DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO vs.

JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of theestate of the deceased Luis Espiritu (December 1, 1917) FACTS: 1. In 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title bycomposition with the State, to threeparcels of land, upon Lucas Espiritu'sdeath, his said lands passed byinheritance to his four children whoinclude allotment to Luis and Margarita, unequal shares. 2. Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado had by this husband five children: Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia (petitioners), at the death of their mother in 1896 they inherited one-half of the land inherited by Margarita from her father. 3. On May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now on litigation. 4. The original notarial document was in possession of Luis but was lost on account of the revolution and registers of public documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned. 5. On May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado pledged or mortgaged to Luis Espiritu forP375 in exchange of the remaining part, oran area of the land that belonged to hisdeceased wife, in order to obtain funds "to cover his children's needs." 6. In May 20, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado,executed to the interested party LuisEspiritu, the notarial instrument in his ownname and those of his minor children as aproof that it was true that the sale of said portion of land had been made by his wifeto Luis Espiritu in 1894.7.On May 17, 1910, the plaintiffs Domingoand Josefa Mercado, together with theirsisters Consejo and Paz, declaredthemselves to be of legal age and inpossession of the required legal statuscertified before a notary the sale of the land by their deceased mother for the sumof P2,600 and their father sold absolutely to Luis Espiritu the land for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase price.8.Petitioners now asked to declare the saleof land null and void after they havereached the legal age because LuisEspiritu, by means of cajolery, induced,and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado who were minors during that time to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum of P400. ISSUE: Whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors and therefore incapable of selling their property to Luis Espiritu on May 17, 1910? And if a person who is a minor after reaching legal age can after theexecution of the deed ask for theannulment of the instrument executed byhim, because of some def ect thatinvalidates the contract so that he canobtain the sold land? RULING: No, petitioners were not minorsbecause of lack of evidence, and the sale of realestate by minors pretending to be of legal age isvalid because they will not be permitted toexcuse themselves of their obligations on accountof minority.a.The sale of land by mother of thepetitioner was valid and the remainingparcel of land sold to Luis by their father isabsolute sale since Luis has paidWenceslao P400 as an increase to theremaining portions of land that was notsold by the plaintiffs mother.b.The document executed on May 17, isvirtually an acknowledgment of thecontract of sale of the parcel or portion of land. So, Luis Espiritu was, during hislifetime, and now, after his death, histestate or intestate estate is

in lawfulpossession of the parcel of land.c.The trial does not show, that thepurchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud,deceit, violence, or intimidation, in orderto effect the sale executed on May 17,1910. Thus, the plaintiff certified the saleof land by their mother and increase of thesale by their father to Luis Espiritu.d.The plaintiffs have absolutely no rightwhatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its owner ship was conveyed tothe purchaser by means of a singular titleof purchase and sale.e.The principal defect that the petitionershold is that when they signed thedocument, they were mi nors or has notattained the required age of 21 but noevidence appears in the record that theplaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercadowere in fact minors, for no certified copieswere presented of their baptismalcertificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduceany supplemental evidence whatever toprove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signedthe document on May 17, 1910 andtestimonies of their sisters or brothersdoes not constitute sufficient proof of thedates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa.f.The plaintiffs who claim be minors whenthey executed the notarial instrument onMay 17, 1910, have suffered positive andactual losses and damages in their rightsand interests as a result of the executionof said document because the sale waseffected by their mother and father to LuisEspiritu which received the exact price of land. HELD: Petition denied.

SIA SUAN AND GAW CHIAO VS. RAMON ALCANTARA by Martin

PARAS; MARCH 4, 1950 FACTS: Rufino Alcantara and sons (including respondent Ramon) executed a deed of sale dated August 3, 1931, conveying five parcels of land to petitioner Sia Suan A few days later (within the month after the sale of the parcels of land), Ramons counsel wrote to Suans husband, Gaw Chiao, disavowing the contract on the ground that Ramon was a minor when the signing took place After Gaw Chiao responded to the letter, Ramon went to the office of Gaw Chiaos counsel to ratify the sale After ratification, Ramon received Php 500.00 from Gaw Chiao, as payment for the sold parcels of land Meanwhile, Sia Suan sold the parcels of land to Nicolas Azores; his son Antonio inherited it NINE YEARS LATER, Ramon filed a case at the Court of First Instance of Laguna, praying that the deed of sale may be annulled on the ground of his minority at the time of its sale to Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao; action was denied and Sia Suan, Gaw Chiao, Ramons father and brother, Nicolas and Antonio Azores were absolved Ramon brought case to the Court of Appeals; CFI Decision reversed o Deed of sale not binding against Ramon due to his minority at the time of the sale o His counsels letter to Gaw Chiao is an indication that the sale was not affirmed; Ramon was thus shielded from laches and estoppel o Sia Suan and Gao Chiao was negligent in protecting their interests to the property since they did nothing when they were informed of Ramons minority o Delay in filing action for annulment filed by Ramon does not bar the said action to prosper; may be barred only when the time period of filing prescribed by law has expired o CA refuses to use the doctrine in Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu: Sale of real estate done by minors is VALID Minors are NOT EXEMPT from fulfilling the obligations in the contract Minors are NOT ALLOWED to annul the contract by invoking that he/she was a minor at the time of the signing o The only protection utilized by Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao here is the ratification done by Ramon o The letter of Ramons counsel duly informed them of his minority Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao files petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Ramon Alcantaras execution of the deed of sale is valid, despite being a minor at the time of its execution Whether or not Ramon is bound by the deed of sale, despite his minority at the time of its execution Whether or not Ramon is allowed to annul the deed of sale

HELD/RULING:

RELATED PROVISIONS:
Art. 1327, NCC: The following cannot give consent to a contract: Unemancipated minors; Art. 1390, NCC: The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:

Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract; xxx These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of ratification. Art. 1403, NCC: The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: xxx (3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract. Art. 1399, NCC: When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him. Ramon may not be allowed to execute deed of sale, but due to his act of ratification, the contract was given its binding effect The deed of sale is binding on Ramon, because he ratified it Ramon is not allowed to annul such deed, because he already ratified it Mercado doctrine is applicable in this case Ramon may have executed his acts in bad faith; he earned money from Gaw Chiao as a result of the sale and its ratification, yet he summons the courts to annul the sale because he executed it while still a minor previous misinterpretation has already estopped him from disavowing the contract The Court of Appeals said that Ramon may not be stopped because of the letter, yet the Supreme Court holds that he is already stopped by his misrepresentation in the deed of sale, due to his minority The Supreme Court is of the opinion that Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao is hereby absolved, without incurring any costs on their part

Court of Appeals Decision REVERSED. Costs AGAINST Ramon Alcantara.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION March 19, 1928 G.R. No. L-28643 NICOLAS JUAREZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RAMONA D. TURON, defendant-appellee. Mateo D. Cipriano for appellant. No appearance for appellee. , J.: 1. That the plaintiff and the defendant are of age, the former residing at No. 104 Calle Zurbaran and the latter at No. 132 Calle Casta?os, both within the jurisdiction of this City of Manila; 2. That the plaintiff and the defendant are husband and wife, having contracted marriage on October 28, 1921; 3. That during the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant a daughter was born of it, known as Lourdes Juarez, who is a minor and who is at present in the possession of the defendant; 4. That after legal proceedings, the defendant was convicted of adultery committed with Gregorio Ramos in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, in criminal case No. 32005 of this court, the offended party in said case being the plaintiff above named; 5. That the judgment for adultery mentioned in the preceding paragraph has become final and was executed; 6. That the plaintiff and the defendant have no conjugal property; and 7. That the plaintiff has also no private property. And plaintiff prays that he be decreed a divorce and have judgment for costs. August 11, 1927, the complaint was amended as follows: After paragraph 5 and before 6 let the following new paragraphs be inserted which shall be called 5A, 5B, and 5C and which shall read as follows: 5A. That the plaintiff, one year before the filing of this complaint, was domiciled and residing at the City of Manila, Philippine Islands.

5B. That the adultery committed by the herein defendant has never been consented to nor pardoned by the plaintiff. 5C. That this action is filed within one year following the date when the plaintiff obtained knowledge of the cause. The defendant made a default. For the purpose of proving his case, the plaintiff offered in evidence the record in and by which his wife was convicted of adultery, and was called and testified as a witness in his own behalf. The lower court denied plaintiff any relief, and dismissed the complaint, from which he appeals and assigns the following errors: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING: 1. That the document Exhibit B, which is a certified copy of the judgment of conviction rendered in criminal case No. 32005 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for the crime of adultery instituted against the defendant, is not an evidence that she had committed said crime. 2. That this action was commenced out of the time in which it should have been brought according to the provisions of Act No. 2710; and 3. In refusing to decree the divorce prayed for in the complaint that initiated this action. JOHNS, J.: The decision of the lower court is as follows: This is a complaint for divorce wherein it is alleged by the plaintiff among other things: That the defendant, after legal proceedings, was convicted of adultery committed with Gregorio Ramos in the City of Manila, P. I., in criminal case No. 32005 of this court, the offended party in said case being the plaintiff, himself above named; and That the judgment for adultery mentioned in the preceding paragraph has become final and was executed. The defendant having been summoned, she was later declared in default at the instance of the plaintiff whose evidence was received by the court in the absence of the defendant. The plaintiff, however, has not presented any evidence upon the adultery committed by the defendant and which can be the only ground for the action herein brought. He did present the judgment render in the aforesaid criminal case for adultery against the same defendant, proving, moreover, that said judgment has become final; but this being a civil action, completely different from the criminal one for adultery against the same defendant, and in which the parties are also different, although in fact and substance the cause of action is the same in the two cases, in the one now before the court for divorce evidence must have been presented that adultery was committed by the defendant, the judgment of conviction rendered in the criminal case against the same defendant not being sufficient, since as evidence it has no effect in this action other than to show that the guilt of the defendant was proven in

a final judgment rendered in a criminal case, which is a condition required by section 8 of Act No. 2710 before divorce can be granted. Where it not for this requirement said judgment would be inadmissible as evidence in this case, except for the purpose of impeaching the veracity of the defendant as witness, if she had appeared and testified. Upon this point the following doctrine is well known: Upon the foregoing principle, it is obvious that, as a general rule, a verdict and judgment in a criminal case, though admissible to establish the fact of the mere rendition of the judgment, cannot be given in evidence in a civil action, to establish the facts on which it was rendered. Vol. 1, Greenleaf on Evidence, par. 537. Which doctrine was cited and approved by the Supreme Court of these Islands in the case of Ocampo vs. Jenkins 14 Phil. pp. 681, 689. On the other hand, the law requires that the action for divorce be brought within one year from the date when the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the cause of action brought by him, but the herein complaint was filed on February 10, 1927, notwithstanding that according to plaintiff himself, he acquired knowledge of the adultery of the defendant about August, 1924. For the foregoing, the court overrules the complaint, holding that judgment cannot be rendered for divorce as prayed for by the plaintiff. Without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. The finding of the lower court, that the plaintiff knew of the alleged adultery in August, 1924, is well sustained by his own evidence, and the complaint in this action was filed on February 10, 1927, about two and a half years after the plaintiff knew of the adultery, for which he now seeks a divorce. All things considered, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered. Malcolm, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions JOHNSON, J., concurring: I concur in the dispositive part of the majority decision. I prefer to leave the discussion of the incongruities of section 4 of Act No. 2710 until the question is squarely presented, hoping that in the meantime the Legislature may have time to make it more plain if that seems necessary. Section 4 contains three periods of prescription or limitation of action for divorce: (a) Under said section an action for divorce cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the complaint became cognizant of the cause; (b) an action for divorce must be filed within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred; and (c) when the cause occurred prior to the date on which this Act took effect (March 11, 1917), then the action for divorce must be commenced within one year from and after such date. It is difficult to harmonize the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) above, said section 4. They must mean, first, that the party aggrieved must bring his action for divorce within one year after he had

knowledge of the cause and, second, that such action cannot be maintained after the lapse of five years from the date when such cause occurred, whether the complaint was cognizant of the cause or not. In other words, an action for divorce under said Act must be commenced within a period of one year from the time the complainant has become cognizant of the causes justifying his divorce, but such action cannot be maintained after the lapse of five years from and after the date when the cause for divorce occurred. That, in my judgment, must be the interpretation of that section as to the two causes of prescription or limitation of action. However, that conclusion leaves much yet to be explained. In the present case the action was not begun within one year from and after the date on which the complainant became cognizant of the causes justifying his divorce. His action is theretofore clearly barred. VILLAMOR, J., dissenting: The preceding decision affirms the judgment of the lower court with costs. The lower courts decision is here reproduced in its entirety, and this court, in affirming it, makes the following comment: The finding of the lower court, that the plaintiff knew of the alleged adultery in August, 1924 is well sustained by his own evidence, and the complaint in this action was filed on February 10, 1927, about two and a half years after the plaintiff knew of the adultery, for which he now seeks a divorce. I vote for the reversal of the judgment appealed from, on the grounds hereinafter briefly set forth. The judgment appealed from dismissed the herein complaint for divorce for two reasons: (1) Because the action was instituted out of time; and (2) because the final judgment in a criminal action for adultery is sufficient evidence in a civil action for divorce. Both reasons are, in my opinion, untenable. According to the evidence, the plaintiff learned of his wifes adultery in August, 1924; or, more correctly, the adultery took place on August 1, 1924. The information for adultery was filed on January 21, 1926, and judgment was rendered in the criminal case on March 2, 1926. This judgment became final and subject to execution. The complaint for divorce was filed on February 10, 1927, and the judgment dismissing it was rendered on August 17, 1927. Such are the facts proved at the trial. Has the plaintiffs action to divorce his legitimate wife prescribed? What does the law provide with respect to the prescription of the action for divorce? Section 4 of Act No. 2710 provides: An action for divorce cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred; but if such cause occurred prior to the date on which this Act takes effect, then only within one year from and after such date. This law took effect on March 11, 1917.

As may be seen, the law establishes two prescriptive periods, according to whether the cause of the divorce occurred before or after said law went into operation. If before, the prescriptive period of the action is one year, that is, within the first year and after the law became effective; if after, as in the present case, the prescriptive period is five years, to be reckoned from the year following the date on which the plaintiff learned of the cause for divorce, namely, his wifes adultery. As August 1, 1924, was the date on which the plaintiff learned of the adultery, the action divorce does not arise said date, but from August 1, 1925, or one year from August 1, 1924. The year from August, 1924 to August, 1925, is not to be counted for the purposes of prescription; it is the year of grace which the law grants the spouses for their reconciliation, because the State is more interested in the continuance of the conjugal union than in the separation of the spouses, for the welfare of the family and of society. If according to the law, the plaintiffs action lasts five years from August 1, 1925, he may bring it at any time between then and August 1, 1930. And the action having been instituted on February 10, 1927, it is evident that said action was filed within the period of time authorized by the law. It must be noted that, as has been said the aforementioned section 4 of Act No. 2710 establishes two periods of prescription: One of one year, if the cause of action occurred before the Act No. 2710 took effect; and another of five years, if the cause arose thereafter. If the opinion of this court affirming that of the lower court were to prevail, the distinction established by the law would disappear, and the law amended by a judicial decision. To my mind, the reason for the two prescriptive periods of action rest on the fact that when the cause of action took place before the Divorce Law became effective, the legislator intended to limit the effects of this law, so as not to favor the institution of divorce proceedings; and when the cause of action occurred after said law had become effective, the same legislator probably took into account the precedents of several States of America, such as Arkansas, Kentucky, etc., which fix the period of five years for the commencement of the action, to be reckoned from the date of the act giving rise to it. (See Hirsh, Tabulated Digest of the Divorce Law of the United States.) At any rate, no matter how arbitrary the fixing of this second period may seem, the law has deemed it wise to establish a period of five years to be reckoned from the year following the date on which the plaintiff became aware of the cause of action for the filing of the action for divorce, that is, August 1, 1924. Therefore, it is contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of the law to hold that the action for divorce has prescribed because it was instituted two and a half years after the plaintiff became aware of the cause of action. With respect to the second ground for dismissal, the judgment appealed from cites the case of Ocampo vs. Jenkins and Worcester (14 Phil. 681), wherein it was held: The fact that an appeal is pending in the Supreme Court in a criminal case for libel, under Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, does not prevent the prosecution of a civil action for damages under the same Act, which clearly recognizes two distinct actions, upon the theory that there are two separate and distinct injuries received from the crime, one by the State and the other by the individual damaged by the

libel. In such a case, therefore, a petition for a writ of prohibition enjoining the prosecution of the civil suit while the criminal appeal is pending, will be denied. The general rule is that the plea of res adjudicata cannot be interposed except where the parties, the facts, and the questions involved are the same. As between civil and criminal actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the prosecution of the other. Hence, a judgment in a criminal cause cannot be pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil action. That case dealt with the interpretation of section 11 of Act No. 277, which reads: In addition to the criminal action hereby prescribed, a right of civil action is also hereby given to any person libeled . . . against the person libeling him for damages sustained by such libel . . . And it was held that Act No. 277 recognized two distinct and independent actions on the theory that two distinct and independent injuries are caused by the crime of libel one to the State and another to the private individual, prejudiced by reason of the crime. The rule adopted was substantially enunciated as follows: A judgment in a criminal prosecution constitutes no bar to estoppel in a civil action based upon the same acts or transactions, and conversely of a judgment in a civil action sought to be given in evidence in a criminal prosecution. The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings are not between the same parties. Different rules as to the competency of witnesses and weight of evidence necessary to the findings in the two proceedings also exist. As between civil and criminal actions, a judgment in one is no bar or estoppel to the prosecution of the other. A judgment in a criminal cause cannot be pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil action. There is no need to amass citations in support of the general rule thus stated, since there can be no doubt that it is well founded upon justice and authority. Nevertheless, I believe that this general rule with respect to a civil action for libel and the criminal action arising therefrom, is not applicable to the instant case, wherein the civil action for divorce is so closely linked to the criminal action for adultery that the very life of the former depends upon the success of the latter. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case for libel is no bar to the institution of a civil action for damages caused by the libel, a judgment of acquittal for adultery kills the action for divorce. While, pursuant to Act No. 277, the civil action may be commenced and prosecuted until the rendering of judgment independently of the criminal action; under Act No. 2710, the action for divorce cannot be prosecuted, although it may be commenced until judgment is rendered in the criminal action for adultery or concubinage. And this shows the intimate relation established by the law between the civil action for divorce and the criminal action for adultery or concubinage. Section 3 of the Divorce Law provides: The divorce may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of a consent to the adultery or concubinage, as the case may be. Where both spouses are guilty, a divorce cannot be claimed by either of them.

And section 8 of the same Act prescribes: A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by final sentence in a criminal action. In view of these legal provisions, I am of opinion that the judgment rendered in the action for adultery, Exhibit B, is conclusive proof of the defendants guilt in the civil action for divorce, which is an indispensable requisite for the granting of a divorce. On the hypothesis that the plaintiff has proved his allegations in the complaint for divorce, and having filed his action within the period authorized by the law, I am of the to the appellants rights in dismissing the present action; and I hold that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and the case remanded to the court of origin with instruction to grant the divorce applied for in the complaint, in accordance with Act No. 2710, without a special pronouncement as to costs. Villa-Real, J., concurs.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT ManilaEN BANC G.R. No. L-26435 March 4, 1927JUANARIA FRANCISCO,

Plaintiff-Appellant , vs. LOPE TAYAO,

Defendant- Appellee . MALCOLM, J.:

chanrobles virtual lawlibrary As rightly stated by counsel for the appellant in his well prepared brief, the present appealraises only a question of law, which is whether or not, under the facts, the plaintiff isentitled to a decree of divorce in accordance with the Philippine Divorce Law. Therelated question resolutory of the appeal is whether or not the wife can secure a divorcefrom the husband, where the latter has been convicted of adultery and not of concubinage, although the acts for which the husband was convicted of adultery may alsoconstitute concubinage. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual lawlibrary Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, and Lope Tayao, the defendant, contracted marriage inthe City of Manila in 1912. They separated in 1917. The husband then removed toZamboanga. There he was later prosecuted for having committed adultery with a marriedwoman named Bernardina Medrano, wife of Ambrosio Torres, at whose instance thecriminal complaint was instituted. As a result of that proceeding,

Lope Tayao, together with his coaccused Bernardina Medrano, was sentenced by the late Judge PoncianoReyes to suffer three years, six months, and twenty-one days imprisonment prisioncorreccional , and to pay the costs. (Exhibit A.) chanrobles virtual lawlibrary On these facts, the action of Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, against Lope Tayao, thedefendant, to have the bonds of matrimony between them dissolved was instituted in theCourt of First Instance of Manila and was there denied by Judge of First Instance Revilla.The trial judge based his decision principally on the point that the plaintiff was not aninnocent spouse within the meaning of sections 1 and 3 of the Divorce Law. Thisfindings, as well as the dismissal of the complaint, is challenged by the plaintiff onappeal. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual lawlibrary In the Philippine Islands, the causes for divorce are prescribed by statute. (19 C. J.,36;Benedicto vs. De la Rama [1903], 3 Phil., 34, reversed by the United States SupremeCourt for other reasons). The grounds for divorce are two: Adultery on the part of thewife or concubinage on the part of the husband. (Villanueva, La

Ley de Divorcio , pp. 27,46, and 47.) The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710, is emphatically clear in thisrespect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A petition for divorce can only be filed for adulteryon the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband . . . ." Note well theadverb "only" and the conjunctive "or." The same thought is again emphasized in section3 of the Divorce Law which provides that "The divorce may be claimed only by theinnocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage

, as the case may be. . . . " Later on comes section 8 providing that "Adivorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by finalsentence in a criminal action"-that is, in relation with section 1 of the same law, by finalsentence in a criminal action for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. Act No. 2716, amendatory of article 437 of the Penal Code, addsnothing to the Divorce Law except as it clarifies the meaning of concubinage. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual lawlibrary Counsel argues along the line that the plaintiff is here the innocent spouse and that actsfor which the defendant was convicted of adultery also constitute concubinage. But the

undeniable fact remains that the defendant was prosecuted for, and was convicted of, thecrime of adultery and not the crime of concubinage. The criminal case was instituted onthe complaint of the injured husband. It was not instituted by the injured wife which isessential for the proper initiation of a prosecution for concubinage. (Albert, The Law onCrimes, pp. 406, 407; 3 Viada Codigo Penal , pp. 144 et seq.; U.S. vs . Rivera and Vitug[1914], 28 Phil., 13.) chanrobles virtual lawlibrary In its last analysis, what counsel is asking this court to do is to sit as a trial court toconvict the defendant of the crime of concubinage, although no prosecution for the samehas been instituted by the aggrieved wife and no hearing has been had or judgmentrendered in a lower court. This the appellate court cannot do. What counsel also desiresthis court to do is to add a third cause for divorce to the law and to insert two words insection 1 of the Divorce Law so that it will read: "A petition for divorce can only be filedfor adultery on the part of the wife or husband or concubinage on the part of thehusband." This likewise the court cannot do. It would amount to judicial amendment of the law. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

For somewhat different reasons but with the same result, the judgement appealed frommust be affirmed without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

l. People v. Ramos (GR No. L-59318, 16 May 1983) Facts: Malcon Olevere was stopped and frisked by police officers when they saw him acting suspiciously during oneevening, and found in his possession dried marijuana leaves. Olevere was then placed under arrest. Duringinvestigation, Olevere declared that he bought the recovered marijuana leaves from Rogelio Ramos, aliasBalanchoy. The following day, a police team was accompanied by Olevere to the residence of Ramos, and Ramos was arrested and immediately brought to the Drugs Enforcement Section Western Police Department Headquartersfor investigation.During the custodial investigation, Olevere executed a written sworn statement implicating Ramos as thesource of the marijuana leaves. Ramos, after having been duly apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before the police officers the commission of the offense charged. He likewise admitted that he sold the marijuanaleaves to Olevere for P10.00. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Documentary evidence, as well as thepolicemen who took down Oleveres sworn statement and arrested Ramos, and a forensic chemist who affirmed thatthe leaves confiscated from Olevere are positive for marijuana were presented. Olevere was not. After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila found Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime charged in view of the verbal admission Ramos himself gave and the evidence offered and admitted in court.The case was raised to the Supreme Court on automatic review.Issue: W/N the confession of Ramos to the police officers of the commission of the offense charged is admissible asevidence against him.Ruling: NO. Ramos only finished Grade VI, which means that he is not adequately educated to understand fairly andfully the significance of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. As mandated, it is not enough that thepolice investigator merely informs him of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking hisstatements down, the interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him. The records do notreveal that these requirements have been fully complied with, nor was there any showing that Ramos has beenrepresented by counsel during custodial investigation. In consonance with Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which statesthat any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence, the Supreme Court holdsthat Ramos verbal admissions during custodial investigation may not be taken in evidence against him.Issue: W/N the constitutional right of Ramos to meet the witness against him face to face and to cross-examinehim has been violated by the non-presentation of Olevere in court.Ruling: YES. The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written sworn affidavit of Olevere, who executed the written sworn statement declaring that Ramos sold to him the marijuana leaves for P10.00. This piece of evidence is amere scrap of paper because Olevere was not produced in court for cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex- parte is often incomplete and inaccurate. Such kind of evidence is considered hearsay. For the court to admit thesworn statement of Olevere without giving the adverse party the right to cross-examine him would easily facilitate thefabrication of evidence and the perpetration of fraud. The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based, not only onthe lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to crossexamine the affiant, but also on the commonly knownfact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by

the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.Since Olevere was not presented as a witness, the testimonies offered by the witnesses for the prosecutionare regarded as hearsay, insofar as they impute to Ramos the commission of the offense charged.

Ramos acquitted, his guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Testimony in open court in actual trial cannot be equated with any out-of-court declaration, even when the witness has in fact been confronted already by the defendant. The direct relevance of the trial to the ultimate judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not present in any other proceeding and is thus afactor that can influence materially the conduct and demeanor of the witness as well as the respective effortsof the counsels of the parties.

A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others, either because he was told or having reador heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned