, in this case U2
Instead of considering what sum of money would compensate for some change or the loss of some facility, we can estimate the adjustment to the consumers income that is equivalent in terms of its effects on the consumers utility, to the change. Thus if the consumer suffers the same loss of utility as in the move from C1 to C2 if relative prices remain unchanged and his income is reduced by M1R, leaving him on the dashed budget line RS, touching the indifference curve U1 at D2, M1R is then termed the equivalent variation in income, as it is the income change yielding the same utility change as the original price changes. EV need not be the same as CV
Peter Else & Peter Curwen: Principles of Microeconomics, Unwin Hyman, London &Boston
Benefits are defined as increases in human well-being (utility). Benefit is what you are willing to pay (WTP) for securing a benefit (or welfare/wellbeing/utility); or willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for losing a benefit (There is a debate about whether to use WTP or WTA values while estimating project benefits and costs. WTP values generally preferred) WTP = Product Price + Consumer Surplus. Hence Market Prices are not a true indicator of Consumer Well-Being. The lower the price, the more important consumer surpluses are likely to be (Abelson, Project Appraisal and Valuation, Macmillan, 1996). Especially so in the case of Environmental Goods/Non-Market Goods where all benefits are consumer surpluses. Measurement of CS is, therefore, important for CBA especially for environmental goods. (Abelson, 1996).
A project or policy to qualify on cost-benefit grounds, its social benefits must exceed its social costs. Society is simply the sum of individuals. The geographical boundary for CBA is usually the nation but can readily be extended to wider limits.
Theoretical Foundations
Costs and Benefits will accrue over time and the general rule will be that future costs and benefits are weighted in such a way that a unit of benefit or cost in the future has a lower weight than the same unit of benefit or cost occurring now. This temporal weight is known as the Discount Factor and derived as follows: 1 DFt = ---------(1 + s)t where: DFt = Discount Factor or weight in Period t. s = Discount Rate. If projects and policies are being evaluated from societys viewpoint, s is a social discount rate.
{ Bi ,t (1 + s ) Ci ,t (1 + s ) } > 0
i ,t i ,t
(B
i ,t
i ,t
Ci ,t ).(1 + s ) > 0
Where: i is the ith individual and t is time. In this formulation Benefits are measured by WTP to secure the benefits (G refers to gainers), and Costs are measured by WTP to avoid the cost (L refers to losers). If the losers from the project have legitimate property rights to what they lose, then WTP should be replaced by WTA, and the equation would read:
The notion of WTP and WTA can be extended to include WTP to avoid a cost and WTA compensation to forego a benefit. The difference, then is that losses are measured by WTA and not by WTP.WTA can differ significantly from WTP. In the two equations WTP and WTA are discounted so that when summed over time the resulting magnitude is known as Present Value (PV). A Present Value is simply the sum of all discounted Future Values. The above equation can also be written as PV (WTP) PV (WTA) > 0
Benefit
80
60
40
Cost
-100
20
20
20
-100 0.952
60 0.907
40 0.864
20 0.823
-95.2
54.4
34.6
16.5
Assumes a discount rate of 5% Source: Pearce et al (2006) Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment, OECD, Paris.
-103
63.6
43.7
22.5
Netting out inflation at 3% p.a. = net benefit in constant year 0 prices Discount factor*
-100
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.952
0.907
0.864
0.823
-95.2
54.4
34.6
16.5
Pearce et al (2006) Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment, OECD, Paris, p.44
U0(Y0+WTA,E1) = U0 (Y0,E0)
U1(Y0-WTP,E0) = U1 (Y0,E1)
Pareto Criterion
Pareto ( 1848, 1923): in his Cours d Economie Politique (1896) argues that the only objective test of whether or not social improvement had been brought about by a change in the existing state was if some people were made better off and no one was made worse off- Pareto Condition or Criterion. The strict Pareto Principle - whereby a policy is good if at least some people actually gain and no one actually loses was clearly stultifying. Virtually all real life context involves gainers and losers. The Pareto Principle was considered to be sterile because it said that a policy was a good policy if and only if no-one suffered a welfare loss and at least one person experienced a gain. (referred to win-win situations). It is hard to find win-win situations; someone always loses in one way or other. The difficulties with the Pareto Criterion led to the formulation of the Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Test.
Critiques of CBA
Since CBA is based on Neo Classical Welfare Economics, the criticisms leveled against Neo Classical Welfare Economics also apply to CBA. Arrows Impossibility Theorem: In his Social Choice and Individual Values establishes there exists no way to decide whether something is a social improvement or not, or we insist that social rankings are based on individual preferences and on certain reasonable criteria. But CBA is a procedure for aggregating individuals preferences so that CBA must fail the Arrows Impossibility Theorem. There is no reasonable way of going from individuals preferences to a social ordering of different states Arrows Theorem related to individuals preferences being expressed in an Ordinal fashion. That is, preferences are capable of being ordered but the distance between them could not be measured.
Critiques of CBA
For eg an Ordinal ranking of states x, y, and z could be : U (x) > U (y) > U (z) where U simply means Utility or Well-Being. With Ordinal ranking no meaning could be attached to the distance between, say, U (x) U (y) The Intensity of Preferences cannot be measured For eg if Anne states that she obtains 10 utils (units of satisfaction) from consumption of an apple and Mike says he gets 5 utils from consumption of an apple we cannot state that Anne obtains double the level of satisfaction (utils) than Mike from consumption of an apple. In contrast Cardinal orderings would enable values to be attached to the distances for purposes of comparison. For eg U (x) U (y) = 9, and U (y) U (z) = 3 We can say that the former is 3 times the latter.
Critiques of CBA
Problem of Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility: To avoid above problem the various intervals between U (x), U (y), etc should mean the same thing for all individuals. For eg it would imply that U1 (x) U2 (y) > U2 (x) U2 (y) where 1 and 2 are different people, otherwise preferences cannot be aggregated.But if Cardinal Utility and Inter-Personal Comparisons both apply then CBA would appear to be valid since preferences can be aggregated. The view that interpersonal comparisons were themselves impossible had become widely accepted with the publication of Lionel Robbins famous essay in 1938.
Critiques of CBA
Problem of Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility: Interpersonal comparisons become essential with the hypothetical (Kaldor-Hicks) Compensation Test.If compensation is actually paid no problem arises. But if it is not actually paid then it is necessary to know if the gainers really could compensate the losers, i.e. the relative size of the gains and losses must be known, which means comparing utilities across different people. If Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility cannot be made then you cant aggregate preferences (to arrive at the social preference)- If so then the Arrow Theorem applies and all non-dictatorial mechanisms for aggregating individual preferences are imperfect in the sense of permitting inconsistent social orderings. If Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility can be done then CBA applies and the Arrows Theorem does not apply.
Critiques of CBA
Scitovsky Paradox: Scitovsky (1941) showed the potential contradiction in the hypthothetical compensation principle. Since a change making some better off and some worse off would change the distribution of income it was possible for those who lost to (hypothetically) compensate those who gained to return to the original situation. In other words the question arises as`to what happens to income distribution once a policy or project is implemented. In theory it could change in such a way that the policy originally sanctioned by the potential compensation principle could also be negated by the same principle i.e. benefits exceed costs for the policy, but the move back to the original pre-policy state could also be sanctioned by CBA. This is referred to as the Scitovsky Paradox.
Critiques of CBA
Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Function: A Bergson (1938) suggested that the policy showing the highest net benefits may not, in fact, be the best one to undertake. One of the ways out of this problem could be to assume a social welfare function a rule that declared how aggregate welfare would vary with the set of all individuals welfare. The problem is of finding a social welfare function that might be regarded as a socially consensus function there are many possible functions and no practical prospect of deciding which one to use. Paul Samuelson (1942) argued that consumer's surplus had no practical validity because one could not assume that the marginal utility of income was constant.The marginal utility of a dollar is higher for the poorer classes as compared to the rich.
Critiques of CBA
Other critiques: Boadway Paradox (1974): Boadway raises another problem that policies my change income distributions and hence relative prices- which in turn will impact on CBA. CBAs underlying value judgement that individual (human) preferences count. Those who believe in Rights-based Approach find CBA unacceptable.Critics believe that other species have intrinsic rights which are not amenable to analysis using human preferences unless humans can be judged to take those rights into account when expressing their own preferences. Others believe that individuals are poorly informed about the environment and its importance as a life-support asset. Guiding policy in these circumstances based on human preferences could risk other social goals, even human survival itself. (Public Trust doctrine used by US Courts to override CBA in several court rulings)
Critiques of CBA
Other critiques:
Belief in Rights is perhaps an example of what has been called endogenous preferences, preferences that are formed by the social context of decision making ,by how others believe, by institutions and social conditioning (Gowdy, 2004) Moral CBA: do moral considerations enter into CBA? A debatable issue ? What motivates human preferences ? Moral notions may also determine human behaviour and it is not clear that such motivations cannot be encompassed in the CBA framework. Other criticisms relate to use of WTP as a measure of preference, discounting, , distribution and equity, sustainability, etc.
References
David Pearce, Giles Atkinson, Susana Mourata (2006) Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment- Recent Developments, OECD, Paris, Chapter 2. Peter Abelson (1996) Project Appraisal and Valuation of the Environment- General Principles and Six Case Studies in Developing Countries, Macmillan, London. Chapter 1.