Sexto Emprico

De Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre Saltar a: navegacin, bsqueda

Sexto Emprico. Sexto Emprico (circa 160 c. 210), mdico y filsofo griego, es uno de los ms importantes representantes del escepticismo pirroniano y fuente de la mayora de datos referentes a esta corriente filosfica.

Contenido
[ocultar]

1 Biografa 2 Recepcin 3 Vase tambin 4 Referencias 5 Bibliografa 6 Enlaces externos

[editar] Biografa
No se sabe de dnde era originario, aunque vivi en Atenas, Alejandra y Roma. Recibi el sobrenombre de Emprico por sus concepciones filosficas pero, especialmente, por su prctica mdica. Sus escritos, muy influidos por los de Pirrn y Enesidemo, estn dirigidos

en contra de la defensa dogmtica de la pretensin de conocer la verdad absoluta, tanto en la moral como en las ciencias. En sus Esbozos pirrnicos ( , Pyrrhneioi hypotypseis) define el escepticismo de la manera siguiente: El escepticismo es la facultad de oponer de todas las maneras posibles los fenmenos y los nomenos; y de ah llegamos, por el equilibrio de las cosas y de las razones opuestas (isostena), primero a la suspensin del juicio (epoch) y, despus, a la indiferencia (ataraxa). Defiende una posicin relativista y fenomenista desde una posicin escptica antimetafsica y empirista. Segn l, hay cosas, pero lo nico que podemos saber y decir de ellas es de qu manera nos afectan, no lo que son en s mismas. No obstante, su epoch no es tan radical como la de Pirrn. Defiende tambin una tica del sentido comn y, aunque como pirroniano acepta la indiferencia (adiaphora) respecto de todas las soluciones morales, reivindica tambin la importancia de lo emprico, razn por la cual defiende que la vida prctica debe regirse por cuatro guas: la experiencia de la vida, las indicaciones que la naturaleza nos da a travs de los sentidos, las necesidades del cuerpo y las reglas de las artes. Hace una crtica del silogismo, al que considera un crculo vicioso, y pone en entredicho la nocin de signo, especialmente tal como lo entendan los estoicos. Critica la teologa estoica sealando las contradicciones de la nocin estoica de divinidad. Para los estoicos todo cuanto existe es corpreo, por tanto, seala Sexto, tambin lo ha de ser la divinidad. Pero un cuerpo puede ser simple o compuesto. Si es compuesto puede descomponerse y, por tanto, es mortal. Si es simple, es uno de los elementos: tierra, aire, agua o fuego y, entonces, es inerte e inanimado. De ah se sigue que la divinidad, o bien es mortal, o bien es inanimada, lo cual es, en ambos casos, absurdo. Adems de este argumento, Sexto Emprico atacaba la nocin de divinidad apelando a otros razonamientos. En todos ellos reforzaba la idea escptica de la necesidad de la epoch o suspensin del juicio. Adems, atac tambin la nocin de causa.

Adversus mathematicos. En general, su obra es importante por cuanto es una de las fuentes del conocimiento del pensamiento antiguo. Concretamente, su Adversus mathematicos aporta datos importantes para el conocimiento de la historia de la astronoma, la gramtica y la ciencia antigua, as como de la teologa estoica. Sus obras principales conservadas son, pues, la ya citada Esbozos pirrnicos y Contra los matemticos o Contra los profesores (Adversus mathematicos, hoc est, adversus eos qui profitentur disciplinas), tradicionalmente dividida en dos partes, con ttulo latino: Adversus mathematicos tambin, libros IVI, y Adversus dogmaticos, libros VIIXI (si bien esta divisin no es segura, ni puede establecerse si en realidad pertenecan a la misma obra o se conservan siquiera completas).

[editar] Recepcin
Un influyente traduccin latina de los Esbozos fue publicada por Henricus Stephanus en Ginebra en 1562, seguida por una traduccin completa de la obra por Gentian Hervet en 1569.1 Petrus y Jacobus Chouet publicaron el texto griego por primera vez en 1621. Stephanus no lo incluy junto con su traduccin al latn ni en la edicin de 1562 ni en la de 1569, ni se public en la reedicin de esta ltima en 1619. Los Esbozos fueron muy ledos en Europa durante los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII, y tuvieron un profundo impacto en autores como Montaigne, Hume y Hegel.

[editar] Vase tambin

Problema de la induccin

[editar] Referencias
1. Richard Popkin (editor), History of Western Philosophy (1998) p. 330.

[editar] Bibliografa

Sexto Emprico. Contra los profesores. Obra completa. Madrid: Editorial Gredos. ISBN 9788424918651.

1. Volumen I: Contra los profesores: libros IVI. 1997. ISBN 9788424918668. 2. Volumen II: Contra los dogmticos: libros VIIXI. 2012. ISBN 978-84-249-3629-7.

(1993). Esbozos pirrnicos. Madrid: Editorial Gredos. ISBN 9788424916138.

[editar] Enlaces externos

XXVIII - ENESIDEMO Y SEXTO EMPRICO 159. Al lado de las escuelas de Zenn de Elea y de Pirrn, se haba establecido la acadmica, que si bien no lo negaba todo, y aun admita la probabilidad, se guardaba de las afirmaciones como de cosa peligrosa e indigna de un sabio. La nueva academia de Arcesilas, desenvuelta luego en la novsima de Carnades, se enlaza con el escepticismo puro, ms de lo que a primera vista pudiera parecer: quien no se atreve a afirmar nada, no est lejos de dudar de todo, si es que ya no duda. El estado de los espritus en el siglo anterior a la era cristiana favoreca las tendencias escpticas: las disputas filosficas lo haban hecho vacilar todo, sin asentar ningn sistema sobre cimientos slidos. Entonces apareci Enesidemo, contemporneo de Cicern. Era natural de Creta; aficionado a las doctrinas de Herclito, en cuyo provecho quiso explotar el escepticismo, renovando los diez motivos de duda universal que se atribuyen a Pirrn. La filosofa de Enesidemo continu sin grande importancia, hasta que, algn tiempo despus, cay en manos de Sexto Emprico, que redujo a sistema las teoras escpticas.

160. Sexto Emprico se dedic especialmente a distinguir entre lo transcendental y lo fenomenal, o sea entre la realidad de la cosa en s misma y su apariencia con respecto a nosotros. No niega los fenmenos, conviene en que tenemos ciertas apariencias, pero sostiene que ellas no pueden conducirnos al conocimiento de la cosa en s misma. As es que admite la posibilidad de las ciencias experimentales, con tal que se cian al orden puramente fenomenal y prescindan del transcendental. 161. La raz del escepticismo de Sexto Emprico es su ideologa sensualista. No admitiendo en el alma otra cosa que sensaciones, es peligroso el caer en el escepticismo. La sensacin es un hecho subjetivo, y por lo tanto no presenta al sujeto el objeto mismo: le ofrece slo una relacin, o ms bien una afeccin, nacida de no se sabe qu. Adems, la sensacin es contingente, varia, por lo que no puede conducir a nada fijo, ni aun en el orden a que se limita. En tal caso, las proposiciones universales pierden su necesidad absoluta, porque son el simple resultado de inducciones que nunca podremos completar; y as el espritu humano flota entre un mundo de apariencias, como pluma ligera que divaga por la atmsfera, sin posibilidad de fijarse en ningn punto. 162. Si se admite esta teora sensualista, el argumento de Sexto Emprico contra la posibilidad de la demostracin es insoluble. La demostracin se ha de fundar en algo indemostrable, so pena de proceder hasta lo infinito. Lo indemostrable no puede ser un hecho contingente; por lo tanto, ha de ser un principio, un axioma, una proposicin universal; y como para llegar a esa universalidad hemos tenido que partir de hechos individuales, pues la hemos formado por induccin, resulta que lo llamado indemostrable se apoya en lo contingente, en cuyo caso el edificio queda sin base. Es imposible deshacerse de esta dificultad si no se sale de la estrecha esfera de la doctrina sensualista y no se admite en el espritu un elemento superior a los sentidos, puramente intelectual, que se nutre de verdades necesarias, independientes de la sensibilidad. Desde el momento que se reconoce un orden intelectual puro, el argumento de Sexto Emprico se desvanece; porque se arruina su fundamento,

cual es el que las verdades necesarias sean mero resultado de la induccin, y por tanto estriben en una base contingente. 163. A la luz de la misma doctrina se suelta el otro argumento de Sexto Emprico sobre la imposibilidad de un criterio. Este criterio dice no se encuentra en las sensaciones, pues que son contingentes, varias y aun opuestas. No lo negamos; pero sostenemos al mismo tiempo que se le halla en la razn, la cual, siendo superior a las sensaciones, juzga de los materiales que stas le ofrecen. Pero el entendimiento, replica Sexto Emprico, es una cosa desconocida; los filsofos no se han puesto de acuerdo sobre su naturaleza. Concedemos lo ltimo; pero negamos que las cavilaciones de los filsofos puedan hacer vacilar la existencia de un orden puramente intelectual, superior a los sentidos, y que todos experimentamos en nuestra conciencia. 164. Es verdad que el espritu, para conocer, no sale de s mismo, que hay distincin entre el sujeto y el objeto, y que ste no se nos presenta unindose por s mismo al entendimiento; pero tampoco cabe duda en que hay correspondencia entre la idea y la realidad, y que no podemos suponer que el orden subjetivo est en contradiccin con el objetivo, a no ser que nos propongamos negar nuestra propia inteligencia, sosteniendo que de nada sirve ni aun en el mismo orden subjetivo (V. Filosofa fundamental, lib. I, cap. XXV). 165. Los ataques contra la nocin de causalidad, renovados en nuestros das por Hume y Kant, se hallan en los sistemas de Enesidemo y Sexto Emprico. Los argumentos de este ltimo flaquean por dos puntos: 1, porque estriba en la ideologa sensualista; 2, porque no se eleva a la verdadera idea metafsica de contener. Claro es que si no concebimos otras relaciones que las puramente materiales, tales como nos las representa la sensacin por s sola, no hallamos en las cosas sino una serie de fenmenos en el espacio y en el tiempo, sin que podamos pasar de la intuicin puramente sensible. En tal caso habr contacto, movimiento despus del contacto; pero si nada aadimos no nos elevamos a la idea de

causalidad. El argumento de Sexto Emprico sobre la imposibilidad de que una sustancia pueda producir algo que no est contenido en ella, nos recuerda el grosero sentido de la palabra contener, que hemos censurado en Spinosa. (V. Ideologa, cap. XI, y Teodicea, cap. X). Otra dificultad propone Sexto Emprico, y es que el objeto debiera ser posterior a la causa, lo que es imposible, porque entonces habra causa sin efecto. No se concibe cmo semejante argumento se objeta seriamente. La causa en cuanto causa en acto, es decir, ejerciendo su causalidad, supone ciertamente que el efecto se produce; pero la causa, no ejerciendo su accin productiva, sino reservando su actividad para el momento de la produccin, no exige la existencia del efecto. Quin encuentra dificultad en esta distincin?

Sextus Empiricus
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search

Sextus Empiricus

Full name

Sextus Empiricus

Born

c. 160 AD c. 210 (aged 4950) AD possibly in Alexandria or Rome Ancient philosophy Western Philosophy Skepticism, Empiric school

Died

Era Region School

Influenced by[show]

Influenced[show]

Sextus Empiricus (c. 160-210 AD), was a physician and philosopher, and has been variously reported to have lived in Alexandria, Rome, or Athens. His philosophical work is the most complete surviving account of ancient Greek and Roman skepticism. In his medical work, tradition maintains that he belonged to the "empiric school", as reflected by his name. However, at least twice in his writings, Sextus seems to place himself closer to the "methodic school", as his philosophical views imply.

Contents
[hide]

1 Writings 2 Philosophy 3 The Ten Modes of Pyrrhonism 4 Legacy 5 See also 6 References 7 Literature o 7.1 Translations o 7.2 Selected bibliography 8 External links

[edit] Writings
Sextus Empiricus's three known works are the Outlines of Pyrrhonism ( or Pyrrhneioi hypotypseis, thus commonly abbreviated PH), and two distinct works preserved under the same title, Against the Mathematicians (Adversus Mathematicos), one of which is probably incomplete. The first six books of Against the Mathematicians are commonly known as Against the Professors, but each book also has a traditional title (Against the Grammarians (book I), Against the Rhetoricians (book II), Against the Geometricians (book III), Against the Arithmeticians (book IV), Against the Astrologers (book V), Against the Musicians (book VI). It is widely believed, with perhaps the exception of Sextus scholar Richard Bett, that this is Sextus's latest and most mature work.[1] Books VII-XI of Against the Mathematicians form an incomplete whole; scholars believe that at least one, but possibly as many as five books, are missing from the beginning of the work that was originally entitled Skeptical Treatises (Skeptika Hupomnmata). The extant books have the traditional titles Against the Logicians (books VII-VIII), Against the Physicists (books IX-X), and Against the Ethicists (book XI). Against the Mathematicians VII-XI is sometimes distinguished from Against the Mathematicians I-VI by giving it the title Against the Dogmatists (in which case Against the Logicians are called books I-II, Against the Physicists are called books III-IV, and Against the Ethicists is called book V, despite the fact that it is commonly believed that the beginning of the work is missing and it is not known how many books might have preceded the extant books). Note that none of these titles except Against the Mathematicians and Outlines of Pyrrhonism, are found in the manuscripts.

[edit] Philosophy
Sextus Empiricus raised concerns which applied to all types of knowledge. He doubted the validity of induction[2] long before its best known critic David Hume, and raised the regress argument against all forms of reasoning: Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is truthworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on ad infinitum.[3] Because of these and other barriers to acquiring true beliefs, Sextus Empiricus advises[4] that we should suspend judgment about virtually all beliefs, that is, we should neither affirm any belief as true nor deny any belief as false. This view is known as Pyrrhonian skepticism, as distinguished from Academic skepticism, as practiced by Carneades, which, according to Sextus, denies knowledge altogether. Sextus did not deny the possibility of knowledge. He criticizes the Academic skeptic's claim that nothing is knowable as being an

affirmative belief. Instead, Sextus advocates simply giving up belief: that is, suspending judgment about whether or not anything is knowable.[5] Only by suspending judgment can we attain a state of ataraxia (roughly, 'peace of mind'). Sextus did not think such a general suspension of judgment to be impractical, since we may live without any beliefs, acting by habit. Sextus allowed that we might affirm claims about our experience (e.g., reports about our feelings or sensations). That is, for some claim X that I feel or perceive, it could be true to say "it seems to me now that X." However, he pointed out that this does not imply any objective knowledge of external reality. Though I might know that the honey I eat at a certain moment tastes sweet to me, this is merely a subjective judgment, and as such may not tell me anything true about the honey itself. Interpretations of Sextus's philosophy along the above lines have been advocated by scholars such as Myles Burnyeat,[6] Jonathan Barnes,[7] and Benson Mates.[8] Michael Frede, however, defends a different interpretation,[9] according to which Sextus does allow beliefs, so long as they are not derived by reason, philosophy or speculation; a skeptic may, for example, accept common opinions in the skeptic's society. The important difference between the sceptic and the dogmatist is that the sceptic does not hold his beliefs as a result of rigorous philosophical investigation. In Against the Ethicists, Sextus in fact directly says that "the Skeptic does not conduct his life according to philosophical theory (so far as regards this he is inactive), but as regards the non-philosophical regulation of life he is capable of desiring some things and avoiding others." (XI, 165). Thus, on this interpretation (and as per Sextus' own words), the skeptic may well entertain the belief that God does or does not exist or that virtue is good. But he may not believe that such claims are true on the basis of reasons. It must also be remembered that by "dogma" Sextus means "assent to something nonevident [, adlos]" (PH I, 16). And by "non-evident" he means things which lie beyond appearances (and thus beyond proof or disproof), such as the existence and/or nature of causality, time, motion, or even proof itself. Thus, the skeptic will, for example, believe the proposition that "Dion is in the room" if sense-data and ordinary reasoning led to the emergence of such a belief. On the other hand, if she were to "strongly" assert that Dion was "really" in the room, then she may be met with opposing arguments of equal psychological force against the self-same proposition and experience mental disquietude as a result. Thus, the Pyrrhonian does not assent to the proposition "Dion is in the room" in a dogmatic way as that would purport to describe a non-evident reality which lies beyond the "appearance" [, phainomenon] of Dion being in the room. The Skeptic simply goes along with the appearance just as "a child is persuaded by...his teacher." (PH I, 229). It is for this reason then that Sextus says the Skeptic lives undogmatically in accordance with appearances and also according to a "fourfold regimine of life" which includes the guidance of nature, compulsion of pathe (feelings), laws and customs, and instruction in arts and crafts. The Skeptic follows this course of life while suspending judgment concerning the ultimate truth of the non-evident matters debated in philosophy and the sciences (PH I, 17). Thus, the Pyrrhonian Skeptic is one who believes possibly many things, but yet does not dogmatize about those beliefs since she finds no ultimate justification for them. Thus,

Pyrrhonian achieves ataraxia not by finding certain knowledge, but rather by suspending judgment on whether not finding certain knowledge is an inherently bad thing in the first place (as was assumed previously).

[edit] The Ten Modes of Pyrrhonism

Pyrrhonism is more a mental attitude or therapy than a theory. It involves setting things in opposition and owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons, one suspends judgement. "We oppose either appearances to appearances or objects of thought to objects of thought or alternando."[10] The ten modes induce suspension of judgement and in turn a state of mental suspense followed by ataraxia. If ever one is in a position in which they are unable to refute a theory, Pyrrhonists reply "Just as, before the birth of the founder of the School to which you belong, the theory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound theory, although it was really in existence, so likewise it is possible that the opposite theory to that which you now propound is already really existent, though not yet apparent to us, so that we ought not as yet to yield assent to this theory which at the moment seems to be valid."[11] These ten modes or tropes were originally listed by Aenesidemus. 1. "The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences in animals." [12] 2. The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences among human beings.[13] 3. The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences among the senses.[14] 4. Owing to the "circumstances, conditions or dispositions," the same objects appear different. The same temperature, as established by instrument, feels very different after an extended period of cold winter weather than after mild weather in the autumn. Time appears slow when young and fast as aging proceeds. Honey tastes sweet to most but bitter to someone with jaundice. Things appear different when drunk as opposed to sober, sick as opposed to well, etc.[15] 5. "Based on positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each of these the same objects appear different." The same tower appears rectangular at close distance and round from far away. The moon looks like a perfect sphere to the human eye, yet cratered from the view of a telescope.[16] 6. We deduce that since no object strikes us entirely by itself, but along with something else, it may perhaps be possible to say what the mixture compounded out of the external object and the thing perceived with it is like, but we would not be able to say what the external object is like by itself."[17] 7. "Based, as we said, on the quantity and constitution of the underlying objects, meaning generally by "constitution" the manner of composition." So, for example, goat horn appears black when intact and appears white when ground up.[18] 8. "Since all things appear relative, we will suspend judgement about what things exist absolutely and really existent.[19] "Do things which exist "differentially" or "have a distinct existence of their own as opposed to a relative existence" differ from relative things or not? If they do not differ, then they too are relative; but if they

differ, then, since everything which differs is relative to something..., things which exist differentially are relative."[20] 9. "Based on constancy or rarity of occurrence." The sun is more amazing than a comet, but because we see the reflections of the sun daily and the comet rarely, the latter commands our attention.[21] 10. "There is a Tenth Mode, which is mainly concerned with Ethics, being based on rules of conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic conceptions."[22] Superordinate to these ten modes stand three other modes: I - that based on the subject who judges (modes 1, 2, 3 & 4). II - that based on the object judged (modes 7 & 10). III - that based on both subject who judges and object judged (modes 5, 6, 8 & 9) Superordinate to these three modes is the mode of relation.[23]

[edit] Legacy
An influential Latin translation of Sextus's "Outlines" was published by Henricus Stephanus in Geneva in 1562, and this was followed by a complete Latin Sextus with Gentian Hervet as translator in 1569.[24] Petrus and Jacobus Chouet published the Greek text for the first time in 1621. Stephanus did not publish it with his Latin translation either in 1562 or in 1569, nor was it published in the reprint of the latter in 1619. Sextus's "Outlines" were widely read in Europe during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, and had a profound effect on Michel de Montaigne, David Hume, and G.W.F. Hegel, among many others. Another source for the circulation of Sextus's ideas was Bayle's Dictionary. The legacy of Pyrrhonism is described in Richard Popkin's The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Descartes and High Road to Pyrrhonism. The transmission of Sextus's manuscripts through antiquity and the Middle Ages is reconstructed by Luciano Floridi's Sextus Empiricus, The Recovery and Transmission of Pyrrhonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Since the Renaissance French philosophy has been continuously influenced by Sextus: Montaigne in the 16th century, Pierre-Daniel Huet and Franois de La Mothe Le Vayer in the 17th century, many of the "Philosophes," and in recent times controversial figures such as Michel Onfray, in a direct line of filiation between Sextus' radical skepticism and secular or even radical atheism[25]. Sextus is the earliest known source for the proverb "Slowly grinds the mill of the gods, but it grinds fine", alluded to in Longfellow's poem "Retribution".[26]

Sexto Emprico

Inicio > Escpticos >Sexto..

www.cinicos.com

Sexto Emprico.
Naci en Apolonia (Libia). De su vida se sabe muy poco, probablemente vivi entre finales del siglo II y comienzos del siglo III de nuestra era, sin embargo su obra es la de mayor influencia de todo el escepticismo antiguo. Por fortuna se ha conservado una parte importante de su obra, particularmente 10 libros (rollos) donde expone detalladamente el pensamiento escptico, lo que supone una importancia fundamental para el conocimiento del escepticismo antiguo. Los tres primeros libros estn traducidos como "Argumentaciones pirrnicas" (o "Esbozos pirronicos") y los otros siete con el ttulo de "Adversus mathematicos", (contra los profesores), en ellos se exponen las ideas escpticas tal y como han sido entendidas despus, tal vez porque se han conservado la mayora de sus obras. De estas obras nos han llegado diversos manuscritos, algunos de ellos del siglo XVI, se conservan en bibliotecas espaolas, en la de San Lorenzo del Escorial y en la Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid. Tambin se ha conservado un tratado de medicina. Sexto fue mdico y filsofo, uno de los representantes ms importantes del escepticismo pirroniano y adems sus escritos han servido de fuente de la mayora de datos referentes a esta corriente filosfica. No se sabe con exactitud de dnde era originario, aunque vivi en Atenas, Alejandra y Roma. Recibi el sobrenombre de Emprico por sus concepciones filosficas y especialmente, por su prctica mdica. En sus escritos se aprecia una fuerte influencia de Pirrn y Enesidemo, y estn dirigidos contra la pretensin dogmtica de conocer la verdad absoluta, tanto en cuestiones de moral, como de ciencia. En sus "Argumentaciones pirronicas" define el escepticismo de la manera siguiente: "El escepticismo es la capacidad de establecer anttesis en los fenmenos y en las consideraciones tericas, segn cualquiera de los tropos, gracias a la cual nos encaminamos, primero hacia la suspensin del juicio y despus hacia la ataraxia". Para Sexto los sistemas filosficos son tres: los dogmticos que son aquellos que creen haber descubierto la verdad, los acadmicos que suponen que no puede ser aprehendida y los escpticos que siguen investigando. Los escpticos son llamados tambin zetticos por su afn de indagar y observar, efcticos por la suspensin del juicio producida por la investigacin, aporticos por dudar de todo y pirrnicos por Pirrn fundador del escepticismo. Segn Sexto, las cosas existen, pero lo nico que podemos saber y por tanto decir de ellas, es de qu manera nos afectan, pero no lo que son en s mismas. No obstante, su epoj no es tan radical como la de Pirrn. Defiende tambin una tica del sentido comn y, aunque como pirroniano acepta la indiferencia respecto de todas las soluciones morales, reivindica tambin la importancia de lo emprico, esta sera la razn por la cual defiende que la vida prctica debe regirse por cuatro reglas: la experiencia de la vida, las indicaciones que la naturaleza nos da a travs de los sentidos, las necesidades del cuerpo y las reglas de las artes. Hace una crtica del silogismo, al que considera un

crculo vicioso, y pone en entredicho la nocin de signo, especialmente tal como lo entendan los estoicos. Critica la teologa estoica sealando las contradicciones de la nocin estoica de divinidad, para los estoicos todo cuanto existe es corpreo, por tanto, seala Sexto, tambin lo ha de ser la divinidad. Pero un cuerpo puede ser simple o compuesto, si es compuesto puede descomponerse y por tanto, es mortal. Si es simple, es uno de los elementos: tierra, aire, agua o aire y, entonces, es inerte e inanimado. De ah se sigue que la divinidad, o bien es mortal, o bien es inanimada, lo cual es, en ambos casos, absurdo. Adems de este argumento, Sexto atac la nocin de divinidad recurriendo a otros varios razonamientos. En todos ellos reforzaba la idea escptica de la necesidad de la epoj o suspensin del juicio. Sus escritos tienen una importancia fundamental para el conocimiento del pensamiento antiguo Concretamente, su obra "Adversus mathematicus" aporta datos importantes para el conocimiento de la historia de la astronoma, la gramtica y la ciencia antigua, o la teologa estoica.

Emprico
Entre los sucesores de Enesidemo, adems de Favorino, natural de Arls, en la Galia, cuyo escepticismo [393] slo es conocido por los ttulos de sus obras y por indicaciones ms o menos vagas de Galeno, distinguironse Agripa y el mdico Sexto, que recibi la denominacin de Emprico a causa de la escuela mdica a que perteneca {136}, y que floreci hacia fines del siglo II de la Iglesia. El primero de stos, o sea Agripa, redujo a cinco los diez tropos o motivos de duda que solan alegar los pirrnicos, a saber: 1, la discordancia y contradiccin en las opiniones y sistemas de los filsofos; 2, la necesidad de proceder in infinitum en lo que se llama demostracin, puesto que las premisas de toda demostracin necesitan a su vez ser demostradas; 3, la relatividad, o, mejor dicho, la subjetividad de nuestras sensaciones e ideas; 4, el abuso de la hiptesis, o sea la conversin de hiptesis en tesis; 5, el empleo frecuente del crculo vicioso. El segundo asumi la misin de reunir, desarrollar y condensar respectivamente todos los argumentos aducidos a favor del escepticismo desde Pirrn hasta sus das. Sus Hypotyposes pyrrhonicae y su tratado Adversus mathematicos, pueden considerarse como una compilacin y comentario general de los trabajos precedentes en favor del escepticismo, y como el arsenal comn de los escpticos que le siguieron hasta nuestros das. Son obras que apenas contienen rasgo alguno de originalidad, pero que revisten el carcter de [394] verdadero monumento literario levantado al escepticismo, a causa de la extensin, universalidad y mtodo de sus ataques. Porque Sexto Emprico, adems de agrupar y exponer en sus obras los argumentos todos del escepticismo, dirige ataques especiales y directos contra cada una de las ciencias. Su obra Adversus mathematicos, aunque lleva este ttulo, contiene captulos o tratados especiales contra los astrnomos, contra los aritmticos, contra los lgicos, contra los fsicos, contra los matemticos,

contra los moralistas, de manera que pudiera muy bien intitularse Adversus omnes et singulas scientias. En realidad de verdad, Sexto Emprico merece ser considerado como el principal representante de la escuela escptico-positivista que nos ocupa, y que parece haber florecido durante los dos primeros siglos de nuestra era. Sexto es el gran vulgarizador de esta escuela, porque en sus dos citadas obras expone, resume y desenvuelve respectivamente las teoras y argumentos de sus antecesores y compaeros. As es que aunque sus escritos no se recomiendan ni por el mtodo, ni por el estilo, ni por la originalidad, sirvieron de arsenal y fueron como fuente general en que han ido a beber en todo tiempo los partidarios del escepticismo. Debemos, adems, al autor de las Hypotyposes pyrrhonicae el conocimiento exacto y concreto de la naturaleza, procedimientos, aspiraciones y fines del escepticismo emprico o positivista. Para Sexto, el escepticismo es una especie de arte o disciplina esencialmente dubitatoria, una facultad o fuerza indagatoria, y a la vez hesitatoria de suyo y siempre (dubitatoria vel [395] haesitatoria, aut inde quod de re omni dubitet et quaerat, aut propterea quod haesitans, suspenso sit animo ad assentiendum aut repugnandum), de manera que en ningn caso y por ninguna razn produce asenso o disenso en el hombre. El verdadero escptico se mantiene siempre en la duda; no se inclina jams a parte ninguna, y esto, no ya slo tratndose de asenso cierto, sino tambin de asenso probable o verosmil, en lo cual el verdaero escptico se distingue y separa del escptico acadmico, que admite probabilidades, es decir, que en sus juicios se inclina a una parte ms que a la contraria: esto sin contar que el escepticismo acadmico afirma que todas las cosas son incomprensibles, afirmacin de que se abstiene el escptico verdadero, el cual ni afirma ni niega {137} tampoco la incomprensibilidad de las cosas. El fin a que debe aspirar el escptico, como fin ltimo y bien supremo del hombre, y fin que se consigue en lo posible por medio del escepticismo, es la imperturbalidad de la mente, la ataraxia, la tranquilidad perfecta del nimo; porque cuando el alma, en el orden especulativo, nada afirma ni niega; cuando nada juzga realmente como bueno ni malo en s mismo, y en [396] el orden prctico o moral se limita a satisfacer las necesidades naturales (la sed, el hambre, el calor, &c.), y a seguir sencillamente las indicaciones de la costumbre y de la ley, es cuando posee la tranquilidad asequible, la imperturbabilidad de nimo que cabe tener. En suma: el escptico se propone como fin y felicidad suprema y nica la imperturbabilidad (dicimus autem finem esse Sceptici imperturbatum mentis statum) del alma; para conseguirla: a) duda de todo, y nada afirma acerca de lo que es bueno o malo, y, por consiguiente, no persigue, ni busca, ni rehuye cosa alguna con vehemencia (qui ambigit de his quae secundum naturam bona aut mala sunt, nec fugit quidquam nec persequitur acri studio, proptereaque perturbatione caret) e intensidad, lo cual excluye la perturbacin; b) sigue en la prctica las corrientes de la vida comn (observationem vitae communis) u ordinaria, conformndose con las costumbres y leyes, sin dejarse llevar de afectos o pasiones tumultuosas, y obedecienco a las necesidades de la naturaleza, como obedece a la costumbre y a las leyes, con perfecto indeferentismo, y sin formar juicio alguno acerca de su bondad o malicia: Nos autem leges, et consuetudines, et naturales affectiones sequentes, vivimus citra ullam opinationem.

Aparte de su contenido escptico, los libros de Sexto Emprico contienen abundantes y, ordinariamente, exactas noticias e indicaciones acerca de los sistemas y opiniones de los filsofos antiguos. Ya hemos indicado antes que las obras de Sexto Emprico son las fuentes en que han bebido todos los escpticos desde la poca del mdico emprico hasta nuestros das. Y ahora debemos aadir que apenas se enecontrar [397] argumento de alguna fuerza entre los alegados por el escepticismo en sus diferentes fases histricas, que no se halle o desenvuelto, o indicado al menos en los escritos de Sexto Emprico. La existencia de Dios y la nocin de causa son objetos preferentes de los ataques del escptico alejandrino, el cual dedica sus esfuerzos a rechazarlas y destruirlas en los primeros captulos del libro tercero de sus Hypotyposes Pyrrhonicae. Entre los dems argumentos, alegados ordinariamente contra la existencia de Dios, hllase all expuesto y desarrollado, con cierto lujo de palabras y detalles {138}, el que se refiere a la providencia divina en sus relaciones con la existencia y origen del mal.

{136} Segn Galeno, florecan por entonces dos escuelas de medicina, cuyos partidarios se distinguan por la preferencia que daban respectivamente a las teoras racionales, o a la observacin y la experiencia: los primeros eran conocidos con el nombre de metdicos, y los segundos con el de empricos. {137} Jam vero, escribe Sexto Emprico, et novae Academiae alumni etiamsi incomprehensibilia esse dicant omnia, differunt tamen a sceptis fortasse, et in eo quod dicunt omnia esse incomprehensibilia; de hoc enim affirmant, at scepticus non desperat fieri posse ut aliquod comprehendatur, sed apertius etiam ab illis in bonorum et malorum dijudicatione discrepant. Aliquid enim esse bonum et malum dicunt Academici... persuasi verisimilius esse, id quod dicunt bonum, bonum esse quam contrarium, cum nos nihil bonum aut malum esse dicamus sed sine ulla opinatione sequamur vitam, ne nihil agamus. Hypot. pyrrhon, lib. I, cap. XXXIII. {138} Copiaremos, en confirmacin de lo dicho en el texto, una parte solamente del pasaje aludido, que es por dems extenso: His autem istud addendum est: Qui dicit esse Deum, aut providere eum dicit rebus quae sunt in mundo, aut non providere: et si quidem providere dicit, aut omnibus, aut aliquibus. Sed si quidem omnibus provideret, non esset neque malum ullum, neque vitiosus ullus, neque ulla vitiositas: atqui vitiositate plena omnia esse clamant: non ergo omnibus providere dicetur Deus. Sin aliquibus providet, quare his quidem providet, illis vero non item? Etenim, aut vult et potest providere omnibus; aut vult quidem sed non potest: aut potest quiddem sed non vult; aut neque vult neque potest. Sed si quidem et vellet et posset, omnibus provideret; atqui non providet omnibus, ut apparet ex supradictis: ergo nequamquam et vult et potest omnibus providere. Quod si vult quidem, sed non potest, ejus vires superabit illa causa propter quam non potest providere illis quibus non providet Non ergo providet Deus iis quae sunt in mundo Ex his autem ratiocinamur, impietatis crimen fortassis effugere non pose illos qui asseveranter Deum esse dicunt. Hypotyp. pyrrhon., lib. III, cap. I.

Pirrn
De Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre Saltar a: navegacin, bsqueda

Pirrn en un mar embravecido. Pirrn (en griego ; Elis, h. 360-h. 270 a. C.) fue un filsofo griego de la Antigedad clsica, y se le considera el primer filsofo escptico, y la inspiracin de la escuela conocida como pirronismo fundada por Enesidemo en el siglo I a. C.. Era natural de Elis ciudad provincial al noroeste del Peloponeso, Grecia. Hizo de la duda el problema central de toda su filosofa. El nico testimonio escrito de la obra pirrnica es una oda laudatoria dedicada a Alejandro Magno. Por este motivo, el legado de su doctrina filosfica nos ha llegado principalmente a travs de su discpulo Timn el Silgrafo. Segn su testimonio, Pirrn era tan radical en su postura que negaba que se pudiera llegar a los primeros principios de la deduccin aristotlica. (Aunque no era tan radical como Antstenes que renunci a toda clase de filosofa). No se sabe por qu motivos la Edad Media escolstica fue tan hostil hacia la filosofa pirroniana, pero como consecuencia de ello se destruyeron gran parte de los contenidos escpticos. Por conjetura inverosmil se puede deducir que al no estar Pirrn con el principio del silogismo (si A es B y B es C, entonces A es C), los escolsticos medievales no lo aceptaran.1 Tuvo gran ayuda de su discpulo Dinidas, que junto con sus compaeros esceptistas Pargus y Lopecio contribuyeron a la difusin de sus enseanzas. Su frase celebre: "Suspende el juicio"

[editar] Notas y referencias

Pyrrho
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search

Pyrrho

Full name

Pyrrho ca. 360 BC Elis, Greece ca. 270 BC Ancient philosophy Western Philosophy Skepticism

Born

Died Era Region School Influenced by[show]

Influenced[show]

Pyrrho (Greek: , gen.: ; ca. 360 BC ca. 270 BC), a Greek philosopher of classical antiquity, is credited as being the first Skeptic philosopher and the inspiration for the school known as Pyrrhonism, founded by Aenesidemus in the 1st century BC.

Contents
[hide]

1 Life 2 Philosophy 3 See also

4 Notes 5 References 6 External links

[edit] Life
Pyrrho was from Elis, on the Ionian Sea. Diogenes Laertius, quoting from Apollodorus of Athens, says that Pyrrho was at first a painter, and that pictures by him were exhibited in the gymnasium at Elis. Later he was diverted to philosophy by the works of Democritus, and according to Diogenes Laertius became acquainted with the Megarian dialectic through Bryson, pupil of Stilpo.[1] Pyrrho, along with Anaxarchus, travelled with Alexander the Great on his exploration of the East, and studied under the Gymnosophists in India and the Magi in Persia. This exposure to Eastern philosophy seems to have inspired him to adopt a life of solitude; returning to Elis, he lived in poor circumstances, but was highly honored by the Elians and also by the Athenians, who conferred upon him the rights of citizenship. Pyrrho wrote nothing. His doctrines were recorded in the satiric writings of his pupil Timon of Phlius (the Sillographer). Unfortunately these works are mostly lost. Today Pyrrho's ideas are known mainly through the book Outlines of Pyrrhonism written by the Greek physician Sextus Empiricus.

[edit] Philosophy
The main principle of Pyrrho's thought is expressed by the word acatalepsia, which connotes the ability to withhold assent from doctrines regarding the truth of things in their own nature; against every statement its contradiction may be advanced with equal justification. Secondly, it is necessary in view of this fact to preserve an attitude of intellectual suspense, or, as Timon expressed it, no assertion can be known to be better than another. Thirdly, Pyrrho applied these results to life in general, concluding that, since nothing can be known, the only proper attitude is ataraxia, "freedom from worry". ("By suspending judgment, by confining oneself to phenomena or objects as they appear, and by asserting nothing definite as to how they really are, one can escape the perplexities of life and attain an imperturbable peace of mind.") The proper course of the sage, said Pyrrho, is to ask himself three questions. Firstly we must ask what things are and how they are constituted. Secondly, we ask how we are related to these things. Thirdly, we ask what ought to be our attitude towards them. Pyrrho's answer was that things are indistinguishable, unmeasurable, undecidable, and no more this than that, or both this and that and neither this nor that. He concluded that human senses neither transmit truths nor lie.[2] Humanity cannot know the inner substance of things, only how things appear.

The impossibility of knowledge, even in regard to our own ignorance or doubt, should induce the wise person to withdraw into themselves, avoiding the stress and emotion which belong to the contest of vain imaginings. This theory of the impossibility of knowledge is the first and the most thorough exposition of noncognitivism in the history of thought.[citation needed] Its ethical implications may be compared with the ideal tranquility of the Stoics and the Epicureans.

[edit] See also

Callisthenes

[edit] Notes
1. ^ Diogenes' testimony is doubtful. See Bett (2000) 1. 2. ^ Long and Sedley (1987) vol. 1, pp. 14-17, vol. 2, pp. 5-7.

[edit] References

This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). Encyclopdia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. Algra, K., Barnes, J., Mansfeld, J. and Schofield, M. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Annas, Julia and Barnes, Jonathan, The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Bett, Richard, "Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho: The Text, Its Logic and its Credibility" Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 12 (1994a): 137-181. Bett, Richard, "What did Pyrrho Think about the Nature of the Divine and the Good?" Phronesis 39 (1994b): 303-337. Bett, Richard, Pyrrho, his antecedents, and his legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Brunschwig, Jacques, "Introduction: the beginnings of Hellenistic epistemology" in Algra, Barnes, Mansfeld and Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 229-259. Burnyeat, Myles (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). Burnyeat, Myles and Frede, Michael (eds.), The Original Sceptics: A Controversy (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). Doomen, Jasper, "The Problems of Scepticism" Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 10 (2007): 36-52. Hankinson, R.J., The Sceptics (London: Routledge, 1995). Long, A.A., Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (University of California Press, 1986). Long, A.A. and Sedley, David, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Striker, Gisela, "On the difference between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics" in G. Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 135-149. Striker, Gisela, "Sceptical strategies" in G. Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 92-115. Striker, Gisela, "The Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus" in G. Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 116-134. Svavarsson, Svavar Hrafn, "Pyrrhos dogmatic nature", The Classical Quarterly 52 (2002): 248-56. Svavarsson, Svavar Hrafn, "Pyrrhos undecidable nature", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 27 (2004): 249-295.

[edit] External links

Pyrrho entry by Richard Bett in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Pyrrho entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Diogenes Lartius, Life of Pyrrho, translated by Robert Drew Hicks (1925). [hide]

v t e

Ancient Greek skepticism

Pyrrhonists Academic skeptics Pyrrho Timon Aenesidemus Agrippa Sextus Empiricus Arcesilaus Carneades Clitomachus Philo of Larissa

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Pyrrho&oldid=486737314" View page ratings

Rate this page

What's this? Trustworthy Objective Complete Well-written

I am highly knowledgeable about this topic (optional) Submit ratings Saved successfully Your ratings have not been submitted yet Categories: 360 BC births 270 BC deaths 4th-century BC Greek people 3rd-century BC Greek people 4th-century BC philosophers Ancient Eleans Ancient Greek philosophers Ancient Skeptic philosophers Epistemologists Hellenistic era philosophers Indo-Greek religions and philosophy Philosophers and tutors of Alexander the Great Hidden categories: Infobox philosopher maintenance Articles containing Greek language text All articles with unsourced statements Articles with unsourced statements from March 2007 Wikipedia articles incorporating a citation from the 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica with no article parameter Wikipedia articles incorporating text from the 1911 Encyclopdia Britannica Persondata templates without short description parameter

Pyrrhonism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2008) Pyrrhonism, or Pyrrhonian skepticism, was a school of skepticism founded by Aenesidemus in the 1st century BCE and recorded by Sextus Empiricus in the late 2nd century or early 3rd century CE. It was named after Pyrrho, a philosopher who lived from c. 360 to c. 270 BCE, although the relationship between the philosophy of the school and of

the historical figure is murky. A renaissance of the term is to be noted for the 17th century when the modern scientific worldview was born.

Contents
[hide]

1 History o 1.1 Ancient Pyrrhonism o 1.2 The second debate of Pyrrhonism in the early modern period o 1.3 Fallibilism 2 See also 3 Notes 4 External links

[edit] History
[edit] Ancient Pyrrhonism
Whereas academic skepticism, with Carneades as its most famous adherent, claims that "Nothing can be known, not even this", Pyrrhonian skeptics withhold any assent with regard to non-evident propositions and remain in a state of perpetual inquiry. They disputed the possibility of attaining truth by sensory apprehension, reason, or the two combined, and thence inferred the need for total suspension of judgment (epoch) on things.[1] According to them, even the statement that nothing can be known is dogmatic. They thus attempted to make their skepticism universal, and to escape the reproach of basing it upon a fresh dogmatism.[2] Mental imperturbability (ataraxia) was the result to be attained by cultivating such a frame of mind.[2] As in Stoicism and Epicureanism, the happiness or satisfaction of the individual was the goal of life, and all three philosophies placed it in tranquility or indifference.[2] According to the Pyrrhonists, it is our opinions or unwarranted judgments about things which turn them into desires, painful effort, and disappointment.[2] From all this a person is delivered who abstains from judging one state to be preferable to another.[2] But, as complete inactivity would have been synonymous with death, the skeptic, while retaining his consciousness of the complete uncertainty enveloping every step, might follow custom (or nature) in the ordinary affairs of life.[2]

[edit] The second debate of Pyrrhonism in the early modern period

The traditions of ancient skepticism found a new reception in the early modern era climaxing in the 17th century, especially under the influence of the Empiricists (especially David Hume - see An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding - and the following rise of empirical science) in the discussion of historical doubt: Pyrrhonismus historicus and Fides historica: the "faith" in recorded history. The fundamental question of the debate could not, and cannot, be solved: How can we prove historical data? History is a realm that

does not allow experimental proofs. Questions such as with how many stabs was Julius Caesar killed can only be discussed on the basis of documents. If they contradict each other historians can try to balance them against each other. Do certain documents have precedence over others as eye witness reports, can they be validated through experience, or do they include unlikely, marvelous incidents one should disqualify as legend? The result of the debate was not a final solution of the inherent problem but the implementation of a new science of critical analysis of documents. The questions had a potential to destabilize religious histories. They lost much of their momentum with the transformation of history from a narrative project to a project of critical debate and with the 19th-century implementation of archaeology as a comparatively objective and experimental science.[citation needed]

[edit] Fallibilism
Fallibilism is a modern, fundamental perspective of the scientific method, as put forth by Karl Popper and Charles Sanders Peirce, that all knowledge is, at best, an approximation, and that any scientist must always stipulate this in his/her research and findings. It is, in effect, a modernized extension of Pyrrhonism.[3] Indeed, historic Pyrrhonists are sometimes described by modern authors as fallibilists. Modern fallibilists also are sometimes described as pyrrhonists.[4]

[edit] See also

Skepticism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search This article is about the philosophical term. For the metal band, see Skepticism (band). "Skeptic" and "Skeptics" redirect here. For other uses, see Skeptic (disambiguation).

Certainty series
Agnosticism Belief Certainty Doubt Determinism Epistemology Estimation Fallibilism Fatalism

Justification Nihilism Probability Skepticism Solipsism Truth Uncertainty

v t e

Skepticism or scepticism (see spelling differences) has many definitions, but generally refers to any questioning attitude towards knowledge, facts, or opinions/beliefs stated as facts,[1] or doubt regarding claims that are taken for granted elsewhere.[2] The word may characterize a position on a single matter, as in the case of religious skepticism, which is "doubt concerning basic religious principles (such as immortality, providence, and revelation)",[3] but philosophical skepticism is an overall approach that requires all information to be well supported by evidence.[4] Skeptics may even doubt the reliability of their own senses.[5] Classical philosophical skepticism derives from the 'Skeptikoi', a school who "asserted nothing".[6] Adherents of Pyrrhonism, for instance, suspend judgment in investigations.[7]

Contents
[hide]

1 Definition 2 Scientific skepticism 3 Religious skepticism 4 Philosophical skepticism 5 See also o 5.1 Literary skeptics o 5.2 Organizations o 5.3 Media 6 Notes 7 Sources 8 Further reading 9 External links

[edit] Definition
In ordinary usage, skepticism (US) or scepticism (UK) (Greek: '' skeptomai, to think, to look about, to consider; see also spelling differences) refers to:

(a) an attitude of doubt or a disposition to incredulity either in general or toward a particular object; (b) the doctrine that true knowledge or knowledge in a particular area is uncertain; or (c) the method of suspended judgment, systematic doubt, or criticism that is characteristic of skeptics (MerriamWebster).

In philosophy, skepticism refers more specifically to any one of several propositions. These include propositions about:

(a) an inquiry, (b) a method of obtaining knowledge through systematic doubt and continual testing, (c) the arbitrariness, relativity, or subjectivity of moral values, (d) the limitations of knowledge, (e) a method of intellectual caution and suspended judgment.

[edit] Scientific skepticism

Main article: Scientific skepticism A scientific (or empirical) skeptic is one who questions beliefs on the basis of scientific understanding. Most scientists, being scientific skeptics, test the reliability of certain kinds of claims by subjecting them to a systematic investigation using some form of the scientific method.[8] As a result, a number of claims are considered "pseudoscience" if they are found to improperly apply or ignore the fundamental aspects of the scientific method. Some people believe that Scientific skepticism does not address all religious beliefs, since most religious beliefs are, by definition, outside perceivable observation and thus outside the realm of systematic, empirical falsifiability/testability.

[edit] Religious skepticism

Main article: Religious skepticism Religious skepticism generally refers to doubting given religious beliefs or claims. Historically, religious skepticism can be traced back to Socrates, who doubted many religious claims of the time. Modern religious skepticism typically places more emphasis on scientific and historical methods or evidence, with Michael Shermer writing that it is a process for discovering the truth rather than blanket non-acceptance. For this reason, a religious skeptic may not believe that Jesus existed, or if he did, that he was not the messiah

and did not perform miracles. Religious skepticism is not the same as atheism or agnosticism, though these often do involve skeptical attitudes toward religion and philosophical theology (for example, towards divine omnipotence). Religious people are generally skeptical about claims of other religions, at least when the two denominations conflict in some stated belief.

[edit] Philosophical skepticism

Main article: Philosophical skepticism In philosophical skepticism, pyrrhonism is a position that refrains from making truth claims. A philosophical skeptic does not claim that truth is impossible (which would be a truth claim). The label is commonly used to describe other philosophies which appear similar to philosophical skepticism, such as academic skepticism, an ancient variant of Platonism that claimed knowledge of truth was impossible. Empiricism is a closely related, but not identical, position to philosophical skepticism. Empiricists see empiricism as a pragmatic compromise between philosophical skepticism and nomothetic science; philosophical skepticism is in turn sometimes referred to as "radical empiricism." Philosophical skepticism originated in ancient Greek philosophy.[9] The Greek Sophists of the 5th century BC were for the most part skeptics. Pyrrhonism was a school of skepticism founded by Aenesidemus in the first century BC and recorded by Sextus Empiricus in the late 2nd century or early 3rd century AD. One of its first proponents was Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-275 B.C.), who traveled and studied as far as India and propounded the adoption of "practical" skepticism. Subsequently, in the "New Academy" Arcesilaus (c. 315-241 B.C.) and Carneades (c. 213-129 B.C.) developed more theoretical perspectives, by which conceptions of absolute truth and falsity were refuted as uncertain. Carneades criticized the views of the Dogmatists, especially supporters of Stoicism, asserting that absolute certainty of knowledge is impossible. Sextus Empiricus (c. A.D. 200), the main authority for Greek skepticism, developed the position further, incorporating aspects of empiricism into the basis for asserting knowledge. Greek skeptics criticized the Stoics, accusing them of dogmatism. For the skeptics, the logical mode of argument was untenable, as it relied on propositions which could not be said to be either true or false without relying on further propositions. This was the regress argument, whereby every proposition must rely on other propositions in order to maintain its validity (see the five tropes of Agrippa the Sceptic). In addition, the skeptics argued that two propositions could not rely on each other, as this would create a circular argument (as p implies q and q implies p). For the skeptics, such logic was thus an inadequate measure of truth and could create as many problems as it claimed to have solved. Truth was not, however, necessarily unobtainable, but rather an idea which did not yet exist in a pure form. Although skepticism was accused of denying the possibility of truth, in fact it appears to have mainly been a critical school which merely claimed that logicians had not discovered truth.

In Islamic philosophy, skepticism was established by Al-Ghazali (10581111), known in the West as "Algazel", as part of the orthodox Ash'ari school of Islamic theology, whose method of skepticism shares many similarities with Descartes' method.[10] Ren Descartes is credited for developing a global skepticism as a thought experiment in his attempt to find absolute certainty on which to base the foundation of his philosophy. Descartes discussed skeptical arguments from dreaming and radical deception. David Hume has also been described as a global skeptic. However, Descartes was not ostensibly a skeptic and developed his theory of an absolute certainty to disprove other skeptics who argued that there is no certainty. Pierre Le Morvan (2011) has distinguished between three broad philosophical approaches to skepticism. The first he calls the "Foil Approach." According to the latter, skepticism is treated as a problem to be solved, or challenge to be met, or threat to be parried; skepticisms value on this view, insofar as it is deemed to have one, accrues from its role as a foil contrastively illuminating what is required for knowledge and justified belief. The second he calls the "Bypass Approach" according to which skepticism is bypassed as a central concern of epistemology. Le Morvan advocates a third approachhe dubs it the "Health Approach"--that explores when skepticism is healthy and when it is not, or when it is virtuous and when it is vicious.

Philosophical skepticism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search For a general discussion of skepticism, see Skepticism. Philosophical skepticism (from Greek - skepsis meaning "enquiry" - UK spelling, scepticism) is both a philosophical school of thought and a method that crosses disciplines and cultures. Many skeptics critically examine the meaning systems of their times, and this examination often results in a position of ambiguity or doubt.[1] This skepticism can range from disbelief in contemporary philosophical solutions, to agnosticism, to rejecting the reality of the external world. One kind of scientific skepticism refers to the critical analysis of claims lacking empirical evidence. We are all skeptical of some things, especially since doubt and opposition are not always clearly distinguished. Philosophical skepticism, however, is an old movement with many variations, and contrasts with the view that at least one thing is certain, but if by being certain we mean absolute or unconditional certainty, then it is doubtful if it is rational to claim to be certain about anything. Indeed, for Hellenistic philosophers claiming that at least one thing is certain makes one a dogmatist. Philosophical skepticism is distinguished from methodological skepticism in that philosophical skepticism is an approach that denies the possibility of certainty in knowledge, whereas methodological skepticism is an approach that subjects all knowledge claims to scrutiny with the goal of sorting out true from false claims.

Contents
[hide]

1 History of skepticism o 1.1 Ancient Western Skepticism 1.1.1 Sextus Empiricus o 1.2 Ancient Eastern Skepticism 1.2.1 Buddhism 1.2.2 Hindu Skepticism 1.2.3 Jain Philosophy of Anekantavada and Syadavada 1.2.4 China 1.2.5 Islam 2 Schools of philosophical skepticism 3 Epistemology and skepticism 4 Skeptical hypotheses 5 See also 6 References 7 Further reading 8 External links

[edit] History of skepticism

[edit] Ancient Western Skepticism
This unreferenced section requires citations to ensure verifiability. The Western tradition of systematic skepticism goes back at least as far as Pyrrho of Elis (b. circa 360 BC). He was troubled by the disputes that could be found within all philosophical schools of his day. According to a later account of his life, he became overwhelmed by his inability to determine rationally which school was correct. Upon admitting this to himself, he finally achieved the inner peace that he had been seeking. From a Stoic point of view, Pyrrho found peace by admitting to ignorance and seeming to abandon the criterion by which knowledge is gained. Pyrrho's ignorance was not the ignorance of children or farm animals: it was a knowledgeable ignorance, arrived at through the application of logical reasoning and exposition of its inadequacy. The school of thought developed primarily in opposition to what it saw as the dogmatism, or ultimately unfounded assertions of the Stoics; Pyrrhonists made distinctions between "being" and "appearing" and between the identity and the sensing of a phenomenon.

Pyrrho and his school were not actually "skeptics" in the later sense of the word. They had the goal of (ataraxia - peace of mind), and pitted one dogmatic philosophy against the next to undermine belief in the whole philosophic enterprise. The idea was to produce in the student a state of aversion towards what the Pyrrhonists considered arbitrary and inconsequential babble. Since no one can observe or otherwise experience causation, external world (its "externality"), ultimate purpose of the universe or life, justice, divinity, soul, etc., they declared no need to believe in such things. The Pyrrhonists pointed out that, despite claims that such notions were necessary, some people "ignorant" of them get by just fine before learning about them. They further noted that science does not require belief and that faith in intelligible realities is different from pragmatic convention for the sake of experiment. For each intuitive notion (e.g. the existence of an external world), the Pyrrhonists cited a contrary opinion to negate it. They added that consensus indicates neither truth nor even probability. For example, the earth is round, and it would remain so even if everyone believed it were flat. Unless, of course, it is flat, and we all simply believe it is round. The goal of this critique, which Pyrrho's followers realized would ultimately subvert even their own method, was to cultivate a distrust of all grand talk. They expected philosophy to collapse into itself. How far in this direction the Pyrrhonean commitment extended is a matter of debate. The Pyrrhonists confessed a belief in appearances, e.g. in hot and cold, grief and joy. It is impossible to deny, they admitted, that one seems to be in pain or seems to touch a piece of wood. Their world, thus, was completely phenomenological. An accomplished Pyrrhonist could, ideally, live as well as a dogmatist but with the added benefit of not worrying about truth and falsity, right and wrong, God's will, and so forth. Later thinkers took up Pyrrho's approach and extended it into modern skepticism. In the process, a split appeared within the movement, never too large or well liked among the literati to begin with. In the Academic skepticism of the New or Middle Academy, Arcesilaus (c. 315-241 BCE) and Carneades (c. 213-129 BCE) argued from Stoic premises that the Stoics were actually committed to denying the possibility of knowledge, but seemed to maintain nothing themselves, but Clitomachus, a student of Carneades, interpreted his teacher's philosophy as suggesting an early probabilistic account of knowledge. The Roman politician and philosopher, Cicero, also seems to have been a supporter of the probabilistic position attributed to the Middle Academy, even if the return to a more dogmatic orientation of that school was already beginning to take place. In the centuries to come, the words Academician and Pyrrhonist would often be used to mean generally skeptic, often ignoring historical changes and distinctions between denial of knowledge and avoidance of belief, between degree of belief and absolute belief, and between possibility and probability.[citation needed] [edit] Sextus Empiricus Sextus Empiricus (c. CE. 200), the main authority for Pyrrhonian skepticism, worked outside the Academy, which by his time had ceased to be a skeptical or probabilistic school, and argued in a different direction, incorporating aspects of empiricism into the basis for evaluating knowledge, but without the insistence on experience as the absolute

standard of it. Sextus' empiricism was limited to the "absolute minimum" already mentioned that there seem to be appearances. He developed this basic thought of Pyrrho's into lengthy arguments, most of them directed against Stoics and Epicureans, but also the Academic skeptics. The common anti-skeptical argument is that if one knows nothing, one cannot know that one knows nothing, and so may know something after all. It is worth noting that such an argument only succeeds against the complete denial of the possibility of knowledge. Considering dogmatic the claims both to know and not to know, Sextus and his followers claimed neither. Instead, despite the apparent conflict with the goal of ataraxia, they claimed to continue searching for something that might be knowable. Empiricus, as the most systematic and dogmatic author of the works by Hellenistic sceptics which have survived, noted that there are at least ten modes of skepticism. These modes may be broken down into three categories: we may be skeptical of the subjective perceiver, of the objective world, and the relation between perceiver and the world.[2] Subjectively, both the powers of the senses and of reasoning may vary across persons. And since knowledge is a product of one and/or the other, and since neither are reliable, knowledge would seem to be in trouble. For instance, a color-blind person sees the world quite differently from everyone else. Moreover, we cannot even give preference on the basis of the power of reason, i.e., by treating the rational animal as a carrier of greater knowledge than the irrational animal. For the irrational animal is still adept at navigating their environment, which presupposes the ability to know about some aspects of the environment. Secondly, the personality of the individual might also have an impact on what they observe, since (it is argued) preferences are based on sense-impressions, differences in preferences can be attributed to differences in the way that people are affected by the object. (Empiricus:56) Third, the perceptions of each individual sense seemingly have nothing in common with the other senses: i.e., the color "red" has little to do with the feeling of touching a red object. This is manifest when our senses "disagree" with each other: for example, a mirage presents certain visible features, but is not responsive to any other kind of sense. In that case, our other senses defeat the impressions of sight. But we may also be lacking enough powers of sense to understand the world in its entirety: if we had an extra sense, then we might know of things in a way that the present five senses are unable to advise us of. Given that our senses can be shown to be unreliable by appealing to other senses, and so our senses may be incomplete (relative to some more perfect sense that we lack), then it follows that all of our senses may be unreliable. (Empiricus:58) Fourth, our circumstances when we do any perceiving may be either natural or unnatural, i.e., we may be either in a state of wakefulness or that of sleep. But it is entirely possible that things in the world really are exactly as they appear to be to those in unnatural states (i.e., if everything were an elaborate dream). (Empiricus:59) We have reasons for doubt that are based on the relationship between objective "facts" and subjective experience. The positions, distances, and places of objects would seem to affect

how they are perceived by the person: for instance, the portico may appear tapered when viewed from one end, but symmetrical when viewed at the other; and these features are different. Because they are different features, to believe the object has both properties at the same time is to believe it has two contradictory properties. Since this is absurd, we must suspend judgment about what properties it possesses. (Empiricus:63) We may also observe that the things we perceive are, in a sense, polluted by experience. Any given perceptionsay, of a chairwill always be perceived within some context or other (i.e., next to a table, on a mat, etc.) Since this is the case, we can only speak of ideas as they occur in the context of the other things that are paired with it. We can never know of the true nature of the thing, but only how it appears to us in context. (Empiricus: 64) Along the same lines, the skeptic may insist that all things are relative, by arguing that: 1. Absolute appearances either differ from relative appearances, or they do not. 2. If absolutes do not differ from relatives, then they are themselves relative. 3. But if absolutes do differ from relatives, then they are relative, because all things that differ must differ from something; and to "differ" from something is to be relative to something. (Empiricus:67) Finally, we have reason to disbelieve that we know anything by looking at problems in understanding the objects themselves. Things, when taken individually, may appear to be very different than when they are in mass quantities: for instance, the shavings of a goat's horn are white when taken alone, yet the horn intact is black.

[edit] Ancient Eastern Skepticism

[edit] Buddhism Buddhist skepticism (Zen Buddhism) is not concerned with whether a thing exists or not. The Zen masters would answer questions "koans" with seemingly unrelated responses such as hitting the student. This would serve as a means of pulling the student back from the confusion of intellectual pontification, and into a direct experience. Since in Zen, all there is is a direct experience, which cannot be explained or clarified beyond the experience itself, this answers the question.

Buddha is said to have touched the earth at the time of his enlightenment so that it could witness his enlightenment. In this way, Buddhism does not claim that knowledge is unattainable. Buddhism places less emphasis on truth and knowledge than western philosophical skepticism. Instead, it emphasizes the goal of Bodhi, which, although often translated as enlightenment, does not imply truth or knowledge. At least in its manifestation of Nagarjuna's texts that form the core of Madhyamaka, the anti-essentialist aspect of Buddhism makes it an anti-philosophy.[dubious discuss] From that stance, truth exists solely within the contexts that assert them.

[edit] Hindu Skepticism One of the main schools of Hindu skepticism is the Crvka (Sanskrit: ) school, also known as Lokyata. The school is named after Crvka, author of the Brhaspatya-stras and was founded in approximately 500 BC. Crvka is classified as a "heterodox" (nstika) system, characterized as a materialistic and atheistic school of thought. [edit] Jain Philosophy of Anekantavada and Syadavada Main articles: Anekantavada and Syadvada Anekntavda also known as the principle of relative pluralism, is one of the basic principles of Jainism. According to this, the truth or the reality is perceived differently from different points of view, and that no single point of view is the complete truth.[3][4] Jain doctrine states that, an object has infinite modes of existence and qualities and, as such, they cannot be completely perceived in all its aspects and manifestations, due to inherent limitations of the humans. Anekntavda is literally the doctrine of non-onesidedness or manifoldness; it is often translated as "non-absolutism". Sydvda is the theory of conditioned predication which provides an expression to aneknta by recommending that epithet Syd be attached to every expression.[5] Sydvda is not only an extension of Aneknta ontology, but a separate system of logic capable of standing on its own force. As reality is complex, no single proposition can express the nature of reality fully. Thus the term syt should be prefixed before each proposition giving it a conditional point of view and thus removing any dogmatism in the statement. .[6] The seven propositions also known as saptabhangi are[7]:otgkhotgkhit354646 1. Syd-asti in some ways it is, 2. syd-nsti - in some ways it is not, 3. syd-asti-nsti - in some ways it is and it is not, 4. syd-asti-avaktavya - in some ways it is and it is indescribable, 5. syd-nsti-avaktavya - in some ways it is not and it is indescribable, 6. syd-asti-nsti-avaktavya - in some ways it is, it is not and it is indescribable, 7. syd-avaktavya- in some ways it is indescribable Each of these seven propositions examines the complex and multifaceted reality from a relative point of view of time, space, substance and mode. To ignore the complexity of the objects is to commit the fallacy of dogmatism. For a rigorous logical and mathematical interpretation see M. K. Jain, Current Science.100, 1663-1672 (2011). [edit] China

In China, the preeminent Daoist work Zhuangzi, attributed to 4th century BC philosopher Zhuangzi during the Hundred Schools of Thought period, is skeptical in nature and provides also two famous skeptical paradoxes, "The Happiness of Fish" and "Zhuangzi dreamed he was a butterfly". Wang Chong introduced a form of naturalism based on a rational critique of the superstition that was overtaking Confucianism and Daoism in the 1st century CE. His neo-Daoist philosophy was based on a secular, rational practice not unlike the scientific method. [edit] Islam In Islamic theology and Islamic philosophy, the scholar Al-Ghazali (10581111) is considered a pioneer of methodic doubt and skepticism.[8][not in citation given] His 11th century book titled The Incoherence of the Philosophers marks a major turn in Islamic epistemology, as Ghazali effectively discovered a methodic form of philosophical skepticism that would not be commonly seen in the West until Ren Descartes, George Berkeley and David Hume. The encounter with skepticism led Ghazali to embrace a form of theological occasionalism, or the belief that all causal events and interactions are not the product of material conjunctions but rather the immediate and present will of God. While he himself was a critic of the philosophers, Ghazali was a master in the art of philosophy and had immensely studied the field. After such a long education in philosophy, as well as a long process of reflection, he had criticized the philosophical method. The autobiography Ghazali wrote towards the end of his life, The Deliverance From Error (Al-munqidh min al-all; several English translations[9]) is considered a work of major importance.[10] In it, Ghazali recounts how, once a crisis of epistemological skepticism was resolved by "a light which God Most High cast into my breast...the key to most knowledge,"[11] he studied and mastered the arguments of Kalam, Islamic philosophy and Ismailism. Though appreciating what was valid in the first two of these, at least, he determined that all three approaches were inadequate and found ultimate value only in the mystical experience and spiritual insight (Spiritual intuitive thought Firasa and Nur) he attained as a result of following Sufi practices. William James, in Varieties of Religious Experience, considered the autobiography an important document for "the purely literary student who would like to become acquainted with the inwardness of religions other than the Christian", comparing it to recorded personal religious confessions and autobiographical literature in the Christian tradition.[12] Scholars have noted the similarities between Descartes' Discourse on Method and Ghazali's work[8] and the writer George Henry Lewes went even further by claiming that "had any translation of it [The Revival of Religious Sciences] in the days of Descartes existed, everyone would have cried out against the plagiarism."[13][not in citation given]

[edit] Schools of philosophical skepticism

Philosophical skepticism begins with the claim that the skeptic currently does not have knowledge. Some adherents maintain that knowledge is, in theory, possible. It could be

argued that Socrates held that view. He appears to have thought that if people continue to ask questions they might eventually come to have knowledge; but that they did not have it yet. Some skeptics have gone further and claimed that true knowledge is impossible, for example the Academic school in Ancient Greece well after the time of Carneades. A third skeptical approach would be neither to accept nor reject the possibility of knowledge. Skepticism can be either about everything or about particular areas. A 'global' skeptic argues that he does not absolutely know anything to be either true or false. Academic global skepticism has great difficulty in supporting this claim while maintaining philosophical rigor, since it seems to require that nothing can be known except for the knowledge that nothing can be known, though in its probabilistic form it can use and support the notion of weight of evidence. Thus, some probabilists avoid extreme skepticism by maintaining that they merely are 'reasonably certain' (or 'largely believe') some things are real or true. As for using probabilistic arguments to defend skepticism, in a sense this enlarges or increases scepticism, while the defence of empiricism by Empiricus weakens skepticism and strengthens dogmatism by alleging that sensory appearances are beyond doubt. Much later, Kant would re-define "dogmatism" to make indirect realism about the external world seem objectionable. While many Hellenists, outside of Empiricus, would maintain that everyone who is not sceptical about everything is a dogmatist, this position would seem too extreme for most later philosophers. Nevertheless, A Pyrrhonian global skeptic labors under no such modern constraint, since he only alleged that he, personally, did not know anything and made no statement about the possibility of knowledge. Nor did Arcesilaus feel bound, since he merely corrected Plato's "I only know that I know nothing" by adding "I don't even know that", thus more fully rejecting dogmatism. Local skeptics deny that people do or can have knowledge of a particular area. They may be skeptical about the possibility of one form of knowledge without doubting other forms. Different kinds of local skepticism may emerge, depending on the area. A person may doubt the truth value of different types of journalism, for example, depending on the types of media they trust. In Islamic philosophy, skepticism was established by Al-Ghazali (10581111), known in the West as "Algazel", as part of the orthodox Ash'ari school of Islamic theology. In the West itself, the one Renaissance thinker mostly viewed as the "Father of Modern Skepticism" is Michel de Montaigne, especially in his seminal Essays.

[edit] Epistemology and skepticism

Skepticism, as an epistomological argument, poses the question of whether knowledge, in the first place, is possible. Skeptics argue that the belief in something does not necessarily justify an assertion of knowledge of it. In this, skeptics oppose dogmatic foundationalism, which states that there have to be some basic positions that are self-justified or beyond justification, without reference to others. (One example of such functionalism may be found

in Spinoza's Ethics.) The skeptical response to this can take several approaches. First, claiming that "basic positions" must exist amounts to the logical fallacy of argument from ignorance combined with the slippery slope[citation needed]. Among other arguments, skeptics used Agrippa's Trilemma, named after Agrippa the Sceptic, to claim no certain belief could be achieved. Foundationalists have used the same trilemma as a justification for demanding the validity of basic beliefs. This skeptical approach is rarely taken to its pyrrhonean extreme by most practitioners. Several modifications have arisen over the years, including the following [1]: Fictionalism would not claim to have knowledge but will adhere to conclusions on some criterion such as utility, aesthetics, or other personal criteria without claiming that any conclusion is actually "true". Philosophical fideism (as opposed to religious Fideism) would assert the truth of some proposition, but does so without asserting certainty. Some forms of pragmatism would accept utility as a provisional guide to truth but not necessarily a universal decision-maker. Skepticism Criticism: Most philosophies have weaknesses and can be criticized and this is a general principle of progression in philosophy.[14] The philosophy of skepticism asserts that no truth is knowable [15] or only probable.[16] Some say the scientific method also asserts probable findings, because the number of cases tested is always limited and they constitute perceptual observations.[17] To claim that the proposition no truth is knowable is knowably true is to refute oneself; as it is contradictory.[18] Pierre Le Morvan (2011) has distinguished between three broad philosophical approaches to skepticism. The first he calls the "Foil Approach." According to the latter, skepticism is treated as a problem to be solved, or challenge to be met, or threat to be parried; skepticisms value on this view, insofar as it is deemed to have one, accrues from its role as a foil contrastively illuminating what is required for knowledge and justified belief. The second he calls the "Bypass Approach" according to which skepticism is bypassed as a central concern of epistemology. Le Morvan advocates a third approachhe dubs it the "Health Approach"--that explores when skepticism is healthy and when it is not, or when it is virtuous and when it is vicious.

[edit] Skeptical hypotheses

A skeptical hypothesis is a hypothetical situation which can be used in an argument for skepticism about a particular claim or class of claims. Usually the hypothesis posits the existence of a deceptive power that deceives our senses and undermines the justification of knowledge otherwise accepted as justified. Skeptical hypotheses have received much attention in modern Western philosophy.

The first skeptical hypothesis in modern Western philosophy appears in Ren Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy. At the end of the first Meditation Descartes writes: "I will suppose... that some evil demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies to deceive me."

The "Brain in a vat" hypothesis is cast in scientific terms. It supposes that one might be a disembodied brain kept alive in a vat, and fed false sensory signals, by a mad scientist. The "Dream argument" of Descartes and Zhuangzi supposes reality to be indistinguishable from a dream. Descarte's Evil demon is a being "as clever and deceitful as he is powerful, who has directed his entire effort to misleading me." The five minute hypothesis (or omphalos hypothesis or Last Thursdayism) suggests that the world was created recently together with records and traces indicating a greater age. The Simulated reality hypothesis or Matrix hypothesis suggest that we might be inside a computer simulation or virtual