Aristotle S Protrepticus Provisional Reconstruction

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)
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Aristotle, Protrepticus
D. S. Hutchinson & Monte Ransome Johnson 2010 viii 31 This document consists of translations from certain ancient Greek texts that transmit evidence of Aristotles lost dialogue Protrepticus, together with editorial comments by DSH and MRJ. Our editorial comments are in italics, not indented, and in 10-point font size, whereas the ancient texts are indented, not in italics, and in 12point font size. Words translated from ancient texts are set in boldface if we believe them to be the very words that were in Aristotles text; when they are not boldface this means that we do not know which words stood in Aristotles text, of which this passage may have been a paraphrase, not a citation. At the end of each paragraph or similar division of text a reference is given; for those readers who find it necessary for scholarly purposes to give a precise reference to any individual sentence, its starting and finishing references may be inferred by using the paragraph reference together with the internal references which divide sentences from each other. We believe that Aristotles Protrepticus was a dialogue in which at least three characters debated with each other in front of an audience of youngsters about the true nature and worth of philosophy. One of these characters was Isocrates, who stands for Isocrates of Athens, a teacher of what he called philosophy, but of which he had a more limited conception than did Plato and his student Aristotle. Another character was Heraclides, who stands for Heraclides of Pontus, a student of Plato with distinctly Pythagorean enthusiasms; and the third main character is, we think, Aristotle, who articulates the particular views of Aristotle himself. Aristotles Protrepticus is a text with very many gaps, even in this relatively advanced state of reconstruction. We have no sure way of knowing how large these gaps are, or how extensive the work originally was, nor can we be sure what the dialogue did not contain. The beginning is particularly damaged, and we have no evidence of how the work gets going, except that it was dedicated to a certain Themison, who apparently enjoyed a good reputation, not only for his wealth. Evidence: Stobaeus, Anthology IV.32.21 (from Teles Epitome).
Provisional Reconstruction
Zeno said that Crates, while sitting in a shoemakers workshop, read the Protrepticus of Aristotle, which he wrote to Themison (a king of Cyprus), saying that no one has more good things going for him to help him do philosophy, since, as he has great wealth, he can spend it on these things, and he has a reputation as well.
We have no firm information about how the narrative of the dialogue began, but it is an attractive possibility that at an early point there was this hostile challenge to philosophy, uttered by a critic almost spluttering with indignation, preserved in an Oxyrhynchus papyrus. It may be that he is responding to a book by Antisthenes of Athens (a student of Socrates), conceivably his lost Protrepticus. Evidence: P.Oxy3659; column I lines 2-32.
but they dont agree at all on that; no, even silver and yet what could be whiter than silver?! no, despite this, Thrasyalkes says its black. [8|9] So then, when even the whiteness of silver is on the doubtful side, why be amazed if people who are deliberating have their disagreements over war and peace, over alliances and revenues and disbursements and the like? [16|17] And what about the philosophers themselves? If you confined them together in the same house and an equal number of madmen in another house next door, you would get much, much, greater howls from the philosophers than from the madmen!! [25] In fact, this one, this Antisthenes here, says he would rather feel madness than pleasure; and Aristippus, what is mad and what about Plato and what [I.2-32]
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Our main source of evidence for the next passage is another papyrus from Oxyrhynchus, which is rich with allusions to classic Socratic and Platonic protreptic argumentation. The speaker seems to be Isocrates, who liberally sprinkles his speech with sayings and slogans to argue that wisdom is worth far more than external goods. He seems to be making reference to the text from which a different papyrus, P.Oxy3699, is a fragment (possibly of Antisthenes Protrepticus), especially at Fragment D, column I lines 2-14: reputation, strength, beauty are unprofitable to such a person. Its pretty much just like a knife to a child how any of such things turns out for an uneducated human, for where he owns the possessions he has the initial impulse for weak self-control, leading to self-indulgence and even gambling and women and other Evidence: P.Oxy666; column I lines 51-55 + II.1-57 + III.1-56. The same passage is also quoted in the Anthology of Stobaeus at III.3.25; Stobaeus refers to it as coming from Aristotle. The version in Stobaeus Anthology is slightly abridged: it has the text which the papyrus presents at lines II.4-III.41, with the omission of II.52-III.5.
since dog in the manger whenever prevent <them> from <both saying> and doing something they decide they need to do. [I.51-55 + II.1-4] This is why those who observe their misfortune should avoid it, and consider success in life as in fact not consisting in the possession of lots of things as much as in the condition of the soul. [15] For one would not say that even a body is happy by being adorned with splendid clothing, but rather by being healthy and in a good condition, even if none of the things just mentioned is present in it; rather, and in the same way, a soul, too, if it has been educated, such a soul and such a man must be hailed as being successful, not if he is splendidly furnished with the externals but is himself worth nothing. [39] For nor is a horse, if it has a golden bit and an expensive harness but is itself bad, the sort of horse that we consider to be worth something; but its any one thats in a good condition that we praise instead. [51|52] Apart from whats been said, what happens to those who are worth nothing, when they do happen across wealth and the goods that come by fortune, is that their possessions are worth more than they are, which is the most disgraceful thing of all. [III.5|6] For just as anybody who is inferior to his own servants would turn into a laughing-stock, in the same way it turns out that those for whom their possessions are more important than their own nature should be considered pathetic. [II.4-III.17] And this is truly how it is: for, as the proverb says, satisfaction begets insolence, and ignorance with power beget madness, since for those whose condition is bad in those respects that concern the soul, neither wealth nor strength nor beauty is anything good; but rather, the more these bad conditions obtain to an excessive degree, the more greatly and the more often those things harm the man who possesses them, if he comes by them without wisdom. [41] For the saying no knife for a child means dont put power into the hands of the bad. [46|47] But everyone would agree that wisdom comes from learning or from searching, the capacities for which are comprehended within philosophy. [53] Hence surely we have to do philosophy unreservedly, and ... [III.18-56]
Iamblichus begins chapter VI of his own Protrepticus by quoting and paraphrasing the conclusions of a stretch of argument from Aristotles Protrepticus. These conclusions in favour of philosophy as the overarching executive ability of life seem to be spoken by the character Aristotle, who takes up and agrees to a limited extent with the line of argument developed in P.Oxy666 (above), a line of argument that we think was spoken by the character Isocrates. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, chapter VI, page 37, lines 3-22.
The things that are supports for our way of life, e.g. a body and whats around it, support it in the manner of certain tools, the use of which is
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dangerous, and rather the contrary is accomplished by those who use them in ways they shouldnt. [7] Well then, one should desire both to acquire this knowledge and to use it appropriately, this knowledge through which we will put all these things to good use. [9] Hence we should do philosophy, if we are going to engage in politics correctly and conduct our own life in a beneficial way. [37.3-11] Furthermore, there is a difference between the kinds of knowledge that produce each of the things of which we want to have more and more in our way of life, and the kinds of knowledge that make use of these kinds of knowledge, and the ones that give service are different from the others that issue orders; and in these as it were more commanding kinds of knowledge exists what is good in the strict sense. [16] If, then, only that kind of knowledge which does have correctness of judgment, and does use reason, and observes the good as a whole -- that is to say, philosophy -- is naturally capable of using all of them and issuing orders, by all means one ought to do philosophy, since only philosophy includes within itself this correct judgment and this intelligence to issue orders without errors. [37.11-22]
After the speech from which the above fragment is a part (if we have correctly placed it in this reconstruction), it seems that Heraclides spoke up with Pythagorean remarks in favour of philosophy (in chapters xxi and xxii of Iamblichus DCM); and after this point it seems that Aristotle spoke again, enlarging on and correcting the history of Pythagorean mathematical philosophy that Heraclides had provided in too dogmatic a fashion. This history of mathematics was apparently preceded and set in context by a set of general comments spoken by the character Aristotle, about the development of wisdom in the wake of one of the disasters that periodically destroy advanced societies. These general comments were paraphrased by the Peripatetic scholar Aristocles of Messene at the beginning of his 10-book volume On Philosophy, and this intermediate work is the named source of the late ancient summary that follows. Evidence: Philoponus, Commentary on the Introduction to Arithmetic by Nicomachus of Gerasa, part I, page 1, lines 14-49.
But since we name the terms wisdom and wise generally, it has to be posited that the names wisdom and wise are used ambiguously, for they have been taken by the ancients in five ways, as Aristocles says in his ten books On Philosophy. [17|18] For it is necessary to understand that humans perish in different ways: by famines and earthquakes and wars and varieties of diseases and by other causes, but most of all by more massive cataclysms. [20] For example the flood of Deucalion was great, to be sure, but not the greatest that has prevailed, for the shepherds and those who have their occupations in the mountains or in the foothills survived, but the plains and those who have their homes on them suffered cataclysm. [24] So they say that Dardanus was saved by being swept by the cataclysm from Samothrace to what was later called Troy. [25] But those who are saved from the flood must live on the uplands, as the Poet <sc. Homer> shows when he says: Zeus the cloud-gatherer first begat Dardanus; and he established Dardania, since Ilium was not yet built on the plain to be a city for mortal men; but still they lived on the slopes of many-fountained Ida. [30|31] The word still indicates that they did not yet have the confidence to have their occupations on the plains. [32] So then, these survivors, not having a source of subsistence, used their intelligence out of necessity for their practical needs, either uncovering the grinding of grain, sowing, or some other thing like that, and they called that kind of use of intelligence wisdom, the kind that discovers the solutions in the face of the necessities of life, and they called wise the kind of person who was intelligent like that. [1.14-36]
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Again they applied their mind to skills, prompted by Athena (as the poet says) , but no longer only so far as was necessary in life, but also going so far as to produce things beautiful and refined. [38] And this again they called wisdom and the discoverers wise, since the wise craftsman fashioned it, knowing well the wisdom prompted by Athena, for they attributed the thought of these things to a god, because the discoveries were so exceedingly great. [41] Again, they turned their thoughts to political matters, and discovered laws and all the things that sustain the cities; and again this kind of thought they called wisdom, for this is the kind of person that the Seven Wise men were, politically virtuous people who discovered virtue. [44] Then they proceeded down the road and applied their intelligence to the bodies themselves and the nature which manufactures them, and this they called by the unique name natural theory, and we say that the kind of people concerned with nature are wise. [47] Fifthly, they then came to the divine, the hyper-cosmic, and the completely unchanging things, and named the knowing of these things wisdom in the strictest sense. [1.36-49]
Our next fragment of evidence from the commentary by Proclus on the first book of Euclids Elements of Geometry, in which he reports part of a speech from the Protrepticus by Aristotle, who sketches the early history of geometry. Evidence: Proclus, Commentary on Euclids Elements I, Second Prologue, chapter 4, page 64 line 8 to page 68 line 4. According to Proclus, the inspired Aristotle had said that
The same beliefs have often recurred to humans at certain regular periods of the world, and that it was not among us, or among any of those of whom we have any cognizance, that the sciences took shape for the first time; on the contrary, they appear and again disappear during other cycles, too numerous to tell, that have come to pass and will in turn exist. [15|16] But since we need to investigate the origin of the arts and sciences in the present period, we say that geometry was first discovered by Egyptians, according to most of those who research the question, and owed its development to the re-measuring of their lands. [20] This was necessary for them because the Nile overflows and obliterates the appropriate property boundaries between them. [23] And it is not at all surprising that the discovery of this, as well as that of the other sciences, had its origin in utility, since everything that is carried on by coming into being proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect form. [65.1] So the transition from sense-perception to thinking and from thinking to insight would be likely to happen. [3] Just as among the Phoenicians the precise cognition of the numbers got its origin from trade and commerce, it was also in this way that geometry was discovered by Egyptians, for the reason mentioned. [64.8-65.7] Thales, having traveled to Egypt, was the first to bring this theoretical subject over into Greece; he made many discoveries himself, and taught the principles of many others to those who came after him, attacking some problems in a more general way and others in a more sense-perceptual way. [11] Next after him, Mamertius, brother of Stesichorus the poet, is remembered for the zeal with which he applied himself to the study of geometry; and Hippias of Elis did research showing that he acquired a reputation in geometry. [15] After them, Pythagoras transformed the philosophy of geometry into a scheme of liberal education, surveying its principles from above and tracking down its theorems in an immaterial and intellectual way; he was also the one who discovered the
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business of the irrationals and the arrangement of the cosmic figures. [21] After him, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae applied himself to many questions in geometry, and so did Oenopides of Chios, who was a little younger than Anaxagoras [66.3 66.4] Following them, Hippocrates of Chios, who discovered the squaring of the meniscus, and Theodorus of Cyrene became eminent in geometry. [7] In fact, Hippocrates was also the first in recorded memory to assemble a written book of elements. [65.7-66.8] Plato, who appeared after them, made great advances in mathematics in general and in geometry in particular because of his zeal for those studies; its pretty clear that his writings are thickly sprinkled with mathematical terms and that he is constantly trying to rouse admiration for mathematics among the adherents of philosophy. [14] At this time there was also Leodamas of Thasos, Archytas of Tarentum, and Theaetetus of Athens, by whose works the theorems were increased and brought into a more scientific arrangement. [18] Younger than Leodamas were Neoclides and his student Leon; they added many discoveries to those of their predecessors, with the result that Leon made a more careful composition of the elements, both in their number and in the utility of their proofs; and he also discovered determinations, to determine when the solution to the problem under investigation is possible and when it is impossible. [66.8-67.1] Eudoxus of Cnidus, a little later than Leon and a companion of those around Plato, was the first to increase the number of the so-called general theorems; to the three proportionals already known he added three more and multiplied the number of propositions concerning the section, which had their origin in Plato, employing analyses on them. [8] Amyclas of Heracleia, one of Platos followers, Menaechmus, a student of Eudoxus who was also associated with Plato, and his brother Dinostratus brought the whole of geometry into a still more perfect state. [12] Theudius of Magnesia had a reputation for excellence in mathematics as in the rest of philosophy, for he produced an admirable arrangement of the elements and made many partial theorems more general. [16] There was also Athenaeus of Cyzicus, who lived around the same time and became eminent in mathematics and especially in geometry. [19] These men lived together with each other in the Academy, making their inquiries in common. [20] Hermotimus of Colophon pursued further the prior discoveries of Eudoxus and Theaetetus, discovered many propositions in the Elements, and wrote something about the common-places. [23] Philippus of Mende, a pupil whom Plato exhorted to study mathematics, also carried on his investigations according to Platos instructions and set himself to study those problems that he thought would help to complete Platos philosophy. [67.2-68.4]
The next fragment of evidence comes from Iamblichus, in the third part of his multi-part volume of Pythagorean philosophy, entitled De Communi Mathematici Scientia, and apparently shows the continuation of this speech of Aristotle In his introductory remarks to this chapter at 70.1-3, Iamblichus picked up a comment that was already quoted by Proclus at 65.16-17 of his commentary: Pythagoras transformed the philosophy of mathematics into a scheme of liberal education. This indicates that for his book Iamblichus chose to skip over most of the material that was quoted or paraphrased by Proclus, except to highlight the one comment that most suits his Pythagorean purposes, before citing the material that follows. Evidence: Iamblichus, De Communi Mathematici Scientia, chapter xxiii, page 70 line 7 to page 71 line 24.
If we have gathered any seed or principle of this kind of cognition by which we passed from a previous verbal acceptance of what kind of science it is to
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precisely observing what sort of thing its nature is, this came to us from nothing other than them. [11] But also the power of the science established it more clearly by the proper arguments in the demonstrations about them. [13] Moreover it is the understanding of these things that has corrected us from being led astray when we were persuaded by many of the appearances, clearly establishing the truth about them, whatever it is. [16] But most of all, we participate for the first time in a vision that is both liberated and fitting for philosophers when we are in their community; what is similar in nature to each thing is what is proper to it, and to the man of liberated status the dominant end of the activity in accordance with his proper way of life has its reference to himself and to nothing else external. [21] And this exists in the sciences previously mentioned, being theoretical, as well as in the first sciences, because learning them occurs first in order, at a young age, without further need of the kind of induction that naturally arises through a habit formed out of the particulars. [70.7-26] And if it is necessary to attribute to this person too the name that is proper to his passion (as with the desires proper to other people, which are named for their fondness for one kind of thing), the philosopher seems to have a drive for a certain science that is prized for itself, and not on account of anything else resulting from it. [71.4] For some of those who wish to advance them would not seem to assign to them the appropriate rank, when they assert that we need to create understanding of them because the training in them is useful for other theoretical fields. [8|9] For those things for the sake of which they encourage us to this are by their nature less akin to the truth, even for those who are accustomed to speaking speeches about them, nor are they champion competitors in respect of the precision of their demonstrations. [12] And heres a sufficient indication of this: we see them enduring and being trustworthy, practiced continually in the same way by those who take up those fields, but in the others we would discover extremely few demonstrations that are at all like that. [70.26-71.15] Now then, mathematical philosophy has helped us, both for many of the necessities for life, and also for those things that are worthwhile in themselves, as soon as we are affluent. [18] For even among the industrial arts we would discover that no small assistance has come about from them. [20] And as for natural philosophy, even if some other one were to have a more exalted rank, we would see that it makes use of many of the things that we have seen in the proper demonstrations, which we have established throughout what has been said. [71.16-24]
After a gap, Iamblichus carries on quoting from the speech of Aristotle, who offers reasons why theoretical sciences have a higher status than other sciences, concluding that it would seem to be absurd and entirely unacceptable to maintain the position that Isocrates was propounding. He viewed these sciences as defective in that they dont yield results that are applicable in practice. Evidence: Iamblichus, DCM xxiii, 71.26-73.5.
But not only because of this kind of assistance should anyone appreciate their power, but rather still more for themselves and because of their proper nature. [72.2] For it is agreed that there are certain sciences that are valued for themselves and not only for what results from them; but this is possible either only or especially for sciences that are theoretical, because their end is nothing else than the theory. [6] But we use the same criteria to posit one science as being more
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valuable than another as we use to judge each one to be valuable. [8] And we value one science over another either because of its precision or because what it observes is better and more honorable; of these sciences, while everyone would agree with us that it belongs especially to the mathematical sciences among them, there are on the other hand those who assign the seat of honor mentioned to the principles that are first, but they suppose the nature of the principle is proper to numbers and lines and their qualities, because of the simplicity of its substance. [71.26-72.16] Again, the objects that are observed in the heavens have the most honorable and most divine rank of the things perceptible to us and are naturally cognized by the science of astronomy, which is one of the mathematical sciences; but it would seem to be absurd and entirely unacceptable to assert that the philosopher is related to the truth while thinking it necessary for him to seek some other fruit from these kinds of theorems (which have shared in the highest truth), or is in love with spectacular sights while thinking it right to acquire such sciences as these for something else, sciences which are about the most common things in nature as well as about the most divine of the things perceptible to us, sciences which, being full of the most numerous as well as the most amazing observations, have a precision not molded from empty arguments, but are proper and secure from their underlying nature. [73.3] In general, whatever someone would seek to require to belong to those of the sciences which are valuable in themselves, we will find that mathematical sciences share in all of them. [72.16-73.5]
After a short gap, Iamblichus carries on quoting from the speech of Aristotle, who explains how the formal procedure of the Pythagoreans is a paradigm of rigorous thinking, and also how they apply their rigorous procedures to the mathematical science of astronomy. Evidence: Iamblichus, DCM xxiii, 73.9-74.1.
Moreover, taking the principles of the demonstrations to be cognizable and in themselves trustworthy, they use them to create the syllogisms about them, so as to be a paradigm for those who wish to infer the demonstrations in any precise way, which is why it would seem to be fitting for those who think that the profession of doing philosophy is in itself valuable, and that mathematical theory is proper and akin to philosophy. [73.9-17] So it is probably for all these reasons that the Pythagoreans honored the zeal for mathematics, and coordinated it with the observation of the cosmos in various ways, for example: by including number in their reasoning from the revolutions and their difference between them, by theorizing what is possible and impossible in the organization of the cosmos from what is mathematically possible and impossible, by conceiving the heavenly cycles according to commensurate numbers with a cause, and by determining measures of the heaven according to certain mathematical ratios, as well as putting together the natural science which is predictive on the basis of mathematics, and putting the mathematical objects before the other observable objects in the cosmos, as their principles. [73.17-74.1]
Iamblichus carries on quoting from the speech of Aristotle, who explains why geometrical knowledge was held in secret by the Pythagoreans, and why they focused uniquely on the basic principles of geometry, not the entire science. Evidence: Iamblichus, De Comm. Math., chapter xxiv, page 74 line 9 to page 76 line 6.
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So then, they separated the arguments about mathematics from those taken from perceptible things, and brought the mind around by them to a belief in incorporeal substance, and they used them to cross over to the intelligible things, and they especially researched the question what it is in them that is comparable to the pure forms and the unitary accounts. [15] Now then, they applied this procedure to the theorems they observed and at one time they removed the knowledge of them from the common and popular awareness, and turned their transmission by the same token into a sworn secret. [19] And they communicated the awareness of them to very few, and if anything anywhere got published to the masses, they abominated this as a sacrilege, which is why they rejected those who were outside their society as being unworthy to partake of them. [23] For Pythagoras took the position that mathematical philosophy should not be shared with everybody, but only with those with whom someone would share his entire life. [26] And into the membership of this group he didnt just admit people randomly or unselectively, but he tested for a long time the ones that were taken and rejected the unworthy. [75.2] And to those outside the society he did not make public the advances he himself made, but kept the arguments about them secret from the others, while he contributed to great advances among those called Pythagoreans, because of their camaraderie with him, both in mathematical philosophy and in geometrical theory, and one would discover that the starting points of almost all later further advances have come to us from him. [74.9-75.10] What he appreciated in mathematics was the observed theorems themselves, not, unlike certain of his successors, their power to discover further solutions to problems; and of these theorems he appreciated not the ones that were most difficult to discover, as did most of his successors, but rather those among them by which to discern to the highest degree an ordered rank or some natural joint feature. [15|16] They felt this because they thought that the first principles of all nature exist in them, and it is especially easy to observe what they are and how many there are, because they concern a nature that persists and is stripped of motion and is also simple, which is why they didnt take on the problematical areas (except the elementary ones) such as the application <of an area>, nor the squaring <of a circle>, nor did they make it their business to go through everything in detail, leaving aside none of the possibilities; they set out to see in each case only the principles themselves. [25] And they turned a training in these sciences and a logical workout that was theoretically precise into a proper science, they set up the ranking in the sciences that was suitable, they made few commitments at first and then worked them out, and they brought to completion mostly the most honorable and most exalted of the theorems they observed, and otherwise they practiced the discipline of bringing the theorems around to apply to other things. [76.4] And they created a ranking among them, such that the ones that are simpler are given the primary rank, while the ones that apply to a complex are secondary. [75.10-76.6]
After a gap, Iamblichus continues to quote from the speech of Aristotle, who continues his history of Pythagorean philosophy by offering an account of the early split between the two divisions of Pythagoreanism. Evidence: Iamblichus, De Comm. Math., chapter xxv, page 76 line 16 to page 78 line 21.
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But there are two forms of Italian philosophy called Pythagorean, since there were two types of people who took up philosophy: the acusmatici and the mathematici. [19] Of these, the acusmatici were agreed to be Pythagorean by the others, but these ones did not agree that the mathematici were Pythagorean, nor that their activity was from Pythagoras, but rather from Hippasus. [22] (Some say Hippasus was from Croton, others that he was from Metapontum.) [24] But those of the Pythagoreans concerned with mathematics both agree that the others are Pythagoreans and say that they themselves are even more so, and what they claim is true. [76.16-77.2] They say that the reason for this dissimilarity was of this sort, that Pythagoras immigrated from Ionia and Samos when Polycrates was tyrant there and Italy was flourishing, and those who were first in their cities formed communities around him. [7] And to the ones who were senior and without leisure because they were involved in political affairs, because of the difficulty that occurs in mathematics and demonstration, he talked in a simple style, believing it would be no less helpful, even without knowing the reason, to know what should be done, just as patients, too, without hearing why they have to do each of those things, recover their health nonetheless. [14] But with those who were younger and more capable of working and learning he conversed by using demonstrations and mathematics. [17] Now then, they themselves descend from these ones, and the others from the other ones. [18] About Hippasus they say that he was one of the Pythagoreans, but because he was the first to bring out and write up the sphere out of the twelve hexagons, he perished at sea because of his impiety, but getting the reputation as its discoverer, though everything came from that man, for that is how they refer to Pythagoras, not calling him by name. [77.3-24] Mathematics made advances, since it was developed especially by two preeminent mathematicians, Theodorus of Cyrene and Hippocrates of Chios. [78.1] And the Pythagoreans say that geometry was developed as follows. [2] A certain Pythagorean lost his estate, and so it happened that he was allowed to make money from geometry. Geometry used to be called research by Pythagoras. [5|6] Now then, with respect to each of the differences among their activities and with respect to mathematics, these sorts of things are pretty much what happened. [77.24-78.8] Because the Pythagoreans occupied themselves with mathematics and appreciated the precision of its accounts, because it is the only thing that humans deal with that has demonstrations, and because equal agreement is reached by using numbers in harmonics and by using diagrams in the mathematics that concern vision, for all these reasons, they thought that these things are causes of what exists and are their first principles. [14] Hence someone who wishes to observe the things that exist as they are, has to look at these things, the numbers and the geometrical forms and ratios of what exists, because everything is clarified by using them. [18] Now since they didnt think it either more opportune or more respectable to attach themselves to the capacities of each of them than to a cause of everything that is also first, they defined the other ones as well in these terms, in pretty much the same way. [78.8-21]
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After Aristotle had given the above sketch of the development of Pythagorean formal philosophy, Isocrates apparently attacked the Academic conception of philosophy, with its heavy emphasis on formal logic and mathematics, as worse than useless. Iamblichus quotes from Isocrates attack in chapter xxvi of his book De Communi Mathematica Scientia. Evidence: Iamblichus, De Comm. Math., chapter xxvi, page 79 lines 5-24.
If their end result is useless, the end for which the philosophers say they should be learned, it will necessarily be much more pointless to invest effort in them. [8] And on what their ends are, there is pretty much agreement among those who have been most precise about it. [10] For some of them say that it is knowledge of what is unjust and just and bad and good, a knowledge similar to geometry and the other sciences, while others say it is intelligence about both nature and that sort of truth, the sort of knowledge introduced by those around both Anaxagoras and Parmenides. [79.5-15] So it should not be overlooked by someone who is going to scrutinize these subjects that everything that is good and beneficial for the life of a human consists in being used and put into action, and not in the mere knowledge, for nor are we healthy by being acquainted with what produces health, but rather by applying it to our bodies, and nor are we wealthy by knowing about wealth, but by possessing much substance, and, most important of all, we do not live well by knowing certain beings, but by acting well, for this it truly is to be successful. [79.15-24]
After a gap, Iamblichus carries on quoting from Isocrates attack on Academic philosophy, specifically on its focus on mathematical theory. Evidence: Iamblichus, De Communi Mathematica Scientia xxvi 80.5-81.4.
For we have the greatest example in the sciences that are similar to it, and the opinions that fall under them, for we see none of the things which the geometers are able to observe by means of proofs as being something that they themselves are capable of doing, but the land-surveyors are capable, by experience, to divide an estate and all the other variables in quantities as well as places, whereas those who know about the mathematical subjects and the discourses about them know how they should act, but are not capable of acting. [80.5-13] The case is similar with music and the other sciences in which there is a division separating the cognitive aspect from the empirical. [15] For those who determine the proofs and the arguments about harmony and other suchlike things, just as in philosophy, are accustomed to enquiring, but take no part in activities. [19] In fact, even if they happen to be capable of crafting any of them, when they learn the proofs, they immediately do them worse, as if on purpose, whereas those who have no knowledge of the arguments, if they are trained and have correct opinions, are altogether superior for practical purposes. [23] So too with the subject matter of astronomy, such as sun and moon and the other stars: those who have practiced knowledge of the reasons and arguments have no knowledge of what is useful for humans, whereas those who have what is called navigational knowledge about them are capable of predicting for us storms and winds and many of these phenomena. [81.1] Hence for practical activities such sciences will be entirely useless, and, if they miss out on the correct activities, the love of learning misses out on the greatest of goods. [80.13-81.4]
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The above passage that Iamblichus had quoted was evidently under the eyes of Proclus as well, who, in his Euclid commentary, paraphrased not only the above criticism that mathematical theory is useless for practical purposes, but also Aristotles response to a critical argument that had come earlier, that there is no beauty or goodness in mathematics. (For Aristotles response to the uselessness criticism, see below.) Evidence: Proclus, Commentary on Euclids Elements I, Prologue I, chapter 9, page 25 line 15 to page 27 line 10.
These remarks will make the student understand the utility of general mathematics both to philosophy itself and to the other sciences and arts. [15] But there are nevertheless several contentious persons who attempt to detract from the worth of this science, some denying its beauty and goodness on the ground that its arguments say nothing about these matters, others declaring the empirical sciences concerned with sense objects are more useful than the general theoretical observations of mathematics, for example land-surveying, they say, is more useful than geometry, popular arithmetic than the theory of numbers, and nautical than general astronomy. [23] For we do not become rich by knowing wealth but by using it, not happy by knowing what happiness is but by living happily. [26.3] Hence we will agree, they say, that the empirical sciences, not the theories of the mathematicians, contribute most to the life of human beings and their activities. [6] Those who are ignorant of principles but trained in dealing with particular problems are on the whole and always superior in meeting human needs to those who have spent their time at leisure pursuing the theory alone. [25.12-26.9] To those who say these things we can reply by exhibiting the beauty of mathematics from the arguments by which Aristotle attempted to persuade us. [13] For he says that three things are especially conducive to beauty of body or soul: order, symmetry, and definiteness. [15] Since ugliness in the body arises from disorder, deformity, asymmetry, and indefiniteness in the material part of our composite nature, and ugliness in the soul comes from unreason, moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of harmony with reason and unwilling to accept the limits it imposes, beauty, therefore will reside in having the attributes opposite of these, namely order, symmetry, and definiteness. [23] These characteristics we observe preeminently in mathematical science: we see the order in its procedure of explaining the derivative and more complex theorems from the primary and simpler ones, for later propositions always depend on their predecessors, and some are counted as principles, others as deductions from the primary hypotheses. [27.1] And we see symmetry in the accord with one another of the things that are demonstrated and in the reference of everything back to the intellect; for the measure common to the whole science is the intellect, from which it gets its principles and towards which its students strive. [6] And we see definiteness in the fixity and lack of change of its arguments; for the objects of mathematical knowledge do not appear now in one guise and now in another, like the objects of perception or opinion, but always present themselves as the same, made definite by intelligible forms. [26.10-27.10]
When Iamblichus resumes citing from Aristotle in De Comm.Math. xxvi and Protrepticus VI, the speaker has changed, and is now Aristotle. In this general context he is replying to further challenges to the Academic conception of philosophy, as being hopelessly difficult, all hard work, and no real progress. At this point in his speech Aristotle is discussing Academic theory of virtue and ethics. Of the four sentences marked in bold as exact citations, the first and third (p. 38 lines 3-7 and 10-14) are repeated verbatim in a passage also cited in Iamblichus, De Comm. Math., xxvi, page 81, lines 9-11 and 12-16. (When Iamblichus made use of Aristotles book for this third part of his Pythagorean volume, he usually cited from it directly (as with the above-cited
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evidence from chapters xxiii-xxv), but in these overlapping passages he seems to have worked from and further condensed the version he had already made in his own Protrepticus, the second part in his multi-part volume.) Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, chapter VI, page 37 line 26 to page 38 line 22.
Furthermore, since everyone chooses what is possible and what is beneficial, it must be pointed out that both these features belong to philosophy, and also that the difficulty of acquiring it is more than outweighed by the magnitude of its benefit; for we all work at the easier tasks with greater pleasure. [26] Now then, that we are capable of acquiring the kinds of knowledge about the just and the expedient and also the ones about nature and the rest of truth, it is easy to demonstrate. [38.3] For prior things are always more familiar than posterior things, and what is better in nature than what is worse, for there is more knowledge of what is determinate and orderly than of their opposites, and again of the causes than of the effects. [7] And good things are determinate and organized more than bad things, just as a fair person is <determinate and organized more> than a foul person, for they necessarily have the same mutual difference. [10] And prior things are causes more than posterior things (for if they are eliminated, then the things that have their substance <made> out of them are eliminated: if numbers then lines, if lines then surfaces, and if surfaces then solids), and letters <are causes more> than what are named syllables. [37.22-38.14] Hence since soul is better than body (being more of a natural ruler), and the kinds of skill and intelligence concerned with the body are medical science and athletic training (for we regard these as being kinds of knowledge and say that some people possess them), clearly for the soul too and the psychic virtues there is a certain discipline and skill, and we are capable of acquiring it, since surely we are also capable of acquiring knowledge of things of which our ignorance is greater and cognition is harder to come by. [38.14-22]
After a short gap, Iamblichus continues in his Protrepticus to cite from this speech of Aristotle, who is here elaborating the idea that there are fundamental principles and elements of nature. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protr. VI 38.22-39.8, overlapping with DCM xxvi 81.20-24 (on overlaps, see above, on Protr. VI 37.26-38.22).
Similarly too for the natural sciences; for intelligence about the causes and the elements is necessarily about the things that are posterior; for these are not among the highest, nor do the first principles naturally grow from them; rather its from those that all other things come into being and are evidently constituted. [39.4] For whether it is fire or air or number or any other natures that are the causes and first principles of other things, it would be impossible to be ignorant of these things and to recognize any of the other things; for how could anyone either be familiar with speech who was ignorant of syllables, or have knowledge of these who understands nothing of the letters? [38.22-39.8]
The gap in our evidence of the text at this point is partly filled by a few sentences from an Egyptian papyrus, now conserved in Vienna. It seems that Aristotle is making the point that the procedure of the philosophers of nature is a scientific and numerate one, against criticisms leveled against it by Isocrates (above). Evidence: P.VindobG26008; column B lines 1-30.
for such a <science> differs not at all in this regard from , but is a science in just the same way. [4|5] And so about beings and the nature of the
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universe they show that what things are composed of is not infinite, but the one says one, another two, another three, another four. [13] Hence they all try to declare this, out of what things everything else is derived, and from infinite things to arrive at limited ones, and from numberless things to number [19 <four lines are too damaged to be legible> 25] investigating nature, cutting off for themselves some one part from beings, they declare the substances with regard to these [B.1-30]
After skipping over a stretch of text in Aristotles dialogue, Iamblichus continues to paraphrase and cite from the speech of Aristotle, who has finished defending the feasibility of Academic philosophy. He is now starting to argue that abstract natural and moral philosophy is highly beneficial for someone with political leadership hopes, a conclusion that intelligent people will predictably reach. These remarks are directed against Isocrates, especially the rhetorically charged conclusion at 40.1-11. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus VI 39.9-40.16 (Protr. VI 39.16-40.1 overlaps with De Comm.Math. xxvi 82.1-11; on overlaps see above, on VI 37.26-38.22).
Now then, that there is a kind of knowledge of the truth and of the virtue of the soul, and how we are capable of acquiring them, this is what we have said about those topics; and that it is the greatest of goods and the most beneficial of all will be clear from what follows. [13] For we all agree that the most worthy and the most excellent by nature should rule, and that only the law should rule and have authority; but the law is a kind of intelligence, i.e. a discourse based on intelligence. [39.9-16] And again, what norm do we have or what more precise standard of good things, than the wise man? [39.18] For all things that this man will choose, if the choice is based on his knowledge, are good things and their contraries are bad. [39.20] And since everybody chooses most of all what conforms to their own proper dispositions (a just man choosing to live justly, a man with bravery to live bravely, likewise a self-controlled man to live with self-control), it is clear that the intelligent man will choose most of all to be intelligent; for this is the function of that capacity. [39.25] Hence its clear that, according to the most authoritative judgment, intelligence is supreme among goods. [39.16-40.1] So one ought not to flee from philosophy, since philosophy is, as we think, both a possession and a use of wisdom, and wisdom is among the greatest goods; nor should one sail to the Pillars of Heracles and run many risks for the sake of property, while for the sake of intelligence devoting neither effort nor expense. [6] It would surely be slave-like to crave living rather than living well, and for him to follow the opinions of the majority rather than evaluating the majority by his own opinions, and to seek out property but for what is noble to take no trouble whatsoever. [40.1-11]
After a gap, Iamblichus continues to quote from the speech of Aristotle, who moves forward to argue that philosophy is actually much easier to acquire than other good things. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus VI 40.15-41.2, overlapping with De Comm.Math. xxvi 82.17-83.2 (on overlaps, see above, on VI 37.26-38.22).
For, despite no payment coming from the people to those who do philosophy that would make them keen to exert considerable effort in this way, and despite having given to the other skills a big lead, nevertheless the fact that in running a short time they have surpassed them in precision seems to me to be a sign of the easiness of philosophy. [40.20] And again, the fact that everybody feels at home with philosophy and wishes to occupy their leisure with
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it, renouncing everything else, is no slight evidence that the close attention comes with pleasure; for no one is willing to labor for a long time. [40.24] In addition to these, its practice greatly differs from all others: philosophers need neither tools nor special places for their job; rather, wherever in the inhabited world the mind runs, it latches onto the truth equally everywhere as if it were present there. [40.15-41.2]
The next excerpt of Aristotles Protrepticus that Iamblichus provides in his De Comm. Math. is a paragraph of quotation from the speech of Aristotle, who recalls his earlier sketch (see above) of the history of the various forms of practical and theoretical intelligence. Evidence: Iamblichus, De Comm.Math. xxvi 83.6-22.
Now admittedly precision about the truth is the most recent of the occupations. [7] For after the destruction and the inundations they were first compelled to be intelligent about their food and staying alive, but when they became more prosperous they worked out the skills that are for pleasure, such as music and so on, and when they had more than the necessities, thats how they undertook to do philosophy. [12|13] And the progress that has now been made from small impulses in a short time by those whose research is about geometry and arguments and the other educational subjects is so great that no other race has made such progress in any of the skills. [16] And yet everyone helps to urge forward by publicly honoring the other skills and giving payment to those who have them, whereas those who busy themselves with these things not only get no exhortation from us, but also are often prevented by us. [20|21] But nevertheless they have advanced the most, because in their nature they have seniority, for what is later in coming to be takes precedence in substance and in perfection. [83.6-22]
The above two passages that Iamblichus had quoted were evidently also under the eyes of Proclus, who paraphrased this part of Aristotles dialogue in his commentary on Book I of Euclids Elements of Geometry. Evidence: Proclus, Commentary on Euclids Elements I, Prologue I, chapter 9, page 28 lines 13 to 22.
Evidence that it is intrinsically valuable to those who are engaged in it is, as Aristotle somewhere says, the great progress that mathematical science has made in a little time, despite no payment coming to those who investigate it. [17] And again, everyone loves the feeling of being occupied with it, and wishes to be at leisure and let go of other things. [19] So those who despise mathematical cognition have no taste for the pleasure there is in these things. [28.13-22]
Iamblichus next provides, in his De Comm. Math., two paragraphs paraphrasing Aristotles Protrepticus, where the speaker is probably still Aristotle. Evidence: Iamblichus, De Comm. Math. xxvi 83.23-84.10.
And so the knowledge of mathematics is far superior to all these other kinds of knowledge, leading all the occupations in beauty and precision. [83.25] But this is true according to the following argument as well: [84.1] the things that are first in the order of growth are much desired by people so that they have as much as possible, but the things that are liberated from our bodily nature are much more valuable than the first. [5] For the things that are chosen out of necessity are presupposed, but what is valuable for itself and serious is worthy of dignities and honour. [7] Mathematics turns out to be no small use for the whole of human
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life, as is made clear by the successes for our way of life of the works due to the mathematical skills. [83.23-84.10]
The next piece of evidence shows Aristotle now establishing the claim that a generally educated person would need to understand the principles of mathematics, in order to be able to judge arguments in that field. Evidence: Proclus, Commentary on Euclids Elements I, Prologue I, chapter 11, page 32 line 23 to page 33 line 20.
The man who is universally educated, says Aristotle, will be able to make judgments about anything, while he who has a mathematical education will be able to judge the correctness of the arguments in that field. [26] Further, he must have previously acquired certain limits of the judgment and must know, in the first place, in which cases one should make the demonstrations in common terms, and in which cases one should look out for the peculiarities of each case. [33.2] For often the same thing occurs in things that differ in kind, for example, in all triangles there are two right angles; and there are many that have the same predicate but in which the common trait differs in form in each case, for example, similarity in figures and in numbers. [7] So we must not demand of the mathematician a single demonstration in these cases, for the principles of figures and numbers are not the same but differ according to the underlying kind. [10] But when the attribute is in itself single, then the demonstration too is single, for the same thing is attributed to all triangles, namely triangle and the definition of triangularity. [13] So just as having the external angles equal to four right angles occurs not only in triangles but also in all rectilinear figures, the demonstration is fitted to every case, insofar as it is rectilinear. [17] For in fact each account brings to bear always a certain peculiarity and property, in which everything shares according to that account, for example being triangular, being rectilinear, or in general being the shape it is. [32.23-33.20]
It seems that the above paragraph is a paraphrase on the part of Proclus of the same passage in Aristotles Protrepticus with which Iamblichus opens the next chapter of his DCM, below. The speaker is still Aristotle. Evidence: Iamblichus, De Comm. Math., chapter xxvii, page 83 line 23 to page 86 line 16.
But since it is the job of the educated man to be able to judge to a good approximation what is right or wrong in the contributions of the speaker, we believe the generally educated man is someone like that, and being educated is being able to do the aforementioned. [25] So this is clear, that the correctly educated man must, in the case of mathematics too, demand from the mathematician correctness and his proper function, whether he is rightly or wrongly making that observation about them. [85.3] For just as we consider the universally educated man to be able to judge in a way about everything, so to speak, though being one in number, similarly too about some delimited science there would be someone else who has the disposition in the way mentioned about a portion. [84.21-85.7] Hence it is clear that certain such limits must be the first step in the observation of the mathematical things too, limits with reference to which the educated man will accept the manner of the expositions, independently of how the truth is, whether thus or otherwise. [11] I mean, for example, whether those who take up each individual theorem of the mathematicians must make determinations about it in accordance with itself, for example about these here triangles, or whether those who suppose the common theorems must also
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investigate the attributes of everything according to something common. [16] For many of these things come about in many kinds different from each other, for example if someone were to make the demonstration insofar as it is a triangle or insofar as it is a rectilinear figure in common. [19] For if in a way the same things belong to things different in form, the demonstration of them would in no way be bound to have any difference. [85.7-21] But perhaps the ones in which the predicate is the same are different from the ones in which it is different by differing in form, for example, similarity in triangles is one thing, but in numbers is something else, and it is necessary to make particular demonstrations according to each one. [25] Thus one has to investigate when one has to observe in common according to kind, and when individually according to each one; for to make determinations about these contributes a great part to mathematical education. [86.2] Again, it is necessary to demand that the mathematician make his accounts in accordance with the underlying substance, and to make his demonstrations in the proper way. [85.2186.4] Thus just as we are satisfied with plausible reasoning from an orator, so it is necessary to demand from the mathematician demonstrations that are necessary. [6] And one must not seek the same necessity everywhere, nor, similarly, the same precision in everything, but just as we distinguish the technical fields by their underlying materials, not seeking precision similarly in gold and tin and bronze, nor in cork and box and lotus, in the same way this is so in the theoretical sciences. [12] For the underlying things will make an immediate difference when some are simpler and others more of a composite, or some are generally immovable and others movable, for example the things in numbers and in harmony, or those in geometry and astronomy; and the principle of some is intellect and of others is thought, but of other things there are also small impulses coming from the sense, just as with the heavenly bodies. [19] For it is not possible to bring to bear the same or similar causes about such things; rather to the degree that the principles differ, to that degree as well the demonstrations differ, for in each of them the manner is akin. [86.422] But a still greater difference than these is whether those who are researching do or do not have principles; so that here too one should not accept either similar causes nor similar arguments. [26] And for these reasons one must recognize what is the same and different, and what is the same by analogy, and which sciences are in greater need and in which the perplexities are greater, for it is pretty much in these and such ways that there are variations in the demonstrations and arguments in each case. [87.5] This kind of observation could contribute not only to judging but also to how research should be done, for having determined the causes of each thing, it will make the proper arguments, which, without being used to it, is not easy to do. [9] For nature itself by itself is able to guide us to the principles, but is not able to judge autonomously each thing without taking up a different understanding. [11] Again, we should ascertain whether the causes about which the mathematician needs to speak are numerous, and which of them are naturally first and second. [14] For the mathematically educated man can both scrutinize the causes that have been supplied and observe their order. [86.23-16]
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After a gap, Iamblichus reports what seems to be the conclusion of this phase of argument: in common with Plato and other Academics such as Heraclides, Aristotle relies on the Pythagorean tradition to argue, against Isocrates, that mathematical discipline is a central element in philosophy, including natural philosophy. Note the reference at 87.23-24 to previous speeches and later remarks in which Aristotle will indicate that there are also non-mathematical fundamental principles. Evidence: Iamblichus, DCM xxvii 87.17-88.10.
Many of the more recent Pythagoreans assumed that mathematics has as its subject matter only the things that are the same and in the same way, and hypothesized only these principles; so in the same way they define as different both the sciences and the demonstrations about such things. [22] But since both in our previous speeches and in our later remarks we demonstrate that there are many different substances that are unchangeable and exist in the same state, not only the ones in mathematics, and that those are more senior and more honorable than these, and we will also demonstrate that these mathematical principles are not the only ones, but there are also others, and these in fact are more senior and more powerful than those, and that these are not the principles of all the things that exist but only of some; so it is for these reasons that the mathematical demonstration now demands a determination of which of the qualities it can demonstrate remain the same and in the same way, and from what kinds of principles it reasons, and about what kinds of problems it produces the demonstrations. [88.6] For the education which discriminates in these matters determines both the correctness and the end of mathematics, and it makes this discrimination as it should, and it includes the way one should conduct research well. [87.17-88.10]
At the end of chapter 27 of his DCM, Iamblichus stops using Aristotles Protrepticus as a source. When, in chapter VII of his other work Protrepticus, Iamblichus resumes his citations from Aristotles Protrepticus, the speaker is still (or is again) Aristotle. After a gap of unknown length in the dialogue, he elaborates a new phase of his argument, that being intelligent observers is the most valuable thing for humans to be, being the function of their highest virtue. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, chapter VII, page 41 line 7 to page 43 line 25.
To be intelligent and cognizant is in itself valuable for humans, for it is not possible to live as a human without these; and it is also useful for our way of life, for nothing good comes to us unless it is accomplished after we have reasoned and acted in accordance with intelligence. [11] Moreover, whether living successfully consists in enjoyment or in having virtue or in intelligence, according to all these we should do philosophy, for these things come to us most of all, and in a pure way, through doing philosophy. [15] Furthermore, part of us is soul, part body; and the one rules, the other is ruled, and the one uses the other, which supports it as a tool. [18] Further, it is always with reference to that which is ruling and using that the use of that which is ruled, i.e. the tool, is coordinated. [20] And of the soul one part is reason (which by nature rules and judges our affairs), the other part is a follower and is naturally ruled. [41.7-22] And everything is well disposed when it is in accordance with its own proper virtue, for to obtain this is good. Moreover, its when a things most authoritative and most honourable parts have their virtue that it is well disposed; therefore the natural virtue of that which is better is naturally better. [27] And that which is by nature more of a ruler and more commanding is better, as a human is over the other animals; thus soul is better than body (for it is more of a ruler), as is the part of the soul which has reason and thought,
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for this kind of thing is what prescribes and proscribes and says how we ought or ought not to act. [42.1] Whatever, then, is the virtue of this part is necessarily the most valuable virtue of all, both for everything in general and for us; in fact, I think one might actually take this position, that we are this part, either alone or especially. [41.22-42.4] Furthermore, its when the natural function of each thing is achieved, not by coincidence but in itself, that it is called finest, and then it should also be called good, and one should take the most authoritative virtue to be the one by which each thing naturally accomplishes this very thing. [9] So that which is composite and divisible into parts has many different activities, but that which is by nature simple and whose being is not relative to anything else necessarily has a single virtue in itself in the strict sense. [42.5-13] So if a human is some simple animal whose being is ordered according to reason and intellect, there is no other function for it than only the most precise truth, i.e. having the truth about existing things; but if it is naturally composed of several capacities, it is clear that, of the several things it can naturally achieve, the best of them is always their function, e.g. of the doctor health, and of the pilot safety. [20] And we can name no function of thought, or of the thinking part of our soul, which is better than truth. [22] Truth therefore is the most authoritative function of this part of the soul. [42.13-23] And it performs this simply with knowledge, and it performs this more with more knowledge; and the most authoritative end for this is observation. [25] For when of two things one is valuable because of the other, the one on account of which the other is valuable is better and more valuable; for example, pleasure is better than pleasant things, and health than healthy things, for the latter are said to be productive of the former. [42.29|43.1] Thus nothing is more valuable than intelligence, which we say is a capacity of the most authoritative thing in us, when disposition is judged against disposition; for the cognitive part, both apart and in combination, is better than all the rest of the soul, and its knowledge is a virtue. [42.23-43.5] Therefore its function is none of what are called parts of virtue, for it is better than all of them and the end produced is always better than the knowledge that produces it. [8] Nor is every virtue of the soul in that way a function, nor is success; for if it is to be productive, different ones will produce different things, as the skill of building (which is not part of any house) produces a house; [12] however, intelligence is a part of virtue and of success, for we say that success either comes from it or is it. [14] Thus according to this argument too, it is impossible for this to be productive knowledge; for the end must be better than the thing which comes to be, and nothing is better than intelligence, unless it is one of the things that have been mentioned and none of those is a function distinct from it. [18] Therefore a certain observational knowledge is what one should name this kind, since it is surely impossible for production to be its end. [20] Hence being intelligent and observant are a function of the virtue, and this of all things is the most valuable for humans, comparable, I think, to seeing for the eyes, which one would choose to have even if there wasnt anything different that was going to result from it beyond the vision itself. [43.5-25]
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At the above point Iamblichus interrupts his citation, apparently briefly; when he resumes citing Aristotles text, the speaker is still Aristotle, who focuses his comments on the comparative value of sight, perception, opinion, and knowledge. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus VII 43.25-45.3.
Again, if we appreciate sight for its own sake, this gives sufficient witness that everybody ultimately appreciates being intelligent and cognizant. [27] Again, if someone appreciates a particular thing because something else coincides with it, it is clear that he will wish more for that which has more of it: for example, if someone happened to choose walking because its healthy, and it occurred to him that running is more healthy for him, and possible, he will choose this even more, as soon as he recognized it. [44.4] Further, if true opinion is similar to intelligence, since having true opinions is valuable in that and insofar as it is similar to intelligence on account of its truth, if this exists more in intelligence, then being intelligent will be more valuable than having true opinions. [43.25-44.9] But yet, living is distinguished from not living by sense perception, and living is defined by its presence and power, and if this is removed life is not worth living, as though life itself were removed along with sense perception. [13] But among the senses the capacity of sight is distinguished by being the most distinct, and for this reason as well we value it most; but every sense perception is a capacity for becoming familiar with things through a body, just as hearing perceives the sound through the ears. [44.9-17] Therefore, if living is valuable because of the perception, and the perception is a kind of cognition, and we choose it because the soul is able to have familiarity by means of it; and weve been saying for a long time, just as of two things the more valuable one is always the one which has more of that same thing, and of the senses vision is necessarily the most valuable and honourable, and intelligence is more valuable than it and all the others, and more valuable than living, then intelligence is more authoritative than true opinion; hence the main pursuit of all humans is to be intelligent. [26] For because people appreciate living they appreciate being intelligent and recognizing, for they value it for no other reason than for the sake of perception, and above all for the sake of vision; for people seem to love this capacity exceedingly, for it is, compared with the other senses, virtually a kind of knowledge. [44.17-45.3]
Here Iamblichus stops citing Aristotles text; when he resumes in chapter VIII, the speaker is now Heraclides, who articulates a Pythagorean set of arguments (from opposites) for the intrinsic value of intelligence. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, chapter VIII, page 45 line 6 to page 47 line 4.
So then, this, at least, is quite clear to everyone, that nobody would choose a life of possessing of the greatest estate and power of all people if they were nevertheless deprived of their intelligence and were raving mad, not even if they were going to live enjoying the wildest pleasures, in the way that some people who are out of their minds carry on. [11] Thus everybody, it seems, avoids being unwise most of all. [12] Now intelligence is the opposite of being unintelligent, and of these opposites the one is to be avoided, the other is valuable. [13|14] So, just as being sick is to be avoided, so is being healthy valuable for us. [45.6-15]
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Intelligence, it seems, according to this argument too, is the most desirable of all things, and not for the sake of anything else that results from it, as the common conceptions give witness. [18] For even if someone had everything, but has some affliction affecting his intelligence, that way of life would not be valuable, for none of his other goods would be of any benefit. [20|21] Hence everybody, insofar as they have some perception of being intelligent and are capable of having a taste of this thing, think the other ones to be nothing; and this is the cause on account of which not a single one of us would put up with being either drunk or infantile up to the ends of our lives. [45.15-25] So, on account of this, too, though sleep is extremely pleasant, it is not valuable, even if we were to suppose that all of the pleasures were present to the sleeper, because the images during sleep are false, while those of the waking are true. [46.4] For sleep and waking are no different from each other except that the waking soul often has the truth, but when sleeping is always thoroughly deceived; for the phantasm in dreams is actually entirely false. [45.25-46.7] And the fact that most people avoid death also shows the souls love of learning; for it avoids what it does not recognize, what is dark and not clear, and naturally seeks what is evident and recognizable. [11] This is why we say we should honour exceedingly those who cause us to see the sun and the light, and revere our fathers and mothers as causes of the greatest goods; and causes they are, it seems, of our having any intelligence and seeing anything. [15] It is for the same reason that we also enjoy what we are acquainted with, both things and people, and call friends those with whom we are familiar. [18] These things, then, might show clearly that what is recognized and evident and plain is appreciated; and if what is recognized and clear is appreciated, it is evident that recognizing is necessary, as is being intelligent, likewise. [46.8-21] In addition to these, just as with property, it is not the same possession that is for the sake of living, and of living well, for humans; so too, with intelligence: we do not, I think, need the same intelligence for merely living and for living nobly. [26] Now then, much allowance is made for the many who do this (they pray to be successful, but appreciate it if they can just stay alive), but anyone who thinks that there is no need to endure living in every way already thinks its ridiculous not to bear every burden and exert every effort so as to possess this intelligence that will have a cognition of the truth. [46.22-47.4]
Here Iamblichus stops citing or paraphrasing Aristotles text; when he resumes the speaker is still Heraclides, who reaches a tremendous conclusion to his speech, that in this world everything other than intelligence is nonsense and foolishness. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus VIII 47.6-48.21.
For one will discover that all the things that seem great to people are an optical illusion. [8] This makes it also right to say that the human creature is nothing and that nothing is secure in human affairs. [10] For strength, size, and beauty are laughable and of no worth -- and beauty seems to be the sort of thing it is by our seeing nothing accurately. [12] For if someone were able to see as keenly as they say Lynceus did, who saw through walls and trees, how could such a sight seem bearable, seeing what bad things he is composed of? [15|16] And honours and reputations, objects of more striving than the rest, are full of indescribable nonsense; for to those who behold anything eternal it is
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silly to take those things seriously. [18] What is great or what is long-lasting in human affairs? [19] No, it is owing to our weakness, I think, and the shortness of our life, that even this appears anything great. [47.6-21] So who could consider himself successful and happy, looking at these things for which we have been composed by nature right from the beginning, as if for punishment - all of us - as they say the Mysteries relate? [47.24] For the ancients have an inspired saying that says that the soul pays penalties, and we live for the atonement of certain great failings. [48.2] For the conjunction of the soul with the body looks very much like a thing of this sort; for as the Tyrrhenians are said to torture their captives often by chaining corpses right onto the living, fitting limb to limb, similarly the soul seems to be extended through and stuck onto all the sensitive members of the body. [47.21-48.9] So nothing divine or happy belongs to humans apart from just that one thing worth taking seriously, as much insight and intelligence as is in us, for, of whats ours, this alone seems to be immortal, and this alone divine. [13] And by being able to share in such a capacity, our way of life, although naturally miserable and difficult, is yet so cleverly managed that, in comparison with other things, a human seems to be a god. [16] For insight is the god in us whether it was Hermotimus or Anaxagoras who said so and the mortal phase has a portion of some god. [18] One ought, therefore, either to do philosophy or say goodbye to life and depart hither, since all of the other things anyway seem to be a lot of nonsense and foolishness. [48.9-21]
Here Iamblichus stops citing Aristotles text; when he resumes in chapter IX, the speaker is no longer Heraclides but Aristotle. In this phase of his argument, Aristotle elaborates two ideas that are extremely prominent in his surviving works: skill and nature. The conclusion is that nature has skillfully designed humans to be intelligent. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, chapter IX, page 49 line 3 to page 51 line 6.
Some of the things that come to be come to be from a certain kind of thought and skill, e.g. a house or a ship (for a certain skill and thought is a cause of both of these), while others come to be not by means of any skill but through nature; for nature is a cause of animals and plants, and all such things come to be by nature. [8] But then some other things come to be by luck as well, for of all the things that come to be neither through skill nor through nature nor by necessity, we say that most of these come into being through luck. [49.3-11] Now then, of the things that come to be from luck, none comes to be for the sake of anything, nor do they have any end; but the things that come into being by skill have present in them both the end and what they are for the sake of (for the man who has the skill will always provide you with a reason on account of which he wrote, i.e. for the sake of what), and this is something better than what comes to be on account of it. [16|17] (I mean all such things as skill is naturally a cause of, in virtue of itself and not coincidentally, for strictly speaking we should assume medicine to be the cause of health rather than of disease, and architecture to be the cause of houses, not of their demolition.) [20] Therefore everything done with skill comes to be for the sake of something, and this its end is the best thing; however that which is by luck does not come to be for the sake of anything, for something good might happen from luck indeed, but yet it is not insofar as it is from luck and in
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accordance with luck that it is good; and that which comes to be by luck is always indeterminate. [49.11-25] But yet what is in accordance with nature does come to be for the sake of something, and is always constructed for the sake of something better than what comes to be through skill; for nature does not imitate the skill, but it imitates nature, and it exists to help nature and to fill in what nature leaves out. [50.2] For some things nature itself seems capable of completing by itself without actually needing any help, but others it completes with difficulty or is completely capable. [5] For example, to begin with, even with reproduction, some seeds presumably germinate without protection, whatever kind of land they may fall onto, but others also need the skill of farming; and, in a similar way, some animals also attain their full nature by themselves, but humans need many skills for their security, both at first in respect of their birth, and again later, in respect of their nurturing. [49.26-50.12] Further, if skill imitates nature, from this it follows for the skills as well that everything that comes to be comes to be for the sake of something. [14] For we should take the position that everything that comes into being correctly comes into being for the sake of something. [15] And surely if nobly, then correctly; and everything that comes to be (or has come to be) in accordance with nature at any rate comes to be (or has come to be) nobly, since what is unnatural is ugly, and in what is in accordance with nature a coming into being comes to be for the sake of something. [50.12-19] And someone could see this also from each of our parts; if, for example, you were to inspect the eyelid, you would see that it has come to be not in vain but in order to help the eyes, so as to provide them with rest and prevent things from falling into the eye. [23|24] Thus it is the same thing, both that for the sake of which something has come to be and that for the sake of which it needs to have come to be; for example, if a ship needed to come to be to provide transport by sea, thats why it actually has come to be. [26|27] Moreover the animals are surely things that have come to be by nature, either absolutely all of them or the best and most honourable of them; for it makes no difference if someone thinks that most of them have come into being unnaturally because of some corruption or wickedness. [51.4] But certainly a human is the most honourable of the animals down here; hence its clear that we have come to be both by nature and according to nature. [50.19-51.6]
Here Iamblichus seems to have skipped over a portion of Aristotles text (the bit containing the reference to Phlius) and resumed with the reason that Pythagoras gave for humans to be alive. The speaker is Aristotle, who concludes, Therefore Pythagoras was right to say that god constructed us for intellectual work. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus IX 51.6-52.8.
This is the thing for the sake of which nature and the god have brought us into being. [7] So what is this thing? [8] When Pythagoras was asked, he said, to observe the heavens, and he used to claim that he himself was an observer of nature, and it was for the sake of this that he had been released into this way of life. [10|11] And they say that when somebody asked Anaxagoras for what reason anyone might choose to come to be and be alive, he replied to the question by saying, To observe the heavens and the stars in it, as well as moon and sun, because everything else at any rate is worth nothing. [51.7-15]
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Further, if for everything the end is always better (for everything that comes to be comes to be for the sake of the end, and that for the sake of which is better, indeed the best of all), and an end in accordance with this nature is that which is in the order of generation naturally last when the generation is completed without interruption, surely the first parts of a human being to reach their end are the bodily ones, and later on the parts of the soul, and somehow the end of the better part always comes later than its coming to be. [23|24] Surely the soul is posterior to the body, and intelligence is the final stage of the soul, for we see that it is the last thing to come to be by nature in humans, and that is why old age lays claim to this alone of good things; therefore, some form of intelligence is by nature our end, and being intelligent is the ultimate thing for the sake of which we have come to be. [52.4] Now surely if we have come to be, its also clear that we exist for the sake of some kind of intelligence and learning. [5|6] Therefore Pythagoras was right, according to this argument anyway, in saying its for the sake of cognition and observation that every human person has been constructed by the god. [51.1652.8]
Here Iamblichus finishes this part of the speech of Aristotle by citing or paraphrasing his conclusion. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus IX 52.8-16.
But whether the object of this cognition is the cosmos or some other nature is a question for us perhaps to consider later; what we have said is enough for us for now as a preliminary. [11] For if intelligence is an end in accordance with nature, then to be intelligent would be best of all. [12] Hence, one should do the other things for the sake of the goods that come about in oneself, and, of these goods, one should have the ones in the body for the sake of those in the soul, and virtue for the sake of intelligence; for this is the highest of all. [52.8-16]
Iamblichus resumes, after a gap, by citing the rhetorically climactic conclusion of the speech of Aristotle counterattacking against Isocrates. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus IX 52.16-54.5.
To seek from every kind of knowledge something other than itself and to require that it must be useful is the demand of someone utterly ignorant of how far apart in principle good things are from the necessities; they are totally different. [20] For among the things without which living is impossible, the ones which are appreciated on account of something else should be called necessities and joint causes, while all those that are appreciated for themselves, even if nothing else results from them, should be called goods in the strict sense; for this is not valuable because of that, and that for the sake of something else, and this goes on proceeding to infinity rather, this comes to a stop somewhere. [25] So it is absolutely ridiculous, then, to seek from everything a benefit beyond from the thing itself, and to ask So, whats the benefit for us? and Whats the use? [28] For its true what we say: such a fellow doesnt seem like someone who knows noble goodness, or who distinguishes between a cause and a joint cause. [52.16-53.2] One might see that what we say is all the more true if someone conveyed us in thought, as it were, to the Isles of the Blest, for in that place there would come to be no use for anything, nor would anything benefit anything else, and
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only thinking and observation remains, which we say even now is an independent way of life. [7|8] If what we say is true, would not any of us be rightly ashamed if when the right was granted us to settle in the Isles of the Blest, we were by our own fault unable to do so? [10] Thus the payment that knowledge brings is not to be despised by humans, nor is the good that comes from it a slight good. [12] For just as the poets who are wise say that we reap the rewards of justice in Hades, in the same way, it seems, we reap the rewards of wisdom in the Isles of the Blest. [53.2-15] It is not weird at all, then, if it does not seem to be useful or beneficial; for we dont claim it is beneficial but that it is itself good, and it makes sense to choose it not for the sake of something else but for itself. [18|19] For just as we travel to Olympia for the sake of the spectacle itself, even if nothing more is going to accrue from it (for the observing itself is better than lots of money), and as we observe the Dionysia not in order to take something away from the actors (rather, we actually spend on them), and as there are many other spectacles we would choose instead of lots of money, so the observation of the universe, too, is to be honoured above all things that are thought to be useful. [53.26|54.1] For surely we should not travel with great effort to see people imitating women and slaves, or fighting and running, and yet not think we should observe the nature of things, i.e. the truth, without payment. [53.1554.5]
It seems that Aristotle may have carried on with the festival metaphor at this point in the Protrepticus, or in another work, as Plutarch alludes to these ideas at the conclusion of his essay On Tranquillity. Other scholars have attributed this allusion in Plutarch to Aristotles lost dialogue On Philosophy (fragment 14 in Walzers and Rosss collections of fragments), but on weak grounds; we now re-attribute this passage to Aristotles Protrepticus. Evidence: Plutarch, On Tranquillity, chapter 20, 477c-e (tr. from Helmbolds Loeb edition).
For the cosmos is a most holy temple and most worthy of a god; into it man is introduced through birth as a spectator, not of hand-made or immovable images, but of those sensible representations of knowable things that the divine mind, says Plato, has revealed, representations which have innate within themselves the beginnings of life and motion, sun and moon and stars, rivers which ever discharge fresh water, and earth which sends forth nourishment for plants and animals. [d] Since life is a most perfect initiation into these things and a ritual celebration of them, it should be full of tranquillity and joy, and not in the manner of the vulgar, who wait for the festivals of Cronus and of Zeus and the Panathenaea and other days of that kind, at which to enjoy and refresh themselves, paying the wages of hired laughter to mimes and dancers. [d] It is true that we sit there on those occasions decorously in reverent silence, for no one wails while he is being initiated or laments as he watches the Pythian games or as he drinks at the festival of Cronus; but by spending the greater part of life in lamentation and heaviness of heart and carking cares, men shame the festivals with which the god supplies us and in which he initiates us. [477c-e]
The gap in our evidence of the text at this point is partly filled by a few sentences from an Egyptian papyrus, now conserved in Vienna. It seems that Aristotle is making the point that those who produce their products by imitating those of others (as Isocrates was urging statesmen should do) are limited by the caliber of the examples they choose. Evidence: P.VindobG26008; column A lines 5-32.
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he who is most fully capable of rendering it accurately is most fully a good poet, and for this reason Homer is good, and Sophocles - for what kinds of things Andromache would say, and how, when she sees her husband being dragged along, he is capable of discovering, in language, in character, and in thought. [18] There are some who do not imitate that person whom they propose to themselves, but instead someone else, and this one excellently, someone of whom we happen to have an idea and an example among ourselves. [26] And so Timotheus in the Lament of Odysseus, if indeed he does imitate someone and knows what is similar to someone, nevertheless what to Odysseus [A.5-32]
Iamblichus finished chapter IX of his Protrepticus by quoting an anti-Isocratean climax of the speech of Aristotle. When he resumes quoting in chapter X, Aristotle is still arguing against Isocrates: contrary to what Isocrates had said, political science cannot be done by imitation alone; it does need theoretical philosophy. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, chapter X, page 54 line 12 to page 56 line 2.
For just as all the sophisticated doctors and most sophisticated athletic trainers pretty much agree that those who are to be good doctors or trainers must be experienced about nature, so good lawmakers too must be experienced about nature - and indeed much more than the former. [18] For some are producers of virtue only in the body, while others, being concerned with the virtues of the soul and pretending to be experts in the success and failure of the state, need philosophy much more. [54.12-22] For just as in the other skills the best of their tools were discovered by their producers from nature (for example, in the builders skill, the carpenters line, and ruler, and string compass) < a line of text is missing > for some are grasped with water, others with light and the rays of the sun, and it is by reference to these that we judge what to our senses is sufficiently straight and smooth - in the same way, the statesman must have certain norms taken from nature itself, i.e. from the truth, by reference to which to judge what is just and what is good and what is advantageous. [55.3] For just as in building these tools surpass all, so too the finest law is the one that has been laid down most in accordance with nature. [6] But this is not something which can be done by someone who hadnt done philosophy and become familiar with the truth. [54.22-55.7] And in the other skills people do not generally know their tools and their most accurate reasonings by taking them from the primary things; they take them from what is second or third hand or at a distant remove, and get their reasonings from experience, whereas the imitation is of the precise things themselves only for the philosopher, for the philosophers vision is of these things themselves, not of imitations. [14] So just as no one is a good builder who does not use a ruler or any other such tool, but approximates them to other buildings, so too presumably if someone either lays down laws for cities or performs actions by looking at and imitating other human actions or political systems, whether of Sparta or Crete or of any other such state, he is neither a good lawmaker nor is he an excellent statesman; for an imitation of what is not noble cannot be noble, nor can an imitation of what is not divine and secure in nature be immortal and secure. [23|24] But it is clear that the philosopher is the only producer to have both laws that are secure and actions
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that are right and noble. [25|26] For he alone lives looking at nature and at the divine, and, just as if he were some good helmsman who hitches the first principles of his life onto things which are eternal and steadfast, gets anchored and lives on his own terms. [55.7-56.2]
After finishing the above part of the speech of Aristotle, Iamblichus reports or quotes a new phase of argument, that theoretical knowledge is useful for guidance, like vision. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus X 56.2-12.
Now then, this knowledge is theoretical, but it provides us with the ability to produce, in accordance with it, everything. [4] For just as sight is a maker and producer of nothing (for its only function is to judge and to make clear each visible thing), but provides us with the ability to do an action in accordance with it and gives us the greatest help towards our actions (for we should be almost entirely motionless if deprived of it), so its clear that, though the knowledge is theoretical, we do thousands of things in accordance with it nevertheless, accept some things and avoid others, and generally gain through it everything good. [56.2-12]
Iamblichus has finished with the argument that philosophy is necessary for political science; after a gap, he turns in chapter XI to a new idea, that philosophers enjoy enhanced vitality as humans. The speaker is still Aristotle. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, chapter XI, page 56 line 15 to page 58 line 14.
The word living seems to mean two things, one with reference to a capacity and the other with reference to an activity, for we call all those animals seeing who have vision and are naturally capable of seeing (even if they happen to have their eyes shut), as well as those who are using the capacity and are applying their vision. [19] And similarly with knowing and having cognition, we mean, in one case, using and observing, and in the other case, having acquired the capacity and having the knowledge. [22] Further, if we distinguish living from not living by perceiving, and perceiving has two senses, in the strict sense as using the senses, but in the other sense as being able to use them (thats why we say, it seems, even of people who are sleeping that they are perceivers), its clear it will follow that living also has two senses: a waking person should be said to live in the true and strict sense, but sleeping people must be said to live because they are capable of making the transition into the process in virtue of which we say of someone that he is both waking and perceiving things. [56.15-57.6] Because of this and with a view to this, when some one word means each of two things, and one of the two is so called either by acting or being acted on, we shall attribute the term as applying more to this one: for example, we attribute knowing to the one who makes use of knowledge more than the one who has it, and seeing to the one who is applying his vision more than the one who has the capacity. [12] (For we use more not only in respect of excess in things for which there is a single definition, but also in respect of what is prior and posterior; for example, we say that health is more a good than the things that conduce to health, and that what is valuable by its own nature is more a good than what produces it. [16|17] And yet we see, surely, that it is not by the definition of good being predicable of both that it applies to each of them, to beneficial things as well as to virtue.) [19] Therefore the waking person should
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be called more alive than the sleeping one, i.e. the one who exercises his soul than the one who merely has it; for it is on account of this that we say that he is alive, that he is the sort who is such as to act or be acted upon in this way. [57.6-23] Thus this is what it is to use anything: if the capacity is for a single thing, when someone is doing this very thing; and if the capacity is for a number of things, when he is doing the best of them, for example, with flutes, one uses them either only when playing the flute, or especially then; for presumably it is for this use that the other ones have their uses. [57.27|58.1] Thus one should say that someone who uses a thing correctly is using it more, for the natural objective and mode of use belong to someone who uses a thing nobly and accurately. [3] Now the only function of the soul, too, or else the greatest one of all, is thinking and reasoning. [5] Therefore it is now simple and easy for anyone to reach the conclusion that he who thinks correctly is more alive, and he who most attains truth lives most, and this is the one who is intelligent and observant according to the most precise knowledge; and it is then and to those that living perfectly, surely, should be attributed, to those who are using their intelligence, i.e. to the intelligent. [10] But if what it is to live is the same, for all animals, at least, it is clear that an intelligent person would surely exist to the highest degree and in the strictest sense, and most of all at that time when he is being active and actually observing the most knowable of existing things. [57.2358.14] Iamblichus continues to cite from the speech of Aristotle, who proceeds to demonstrate that philosophers enjoy
the highest pleasure. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus XI 58.15-59.17.
And yet, surely the perfect and unobstructed activity has its enjoyment in itself; hence the activity of observation would be the most pleasant of all. [17] Furthermore, there is a difference between enjoying oneself while drinking and enjoying drinking; for nothing prevents someone who is not thirsty, nor has been brought the drink he enjoys, from enjoying himself while drinking, not because he is drinking but because he happens at the same time to be seeing or being seen as he sits there. [21] Thus we will say that this fellow enjoys himself, and enjoys himself while drinking, but not because he is drinking, and not because he enjoys drinking. [23] Thus in the same way we will also say that walking and sitting and learning and every process is pleasant or painful, not insofar as we happen to feel pain or pleasure in their presence, but insofar as we all feel pain or pleasure by their presence. [27] So, similarly, we will also say that they live pleasantly whose presence is pleasant to those who have it, and that not all to whom it happens that they enjoy themselves while living are living pleasantly, only those to whom living itself is pleasant and who enjoy the pleasure that comes from life. [58.15-59.3] Thus we attribute living more to the one who is awake rather than to the one who is asleep, and to the one who is being intelligent more than to the one who is unintelligent; and we say the pleasure that comes from life is the one that comes from the uses of the soul, for this is being truly alive. [7] Further, even if there are many uses of the soul, still the most authoritative one of all, certainly, is the use of intelligence to the highest degree. [9] Further, it is clear that the pleasure that arises from being intelligent and observant must be the
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pleasure that comes from living, either alone or most of all. [11] Therefore living pleasantly and feeling true enjoyment belong only to philosophers, or to them most of all. [13] For the activity of our truest insights, filled up by the most real of things and preserving steadfastly for ever the perfection vouchsafed to us, that activity, of all of them, is also the one that is most effective for cheerfulness. [59.3-17]
After a gap, in chapter XII Iamblichus continues quoting Aristotle, who braids together strands of previous arguments to reach what is apparently his ultimate conclusion: philosophy is the indispensable key element in a successful human life. Evidence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, chapter XII, page 59 line 24 to page 60 line 10.
For everything, both those that are for this and those that are on account of this <are valuable a line of text is missing > to be valuable for everyone, both those things we do as necessary and the pleasant things that make us feel successful. [59.26] Thus we take the position that success is either intelligence and a certain wisdom, or virtue, or great enjoyment, or all these. [60.1] Thus if it is intelligence, clearly only philosophers will have a successful life; and if it is virtue of the soul or enjoyment, even so it will belong to them either alone or most of all, for a virtue is the most authoritative thing in us, and the most pleasant of all things, on a one to one basis, is intelligence; and similarly, even if someone were to say that all these same things together are success, that is to be defined as being intelligent. [60.7] Hence everyone who is capable of it should do philosophy, for surely this either is living perfectly well, or is, most of all, anyway, speaking on a one to one basis, responsible for it in their souls. [59.2460.10]
Having quoted this conclusion by Aristotle, Iamblichus quickly sketches a vision of philosophy in paradise to close chapter XII (60.10-61.1) of his Protrepticus. This vision of paradise seems unlikely to derive from the same speech of Aristotle that we have just been reading in chapters IX-XII. In fact its themes have little to do with any of the preceding fragments of Aristotles Protrepticus. These lines were not among the passages authenticated by DSH and MRJ in 2005 as part of Aristotles lost work Protrepticus, and certain details suggest rather that Iamblichus is here paraphrasing a different lost dialogue of Aristotle, his Eudemus or On the Soul, from one of the passages in that dialogue that was heavy with Pythagorean themes. We have no evidence about the works conclusion, which is lost without trace.

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Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

Aristotle, Protrepticus (reconstruction)

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