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SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

1AC Solvency
Plan Solves Warming A/T “Europe Proves Cap-and-trade fails” A/T “Other Countries Will Emit” A/T “Reduction Targets Not Strict Enough”

1-8 9 10 11-12 13 14-16 17 18 19 20-22 23-24

Disads A/T “Economy DAs” A/T “Price Volatility DA”
Not Unique Link Answers

A/T “Spending” Counterplans A/T “Carbon Tax CP” A/T “States CP”


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

1AC Contention One is Inherency.
The Lieberman-Warner cap and trade bill on carbon emissions was recently defeated in the Senate- other efforts to combat global warming will meet a similar fate Politico 6/11/08 (Climate change in '09?, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0608/10989.html)
The Senate global warming bill may be six feet under, but the tears have already dried along K Street as lobbyists set their sights on the next administration. Regardless of who claims the White House this fall, climate change legislation is all but certain to be a top priority next year.

Environmental lobbyists have already swung their focus around from the Senate to the House, from which the next big bill is predicted to emerge. Maintaining momentum from the old bill is key,
they say, and members can expect a push this summer that is nothing short of global warming boot camp. “All the lobbying interests working on Lieberman-Warner are turning their sights to the House side,” said Friends of the Earth Legislative Director Shawnee Hoover. “If we don’t get started on the House now, they

won’t be able to pass a bill next year.” The Lieberman-Warner climate change bill died a short, painful death on the Senate floor after Republicans forced clerks to read
the entire 492-page bill and supporters were unable to muster the 60 votes needed to thwart a filibuster. Now on the House drawing board is a round of new climate change bills, and one could be unveiled by the end of the month, according to Friends of the Earth, which is contributing to the legislation. No

one expects the legislation to become law this year. Instead, the bills will serve as a training round for the House, which never got to consider the Senate bill. It will be an uphill climb. The bills are expected to be even tougher than Lieberman-Warner on emission reductions and cap-and-trade auctions. A bill
recently introduced by Rep. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) would reduce greenhouse gas emission levels to 85 percent below 1990 levels — more aggressive than the 70 percent allowed in the bill by Sens. Joseph I. Lieberman (I-Conn.) and John Warner (R-Va.).

Contention Two is HarmAdvantage One is Global Warming.
Human-induced warming is happening now – short-term action is critical. Podesta, Stern, and Batten 2007 (John, Todd, and Kit, President, Managing Director for Energy and Environmental Policy, and
Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Capturing the Energy Opportunity, November 2007, Accessed May 15, 2008, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/11/pdf/energy_chapter.pdf)

There is no longer any real question that global warming is occurring as the result of the rapid build-up of greenhouse gases primarily caused by human activities. We are on a trajectory for global warming to become much more intense unless we begin a concerted, rapid shift toward a low-carbon economy. And the danger is increasingly clear and present. As Rajendra
Pachauri, chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and recipient of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize, has said, “If there’s no action before 2012, that’s too late. What we do in the next two to three years will determine our future. This is the defining moment.”


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

Global warming causes disease spread, environmental damage, and escalating regional conflicts Podesta, Stern, and Batten 2007 (John, Todd, and Kit, President, Managing Director for Energy and Environmental Policy, and
Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Capturing the Energy Opportunity, November 2007, Accessed May 15, 2008, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/11/pdf/energy_chapter.pdf)

Climate change presents the United States with multiple foreign policy challenges quite apart
from those directly connected to our nation’s deepening dependence on imported oil, which we will detail shortly. These challenges include, for example, increased border stress resulting from the impact of climate change-induced storms and droughts in Mexico and the Caribbean. Or consider the complications posed by ever-scarcer water supplies to

political progress in the Middle East. Perhaps the greatest climate change-induced geopolitical challenge in the shortterm, though, will arise in the developing countries in the earth’s low latitudes. In these countries, even a relatively small climatic shift can trigger or exacerbate food shortages, water scarcity, the spread of disease, and natural resource competition. Such conditions fuel political turmoil, drive already weak states toward collapse, and threaten regional stability. According to a recent report by 11 former Army generals and Navy admirals, climate change is a “threat multiplier for instability” in volatile parts of the world.16 Nigeria and East Africa
pose particularly acute challenges. Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, will confront intense drought, desertification, and sea-level rise in the coming years. Already, approximately 1,350 square miles of Nigerian land turns to desert each year, forcing both farmers and herdsmen to abandon their homes.17 Lagos, the largest Nigerian city, is one of the West African coastal megacities that the IPCC identifies as at risk from sealevel rise by 2015.18 These conditions, coupled with rapid population growth projections, are likely to force significant human migration and contribute to regional political and economic turmoil. The threat of regional turmoil is higher yet in East Africa because of the concentration of weak or failing states, numerous unresolved political conflicts, and the severe effects of climate change. Climate change will likely create large fluctuations in the amount of rainfall in East Africa during the next 30 years—a 5 percent to 20 percent increase in rainfall during the winter months would cause flooding and soil erosion, while a 5 percent to 10 percent decrease in the summer months would cause severe droughts.19 Such volatility will jeopardize the livelihoods of millions of people and the economic capacity of the region: Agriculture constitutes some 40 percent of East Africa’s GDP and employs 80 percent of the population.20 In Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya, water shortages have already led to the desertification of large tracts of farmland and grassland. Fierce competition between farmers and herdsmen over the remaining arable land, combined with simmering ethnic and religious tensions, helped ignite the first genocide of the 21st century.21 This conflict has now spilled into Chad and the Central African Republic. Meanwhile, the entire Horn of Africa remains threatened by a failed Somalia and other weak states. Beyond

Africa, the IPCC warns that “coastal areas, especially heavily populated mega-delta regions in South, East and Southeast Asia, will be at greatest risk due to increased flooding from the sea and, in some mega-deltas, flooding from the rivers.”22 In South Asia, this will generate political tension as displaced people traverse the region’s many contested borders and territories, such as those between Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and China. In Bangladesh, for example, the combination of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, radical Islamic political groups, and dire environmental insecurity brought on by climate change could prove a volatile mix, one with severe regional and potentially global consequences.23 Independently, warming causes human extinction Henderson 2006 (Bill, Frequent Contributor to online news source CounterCurrents, Counter Currents, August 19, 2006, Accessed May
10, 2008, http://www.countercurrents.org/cc-henderson190806.htm)

The scientific debate about human induced global warming is over but policy makers - let alone the happily shopping general public - still seem to not understand the scope of the impending tragedy. Global warming isn't just warmer

temperatures, heat waves, melting ice and threatened polar bears. Scientific understanding increasingly points to runaway global warming leading to human extinction. If impossibly Draconian security measures are not immediately put in place to keep further emissions of greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere we are looking at the death of billions, the end of
civilization as we know it and in all probability the end of man's several million year old existence, along with the extinction of most flora and fauna beloved to man in the world we share.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

1AC Advantage Two is Soft Power.
Current US policy toward climate change damages US image and encourages balancing: cap and trade would boost soft power and spur cooperation on other issues Busby 2007 (Joshua, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs at UT and a fellow with the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community
Service as well as the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Who Cares about the Weather? Climate Change and U.S. National Security, Paper prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association annual conference in Chicago, Illinois, March 1-3, 2007, www.utexas.edu/lbj/faculty/busby/papers/ClimateSecurity.pdf)

While response to climate-related disasters may enhance U.S. soft power, a broader response to climate change writ large could also serve American interests. The reputation of the United States in the world has not been this bad since the Vietnam War. One likely reason U.S. popularity has suffered is because of the Bush Administration’s cavalier treatment of its allies on issues of importance to them like climate change. The U.S.’s highhanded
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol at the start of the Bush tenure in 2001 confirmed Europe’s fears that Bush was a unilateral cowboy in the thrall of oil companies. While we cannot know for sure if a different stance on climate change would have had any appreciable impact on America’s allies’ disposition towards the Iraq war, the

rejectionist pose of the Bush Administration on climate has been part of the mix that soured European publics on American leadership and likely made it costlier for the U.S. to get what it wants in the international arena.63 Multilateralism, selfrestraint, and giving one’s allies a voice in decision-making may be part of a sensible grand strategy for great powers. As John Ikenberry wrote in After Victory, the U.S. construction of institutions in the post-World War II environment enshrined its influence and legitimated its rule in the West among its allies, making the system easier to manage and more durable over the longer-term.64 It is this kind of pragmatism that led

It may make sense for the United States to cooperate on issues the Europeans care more about (climate change) so that they are more willing and able to cooperate on issues the United States cares more about (terrorism).66 This
Ikenberry and Kupchan to call this approach “liberal realism.”65 could under certain circumstances, as diagrammed in Figure 3, lead to reputational benefits for the United States, making it easier to achieve its core security objectives. Figure 3: Action on Climate Change as a Remedy for Decline in U.S. Soft Power Poor U.S. image High Transactions Leadership on Reputational Less Costly (Problem) Costs of Cooperation Climate Change Benefits Cooperation (I.V.) (Pos. Externalities) (D.V.) Remedy There are better and worse ways of going about rehabilitating the U.S. image. The U.S. pursuit of a climate strategy for reputational reasons could do little for the climate and little to improve its international standing or might be successful but resented. Even when the U.S. proposes sound climate policies, these may be resisted. At the heart of the Kyoto negotiations were flexibility mechanisms like emissions trading. At the time, these were fiercely resisted by the Europeans and yet now form the core part of Europe’s approach to greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Similarly, the Bush Administration has championed the idea of reducing the economy’s carbon intensity. This is a sensible metric and should have great relevance to China and India where absolute emissions are likely to rise but concerted efforts to introduce cleaner energy technology should lead to lower emissions per unit of output. Convincing the Chinese and Indians to accept an intensity target would be difficult but not impossible. However, because the Bush Administration’s own target mirrored the natural rate of efficiency gains, the idea may have been sullied. If promoted by the United States, there are likely to be significant quarters of the environmental community unwilling to recognize anything but a significant short-term emissions reduction target as a step forward. In the scheme of things, where net greenhouse gas emissions need to fall on the order of 45-60% below 1990 levels by 2050 to avoid dangerous climate change, they are right.67 The hardest part for the U.S. however may be getting started and sending a reasonably strong signal to the private sector that governments are serious and committed to limiting greenhouse gas emissions over the long haul. In any case, the U.S. needs to evaluate what price it is willing to pay for reputational advantages. Some policy choices may prove to be expensive ways of purchasing good will. For example, the U.S. pledged at Kyoto to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 7% below 1990 levels by the 2008-2012 time period. Given that U.S. emissions grew more than 15% in the 1990s, meeting that target would effectively require more than a 20% reduction in emissions.68 Different estimates of the costs of implementation of Kyoto were calculated and ranged anywhere from 0.42% to 1.96% of GDP.69 While these may overestimate the costs of implementation, any administration that is not wedded to climate protection goals for their own sake must evaluate different strategies for re-gaining others’ good will. There may be other issues and ways to curry favor at lower cost, namely being nice (i.e. diplomatic) and acting like you are listening to your allies. Such was the nature of the early visits to Europe by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President Bush in 2005. At some point, however, America’s allies will demand more substantive action on climate. If the U.S. government decides that for reputational reasons it would like to embrace climate change, then for its actions to be credible, it might have to incur some reasonably significant costs. These need not be purely material; they could entail political costs of standing up to core constituencies. To

get credit from skeptical allies, the U.S. might have to do something unexpected or against type, such as a carbon tax, a Patriot tax on gasoline as Thomas Friedman has suggested, or embrace of a cap-and-trade emissions scheme.70As a consequence, the U.S. could find its allies were in a better position to support the country on issues of more central concern. Such a move would also make it more difficult for critics to use the symbolism of U.S. obstructionism on climate for their own domestic grandstanding or to engage in quasi-balancing behavior.71


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

Soft power is critical to US leadership Fried 06 (Eli, “The Soft Power of Multilateralism,” The Jerusalem Report, Oct 16, proquest)
If there is one big lesson to be learned from the war in Lebanon and Iraq, it is that both Israel and the United States can gain as much, if not more, from international

cooperation as from the unilateral use of naked power. America's experience in Iraq has demonstrated that no amount of military power can make up for a lack of vital international support. Indeed, as a
result of its aggressive and unilateralist post- September 11 policies, Washington found itself unable to play the role of regional broker early on in the Lebanon fighting. However, it went on to pursue a sustainable cease-fire through a process of multilateral engagement, and, with the passing of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, significantly enhanced its persuasive capacity - or "soft power" - in the region. Its pursuit of an agreed- upon policy enabled the United States to co-opt the international community without sacrificing President Bush's paradigmatic division between the forces of good and evil. In other words,

it is not the U.S.'s moral partitioning that the world opposes, but rather its perceived neo-colonialist policies and unilateralist tendencies. US leadership solves global nuclear conflict Khalilzad 1995 (Zalmay, Program director for strategy, doctrine, and force structure of RAND's Project AIR
FORCE, Washington Quarterly, Vol 18 No 2, Spring 1995, p.84)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership

would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values - democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global
stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

Thus the plan: The United States federal government should enact the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008. We’ll clarify.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

1AC Contention Three is Solvency.
The Lieberman-Warner bill would cut carbon emissions enough to stop the impacts of global warming and lead to increased use of alternative energy Environmental Defense 12/5/2007 (Leading national nonprofit organization, press release, Environmental Defense Hails
Landmark Vote on Lieberman-Warner Climate Change Bill, http://www.edf.org/pressrelease.cfm?contentID=7404)

Waiting just two years to enact the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act or similar legislation would double the rate at which the U.S. will need to cut emissions – from just under 2% a year to more than 4.3% a year – in order to bring emissions down to where they need to be by 2020. The Climate Security Act (S. 2191) would reduce emissions by almost 20 percent below current levels by 2020, largely through an emissions cap and trade system, putting the U.S. on a path that is consistent with the roughly 80 percent reductions scientists say we need by mid-century to avoid a dangerous climate tipping point. The strong short-term emissions goal is essential to deploying the technology we already have to combat climate change, and sparking the innovation and investment we will need for the long term. A groundbreaking analysis released last week by the management consulting firm McKinsey & Company found that the U.S. can cut its projected emissions by as much as a third to one-half by 2030 at little cost and without major new technology or lifestyle changes – provided we have the right policy incentives and start soon. “We can meet bold targets
with today’s technology and create the new jobs that will power our economy in the 21st century, we just need a smart national policy like cap and trade. We also need a quick start. The longer we wait, the faster those opportunities will slip away,” Krupp said. The Climate Security

Act’s cap and trade system is a time-tested approach to reducing pollution that sets a mandatory limit on emissions and frees companies to hunt for the lowest-cost reductions. Coupled with energy efficiency provisions in the bill, the cap will result in reductions greater than 60 percent below current levels by 2050.
The bill also contains a “look back” provision requiring the National Academy of Sciences to periodically update Congress on the latest climate change science.

The cap-and-trade system spurs use of current technology to cut carbon emissions and allows development of even more efficient technology Arroyo 2007 (Vicki, Director of Policy Analysis for the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Climate Policy Should Focus on
Reducing Emissions, http://www.pewclimate.org/press_room/articlesopeds/arroyoenvironmentalforum.cfm, September/October) Granted, tackling climate change requires a Herculean effort: emissions are on the rise, while the newest science reveals

impacts occurring faster than we envisioned. We are running out of time. To avoid the most serious consequences of warming — loss of species, irreversible breakdown of ice sheets, and the human toll from more intense heat waves and hurricanes — scientists say we need to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide at less than a doubling of preindustrial levels (in the range of 450–550 ppm of CO2). If we’re
very lucky, that might hold us to a 3.6ºF (2ºC) global average temperature rise. It’s tempting to dismiss projected impacts as hyperbole or to believe that we can engineer a “fix,” the way the Apollo 13 crew saved themselves by using duct tape to fashion a make-shift filter in their struggle against rising CO2 levels on board their malfunctioning space capsule. I applaud those working on grand fixes and wish them every success. But I place more stock in solutions that exist now. A Princeton University study shows that choosing just seven

current technologies from a number of options, including renewables, energy efficiency, and nuclear power, can curb emissions growth sufficiently now, while buying time for technological breakthroughs. Each of these socalled “wedges” can cut emissions by 1 gigaton per year within 50 years. But these technologies won’t be deployed on the necessary scale without the right policies. One key policy is emissions trading, which has worked for traditional air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and is even better suited to curbing greenhouse gases. The European Union has already developed the world’s largest carbon market. Some U.S. states are following suit, and a number of capand-trade proposals are pending in Congress. By combining cap-and-trade with efficiency standards for cars and appliances, advanced technology research, and development of geological storage, we can reach our emissions reductions goals. So the essential first step is simple: stimulate existing technologies through demonstrated, cost-effective policies. This takes political will, and there is no time to lose. Greenhouse gases differ from traditional air pollutants, which
can be eliminated with more than 99 percent efficiency at the stack. Greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere — and our oceans — for hundreds of years. Even if geoengineering manages to cool a warming planet, it won’t solve other problems, such as ocean acidification from conversion of CO2 to carbonic acid. And the risks of such “fixes” as seeding the oceans with iron and adding cooling particles to the atmosphere are too big to ignore.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

EPA analyses prove Lieberman-Warner cuts emissions enough to solve the impacts of global warming Green Car Congress 3/17/08 (EPA Analysis Finds Climate Security Act Could Cut GHG Emissions 25% Below 1990 Levels By
2050 at a Cost of 0.06 to 0.16 Percentage Points of GDP per Year; Transportation Contributes Little, referring to the EPA document that can be found at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/s2191_EPA_Analysis.pdf, http://www.greencarcongress.com/2008/03/epa-analysisfi.html)

The Climate Security Act’s cut in cumulative US greenhouse-gas emissions is deeper than one found earlier by EPA to be consistent with keeping global CO2 concentrations below 500 parts per million in 2100. The finding
assumes that other developed countries reduce their emissions by less than the US, and that the developing countries do not start making similar reductions until 2025. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, keeping the global concentration below 500 ppm greatly decreases the risk of severe global warming impacts in the US and elsewhere.

Experts conclude US domestic action spurs other nations to cut emissions Washington Post 6/16/08 (Staff Writer, 'Aggressive Action at Home'; Another call for U.S. leadership on
climate change, Editorial Copy, Regional Edition, lexis-nexis) A 29-MEMBER independent task force of the Council on Foreign Relations released a report Friday that adds another authoritative voice to the clamor for U.S. leadership on climate change. Co-chaired by former New York
governor George E. Pataki (R) and former Iowa governor Tom Vilsack (D), the bipartisan document makes an argument that has fallen on deaf ears at the White House. "As the United States takes increasingly aggressive action at home," the authors correctly note, "it will be in a stronger position to ask more of others." "Confronting Climate Change: A Strategy for U.S. Foreign Policy" endorses a reduction in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions between 60 and 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050 through a cap-and-trade system. This puts it in line with the 60 percent goal of the Climate Security Act that failed in the Senate last week and with the 50 to 85 percent target of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The task force insists that the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol include developing nations, such as China and India, and it calls on the United States not to sign an international climate agreement without them. And if the United States doesn't sign, the task force urges it, the European Union and others to create a smaller emissions trading pact that could link up with another global pact later. The report advocates the formation of the "Partnership for Climate Cooperation." Think of it as a nod to the Major Economies Meetings convened by President Bush over the past year with the world's largest carbon-dioxide-emitting nations. But the task force makes explicit that the partnership "would be rooted in an aggressive effort to cut U.S. emissions and would focus on practical actions and implementation of specific strategies." This is a far cry from the "aspirational goals" that have been the sorry hallmark of Mr. Bush's endeavor. Because climate change will have a major impact on poor countries and could have national security implications for the United States, the task force urged that climate considerations be incorporated into foreign aid. It also called on developed nations to give this assistance more strategically as a way of building political pressure on wealthier developing countries to take action to combat global warming. None of these

recommendations will become reality as long as the United States remains on the sidelines. As the task force noted, a predicate for action is for leaders in Washington to "honestly communicate the challenges and opportunities involved in tackling climate change." Judging from the demise of the Climate Security Act in the Senate earlier this
month, Washington isn't quite there yet.

Federal action is key to effectiveness – decreases economic burden and creates a greater incentive for innovation. Repetto 2007 (Robert, Professor in the Practice of Economics and Sustainable Development at the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, National Climate Policy: Choosing the Right Architecture, June 2007, Accessed May 12, 2008, http://www.climateactionproject.com/docs/Repetto.pdf)

A national system should supersede other domestic cap-and-trade systems established on the state or regional level, in order to avoid duplication and conflicting requirements, targets and timetables. It will not be appropriate to
have a national upstream cap-and-trade system operating in tandem with a regional cap-and-trade system covering just power plants and large industrial establishments. A national system will confront national companies with fewer compliance burdens and

will obviate problems of inter-regional leakage that geographically limited systems would have to face. A national upstream cap-and-trade system will also obviate the need for sector-specific regulations, such as CAFE standards, because higher fuel prices will provide more comprehensive and flexible incentives for drivers and auto makers to reduce automotive emissions. The system will also provide strong incentives for energy efficiency improvements, though complementary policies to reduce market frictions, such a government procurement policies
and minimum efficiency standards, might still have a role.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

Action on climate change is inevitable- the plan avoids a worse “crash system” in the future Podesta, Stern, and Batten 2007 (John, Todd, and Kit, President, Managing Director for Energy and Environmental Policy, and
Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Capturing the Energy Opportunity, November 2007, Accessed May 15, 2008, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/11/pdf/energy_chapter.pdf) The challenge before us, then, is clear, and nothing is gained by delay. If

we ignore the risks of climate change and oil dependence, or fail to mobilize the political will needed to address them, then we will ultimately be forced into a much more costly and much less effective crash program down the road. A short-sighted, business-as-usual approach to climate change will make it more difficult to cope with increased disaster-related damage in the future and force us to abandon existing infrastructure and equipment and any new physical capital we improvidently deploy without regard to global warming. Moreover, we would incur a very large opportunity
cost, having lost out on the chance to become the economic leader in developing alternative and more efficient uses of energy. Instead, we should seize the moment of challenge and opportunity now to start building the low-carbon economy.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

Solvency: Plan solves Warming
Cap-and-trade is the best way to solve emissions – guarantees reductions. Robert N. Stavins 2007 (Professor of Business and Government at Harvard University, A US Cap-and-Trade
System to Address Global Climate Change, October 2007, Accessed May 16, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climate_stavins/10_climate_stavins.pdf)
The evaluation must also consider how certain it is that the proposed policy will achieve its emissions or other targets. Different policy designs may be expected to achieve identical targets, but with different degrees of certainty. A cap-and-trade

system can achieve emissions targets with high certainty because guaranteed emissions levels are built into the policy. With a carbon tax or technology standards, on the other hand, actual emissions are difficult to predict because of current and future uncertainty about future energy prices or how quickly new technologies will be adopted. Such policies may aim to achieve particular emissions targets, but actual
emissions may either exceed or fall below those targets, depending on factors beyond policymakers’ control.

Permits solve emissions by forcing cuts in the most cost-effective sectors.
Jason Furman, Jason Bordoff, Manasi Deshpande, and Pascal Noel, 2007 (all at the Hamilton Project, An Economic Strategy to Address Climate Change and Promote Energy Security, October 2007, Accessed May 16, 2008 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climatechange_furman/10_climatechange_furman.pdf) Comprehensive market mechanisms are well suited to the nature of the climate and energy security challenges. As noted earlier, the reduction of either a ton of carbon from automobiles or a ton of carbon from electricity generation would have the same effect on mitigating climate change. Similarly, it does not matter which cars use less oil, as long as total consumption falls. The key to addressing climate

change and energy security is to generate emissions and consumption reductions wherever they are cheapest; a market-based option that prices carbon emissions provides precisely the incentive to undertake the most cost-effective carbon reductions.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

Solvency: A/T “Europe proves cap-and-trade fails”
It’s too early to judge the EU’s system: uncertainty about future changes and lack of a “banking” provision for emission credits make current data unreliable Harrison et al 2008 (David, Senior Vice President, NERA Economic Consulting, and head of NERA’s global environmental practice,
Using Emissions Trading to Combat Climate Change: Programs and Key Issues, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1140808) 2. Experience With the EU ETS Thus Far It

is too early to provide a definitive assessment of the potential economic and environmental gains from the EU ETS.29 One reason for this is the high volatility in allowance prices over the first phase, which may have reduced incentives to invest in lower emitting production technologies. Moreover, uncertainty about the design of the trading scheme in future phases may have encouraged a “wait and see” attitude among many covered installations. Effects have been observed, however, in the electric power sector. There has been extensive
discussion of the effects of the program on electricity prices, and these discussions have expanded into more general discussions about the current and future effects of the EU ETS on the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries in Europe. We return to these issues in Part IV. Figure 1 shows the prices of EU ETS allowances (EUAs) over time, split into Phase I and Phase II allowances, and the total volume traded each week.

The graph shows wide fluctuations in the price of Phase I allowances. The large decline in prices in late
April 2006, followed the publication of verified emissions data for the first time. In a number of Member States, 2005 actual emissions were considerably lower than had been expected and significantly lower than the total quantity of allowances that had been allocated. Because

banking of allowances between Phases I and II generally has been prohibited, the “overallocation” of allowances has led to a steady decline in prices toward zero by the end of Phase I. Based on more reliable emissions data, Phase II caps have been set to be more stringent, and as Figure 1 indicates Phase II prices have so far remained at relatively high levels. The more stringent Phase II cap in part reflects demands by the European
Commission that some Member States issue less generous allocations than initially proposed.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

Solvency: A/T “Other countries will emit”
US climate policy is modeled internationally Paltsev et al 2007 (Sergey, Assessment of US Cap-and-trade proposals, research of MIT’s Joint Program on the Science and Policy of
Global Change, a joint center sponsored by the Center for Global Change Science and the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, http://tisiphone.mit.edu/RePEc/mee/wpaper/2007-005.pdf)

Also at issue is the equitable sharing of the cost burden of emissions reduction. Such equity

concerns are inextricably linked to the strategic objective of getting other countries to mitigate their own greenhouse gas emissions. Poorer countries see a U.S. and developed world that has freely emitted CO2 over the history of fossil use, and are thus responsible for the level of concentrations we see today. And they see economies with far higher incomes that are in a better position to afford the burden of mitigation. Thus, a perception of the U.S. taking on an equitable share of the burden of abatement is probably essential if the U.S. policy is going to serve the strategic goal of moving climate policy forward elsewhere. These issues are well beyond the scope of this analysis but
consideration of them is essential in determining the best policy for the U.S.

Lieberman-Warner causes China and India to adopt emission reductions Environmental Defense 6/4/08 (Climate Security Act Talking Points, http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=22957) S. 3036 helps America lead the world. The Climate Security Act uses America’s most powerful leverage – access to our markets – to compel action from China, India and other big emitters in the developing world, ensuring that we won’t go at it alone. The U.S. has never before waited for China to tackle
global challenges, and it should not wait now.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

Solvency: A/T “Other Countries Will Emit”
Provisions in the Lieberman-Warner bill give large exporters like China incentive to cut emissions Chevalier 2007 (Judith, professor of economics and finance at the Yale School of Management, A Carbon Cap That Starts in
Washington, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/business/16view.html?ex=1355461200&en=57a05db98eef77df&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss) But instead

of using Chinese inaction as an excuse to avoid dealing with the problem, we should consider why emissions from China are soaring. There are numerous factors, all stemming from China’s rapid economic development. Yet one of the biggest is the enormous increase in China’s production of manufactured goods for export. Indeed, a study by the Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research in Britain estimated that in
2004, net exports accounted for 23 percent of Chinese greenhouse gas emissions. We know where most of those Chinese exports are headed — to developed countries, like the United States, which accounts for about a quarter of them. A rough calculation suggests that almost

6 percent of Chinese carbon emissions are generated in the production of goods consumed here. That is the rough equivalent of the total emissions produced by Australia or France.
The Tyndall Center argues that carbon reduction policies should focus on carbon consumption, not emissions. That makes sense, especially in the absence of a binding global agreement. One goal of a tradeable permit system is to force consumer prices for goods to reflect the harm that the production of those goods causes the planet. For example, if a television were made using a high-emission process, the factory would have to buy many carbon permits, driving up the TV’s price. A television made in a low-emission factory would require fewer permits, lowering its relative price. Consumers, of course, would have an incentive to choose the TV from the low-emission factory, and all factories would have an incentive to lower emissions. A problem would arise, however, if a producer needed to buy permits to make televisions in a country with a carbon cap, while no permits were required in a country without a cap. The television from the country without the cap would be cheaper, consumers would prefer it, and there would be no economic incentive to cut emissions. Environmentalists call this the “leakage problem”: just as a balloon squeezed at one end will bulge at the other, emissions caps applied in only some economies will lead to emissions surges in others. A provision in the current version of the

Climate Security Act links responsibility to carbon consumption, not

production. This idea derives from a joint proposal by the American Electric Power Company and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. The provision requires that importers of goods from countries without carbon caps obtain permits for the emissions resulting from the goods’ production. While this requirement could be used to protect American jobs from foreign competition, if handled equitably, it could provide an elegant solution to the leakage problem. If the United States adopted a tradable permit system that treated emissions from domestic producers
identically to emissions associated with imported goods, then products that are more emissions-intensive, whether domestic or imported, would require more permits and thus be more expensive. Producers in the United States and abroad would have an incentive to reduce greenhouse gases to make their goods more competitive. Of course, such a plan would have an immediate cost for Chinese producers and American consumers. Chinese production methods are now much more carbon-emission-intensive than American methods, so the plan would probably raise the average price of Chinese imports. The alternative, however, is to try to force the Chinese to adopt binding carbon caps similar to those considered in the United States. But that would also raise the Chinese imports’ price. Moreover, Chinese adoption of carbon caps would apply to the whole economy and would be much more costly for China; an American carbon consumption permit system would shield the Chinese domestic sector. “The best policy — both in terms of the environment and in terms of economic theory — would be to have all countries take on binding emissions caps under an international agreement,” said Nathaniel Keohane, director of economic policy and analysis at Environmental Defense, a nonprofit advocacy group. “But we have to recognize that’s not going to happen overnight.” In the meantime, he said, the United States and other developed countries “need to take the lead.” He called carbon consumption caps “a good first step.” “FROM an environmental point of view,” Mr. Keohane said, “it

would ensure that the pollution we cut here at home doesn’t simply end up coming out of a smokestack somewhere else. It levels the playing field for American companies in the global economy. And it also helps us move toward a truly international system, by providing an incentive for developing countries to take on binding caps of their own.”


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

Solvency: A/T “Reduction Targets Not Strict Enough”
Studies conclude the key to avoiding the impacts to warming is to keep CO2 emissions below 550 parts per million- recent analyses prove Lieberman-Warner does this Weiss 3/8/08 (Daniel J., Senior Fellow and the Director of Climate Strategy at American Progress, Incomplete Study Still Shows
Affordable Results EPA Looks at Lieberman Warner Bill, Center for American Progress, Issues: Energy and Environment, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/03/new_studies.html) On March 14, the

Environmental Protection Agency released a study, “EPA Analysis of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 2191” which projects that that the Lieberman Warner Climate Security Act would achieve significant global warming pollution reductions at an affordable price. The study found that “the global CO2 concentration in 2095, while not stabilized, would likely be lower than 491 ppm [parts per million] if the US adopts S. 2191.” This very cautious estimate still indicates that emissions will be in the 450 ppm-550 ppm range advanced by scientists to stave off the worst effects of global warming.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

A/T “Economy DAs”
Global warming and oil dependence ensure a future crash- cap and trade avoids both and ensures short-term business certainty National Wildlife Federation 1/20/08 (Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act: Energizing America’s Economy,
SustainableDelco, http://sustainabledelco.org/2008/01/20/lieberman-warner-climate-security-act-energizing-america%E2%80%99s-economy/)

Doing nothing on climate change is a recipe for economic failure. Consider the major economic risks from our current dependency on fossil fuels, including the potential disruptions to foreign supplies of oil. Also, the economic damage from global warming itself will climb year after year if we fail to act. A recent commission chaired by Sir Nicholas Stern, former chief economist of the World Bank, found that global warming could reduce world economic output by as much as 20 percent if we fail to take action Beyond the impacts of global warming, there is also a very real price industry will pay the longer we wait. Businesses are making billions of dollars in investments in the coming years for power plants and other energy capital, and they need certainty of the rules – and a flexible framework such as that in the Lieberman-Warner bill – to make the most efficient decisions. Also, a slow start on federal action means a crash finish. If we start cutting pollution by the year 2012, we can cut pollution gradually by about 2% every year. If we delay even two years, we will need to cut pollution at twice the rate (around 4% a year) just to achieve the
Economic Cost of Delay: same cumulative pollution levels through the year 2020.

Their arguments are based on economic models that don’t assume technological innovation and resultant decreases in energy costs National Wildlife Federation 1/20/08 (Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act: Energizing America’s Economy,
SustainableDelco, http://sustainabledelco.org/2008/01/20/lieberman-warner-climate-security-act-energizing-america%E2%80%99s-economy/) Economic Modeling of the Legislation: Because the Lieberman-Warner bill designed to drive technology innovation,

economic models are incapable of guessing at what that innovation may bring, and the economic opportunity it entails. However, many economists analyze bills based on the technology we have now to determine what the likely market-based price will be for emission allowances, and how that will affect energy prices and GDP. According to a detailed technology analysis by McKinsey & Company on behalf of Shell, Honeywell, DTE Energy and other sponsors, U.S. emissions can be reduced by 20-30% below current levels by the year 2030 (reductions comparable to those in the Lieberman-Warner bill) through measures that are cost effective. The cost savings from many of these measures (such as improving efficiency in buildings) would roughly offset the added cost of the more expensive options (such as reducing pollution at coal-fired power plants). Analysis of an earlier version of the Lieberman-Warner bill by Duke University’s Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions and RTI International suggests the following: (1) America’s economy will grow strongly under the Lieberman-Warner bill. Total U.S. GDP will roughly triple in size between 2010 and 2050 with or without enactment of the bill. However, there may be
some slight loss in GDP through 2050 – roughly equivalent to delaying economic growth by about 6 months over a 40 year timeframe. This analysis does not attempt to assess, however, the positive boost to the U.S. economy that would accompany a renaissance in manufacturing clean energy technologies to sell around the world. (2) The Lieberman-Warner bill returns significant revenues to consumers. The bill is the first to provide detailed provisions to aid a just transition to a clean energy future for low- and middle-income families. Based on the Nicholas Institute’s forecast for emission allowance prices, NWF calculates that the consumer-oriented provisions in the bill’s allocation formula will return $425 billion to low- and middle-income consumers thru the year 2030. (3) Energy prices may increase for businesses and residential consumers, although energy bills could go up or down. Compared to a “business as usual” pathway, the Nicholas Institute estimates that, by the year 2015: the price of gasoline may increase by 7%; the price of natural gas may increase by about 17%; and the price of electricity may increase by about 20%. However, increasing energy prices does not automatically translate into higher energy bills, as consumers

will have greater access to energy saving technologies that reduce the amount of gasoline, natural gas and electricity purchased. A recent analysis by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency of a similar climate bill (S. 280) determined that overall cost of generating electricity across the United States would decrease by 2025, as the savings from energy conservation more than offset the costs of pollution controls to industry. (4) The United States energy mix will diversify and rely less on fossil fuels. The legislation will drive energy conservation and
renewable energy sources, with the overall use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) declining 12% by 2015 relative to business-as-usual. United States dependency on oil will be reduced by 15% compared to business-as-usual by 2050. (5) The Cost of emitting greenhouse gas emissions will increase over time as emissions limits tighten. Emission allowance prices are estimated to start at about $20 per ton (carbon dioxide equivalent) in 2015 and increase as emission caps tighten.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

A/T “Economy DAs”
Their evidence only indicates a slight slowdown of future growth, never a downturn Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2008 (In Brief, Insights from Modeling Analyses of the Lieberman-Warner
Climate Security Act (S. 2191), May, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUpdloads/L-W-Modeling.pdf)

Climate policies such as S. 2191 will still allow the economy to grow robustly. It is important to note that projections of changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across all of the models reflect a reduction in future expected growth—never an absolute reduction (see Table 1). For 2030,
reductions from BAU forecasts of GDP vary across models from 0.3% to 2.7% but the ACCF/NAM analysis (which is not fully representative of the key policy elements of S. 2191) is a clear outlier. In all of these cases, including the most pessimistic, the economy is projected to grow significantly. Similarly, in 2050, estimates of reductions in future expected growth from BAU generally vary from 0.75% to 2.7%. The BAU or reference cases in the various models show that overall U.S. GDP doubles by 2030 and more than triples by 2050. Thus, decreases from future GDP are quite small compared to the overall economic growth over the time period considered. For example, in EIA’s analysis, GDP grows 183% from 2005 to 2030 in the S. 2191 core (policy) scenario compared to 184% in the reference case. For context, this means that the economy would be less than 2 months behind BAU levels in 2030 with GHG caps.

Economic models are inherently uncertain Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2008 (In Brief, Insights from Modeling Analyses of the Lieberman-Warner
Climate Security Act (S. 2191), May, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUpdloads/L-W-Modeling.pdf) Consideration of the range of uncertainty in the model is important for putting the potential cost impacts of a policy in perspective. Uncertainty about the types of technology that will be available in 20, 30, or even 50 years is significant. Who would have predicted back in the 1950s the computing or communications capabilities we have today? Further, predicting how our economy will grow is also rife with

uncertainty. In the six modeling exercises that we examined, the difference between reference case GDP (that is, future GDP in the absence of climate policy) in 2030 was almost 3 trillion dollars, representing a difference of more than 10 percent. Predicted impacts (for example, the 0.44% reduction in 2030 GDP from BAU suggested by the MIT model) in light of this large uncertainty seems insignificant.

Turn: Innovation A. Cap spurs renewable innovation – which is key to US competitiveness. Byron Swift and Jan Mazurek 2008 (Director of the Center for Energy, Economy and Innovation at the Environmental
Law Institute and the Director of the Center for Innovation and the Environment at the Progressive Policy Institute, Progressive Policy Institute Policy Report, October 2001, Accessed May 16, 2008, http://www.ndol.org/documents/clean_energy_part2.pdf) The adoption by other countries of greenhouse gas caps virtually guarantees that the country (or company) first to market with carbon-abatement technologies will reap unprecedented dividends. Although we can’t foresee exactly what carbon mitigation technologies will form the ultimate response to global warming, we should be creating incentives to develop them now. We know from experience that new technology, an entrepreneurial spirit, and sound public policies can simultaneously produce environmental improvements, growth, and affordable energy. U.S. companies should have incentives to develop carbon mitigation technologies that will have world markets. It is
also up to countries like the United States that have the capital and expertise to develop these technologies in order for lesser-developed countries to be able to commit to reductions by applying those technologies.

Competitiveness is key to US economic growth. Council on Competitiveness 2008 (Define: Progressive Dialogue I: The Energy-Competitiveness Relationship, February 2008,
Accessed May 16, 2008, http://www.compete.org/images/uploads/File/PDF%20Files/Define%20Final.pdf)

It is clear that the United States faces serious challenges and a new competitiveness landscape as it
contends with the twin challenges of energy security and sustainability. America’s continued economic growth and prosperity is at risk if we do not improve our energy productivity. Though the policy and regulatory response to these issues is still in flux– and can vary considerably at the state, national and international levels–leading companies are not waiting to act. As they do so,

they are realizing significant cost savings and new opportunities for top line growth.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

A/T “Economy DAs”
Global warming ensures a global depression Environment News Service, October 30, 2006 (Accessed May 17, 2008, http://www.ensnewswire.com/ens/oct2006/2006-10-30-06.asp)

LONDON, UK, October 30, 2006 (ENS) - The

most comprehensive review ever carried out on the economics of climate change warns that global warming could inflict worldwide disruption as great as that caused by the two World Wars and the Great Depression. Published today and launched at the offices of the Royal Society in London, the Stern Review estimates that US$9 trillion dollars would be the global economic cost of doing nothing. The review, sent to Prime Minister Tony
Blair and Chancellor Gordon Brown, was commissioned by the chancellor in July last year. It was carried out by Sir Nicholas Stern, head of the Government Economic Service and a former World Bank chief economist. Sir Nicholas said today, "The conclusion of the review is essentially optimistic. There is still time to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, if we act now and act internationally. Governments, businesses and individuals all need to work together to respond to the challenge. Strong, deliberate policy choices by governments are essential to motivate change."


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

A/T “Price Volatility DA”- Not Unique
( ) Not Unique – Prices are volatile now for a host of reasons. CNN ‘8 (July 1st -- http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/07/01/oil.congress.ap/)
Still, with oil bouncing from high to higher, the primary concern at the meeting was over availability and prices that are propelled higher by a potent mix of developments. There is the weakening U.S. dollar; each time it loses traders buy oil as a hedge; and dollar appears set to fall further with Europe possibly moving toward interest rate increases as low U.S. rates stand firm -- trends that will see more investors abandon the American currency. Adding to oil's more than twofold price increase in the past year is rising demand, particularly in fast-growing economies such as China and India. Supply interruptions in the Middle East and Nigeria have also contributed, as has falling production in Mexico. And tensions over Iran, OPEC's second-largest producer, have added to volatility.

( ) Price volatility now – speculative investment is driving high prices. Asia Pulse ‘8 (Asia Pulse -- June 30, 2008 – lexis)
Large amounts of speculative investments in oil may be having a significant impact on world oil prices, according to an economic briefing entitled "Speculative Oil" from Oxford Business Group (OBG), a global publishing and research firm. It questions the common explanation that supply, demand and other structural market factors are forcing prices upwards, noting that the higher prices go, the less plausible it becomes that unremarkable supply and demand pressures could account for such dramatic price increases. OBG said prices were now almost seven times higher than the average price of $20US for the last 15 years of the 20th century and have already increased by over 30 percent in 2008. "Evidence suggests that there are other, more speculative forces at work in the oil sector which are driving up prices," it said. Recently, the Group of Eight (G8) finance ministers called for an investigation, involving the International Monetary Fund (IMF), into the recent energy price volatility. Pressure is mounting on political leaders to produce a solution to the price spike, and OBG asserts that with prospects in equities, bonds and other assets looking bleak, commodity prices are increasingly being billed by financiers as a new class for investment.

( ) Prices highly volatile already CNN Money ‘8 (June 30th –
http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/apwire/a004fe75c2d69e882c74c35c18115aee.htm) Aluminum products maker Kaiser Aluminum Corp. said it will add surcharges to all new orders of fabricated aluminum products beginning July 1 to offset rising costs for natural gas, electricity and diesel fuel. The company said commodity prices for natural gas and diesel fuel was about 60 percent higher in May compared with the average 2007 price. "These energy prices are spiraling and highly volatile, so we've elected to introduce a surcharge as the most transparent method to recover these costs," Chief Executive Jack A. Hockema said.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

A/T “Price Volatility DA”- Link Answers
The banking and borrowing of emissions permits under Lieberman-Warner solves price volatility Parry and Pizer 2007 (Ian and William, Senior Fellows at Resources for the Future, Regulation, Vol 30 No 3, Fall 2007, p.21)
Second, the problem of permit price

volatility can be addressed through provisions like "safety valves" and, to a lesser

extent, permit banking and permit borrowing . With a safety valve, firms can buy additional permits from the government in periods when the permit price reaches a specified trigger level. This effectively relaxes the permit cap in that period, thereby keeping a ceiling on permit prices when permits would otherwise have been in excessive demand. Coupling a very tight cap with a safety valve would almost completely stabilize prices. Alternatively, transitory permit price

spikes might be ironed out by allowing firms to borrow permits from the government during periods of high permit prices and pay them back through more stringent emissions control in some future period. Similarly, permit banking helps to create a floor under permit prices; under this mechanism, in periods when the demand for permits is slack because abatement costs are low, firms have an incentive to abate more in order to hold over some allowances for use in future periods when they expect higher permit prices. While still subject to fluctuations driven by longer-term price expectations, these mechanisms at least remove shortterm volatility. Although arrangements for banking and borrowing permits strengthen the need for new financial institutions, such
institutions would probably develop quickly and at relatively low cost.

Even if actual legislation isn’t inevitable, businesses think it is- plan provides economic certainty Walsh 2008 (Bryan, Environmental staff writer, Time, April 28, 2008, Accessed May 16, 2008,

It's true that there will be costs associated with any carbon-pricing plan; ending climate change won't be free. "You want a clean environment, you have to pay for it," says Peter Fusaro, founder of the green investment group Global Change Associates. But just how high will the tab be? An Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) study found that gdp would grow just 1% less from 2010 to 2030 under Lieberman-Warner than without it—and that doesn't take into account the potential economic benefits. In an April study, the International Monetary Fund concluded that smart carbon-cutting policies could contain climate change without seriously harming the global economy. And while the U.S. business community will fight hard over the details of any cap-and-trade plan, a growing number of companies are now begging for the certainty that will come from what many see as inevitable legislation. "I believe it will be a challenge, but it's doable," says Peter Darbee, CEO of the West Coast utility PG&E.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

A/T “Spending”
Lieberman-Warner will boost government income by $100 billion in the first year Thompson 6/21/08 (Clive, contributing writer for the New York Times Magazine, International Herald Tribune, “The mission of
Mister Clean,” lexis-nexis)

But the

Lieberman-Warner bill, like virtually every other cap-and-trade bill in the works, gives away only 75 percent of the allowances; the government auctions off the rest. Year by year, the percentage of allowances that will be auctioned off steadily rises, until nearly all of them are. This is a huge new source of money for the government: Carbon allowances are projected to be worth $100 billion in the first year alone, rising to nearly $500 billion by 2050.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

A/T “Carbon Tax CP”
( ) Tradable permits solve better than a carbon tax – they a more flexible and are more likely to reduce emissions Pizer ‘7 (William A. Pizer is a senior fellow at Resources for the Future in Washington, DC.
Council on Foreign Relations -- How Should the United States Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions? -- June 23rd -http://www.cfr.org/publication/13646/how_should_the_united_states_regulate_greenhous e_gas_emissions.html) Between taxes and tradable permits, I believe a tradable permit system is a better way to go for two overarching reasons. First, a tradable permit system can be designed to mimic all of the key features of a tax and can do more; and second, this flexibility to do more—specifically to easily provide compensation to various businesses and individuals through a free allocation—takes away pressure to exclude some sectors.Taxes are typically advocated because they fix the price rather than leaving it to fluctuate in response to volatility in permit demand, and they raise government revenue that can be used to cut other taxes. Yet, a tradable permit system—through use of a safety valve and permit auctions—can match these two features. A safety valve would limit the permit price by having the government supply unlimited “extra” permits at a specified price. If the emission cap is low enough, the safety valve can fix the price with certainty. Similarly, the government can sell off permits and raise money to cut other taxes. But a permit system can do more. While a safety valve can fix the price like a tax, the safety valve can also be removed as more emission certainty is desired. And, all the permits need not be auctioned—some can be given away or used to finance related technology investments. This latter flexibility is the key to why I favor permit trading.

) Permits are better for the environment than carbon taxes. Mintz ‘6 (Jack Mintz is a professor in Business Economics and director of the International Tax

Program at the Rotman School of Management. Alternatives Journal 32:3 -http://www.alternativesjournal.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=232) A carbon tax will not be an effective environmental policy compared to regulations accompanied by flexible tradable permit trading, since taxes are set rigidly for two reasons. First, governments do not have full information about the carbon content of all products and the potential demand and supply responses needed to be known to properly assess the optimal tax rates needed to curb emissions. As \ Martin Weitzman pointed out years ago, quantity controls may be superior to price controls depending on the market characteristics unknown to the government and the responsiveness of supply and demand to price changes. Using this basic analysis, a regulation accompanied by tradable permits is superior to a carbon tax if unknown demand is less responsive to prices than supply. Second, governments are unwilling to adjust tax rates in the face of changing technologies that reduce carbon content in products, given their reliance on the revenues. As noted in past literature, sin taxes on alcohol and tobacco reduce consumption, but governments have also set tax rates to maximize their revenue rather than more effectively curb consumption. The same will happen with carbon taxes where revenue-raising objectives will compromise environmental policy. For this reason, I believe regulations with tradable permits would be better since governments do not get a slice of the pie and will focus more on environmental concerns. So far, I have seen little analysis comparing which policy is more effective in achieving environmental objectives, but I would bet my bottom tax dollar that tradable permits are far better, even with imperfect monitoring.

( ) Only permit schemes create international linkages – this best capture global solvency. Clausen & Greenwald ‘7 (Eileen Claussen is president of the Pew Center on Global Climate
Change. Judith Greenwald is director of innovative solutions at the Pew Center. Miami Herald -- July 12 -http://www.pewclimate.org/press_room/opinion_editorials/oped_miamih07122007) Both a carbon tax and a cap-and trade system would use economic incentives to drive emission reductions. Cap-andtrade, however, has some important advantages. It's more flexible for one, allowing you to link your system to other cap-and-trade systems around the world. In today's global economy, where companies operate in multiple countries at once, this kind of system has obvious advantages. Cap-and-trade also allows the ''banking'' of emission allowances - reducing emissions early and using the saved emission allowances for later.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

A/T “Carbon Tax CP”
( ) Carbon Tax does not increase innovation – only permits create new environmental technology to solve warming. Caston ‘8 (Sean, President & CEO of Recycled Energy Development, a company dedicated to the
profitable reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Gristmill – March 28th -http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2008/3/26/163543/055) To understand why, we need only go back to my simple test of any climate policy proposal: the degree to which it encourages investment in capital that lowers atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. Cap-and-trade and carbon taxes do not pass the test equally. A carbon tax provides no direct revenue to carbon reducers
Suppose you're me. You've got investors who want you to invest in projects that reduce GHG emissions. They also want to invest their money as rapidly as possible, and to earn as much money as possible from those investments. All of that makes them very keen to figure out how different carbon policies affect their investment thesis. You now find yourself in a board meeting, trying to explain to them how you will realize financial value from a carbon tax, given your expertise identifying and building projects that reduce GHG emissions. Let's walk through your conversation: Q: Will your projects get paid for their beneficial GHG impacts? A: No. The tax gets charged to emitters. Since my projects don't emit carbon, I don't have to pay the tax. But I don't get any of the revenue. Q: That still gives you a cost advantage relative to your competition, right? A: Not precisely. In the long run, the tax could increase the cost of electricity as produced by more carbon-intensive suppliers. Q: "Long run"? "Could"? A: Yes. Utility costs don't immediately translate into higher rates. First they have to go through rate cases, and there is a time lag between when their cost structure goes up, when they file for a new rate case, and when that rate case gets approved. Q: But you can at least assume it will have a demonstrable impact on the competing price of power, right? A: Not really. I don't know how the rate case will apportion rates across different rate classes, so I don't know whether my customers will be affected in a predictable way by the carbon tax. It is possible that they will simply impose those costs on other rate payers. There is also a move afoot in the environmental community that would prohibit utilities passing the costs of greenhouse-gas abatement along to their rate payers; in that case, the impact of the tax would be to lower the profit margins of regulated utilities, but it would not have any impact on the competing price of electricity. Q: But surely you can structure power contracts with your hosts such that they give you some upside from the resulting carbon tax, should it come, right? A: Maybe, but that's a hard commercial sell. Would you pay me money today on a gamble about the direction that Congress will take on tax treatment for carried interests to private equity funds? Probably not -- and for the same reasons, it's unlikely that my customers would give me upside on a tax bet. Q: So what value should we place on carbon reductions for your projects, given this carbon tax? A: Zero.

This (Socratically) is the crux of the problem with carbon taxes. It is a stick upon the emitter, without any direct carrot for the reducer. And the financial value to the reducer is therefore only realized depending upon the manner in which the emitter's prices change -- but this is far from precise. (Witness all the manufacturers whose profits get squeezed when fuel costs rise because they have no direct way to pass those costs along to consumers.) By contrast, a system that allows emitters and reducers to trade allows for direct financial benefits to those who do the right thing -- and a benefit that can be negotiated, built into contracts, and used to affect investment decisions.

( ) Carbon Tax places economics over the environment without really being a better option for the economy . Only permits ensure less emission. Williams-Derry ‘7 (Clark Williams-Derry is research director of Sightline Institute, a research and
communications center based in Seattle that tracks long-term trends in environmental and social wellbeing – Gristmill – December 6th -http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2007/12/5/102441/300)
Just so, a tax gives a better guarantee of price stability than cap-and-trade. There's no chance of a carbon "price shock" with a tax, nor of a collapse in carbon prices (as happened in the early stages of the European emissions trading system). And businesses love predictability -without it, it's hard to plan investments. A cap-and-trade system has to be designed very carefully in order to reduce the chance of wild price swings -- something that a tax does by design. But what I don't like about this op-ed is that it seems to elevate the principle of price stability over effective climate protection. For example, the authors stress the difficulty of setting the initial emissions limits right in a cap-and-trade system -- particularly, that an emissions limit that's too high or too low may send inconsistent price signals at the outset of the program. That's fair enough, I suppose. But how is that any more worrisome than a system that sends consistent price

signals, if it turns out later that those price signals were too low to be effective? It seems that the much greater risk, over the long haul, is a carbon tax that's never quite high enough to get the emissions reductions we need. And that's where cap-and-trade really shines -- if done properly, it works like a self-adjusting tax, with the level of the tax always pitched just high enough to guarantee the next incremental emissions reduction. And if implemented through an
upstream system with frequent and full auctioning of emissions allowances, a cap shouldn't be all that different from a carbon tax. I'm willing to be proven wrong here. But it seems every bit as difficult to get the tax level right -- and keep it right -- as it is to get the

initial emissions limit right. If we get the taxes too low, we'll need to continually generate the political will needed to adjust the tax rate upwards. And by the time that happens. North Americans may have emitted literally billions of tons of additional CO2.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

A/T “Carbon Tax CP”
( ) Permits solve for the environment best – taxes causes people to keep consuming carbon and simply pay more. Mintz ‘6 (Jack Mintz is a professor in Business Economics and director of the
International Tax Program at the Rotman School of Management. Alternatives Journal 32:3 -http://www.alternativesjournal.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=232)

The argument for a carbon tax yielding a green dividend is that consumers will avoid purchasing higher taxed products with greater carbon content. However, the tax approach may achieve little in the way of environmental objectives. The demand for such products as gasoline and heating fuel is less sensitive to price, since the tax also falls on necessary, almost essential, services such as heating and transportation. The carbon tax is also a highly inflexible tool since it cannot be easily adjusted for changing emission levels. Further, governments become reliant on the revenue and are less willing to adjust the tax rates downward when emissions decline. For these reasons, some experts have argued regulations that limit emissions, including tradable permit regimes, can be more effective and more flexible.

( ) Permits provide environmental certainty – carbon tax does not Clausen & Greenwald ‘7 (Eileen Claussen is president of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change.
Judith Greenwald is director of innovative solutions at the Pew Center. Miami Herald -- July 12 -http://www.pewclimate.org/press_room/opinion_editorials/oped_miamih07122007) But the key difference between a carbon tax and the cap-and-trade approach comes down to the issue of certainty. A tax provides for cost certainty; the cost is fixed because of the tax. Cap and trade, on the other hand, provides for environmental certainty. What's fixed is the cap itself -- and it is based on an assessment of the level of emissions you need to get to in order to protect the climate

( ) Carbon Tax is not easier to administer, and the EU proves that tradable permits are a better option. Clausen & Greenwald ‘7 (Eileen Claussen is president of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change. Judith
Greenwald is director of innovative solutions at the Pew Center. Miami Herald -- July 12 -http://www.pewclimate.org/press_room/opinion_editorials/oped_miamih07122007)

As Congress moves closer to enacting a ''cap-and-trade'' program aimed at limiting U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, a number of commentators are touting a carbon tax as a preferable policy. Their key arguments in support of such a tax: 1) it would be simpler; and 2) the European Union has tried the cap-and-trade approach, and it has failed. Both arguments are wrong.
Under a cap-and-trade program, the government sets an overall emissions cap and issues tradable allowances that grant businesses the right to emit a set amount. Those who can reduce their emissions more cheaply are able to sell extra allowances to others who would otherwise have to pay more to comply. Because of this market-based approach, a cap-and-trade system helps assure that you can achieve your

overall cap at the lowest possible cost. Cap-and-trade is the basis of the U.S. effort to control acid rain pollution, which has achieved greater reductions at lower costs than anyone anticipated. Under a carbon tax, emitters are required to pay a tax for every ton of pollution they emit. Neither system is inherently more complex than the other. Both require monitoring and enforcement -- to determine taxable emissions and to
guarantee payment in the case of a tax, or to ensure that allowances match overall emissions in the case of cap-and-trade. Both approaches also must address the question of how to distribute costs and benefits. For cap-and-trade, that means figuring out how to distribute and/or auction emission allowances; under a tax, it means figuring out who pays and what to do with the revenue.

Yes, under a cap-and-trade program, exemptions and special treatment are possible, and even likely. But the same goes for a tax. Only someone who has never filled out a tax form or helped write a tax bill could expect a tax to be simpler than cap-and-trade. As for the cap-and-trade system in Europe, it is actually a major success. The system covers more than 10,000 sources and has spawned a robust emissions trading market with millions of transactions per month.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

A/T “States CP”
( ) Even if initially uniform, a state-lead permit regime would always scare businesses and would solve worse because federal permits create a far larger market for innovation Litz ‘8 (Franz T. Litz, Esq. Senior Fellow -- WORLD RESOURCE INSTITUTE -- TOWARD A
CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES IN U.S.CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY – June -- http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf.) The greater reliance on federal control in all areas would maximize the uniformity of policies across all states, and create a predictable business environment. For those programs that are most effectively implemented on a national level—like a cap-and-trade program—the overall cost of the programs will be minimized, allowing for more significant reductions overall. A few potential policies are outlined below before a discussion of the benefits and challenges of the Heavy Federal Role Approach. National Cap-and-Trade Program. In general, a cap-and-trade program presents the classic example of a policy measure that is more effectively deployed at a national level than at the state or regional level. This is true because the more sources covered by a cap, the greater the possibility for inexpensive reductions across the system as a whole, and in turn, the greater the overall reduction practically achievable. Larger cap-and- trade programs also send more robust market signals to investors who seek larger markets for new technologies to address GHG emissions. A federal program also tends to level the playing field for sources as compared to state or regional emissions trading regimes.

( ) Federal action is key to US environmental leadership – States are already in favor of climate action, but the US image will struggle until Bush changes course. Deutsch ‘8 (Klaus Deutsch is an economist at Deutsche Bank Research -- Cap and Trade in America
– May 5th -- http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DEPROD/PROD0000000000224857.pdf.) On the diplomatic side, the Bush Administration had a difficult time with the Europeans in particular. President Bush has been staunchly opposed to a major carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system for GHGs from the beginning. In 2001, he
rejected the Kyoto approach to climate change in particular and announced a withdrawal of the US from its commitment to reduce US GHG emissions by 7% in the period 2008-2012 as compared to 1990. In 2006, President Bush launched the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate with Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea instead. A number of bilateral partnerships with other countries are also of importance. Moreover, some significant cap-and-trade action occurred in 2007 under the Montreal protocol for hydrochloro fluorocarbons (HCFCs). In global climate diplomacy, the US gradually changed course only during 2007 and in the face of major international pressure both in the G8 and the UN frameworks. At the G8 summit at Heiligendamm on June 7, 2007, Bush conceded the US would fully participate in the UN process to formulate by 2009 a binding agreement to follow on from the Kyoto Protocol that expires in 2012 and agreed to the phrase: “In setting a global goal for emissions reductions in the process we have agreed-together with all major emitters-to consider seriously the decisions made by the European Union, Canada and Japan which include at least a halving of global emissions by 2050”. However, the White House made clear afterwards that the US would not consider such a strong reduction feasible. After the Heiligendamm summit, President Bush invited govern- ments of major emitting countries to two “Major Economies Meetings” designed to encourage those governments to commit themselves to more stringent GHG mitigation policies. 19 A third was held in Paris April 1718. The US even accepted the Bali com- promise of the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC which entails a commitment on the part of the industrial countries to reduce emissions until 2020 in accordance with Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommendations 20 , even though President Bush publicly stated afterwards that the approach would yield risks for the US economy. However, he also stated that the US prefers sealing an agreement at the 15th Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, Denmark in December, 2009. Criticism. This mix of federal policies scattered across dozens of programmes mostly of an energy-policy nature on the one hand and

misgivings about climate diplomacy on the other did not fully reflect governance desires and policy objectives on climate change as proposed by the states, communities and environmental NGOs in the US. In fact, as Schreurs and others have noted, federal environmental policy lost its national and international leadership roles of the 1970s and 1980s roughly by 1990 after the signing of the Montreal Protocol because domestic political conflict prevented comprehensive action both at home and in diplomacy. President Bush’s climate policy has elicited much criticism of a lack of ambition. The current political situation is, however, ambiguous as Congress has shifted gear again and has tackled climate change in a comprehensive draft bill at Committee level so far. If legislation were to come about, domestic federal leadership would be resurrected and international action would probably follow suit as well.


SDI 2008 Lieberman-Warner Aff

Opening Packet

A/T “States CP”
( ) International Permits Schemes a) Federal action is crucial to create these global linkages Litz ‘8 (Franz T. Litz, Esq. Senior Fellow -- WORLD RESOURCE INSTITUTE -- TOWARD A
CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES IN U.S.CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY – June -http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf.) In the United States to date, states have taken most of the significant actions to address climate change. Yet enactment of a nationwide program requiring reductions across the entire United States is both necessary and increasingly likely. This prospect raises a number of questions as to the appropriate division of responsibilities between state and federal governments across the many areas where climate change action is needed. The key question is not whether
responsibility for climate change action should rest exclusively with the federal government or the states, but rather how and to what degree the federal government and the states should share responsibility for tackling the problem. A number of arguments exist to support state-level action on climate change. States have historically played a role as effective first-movers on important environmental issues, functioning as policy innovators, testing policies that have later been adopted at the federal level. States also bring an understanding of the unique circumstances within their boundaries and a familiarity with their stakeholders. States drive federal action, sometimes insisting that policies be strengthened even after the federal government has acted.

There are also numerous arguments in favor of a strong federal role in climate policy. A federal program would bring every state into the climate change effort and tend to level the playing field for businesses in all 50 states. Federal action offers a platform for engaging with other nations in forging an international emissions reduction agreement. A national GHG cap-and-trade program would keep costs manageable and drive climate- friendly technological innovation, and could link with other markets around the world.

b) Truly international permit schemes are necessary to maximize solvency Baron & Bygrave ‘2 (Richard Baron, International Energy Agency and Stephen Bygrave,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development -- Towards International Emissions Trading: Design implications for Linkages -http://www.iea.org/textbase/papers/2002/linkages.pdf.) A number of national and international emissions trading schemes have emerged since the adoption of the Protocol. However, Parties with domestic trading systems, if acting in isolation, would see more limited efficiency gains than those that might be delivered through international emission trading. An international price would not emerge as rapidly, and would not reflect the actual marginal cost of abatement for all sources involved. Furthermore, the more sources that compete for transactions on the international market, the less likely the market will be prone to price manipulations, price volatility and resultant increases in compliance costs. It is therefore useful to assess how the international trading regime could grow from a set of domestic trading systems into an international architecture. This architecture alone does not preclude, but neither does it guarantee, the emergence of an efficient emission trading system at international level under the Kyoto Protocol.


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