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‘Normal science’ is a term Kuhn uses to describe the phase of science and
research that take place at a time of consensus within the community. The
consensus of the community means that the practice of a given field of science is
When the individual scientist can take a paradigm for granted, he need no longer, in
his major works, attempt to build his field anew, starting from first principles and
justifying the use of each concept introduced. That can be left to the writer of
textbooks. Given a textbook, . . . the creative scientist can begin his research
where it leaves off and thus concentrate exclusively upon the subtlest and most
esoteric aspects of the natural phenomena that concern his group (p 19-20).
The texts usually display discoveries and achievements in modern terms, terms
that would often be considered completely alien to the founding scientist (but
most certainly are rarely the original documents of the founding scientists)(p 10).
Paradigm is the term Kuhn uses to refer to the achievements that define
the consensus. Paradigm is a very specific term that refers to two specific
competing scientific practices and activities. The second characteristic is that the
achievement has to be “open-ended” enough that it provides this group with
guidance while leaving a great deal of answers yet to be discovered and puzzles yet
to be solved (p 10). Kuhn’s phraseology at this early point in his book is somewhat
a consensus, around which scientists gather because of its relative novelty and
paradigms and normal science. Essentially it is the paradigm that provides the
organizing principle around which a normal science exists. Normal science would
not exist without what Kuhn terms paradigm. Of course the paradigm is really just
a set of conditions that enable normal science the consensus and stability that is
rule-of-thumb that facilitates future work, thought and decisions within a given
area. The analogy to common law is an excellent one and provides an intuitive
increasingly obscure and detailed work that allows for the rapid specialization and
field of their study. It is the paradigm that provides this foundation through an
ever increasing realm of achievements and discoveries that this community largely
agrees upon. Thus, leaving the scientist with a large area of background knowledge
at their disposal that allows for concentration on very precise and specialized
research.
Sometime between 1740 and 1780, electricians were for the first time enabled to
take the foundations of their field for granted. From that point they pushed on to
more concrete and recondite problems, and increasingly they then reported their
results in articles addressed to other electricians rather than in books addressed
to the learned world at large. . . . They had, that is, achieved a paradigm that
proved able to guide the whole group’s research. . . . it is hard to find another
criterion that so clearly proclaims a field a science (p 21-2).
The transition of which Kuhn speaks, in the above quotation, is a movement into
The actual work of a normal science scientist involves what Kuhn terms
“mop-up” work. This sort of work is also referred to as puzzle solving. Basically
good deal of her time attempting to make all of the data and phenomena fit into
drudgery but is in fact a very engrossing and perhaps addictive task. This puzzle
solving involves the engrossing task of ‘making everything fit’. The search for
other fundamental theories and perspectives is decidedly not the sort of work a
‘normal scientist’ engages. In fact if the scientist did attempt to devise a new
theory or organizing principle it would be quite unlikely that his ideas would be well
invented theories. The discovery of new phenomena and problems with the
accepted paradigm are decidedly frowned upon or just do not seem to occur. In
fact it is Kuhn’s contention that phenomena that do not fit into the paradigm are
In the eighteenth century, for example, little attention was paid to the
experiments that measured electrical attraction with devices like the pan balance.
Because they yielded neither consistent nor simple results, they could not be used
to articulate the paradigm from which they derived. Therefore they remained
mere facts, unrelated and unrelatable to the continuing progress of electrical
research (p35).
An unsuccessful project, like the one mentioned above, would reflect negatively
upon the scientist as a failure to solve the puzzle. This failure is usually perceived
as a reflection not of the paradigm, nor of nature but of the scientist’s abilities to
do her job. The problems undertaken by the scientist are valuable in the
articulation and advancement of the scientific field itself but, the question is
raised, why do scientists undertake these problems with such enthusiasm and verve
if failure reflects solely upon them? The answer is in the puzzle solving element
that is central to scientists of normal science. The puzzle is not in achieving the
data the scientist needs to further his field of science. The puzzle is how to go
about, procedurally, uncovering the data and phenomena that are predicted by the
known, to exist (p 36). One reason for the incredible rate of growth of normal
resolvable that only a “lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving” them (p
37). The rest of Kuhn’s conceptualization of puzzle solving now comes to the fore.
A puzzle if it is indeed possible to solve also involves rules that restrict and guide
its resolution. For instance, to solve a jigsaw puzzle you need to follow the
fundamental rules of the game. An example of such a rule is that all of the pieces
of a jigsaw puzzle must be turned so that the correct side is up (p 38). Kuhn
appeals to a broad use of the term rule to enable the analogy to apply well to the
becomes clear. When one paradigm is replaced by another, it usually only occurs
after the current generation of scientists dies out. This is because the choice of
where Kuhn’s broadened use of ‘rule’ becomes clearly important. Part of what it
means to adopt a paradigm is to adopt certain viewpoints which are not simple
things to drop modify or replace. The changing of a paradigm for an individual is
Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a search for new ones (p68).
Thus it also becomes clear that the evaluation of a paradigm has more to it than a
mere comparison with the phenomena, the world, the rejection of one paradigm
always comes together with the adoption of another (p 77). It is not the inability
of one paradigm to fit nature that leads to scientific revolution but the comparison
out of existence by ad hoc modifications of the paradigm, unless the anomalies are
numerous and extremely serious. Ad hoc modifications are part of the process
that involves the ‘loosening’ of the ‘rules’ of normal research within a paradigm (p
84). Once normal research ‘loosens’ the paradigm comes into question and it may
Almost always the men who achieve these fundamental inventions of a new
paradigm have been either very young or very new to the field whose paradigm
they change. . . . for obviously these are the men who, being little committed by
prior practice to the traditional rules of normal science, are particularly likely to
see that those rules no longer define a playable game and to conceive another set
that can replace them (p 90).
The phase that occurs between crisis of normal science and revolution, or for that
matter crisis and the restabilizing of the original paradigm is what Kuhn calls
extraordinary science. This phase can end in revolution and the adoption of a
The debate between paradigms is bound to circularity “each group uses its
own paradigm to argue in that paradigm’s defense” (p94). Though the circular
argument can be extremely persuasive, it becomes clear that paradigm change can
only occur when the scientist wants to be persuaded or is extremely open to the
discussion. The limits of logic in paradigm shift is clear. A participant need merely
refuse to enter the circle of the argument to avoid being persuaded (p 94). This
The scientist can have no recourse above or beyond what he sees with his eyes and
instruments. If there were some higher authority by recourse to which his vision
might be shown to have shifted, then that authority would itself become the
source of his data, and the behavior of his vision would become a source of
problems . . . (p 114).
conflict then the paradigm shift would not seem so strange nor would it pose
philosophical problems. This sort of paradigm shift can occur but is not the rule.
More often than not the competing paradigms have no common ground on which
criticism appears to stem from the Kuhnian view that anomalies can often be
paradigm. The drudgery portion of the criticism stems from a clear statement by
Kuhn that the majority of work in normal science is mopping-up. These criticisms
circumstances the scientist is required to come up with novel theories that could
either explain away the crisis or replace a defunct paradigm. It is this sort of
This question of drudgery is easily cleared up and so I will deal with this
element of the question first. For the majority of time normal science is not in
crisis and this means that the scientist is involved in the fleshing-out of the
paradigms her community accepts. Much of this sort of work is indeed very
science. Kuhn describes the primary task of scientists within normal science to be
puzzle-solving. This task is anything but drudgery in the way that Kuhn
conceptualizes it.
differently creative than the common conceptualization, but it does not appear to
seems to be a clear case of human fallibility and not human gullibility. The fact
that the repulsive force of static electricity was attributed to gravity, not seen as
a factor of electricity, was due to the fact that it did not fit into their framework
this does not make them uncritical, merely capable of error. Capable of error and
uncritical are not synonymous. For the sake of argument let us assume that error
is synonymous with uncritical. In this case the scientists who mistook electrical
repulsion for gravity would then be considered uncritical. If scientists are found
to have been critical in the past then science of the past is uncritical. If science
of the past is found to be uncritical in this sense then science of the present most
electrical scientists we need only review the much tooted discovery that bacteria
(hylicobacter hyplori) were discovered to live and thrive within the acid
environment of the stomach. The remarkable element of this discovery is that this
scientific breakthrough was held back by ten years by the mere conceptualization
that no living thing could actually live in the human stomach. We are not committed
criticism appears to be unkind to Kuhn, by giving very little charity to his work.
Indeed paradigm shift occurs when the old paradigm is sufficiently crisis-wrought
that it is evident that it has little more to contribute to scientific advancement.
In the replacing of an old paradigm with a new one, it is a transition from one
system that is problematic into a new system that is promising and able to deal
with the very anomalies that threatened the old one. The focus of this criticism
Scientists are not able to readily compare one paradigm with another because the
paradigms lack common ground for comparison. The shift from one system to
systems.
dominant paradigm there may be a number of anomalous cases that could ‘falsify’
that paradigm. It is Kuhn’s contention that ‘falsification’ instances may not exist
at all.
. . . no theory ever solves all the puzzles with which it is confronted at a given time,
nor are the solutions already achieved often perfect. On the contrary, it is just
the incompleteness and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit that, at any
time, define many of the puzzles that characterize normal science. If any and
every failure to fit were ground for theory rejection, all theories ought to be
rejected at all times. On the other hand, if only severe failure to fit justifies
theory rejection, then the Popperians will require some criterion of “improbability”
. . . they will almost certainly encounter the same network of difficulties that has
haunted the advocates of the various probabilistic verification theories (p 146-7).
These paradigms often will have different “non-empirical” premises that must be
accepted without a proof for the individual proponents to make their case. This
sort of debate between paradigms is not a simple matter of proofs because of the
paradigms is bound to circularity “each group uses its own paradigm to argue in
that paradigm’s defense” (p 94). Though the circular argument can be extremely
persuasive, it becomes clear that paradigm change can only occur when the
of logic in paradigm shift is clear. A participant need merely refuse to enter the
circle of the argument to avoid being persuaded (p 94). This does not make the
paradigms is the new use of terms that are incompatible with the old system.
Copernicus did not merely view the earth in motion he had an entirely new way of
viewing both the ‘earth’ and ‘motion’. The problems of paradigm comparison clearly
Thus what is involved in paradigm choice becomes not some clear concise debate
but a complex debate interspersed with translation from one system to another
and from one world to another. Each paradigm is very much like a language. Terms
and concepts are dependent on the context of the language (paradigm) and on the
context of other concepts within the language (paradigm). Thus it becomes
necessary that the participants of debate learn the others’ language in order to
another language, this only happens with practice and not by choice. Thus it
becomes clear that the ‘conversion’ analogy between paradigms can sound like an
irrational process, like a “mob reaction”. But clearly when speaking of language
understand. It involves processes that are not perspicuous but certainly would not
language is like learning how to think from another viewpoint. It is not irrational
merely very difficult way of thinking that scientists are not especially used to
language community to another. The shift occurs because scientists have found
world. Thus, it becomes clear that we can derive a better picture of how the
one (p 199-202).
. . . a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making
them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new
generation grows up that is familiar with it (p 151).
Kuhn’s view of this very common occurrence in scientific communities clearly leaves
little room for the view that science is irrational. One of the strengths of normal
often the anomalies are explained and resolved within a given paradigm. This same
resistance to change is cited by Kuhn as the very same characteristic that allows
Kuhn is also criticized that his opposition to the usefulness, or even the
suggest that there may not be a single truth, that in fact both groups may be
becomes a relativist stance. Kuhn then goes into a description of why this does not
have to translate into relativism when applied to science. I will not go into this
relativism comes from the perspective that a scientific theory actually uncovers
the truth about the world. Somehow a theory is supposed to be able to describe
things in the world as they really are. This position on truth is a hard one to
justify and implies an unnecessary stance toward the relation between science and
the world. We cannot step outside of all possible theories. We cannot measure
the applicability of one particular theory to the world. This is enough justification
indeed construed as relativistic then it is not clear precisely what (if anything) is
wrong with this approach (p 205-7). The charge, that Kuhn arbitrarily denies the
entirely accurate. Kuhn’s claim is that there can be no hard and fast rules for such
which to compare two incommensurable theories. Kuhn does however describe the
process of translation and debate that would be required for any reasonable
debate between such systems (see above for a discussion of the process).
An alternative perspective on adjudication between theories is provided by
the argument helps to calm the discontent that creeps up in instances (like the
philosophical connotations of such a stand are hard to bear. Lakatos’ ‘long essay’
reveals a comforting approach that seems much more complex (and for that reason
more accurate) than any mono theoretical approach (such as Kuhn’s). For Lakatos,
to conceptualize the paradigm as mono theoretical, his models lose a great deal of
accuracy, not reflecting the true intricacies of a given scientific field. Thus, the
intricacies that are lost often are misconstrued by Kuhn’s critics as a simple
Lakatos’ ‘research program’ into Kuhn’s system would however not be without
mono theoretical he treats them as such, and thus loses a great deal of accuracy in
could simply:
. . . replace first one, then the other, then possibly both, and opt for that new set-
up which provides the biggest increase in corroborated content, which provides the
most progressive problemshift (p 130).
Clearly Kuhn has a lot to say about the conceptual difficulties involved in such a
between paradigms would have need to carefully work to learn the language of
clear and careful in considering the very real barriers against meaningful discussion
and logical proofs, in a way that Lakatos seems to utterly ignore. Methodological
procedures are essentially useless in light of the complex and near ‘radical