Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta Facts: On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta

when he was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Issues: 1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void 2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous. Held: 1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled in favor of the statute. 2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. Vehicular Traffic is not defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc. Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

T O P I C : C H A P T E R V S U B J E C T S O F C O N S T R U C T I O N D. ORDINANCES T I T L E : J U A N A U G U S T O B . P R I M I C I A S v s . T H E M U N I C I P A L I T Y O F URDANETA,PANGASINAN, ET AL.(93 SCRA 462, G.R. No. L-26702 18 OCTOBER 1979) FACTS:A criminal complaint was filed against plaintiff Primiscias for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 after being apprehended by a member of the Municipal Police for overtaking a truck. Primiscias thereafter filed for the annulment of the subject ordinance with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction to restrain defendants from enforcing the said ordinance. The Court of First Instance rendered Ordinance No. 3,S-1964 as null and void, and repealed by RA 4136 also known asthe Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Appellant appealed the decision. ISSUE:Whether or not Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 enacted by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is null and void. HELD:Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that subject ordinance has been repealed by the enactment of RA 4316 and has therefor, become null and void stating that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The Supreme Court further averred that local ordinances, in this case, a municipal ordinance, are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state and whenever there is conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must

give way.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Arroyo v De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.
Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious; Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

In view of what is essential Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED. First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'" Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative

body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".

In view of House Rules No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in. Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.

In view of grave abuse Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.) With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just.

Alejo Mabanag vs Lopez Vito

Facts: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress. HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No

discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. **Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito

FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto. The petitioners contend that their vote were not taken into consideration in requiring that in amending the constitution, the law requires 3/4 of the votes of the member of the Congress thus arriving in the question of constitutionality of the said resolution. ISSUES: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction and whether or not the journals can be investigated against the conclusiveness of the enrolled bills. HELD: Petition is dismissed without cost. The Court held that to go behind the enrolled bills which were already authenticated and to investigate the journals amounts to disregard of the respect due to the coequal and independent department of the state, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to confusion in the administration of the law. Duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts and the due enactment thereof

Case Digest, People vs. Purisima, No. L -47757-61, January

FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and separately, before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed before them an order to quash or dismiss the informations on a common ground Lack of essential elements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to constitute the said offense, two elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the intent of the accused are irrelevant since its is a statutory offense and punishing the possession of such deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners also argued that the preamble is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the law itself. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct? HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9 also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Purisima

GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978 FACTS OF THE CASE: There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law. Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

ISSUES OF THE CASE: Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.

HELD: COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON: The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents. DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis. In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000i[1] (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.ii[2] Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.iii[3] In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols.iv[4] The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary.v[5] Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.vi[6] Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.vii[7] The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows: xxx 2. PURPOSE: The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national security. 3. SITUATION:

Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel. 4. MISSION: The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are welltrained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel. 5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS: a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP. b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of highprofile crimes perpetrated by organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and police to work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to the people and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality. c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force TULUNGAN shall be organized to provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing the security situation. xxx.viii[8] The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport.ix[9]

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that: I THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT: A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION; B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION; C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT. II IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.x[10] Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement. Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution,xi[11] dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor General to file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment. The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether or not the calling

of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP. The petition has no merit. First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.xii[12] The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.xiii[13] The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.xiv[14] The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.xv[15] In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-

stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.xvi[16] In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.xvii[17] Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.xviii[18] In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as

stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment.xix[19] The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court. As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties formulation of the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general welfare.xx[20] For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus: More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security. xxxxxi[21] Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result.

We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary because it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable. As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.xxii[22] It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution. As Taada v. Cuencoxxiii[23] puts it, political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,xxiv[24] [p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question. The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that (T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.xxv[25] Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.xxvi[26] Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.xxvii[27] When political questions are involved, the

Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.xxviii[28] By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.xxix[29] Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.xxx[30] A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.xxxi[31] When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Courts duty of purposeful hesitationxxxii[32] before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

xxx The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus: xxx Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.xxxiii[33] That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its

letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit: FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence. When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody. xxx FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence: The President may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger. MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the First Sentence: The President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea? MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.xxxiv[34] The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court. Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the

President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers. If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court. The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila...xxxv[35] We do not doubt the veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force. Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Section 3, Article IIxxxvi[36] of the Constitution. We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.xxxvii[37] Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures.xxxviii[38] It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.xxxix[39] It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers.xl[40] In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.xli[41] In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain traditionally civil functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,

some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of cooperation, are:

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary; COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential Consultant on Council of Economic Advisers/Economic Affairs; ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on Political Affairs; VERONICA IGNACIO-JONES, as Presidential Assistant/ Appointment Secretary (In charge of appointments), respondents. DECISION GONZAGA-REYES, J.: In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations. In addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Finally, petitioner prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain matters. On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity as Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The rest of the respondents, who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor General, filed their Comment with this Court on March 7, 2000. Petitioner then filed a Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereupon this case was considered submitted for decision. I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.[1] Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.[2] Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the Constitution the amendment of the fundamental charter.[3]

It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot and academic. We agree. An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead.[4] Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999.[5] However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which extended the time frame for the completion of the commissions work, viz SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows: Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and complete the same on or before 31 December 1999. The Commission shall submit its report and recommendations to the President within fifteen (15) working days from 31 December 1999. The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it.[6] Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison detre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve. The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such.[7] Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.[8] At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power. In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing constitutes another obstacle to the successful invocation of judicial power insofar as the PCCR is concerned. The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[9] In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.[10] A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[11] In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,[12] we denied standing to petitioners who were assailing a lease agreement between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation, stating that, in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was denied to a petitioner who sought to declare a form of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid because, as the Court held,

Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim that his rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been directly and personally injured by the operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the present petitioners. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under Rule 3, d 2. Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.[13], Thus payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.[14] This was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP) and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of section 92 of B.P. No. 881 (otherwise knows as the Omnibus Election Code) requiring radio and television stations to give free air time to the Commission on Elections during the campaign period.[15] The Court held that petitioner TELEBAP did not have any interest as a taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the taxing or spending power of Congress.[16] Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to taxpayers upon whether or not the case involved a disbursement of public funds by the legislature. In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,[17] the petitioners therein were allowed to bring a taxpayers suit to question several presidential decrees promulgated by then President Marcos in his legislative capacity calling for a national referendum, with the Court explaining that ...[i]t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential Decrees are of such nature may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of

such funds. The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries an appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. In still another case, the Court held that petitioners the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization - had standing as taxpayers to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as it provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leaves to Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of Congress.[18] And in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,[19] the Court allowed petitioner to maintain a taxpayers suit assailing the constitutional soundness of Republic Act No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the construction, repair and improvement of feeder roads within private property. All these cases involved the disbursement of public funds by means of a law. Meanwhile, in Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron,[20] the Court declared that the trial court was wrong in allowing respondent Ravanzo to bring an action for injunction in his capacity as a taxpayer in order to question the legality of the contract of lease covering the public market entered into between the City of Dagupan and petitioner. The Court declared that Ravanzo did not possess the requisite standing to bring such taxpayers suit since [o]n its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the lease contract entered into between petitioner and the City shows that no public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market building. Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. The relevant provision states Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for the operational expenses of the Commission to be sourced from funds of the Office of the President, subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Additional amounts shall be released to the Commission upon submission of requirements for expenditures. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no an appropriation at all. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. [21] The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of article VI of the Constitution.

In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayers suit.[22] In the case at bar, there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[23] In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit.[24] Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation. II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential consultants. Petitioner alleges that in 1995 and 1996, the President created seventy (70) positions in the Office of the President and appointed to said positions twenty (20) presidential consultants, twenty-two (22) presidential advisers, and twenty-eight (28) presidential assistants.[25] Petitioner asserts that, as in the case of the PCCR, the President does not have the power to create these positions.[26] Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue before the Court. First of all, he has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment of such presidential advisers. Secondly, petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue. Unlike the PCCR which was created by virtue of an executive order, petitioner does not allege by what official act, whether it be by means of an executive order, administrative order, memorandum order, or otherwise, the President attempted to create the positions of presidential advisers, consultants and assistants. Thus, it is unclear what act of the President petitioner is assailing. In support of his allegation, petitioner merely annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex C) listing the names and positions of such presidential consultants, advisers and assistants to his petition. However, appointment is obviously not synonymous with creation. It would be improvident for this Court to entertain this issue given the insufficient nature of the allegations in the Petition. III. Right to Information Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora to answer his letter (Annex D) dated October 4, 1999 requesting for the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang.[27] The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which provides that The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by

law. Under both the 1973[28] and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts. This was our ruling in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[29] wherein the Court classified the right to information as a public right and when a [m]andamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. However, Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which took effect on March 25, 1989. This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.[30] Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v. Dimaano[31] that [t]he incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decisionmaking if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning matters of public concern, a term which embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.[32] Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioners letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property. With regard to petitioners request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business.[33] WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested. SO ORDERED.

ii JUAN BAUTISTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG, RIZAL, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

DECISION REYES, J. B. L., J.: Appeal by Plaintiff Juan Bautista from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing his petition in civil case No. 1649. It appears that on February 19, 1952, Plaintiff Bautista filed in the court below against the Municipal Council and Mayor of the municipality of Mandaluyong, province of Rizal, the following petition:
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COMES NOW Petitioner, by and through his undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court, most respectively alleges:
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1. That Petitioner is of legal age and residing at 1067 Int. 1, Dart, Paco, Manila, and that Respondents are the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal and Bonifacio Javier, Mayor of the said municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, where they may both be served with summons; 2. That Petitioner is engaged in guard and watchman business, duly licensed and doing business under the firm name Allied Investigation Bureau, the principal office of which is at Manila, Philippines; 3. That on September 22, 1946, the Respondent Municipal Council of the municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, passed and promulgated Ordinance No. 13, series of 1946, hereto attached as Annex A and made an integral part hereof; 4. That a portion of section 3 of the said ordinance is as follows:
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PROVIDED HOWEVER, only one Special Watchmens Agency shall be granted the exclusive privilege or right to conduct a special watchmans agency within the territorial limits of this municipality subject to the power of the Municipal Mayor to revoke their license in view of the reasons provided elsewhere in this Ordinance. 5. That said ordinance was approved by Respondent Bonifacio Javier, as Mayor of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal; 6. That the aforementioned ordinance is invalid, being in violation of the law; 7. That Petitioner, being engaged and duly licensed in the guard and watchmen business, has contracted to guard and has in fact guards assigned to watch the Wack Wack Golf and County Club at Mandaluyong, Rizal; 8. That his rights as one engaged in Guard and watchmens business are affected by the ordinance aforesaid. WHEREFORE, it is most respectively prayed of this Honorable Court, that judgment be rendered declaring the Municipal Ordinance No. 13, series of 1946 of the municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 22, 1946, null and void, it being violative of the law. (Rec. App., pp. 1-3.) The Defendants, represented by the provincial fiscal, moved on March 14, 1952 for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of lack of a cause of action, or for a bill of particulars for failure of the petition to specify which particular law was allegedly violated by the ordinance in question. The said motion was set for hearing on March 19, 1952. On March 17, Plaintiffs counsel filed a written motion to postpone the hearing of Defendants motion to dismiss or for a bill of particulars, because he was to appear in a registration proceeding in Pampanga on the same date. The Court, however, denied the motion for postponement in its order of March 19, 1952 and, at the same time, granted Defendants motion to dismiss and ordered the dismissal of the petition. Plaintiff moved but failed to have the order of dismissal

reconsidered, so he appealed to this court. For some reason or another, the records were sent to the Court of Appeals, which forwarded the case to us for raising only questions of law. We find no merit in the appeal. In the first place, the motion was not made with the three days advance notice required by the rules (Rule 26), and the lower court had discretion to refuse to hear a motion on shorter notice. In the second place, motions for continuance are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we cannot consider the lower courts denial of Appellants motion to postpone an abuse of discretion, for as it correctly held, Appellant was represented by the law firm of Macapagal, Punzalan, and Yabut; so the absence of one attorney did not excuse the failure of another member of the law firm to appear at the date of the hearing. And even granting that Attorney Canilao was sole counsel for Appellant, he had no right to assume that his motion to postpone would be granted (specially on less than 3 days notice) and should have sent a representative at the hearing in his behalf to argue the merits of his motion for continuance, or else, he could have simply submitted a written answer or reply to the motion to dismiss, or even amended his petition.
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In the third place, Appellants petition was correctly dismissed by the Court below for failure to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The rule is that a person who questions the validity of a statute or law must show that he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as the result of its enforcement (Custodio vs. President of Senate, (42 Off. Gaz. 1243) November 7, 1945; Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn. vs. De la Fuente, (88 Phil., 60) January 11, 1951). Appellants petition does not show that his interests are, or about to be, adversely affected or prejudiced by the enforcement of the ordinance which he claims to be invalid. On the other hand, it appears that he still has a license to engage in the guard and watchman business, and there is no showing of any threat that his license would be revoked or cancelled.
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The order appealed from is affirmed, without prejudice to Appellants right to file another complaint alleging a sufficient cause of action. Costs against Appellant Juan Bautista. SO ORDERED.

iii

ivTAADA VS. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication; 2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. HELD:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. J. Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

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