01 Director of Lands vs CA & Abistado 02 Roxas vs CA 03 Republic vs Marasigan 04 Roxas vs Enriquez 05 Reoublic vs CA & Ribaya 06 Republic vs Register of Deeds

of Quezon 07 Director of Lands vs Medina 08 Esconde vs Barlongay 09 Director of Lands vs Agustin 10 Director of Lands LMB vs CA 11 Valisno vs Plan

2 7 13 18 33 40 45 50 55 56 62

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Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Actions in Rem; An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication; The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concernednay, the whole worldwho have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Official Gazette; The Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all; The allencompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
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G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997.* THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Appeals; Petition for Review; Where a party appeals a final disposition of the Court of Appeals, his remedy is a petition based on Rule 45, not Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. Same; Same; Land Registration; Publications; Absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court cannot validly confirm and register the title of the applicant.Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents. We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement. Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The word shall denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute; If mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative where the law includes such requirement in its detailed provision.The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD No. 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per

vacillation or equivocationthere is room only for application.Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence. Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued. The Facts On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirsMargarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistadorepresented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938. In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7 x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. E) in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit E was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits F and G). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:8 It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is
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PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Apollo T. Tria for private respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory? Statement of the Case The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:4 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of

jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm. Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dated November 19, 1991. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.9 The Issue Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion10 in holding x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication. Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and x x x in x x x a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process.11

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.12 In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:13 x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise:14 x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration. The Courts Ruling We find for petitioner. Newspaper Publication Mandatory The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows: Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc.The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. 1. By publication.

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Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. xxx xxx x x x

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents. We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement. The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty.18 He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concernednay, the whole worldwho have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose. It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting. Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.19 There is no alternative.
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Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur. Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), On leave. Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside. Application for land registration dismissed without prejudice. Notes.Publication should precede the date of initial hearing, and where the issue of the Official Gazette where the notice was published was released only after the initial hearing, the court did not properly acquire jurisdiction over the case. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 442 [1994]) The Supreme Court has consistently accepted the probative value of certifications of the Director of the National Printing Office in reconstitution casesand there is no reason for it to deviate from its earlier rulings and to require now the submission of Official Gazette issues to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 551 [1995]) o0o

Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 276(1997)]

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fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons. Same; Same.Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.

G.R. No. 118436. March 21, 1997.* HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS (in substitution of original petitioner), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Actions; Courts; Land Registration; Fraud; The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law [Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529] as valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration.Registra-tion of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended and codified laws relative to registration of property. Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party. Absence, minority or other disability of any person affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree, that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. Words and Phrases; Actual Fraud; Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive

Land Registration; Fraud; The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened and reviewed.The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened and reviewed. In the oft-cited Macabingkil v. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation case, the Court drew from American jurisprudence stating that relief has been granted on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, (and) that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court. The fraud contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional omission of fact required by law. For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration. Same; Same; Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.In Ramirez v. CA, this Court adopted the Court of Appeals ruling that the suppression of the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield merely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.

PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

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Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioners. Briccio P. Contreras for private respondent. ROMERO, J.:

Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her heirs,1 instituted this petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, (CA G.R. CV No. 38328), alleging reversible error committed by respondent appellate court when it affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The issue presented before us is whether or not private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining a decree of registration over two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a decree of registration. The facts of the case are narrated below: On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an area of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively. The original registration case was docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, presided over by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990. Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun Corporations application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings. Publication was made in the Official Gazette

and the Record Newsweekly.2 After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority reported, among other things, that the subject parcels of land had previously been applied for registration in Land Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the Court of First Instance of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been rendered thereon.3 Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporations application for registration (Land Registration Case No. TG-373) in a three-page decision with the following dispositive portion:4 WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for registration of said lands described in plan As-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one with an area of 3,641 and the other with an area of 10,674 square meters, as supported and shown by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the records, in the name of Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, with office address at 521 Edsa, Quezon City, free from all liens and encumbrances and from any other adverse claims of any kind and nature. Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso facto becomes executory, upon which eventuality the corresponding decree of registration may thus be issued. SO ORDERED. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991, after the aforementioned Decision in LRC No. TG373 became final5 but not before it ordered, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case No. 500 (GLRO Record No. 55072) applied for by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed. It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporations name. Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, who died on April 15, 1946 and that her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and
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uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they applied for its registration under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed a number of irregularities in the documents to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, she claimed that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the Land Registration Authority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As a result, an order of general default was issued and Maguesun Corporations application for registration was granted. She charged Maguesun Corporation with knowledge or authorship of the fraud owing to the fact that Maguesun Corporations president, Manolita Guevarra Suntay after whom the corporation was named, was her niece. Manolita Suntay is the daughter of Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who used to help with the latters business affairs. Manolita Suntay used to take care of the registration and insurance of the latters cars.6 The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-trial, was whether or not Vda. de Roxas signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of Zenaida Melliza were forged.7 Petitioner, who was then already 92 years of age, testified in open court on February 11, 1992 that she has never met Zenaida Melliza, that she did not sell the subject lots and that her signatures on the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were forged.8 A document examiner from the Philippine National Police (PNP) concluded that there was no forgery.9 Upon petitioners motion, the signatures were reexamined by another expert from the National Bureau of Investigation. The latter testified that the signatures on the questioned and sample documents were not written by the same person.10 Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial court dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration on April 15, 1992.11 Placing greater weight on the findings and testimony of the PNP document examiner, it concluded that the questioned documents were not forged and if they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation, who was responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud. The court further noted that petitioner Mrs. Trinidad Roxas had not been paying taxes for several years, which fact exhibited what appeared to be unmistakeable signs of not actually owning (the lots) any more, and that her application for registration was previously dismissed and abandoned, thus

indicating that petitioner herself is aware that she had already lost x x x interest, if not actually her rights, over the property in question.12 In a decision dated December 8, 1994,13 respondent court denied the petition for review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annulling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Additionally, respondent court stated that the discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve matters that are too trivial, requiring knowledge of the intricacies of the law and are not necessarily and exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faithespecially when considered in the light of circumstances hereinafter discussed. The records also show, according to the appellate court, that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the existence of petitioner or any interest she may have had in the registration proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that publication of the initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.14 Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporations good faith. Petitioners pray that the registration of the subject lots in the name of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said property be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and that respondent corporation pay moral damages not less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages not less than P36,000.00 and attorneys fees of P60,000.00. We find the petition for review impressed with merit. 1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended and codified laws relative to registration of property.15 Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party.16 Absence, minority or other disability of any person affected, or any proceeding
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in court for reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration.17 It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree, that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.18 Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.19 Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interest and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.20 Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy.21 Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.22 The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened and reviewed.23 In the oft-cited Macabingkil v. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation case, the Court drew from American jurisprudence stating that relief has been granted on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, (and) that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court.24 The fraud contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional omission of fact required by law.25 For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.26 Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.

In Ramirez v. CA,27 this Court adopted the Court of Appeals ruling that the suppression of the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield merely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud.28 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.29 The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner. Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property. In the corporations application for registration filed with the trial court in LRC No. TG-373, the following declaration appears: 6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors, encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown on the plan as claimants are as follows: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.).30 The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of the word provincial typed over correction fluid. Maguesun Corporation, however, annexed a differently-worded application for the petition to review case (Civil Case No. TG-1183, Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, et al.). In the copy submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same number is as follows: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas31. The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word Roxas were indeed erased and replaced with Pro-vincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.) in the original application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but
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the copy with the word Roxas was submitted to the trial court in Civil Case No. TG-1183, it is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking that Roxas was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner, encum-brancer, occupant or claimant, the same application which formed the basis for the Land Registration Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the extent of the search made to find them. Respondent corporation likewise failed to comply with this requirement of law. The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez.32 Respondent Maguesun Corporation also declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject property. Respondent corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge of such possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas owned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants could have been made facilely. Respondent corporations intentional concealment and representation of peti-tioners interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration. Through such misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving their property, thus effectively depriving them of their day in court. 2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas or any interest she may have in the registration proceedings for the records are replete with references by Maguesun Corporation itself to petitioner.33 Mention of the late Presidents name as well as that of petitioner was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for respondent corporation, in a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax declarations and as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the application for registration. Disclosure of petitioners adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for registration,

otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims. 3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette and in the Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general circulation. The Court of Appeals held that pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. x x x While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due process and aimed at giving as wide publicity as possible so that all persons having an adverse interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified thereof.34 Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicants right or title to the land. 4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as well as in the testimonial evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to this case, compelled the Court to undertake a careful review of the facts of the case.35 A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporations direct participation in the execution and preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the innocent purchaser for value who merits the protection of the law. In response to the questions fielded by the trial court and by counsel for petitioner, PNP Document Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all the differences pointed out in the questioned signatures and in the sample signatures as having been caused merely by natural variation.36 He concluded that the questioned signatures were not forged. In contrast, Chief of the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, Arcadio Ramos, testified with more specificity as befits an expert that the questioned and sample signatures were not written by one and the same
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person because of (t)he manner of execution of strokes; the personalized proportional characteristics of letters; the link-ing/connecting between letters; the structural pattern of letters and other minute details x x x.37 Moreover, petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas categorically declared that she has never met Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the subject property.38 Petitioner, then over ninety years old, has no motive to attest to a falsehood. Petitioner and her family also own several other pieces of property, some of which are leased out as restaurants, e.g. Leos Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant.39 This is an indication that petitioner is not unaware of the value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that she would sell over thirteen thousand square meters of prime property in Tagaytay City to a stranger for a measly P200,000.00. Finally, even to a laymans eye, the documents, as well as the enlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal forgery. The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of SelfAdjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several documents executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioners signatures, characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons. There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner.40 In it she declares that she is a resident of 22 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, when she actually lives in 2 Park Road, North Forbes Park, Makati. She also states that she is the sole heir of the late Manuel De Roxas who died sometime on the year 1944 at Manila. Petitioners husband is President Manuel A. Roxas and she refers to herself as Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas. President Roxas was survived by petitioner and their two children, Ma. Rosario Roxas and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased petitioner). The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the general public, as well as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have been ignored. If petitioner did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she should state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family. Additionally, Zenaida Mellizas non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence. Her given address was Matina, Davao City. How was she related to petitioner and what led her to purchase the subject property? Respondent corporation could very well have presented her to prove the legitimacy of their transaction. If petitioner were selling said property, would she not have offered them first to interested relatives such as Manolita G. Suntay? Would an

ordinary person sell more than thirteen thousand square meters of prime property for P170,000.00 when it was earlier purchased for P200,000.00? These questions highlight several implausibilities in the alleged sale of the subject property by herein petitioner. As Maguesun Corporations President who is related to petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay should have verified the sale of the subject property by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntays closeness to petitioner Vda. de Roxas, as one who even registered the latters car, suggests acquaintance with the late petitioners properties as well as the possibility that she took advantage of such knowledge. From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its possession to that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza conveyed no title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner thereof.41 Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled to the registration decree which the trial court granted in its decision. Palpably, petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subject lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper and sufficient for original registration over the two parcels of land in question pursuant to Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.42 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 (Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management & Development Corporation, et al.) promulgated on December 8, 1994 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of land, described in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and 10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and supported by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the Records of LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners. Upon finality of this Decision, the Land Registration Authority is hereby directed to ISSUE with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. SO ORDERED. Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Petition granted.
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Note.The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the free patents and titles. (Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162 [1995]) o0o

Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 309(1997)] G.R. No. 85515. June 6, 1991.* REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Land Registration; Reconstitution; Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that Section 13 has been at least impliedly amended by Section 23 in relation to Section 110 of P.D. 1529.Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered, modified or amended. Since the requirement therein of service of notice of the initial hearing to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land was not complied with in this case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66062. Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the Order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that said Section 13 has been at least impliedly amended by Section 23 in relation to Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect on 11 June 1978. Same; Same; Same; View that Section 13 of RA No. 26 appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 totally unfounded.We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529. There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to amend said Section 13. Same; Same; Same; Requirements of Section 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 mandatory and jurisdictional.In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., We ruled that the requirements of Section 12 and Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 are mandatory and jurisdictional and noncompliance therewith would render all proceedings utterly null and void.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 23 of PD No. 1529 never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting.This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the private respondent the duty to comply with the requirement of service of notice unacceptable.The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the private respondent the duty to comply with the requirement of service of notice because it was not through her fault that the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable since the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and private respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that mandatory requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which the Constitution directs public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We should stress here that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason or a justification for non-observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the first to obey the laws. PETITION for review by certiorari from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Melo, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for petitioner. J. Renato V. Leviste for private respondent. DAVIDE, JR., J.:
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This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision of 29 August 19881 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 2 and its Resolution of 18 October 19883 which, respectively, affirmed the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region, of 17 June 19874 granting the petition of private respondent for the reconstitution of the original and the owners duplicate copies of a transfer certificate of title despite lack of service of notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, and denied petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the Decision.5 The issue in this petition is whether notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land are mandatory and jurisdictional in judicial reconstitution of certificates of title. On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered owner of a parcel of land located in Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for the reconstitution of the original and duplicate copy (sic) of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the owners duplicate copy.6 She alleged therein that she is in possession of the title subject matter of the petition but she, however, did not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution. In its Order of 4 November 1986 the trial court set the petition for hearing and required its publication in the Official Gazette, which was done. Required notices, except to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, were given. Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of private respondents evidence was made by the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. Thereafter, on 17 June 1987, the trial court handed down an Order7 which made the following findings of facts: From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of the vendees of a certain parcel of land situated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 and registered in the name of Epifania Alcano (Exh. B) as evidenced by a document of sale executed by the registered owner (Exh. I). The original copy of said title

which was usually kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province was destroyed by reason of the fire which razed to the ground the entire Capitol Building then housing said office on August 12, 1977 (Exh. C). It appears further that there are no co-owners, mortgagees, lessees duplicate copy of said certificate of title which had been previously issued by the Register of Deeds of this province; that the petitioner is in actual possession of the area of 16,647 square meters which was sold to her and that she is benefitting from the produce of the improvements existing on the area belonging to her. and disquisition: Accordingly, finding the instant petition to be well-founded and there being no opposition to its approval, same is hereby granted. The Register of Deeds of this province is hereby directed to reconstitute the original and the owners duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the name of the registered owners (sic) thirty days after receipt of this Order by the Register of Deeds of this province and the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission, on the basis of the existing owners duplicate copy thereof. Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from said Order to the Court of Appeals and made the following assignment of errors: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE OWNERS DUPLICATE COPIES OF TCT NO. T-66062 WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SERVICE OF NOTICE OF HEARING TO THE ADJOINING OWNERS AND ACTUAL OCCUPANTS OF THE LAND AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION.8 The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163. In support of the first assigned error, petitioner maintained that the requirement of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as held in MWSS vs. Sison, et al., 124 SCRA 394. In its Decision of 29 August 19889 respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the arguments of petitioner and held that:
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1) Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which requires the sending out of notices to the adjoining owners and actual occupants to vest jurisdiction, appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 because it is inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which provides that in original registration cases publication of notices of initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. Section 110 of said Decree provides: SEC. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens Title. Original copies of certificates of title lost or destroyed in offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with this Decree. (emphasis supplied) 2) The MWSS vs. Sison case is not on all fours with the instant case for in the former both the original and the owners duplicate copies of the certificate of title were claimed to be lost, unlike in the instant case where the duplicate copy is intact; it was not shown that the original copy in the custody of the Register of Deeds was destroyed; the copies of the titles alleged to have been lost were later found intact in the names of other persons; and, more importantly, the Petition was not published in the Official Gazette but in the Manila Daily Bulletin, unlike in the instant case. 3) The duty to send notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants is imposed upon the court, not the party filing the petition for reconstitution (herein private respondent); any lapse in regard thereto should not prejudice or injure the latter. 4) Finally, in the instant case, the private respondent cannot be blamed for the loss of the original copy of the transfer certificate of title; it was lost by reason of the burning of the Capitol Building; she should not, therefore, be put to trouble, anxiety and expenses. Petitioners motion to reconsider the Decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 18 October 1988, petitioner filed the instant petition on 22 December 1988 alleging therein that: a. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law when it did not consider that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the instant petition for reconstitution of the original owners (sic) duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062 as there is no requisite service of notice of hearing to the adjoining

owners and actual occupants of the land as required by Section 13 of R.A. No. 26; b. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law in granting the petition for reconstitution of the original and duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062. In Our resolution of 16 January 1989,10 We required the respondents to comment on the petition. Private respondent filed her comment on 10 February 1989.11 She practically copied therein the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals. In Our resolution of 15 March 1989 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda, which petitioner complied with on 3 July 198912 and private respondent on 10 June 1989.13 The petition is impressed with merit. The questioned Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of Appeals, as well as the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro of 17 June 1987, must be set aside. Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered, modified or amended. Since the requirement therein of service of notice of the initial hearing to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land was not complied with in this case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66062. Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the Order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that said Section 13 has been at least impliedly amended by Section 23 in relation to Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect on 11 June 1978. In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,14 We ruled that the requirements of Section 12 and Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 reading as follows: SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3 (e) and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners
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mortgagees or lessees duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2 (f) or 3 (f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property. SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petition, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificates of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of the occupants or person in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objection to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court. are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render all proceedings utterly null and void. We reiterated this rule in Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.15 where, in respect

particularly to the required notice to an adjoining owner, We categorically declared: The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less) of Lot 2, as well as the failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality (sic) on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat, are fatal to the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court. In MWSS vs. Sison et al., supra., We further re-affirmed the foregoing doctrine: The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, the service of the notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land, as well as the posting of the notices in the main entrance of the provincial and municipal buildings where the property lies at least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing, as prescribed by Section 13 of the law, are mandatory and jurisdictional requisites. This re-affirmation is clear enough as to leave no room for any convoluted logic to support a sophistic distinction between said case and the instant case and an implausible interpretation of the law. We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529. There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as follows: x x x that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. and provides, inter alia, that:

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The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. As regards publication, it specifically provides: Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. x x x This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication. That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree, which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to or could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few copies only per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, owners of both unregistered and registered lands may someday painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because scheming parties had caused their registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and sold the property to third parties. The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the private respondent the duty to comply with the

requirement of service of notice because it was not through her fault that the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable since the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and private respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that mandatory requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which the Constitution directs public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We should stress here that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason or a justification for non-observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the first to obey the laws. IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition and SETTING ASIDE the Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 and the Order of Branch No. 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region in Petition No. 11,456. Costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED. Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur. Petition granted and decision and resolustion set aside. Note.Publication of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette at least 30 days before the hearing of a petition for reconstitution of title is a mandatory requirement that confers jurisdiction upon the court. Any defect in such publication deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear the petition. (Register of Deeds of Malabon vs. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 170, 181 SCRA 788.) o0o

Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Republic vs. Marasigan, 198 SCRA 219(1991)]
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4.ID.; ID,; ID.; PERSONAL NOTICE.Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, & proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state, or notice by name to those outside of it and not encounter any provision of the fundamental law of the land, Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Proceedings in the land court for the registration of land would be impossible were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the purpose of the proceeding is to bar all. 5.ID.; ID.; STATE CONTROL OVER PROPERTY.The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to land might be quieted "by notice by publication to all persons." Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the state had the power and right to provide a procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. The state has control over the real property within its limits. The conditions of ownership of real estate within the state, whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen, is subject to its rules, concerning the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the modes of establishing title thereto, and for the purpose of determining these questions, it (the state) may provide any reasonable rules or procedure. The state possesses not only the right to determine how title' to real estate may be acquired and proved, but it is also within its legislative capacity to establish the method of procedure. 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ADJUDICATION OF TITLE.The state, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown. 7.ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTITUTED SERVICE.If the state can provide for substituted service, for the purpose of quieting title to real estate against an unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable method for securing substituted service against residents. The power of the state to provide methods of quieting title to real estate should not be limited to known persons. In order to make such a law valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it be made to operate on all interests and all persons, known or unknown. If the procedure adopted for obtaining service does not satisfy the constitution, a judicial proceeding to clear title against all the world is hardly possible, for the very meaning of such proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well as known claimants. To deny this power of the state would be to deny its power to deal with titles to land and to quiet title thereto. The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable character of the requirement, having reference to the subject with which the constitution deals. 8.ID.; LAND COURT; EIGHT TO CORRECT ERRORS OF CLOSURE OF PLAN.The right of the land court to correct an error of closure, we believe is authorized and sustained by law, provided such correction does not include land not included in the original petition. 9.ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO CORRECT ERRORS IN ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE.Section 112 of Act No. 496 provides that the registered owner may, at any time, apply by petition to have corrected any "error, omission, or mistake made in entering a certificate, or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate." Under said provision the original certificate may be
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[No. 8539. December 24, 1914.] MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner and appellee, vs. RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ ET AL., objectors and appellants.
1.REGISTRATION OF LAND; NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS IN.The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding 'in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment, without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of the claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49.) 2.ID.; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE AND EFFECT.The real purpose of the Torrens Land Registration system is to relieve the land of the burden of known as well as unknown claims. If there exist known and just claims against the title of the applicant, for the registration of his land under the Torrens systems, he gains nothing in effect by his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent transfers of his title. The registration either relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come into court and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainty concerning either the character or the extent of such claims. 3.ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF APPLICATION.The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants." The great difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible unknown claimants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the transfer of title. Courts have held that in actions in rem, personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the res. It is admitted in the present case that the petitioner was not guilty of fraud. The record shows that she named all persons who might have any interest in the registration of her land. She is not charged even with negligence. She did all the law required her to do.

amended so as to include not only the land described in the original petition, but the buildings located thereon as well, which had also been included in the original petition.

Points or stations. A to B B to C C to D D to E E to F F to G G to H H to I I to J J to K K to A

Directions in degrees. S. 44 30' W S. 46 15' E S. 42 00' E S. 40 50' E N. 49 45' E N. 52 00'' E N. 37 10' W N. 35 45' W N. 50 30' E N. 35 00' W N. 42 05' W

Distances in meters. 31.08 16. 15 32. 75 13' 20 14 25 10.94 24.90 6.56 1.92 7.60 25.50

Boundaries. Calle Escolta. Heirs of Antonio Enriquez.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Land Registration, sitting in banc. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Southworth & Faison for appellants. D. R. Williams for appellee. JOHNSON, J.: It appears from the record that on the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system, four parcels of land, known as Parcel A, Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D, all of which were located in the city of Manila. The only one of said parcels to which attention need be given in the present appeal is Parcel A. From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described generally and technically. "I. General description.It is a parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River; bounded on the north by Calle Escolta for 31.08 meters, on the south by the Pasig River for 25.19 meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P. Roxas for 66.48 meters, and on the west by the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez for 62.10 meters; with an area of 1,817.03 square meters as set forth in the attached plan. "II. Technical description.The undersigned on the 26th of the present month proceeded to survey and fix the boundaries for preparing the topographical plan of a lot occupied by buildings of strong materials one and two stories high belonging to Maria del Consuelo Roxas y Chuidian, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84,90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River. The point marked on the plan with the letter 'X,' located at the vertex of the angle formed by the northeastern side of Calle Escolta and the corner of the Pasaje de Perez was selected as the basic point, whence S. 49 40' W., 27.75 meters is located Point A, chosen as the point of beginning for the topographical operations, the result whereof is as follows:

Pasig River.

Pedro P. Roxas. "The lot described has an area of 1,817 [Roxas vs. Enriquez., 29 Phil. 31(1914)]

"The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the points specified are marked on the attached plan, the bearings are magnetic, and its boundaries are: on the north, Calle Escolta; on the south, the Pasig River; on the east, the estate of Pedro P. Roxas; and on the west, the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez." The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and which accompanied the petition is as f ollows and is marked "Exhibit A.". By comparing the above technical description with the plan presented (Exhibit A), it will be noted that the line A-B in the technical description runs S. 44, 30' W., and that the distance between A and B was 31.08 meters, while in the 'plan line A-B runs S. 46, 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters. Attention is called to this difference between the technical description- and the plan at this time, but its importance to the questions presented will be discussed below. Attached to said petition was a number of documents presented as exhibits, showing the chain of title of the petitioner. We find that said petition contains a statement of the names of the adjoining owners of the land in question. The petition gives the names of said persons, as follows: "The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of the owners of the parcels of land conterminous with this estate are, according to my information:
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"The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives are the attorneys Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, 7 Anda, Intramuros, Manila, Pedro P. Roxas, 154 Malacaang, San Miguel." Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and the documents showing the chain of title of the petitioner, the matter was referred to the examiner of titles of the Court of Land Registration, who made a very careful examination of the title of the petitioner to the land in question, and on the 5th day of March, 1906, presented a very carefully prepared report, in which he sets out in detail the title of the petitioner to said Parcel A, as well as the other parcels, and recommends the registration of said Parcel A, as well as the others, in the name of the petitioner. Upon the issue thus presented we find that the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, on the 23d day of March, 1906, in accordance with the provisions of section 31 of Act No. 496, issued the f ollowing notice: "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, "PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

the three on Calle Malacaang, district of San Miguel; Francisco Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso Tiaoqui, Calle Lacoste No. 122, and Gervasia Rosario Ventura, Calle Dulumbayan No. 111, these three of the district of Santa Cruz; and Enrique Somes, Calle Alix No. 140, district of Sampaloc; all of the city of Manila, P. I., and to all whom it may concern: "Whereas an application has been presented to said court by Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, through her attorney in fact Antonio Bonifas, Calle Padre Herrera No. 59, district of Tondo, city of Manila, P. I., to register and confirm her title in the f ollowing described land: Four parcels of land with the improvements of strong materials thereon, situated in the district of Binondo, Manila, P. I., more particularly bounded and described as follows: "Parcel A.Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96, beginning at a pt. marked 'A' on plan, being S. 49 40' W., 27.75 m. from the W. end of the chaflan at the S. intersection of the Escolta and Pasaje de Perez; thence S. 46 30' W., 31.08 m. along the SE. line of the Escolta, to pt. 'B'; S. 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to pt. 'C'; S. 42 E., 32.75 m. to pt. 'D'; S. 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to pt 'E'; N. 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to pt. 'F'; N. 52 E., 10.94 m. to pt. 'G'; N. 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to pt. 'H'; N. 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. 'I'; N. 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to pt. 'J'; N. 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to pt. 'K'; N. 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to pt. 'L'; N. 40 05' W., 14 m. to pt. 'M'; N. 44 W., 15.35 m. to pt. of beg.; containing 1,817.03 sq. m. Lines from pt. 'E' to 'G' follow the NW. bank of the Pasig River. "Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; SE. by the Pasig River; SW. by property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez and NW. by the Escolta. "Date of survey, December 26, 1905.

" [Registration of title. Court of Land Registration. "Case No. 1895.]

"To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing, Nos. 84-88; A. Burke, No. 90; Messrs. Macke and Chandler and F. M. Sousa, these two No. 90 interior; Ramon Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno, No. 92; Rosendo Comas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No. 96; Luciano Cordoba, No. 28; Messrs. Salgado, Gordillo and Martinez, No. 32; Messrs. Greilsammer Bros., No. 36; and Messrs. Williams & Chandler, No. 34, upstairs; these on Calle Escolta; Antonio Vy Chuico, No. 226, and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario; Ang Seng Queng, Calle Nueva No. 149; and Candido Lim, Calle Jaboneros No. 113; all these of the district of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, attorneys of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, Calle Santo Tomas, corner of Calle Cabildo, district of Intramuros; Carmen Ayala de Roxas, No. 154; and Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, these two No. 330,

"You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land Registration to be held at the City Hall, Calzada de las Aguadas, city of Manila, P. I., on the 25th day of April, A. D. nineteen hundred and six, at 8 o'clock in the forenoon, to show cause, if any you have, why the prayer of said application shall not be granted; and unless you appear at such court at the time and place aforesaid your default will be recorded and the said application will be taken as confessed, and you will be forever barred from contesting said application or any decree entered thereon.

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"Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court, this 23d day of March in the year nineteen hundred and six. "Attest: A. K. JONES, "Clerk of said Court." In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of Land Registration, on the 28th day of March, 1906, sent a copy of said order to each of the persons mentioned therein, by registered mail. The record shows that each of said persons received a copy of said notice, including the representative of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The record further shows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of Manila, that said notice was posted upon the land in question. The record further shows that said notice had been published in two daily newspapers of the city of Manila, The Manila Times and La Democracia. On the 17th day of April, 1906, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration, made the following certificate relating to the notices and to the publication of the notices required by section 31 of Act No. 496. "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, "PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. "COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke; Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Crdoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes, a copy of said notice in Spanish having been sent to each one on March 28, 1906, by registered mail. And for the purposes of the necessary procedure, I issue the present in Manila on the 17th day of April, 1906. "A. K. JONES, "Clerk of the Court." On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila (p. 131, record) presented a written statement to the court calling its attention to the fact that there existed an "error of closure" in the plan of said Parcel A, and asked the court to correct the error. The said attorney also called the attention of the court to the fact that other errors existed with reference to the other plans of the other parcels of land, included in the original petition. Our attention has not been called to any order made by the lower court, relating to said request of the attorney of the city of Manila. In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on the said petition was brought on for trial on the 25th day of April, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m., at the place mentioned in said notice. At that hearing the petitioner was represented. No one appeared to represent the "heirs of Antonio Enriquez." On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the cause relating to said Parcel A was brought on for trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas appeared for the petitioner and Mr. Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila, appeared for the city of Manila. Mr. Reyes called the attention of the court again to the fact that there existed certain errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the plan presented by the petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of errors) the court ordered that said errors be corrected. So f ar as the record shows no correction whatever was made in the plan of said Parcel A. On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been brought on for hearing, the honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, dictated the following order or judgment in default against all persons:
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"Case No. 1895.

"Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant. "I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands. certify that, in compliance with the order issued by said court, a notice referring to the application for registry No. 1895, presented by Antonio Bonifas, as representative of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, was published once only in the daily newspapers of this city, The Manila Times on March 28, 1906, and La Democracia on the 31st of the same month and year, in English and Spanish respectively, and notice was served upon the Attorney-General

"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, "PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. "COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

"Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a conspicuous place on each of the parcels of land included in the application a certified copy of the notice in Spanish, and also in a conspicuous place in the principal municipal building of the city of Manila, before the fourteen days preceding that set f or the termination of the period fixed; "Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have f ailed to appear to impugn the application, within the period fixed by the law; "This court orders a declaration of default against all the defendants and other persons who may be concerned in opposing the application, which is granted.

"No, 1895.

"Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian for registration of the real estate described herein,

"Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in Manila, this 21st day of July, 1906. "Attest:

"vs. A. K. JONES, "Clerk of the Court." "The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A, Sing; A. Burke: Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa; Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may concern, defendants. "The present case having been duly tried, and "Whereas, the clerk of this court caused to be published once only a notice in due form referring to the application mentioned, in two newspapers of general circulation, one printed in the English language and another in the Spanish language, to wit, The Manila Times of this city, and La Democracia of the same city; and 119 days have elapsed since publication of said notice was effected; "Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered mail, within seven days after the publication of the said notice, a copy thereof in the Spanish language to each one of the persons named in the application or who appeared to be concerned therein; Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreeing that said parcel of land, A, be registered as the absolute property of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian. Said decree was as follows: "Having tried case No. 1895, this court.decrees that Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, of Manila, Philippine Islands, applicant, spinster, is the absolute owner of the real property, which is adjudicated to her, located in the city of Manila, the description whereof is hereinafter set forth: "A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo; bounded on the NE. by the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; on the SE. by the Pasig River; on the SW by the property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez; and on the NW. by Calle Escolta. "Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which point is 27.75 m. S., 49 40' W. from the extreme W. of the angle situated at the intersection S. of Calle Escolta and Pasage de Perez; and from said point A., S., 46 30' W., 31.08 m. to point B; thence S., 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to point C; thence S., 42 E., 32.75 m. to point D; thence S., 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to point E.; thence N., 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to point F; thence N., 52 E., 10.94 m. to point G; thence N., 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to point H; thence N., 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to point I; thence N., 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to point J; thence N., 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to point K; thence
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N., 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to point L; thence N., 40 05' W., 14 m. to point M; thence N., 44 W., 15.35 m. to point of beginning; having an area of 1,817.03 square meters. "All the points named are marked on the plan; the bearings are magnetic; date of survey, December 26, 1905. "Wherefore this court orders that the said real property be registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of the aforesaid Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, subject however to any of the encumbrances set forth in section 39 of said Act that may be in force and effect. "Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in Manila, this twenty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and six, at eight o'clock and ten minutes ante meridian. "Attest: "[SEAL.] (Sgd.) "A. E. JONES,

"Case No. 1895.

"Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.

"MOTION.

"The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney, comes now into the court and respectfully represents: "I. That the plan of the property with which the present case deals is affected by an error of closure greater than 1/1500; "II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error as it has to expropriate a portion of said land f or use as a public street; "Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a new survey of said property described in the plan filed in this case. "Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911." It is not clear whether said petition refers to the incorrections in the plan of Parcel A or to the incorrections in the plans of the other parcels of land (B, C, and D), which were included in the petition of the petitioner. On the 23d day of December, 1911, the honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, referred the petition of the city of Manila to the chief surveyor of the court. On the 27th day of December, 1911, the said surveyor reported to the court that there existed "errors of closure in said plans." On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the Court of Land Registration ordered the chief surveyor to prepare new plans, in accordance with section 4 of Act No. 1875, and directed that notice be given to the adjoining owners. On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of the
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"Clerk of the Court." "A copy of this decree was sent to the register of deeds of Manila, September 25, 1906." On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known as No. 742, and delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the property became registered under the Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner. After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of the petitioner, on the 21st day of July, 1906, nothing further seems to have been done in the Court of Land Registration until on or about the 19th day of December, 1911, nearly five years and a half after said land had been registered, when we find that the assistant attorney of the city of Manila filed the f ollowing petition: "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, "PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. "COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

certificate issued to her on the 21st day of July, 1906, so as to include the buildings upon the lands included in her petition. Said petition was as follows: "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, "PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. "COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION:

15,000 dollars, United States currency; and the land of the estate designated by the letter (c) was assessed at 5,658 dollars United States currency, and the buildings at 5,000 dollars United States currency. "4. That both in the property titles to the said estates and in the plans and technical descriptions thereof which accompany said application and are annexed to the aboveentitled case, it appears that on the parcels of land which form part of the estates under consideration there are erected buildings, consisting of two houses of strong materials, one behind the other, in the estate designated by the letter (a); a house of stone and masonry in that designated by the letter (b) ; and another house of stone and masonry in that designated by the letter (c). "5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the registration entries referring to the said estates, it appears that they consist of the parcels of land and the buildings stated. "6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the Municipal Board, the tenants, and owners conterminous with the estates ref erred to therein, the buildings erected on them are likewise mentioned. "7. That by decree of J June 21, 1906, adjudication and registration of the estates were ordered in applicant's favor in the terms set f orth in the application; but in the certificate of the decree or resolution under consideration, issued by the clerk of the court, the description of the parcel of land corresponding to each estate was given, but the respective building on each was omitted, and in this form were issued the certificates of title, Nos. 472, 764, and 743, which accompany this application. "8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and 22, 1906, the legal representative of the applicant guaranteed by deposit, as assurance fund, the rights of issuance of title and one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessed valuation, the sum of P943.70 Philippine currency, the receipts and vouchers wherefor do not accompany this application because the applicant destroyed them in the belief that there was- no need to exhibit them, but averring that the amounts paid for those purposes are credited in the accounting division of the Court of Land Registration and the office of the register of deeds, as has been ascertained by a person delegated therefor by the applicant. "9. That when the applicant attempted to alienate one of the estates mentioned she observed the omission in the corresponding certificate of title of the building existing thereon, the same as in the certificates of title
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"Case No. 1895.

"Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant. "Comes now the applicant into the honorable Court of Land Registration and represents: "1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in the name and representation of the applicant, sought the legalization of property title to four estates, among them the following: " (a) A parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo. "(b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon located at Nos. 28 to 36 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo. "(c) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at No. 149 Calle Nueva, corner of Callejon Carvajal, district of Binondo. "2. That the other estate mentioned in the said application refers to a parcel of land, with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 222 to 230 Calle Rosario, district of Binondo, which buildings were totally destroyed by the fire that occurred on the 2d of November of the year just past, and it cannot therefore be included in the purpose of the present application. "3. That in the said application it is stated that the land of the estate designated by the letter (a) was assessed at 65,072 dollars and 50 cents United States currency, and the buildings at 18,500 dollars United States currency; that the land of the estate designated by the letter (b) was assessed at 55,020 dollars and 50 cents, United States currency, and the buildings at

corresponding to the other two estates; and as it is to be supposed that said omission is due solely to a simple clerical error, which nevertheless greatly affects the applicant's right, she appeals to your honorable court with the request that you order the correction of said omission, especially as there at present exist on the said parcels of land, without modification or alteration, the same buildings that existed when legalization of title thereto was applied for and which appear in the titles of acquisition annexed to the above-entitled case, reference whereto has been made in the third paragraph. "10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of proving that the said estates consist not only in the parcel of land or lot but also in the building erected on each, the applicant attaches hereto the assessment or property-tax receipts f or each of the said estates, wherein are stated the two points mentioned. "11. That in view of what has been set forth and explained, the applicant prays the honorable court to decree, after the necessary legal proceedings, correction of the omission referred to by ordering the free issuance of a new certificate of title to each of the said estates, wherein record be made of the building erected on each, consisting of those enumerated in the third paragraph of this application. "Manila, February 28, 1912. "MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN." On the 9th day of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent a communication to Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, accompanied by a contract, showing that on the 20th day of March, 1912, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold all her right, title, and interest in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon, to the said Masonic Temple Association of Manila. Said Masonic Temple Association of Manila requested the judge of the Land Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issue a new certificate to it. On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B. W. Hay, surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, was presented, in accordance with the order of the court of the 23d of December, 1911. Said new plan was made for the purpose of correcting the errors in closure in the original plan presented by the petitioner on the 10th day of January, 1906. Said new plan is as follows (see page 48):

After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions: (a) That of the city of Manila to have corrected the error of closure in the original plan; (b) That of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, to have included in her certificate of title the buildings located upon the lands registered in accordance with her original petition; and (c) That of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, to have a certificate issued to it in accordance with its contract of purchase of said lands f rom Maria del Consuelo

Felisa Roxas y Chuidianafter notice had been given to all the interested parties, were set down for hearing. For one reason or another, the hearings on said motions were transferred from one date to another from the 22d of April, 1912, until the 24th of August, 1912. During said various hearings, in addition to the appointment of a commission to view the premises, certain proof was taken upon the question of the correctness of the original plan presented by the petitioner, in January, 1906. During said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez appeared and apparently made some objection to the granting of said motions. They presented no written statement in which their specific objections appear. The nearest approach to a definite and specific statement of their objections appears in the argument of their counsel at the close of said several hearings, in which it appears that their objection to the correction of the original plan and certificate and the issuance of a new certificate to the Masonic Temple Association of Manila was based upon the ground that they claimed easements or servitudes in the land in the question. After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, and his associates, the Honorable James A. Ostrand and the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, auxiliary judges of said court, sitting in banc, on the 24th day of August, 1912, by a unanimous decision, granted the motions of the city of Manila, of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, and of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila. On the 10th day of September, 1912, the presented a motion for new trial, basing it conclusions of the lower court were manif estly due consideration of said motion for a new attorneys for the objectors upon the ground that the contrary to the proof. After a trial and after hearing the
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respective parties, the Court of Land Registration, sitting in banc, composed of Charles H. Smith, James A. Ostrand, and Norberto Romualdez, denied said motion, and the case was appealed to this court. In this court the respondents presented the following assignments of error: "1. That the court below erred in holding that the proceedings of the Court of Land Registration were valid in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and appellee, confirming the title to lot 4, which is in controversy in this suit "2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law. "3. That the judgment of the court below is against the manifest weight of the evidence." After a careful examination of the argument of the appellants in support of each of said assignments of error, we are of the opinion that they may be discussed together. In the argument of the appellants in support of their assignments of error, there is but little argument against the decision of the court rendered on the 24th of August. 1912. Practically the whole argument of the appellants is based upon the ground that the original certificate (No. 742, issued July 21, 1906) is absolutely void, for the reason that "the appellants had no notice of the pendency of the original action to confirm the title of said property." Appellants now admit that a notice of the pendency of the original action was sent to attorneys Hartigan, Rohde & (Marple?) Gutierrez. Appellants now allege that it affirmatively appears that neither this firm nor any of its members represented the defendants and appellants in that action. The record shows, as we have pointed out above, that the original petition showed that Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez were the representatives of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez, and that notice was duly sent to them. We have searched the record now in vain to find the slightest denial of the fact that they were the representatives of said heirs, even though one of said attorneys represented them, or at least some of them, in the present proceedings. So far as the record shows there is not even a suggestion found in the various hearings and proceedings taken and had under the above motions, that said attorneys were not the representatives of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez at the time of the original proceedings. Neither does the record show any attempt on their part to deny the fact that they received the notices given in the original action. The appellants assert in their argument that ''personal notice was absolutely necessary in order to justify the court below in rendering a decree in favor of the plaintiff and appellee, in the first instance" (the original proceeding). The

appellants, by that argument, attempt to show, not that the judgment of the 24th of August, 1912, was invalid, but that the original certificate. (No. 742) was void, because they had not been served with personal notice. This brings us to the question whether or not personal notice to all of the persons interested in an action for the registration of real property under the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of said registration. It will be remembered that we noted above that personal notice of the pendency of the original petition had been given and that a publication of the same had been made in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496. After the expiration of the period during which notice must be given, the original cause was set down for hearing. The record also shows that the clerk of the Land Court made a certificate showing that that notice had been issued and published in accordance with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said "certificate of the clerk that he had served the notice as directed by the court, by publishing or mailing, shall be filed in the case before the return day, and shall be conclusive proof of such service." On the day set for the hearing of said original petition, no one appeared to oppose the granting of the prayer which it contained. Section 35 of Act No. 496 provides: "If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the application (petition) be taken for confessed. By the description in the notice, "To all whom it may concern," all the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. The court shall not be bound by the report of the examiner of titles, but may require other and further proof." The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the contention of the appellants. It seems to directly contradict the requirement of personal notice as an absolute prerequisite to the granting of a valid title under the Torrens system. The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section 38 of said Act No. 496. Said section 38 provides that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may concern.' "

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There is a further and very strong intimation in the law that personal notice is not absolutely a prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens system. Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that: "The court shall, so far as it deems it possible, require proof of actual notice to all the adjoining owners and to all persons who appear to have an interest in or claim to the land included in the application." It will be noted also that the petitioner in registration cases is not by law required to give any notice to any person. The law requires the clerk of the court to give the notices. (Sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the court may also cause other or f urther notice of the application to be given in such a manner and to such persons as it may deem proper." Thus it is seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved f rom any obligation whatsoever to give notice to any person of the pendency of his application to have his land registered under the Torrens system. That being true, upon what theory may the applicant be subjected to harassment or delay or additional expense, because some person claims that he did not receive actual personal notice? Sections 101 and 102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons who have suffered damages for the failure on the part of court officials to comply with the law. (Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to have the registration and certificate annulled, unless he comes within the provisions of section 38, and even then he is without a remedy against the applicant unless he can show, within a period of one year after the decree of registration and the granting of the certificate, that he has been "deprived of land or any estate or interest therein," by fraud, and not even then, if an "innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest." In the present case five years and a half had transpired and negotiations f or the sale of the land to an innocent purchaser had been terminated. There is no intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud, in the slightest degree. While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times, it has been adopted in many States and its provisions have been attacked at almost every point. The requirement relating to notices has been a fruitful source of litigation. The constitutionality of the law has been attacked many times, because of the provision of said law relating to notices. This is not the first time that the question has been presented to this court. The same question was presented to this court in the case of Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz (17 Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the registered title was attacked upon the ground that f raud existed, simply because personal notice had not been given. The existence of fraud was predicated upon the failure of actual personal notice. In passing upon that question, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, said (quoting from the syllabus) :

"In original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the appellee herein was made a partydefendant by publication, but was not personally served with notice: Held, That the decree of the Court of Land Registration is conclusive against him as well as all the world." "The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, f or it would hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)" In the present case there is not the slightest intimation that the original applicant (Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian) was guilty of fraud. The record shows that she named all the persons who might have an interest in the registration of her land, in her petition. The applicant is not charged even with negligence. The record shows that she did all the law required her to do. In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary purpose is the registration of the title which the applicant or petitioner has and to relieve his land of unknown liens or claims, just or unjust, against it. The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration of title to land only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land. It is not intended that lands may be acquired by said system of registration. It is intended only that the title, which the petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of whatsoever character, except those which shall be noted in the order of registration and in the certificate issued. If there exist known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains nothing in effect by his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent transfers of his title. The registration either relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims, absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come into court and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainty concerning either the character or the extent of such claims. The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants."
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The great difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible unknown claimants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They f urnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the transfer of titles. Courts have held that in actions in rem personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the res. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; American Land Company vs Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47.) This rule was first established in admiralty proceedings. It was established out of the very necessities of the case. The owner of a ship, for instance, lived in London. His ship was found in the most distant ports of the earth. Its operation necessarily required supplies, such as men, coal, and food. The very nature of its business necessitated the making of contracts. The continuance of its voyage depended upon its capacity to make contracts and to get credit. It might also, perchance, cause damage to other craft, in like conditions. To be able to secure all such necessities, to satisfy all possible obligations, to continue its voyage and its business on the high seas, merchants and courts came to regard the "ship" as a person, with whom or with which they were dealing, and not its real owner. Consequently there came into existence this action in rem. For the purpose of carrying into effect the broader purposes of the Torrens land law, it has been universally considered that the action should be considered as one in rem. Mr. Justice Holmes, then of the Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts, and now a member of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71), in discussing this question, said: "Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution (of the State of Massachusetts or the United States). Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U. S., 714, 727; The Mary, 9 Cranch, 126, 144.)" There are many classes of cases where men may be deprived of their property and of their rights, without personal notice of the proceedings in which that may occur. For instance, in attachment cases, notice or service

upon the defendant may be had by publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U. S., 714, 727.) So also in divorce proceedings, as well as the rights of claimants against estates of deceased persons, personal notice is not a prerequisite. Notice by publication may be had. Also unknown claimants or owners may be brought into court without personal notice in an action for the condemnation of private property for public use. There exists a multitude of cases in which personal service is not necessary and service by publication is sufficient. The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to land might be quieted "by notice by publication to all persons." (Hamilton vs, Brown, 101 U. S., 256, 274; Huling vs. Kaw Valley, etc., Co., 130 U. S., 559, 564; Parker vs. Overman, 18 Howard (N. Y.) 137; American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U. S., 316; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.) Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states had the power and right to provide a procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. The state had control over real property within its limits. The conditions of ownership of real estate in a state, whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen, are subject to its rules, concerning the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the modes of establishing title thereto; and for the purpose of determining these questions, it (the state) may provide any reasonable rules or procedure. (Clark vs. Smith, 13 Peters, 195; Barker vs. Harvey, 181 U. S., 481; Mitchell vs. Furman, 180 U. S., 402; Botiller vs. Domingues, 130 U. S., 238; Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U. S., 70; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U. S., 316; American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47.) The state possesses not only the power to determine how title to real estate may be acquired and proved, but it is also within its legislative competency to establish the method of procedure. (American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47; Bertrand vs. Taylor, 87 111., 235; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 208, 305; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.) The state, as sovereign over the lands situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem, or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons known and unknown. (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580; 21 Am. St. Rep., 67; McLaughlin vs. McCrory, 55 Ark., 442; 29 Am. St. Rep., 56; People's National Bank vs. Cleveland, 117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon, 176 III., 165; 68 Am. St. Rep., 175; Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662; Ruppin vs. McLaughlin, 122 lowa, 343; Young vs. Upshur, 42 La.
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An., 362; 21 Am. St. Rep., 381; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; 51 L. R. A., 433; State vs. Westfall, 85 Minn., 437; 89 Am. St. Rep., 571; 57 L. R. A., 297; Rohrer vs. Ader, 124 Mo., 24; Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90 N. Y. Supp., 76, 79, 97; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U. S., 316.) If the state can provide for substituted service for the purpose of quieting title to real estate against an unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable method for securing substituted service against residents. The power of the state to provide methods of quieting title should not be limited to known persons. In order to make such a law valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it be made to operate on all interests and persons known or unknown. Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71) in discussing this question, said: "If it (the procedure) does not satisfy the Constitution, a judicial proceeding to clear titles against all the world hardly is possible, for the very meaning of such a proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well as known claimsindeed certainty against the unknown may be said to be its chief endand unknown claims cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant." Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss (219 U. S., 47) said: "To argue that the provisions of the statute are repugnant to the due process clause (of the Constitution) because a case may be conceived where rights in and to property would be adversely affected without notice being actually conveyed by the proceedings is in effect to deny the power of the state to deal with the subject. The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the subject with which the statute deals." The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the case of In re Empire City Bank (18 N. Y., 199, 215) in speaking of the right of the state to prescribe in suitable cases for substituted service, said: "Various prudential regulations are made with respect to these remedies but it may possibly happen, notwithstanding all these precautions, that a citizen who owes nothing, and has done none of the acts mentioned in the statutes, may be deprived of his estate without any actual knowledge of the process by which it has been taken from him. If we hold, as we must, in order to sustain this legislation, that the Constitution does not positively require personal notice in order to constitute a legal proceeding due process of law, it then belongs to the

legislature to determine in the particular instance whether the case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation, and what manner of constructive notice shall be sufficient to reasonably apprise the party proceeded against of the legal steps which are taken against him. (American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 289.)" The only case cited by the appellants in support of their argument, is the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss (219 U. S., 47). In view of the facts and the decisions of the different courts which are cited in that case, it is difficult to understand how it is authority in support of the contention of the appellants here. The facts in that case are as follows: Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an action in the superior court of the county of San Francisco, alleging in substance that on the 18th and 19th days of April, 1906, a material part of the public records contained in the office of the county recorder of the city and county of San Francisco was destroyed by fire; that on the 18th day of April, 1906, and at the time of the filing of the complaint, he was the owner and in the actual and peaceable possession of the parcels of land in controversy: that his estate, title, interest in and to said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrances, liens, defects, claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prayed that he be adjudged to be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said described parcels of land in fee simple, and that no one else had any estate, right, title, interest or claim in or to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent. Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeiss, a summons was issued and notice of the pendency of the action was published in certain newspapers, as was required by law. Notice was also posted upon the property, as required by the statute. No one having appeared and opposed the granting of the petition of the complaint, or claimed any interest in or lien upon the property described in the complaint, a default was ordered against all persons, and on the 19th day of December, 1906, a decree was entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he was the owner in fee simple, absolute, and entitled to the possession of the land described in the complaint and that no other person had any right, title, interest, or estate in and to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent. Nothing else seems to have transpired after said decree was issued in favor of Zeiss, until the 26th day of May, 1908, or one year and five months after the
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entry of the decree of the superior court, in the city and county of San Francisco. On that date (the 26th of May, 1908) an action was brought in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, in which the plaintiffs claimed title to the parcels of land, as owners in fee simple, absolute, which had theretofore been decreed to Zeiss. The plaintiff alleged that the decree issued by the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco was void and of no force and effect and was made and maintained without due process of law, and that said superior court, in said action and proceeding, never had any jurisdiction over the persons holding the title during such proceeding, and that said court did not have or obtain jurisdiction to divest the right, title, interest or estate of plaintiff. The complaint alleged that "Zeiss had no right whatever in said parcels of land, other than his right of possession and occupation." The bill further alleged that the plaintiffs had been at all times citizens and residents of California, not seeking to evade, but ready to accept service of summons and easily reached for that purpose; that, notwithstanding that fact, no service was made upon them nor did they in any way receive notice of the pendency of the action (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described); nor did they gain any knowledge of the existence of the decree until more than a year after its entry. To the complaint the defendant, Zeiss, demurred. Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth District certified the questions involved to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States, after a careful analysis of the f acts and of the law, in a very lengthy and instructive opinion (219 U. S., 47), decided each of the questions submitted by the Circuit Court of Appeals against the contention of the plaintiff and returned the cause to the court below. The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the title to two parcels of land and for the purpose of registering his title to the same under an act of the legislature of the State of California, entitled "An act to provide for the establishment and quieting of title to real property in case of loss or destruction of public records." Said law is known as the McEnerney Law. It was intended by said act to provide a method whereby owners in possession of real estate, where records had been destroyed to such an extent as to make it impossible to trace a record title, might secure a decree in the courts which would furnish public, authenticated evidence of title. The special occasion for the law was the fact that practically all of the public records of title in several counties in the State of California had recently theretofore been destroyed as the result of an earthquake and fire. Said law provided that

whenever the public records in the office of the county recorder had been, or shall hereafter be lost or destroyed, in whole or in any material part, by flood, fire, or earthquake, any person who claims an estate of inheritance or have title in, and who has by himself or his tenants, or other persons holding under him, in actual and peaceable possession any real property in said county, may bring and maintain an action in rem, against all the world, in the superior court for the county in which said real property is situate, to establish his title, and to determine all adverse claims thereto. The law further provides that an action shall be commenced by the filing of a verified complaint, in which he shall name the defendants as "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof." He was required to give in his complaint a particular description of the property. The law provided that upon the filing of the complaint, a summons or notice was required to be issued, containing the names of the court and the county in which the action was brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a particular description of the property involved, which notice was directed to "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof," as defendants. The law further provided that said summons or notice should be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the action was brought, at least once a week for a period of two months. The law further provided that personal notice should be given to any person claiming an interest in the property or a lien thereon adverse to the plaintiff. The law also provided that said summons or notice should be posted in a conspicuous place on each parcel of property described in the complaint, within fifteen days after the first publication of the summons or notice. The said law further provided that upon the publication and posting of the summons and its service upon and mailing to the person, if any, upon whom it is herein directed to be specially served, the court shall have full and complete jurisdiction over the plaintiff and said property and of the person and every one claiming any estate, right, title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property, or any part thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the possession and control of said property, for the purposes of the action, and shall have full and complete jurisdiction to render judgment therein, which is provided for in the law.

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In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss, cited and relied upon by the appellants, the validity of said law was attacked and the legality of the title granted to Zeiss was impugned for the reason that the law was unconstitutional and void, and because the plaintiff had not received actual notice of the application of Zeiss to have his title quieted, under said law. The Supreme Court of the United States (219 U. S., 47) held, as has been above indicated, that the law was constitutional and that a compliance with the requirements of the notice provided for in said law was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the res and to enter a valid decree. There seems to be but little in the decision in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss to support the contention of the appellants. Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands had full power to adopt the procedure provided for in Act No. 496, f or the registration of the title of lands; and Considering that the court in the original action followed strictly the procedure adopted by said law; and Considering that there is no claim of fraud, actual or constructive, upon the part of any of the parties connected with said action, we are forced to the conclusion that the appellants here are not now entitled to have that judgment or decree of registration and certificate amended or set aside. There remains another question, however, which the appellants have not discussed and which we deem of importance. It is the question of the right of the Land Court to correct an error of closure in a plan or of a statement contained in a certificate. A plan is prepared and is presented with the petition for the registration of a parcel of land. No opponents appear. No opposition is presented to the registration. All the steps in the procedure required by law have been taken. The land is registered. It is then discovered f or the first time that by reason of a wrong direction given to one of the lines in the plan, said plan will not closethat if a wall were built upon the lines of the plan, one of the four corners of the wall would not meet. We believe that an error of that character may be corrected by the court, provided that such correction does not include land not included in the original petition. Upon the question whether the amended plan (p. 252, record) included more or different lands than were included in the original petition, we find the following statement made by one of the judges who ordered said plan amended. The statement is:

"At this stage of the proceedings and on this particular point nothing further is incumbent upon the court than to determine the property as it was adjudicated in this case. "Therein no new portion was either added or subtracted, and this court finds that such should be the holding on this particular point." We have a further statement made by one of the judges, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, relating to the same question, in an answer presented by him to a petition for a writ of prohibition, presented by some of the appellants herein, to the Supreme Court. That petition for a writ of prohibition involved practically the same questions presented by the appellants here now. Upon the question whether or not additional lands had been included in the new plan (p. 252, record), Judge Smith, in answering for himself and his associates (Ostrand and Romualdez) said: "Respondents deny that a new dividing line between the premises in question (premises of the plaintiff and appellant) was determined and established by an order of the court issued at the conclusion of said proceedings, but, on the contrary, respondents charge the truth to be that the dividing line between said properties was not changed but simply approved and so indicated upon the record title. For instance, the line between said properties beginning on the south side of the Escolta is exactly at the same point indicated in the original description and approved by the court; in other words, the premises in question of the said Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian have not been enlarged; the boundary lines thereof have not been changed; the real descriptions of the properties have been left undisturbed; the adjoining land owned by the petitioners is undiminished, except possibly as to alleged easements claimed to have been created by the projection of some of the roofs of the petitioners' building over the aforesaid registered property of the said Roxas. That matter is settled clearly by the provisions of the last paragraph of section 39 of Act No. 496." We called attention above to the fact that the petitioner alleged that the line AB of her property ran S., 44 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters, while the plan accompanying said petition (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) made said line to run S., 46 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters. An examination of the certificate issued to the petitioner (see page 39, ante) also states that the line A-B runs S., 46. 30' W., for a distance of 31.08 meters. The record contains no explanation why the original plan (see Exhibit A, page 35. ante) did not conform to the description of the land given in the
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petition. That error, in our judgment, seems to have constituted the real difficulty with the closure of the plan. Under said conditions we are of the opinion that the Land Court is entirely justified in ordering the plan corrected for the purposes above indicated. There is still another question involved in the case, which the appellants have not discussed, and that is the right of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian to have her original certificate of registration corrected, for the purpose of showing that she was the owner of the buildings located upon the parcel of land in question. It will be remembered that in her petition presented January 12, 1906, she alleged that she was the owner of the parcel of land in question, together with the buildings thereon. No opposition was presented. No objection was made to the registration of the land as described in her petition. The record shows no reason why the buildings should have been omitted in the certificate of registration. The omission must have been an error on the part of the clerk. We find that Act No. 496 contains an express provision for the correction of such errors. Section 112 provides that the registered owner may, at any time, apply by petition to have corrected any "error, omission, or mistake made in entering a certificate, or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate." We think the petition presented by Miss Roxas for the correction of such original certificate was entirely within her right under the law. It might be claimed, and we believe that the proposition is sustained by law, that the registration of a parcel of land, unless the record contains something to the contrary, necessarily includes the buildings and edifices located thereon, even though they are not mentioned. Without relying upon that proposition of law, however, and in view of the petition of the plaintiff, it is hereby ordered that the original certificate be amended so as to include not only the land described in the original petition, but the buildings located thereon as well. With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, the record contains no sufficient reason f or not granting the same. Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below should be and it is hereby affirmed, with costs. Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed. _____________

Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Roxas vs. Enriquez., 29 Phil. 31(1914)]

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Same; Same; Prescription; Public land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time.Prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Where the land applied for is part of the public forest, the land registration court acquires no jurisdiction over the land, which is not yet alienable and disposable.We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only on 31 December 1930, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the States action to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription. Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original plan was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of the required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court; it is a jurisdictional requisite. Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice. Same; Same; Same; A land registration court acquires no jurisdiction over a land embraced by an amended plan that was not published.A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land. On the basis of the decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have amended its decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended plan. Pleadings and Practice; Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; Machine copies of original documents are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible if the offeror failed to prove any of the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and to establish the conditions for their admissibility.The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits 6 and 6-A are a machine copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of the offeror to prove any of the
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G.R. No. 113549. July 5, 1996.* REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF LUIS RIBAYA, namely, ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE, LUIS RIBAYA, ANTONIA RIBAYA-CONDE and JOHN DOE RIBAYA, all represented by ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE as Administratrix of the Estate of Luis Ribaya, respondents.
Actions; Appeals; The Supreme Court is compelled to review the factual antecedents of a case where the Court of Appeals reversal of a decision was primarily due to its disagreement with the trial courts findings of fact.The Court of Appeals reversal was primarily due to its disagreement with the trial courts findings of fact. Hence, such removes this case from the general rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind us in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We are thus compelled to review the factual antecedents. Same; Land Registration; The one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree; Remedies available to an aggrieved party after the one-year period.The one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree. In the second place, there are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 55 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud. Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund.

exceptions provided therein and to establish the conditions for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value.

signature. Moreover, as per Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry, the above parcel of land was considered part of the public forest and released for disposition only on 31 December 1930.7 In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot covered by Plan II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050. Notice of the application and hearing thereof were published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette,8 and in its decision of 18 September 1925,9 the CFI granted the said application. Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a resurvey of the parcel of land covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the spouses Ribaya. This gave rise to Plan II-13961-Amd., which embraced, inter alia, four different parcels of land with an aggregate area of only 10,975,022 square meters, instead of the original 25,542,603 square meters. Plan II-13961-Amd. appeared to have been approved by the Director of Lands on 26 February 1926.10 The application was not amended to reflect the resurvey and the amended plan was not published. On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was issued,11 while on 19 August 1926, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots embraced by Plan II-13961-Amd. was issued in the names of the spouses Ribaya.12 On 11 September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively reconstituted from the owners duplicate copy thereof and the reconstituted title was denominated as OCT No. RO-10848 (3947).13 In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private respondents) received compensation from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land during the war.14 In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private respondents herein, the land covered by OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-96075, approved on 16 December 1968.15 Then, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was cancelled and separate Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) were issued to the private respondents.16 In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the land17 and claiming ownership thereof, requested the Director of Lands to institute an action to annul OCT No. RO-10848 (3947).18 Finding merit in the request, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint, dated 17 August 1978, with the CFI (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, Branch V, for the declaration of nullity of OCT No. 3947, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), and all subsequent titles
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PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Ramon C. Fernandez and Carlos R. Buenviaje for private respondents. DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution1 of 24 January 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351, which set aside its earlier decision2 of 9 January 1991. The latter affirmed the decision3 of 11 November 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 6198 which declared null and void an original certificate of title issued pursuant to a decree and a decision in a land registration case decided on 18 September 1925. After the private respondents filed their Comment and the petitioner their Reply, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The Court of Appeals reversal was primarily due to its disagreement with the trial courts findings of fact. Hence, such removes this case from the general rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind us in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.4 We are thus compelled to review the factual antecedents. From the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and the pleadings of the parties, the following were established: On the basis of the private respondents exhibits,5 on 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920, a parcel of land located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, was surveyed for the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the spouses Ribaya) by Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of Lands surveyor. The parcel of land was found to comprise an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-13961 and allegedly approved by the Acting Director of Lands on 3 January 1922. However, as noted by the Court of Appeals in its 9 January 1991 decision,6 these exhibits do not at all show the surveyors

emanating from the original title, viz., TCT Nos. T-31333 to T-31358, inclusive. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6198. The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through fraud and that the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of republication of the amended plan, neither did the spouses-applicants comply with Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874.19 The petitioner further alleged that at the time the petition for registration was filed, the land covered therein was forest land, and therefore, inalienable. On 27 October 1979, the aforementioned 62 farmers filed a complaint-inintervention and prayed that the land revert to the petitioner and their titles over the portions respectively occupied by them confirmed. In its decision of 11 November 1987,20 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) held for the petitioner as follows: WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) as null and void ab initio and without force and effect; 2. Declaring separate Transfer Certificates of Title, to wit: T-31333, T-31334, T-31335, T-31336, T-31337, T-31338, T-31339, T-31340, T-31341, T-31342, T-31343, T-31344, T-31345, T-31346, T-31347, T-31348, T-31349, T-31350, T-31351, T-31352, T-31353, T-31354, T-31355, T-31356, T-31357 and T31358, emanating from OCT No. 3947 and OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), all issued to the heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris, as likewise null and void and without force and effect. 3. Ordering [respondents] Heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris to surrender their copy of OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) as well as their separate transfer certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Albay, who (sic) is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel the same. 4. Ordering the reversion of the land to [petitioner] Republic of the Philippines, as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. 5. And ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim. The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya filed their petition for registration, the land was already classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land; however, the then CFI, as a land registration court, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said lot due to lack of publication or republication in the Official Gazette of Plan II-13961-Amd., which was the basis of the

decree of registration and OCT No. 3947. Consequently, said OCT No. 3947 and its derivative titles were void.21 In so finding, it relied on Fewkes vs. Vasquez,22 where it was held that any amendment or alteration in the description of the land after its publication and decree of registration was not permissible unless coupled with republica-tion. The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence that the possession of the spouses Ribaya and their predecessors-in-interests was open, continuous, and adverse under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of years; moreover, they failed to present any tax declarations. It then concluded that the said spouses may have occupied portions of the land at a later time, but not in the concept of bona fide owners, for mere casual cultivation and raising of cattle on the land did not constitute possession as contemplated by law.23 The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 17351), which, in its decision24 of 9 January 1991, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the trial court. The appellate court further pointed out another reason why the registration in favor of the applicants was invalid, thus: [W]hen [the] spouses [Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris] applied for registration thereof in their names said land was still part of the public forest. The land was released for public disposition only on December 31, 1930 as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry (Exhs. K, K-5). Consequently, OCT No. 3947 as reconstituted by OCT No. RO-10848 is void ab initio. It is well-settled that lands of the public domain classified as forest or timber lands, are incapable of registration in the names of private persons and their inclusion in a title nullifies the title (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 and cases cited therein.)25 In refuting the claim of the private respondents that publication of the amended survey plan was unnecessary in light of the decision of this Court in Benin vs. Tuazon,26 the Court of Appeals held that the facts in Benin were different. In Benin, an approved survey plan was submitted before the property was decreed for registration, while in the present case: [T]he land was decreed for registration on September 18, 1925, while its survey was performed sometime in November and December 1925. The amended survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) thereof was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926. In other words, the survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) of the land in the instant case was approved when the land was already decreed for registration. . . .27
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There was then, the Court of Appeals concluded, a violation of Sections 23 and 26 of Act No. 496.28 The private respondents seasonably moved for a reconsideration of this decision. In its resolution29 of 24 January 1994, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside its decision of 9 January 1991, reversed that of the trial court of 11 November 1987, and dismissed the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 6198 of Branch 7 of the RTC of Legazpi City. In overturning its previous decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that OCT No. 3947 is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496).30 It further applied the presumption of regularity in the grant of the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya, and even extended said presumption to their compliance with all conditions required by law, in particular, their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. It thus burdened the Republic to prove otherwise.31 It likewise ruled that the failure of the spouses Ribaya to present tax receipts was not fatal, and that although they actually lived in Oas, Albay, such did not negate the character of their possession for [p]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before he can be said that he is in possession.32 The Court of Appeals also rejected the application of the Fewkes case and applied, instead, the decision in Benin, where this Court held that republication could be dispensed with in an amendment in the application or in the survey plan, where such amendment consisted of the exclusion of a portion covered by the original application and the original survey plan as published. Accordingly, the land registration court retained its jurisdiction. Finally, the Court of Appeals withdrew its earlier finding that the land in question still formed part of the public forest at the time of the application for registration. It asserted, instead, that there was insufficient basis to conclude that a parcel of land only became open to disposition on the basis of the date of approval of the land classification map, because such approval may have been made later by authority of a prior executive declaration.33 Unsatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition and asserts that: (1) the indefeasibility of title does not lie against the State in an action for reversion of

land; (2) the spouses-applicants failed to prove possession of the land for the period required by law, and the evidence shows that their possession was not open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim of ownership; (3) the amended survey plan was not published; (4) the land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part of the forest land, hence, inalienable; and (5) the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful.34 In their Comment, the private respondents allege that the petition merely raises factual matters and argue that OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering that the land was no longer part of the public forest when it was decreed in favor of their parents. They further contend, invoking Benin, that the issue of republication is inapplicable since the publication of the original survey plan was already had in compliance with law. Moreover, possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-applicants, was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof in favor of the government and the compensation they received from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land during the war sufficiently proved that they were the legitimate owners of the land. Finally, the original survey plan could no longer be questioned by the petitioner.35 As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit: 1. Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for annulment of OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title; and 2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of land subject of the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree issued on 31 July 1926 by the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the said court of 18 September 1925. As to the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCT No. 3947 was, to repeat: [C]onclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496).36 First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree. In the second place, there are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 55 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that in all cases of registration
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procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title.37 Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud.38 Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund.39 Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. In Republic vs. Animas,40 we ruled: Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the state. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription. We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only on 31 December 1930,41 the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the States action to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription. Anent the second issue, we hold that the land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan (Plan II-13961) or the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total want of publication of the second. As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original plan was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of the required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court;42 it is a jurisdictional requisite.43 Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.44

Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey plan. The fact remains, however, that in November of that year that original plan was amended (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all. There is no evidence that the court amended its decision to conform to the amended plan, neither is there a showing that the parties even attempted publication thereof. However, the decree that was subsequently issued was based on the amended plan insofar as the four lots were concerned. A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land.45 On the basis of the decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have amended its decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended plan. The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and the private respondents, however, maintain that the publication of the amended plan was unnecessary under our pronouncements in Benin vs. Tuazon.46 This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial,47 Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz,48 Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua,49 Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus,50 and Director of Lands vs. Benitez,51 that only where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of land not previously included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added after the publication of the original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was published, no new publication is required. Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In the first place, the amendment of the original survey plan for the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was made after the land registration court rendered its decision. It follows then that a re-opening of the case was indispensable; however, no such re-opening appears to have been done therein. Second, as earlier shown, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land covered by the original plan because of insufficient publication in the Official Gazette. Third, it has not been sufficiently shown that the four parcels of land covered by OCT No. 3947, which are based on the amended plan, are but a small part of the same land covered by the original survey plan. This conclusion is thoroughly discussed below.
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In the 24 January 1994 resolution of the Court of Appeals, it found the original areas covered by Plan II-13961 to be 25,542,603 square meters and the four parcels of land embraced in the amended plan, Plan II-13961-Amd., to be in the aggregate of 10,975,022 square meters. Thus: In the case at bar, in 1925, the spouses Ribaya sought for a judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title of the land described as follows: Parcel of land (plan II-13961) containing an area of 25,542,603 square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, P.I. x x x (Italics Supplied). Said 25,542,603 square meter land was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands which survey was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922. (Exh. 6). The notice of application and hearing of the land as aforedescribed, was published in the March 17, 1925 issue of the Official Gazette (Exhs. J and J1). The land registration court issued a decision in favor of the spouses Ribaya on September 18, 1925 but for a smaller parcel of land than the 25,542,603 square meters are applied for. On November 23 and 30, 1925, said smaller parcel of land was surveyed by Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 as Plan II-13961Amd. (Exh. H and series). Plan II-13961-Amd. embraced 4 parcels of land in the aggregate area of 10,975,022 square meters separately described as follows: 1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318,454 square meters, more or less; 2. A parcel of land (Lot No. 2 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575,195 square meters more or less; 3. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 4,844,205 square meters, more or less; 4. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4 Plan II-13961-Amd.), con taining an area of 1,237,368 square meters, more or less.52 This was also its finding in its earlier decision of 9 January 1991.53

In their Comment of 30 May 1994, the private respondents do not, for obvious reasons, dispute such finding and so they not only quoted it therein,54 they also explicitly assert that: The undisputed facts are that the original plan of the land applied for which was published in the Official Gazette contained an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The land actually embraced in the decree of registration contained only 10,975,022 square meters.55 (emphasis supplied) In hectares, the 25,542,603 square meters means Two Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Four Hectares, two ares, and six hundred and three centares (2,554 has., 2 ares, and 603 centares); and the 10,975,022 square meters means one thousand and ninety seven hectares, five ares, and twenty-two centares (1,097 has., 5 ares, and 22 centares). However, the trial court is somewhat confused as to the area of the land covered by Plan II-13961, as well as that covered by the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.). Thus: [A]nd on March 7, 1978 Land Investigator Selecio San Felipe wrote the Director of Lands that the report of the ocular inspection and investigation conducted on May 14, 15 and 16, 1977 was true and correct, . . . that Plan II13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 18-21, December 8-9, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 23-30, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH2 for intervenors); . . . that Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) covers 4 parcels of land, to wit: Lot No. 1, (plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318.454 square meters more or less, Lot No. 2, (plan II-13961Amd.), containing an area of 1,575.195 square meters more or less, Lot No. 3, (plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 4,844.005 square meters more or less, and Lot No. 4, (plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237.368 square meters more or less, with a total of 10,975.022 square meters more or less; x x x that plan II-13961 of property as surveyed for Luis Ribaya, situated in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, province of Albay, containing an area of 25,542.603 square meters, was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 in accordance with Section 45 of Act 2874 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, and the said plan was
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approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922 (Exhibits 6 and 6-A) . . . .56 (emphasis supplied) Note that instead of a comma (,) before the last three digits in the areas of the four lots covered by the amended plan, as well as the areas embraced in the original plan, the trial court placed a period (.). The change from a comma to a period is of vital significance. For, translated into hectares, the 25,542.603 square meters would be only Two (2) hectares, five (5) ares, and five hundred and forty-two (542) centares; and the aggregate of 10,975.022 square meters for the four lots embraced in Plan II-13961-Amd. would be one (1) hectare and nine hundred seventy-five (975) centares. Indeed, the disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the trial court as to the land area of the original survey plan (Plan II-13961), i.e., whether it was 25,542,603 square meters (twenty-five million, five hundred and forty-two thousand and six hundred three square meters) as found by the former, or 25,542.603 square meters (twenty-five thousand, five hundred forty-two point six hundred and three square meters) as found by the latter, only shows the unreliability of the original plan sought to be established through Exhibits 6 and 6-A. The Court of Appeals itself so found it to be in its decision of 9 January 1991 because these exhibits did not show that the survey plan was signed by the surveyor. Thus: Although the trial court said so (decision, p. 4) its basis, which is (original) plan II-13961 (Exhs. 6, 6-A), did not indubitably establish the same. In the first place, said original plan (plan II-13961) does not bear the signature of the surveyor thereof, thereby casting doubt on its genuineness and due execution . . . .57 (emphasis supplied) Such doubt gains strength if we consider that if indeed the area embraced therein was that found by the Court of Appeals, i.e., 25,542,603 square meterswith a comma before the last three digitsit would have been physically impossible to finish the survey thereof in only eleven days (9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920). Plainly, the present-day sophisticated survey instruments were not then available. Furthermore, the trial court indicated in its findings of fact that in addition to the four lots covered by OCT No. 3947, there were other large tracts covered by the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.), viz.: [T]hat Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares, located at Magragondong,Ligao, Albay, . . . (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for plaintiff and ExhibitsGG, GG-1 and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheetno. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares,located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, . .

. (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors);58(emphasis supplied) The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits 6 and 6-A are a machine copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of the offeror to prove any of the exceptions provided therein and to establish the conditions for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value. Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four parcels of land included in OCT No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original plan (Plan II-13961). WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351 is SET ASIDE, while its decision therein of 9 January 1991 affirming in toto that of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City of 11 No-vember 1987 in Civil Case No. 6198 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED. Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Petition granted. Notes.Publication should precede the date of initial hearing, and where the issue of the Official Gazette where the notice was published was released only after the initial hearing, the court did not properly acquire jurisdiction over the case. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 442 [1994]) A land registration court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the existence or nonexistence of a tenancy relationship. (Cuao vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 122 [1994]) o0o

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Such an assertion betrays a lack of comprehension of the role of the Solicitor General as government counsel or of the OSG as the governments law office. Only the Solicitor General, as the lawyer of the government, can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and, therefore, actions filed in the name of the Republic, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, will be summarily dismissed. Same; Same; Land Registration Proceedings; Specifically, he is empowered to represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings. His representative, who may be a lawyer from the Bureau of Lands, has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal should be made.Specifically, he is empowered to represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings, such as, an action for cancellation of title and for reversion of a homestead to the government. Hence, he is entitled to be furnished with copies of all court orders, notices and decisions. Consequently, service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary period for filing appeals and for finality of decisions. His representative, who may be a lawyer from the Bureau of Lands, has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal should be made.

G.R. No. 73974. May 31, 1995.* REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Represented by the Director of Lands), petitioner, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON, MANUEL G. ATIENZA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (Lucena Branch) and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Remedial Law; Appeals; Rules of Court; Appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious. Respect for the appellants right, however, carries with it the corresponding respect for the appellees similar rights to fair play and justice. Thus, appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Same; Same; Same; Duty of an appellant to serve a copy of his brief upon the appellee with proof of service thereof is of paramount importance.Of paramount importance is the duty of an appellant to serve a copy of his brief upon the appellee with proof of service thereof. This procedural requirement is consonant with Section 2 of Rule 13, which mandates that all pleadings and papers shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties affected thereby. The importance of serving copies of the brief upon the adverse party is understood in Mozar v. Court of Appeals , where the Court held that the appellees should have been given an opportunity to file their appellees brief in the Court of Appeals if only to emphasize the necessity of due process. Same; Same; Same; Only the Solicitor General, as the lawyer of the government, can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and, therefore, actions filed in the name of the Republic, if not initiated by the Solicitor General will be summarily dismissed.

Same; Same; Same; Service of Notice; Service of appellants brief on Atty. Torres was no service upon the Solicitor General.Service of the appellants brief on Atty. Torres was no service at all upon the Solicitor General. It may be argued that Atty. Torres could have transmitted one of the two copies of appellants brief upon the Solicitor General, but such omission does not excuse Atienzas failure to serve a copy of his brief directly on the Solicitor General. Same; Same; Judgments; Appellate courts decision based solely on appellants brief was arrived at in grave abuse of discretion.On the part of the appellate court, its decision based solely on, and even quoting verbatim from, the appellants brief was certainly arrived at in grave abuse of discretion. It denied appellee (petitioner herein) of the opportunity to be heard and to rebut Atienzas allegations, in rank disregard of its right to due process. Such violation of due process could have been rectified with the granting of petitioners motion for reconsideration by the appellate court, but even the door to this recourse was slammed by the appellate court with the denial of petitioners motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 12, 1986, which ruling erroneously applied the Habaluyas doctrine. Public Lands; Land Registration; The task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources.In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources). Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. Same; Same; In controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant.Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands,
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the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant who, in this case, is Atienza. The records show, however, that he failed to present clear, positive and absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to support his claim. Same; Same; Certificate of Title; The indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. The fraud contemplated by the law (Section 32, P.D. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, that is, an intentional omission of fact required by law.The fact that Atienza acquired a title to the land is of no moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system. In Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. The fraud contemplated by the law (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, that is, an intentional omission of fact required by law, which in the case at bench consisted in the failure of Atienza to state that the land sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest lands.

acquired. Thus, on March 19, 1970, a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, against Atienza and four other persons for allegedly falsifying their applications for free patent, the survey plans, and other documents pertinent to said applications. In its decision dated October 4, 1972, the court acquitted the accused of the crime charged but, finding that the land covered by the application for free patent of private respondent was within the forest zone, declared as null and void OCT No. P-13840 in Atienzas name and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon to cancel the same. Meanwhile, before the promulgation of said decision, or on May 10, 1972, then Acting Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco filed for the petitioner a complaint against Atienza, the Register of Deeds of Quezon, and the Rural Bank of Sariaya, which was later dropped as defendant and, in an amended complaint, substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines as actual mortgagee of the subject parcel of land. Docketed as Civil Case No. 7555, the complaint prayed for the declaration of nullity of FP No. 324198 and OCT No. P-13840. In his answer, Atienza claimed that the land in question was no longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application for free patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land was already alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Since the subject land was a very small portion of Lot 5139 of the Pagbilao Cadastre, an area which had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court on March 9, 1932 in Cadastral Case No. 76 entitled El Govierno Filipino de las Islas Filipinas contra Jose Abastillas, et al., G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1124, he also averred that the Director of Lands had given due course to free and homestead patent applications of claimants to Lot 5139. He further alleged that through a certain Sergio Castillo, he had been in possession of the land since the Japanese occupation, cultivating it and introducing improvements thereon. The DBP, after due and proper investigation and inspection of his title, even granted him a loan with the subject property as collateral. Finally, he stated that his acquittal in the criminal case proved that he committed no fraud in his application for free patent. On July 27, 1981, the lower court rendered a decision with the categorical finding based on solid evidence that the land in question was found definitely within the forest zone denominated as Project 21-A.
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PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Caluntad-Alfaro and Associates for private respondent, M.G. Atienza. ROMERO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside the decision1 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court reversing the decision of the former Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II at Lucena City2 which annulled Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13840 and Free Patent (FP) No. 324198 issued to Manuel Atienza for a 17-hectare piece of land which turned out to be within the forest zone in Pagbilao, Quezon. On April 18, 1967, Atienza was awarded FP No. 324198 over a parcel of land located in Ila, Malicboy, Pagbilao, Quezon, with an area of 172,028 square meters. By virtue of such award, he was issued on May 5, 1967, OCT No. P13840. Sometime in 1968, an investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in connection with alleged land grabbing activities in Pagbilao. It appeared that some of the free patents, including that of Atienzas, were fraudulently

The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, (J)udgment is hereby rendered: (a) Declaring as null and void Original Certificate of Title No. P-13840 in the name of defendant Manuel G. Atienza, as well as Free Patent No. V-324198; (b) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the Development Bank of the Philippines, Lucena City Branch, the sum of P15,053.97, and all interests due thereon; and (c) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the costs of this suit.

The instant petition for review on certiorari raises the following arguments: (a) petitioner was denied due process and fair play when Atienza did not furnish it with a copy of his appellants brief before the then Intermediate Appellate Court thereby depriving it of the opportunity to rebut his assertions which later became the sole basis of the assailed decision of December 27, 1985; (b) the appellate court erred in holding that the land in question is part of the alienable and disposable public land in complete disregard of the trial courts finding that it forms part of the unclassified public forest zone; and (c) the appellate court erred in declaring that the land in question could be alienated and disposed of in favor of Atienza. We find for the petitioner.

SO ORDERED. On appeal, Atienza maintained that the land in question was not within the unclassified public forest land and therefore alienable land of the public domain. The then Intermediate Appellate Court relied only on the arguments he raised since petitioner had not filed any brief, and arrived at the conclusion that (t)he litigated land is part of public land alienable and disposable for homestead and [F]ree Patent. On December 27, 1985, the appellate court set aside the lower courts decision, declared as valid and subsisting Atienzas OCT, and dismissed the crossclaim of the DBP. After receiving a copy of said decision, Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili informed the Director of Lands of the adverse decision of the appellate court, which noted that no appellees brief had been filed in said court. Agcaoili also stated that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had not been furnished with the appellants brief; that the Bureau of Lands received notice of hearing of the record on appeal filed by the appellant but the OSG had not been informed of the action taken thereon; that since the Bureau of Lands had been furnished directly with relevant pleadings and orders, the same office should take immediate appropriate action on the decision; and that it may file a motion for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from January 6, 1986, the date of receipt by the OSG of the copy of the decision sought to be appealed. On January 28, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated February 12, 1986. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said resolution was likewise denied. Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious.3 Respect for the appellants right, however, carries with it the corresponding respect for the appellees similar rights to fair play and justice. Thus, appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.4 Of paramount importance is the duty of an appellant to serve a copy of his brief upon the appellee with proof of service thereof.5 This procedural requirement is consonant with Section 2 of Rule 13, which mandates that all pleadings and papers shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties affected thereby. The importance of serving copies of the brief upon the adverse party is understood in Mozar v. Court of Appeals,6 where the Court held that the appellees should have been given an opportunity to file their appellees brief in the Court of Appeals if only to emphasize the necessity of due process. In this case, however, the Court of Appeals, oblivious of the fact that this case involves public lands requiring as it does the exercise of extraordinary caution lest said lands be dissipated and erroneously alienated to undeserving or unqualified private individuals, decided the appeal without hearing the governments side. Atienza avers that he furnished Atty. Francisco Torres, a lawyer in the Bureau of Lands and designated special attorney for the Office of the Solicitor General, with two copies of the appellants brief, thereby implying that it was not his fault that petitioner failed to file its appellees brief.
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Such an assertion betrays a lack of comprehension of the role of the Solicitor General as government counsel or of the OSG as the governments law office.7 Only the Solicitor General, as the lawyer of the government, can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and, therefore, actions filed in the name of the Republic, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, will be summarily dismissed.8 Specifically, he is empowered to represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings,9 such as, an action for cancellation of title and for reversion of a homestead to the government.10 Hence, he is entitled to be furnished with copies of all court orders, notices and decisions. Consequently, service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary period for filing appeals and for finality of decisions. His representative, who may be a lawyer from the Bureau of Lands, has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal should be made.11 Service of the appellants brief on Atty. Torres was no service at all upon the Solicitor General. It may be argued that Atty. Torres could have transmitted one of the two copies of appellants brief upon the Solicitor General, but such omission does not excuse Atienzas failure to serve a copy of his brief directly on the Solicitor General. On the part of the appellate court, its decision based solely on, and even quoting verbatim from, the appellants brief was certainly arrived at in grave abuse of discretion. It denied appellee (petitioner herein) of the opportunity to be heard and to rebut Atienzas allegations, in rank disregard of its right to due process. Such violation of due process could have been rectified with the granting of petitioners motion for reconsideration by the appellate court,12 but even the door to this recourse was slammed by the appellate court with the denial of petitioners motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 12, 1986, which ruling erroneously applied the Habaluyas doctrine.13 Such denial notwithstanding, petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. Considering the clear allegations thereunder, the appellate court would have done well, in the interest of justice, not to blindly adhere to technical rules of procedure by dismissing outright said motion. As we declared in Villareal v. Court of Appeals:14 x x x. The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain and air their side. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling taken. (Italics supplied) In view of the foregoing and the long-standing procedural rule that this Court may review the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals in the event that they may be contrary to those of the trial court,15 in order to attain substantial justice, the Court now reviews the facts of the case. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.16 In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources17 (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources).18 Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department through the Office of the President.19 Courts have no authority to do so.20 Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant21 who, in this case, is Atienza. The records show, however, that he failed to present clear, positive and absolute evidence22 to overcome said presumption and to support his claim. Atienzas claim is rooted in the March 9, 1932 decision of the then Court of First Instance of Tayabas in Cadastral Case No. 76, which was not given much weight by the court a quo, and for good reasons. Apart from his assertions before this Court, Atienza failed to present proof that he or his predecessor-in-interest was one of the claimants who answered the petition filed by the then Attorney-General in the said cadastral proceedings. The document reflecting said cadastral decision, a xerox copy, indicated the claimants simply as Jose Abastillas et al. In support of that decision, Atienza presented a certification purportedly issued by someone from the Technical Reference Section of the Surveys Division, apparently of the Bureau of Lands, stating that Lot 5886 is a portion of Lot 5139 Pagbilao Cadastre, which
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evidence is, however, directly controverted by the sketch plan showing that the land in controversy is actually outside the alienable and dispos able public lands, although part of Lot 5139. The fact that Atienza acquired a title to the land is of no moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system. In Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 we ruled that the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. The fraud contemplated by the law (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, that is, an intentional omission of fact required by law,24 which in the case at bench consisted in the failure of Atienza to state that the land sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest lands. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the court a quo dated July 27, 1981, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Feliciano (Chairman), Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur. Judgment reversed and set aside. Decision of court a quo reinstated. Notes.The authority given to the Lands Department over the disposition of public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory action, the public character of the land notwithstanding. (Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 446 [1992]) It is now settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily and ultimately to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. (Busante vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 774 [1992]) o0o

Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Republic vs. Register of Deeds, 244 SCRA 537(1995)]

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for the Director of Forestry. In fact, the court allowed the Provincial Fiscal to adduce evidence for the latter official and his government agency without the private respondent registering any opposition. That fact estopped the court and the private respondent from later questioning the personality of the Director of Forestry. Moreover, pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of the Revised Administrative Code and P.D. No. 478, the Solicitor General acts as counsel for the government in land registration cases and not for any particular government official and agency. His appearance therein is premised on his authority to protect the interest of the government and not that of any particular government official or agency.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Mandamus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Edmundo T. Zepeda for private respondent. ROMERO, J.: G.R. No. 41968. February 15, 1995.* THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. THE HON. JUDGE DELIA P. MEDINA and DOMINGO REYES, respondents.
Land Registration; Solicitor General; As deputy, the fiscal is no more than the "surrogate" of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding.The Solicitor General, therefore, has "control and supervision" over the fiscal who has been deputized to appear for him. As such deputy, the fiscal is no more than the "surrogate" of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding. The Solicitor General's request for his representation does not make the fiscal the counsel of the Republic. As the principal counsel, the Solicitor General is entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and decisions. Same; Same; Service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary period for filing appeals and for determining whether a decision had attained finality.Since court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as an agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General, "service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary period for filing appeals and for determining whether a decision had attained finality." Same; Same; Pursuant to the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code and P.D. No. 478, the Solicitor General acts as counsel for the government in land registration cases and not for any particular government official and agency.We hold that under the law and the peculiar circumstances of this case, such appeal was also timely filed. After he had entered his appearance as counsel for the Director of Lands and deputized the provincial fiscal to appear during the hearings, the latter appeared, not only as counsel for the Director of Lands, but also

In 1968 Domingo Reyes sought the registration of eight (8) parcels of land in the barrios of Vigo, Catidang, and Tala in San Narciso (now San Andres), Quezon before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch I, as a land registration court. The Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application, as did several private individuals. In due course, the court issued a general order of default except for the Director of Lands and the private oppositors. During the hearings of the case, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon appeared as counsel for both the Director of Lands and the then Director of Forestry. Although the latter did not formally enter his appearance in the case, the court allowed him, through the Provincial Fiscal, to introduce evidence in support of the fact that 176 hectares of the area sought to be registered fell within the forest classification and, therefore, were inalienable and unregisterable. On July 31, 1974, Judge Delia P. Medina rendered a decision adjudicating to Domingo Reyes the four (4) parcels of land sought to be registered and ordering their registration in his name. The Provincial Fiscal received a copy of the Decision on August 8, 1974, but the Solicitor General received his copy only on November 13, 1974.

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On December 12, 1974, within the 30-day period then required for interposing an appeal, the Solicitor General filed for the Directors of Land and Forest Development, a notice of appeal and an urgent motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal, which the Provincial Fiscal eventually filed on January 2, 1975. On December 26, 1974, however, counsel for Domingo Reyes filed an opposition to the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file record on appeal. He contended that since it was principally the Provincial Fiscal who represented both the Directors of Land and Forest Development and who received the copy of the Decision on August 8, 1974, the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time filed by the Solicitor General had been filed out of time, the Decision, having become final and executory. The Solicitor General replied that since he was the counsel of record and principal counsel with the Provincial Fiscal appearing merely as his representative in the case, he should have been served all pleadings and processes in the case and that receipt by the fiscal of the decision was not equivalent to his receipt thereof inasmuch as such representation did not divest him of control over the case as its principal counsel. Domingo Reyes reacted to these averments by arguing that although the Office of the Solicitor General filed for the Bureau of Lands an opposition to his application for registration, there was no justification for the Solicitor General's claim that he was the principal counsel for the oppositors as other lawyers had appeared for and in behalf of both the private and public oppositors. Moreover, it was the Provincial Fiscal who "carried the brunt for the oppositor Bureau of Forestry" and not the Solicitor General who did not appear and participate during the hearings of the case. In his rejoinder, the Solicitor General asserted that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 478, he was the government's representative in land registration cases; that his authority to deputize the Provincial Fiscal in the performance of his duties did not divest him of control over the case; and that in the land registration case at hand, he did not empower the Provincial Fiscal to receive pleadings and court processes. On March 31, 1975, Judge Medina issued an order ruling that, as far as the Director of Lands was concerned, the period to file an appeal should be counted from receipt of the Decision by the Solicitor General considering that the Provincial Fiscal who had appeared as counsel of record "with personality separate and distinct from that of the Solicitor General('s)," had expressly

informed the court and the adverse party that he was a mere representative of the Solicitor General. Citing Circular No. 41,1 which was issued on November 28, 1973 by the Secretary of Justice, Judge Medina opined that in cases where fiscals had been authorized to appear by the Solicitor General, they appeared as special attorneys of the Office of the Solicitor General. Judge Medina also stated: "The Fiscal, being thus a mere representative and extension of the personality of the Solicitor General cannot be considered as a separate counsel of record for the oppositor, Director of Lands, notice to whom is also notice to the Solicitor General, as contemplated in the case of Palteng vs. Court of Appeals (26 SCRA 736). The Solicitor General, being the principal counsel, is entitled to service of the orders, pleadings and the decision in this case and pursuant to Circular No. 41 of the Department of Justice, the service to him of the decision rendered in this case shall be the basis of the finality thereof. However, the above is true only with respect to the opposition of the Director of Lands, since it was only the Director of Lands for whom the Solicitor General entered a formal opposition and specifically authorized the Fiscal to appear in his behalf, in the light of Circular No. 41 of the Department of Justice. The record shows that the Director of Forestry was represented only by the Fiscal who did not interpose for him a timely appeal despite receipt of the Decision on August 8, 1974, hence, said Decision has become final and executory as to the Director of Forestry."2 Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal of the Director of Forestry, gave due course to the appeal of the Director of Lands, and directed the Solicitor General to amend the notice of appeal and record on appeal within ten (10) days from notice. In behalf of the Director of Forest Development, the Solicitor General filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Order of March 31, 1975, on the ground that since Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 478 vests upon the Solicitor General the exclusive authority to represent the government and its officers, service of the Decision upon the Provincial Fiscal who had "no legal personality by himself to appear for the Director of Forestry" produced "no legal effect whatever and his inaction" could not bind the Director of Forestry. The Solicitor General also contended that although he had not filed a formal opposition to the application for land registration in behalf of the Director of Forestry, he should be "deemed for all legal intents and purposes" said Director's counsel and receipt by him of copy of the Decision should be determinative of its finality.
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Said motion was denied by the lower court on June 17, 1975 for lack of merit. On July 22, 1975, the Solicitor General filed a motion for a 30-day extension within which to submit an amended record on appeal. Domingo Reyes opposed the motion, and on July 31, 1975, the lower court dismissed the Solicitor General's appeal for his failure to amend the notice of appeal and record on appeal as required in the order of March 31, 1975, after a lapse of more than three months. It turned out, however, that a motion for extension of time dated July 23, 1975, had in fact been filed by the Solicitor General because on August 1, 1975, the lower court issued an Order holding that such motion had been "rendered moot and academic" by its Order of July 31, 1975, dismissing the appeal interposed by the Solicitor General. Nevertheless, on August 14, 1975, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an amended notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. On August 22, 1975, a special counsel filed a motion and manifestation stating that upon the instruction of the Provincial Fiscal, he was submitting a motion for reconsideration signed by the Assistant Solicitor General and an amended record on appeal incorporating relevant pleadings and orders. He manifested that "the Office of the Provincial Fiscal was not able to immediately comply with the wire-request dated July 22, 1975 for the reason that said wire-request was received by this Office only on July 30, 1975, aside from the fact that the record of this Office regarding this case has all been forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor General."3 The said motion for reconsideration of the Order of July 31, 1975, was filed by the Solicitor General for the Director of Lands. It alleged: "x x x xxx xxx

erroneously filed with the Court of Appeals on July 22, 1975. Sad to state, said Provincial Fiscal did not comply with aforesaid instruction to file the amended record on appeal. Had he immediately done so upon receipt of the wire dated July 22, 1975, there would have been no occasion for this Court to issue the Order dated July 31, 1975 since the desired amendment, as we see it, merely involves the simple expedient of deleting or striking out from the notice of appeal dated December 12, 1974, the Director of Forest Development as party appellant thereby leaving the Director of Lands as the sole appellant herein, which act the Clerk of Court may well do by himself upon the direction of the Court; 4. That there being no showing that the amendment directed by the Court is necessary for the proper understanding and resolution of the issues, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 41, Rev. Rules of Court, the omission of the Fiscal in making such amendment should not prejudice the Director of Lands who has seasonably perfected his appeal; x x x." To this motion, the Solicitor General attached the amended record on appeal. In an order dated November 12, 1975, the lower court denied the said two motions. Thereupon, the Solicitor General instituted the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of the Directors of Land and Forest Development. He averred that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, "or at least, in violation of law," in dismissing the appeal of the Director of Forestry, because while said official did not file a written opposition to the application for land registration, the lower court allowed him to adduce evidence which fact "could not legally foreclose the said petitioner's right to appeal through his principal counselthe Solicitor Generalwho x x x interposed for him a timely appeal." The Solicitor General also charged the lower court with having acted with grave abuse of discretion, "or at least in violation of law," in dismissing the appeal of the Director of Lands for his failure to file an amended record on appeal within the ten-day period granted him. He argued that while Sec. 7, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates the inclusion in an amended record on appeal of any matter essential to the determination of a case, the lower court directed the exclusion of the Director of Forestry as a party litigant as well as all pleadings bearing on his opposition.

2. That previously, on April 29, 1975 a partial motion for reconsideration of the Order of March 31, 1975 was presented by undersigned counsel which was denied in an Order dated June 17, 1975, which second order although received by the Office of the Solicitor General on June 23, 1975 was actually delivered to the undersigned Solicitor in charge of the case only on July 16, 1975; 3. That, thereupon, on July 22, 1975 the Solicitor General wired the Provincial Fiscal directing him to file immediately the amended record on appeal pursuant to the order of March 31, 1971, at the same time filing a motion for extension of time to file the amended record on appeal but which was

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In his manifestation and motion, private respondent alleged, among others, that certain portions of the tract of land subject of his application for registration are within the alienable and disposable areas of the public forest lands. The Solicitor General disputed said allegation, stating that according to the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), the areas referred to by private respondent are not entirely alienable and disposable. Although the averments of the parties are factual matters which are not within the ambit of this Court's jurisdiction, the contradictory allegations on such factual issues necessitate a review of the merits of the application for land registration. Such a review may only be done upon a favorable action on the instant petition which we find to be impressed with merit. The instant petition actually requires an examination of the extent of the authority of the Solicitor General to represent the government and to delegate his authority to the Provincial Fiscal, although principally assailing the ruling of the lower court as regards the timeliness of the appeal interposed by the petitioners. As regards the authority of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the government when he entered an opposition to the private respondent's application for land registration, the law then governing was the Revised Administr ative Code, as amended, which states: "SEC. 1661. Duties of the Solicitor General.As principal law officer of the Government, the Solicitor-General shall have authority to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. Upon the request of the President or Speaker of any of the Houses of the Congress of the Philippines, the SolicitorGeneral or his authorized representative shall assist and attend any legislative committee that may be practicing any investigation ordered by the Congress, or by any of the Houses thereof. It shall, among other things, be his duty, in person or by proper subordinate: xxx xxx xxx

"x x x

xxx

x x x."

When the decision in the land registration case was promulgated on July 31, 1974, the law in force was Presidential Decree No. 478, the Magna Carta of the Office of the Solicitor General,4 which took effect immediately after its issuance on June 4, 1974.5 This law provides that: "SECTION 1. Functions and Organization.(1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: "x x x xxx x x x.

(e) Represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings. Institute actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution. "x x x xxx x x x.

(g) Deputize, whenever in the opinion of the Solicitor General the public interest requires, any provincial or city fiscal to assist him in the performance of any function or discharge of any duty incumbent upon him, within the jurisdiction of the aforesaid provincial or city fiscal. When so deputized, the fiscal shall be under the control and supervision of the Solicitor General with regard to the conduct of the proceedings assigned to the fiscal, and he may be required to render reports or furnish information regarding the assignment." The Solicitor General, therefore, has "control and supervision" over the fiscal who has been deputized to appear for him. As such deputy, the fiscal is no more than the "surrogate" of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding.6 The Solicitor General's request for his representation does not make the fiscal the counsel of the Republic.7 As the principal counsel, the Solicitor General is entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and decisions.8 Since court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as an agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding
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(b) To represent (the United States in the Supreme Court in all criminal cases, and to represent the United States and) the Government of the Philippines in the Supreme Court in all civil actions and special proceedings in which (either of) said Government, or any officer thereof in his official capacity, is a party.

until they are actually received by the Solicitor General,9 "service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary period for filing appeals and for determining whether a decision had attained finality."10 All these jurisprudential pronouncements inexorably point to no other conclusion than that the appeal herein involved was timely filed by the Solicitor General. Considering, however, that the Solicitor General entered his appearance only for the Director of Lands, was the appeal interposed by the Director of Forestry (later Forest Development) likewise deemed timely filed? We hold that under the law and the peculiar circumstances of this case, such appeal was also timely filed. After he had entered his appearance as counsel for the Director of Lands and deputized the provincial fiscal to appear during the hearings, the latter appeared, not only as counsel for the Director of Lands, but also for the Director of Forestry. In fact, the court allowed the Provincial Fiscal to adduce evidence for the latter official and his government agency without the private respondent registering any opposition. That fact estopped the court and the private respondent from later questioning the personality of the Director of Forestry. Moreover, pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of the Revised Administrative Code and P.D. No. 478, the Solicitor General acts as counsel for the government in land registration cases and not for any particular government official and agency. His appearance therein is premised on his authority to protect the interest of the government and not that of any particular government official or agency. Considering the foregoing, the lower court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal of the government on the basis of what it perceived as a procedural lapse. The lower court should be reminded that the ends of substantial justice should be the paramount consideration in any litigation or proceeding. As this Court ruled in Republic v. Associacion Benevola de Cebu,11 "to dismiss the Republic's appeal merely on the alleged ground of late filing is not proper considering the merits of the case" and to ignore the evidence presented by the provincial fiscal in behalf of the Director of Forestry which constituted the crux of the government's case "would defeat the timehonored Constitutional precepts and the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony." This notwithstanding, we need not discuss the issue raised as regards the filing of the record on appeal, as such procedural requirement has

been dropped under Sec. 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines dated January 11, 1983. Now, a word about the working relationship between the Solicitor General and his deputy, the Provincial Fiscal. The problems ventilated in this petition would not have arisen had there been close coordination between the two officials and their respective offices to the end that all problems, whether substantive or procedural, could have been ironed out before they worsened. They should have remembered that they were representing the interests of the Republic which should, in no case, be compromised through neglect, inefficiency, or even ignorance, but accorded utmost attention. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby GRANTED and the questioned orders of the lower court dismissing the appeal interposed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the government are SET ASIDE. The Solicitor General is directed to file the proper petition for review before the Court of Appeals which shall resolve with dispatch the instant land registration case which has been pending for some twenty years. SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Melo, Vitug and Francisco JJ., concur. Petition granted, orders set aside. Note.Service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary period for filing of appeals and for determining whether a decision had attained finality. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 1 [1991]) o0o

Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [The Director of Lands vs. Medina, 241 SCRA 340(1995)]

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remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. Same; Action height one year from issuance of decree.The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof (Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 357 [1977]). An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner (Director of Lands, et. al. v. Register of Deeds, et al. 92 Phil. 827 [1953]). Same; Action for reconveyance of property on the ground of fraudfiled within four years from discovery of fraudPetitioner's action for reconveyance had already prescribed. An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title (Babin v. Medalla, 108 SCRA 666; and Alarcon v. Bidin, 120 SCRA 390). PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan.

No. L-67583. July 31, 1987.* BASILISA S. ESCONDE, petitioner, vs. HON. SAMILO N. BARLONGAY and RAMON V. DELFIN, respondents. Land Registration; In case a decree of registration is obtained by fraud, party defrauded has one year from entry of the decree to file a petition for review, provided there has been no transfer to an innocent purchaser for value.lt is a settled doctrine that when a decree of registration has been obtained by fraud, the party defrauded has only one year from entry of the decree to file a petition for review before a competent court, provided that the land has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value. Same; Failure to object to registration under Torrens System or to question its validity within one year after issuance of certificate of title claimant lost his right to such land.It has been held that a claimant having failed to present his answer or objection to the registration of a parcel of land under the Torrens System or to question the validity of such registration within a period of one year after the certificate of title had been issued, had forever lost his right in said land even granting that he had any right therein. Same; Action for reconveyancea legal remedy granted to rightful owner of land wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another to compel the latter to reconvey the land to him.An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April 16, 1984 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan, Branch CLXXII, dismissing petitioner's complaint. The facts admitted by the parties are the following: Private respondent Ramon V. Delfin is the applicant in the "Application for Registration of Title" dated April 14, 1969, docketed as LRC Case No. 710-V
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at the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, Valenzuela, Metro Manila (now RTC, NCJR, Branch 171, Valenzuela). The land subject of the Application, Reconveyance and the present petition is one and the same parcel of land containing an area of 2,273 sq. in. The application was granted in a "Decision" dated December 8, 1969, and private respondent received copy thereof on the same date. Said parcel of land is now covered by OCT No. 05002 issued on January 23, 1971 by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. On February 13, 1978 said private respondent Ramon V. Delfin as applicant in the LRC Case filed his "Petition for Writ of Possession" against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 6-7, Rollo, p. 120). On March 6, 1978, Judge Crispin V. Bautista issued an Order denying for lack of merit the opposition filed by the Esconde spouses to the petition for Writ of Possession. On September 26, 1978, Judge Avelino M. Constantino, who took over the same branch presided over by Judge Bautista, issued an Order for a writ of possession against the said spouses. Petitioner filed with the same court a Petition to quash the Writ of Possession to which an Opposition was filed by the private respondent (Comment, Rollo, pp. 88-90). On October 6, 1978, herein petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 5th Judicial District, Branch VIII (now RTC, NCJR, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Bulacan) a complaint for reconveyance, against the herein private respondent, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 721-V78 (Record, pp. 24-28). On October 14, 1978, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint with prayer for stay of execution of judgment in LRC Case No. V-710 (Ibid., p. 29-33). Private respondent, in a Motion to Dismiss dated December 26, 1978, moved for the dismissal of the case on the grounds, among others, that (1) the cause of action, if any, is barred by res judicata; (2) the complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action f or reconveyance; and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the case (Ibid., pp. 34-39). On January 15, 1979, petitioner filed a Rejoinder to Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Complaint to Include Plaintiff s Husband as Party-Plaintiff (Ibid., pp. 40-44). On the same date, the Amended Complaint was filed (Ibid., pp. 45-50).

Private respondent filed a Reply to Rejoinder (Opposition) to Motion to dismiss with Opposition to the Motion For Leave of Court to Amend Complaint, dated January 18, 1979 (Ibid., pp. 51-54). On June 5, 1979, Judge Constantino denied Petition to Quash Writ of Possession (Rollo, p. 108). The Sheriff then delivered possession to the private respondent, but then petitioner re-entered the premises and took possession thereof, hence private respondent filed a Motion for an Alias Writ of Possession on March 2, 1983. On March 4, 1983, an order directed the issuance of an alias writ of possession. On March 29, 1983, the Sheriff turned over possession of the premises to the representative of the private respondent. This notwithstanding, when private respondent went to the premises, he was barred by the petitioner from entering the property. Consequently, private respondent asked for a writ of demolition for the removal of any construction of the Esconde family on the premises and to cite petitioner Basilisa Esconde for contempt of court. On November 17, 1983, private respondent moved for a second alias writ of possession in view of the failure of the petitioner to turn over possession of the premises to private respondent and the same was granted in the Order of November 21, 1983. Petitioner then filed with Judge Avelino M. Constantino of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Motion to Quash and/or to Hold in Abeyance Execution of Second Alias Writ of Possession on the ground that they have filed a civil action for reconveyance. On February 1, 1984, petitioner filed a Motion to Expedite Resolution of Pending Incidents and Motion For Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (Ibid., pp. 5759). On February 13, 1984, private respondent filed a Manifestation With Opposition to Motion for Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (Ibid., pp. 60-62). Respondent Judge, in an Order dated April 16, 1984 (Ibid., pp. 63-64), dismissed the complaint for reconveyance on the grounds: (1) that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by res judicata; and (2) that the Motion to Admit Amended Complaint and for Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
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Injunction is not proper as it seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a writ of possession issued by another branch of this Court which is not allowed. Hence, the instant petition (Ibid., pp. 10-23). The Second Division, in a Resolution dated August 29, 1984, resolved to require the respondents to comment (Ibid., p. 75). On October 20, 1984, respondents, in compliance with the above-mentioned Resolution, filed their Comment (Ibid., pp. 87-101). In a Resolution dated December 3, 1984, the Second Division resolved to give due course to the petition; and to consider respondents' comment to the petition as an answer (Ibid., p. 110). In a letter dated January 21, 1985, counsel for the petitioner was required to file petitioner's brief (Ibid., p. 112). In compliance therewith, said brief was filed on March 23, 1985 (Ibid., p. 120). On April 1, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion to Include Additional PartyRespondent and Motion for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, praying, among others, that the Sheriff be included as additional party-respondent (Ibid., pp. 122-126). The Second Division, in a Resolution dated April 17, 1985, resolved to require the respondents to comment on the motion by counsel for the petitioner to include an additional partyrespondent and the motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction (Ibid., p. 141). On May 7, 1985, respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Include Additional Party-Respondent and Motion for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction (Ibid., pp. 142-146). On June 21, 1985, Brief for the Respondents was filed (Ibid., p. 148). The Second Division, in a Resolution dated November 11, 1985, resolved to consider the case submitted for deliberation (Ibid., p. 158). On November 26, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Resolution of her motion of April 1, 1985motion to include the Sheriff as party-respondent and for the issuance of a preliminary injunction (Ibid., pp. 159-162). This motion of petitioner, in a Resolution dated December 11, 1985, was noted by said Division (Ibid., p. 165).

On February 1, 1986, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion, praying, among others, for the inclusion of the Sheriff as party-respondent, and thereafter, for an injunction directing the Sheriff to restore the peaceful possession of the land to petitioner (Ibid., pp. 166-171). The Second Division, in a Resolution dated February 17, 1986, resolved to issue a temporary restraining order directing the Sheriff and private respondent to refrain from enforcing and/or carrying out the Third Alias Writ of Possession (Ibid., p. 176). On March 4, 1986, petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Resolution and Temporary Restraining. Order both dated February 17, 1986, either nullifying the Third Alias Writ of Possession served or in the alternative to issue a mandatory injunction (Ibid., pp. 179-183). This motion was denied by the Division in a Resolution dated May 21,1986 (Ibid., p. 185). The issues in this case are 1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA; and 2. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ADMIT AMENDED COMPLAINT AND FOR ISSUANCE OF RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS PROPER. The petition is devoid of merit. Land registration proceedings in this case commenced on April 14,1969 and decision thereon was rendered on December 8, 1969. Hence, the law in force at the time was Act 496, P.D. 1529 (otherwise known as Property Registration Decree) having taken effect only on Jan. 23, 1979.1 The pertinent provisions of said Act 496 read: "SEC. 34. Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf. (As amended by Sec. 1, Act No. 3621)." "SEC. 35. If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
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appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the application to be taken for confessed. By the description in the notice, 'To all whom it may concern,' all the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. After such default and order, the court may enter a decree confirming the title of the applicant and ordering registration of the same. (As amended by Sec. 8, Act No. 1699)." On the other hand, under Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the effect of such order is as follows: "SEC. 2. Effect of order of default.Except as provided in section 9 of Rule 13, a party declared in default shall not be entitled to notice or subsequent proceedings, nor to take part in the trial." Petitioner's claim that she came to know of the land registration case only upon receipt of a Petition for Writ of Possession is completely rebutted by private respondent's evidence. In the notice of Initial Hearing (Rollo, p. 148-a) she is one of those cited to appear; in the Survey Notification Letter (Rollo, p. 148-c) her husband was notified of the scheduled survey of the land as indicated by his signature opposite his name and in the Surveyor's Certificate (Rollo, p. 148-b) her husband was reported one of the adjoining owners present. There is no question that notice to her husband is notice to her under the law, her husband being the administrator of the conjugal partnership (Art. 165, Civil Code). Otherwise stated, there was no concealment on the part of private respondent. In fact, the records show that private respondent stated in his application for registration of title that a portion of the land was being occupied by petitioner sometime in September 1967, by breaking the stone wall fence without his knowledge and consent (Application for Registration of Title; Rollo, p. 102). However, petitioner and her husband, despite the chance given them to be heard in the land registration proceedings, opted not to appear. Thus, as aptly stated by respondent Judge, "A land registration proceedings which is in rem, is valid and conclusive against the whole world. The failure of the plaintiff and her husband, despite the notice of the publication and posting by the sheriff of the notice of hearing, to oppose the defendant's application for registration will bar her from filing this action." (Order, dated April 16, 1984; Civil Case No. 721-V-78; Rollo, p. 64). Under Section 38 of Act 496 'x x x Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto x x x. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,

whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation or included in the general description To all whom it may concern'." That under said section, this decree became conclusive after one year from the date of the entry, is not disputed (Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 354 [1923]). On the contrary, this Court has invariably ruled that "Land Registration is a proceeding in rem and binds all persons known and unknown." (Moscoso v. C.A., 128 SCRA 70 [1984]). It is a settled doctrine that when a decree of registration has been obtained by fraud, the party def rauded has only one year from entry of the decree to file a petition for review before a competent court, provided that the land has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value. Said Section 38 categorically declares that "upon the expiration of the said term of one (1) year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible (Albienda v. C.A., 135 SCRA 406-407 [1985]). Hence, it was established that when no answer in writing nor any opposition is made to an application for registration of property in Court, all the allegations contained in the application shall be held as confessed by reason of the absence of denial on the part of the opponent. A person who has not challenged an application for registration of land even if the appeal afterwards interposed is based on the right of dominion over the same land, cannot allege damage or error against the judgment ordering the registration inasmuch as he did not allege or pretend to have any right to such land (Cabanas v. Director of Lands, 10 Phil. 393). In the same manner, it has been held that a claimant having failed to present his answer or objection to the registration of a parcel of land under the Torrens System or to question the validity of such registration within a period of one year after the certificate of title had been issued, had forever lost his right in said land even granting that he had any right therein (De los Reyes v. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420). However, an action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him (Bilog, "Remedies Available to Aggrieved Parties As a Consequence of Registration Under the Torrens System"; Property Registration 1979; pp. 122-123). The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property
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is not the real owner thereof (Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 357 [1977]). An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner (Director of Lands, et al. v. Register of Deeds, et al. 92 Phil. 827 [1953]). Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper remedy. As earlier stated, there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period of one year within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions, the Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered owner (Paterno, et al. v. Salud, 118 Phil. 933934 [1963]). Even more implicitly, this Court held in Rural Bank of Paraaque, Inc. v. Remolado (135 SCRA 412 [1985]) that: "Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves comiseration or sympathy." Moreover, petitioner's action for reconveyance had already prescribed. An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title (Balbin v. Medalla, 108 SCRA 666; and Alarcon v. Bidin, 120 SCRA 390). The first issue being without merit and the second issue being a mere incident thereto, there appears to be no necessity to discuss the latter. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. Petition denied; Order affirmed. Notes.Decision which had long become final cannot be disturbed anymore on ground of res judicata. (Republic vs. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186.)

Parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed. It should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. (Sy Kao vs. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 302.) o0o

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easement be noted upon whatever title might be issued to Amado L. Santos for said lots Nos. 122 and 123. Upon the issue thus presented with reference to the reg-istration of said lots Nos. 122 and 123, two questions arose, namely: (1) Was Amado L. Santos the owner in fee simple of said lots Nos. 122 and 123, and entitled to have the same registered under the Cadastral system (Torrens system)? (2) Whether the owner of said lot No. 124 was entitled to have his alleged easement noted upon whatever certificate of title might be issued to Amado L. Santos for lots Nos. 122 and 123. That no person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposi-tion presented against such registration by third persons, has been decided by the courts many times. One of the primary and fundamental purposes of the registration of land under the Torrens system is to secure to the owner an absolute indefeasible title, free from all encumbrances and claims whatsoever, except those mentioned in the cer-tificate of title issued, and, so far as it is possible, to make the certificate issued to the owner by he court, absolute proof of such title. In order that the petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the cer-tificate of title, finally issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the regis-tration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justi-fied in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the registrar tion of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts presented did not show that the peti-tioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered. (Maloles and Malvar vs. Director of Lands, 25 Phil., 548; De los Reyes vs. Paterno, 34 Phil., 420, 424; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil., 367, 376.) The lower court, at the close of the hearing, reached the conclusion that Amado L. Santos had not adduced proof sufficient to show that he was the
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G. R No. 16179

06 October 1921

Director of Lands vs. Agustin

a lien upon a sawmill used in sawing timber on which the forest charges have not been paid. The lien created by that section was evidently intended to apply to property used in relation with a business or occupation subject to some form or other of the privilege taxes recognized in the Internal Revenue Law; and the language used is clearly expressed to this effect. The forest charges for timber taken from the public forests do not constitute a privilege tax on a business or occupation in any sense, and hence the lien does not attach to a sawmill in which the timber is cut into lumber.

In this view of the case it is a matter of indifference whether the sawmill in question was owned by Pujalte & Company or by the bank. Judgment reversed. Johnson, J.:

Some time prior to the 29th day of July, 1918, the Director of Lands presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga for the registration of a cer-tain piece or parcel of land under the Cadastral system. On the 29th day of July, 1918, the appellant Amado L. Santos presented a claim lots Nos. 122 and 123, alleging that said lots belonged to him, and prayed that the same be registered in his name. To the claim of the appellant Amado L. Santos, Ladislao Dayrit presented his opposition, alleging that he was the owner of lot No. 124 and that there existed in favor of said lot (No. 124) an easement upon said lots Nos. 122 and 123, and requested that said

owner in fee simple of said lots Nos. 122 and 123, but granted to him sixty days within which to present additional proof showing his right to have said lots registered, subject, however, to the easement which the said Ladislao Dayrit claimed against said lots. In other words, while the lower court found that the evidence was insufficient to justify a registration of said lots Nos. 122 and 123 under the Cadastral system, it did find that the evidence showed that there existed in favor of lot No. 124 an easement of the right to take water through a canal across said lots Nos. 122 and 123. The said Amado L. Santos, instead of presenting ad-ditional proof showing his right to have said lots Nos. 122 and 123 registered, subject to said easement, immediately ap Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Director of Lands vs. Agustin, 42 Phil., 227(1921)] G.R. No. 112567. February 7, 2000.* THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARINO, respondents.
Land Titles; Land Registration; Private respondents has not produced a single muniment of title to substantiate hijs claim of ownership.The petition for land registration at bar is under the Land Registration Act. Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composition con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and information possessoria or possessory information title, which would become a titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title. In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single muniment of title to substantiate his claim of ownership. The Court has therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss private respondents petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496. Same; Same; Evidence adduced by private respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.Even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondents petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title. Same; Same; Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor.Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor,

unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State. Same; Same; Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed.Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. x x x There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public agricultural lands may be granted judicial recognition. Same; Same; General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. Same; Same; The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation.As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence. The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, by which characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Jose B. Alvarez for private respondent. Agapito G. Carait for the legal heirs of private respondent. PURISIMA, J.:

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At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which affirmed the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in LRC No. B-467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the private respondent. The facts that matter are as follows: On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Carino, filed with the then Branch I, Court of First Instance of Laguna, a petition1 for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911,2 and later administered by him in behalf of his five brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.3 In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Carino, became coowners of Lot No. 6 by virtue of an extrajudicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.4 Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands Management), disclosed: x x x 1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect title is situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna as described on plan Psu-108952 and is identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same is agricultural in nature and the improvements found thereon are sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees and one house of the tenant made of light materials; 2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military reservation, riverbed, park and watershed reservation and that same land is free from claim and conflict;

3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro Manila squatters nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing public land application and no patent or title has been issued therefor; 4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa Lauchangco as mentioned on the Extrajudicial partition dated July 26, 1963 which applicant requested that said instrument will be presented on the hearing of this case; and that said land is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the name of the petitioner; x x x5 With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as the only oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court granted private respondents petition, disposing thus: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders and declares the registration and confirmation of title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6, plan Psu108952, identical to Cadastral Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna, containing an area of FORTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters, mcve or less, in favor of applicant AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to Francisca Alomia, of legal age, Filipino, with residence and postal address at Binan, Laguna. After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of decree of registration be issued. SO ORDERED.6 From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which, on November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from. Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that: I.

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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR PROOF OF POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE. II.

but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied) Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State.13 Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. In Director of Lands vs. Agustin,14 this Court stressed that: x x x The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system, simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered.15 There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public agricultural lands may be granted judicial recognition.16

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS A PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.7 The Petition is impressed with merit. The petition for land registration8 at bar is under the Land Registration Act.9 Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and information possessoria or possessory information title, which would become a titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title.10 In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single muniment of title to substantiate his claim of ownership.11 The Court has therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss private respondents petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496. Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondents petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title. Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12 as amended by R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,

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The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated in Republic vs. Lee:17 x x x Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in wellnigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right over the same as dominus. x x x18 In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him (petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title.19 In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to what he theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However, other than his unilateral assertion, private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911. Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.20 From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration covering Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent and his brother, Severino

Carino. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969 declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an assessment of Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.21 It bears stressing that the Exhibit E referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration for subject land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent does not appear to have any sustainable basis. Said Exhibit E shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the name of private respondent and not in the name of his parents.22 The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court is not without exceptions. Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the findings by the lower courts that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private respondents predecessor-in-interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,23 the Court ratiocinated thus: This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the case (People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533, May 3, 1986). This case therefore is an exception to the general rule that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court. and x x x in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering such a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision. 24 Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it examined the original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land involved was never declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the private respondent. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not
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incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of claim of ownership.25 In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:26 x x x if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property.27 As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is selfserving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence. The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, by which characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.28 In a case,29 this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the registration of a parcel of land in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law; holding as follows: Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernards Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in private respondents declaration is hardly the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession, x x x30 In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31 the application for confirmation of imperfect title was likewise denied on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit:

We hold that applicants nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de duefio. Although they claimed that they have possessed the land since 1950, they declared it for tax purposes only in 1972. It is not clear whether at the time they filed their application in 1973, the lot was still cogon land or already cultivated land. They did not present as witness their predecessor, Penaflor, to testify on his alleged possession of the land. They alleged in their application that they had tenants on the land. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicants had possessed the land as owners. xxx On the basis of applicants insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be concluded that they have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they had performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant of a portion of the public domain.32 Neither can private respondent seek refuge under RD. No. 1073,33 amending Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, under which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a public land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-interest occupied subject land under the conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could only establish his possession since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by law. The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by the private respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property.34 To reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State.35 Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus.36 Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his petition for registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto de duetto for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition,37 the Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the public domain not registrable in the name of private respondent.
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WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. B-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and more particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the administrative supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Petition granted, judgment set aside. Note.The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. (Palomo vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 392 [1997]) o0o

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happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorized. Same; Same; Judgments; The doctrine in Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, needs re-evaluation; A final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining ownership of a certain land is res judicata in the kind registration case where the parties and the property are identical including the addition of a party in the registration case where he claims co-ownership.There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The decision in C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayabas co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the coownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano in his and Bienvenido Noriegas favor. With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayabas and Noriegas names. Same; Same; Same, Caption of the complaint, as action to recover possession, does not control where same is really an accion reinvidicatoria.While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an accion reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two cases there is identity of causes of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in ones name is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which is different. But the employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

No. L-55152. August 19, 1986.* FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents.
Land Registration; Actions; Practice & Pleadings; In land registration cases, an opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with counterclaim and a motion to dismiss the opposition is not unauthorized as Rules of Court are merely suppletory to such proceedings.Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 4961 does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be registered in appellants name had previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to ran its usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same consideration applies to the case at bar. Same; Same; Same; Same.It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if ever,

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PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Br. II. Plan, J.

Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive possession thereof in the concept of owners by installing as caretaker one Fermin Lozano, who had his house built thereon. On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and one Bienvenido G. Noriegas favor on June 30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano from possession of the land. He subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land. On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a complaint against private respondent for recovery of possession of said parcels of land. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Branch 11-895, was in due time resolved in favor of petitioners who were declared owners thereof. On appeal, however, by private respondent to the then Court of Appeals, the appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, the appellate court in a decision promulgated on January 19, 1978, reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the complaint of petitioners on a finding that: Firstly, the land in question described in the complaint and sketched in Exhibit C x x x by Dr. Guillermo Blanco, is completely different from the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the appellant, their respective area and boundaries being completely dissimilar. Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence of the appellees showing that their property encroaches, much less covers that of the property presently occupied by the appellant, except the self-serving sketch prepared by the appellees own witness, Dr. Blanco. We refuse to give any weight to this piece of evidence because it was prepared by someone who has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statement or to suppress or prevent the truth or to state what is false. [Deering v. Wisona Harvester Workers. 155 U.S. Sun Ct. Rep. 238] Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not been successfully identified with that described in the complaint, the instant action should have been dismissed outright, in view of the provision of Article 434 of the New Civil Code which reads. Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioners. Diosdado B. Ramirez for private respondent. FERNAN, J.: Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order are two [2] orders issued by respondent judge in Land Registration Case No. Branch II-N-204 of the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, entitled, Application for Registration of Title, Vicencio Q. Cayaba, Applicant, versus Flordeliza Valisno and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors, the order dated July 2, 1980, dismissing the opposition filed by petitioners on the ground of res judicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The antecedents are as follows: On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio Valisno purchased from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed Blanco, two parcels of land, particularly described as follows: [a] a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim, Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Five Thousand (5,000) square meters or fifty (50) meters facing the Provincial Road by one hundred (100) meters long; bounded on the North by Pedro del Rosario, on the South by Alberto Tungangui, on the East by the Provincial Road; and on the West, by Terreno del Estado, now Matias del Rosario; and, [b] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (6,250) square meters or fifty (50) meters at the east side by one hundred twenty-five (125) meters at the North and South; bounded on the north by Matias del Rosario, on the south by Alberto Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and on the west by Cauayan Diversion Road and Matias del Rosario. [Annex B, Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo ]

defendants claim. as well as the doctrine enunciated in a long line of decision [sic] starting from Lim vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 343. Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the present occupant of the land since he purchased the same from Tomasita F. Verano on June 30, 1967, having constructed a six-door apartment in the premises which he lets to both transients and residents of the locality. Being the actual possessor of the property, he, therefore, possesses it with a just title and he need not show or prove why he is possessing the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil Code] Finally, between the evidence of the appellees and that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly choose the latter in the matter of identifying the property in question because it is a vicinity plan [Exhibit 8] showing the position of the land in relation not only to the properties adjoining the same but also with known boundaries and landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the appellees evidence, particularly the description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable, since the area and boundaries of the property are mere estimations, reached thru pure guess-work. [Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 879]. Expressing the same sentiment, one noted authority states: The proposition that in identifying a particular piece of land its boundaries and not the area are the main factors to be considered holds true only when the boundaries given are sufficiently certain and the identity of the land proved by the boundaries clearly indicates that an erroneous statement concerning the area can be disregarded. [Bilog, Effective Judicial Implementation of Land and Forestry Laws, Fourth Advanced Course for Municipal Courts (1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620, September 30, 1963]. (Annex C-1, Petition, pp. 53-55, Rollo.] A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by petitioners before this Court was denied due course. Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court of First Instance of Isabela an application for registration in his name of the title of the lands in question, basing his entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale as well as the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex A, Petition, pp, 32-40, Rollo). On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application. [Annex B, Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private respondent, however, moved for the

dismissal of said opposition on the ground that the same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Despite the opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the first of the assailed orders dismissing the petitioners opposition on the ground of res judicata. [Annex E, Petition, p. 83, Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed the instant petition, raising as grounds therefor the following: RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT OF ABELLERA VS. FAROL THAT RES JUDICATA CANNOT BE SET UP IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES JUDICATA EXIST IN THE CASE AT BAR, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A MOTION TO DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE, AND THAT RES JUDICATA MAY BE RAISED IN SAID MOTION TO DISMISS. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF THEIR DAY IN COURT, SPECIALLY IN THE FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS, ALREADY IN THE RECORD, THAT RESPONDENT CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING TO SECURE TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF THE PETITIONERS. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS ORDERS OF JULY 2, 1980 [ANNEX E] AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980 [ANNEX H]. (pp. 18-19, Rollo) On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their briefs. Petitioners did so on August 26, 1981. Private respondent, on the other hand, failed to file his brief within the given period which expired on October 9, 1981. Thus, the case was considered submitted for decision without the brief of private respondent. On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case No.
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Br. II-N-204, praying that he be included as co-applicant to the land sought to be registered. In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe that the situation obtaining in the case at bar, i.e., a motion to dismiss the opposition having been filed and more importantly, granted, is indeed unique and peculiar. But while this may be so, it is not highly irregular as petitioners would characterize it. Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be registered in appellants name had previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same consideration applies to the case at bar. It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorized. The case of Abellera vs. Farol, 74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by petitioners needs re-evaluation. In said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo, speaking for the Court, ruled that while in a cadastral case, res judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless, prior judgment can not be set up in a motion to dismiss. Concurring in said opinion were then Chief Justice Yulo and Associate Justices Moran and Ozaeta. Mr. Justice Paras dissented, saying in my opinion, Rule 132 in connection with

Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, instead of prohibiting expressly authorizes the lower court in land registration or cadastral proceedings to entertain a motion for dismissal on the ground of res judicata or prescription. Of course, the dismissal of petitioners claim will not necessarily or automatically mean adjudication of title to the individual respondents but it will certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to be contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is the main purpose of said rules. Let there be no retrogression in the application of sound rules and doctrines. [Ibid., pp. 286-287) In support of his opinion, Justice Paras cited the cases of Menor v. Quintana, 56 Phil. 657, Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil. 425 and Santiago v. Santos, 54 Phil. 619, wherein the Court invariably ruled that a final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining the ownership of certain land is res judicata in a registration case when the parties and the property are the same as in the former case. [Menor v. Quintana, supra.] There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The decision in CA. G.R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayabas co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the co-ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his and Bienvenido Noriegas favor. With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayabas and Noriegas names. While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In
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effect, it is in the nature of an accion reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two cases there is identity of causes of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in ones name is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which is different. But the employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. [Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411; Sumarariz v. Development Bank of the Phil., 21 SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v. Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al, 106 Phil. 68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil. 258; San Diego v. Cardona, et al., 70 Phil. 281]. It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the second case is being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough that the court which decided the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata. If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res judicata can be set up by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of another claimant, what useful purpose would be served by allowing a party to present evidence of ownership over the land sought to be registered when the final result would necessarily be in favor of the claimant who had set up the defense of res judicata? And supposing the land registration court finds that the party against whom the principle of res judicata operates does have a better right or title to the land, what happens to the principle of res judicata? Can a court sitting as a land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another court of general jurisdiction?

To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either the application for registration or the opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably shown, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is barred by a prior judgment. The ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned. Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition, respondent court had denied them their day in court. It is well to remind petitioners that they had their day in court in Civil Case No. Branch 11-895 as well as C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R, where their claim over the land in question was fully aired and ventilated. The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent; Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with respect to the land under consideration had been put to rest in C.A. G.R, No. 60142-R. Said decision having attained finality, the same remains the law of the case between the parties. Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing petitioners opposition, such dismissal must be affirmed. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ, concur. Petition dismissed. Notes.A counterclaim should be answered, and failure to do so within the statutory period renders the plaintiff in default, even if a motion to dismiss the counterclaim has been filed. (Zambales Colleges, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 1 SCRA 870.) The right to counterclaim is barred by res judicata where such right was not set up in an earlier case. (Gonzales vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., 15 SCRA 644.) The dismissal of counterclaim for lack of evidence to sustain it is in order. (Blue Bar Coconut Company vs. Hilario, 2 SCRA 325.) o0o

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