Wassmer v.

Velez, 12 SCRA 648 (1964)

Facts: 2 days before the planned wedding, Velez sent a note to Wassmer saying that he will not push through w/ the wedding due to his mothers objection. The next day, he sent a note saying that the wedding will push through. On the wedding day and the succeeding days, he did not appear. Held: Although breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, Art 21CC says that when a person willfully causes loss or injury to a person contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, he shall compensate the injured person for damages. Velez is liable for the cost of wedding preparations.

De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil 866 (1933)

Facts: - Antonia Loanco, an unmarried girl of 20 years, was hired as a cashier in a barbershop in Tondo owned by one Vicente Mendoza. - Cesar Syquia, an unmarried man of 23 years, brother-in-law to Mendoza, made Antonias acquaintance and began amorous relations with her. - Antonia was impregnated and the defendant became a constant visitor in the formers home. The defendant wrote several letters to the plaintiff while he was abroad. These letters showed his paternal interest in Antonias pregnancy, going so far as proclaiming his desire to name the child after himself. - June 17, 1931- a baby boy was born. Syquia made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint Josephs Hospital of the City of Manila. - When Antonia was discharged from the hospital, Syquia took the mother and the baby to live with him at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for a year through the support of the defendant. - When the time for the christening of the child came, the defendant gave the name Ismael Loanco instead of the planned Cesar Syquia, Jr. - When the plaintiff started showing signs of a second pregnancy, the defendant decamped and married another woman. - Antonia filed for damages against defendant Syquia on the basis of a breach of a marriage promise. The damages sought are as follows: 30,000.00 pesos as damages recognition that Ismael and Pacita Loanco are natural children of de Jesus and Syquia 500.00 pesos per month for living expenses compensation for the costs of filing the case

Procedure: This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance in Manila by Antonia de Jesus against Cesar Syquia on the basis of a breach of a marriage promise. The trial court gave a judgment from which both parties appealed. The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. Issues: WON the note to the padre, in connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity; and WON this acknowledgment, taking the form of multiple documents, is sufficient WON the trial court erred in holding that the defendant should recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child based on the conduct of the defendant himself and based on the childs uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child WON the plaintiff is due damages for the breach of promise to marry Decision: The trial court entered into a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child

and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of 50.00 pesos per month, without costs. Reasons: YES; the note to the padre, in connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity. Recognition can be had from putting together the indubitable admissions of more than 1 document. NO; there is sufficient evidence to justify that the child was under the uninterrupted possession of the defendant as a natural child. The duration of this possession was long enough to manifest the fathers resolution to concede the status. Art. 135 of the Civil Code: The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases: (1) When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence. (2) When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father himself or that of his family. NO; there is not enough evidence that there was a promise to marry.

Navarro v. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129 (1996)

Facts: Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Navarro, submitted evidence in relation to 2 specific acts committed by respondent MCTCC Judge Domagtoy, which he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First one is that respondent judge solemnized wedding between Tagadan and Borga, with knowledge that Tagadan is merely separated from his first wife for almost 7 years. Respondent merely let Tagadan and Borga sign an affidavit stating that Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost 7 years. Second, that respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction to Sumaylo and Rosario. The wedding was solemnized in respondents residence in Dapa, 40 to 50 kilometers away from where he holds office and has jurisdiction in MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos. Issue: WON respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for: 1) solemnizing marriage without securing a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee wife of the present spouse and 2) solemnizing a marriage which is outside the solemnizing officials jurisdiction. Held: 1) NO. A summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. In absence of it, Tagadan remains married to his first wife. As a result, the marriage to Borga is bigamous and void; 2) YES. Non compliance of the provision providing the venue of marriage ceremony to be conducted by a judge does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer. However, this results in an irregularity in the formal requisites laid down in Art. 3 of FC, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Decision: Respondent was suspended for 6 months and given a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Araes v. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402 (2002)

Facts: The petitioner, Mercedita Mata Aranes charged the respondent Judge Salvador Occiano with Gross Ignorance of the Law. The judge solemnized the petitioners marriage to Dominidor Orobia without a valid marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner and Orobia lived together as husband and wife until the latter passed away. Because the marriage was null, petitioner was not able to inherit the vast properties of Orobia as well as receive his pension. According to the respondent judge, he solemnized the marriage only out of human compassion and as a regard to Orobias health who suffered a stroke. Upon reading the Comment of the respondent, the petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance attesting that the judge initially refused to solemnize the marriage due to want of a valid marriage license but only proceeded due to her prodding and reassurance. Issues: 1. Whether or not marriage solemnized without a marriage license is valid. 2. Whether or not a judge can solemnize marriage outside his jurisdiction. Held: 1. No. A valid marriage license is one of the formal requisites of marriage and therefore absence of it makes marriage void. 2. No. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may only officiate weddings within said areas and not beyond. Decision: Respondent was found GUILTY, fined Php5000.00 with STERN WARNING against repetition of same offense.

Alcantara v. Alcantara, 531 SCRA 446 (2007) GR No. 167746 | 28 August 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS Petitioner assails the decision of the CA denying his appeal, thereby affirming the decision of the Makati RTC which dismissed his petition for annulment of marriage On December 8, 1982 petitioner and respondent went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a fixer who could arrange their marriage, without first securing a marriage license The fixer consequently arranged for the couple to be wedded before a certain minister on that same day. On March 26, 1983, the couple went through another marriage ceremony, this time a church wedding, likewise without the parties securing a marriage license In their marriage contract, however, a marriage license is indicated supposedly procured from Carmona, Cavite. This is evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite that such a license under their names were on file. Neither party was a resident of Carmona and they never went there to apply for a license with the local civil registrar In 1988, petitioner and respondent parted ways and lived separate lives. Thereafter, petitioner prays that judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and cancel their corresponding marriage contract RTC dismissed petitioner's prayer for lack of merit and CA, on appeal, affirmed RTC's judgment. CA held that the marriage license is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner failed to present evidence to overcome this presumption

ISSUES W/N their marriage is void because: there was no marriage license at the precise moment of solemnization of the marriage marriage license on entry at the Carmona Civil Registry is a sham since neither of the party lived in Carmona and that they never went there to apply for the license marriage license number on entry at Carmona civil registry and the marriage license number indicated in their marriage contract did not match their marriage was not conducted in good faith and the authority of the solemnizing officer is questionable RULING/RATIO NO. For a marriage to be considered void ab initio on the ground of absence of a marriage license, that absence must be apparent on the marriage contract or must be supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and the respondent indicated a marriage license number. A certification from the local civil registrar of Carmona has likewise been issued where it identified petitioner and respondent as the parties to whom the marriage license was issued. NO. the issuance of a marriage license enjoys the presumption of regularity of official acts. This means that official duty has been regularly performed and that it was done in the regular conduct of official business. Unless rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty or that officer had acted unlawfully, this presumption prevails. Moreover, issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality not the residence of either of the contracting parties is considered a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of the marriage. NO. Discrepancy between the marriage license number (7054133) indicated in the Carmona civil registry and the marriage license number (7054033) in their marriage contract could be assumed to be a mere typographical error. This does not affect the fact that a marriage license exists and was duly issued. NO. Obviously, petitioner was amenable and willing to participate to both marriage ceremonies. Likewise, the authority of the solemnizing officer will be presumed in the absence of any indication of the contrary. All the solemnizing officer has to do is ask if a marriage license has been duly issued and from such issuance he has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties fulfilled the requirements of the law. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Dispositive: Petition denied, judgment affirmed. -NOTE Marriage (in 1982) took place before the promulgation of the Family Code so the Civil Code which was the law in effect at that time shall be applicable Principle: Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio --- the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. And the courts look upon this presumption with great favor.

Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6 (1992)

Facts: Terre, a law student, married W when she was already married. He convinced her that her 1 st marriage to her first cousin is void. After they got married & had a child, he abandoned her and contracted a 2 nd marriage. Held: There must first be a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage before a 2 nd marriage can be legally contracted. The Ws 1st marriage to her first cousin is void for being bigamous. Terre was disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, he shouldve known that a judicial declaration was essential. Facts: Terre, a law student, married Dorothy. Dorothy was already married but Terre convinced her that the first marriage to her first cousin was void. After their first child was born, Terre abandoned Dorothy and contracted a second marriage. Held: A judicial declaration that the first marriage is void is essential for contracting a subsequent marriage. Dorothys marriage to Terre is void for being bigamous. Terre demonstrated grossly immoral conduct. He should have known that a declaration was essential. Terre was disbarred.

Rep. v. CA & Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997) Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts: Roridel Molina and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985. A son was born to them on July 29, 1986. After a year of marriage Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father based on the following: - He squandered his money on friends whom he spent more time with - He was never honest with his wife regarding their finances - He depended on his parents for financial assistance - Roridel had been the breadwinner of the family since February 1986 when Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila - Reynaldo abandoned his wife and child Procedural History: The regional trial court declared the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the family code. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court. Hence this petition. Issue: - WON psychological difficulty and opposing and conflicting personalities constitute grounds for annulment based on the psychological incapacity of a person Decision: Petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. Reason: - NO; there is no clear showing that the psychological defect of the husband is an incapacity. This is more of an incompatibility and difficulty, if not outsight refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Notes: Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code: 1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: A. medically or clinically identified B. alleged in the complaint C. sufficiently proven by experts D. clearly explained in the decision 3. The incapacity must be proved to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by ART. 68 - 71, 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code. 7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

Te v. Te, GR No. 161793 (2009) Feb. 13, 2009

Facts: Edward Kenneth Ngo- Te filed a petition for certiorari as the CA reversed the decision of the trial court granting him annulment of his marriage to Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te. The petitioner and respondent met in college and eloped after 3 months of meeting. The couple went to Cebu where they tried to find jobs. When they have spent the money of petitioner, they returned to Manila and stayed at respondents uncles house. On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. Petitioner claims that he lived like a prisoner and was threatened by both wife and uncle. Petitioner managed to escape and live with his parents who hid him from Rowena. He filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage after four years. The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated. The trial court rendered marriage null and void. The CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision. Issue:

Whether or not the psychological incapacity of the contracting parties was proven by the clinical psychologist even without personally examining the respondent. If yes, whether or not the marriage is void. Held: Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. In this case, there is an expert opinion declaring both parties as psychologically incapacitated. There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Yes. Marriage is void under Art. 36 of the family Code. Decision: The petition is GRANTED. The CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC decision is REINSTATED.

Ninal v. Badayong, 328 SCRA 122 (2000)

Facts: Nial shot his 1st H causing his death. After 20 months, she married Badayog but w/o a valid marriage license as they were cohabiting for 5 years already. They secured an affidavit stating these facts. The heirs contest the validity of their marriage. Held: 5 year cohabitation contemplated by the law is that w/c is in the nature of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by absence of the marriage contracts. Of the 5 years they cohabited, only 20 months were w/o any legal impediment. For purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy of child, settlement of estate, property regimes, or criminal cases, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Zhai Garcia Facts: Nial and Bellones were married in 1974. Nial shot Bellones in 1985, causing her death. After a year and a half, Nial contracted a second marriage with Badayog without a marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating that they have cohabited for at least five years. Nial died in 1997. His children with Bellones seek a declaration of nullity of Nials marriage with Badayog. Held: Second marriage was void for lack of marriage license. They are not exempt from acquiring marriage license because their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Of the five years they had cohabited, only 20 months were without any legal impediment. For purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993)

Facts: The couple were married even though the H still had a valid & subsisting marriage. When she was abroad, he squandered the conjugal properties. She filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity and Separation of Property. Husband filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since their marriage was void ab initio for being bigamous, the declaration of nullity was unnecessary Held: Judicial declaration of nullity can be invoked for purposes other than remarriage. Separation of property is also one of the effects of judicial declaration of nullity. Zhai Garcia Facts: Delia Domingo filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity and Separation of Property. Her husband filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition was unnecessary since their marriage was void ab initio because of Robertos previous marriage. Held: Judicial declaration of nullity can be invoked for purposes other than remarriage. Separation of property is also one of the effects of judicial declaration of nullity

Aquino v. Delizo, 109 Phil 21 (1960) July 27, 1960 | Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts: Conchita Delizo concealed her 4-month pregnancy from Fernando Aquino during their marriage on September 6, 1955. Aquino claimed that this was the child of another man and that he wants the marriage annulled because of this fraud. Defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff. Issues: WON concealment of pregnancy at time of marriage constitutes fraud as ground for annulment WON mere failure to answer motion is evidence of collusion and ground for denial for new trial, in this case Decision: Decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for new trial. Without costs. Reason: YES; concealment of the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage Then: Art. 85, par. 4; Art. 86, par. 3 of the New Civil Code Now: Art. 45 (3) (FC): That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. Art. 46 (2) (FC): Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband. NO; such is not evidence of collusion especially since a provincial fiscal as been ordered to represent the government to prevent such collusion. The evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial along with what has already been adduced is sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by the plaintiff.

Hontiveros v. RTC, 309 SCRA 340 (1999) GR # 125465 | June 29, 1999 | Mendoza, J.
Facts: The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against Augustos brother Gregorio and Teodora Ayson, allegedly Gregorios wife. In the course of submission of pleadings and other documents to the trial court, the spouses made a motion for a judgement on the pleadings. The trial court denied that motion and at the same time, dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by art 151 of the FC The spouses appealed the dismissal of the case to the SC Issue104: Whether or not the trial court was correct in dismissing the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by art 151 of the FC Held: NO Ratio: The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served Only if it is later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted would the court be justified in dismissing the action. Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among the family members. Whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving the family members, the requisite showing the earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory. The inclusion of Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Relationship by affinity is not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Spouses are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.

Modequillo v. Breva, 185 SCRA 766 (1990) May 31, 1990 | Gancayco, J.
PETITIONER: Jose Modequillo RESPONDENTS: Hon. Augusto V. Breva, et al FACTS: In January 1998, petitioner was convicted to pay damages involving a vehicular accident, which happened in 1976. Included in the levied properties was a residential land, which he claimed be his family home since 1969, citing Art 152107, 153108, 155109 and 162110 of the Family Code. Motion to quash to set aside levy on the said property was denied by trial court. ISSUE: WON family home of petitioner is exempt from execution HELD: NO RATIO: The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose and was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court in January 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The case does not fall under the exemptions from execution in the Family Code DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.

Arriola v. Arriola, 542 SCRA 666 (2008)

Petitioner: Vilma G. Arriola, Anthony Ronald Arriola Respondent: John Nabor Arriola FACTS: Family Love: Fidel Arriola Victoria Calabia (first wife) = John Fidel Arriola Vilma G. Arriola (second wife) = Anthony When Fidel Arriola died, he left a parcel of land. RTC ordered the partition thereof among Vilma, Anthony, and John, in equal shares of 1/3 each. The said parties failed to agree on how to partition the land, thus, respondent John sought its sale through a public auction. Petitioners, Vilma and Anthony, opposed to include the house standing on the subject land. ISSUE: W/N the public auction should include the subject house. HELD: NO. Examining the NATURE of the subject house: Petitioners claim that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Art. 153, FC: The Family Home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence xxx [it] is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Art. 159, FC: The Family Home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses xxx for a period of 10 years xxx. Thus, the Family Home consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of the parties, herein. Fidel Arriola died on March 10, 2003. Thus for 10 years from said date (until March 10, 2013), or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, MUCH LESS when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property.

Benitez-Badua v. CA, 229 SCRA 468 (1994) GR # 105625 | January 24, 1994 | Puno, J.
Facts: Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chiongpian are husband and wife. They own various properties. Marissa Benitez-Badua is allegedly their daughter. Isabel died in 1982. Vicente died in 1989. A petition for issuance of letters of administration of their estate was filed by Vicentes sister and nephew. Their petition was opposed by Marissa who claims to be the legitimate only daughter of the spouses, thus the only legal heir under the law. The sister and nephew countered saying that Marissa is not really the biological daughter of Vicente and Isabel. They claim that she is a mere ward or ampon who isnt even legally adopted; therefore, she cannot be a legal heir and entitled to administer the property. To prove her status as daughter of Vicente and Isabel, Marissa presented her certificate of live birth, baptismal certificate, ITR and GSIS Info sheet of Vicente naming Marissa as his daughter, school records, and the like. She also testified that the spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. The sister and nephew on the other hand, used testimonial evidence from several people to prove that the spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage, that Isabel was even referred to an OB-Gyne for treatment. The then 77 year old sister of Vicente also categorically stated that Marissa is not the biological child of the spouses. The deed of extrajudicial partition of Isabels estate was done by Vicente and Isabels brother. In it, they declared that they two are the only heirs of Isabel because she died w/o any ascendants or descendants. Nonetheless, the trial court ruled in favor of Marissa. The CA reversed the trial court. Marissa appeals to the SC, alleging that the statutory presumption of legitimacy in articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the FC has not been applied by the CA and that her legitimacy cannot be impugned in a petition for issuance of letters of administration but only through an action directly instituted for that purpose. Issue: 1. Whether or not the statutory presumption of legitimacy in articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 applies in this case 2. Whether or not her legitimacy can be questioned in a case not directly instituted for that purpose as the present case 3. Whether or not Marissa is the daughter of Isabel and Vicente Held/Ratio: 1. NO. Those only apply in cases where the status of a person as a legitimate child is impugned, not in cases where the child is alleged not to be a natural or biological child of a certain couple. 2. NO. But then again, its not her legitimacy which is being questioned but her being a natural or biological child of the decedents. 3. NO. The totality of evidence proves that she is not the daughter of Isabel and Vicente. The evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. This is attested to by several disinterested persons such as neighbors. The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby at all Vicentess 77 year old sister Victoria also categorically testified that Marissa was only an ampon. Her testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she would hardly be interested in material things anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under oath as a witness. Marissas birth certificate with Vicente appearing as the informant, is highly questionable and suspicious. For Isabel, who was already 36 years old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced, skillful and caring hands of doctors, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How come, then, that as appearing in her birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in Avenida, Rizal with no physician or even a midwife attending? If Marissa is truly the real, biological daughter of Vicente and Isabel, why did Vicente and Isabel's only sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in the extrajudicial settlement that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without descendants or ascendants?

It is strange that if Marissa was truly the daughter of Isabel and Vicente, why would Isabel, at her death bed, have to write a note to her husband exhorting him to make their daughter his sole heir when he too dies? It would not have been necessary for Isabel to write and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband, since Marissa would be their legal heir by operation of law. Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente gave the date December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they gave her the birth date of Vicente's mother.

Constantino v. Mendez, 209 SCRA 18 (1992) (May 14, 1992)

PETITIONER: AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO RESPONDENTS: IVAN MENDEZ; COURT OF APPEALS Ponente: BIDIN, J. Keywords: filiation FACTS: In August 1974, Amelita Constantino met Ivan Mendez. She claims to have had consensual sexual intercourse with him from then until November, knowing that Ivan was a married man. Apparently she got pregnant and eventually gave birth to a Michael on August 3, 1975. Ivan denies having illicit sexual relation with her. In June 5, 1975, petitioner filed a suit with CFI Davao which decided in her favor ordering Ivan Mendez to (1) acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2) give monthly support and (3) pay actual and moral damages and attorneys fee. On appeal, CA set aside decision and dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: WON CA erred in setting aside decision of the trial court and dismissing the complaint HELD: NO

Mariategui v. CA, 205 SCRA 337 (1992) Petition for review on certiorari | Bidin, J | January 24, 1992
Petitioner: Maria Del Rosasrio Mariategui et. al. Respondent: CA, Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui FACTS: Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages: Eusebia Montellano: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo Flaviana Montellano: Cresenciana Felipa Velasco: Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Lupo died without a will on June 26, 1953; he left some properties acquired when he was not still married Baldomera died and was survived by her children: Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico Ireneo also died and left a son: Ruperto December 2, 1967- descendants on his first and second marriages: Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, and Cresenciana (Mariategui), and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico (Espina) executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot 163 of the Muntunglupa Estates

 April 1, 1971- land titles were issued in the name of the abobe-mentioned heirs and caused its subdivision into Lots 163-A to 163-H April 23, 1971- Lupo's children by third marriage filed a complaint that they were deprived of respective shares in the lots with the adjudication of said Lot 163 Cresenciana, Flaviana and Isabel were impleaded as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs; defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action and the complaint was for the recognition of natural children The complaint and the motion were dismissed by the trial court CA declared all descendants and children of Lupo entitled to equal shares in the estate execute deeds to reconvey shares in favor of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina reimburse the fair market value of the shares Defendants file a motion for reconsideration but was denied ISSUE: W/N prescription barred respondent's right to demand the partition? DECISION: (petition denied, decision affirmed) The allegation with respect to the respondents status was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate, hence, it is principally one of partition. There exist a presumption of marriage if all requisites are present even if no record exists if they deport themselves as man and wife. Especially if the facts are not controverted. But because this fall after the effectivity of the Family Code, it should be decided under this: Art. 172 provides that filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth refereed to in this article. Though, his two other siblings have not presented their evidence, the continuouly enjoyed the status of children of Lupo like their brother. There was no evidence to disprove this fact At a considerable length of time, they lived with Lupo until his death despite the death of their mother Felipa. Petitioners also admitted that respondents were kapatid sa ama. Because they are legitimate children, action for partition does not prescribe nor barred by laches unless there is a valid repudiation by the co-owner Excluding respondents in an extrajudicial partition and registration of properties in their name can not be considered as valid repudiation. In spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship with the respondents, they fraudulently witheld the latter's share in the estate because since 1962, Jacinto has been inquiring from Maria del Rosario about their share (he was told not to worry because they will get their shares); in fact, Jacinto constructed his own house uncontested by any of the petitioners In as much as there was fraud, prescription should start at the time of the discovery of fraud. Hence, the action was not barred since only two months have lapsed after respondents' learned of the registration in the name of the petitioners.

St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos [GR 143363 | Feb 6, 2002 | Pardo | Certiorari of CA decision]
Petitioner: St. Marys Academy [school for brevity] Respondents: William & Lucia Carpitanos (parents of the minor victim Sherwin Carpitanos) James Daniel, II (minor child who committed the tortious act) and his parents Guada & James Vivencio Villaneuva (jeepney owner) Summary: Facts - Participants in the enrollment campaign of St. Marys in Dipolog were riding a jeepney owned by Villanueva and driven by James Daniel II, a minor. The minor allegedly drove recklessly. The steering wheel was detached to the jeepney thereby causing the vehicle to turn turtle. As a result, Sherwin Carpitanos died. RTC & CA ruled that the school should be liable for indemnity & damages since they had special authority over the deceased minor. The minor-drivers parents were held subsidiarily liable in case of the schools insolvency. Held The act/ommission of the school wasnt the proximate cause of the injury caused. The school couldnt have controlled the recklessness of the minor-driver nor the mechanical defect. The case was remanded to determine the liability of the parents of the minor and the owner. Facts: St. Marys Academy had an enrollment campaign in Dipolog City. The participants were riding a jeepney owned by Villanueva. The jeep was driven by James Daniel, II, student of that school, 15 y/o. James allegedly drove recklessly. The traffic investigator, Villanueva, the Daniels & the Carpitanos agree that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel. In any case, the jeepney turned turtle. Sherwin, a participant, died as a result of the accident. RTC ruled in favor of the Carpitanos: The school is primarily liable must pay indemnity for loss of life, actual damages, attys fees, & moral damages The parents of James II are only subsidiary liable in case of the schools insolvency James II is absolved from paying since he was under special authority of the school Villanueva is absolved of any liability CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Issues: 1. WON the school liable for damages for Sherwins death. No. 2. WON the school is liable for moral damages. No. Ratio: 1. The main contention of the respondents was that the school was negligent in allowing a minor to drive & in not having a teacher accompny the minor students in the jeep. The Court cited Arts 218 & 219 FC but for a person having special parental authority under a minor to be liable, there must be a finding that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury caused. The neglience must have a causal connection to the accident.233 The connection between the negligenc & the inquiry must be a direct & natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.234 The Daniels & Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel Respondents presented no evidence showing that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school or the reckless driving of James II It was Villanuevas grandson (the supposed driver) who allowed James II to drive at the time of the accident. The liability must be pinned on James parents primarily, WON the accident was caused by the mechanical defect or by James IIs negligence The negligence of James II and the detachment of the steering wheel cant be controlled by the school, the

school may not be held liable for the death resulting from the accident. 2. Moral damages may be recovered if the schools negligence was the proximate cause of the wrongful act. But since the school was not directly liable for the accident, the payment of indemnity and attorneys fees must be deleted. Obiter the registered owner of any vehicle would be primarily liable for injuries caused while the vehicle was being driven235. Thus, Villaneuva shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. RTC & CA decisions reversed & set aside. Case remanded to the RTC to determine the liability of the Villanueva and the Daniels, excluding St. Marys.

BUCCAT v. MANGONON DE BUCCAT

FACTS: Plaintiff Godofredo Buccat sought to annul his marriage with respondent Luida Mangonon de Buccat. Plaintiff alleged that he consented to the marriage because the respondent assured him that she was a virgin. However, respondent gave birth to a nine-month old baby 89 days after cohabiting. As a result, plaintiff abandoned respondent. ISSUE: WON the case at bar presents clear and irrefutable evidence necessary for annulling the marriage. HELD/RATIO: NO. It is unbelievable that plaintiff did not suspect the very advanced state of pregnancy of respondent. There is no basis to consider the fraud in the case at bar. DECISION: Affirmed. MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, v. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent. Ponente: Puno, J. Facts: This case concerns an incident wherein Occiano, the respondent, who is an MTC judge, solemnized the marriage of the petitioner and Dominador Orobia despite their lack of the required marriage license and the fact that said ceremony took place outside his territorial jurisdiction. Araes alleges that when her husband died, she was unable to inherit the properties he left as well his pension benefits because the marriage was a nullity, hence, the filing of the Administrative Case against Occiano. Occiano, in his Comment, contended that he only agreed to solemnize the marriage despite it being outside his jurisdiction because of the groom was not fit to travel to his jurisdiction. He adds that he refused to solemnize the marriage at first upon discovery of their lack of a marriage license, but given the circumstances, he finally agreed to do so out of human compassion. Araes, after reading said Comment, subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance, admitting that Occiano initially refused to solemnize the marriage because they didnt have a marriage license, but eventually agreed to do so because of her own insistence and that she only filed the case out of rage. Despite this, the Office of the Court Administrator still decided against the respondent. Issue: W/N Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage outside his territorial jurisdiction and without a marriage license. Held: Respondent is guilty. [The Court gave him a STERN WARNING and fined him P5,000.] Ratio: Re: lack of jurisdiction: According to the SC, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 [BP 129] states that the authority of RTC judges and those of inferior courts to solemnize judges is only within their territorial jurisdictions. The Court reiterated its Navarro v. Domagtoy decision, wherein it held that judges appointed to specific jurisdictions [unlike those in the appellate courts] may solemnize weddings only within those jurisdictions, and while it may not affect the marriages validity, said judges will be open to administrative liability. Re: lack of a marriage license: The marriage license gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize, except in certain cases provided by law. Hence, Occiano did not have authority when he solemnized the marriage. Also, in People v. Lara, the Court held that a marriage without a license is void, and even if a license is subsequently issued, it will still be void. Note: Despite the Affidavit of Desistance, Occiano cant escape liability because the withdrawal of the complaint doesnt necessarily exonerate the respondent from disciplinary action.

Buccat v. Buccat
Facts:

romised to hi that she was still a virgin.

when they got married.

Issue: WON the case at bar presents enough clear and irrefutable evidence necessary for the annulment of marriage Held: NO. There is no enough evidence. Decision of CFI of Baguio AFFIRMED. Ratio: It is impossible for the plaintiff to not suspect that his wife (or wife-to-be then) is not pregnant since he married her during the 6th month of her pregnancy, which is already an advanced state of pregnancy. Given that, case could not fly on the basis of fraud on the part of the defendant-appellee. The allegation that it is not strange to find people with developed abdomen is considered was not entertained. Said argument is considered to be puerile (immature/ juvenile).

Laperal vs. Republic

Elisea Laperal, petitioner v. Republic of the Philippines, oppositor Nature: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City Date: October 30, 1962 Ponente: Barrera, J. Facts: March 34, 1939 Elisea Laperal married Enrique R. Santamaria and during her marriage, she naturally used Elisea L. Santamaria instead of her maiden name January 18, 1958 Enrique was given a decree of legal separation from Elisea May 10, 1960 Laperal filed in the CFI of Baguio a petition praying that she be allowed to change her name and/or permitted to resume using her maiden name: ELISEA LAPERAL on the ground that she has been legally separated from Enrique and likewise ceased to live with him for many years. City attorney of Baguio opposed the petition as this violated article 370(should be 372) of the civil code and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court CFI DENIED Article 372 requires the wife, even after the decree of legal separation, to continue using the name and surname she employed before legal separation CFI after motion of petitioner treats the petition as one for a change of name - GRANTED To allow petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets Issue: WON the petitioner be allowed to resume using her maiden name Held: No. (petition is dismissed.)

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr. Facts: Alice Reyes is a Filipino citizen while Richard Upton is a US citizen. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and after their marriage, they resided in the Philippines. In 1982, they divorced in Nevada, US. Alice remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. In June 8, 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice stating that Alice's business in Manila, The Galleon Shop, is conjugal property of the parties and that he be declared with the right to manage the conjugal property. Alice moved to dismiss the case stating that the cause of action is barred by the Nevada divorce proceedings because Richard had acknowledged that he and Alice do not have community property as of June 11, 1982. The Pasay RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, hence the divorce decree has no bearing in the case. Issue: W/N the foreign divorce on the parties is valid and binding in Philippine jurisdiction. Held: Yes, the divorce is valid. Ratio: The Nevada divorce decree is binding on Richard (private respondent) as he is an American citizen. The divorce decree released Richard from his marriage with Alice, therefore he is no longer her husband. He would have no standing to sue in this case as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets

GOITIA v. CAMPOS FACTS The parties were legally married an lived together for about a month. Within the period of their cohabitation, the defendant, Jose, demanded that Eloisa should perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Plaintiff-appellant refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. Defendant, then, maltreated her by word and deed. Subsequently, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and live with her parents. She filed this action against her husband for support outside their conjugal domicile. ISSUE WON a spouse (in this case, the husband) is STILL obliged to support the other when the latter is living outside their conjugal domicile. HELD Yes. (CONCURRING OPINION: The wife is legally still within the conjugal domicile) RATIO Defendant cites a ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain stating that the obligation of the spouse to give support even without cohabition is limited to cases wherein there is a legal decree of separation OR a judgement of divorce. Since in the case at bar, the wife merely left the conjugal abode in the absence of any judicial decree, the husband is not obliged to give support to the wife. Such doctrine would not control this jurisdiction because the substantive law of the Philippines is different from that of Spain. The doctrine is also NOT APPLICABLE to cases wherein one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. Moreover, should the doctrine cited by the defendant prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will.

Cang v. CA Herbert Cang v. CA and spouses Ronald and Maria Clavano Romero [1998]. Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision. Facts: Petitioner Herbert and wife Anna begot 3 children. Later, wife learned of husbands extramarital affair, and filed a petititon for legal separation. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court granted it, and the spouses agreed in a joint manifestation that, among others: [1] The children shall be entitled to support; and [2] the wife shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any person/s without the written consent of the husband. Husband left for US, sought divorce from wife in the Second Judicial District Court of Nevada, which issued the divorce decree and granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to the wife. While in the US, husband married then divorced again, and ultimately never remarried. He continued remitting money for the childrens expenses. Meanwhile, wife Annas brother and sister-in-law, a childless couple, filed proceedings for the adoption of the 3 minor children before RTC-Cebu, and petition bears the signature of the eldest child consenting to his adoption. Anna also files affidavit of consent alleging that: [1] husband Herbert evaded his legal obligation to support the children; [2] her brothers and sisters had been helping her in taking care of the children; [3] Anna would be going to the US to attend to a family business, and leaving the children would be a problem that would hamper her job-seeking venture abroad. Husband immediately returned to the RP and filed an opposition, saying that although wifes brother and sister-in-law were financially capable, their finances are too meager compared to theirs, and wouldnt allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children. RTC-Cebu issued an order that wife Anna in effect relinquished custody over the children, and custody should be transferred to the father. Another branch of the RTC-Cebu then issued a decree of adoption to Annas brother and sister-in-law. Husband Herbert, before the CA, opposed and contended that the lower court erred in that he didnt have a written consent to the adoption, and 2 children didnt properly give their written consent. The CA affirmed the decree of adoption, saying that the court has held that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary (as in Dayrit v. Piccio, Santos v. Ananzanso). Herbert has not been performing his duties as a father, contrary to his protestations. Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent. Held: Because the husband didnt really abandon the children, his consent was necessary. Since it was not obtained, the petition for adoption of the 3 children is denied. Petition is GRANTED, and the CA decision is set aside. B2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan | 89

Ratio: As clearly inferred from Art. 188 of the FC, and Rule 99 of the ROC, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensible for the validity of the decree of adoption. But the requirement can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child, or is insane or hopelessly intemperate. Although not a trier of facts, the SC finds that the RTC and the CA failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that shouldve elicited a different conclusion on whether the petitioner-father has so abandoned his children. To abandon is to forsake entirely, renounce utterly, or forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child; to neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children. Here, the husbands conduct didnt manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is NOT tantamount to abandonment. While physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care, and support. There were several pieces of evidence not only on financial support, but also the emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family, via letters. The lower courts attached too high a premium to the prospective adopters financial status, but totally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children. The SC has previously decided that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. The lower courts conclusion that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them, that his children would not miss guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems, and triumphs. That the mother Anna went abroad as well to find better employment worsened the scenario for the kids. While Annas brother and sister-in-law were capable of providing to the children, the brother was commuting to and fro Manila, while the sister-in-law was an international flight stewardess. A closer look into their testimonies reveals that they merely wanted to keep the children away from their father, stemming from the notion that he was an inveterate womanizer. That the petitioner had an affair with a paramour cant be taken as sufficient basis that hes an unfit father. A bad husband is not necessarily a bad father.