PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA September 28, 1954, Paras, C.J.

Facts: Arturo Mendoza and Jovita de Asis were married on Aug. 5, 1936 in Marikina. While the marriage was still subsisting, Mendoza got married to Olga Lema in Manila on May 14, 1941. de Asis died on Feb. 2, 1943. Then, Mendoza contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna on Aug. 19, 1949. He was sued and convicted of bigamy for the second marriage. Issue: WON Mendoza is liable for bigamy

After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City. After her death, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City where she worked as a teachernurse. The accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it appears that Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. The accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang in Sibonga, Cebu. Issue:

Held: No. Sec. 29, Marriage Law Act 3613 (in force at the time appellant contracted his second marriage): Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void unless first marriage has been annulled, dissolved or first spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive years without news if he/she is still alive. Judicial declaration of nullity is only necessary for third case. Thus, his second marriage is null and void without need for judicial declaration. The third marriage was contracted after the death of the first spouse, thus not bigamous. PEOPLE VS. ARAGON G.R. No. L-10016, February 28, 1957 Facts: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Cebu finding Proceso Aragon guilty of bigamy. The accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in Cebu. While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol in Iloilo City.

Whether the accused committed bigamy when he married for the third time. Held: It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, Maria Faicol, whose marriage with the appellant Proceso Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage (the marriage of Proceso Rosima with Maria Gorrea) was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage cannot prosper. TOLENTINO VS. PARAS May 30, 1983, Melencio-Herrera, J. Facts: While marriage was still subsisting with first wife, Amado Tolentino contracted another marriage with Ma. Clemente on Nov. 1, 1948. He was convicted with bigamy. After serving his sentence, he continued living with Clemente until he died. Ma. Clemente was the surviving spouse indicated in his death certificate. Amelita Tolentino, the first wife, claims that she is the

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rightful surviving spouse and petitions for correction of the death certificate. Lower court dismissed petition for lack of proper requisites under law. Issue: WON Tolentino is the rightful surviving spouse Held: Yes. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted of bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of the petitioner and the deceased. The second marriage he contracted was void from the beginning and thus has no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish invalidity of a void marriage. While documents, such as death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy. Therefore, it should be the petitioners name on the death certificate and not the respondent. WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DY August 19, 1986, Paras, J. Facts: Karl Wiegel filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva on the ground of Lilias previous existing marriage to one Eduardo Maxion. Lilia admitted to the previous marriage but claimed that it was null and void since she was forced to enter the said union. In the pre-trial that ensued, both parties agreed that the issue was whether the previous marriage was void or merely voidable. Lilia asked the court for an opportunity to present more evidence but the respondent judge denied the petition. Lilia appeals to the SC in hopes of modifying the agreed facts and to allow her to present evidence in her favor. Issue: WON the prior marriage was void or voidable.

Held: The petition is devoid of merit. There is no need to prove that her marriage was vitiated by force. Assuming, however that this is so, it would still be irrelevant since the previous marriage wasnt void but merely voidable (therefore valid, until annulled). Since no annulment was made, her current marriage is therefore void. DONATO VS. LUNA GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988 Facts: Information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donatos second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already previously married. Issue: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending

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before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question. Held: Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. TERRE VS. TERRE July 3, 1992, Per Curiam Facts: The man, a lawyer, pursued a woman despite knowing that she was already married. He convinced her to marry him and that the first marriage was void because the woman married her first cousin, and was thus void ab initio. Since it was void, according to the lawyer, it was no longer necessary to go to court to declare it as such. She agreed to marry him. After the birth of the first child, the lawyer disappeared and contracted a second marriage while claiming that his marriage to the woman was void from the beginning since she had already married her first cousin. Issue: WON an action for judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage is necessary before entering asubsequent marriage. Held: Yes. Even if the first mistake was contracted in good faith, the lawyer would still be liable for bigamy after he contracted his second one. It was deemed that the moral character of the respondent was deeply flawed and thus, should be disbarred and struck out from the Roll of Attorneys.

JONES VS. HORTIGUELA March 6, 1937, Concepcion, J. Facts: Jones married Escano in December 1914 and had a child with her named Angelita. Four years later Jones secured a passport to go abroad and was never heard from again. Escano instituted proceedings to have her husband judicially decared an absentee. The court issued an order which would take effect six months after publication (Dec. 1919). Later, Escano married Hortiguela in 1927. Escana died intestate leaving her widower Hortiguela as judicial administratrix and both Hortiguela and Angelita as sole heirs. Property was divided accordingly. However, upon Angelitas marriage and her reaching the age of majority, she filed a complaint claiming that she was the only heir of her mother since the marriage between Escano and Hortguela was void because only six years and fourteen days have elapsed prior to the solemnization of the second marriage. Issue: WON the subsequent marriage can be considered void. Held: No. It is not necessary that the former spouse be judicially declared an absentee. The law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage or the former spouse is reputed to be dead and this is the belief of the spouse present. The absence of Jones begins on the date when the latest news about him was received Jan. 10, 1918. Hence, the more than nine years have elapsed prior to the present spouse contracting the subsequent marriage REPUBLIC VS. CA and MOLINA G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

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Facts: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them. Issue: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Held: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity. The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case: burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state. CHOA VS. CHOA GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002

Facts: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case. Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country. Issue: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity. Held: The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion

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bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination. BARCELONA VS. CA September 24, 2003 Facts: On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against his wife, Diana. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations: During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the whole day.

When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of reevaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition fails to state a cause of action. Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity. Issue: WON the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Held: No. There is no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts can determine the root cause and at times they couldnt determine it. What the new Rules require the petition to allege are physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the

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psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. The second petition of Tadeo complies with this requirement. He has stated in his petition facts to support his claim. REPUBLIC VS. QUINTERO-HAMANO GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004 Facts: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child. Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. Issue: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation. Held:

The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated. MORIGO VS. PEOPLE GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004 Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith. Issue: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case. Held:

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Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed. TENEBRO VS. CA February 18, 2004 Facts: Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy. Issue: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. Held: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage

before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

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