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Background Briefing: Vietnam is the Real Pivot Carlyle A. Thayer July 25, 2012

Vietnam looking to play pivotal role with both China and the US, Asian Review, Global Times, Beijing: QUESTIONS: How will relations between Vietnam and the US develop in the future, giving that the US is shifting its focus back to Asia and the Vietnam is in need of a strong ally to counter China's influence. We request your response to the following questions: 1.Does the US need Vietnam's help in realizing its returning to Asia policy? And does Vietnam need the US's support to counter China on issues like territorial dispute? 2. Will this mutual desire draw them closer than ever? How close will their relations become? Will ideology become an obstacle? 3. How will the Vietnamese government deal with political risks brought by this closer relationship (such as the US influence over its political system, support of political dissident, etc.)? Can the government bear these risks for external political gain over China? 4. How will Vietnam deal with risks of getting closer to the US, such as US's influence to its political system, support of political dissident, while maintaining a good relationship with the US, at the end of the last paragraph? The two paragraphs highlighted in yellow were edited out. OPINION EDITORIAL: No analyst residing in a country that has gone to war with Vietnam can doubt Hanois commitment to maintaining its own independence. Vietnam has also learned from history that too much reliance on a major power can have negative consequences. This historical backdrop is a necessary reminder to readers that Vietnam is not aligning with the United States to oppose China. Since 1991 Vietnam has pursued a foreign policy to diversify and multilateralize its relations and become a reliable partner to all countries. Vietnam has achieved success. It was the Asias bloc unanimous choice as its representative for a seat on the United Nations Security Council as a non-permanent member. Also Vietnam has entered into strategic

2 partnerships with Russia, Japan, India, China, South Korea, Spain, United Kingdom, and Germany. Vietnam seeks to be the pivot in relations with China and the United States. In other words, Vietnam seeks to develop comprehensive ties with each and make each bilateral relationship important in its own right. As pivot, Vietnam wants China and the United States to accept Vietnam as a reliable partner. Vietnam wants to shape its relations so it does not have to ally with one side against the other. In 2003, Vietnams Communist Party adopted the terms to cooperate and to struggle to guide its relations with China and the United States. This formulation overcame an apparent contradiction in Vietnamese ideological thinking: how to explain friction and conflict with socialist China and how to explain areas of common interests with the imperialist United States. Vietnam decided to cooperate with both but to struggle when Vietnams core interests were challenged. The United States has announced a policy of rebalancing its military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Some Chinese and regional analysts concluded that the United States was attempting to contain China. As part of its rebalancing policy the U.S. has sought to upgrade its defense relations with Vietnam. Vietnam has been receptive but only up to a point. For example, for the past three years Vietnam and the United States have conducted joint naval activities. These are not military exercises involving the exchange of combat skills. The best way to view U.S.-Vietnam defense relations is to compare them with Chinas defense relations with Vietnam. Vietnam exchanges high-level visits with both countries. Vietnam conducts strategic dialogues with both countries and recently raised the level to that of deputy defence minister with both countries. Vietnam permits all countries to make naval port visits, but restricts this to one visit a year, including the United States. In 2010, for example, the USS John S. McCain destroyer visited the port of Da Nang, several months later one of Chinas most modern guided missile frigates also called in. The United States would like greater access to Vietnam. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta made that clear during his recent visit to Cam Ranh Bay. But it highly unlikely that U.S. warships will visit that port soon. Vietnam has opened the commercial repair facilities at Cam Ranh to all navies. The U.S. was the first to take up this offer by sending three Military Sealift Command ships for minor repairs. These ships are logistic vessels, not warships, and are crewed by civilians. During Secretary Panettas talks in Hanoi Vietnams Defense Minister and Prime Minister, requested that the U.S. remove restrictions on the sale of military equipment contained in the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations. It should be noted that China lists as one of it three obstacles to developing military cooperation with the U.S. restrictions in the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2000. Vietnams 2009 Defense White Paper outlines its policy of maintaining independence. I have dubbed this policy the three nos: no foreign bases on Vietnamese territory, no military alliances, and no use of a third country to oppose

3 another country. The U.S. may want to increase navy access to Vietnam but Hanoi will resist a U.S. naval presence to protect its independence. In 2009 tensions rose in the South China, Vietnam responded by signalling that they supported a U.S. navy presence to counter-balance China. Vietnam demonstrated this in a symbolic way by flying out to U.S. aircraft carriers to observe flight operations. In other words, Vietnam was playing the role of pivot. It enhanced its cooperation with the United States but did not align with the U.S. to confront China. Finally, there is another reason why Vietnam will impose limits on its defense relations with the United States. A recent commentary by the Peoples Daily Online (July 11, 2012) captures this point nicely. It stated, Hanoi is counting on China to vindicate its political choices [following the path of China, realizing rapid development by taking the road of gradual reform], but also wants to counter China by leveraging US power. The commentary notes that Vietnam has to strike a balance between its external relations and domestic political forces. There are many political leaders in Vietnam who fear that the U.S. has the ultimate objective of regime change through peaceful evolution. Vietnamese leaders are not of one mind on this issue and Vietnam often pursues contradictory policies. For example, Vietnam lobbies the U.S. to remove restrictions on arms sales while repressing bloggers at the same time even though the U.S. has set human rights preconditions on arms sales. Vietnam attempts to mitigate the risk of too close an embrace with the U.S. by stalling on many projects. Vietnam also represses pro-democracy advocates and bloggers especially those with overseas connections. And Vietnams party, public security ministry and army general political department share experiences with their Chinese counterparts. The solution to Vietnams dilemma, is not, as the Peoples Daily advocates to coordinate with China to limit the US pivot to Asia, but to maintain Vietnams independence by acting as the pivot between Beijing and Washington. If these powers respect Vietnams core interests and independence, cooperation will trump struggle.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, Vietnam is the Real Pivot, Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 12, 2012.

ASIANREVIEW
Politics remains tight barrier for diplomats

Wednesday July 25, 2012 13

Illustration: Sun Ying

Vietnam looking to play pivotal role with both China and US

By Carlyle A. Thayer

o analyst residing in a country that has gone to war with Vietnam can doubt Hanois commitment to maintaining its own independence. Vietnam has also learned from history that too much reliance on a major power can have negative consequences. This historical backdrop is a necessary reminder to readers that Vietnam is not aligning with the US to oppose China. Since 1991 Vietnam has pursued a foreign policy to diversify and multilateralize its relations and become a reliable partner to all countries. This has been a success. Vietnam was the Asias bloc unanimous choice as its representative for a seat on the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member and it has entered into strategic partnerships with Russia, Japan, India, China, South Korea, Spain, the UK, and Germany. Vietnam seeks to be the pivot in relations with China and the US. In other words, Vietnam seeks to develop comprehensive ties with each and make each bilateral relationship important in its own right. As pivot, Vietnam wants China and the US to accept Vietnam as a reliable partner. Vietnam wants to shape its relations with both so it does not have to ally with one side against the other. In 2003, Vietnams Communist Party adopted the terms to cooperate and to struggle to guide its relations with both China and the US. This formulation overcame an apparent contradiction in Vietnamese ideological thinking: how to explain friction and conflict with socialist China and how to explain areas of common interests with the imperialist US. Vietnam decided to cooperate with both but to struggle when Vietnams core interests are challenged. The US has announced a policy of rebalancing its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Some Chinese and regional analysts have concluded that the US is attempting to contain China. As part of its rebalancing policy, the US

As pivot, Vietnam wants China and the US to accept Vietnam as a reliable partner. Vietnam wants to shape its relations with both so it does not have to ally with one side against the other.
has sought to upgrade its defense relations with Vietnam. Vietnam has been receptive but only up to a point. For example, for the past three years Vietnam and the US have conducted joint naval activities, but these are not military exercises involving the exchange of combat skills. The best way to view US-Vietnam defense relations is to compare them with Chinas defense relations with Vietnam. Vietnam exchanges high-level visits with both countries. Vietnam conducts strategic dialogues with both countries and recently raised the level to that of deputy defense minister with both countries. Vietnam permits all countries to make naval port visits, but restricts this to one visit a year, including the US. In 2010, for example, the USS John S. McCain destroyer visited the Da Nang Port, several months later one of Chinas most modern guided missile frigates also called in. The US would like greater access to Vietnam. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta made that clear during his recent visit to Cam Ranh Bay. But it is highly unlikely that US warships will visit that port soon. Vietnam has opened the commercial repair facilities at Cam Ranh to all navies. The US is the first to take up this offer by sending three military sealift command ships for minor repairs. These ships are logistic vessels, not warships, and are crewed by civilians. Vietnams 2009 white paper on national defense outlines its policy of maintaining independence. I have dubbed this policy the three nos: no foreign bases on Vietnamese terri-

tory, no military alliances, and no use of a third country to oppose another country. The US may want to increase navy access to Vietnam but Hanoi will resist a US naval presence to protect its independence. In 2009, tensions rose in the South China Sea, Vietnam responded by signaling that they supported a US navy presence to counterbalance China. Vietnam demonstrated this in a symbolic way by flying out to US aircraft carriers to observe flight operations. In other words, Vietnam was playing the role of a pivot. It enhanced its cooperation with the US, but did not align with the US to confront China. Finally, there is another reason why Vietnam will impose limits on its defense relations with the US. An editorial by the Global Times on July 11 captures this point nicely. It states, Hanoi is counting on China to vindicate its political choices [ following the path of China, realizing rapid development by taking the road of gradual reform], but also wants to counter China by leveraging US power. The commentary notes that Vietnam has to strike a balance between its external relations and domestic political forces. There are many political leaders in Vietnam who fear that the US has the ultimate objective of regime change through peaceful evolution. Vietnamese leaders are not of one mind on this issue and Vietnam often pursues contradictory policies. For example, Vietnam lobbies the US to remove restrictions on arms sales while repressing bloggers at the same time even though the US has set human rights pre-conditions on arms sales. In conclusion, the solution to Vietnams dilemma, is not, as the Global Times editorial advocates, to coordinate with China to limit the US pivot to Asia, but to maintain Vietnams independence by acting as the pivot between China and the US.
The author is an emeritus professor with the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

Relations between Vietnam and the US have slowly but steadily improved since Vietnams post-war reunification in 1976. Different countries at different times take the initiative to seek improved relations based on their perceived interests under different domestic and international circumstances. In the late 1970s, the US was more interested in normalizing relations with Vietnam because then US president Jimmy Carter wanted to heal the wounds of war. In the late 1980s, Vietnam was more interested in normalizing relations with the US to get out of diplomatic and economic isolation caused by its war in Cambodia, and to focus on economic reform at home. Since the dawn of the 21st century, and especially since 2009, Chinas claims in the South China Sea have led to a convergence of strategic interests between Vietnam and US and, therefore, produced incentives for both countries to improve their relations. However, although regimes with incompatible political systems may be temporary allies, such as the case of the US and China against Vietnam and the Soviet Union during the Third Indochina War, they cannot serve as the basis for a trusting, durable alliance. But when Vietnam opens itself to the world in order to benefit from a globalized economy, it also exposes itself to outside influence, including that from the US. The prevailing trend in the global system today is the growth of human rights and democratization. The pressure for change may come from abroad, but the real challenge comes from within the country. As for the US, because of its traditional values and domestic politics, it has to publicly support and encourage progress toward democracy and human rights in Vietnam. But it is not in US strategic interest to destabilize Vietnams political system. The interest of the US is to encourage political reform but not to seek a chaotic disruption of the current regime in Vietnam. On the other hand, the US may take a softer stance on Vietnams sensitive issues as it is seeking regional support to its returning to Asia policy. US diplomacy always mixes a variety of approaches, and strategic and economic interests may trump value interests. But the US interest in human rights cannot be completely ignored. The recent spat in the US caused by Congressman Frank Wolfs demand that US ambassador to Vietnam David Shear be dismissed for his weak stance on human rights represents this latent tension between foreign policy and domestic politics.
The article was compiled by Global Times reporter Gao Lei based on an interview with Hung M. Nguyen, professor of government and international politics and expert on US-Vietnam relations at George Mason University. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn
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