The Center for National Policy is an independent think tank dedicated to advancing the economic and national security

of the United States. We bring together thought leaders and decision makers who are focused on the revitalization of our economy for the benefit of all Americans and the strengthening of the values of human rights and democracy at home and across the globe. (www.cnponline.org) Scott Bates is the President of the Center of National Policy. He has served in leadership roles at the state, national and international levels in policy development and government for over twenty years. Bates has extensive experience on Capitol Hill, including serving as Chief of Staff for Congressman Nick Lampson, Counsel to Congressman Jim Turner, and Senior Advisor to Congressman Maurice Hinchey. As Secretary of State and Legislative Director for Governor Douglas Wilder of Virginia, Scott focused on ethics reforms in state government and development and passage of the governors legislative agenda. Scott Bates has been on the ground in every war zone where American troops have fought in this generation. He has worked with elected leaders and activists alike to build democracy and good governance in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti and the Persian Gulf. After September 11th, Scott became the first Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee and was the principal author of "Winning the War on Terror" which helped inform the 9/11 Commission in its deliberations and development of its report. Bates taught Homeland Security at the National Defense University in Washington DC. He was a Visiting Professor of International Law and International Human Rights Law at the University of Indiana School of Law, and Visiting Professor of Government at Connecticut College. Bates has advised the Premier of South Australia and taught at the University of Pristina in Kosovo. Scott Bates holds a JD from the University Of Virginia School Of Law and a MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics. Ryan Evans is a Research Fellow at the Center for National Policy and an Associate Fellow at the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR). Evans specializes in the conflict in Afghanistan, having worked for the US Army's Human Terrain System in Afghanistan. He was embedded as a social scientist supporting the British-led Task Force Helmand (TFH). In that capacity, he conducted field research on dozens of patrols and advised the TFH Commander, Battlegroup Commanding Officers, and their staffs on a variety of topics, including the effect of counterinsurgency operations on the population, Afghan security force effectiveness, counter-narcotics programs, development and security, land tenure, and the impact of factional affiliations on local politics. For his PhD research at the Kings College London War Studies Department, Evans is examining Islamic political activism in Turkey and Egypt. He has an MA in Intelligence and International Security from King's College London.

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following people for their insights: Michael Fechter; Brian Fishman; Jason Fritz; COL Karl Gingrich, U.S. Army; Frank Hoffman; MAJ Michael Jacobson, U.S. Army; MAJ Kim Ndskov, Royal Danish Air Force; and others who cannot be named. The opinions in this report are not necessarily shared by these individuals, much less the organizations that employ them. Any mistakes are the sole responsibility of the authors. We would also like to thank the CNP staff for their crucial assistance: Willis Bretz, Lea Facey, Chere Flowers, Daniel Glassman, and Andrew Lavigne. Cover Photo: Cpl. Michael S. Cifuentes, U.S. Marine Corps

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Table of Contents

1 3 4 7 9 13 13 14 16 17

Executive Summary Introduction: Reality Check An Accelerated and Substantive Transition A Nation-Building Strategy by Any Other Name... Interests-Based Strategy Logistics: The Central Challenge Do Not Cut and Run: The Need for Enduring Support for the Afghan State and Security Forces Post-2014 Accepting and Managing Risk In Search of a Political Settlement: Talking to the Taliban? Conclusion

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Executive Summary
After a decade of war, the democracies of NATO need a realistic and sustainable strategy which will close the gap between stated goals and achievable ends. The Obama Administrations discrete ends of defeating al Qaeda have become disjointed with ways and means. Leaders of NATO member states must act now or lose the confidence of their people and watch momentum grow for a rush to the exits that could end in a Western defeat, victory for the Taliban, and new life for Al Qaeda.

Strategy
Based on the overriding policy goals of containing transnational threats and sufficient regional stability, the Center for National Policy proposes a modified strategy for success in Afghanistan. It is important that the U.S. remain committed to core international obligations, particularly those within the NATO framework and bilateral U.S.-Afghan agreements. The main elements of this plan, some of which are already in place, are as follows: Continue transition plans to place Afghan Government and Security Forces in the lead across the country by April 2013. However, transition must take on more substance than it has so far. The April 2013 transition cannot be a political fig leaf for home audiences, but an end to American and Allied (non-Afghan) combat operations against Afghan-oriented insurgents outside the scope of embedded mentoring and fire support. Dissolve the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and place Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) in charge of the military mission by April 2013. This will be accompanied by a drawdown of US-NATO troop levels to a force of approximately 30,000 6,000-8,000 of whom should be nonU.S. military personnel. This large drawdown will ensure that ownership is transitioned to the Afghan state. The primary military mission will be to continue the intelligence and direct action campaign against transnational terrorist networks in the region. Full transition of governance and development efforts in Afghanistan to the United Nations by April 2013. Governance and development efforts do not aggregate to form an American political strategy. The United States and NATO allies will provide enduring material and political support to the Afghan state in order to ensure sufficient stability around Kabul, the north, and the west and prevent transnational terrorist networks from operating from Afghanistan.

Keeping more troops in Afghanistan through 2013 will not result in appreciable and durable gains in consolidating the Afghan government's hold over the country. Therefore, the costs in blood and treasure associated with a more gradual drawdown are simply not worth the meager gains they will deliver.

Benefits
There are a number of benefits to this strategy. They include: Fewer American and NATO allied casualties. In a time of reduced resources available for national security, this proposed plan for NATO engagement in Afghanistan reduces costs associated with maintenance of a larger force. Reduction of unsustainable pressure on military entitlement programs from a decade of constant war. Clarification of ends and a realignment of ends with ways and means. This will allow the U.S. and NATO allies to better ensure core interests in the region. Ending the counterinsurgency phase of this campaign will reduce destabilizing pressures on Pakistan.

Risks
There are inherent risks to this strategy, but all of them are manageable. Moreover, slowing the drawdown of US, NATO and partnered forces does nothing to avert or sufficiently mitigate them. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) in particular may fragment along factional, ethnic, and tribal lines in some parts of the country. This can be partially mitigated by accelerating the integration of Afghan Local Police (ALP) militias into the ANP and disbanding those most likely to threaten ANSF institutional cohesion. This would effectively end Village Stability Operations (VSOs). Civil war and the crumbling of the Afghan state in the south and east is likely. Pakistan will continue to support violent non-state groups, including the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network, in pursuit its immutable interests: (1) Avoiding strategic encirclement by India; (2) Maintaining strategic depth against India; and (3) Blunting Pashtun nationalism.

Negotiations
While hopes for reconciliation between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and various insurgent groups are high, prospects for a meaningful and durable settlement are slim. The timing for talks, coinciding as they do with troop withdrawals, could not be worse. The concept of talking to the Taliban ignores other insurgent groups - most notably Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami and the Haqqani Network. It also ignores the Taliban's loose structure, over which the Quetta Shura does not have reliable control. A negotiated solution to the conflict remains a remote possibility.

Introduction: Reality Check

After removing the Taliban regime from power, Afghanistan stood according to one optimistic observer at the dawn of a new day that would see a moderate, stable and democratic state and society rise.1 Afghanistan fell into disarray once more after several years of Western under-resourcing accompanied by malfeasance in Kabul and the provinces. In 2009, President Obama said that this right war could only be saved through a dramatic infusion of conventional military manpower and resources to crush the Taliban insurgency, while winning the Afghan people over through carefully mentored improvements in governance and the provision of development aid. Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards, President Obama insisted in December 2009 when he announced an 18 month-long surge. Oncepopular rhetoric about Afghan democracy was replaced by relative pragmatism: denying al Qaeda a safe haven, reversing the Taliban's momentum, and strengthening the capacity of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) in advance of an implied "Afghanization" of the conflict.2 More than two years later, while foreign and Afghan forces have been successful in reversing some of the Talibans momentum, progress remains, in the words of now-CIA Director David Petraeus, fragile and reversible. ISAF failed to deliver on its lofty and ever-shifting promises, despite the sacrifices of many hardworking soldiers and civilians from the United States and dozens of allied nations. ANSF has expanded considerably, but precious few battalions (kandaks) can operate independently. Meanwhile, growing majorities in Europe and the United States believe that the war in Afghanistan was not worth it, eroding the credibility of long term western support for the Afghan state.3 President Obama has rightly vowed to conduct a drawdown of forces from Afghanistan, but a responsible drawdown need not be as gradual as some military leaders and analysts propose. General John Allen, Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), has openly and repeatedly expressed the preference that as many as 68,000 U.S. troops remain on the ground, conducting combat operations in Afghanistan until the end of 2013. However, there is little evidence to indicate that such a commitment of forces at predictable cost to life, limb, and the treasury will result in a more durable Afghan state.

Secretary Colin L. Powell, "Democracy Rises in Afghanistan," U.S. Department of State Archive, October 8, 2004, http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36934.htm 2 "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan," Eisenhower Hall Theatre, United States Military Academy at West Point, West Point, New York, December 1, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forwardafghanistan-and-pakistan. 3 See for example: "AP-GfK Poll: Support for war in Afghanistan at new low of 27 percent," Associated Press, May 9, 2012, http://ap-gfkpoll.com/uncategorized/may-2012-poll-findings 4 Lisbon Summit Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 20, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm; Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration, North

An Accelerated and Substantive Transition

NATO Heads of State are meeting in Chicago this month to agree upon the next phase of transition in Afghanistan. The Center for National Policy proposes a renewed focus on core American and NATO interests in Afghanistan and the surrounding region: The containment of transnational terrorist threats to American and Allied targets and Sufficient regional stability

These ends should form the basis of American strategy in Afghanistan. Based on these interests, the United States and its ISAF allies should conduct an accelerated transition to end combat operations and place the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in the lead by the spring of 2013. At that point, ISAF will be disbanded and the command of the military mission in Afghanistan will be assumed by Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) via Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, (CJSOTF-A).

Precise decisions on troop numbers and logistics will flow from this strategic-level decision to transition in 2013. Military planners and logisticians will have to assess the numbers and processes, but CNP assesses that a spring 2013 transition should drive a drawdown that leaves approximately 30,000 NATO and partnered troops in Afghanistan by April. 6,000-8,000 of this number should be from non-U.S. countries. This will require accelerating the process of transition in accordance with views expressed by many Afghan leaders, including President Karzai. The focus, however, cannot just be on the pace of a drawdown, but rather (a) the ability to sustain operations in pursuit of core American and Allied interests after the drawdown and into the future and (b) the political future of the region. The U.S., its allies, and the international community must commit to enduring forms of support to the Afghan Government and security forces beyond 2014, including military assistance and aid as well as targeted development funds and advisers. This is not about counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism. Continuing the debate in such falsely bifurcated terms means continuing to discuss operational methods while pretending to debate strategy. This is the path to folly. This report is about strategy and as such does not comprehensively address many operational issues. The current pace of drawdown is perpetuating the cycle of dependency allowing the Afghans to avoid ownership. Thus far, transition has been almost meaningless in practice. Most transitions either recognized a pre-existing ANSF lead in security operations or involved transition in name only. Transition cannot be a public relations event for home audiences. The April 2013 transition must actually place the ANSF in the lead. Many Afghan units will fail, but this will be a necessary tactical and operational learning process for their forces. It is important that the United States remain committed to core international obligations vis--vis Afghanistan particularly those within the NATO framework, the Declaration on an Enduring Partnership signed by NATO and the Afghan Government, and the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the U.S.A. and Afghanistan. The NATO Heads of State and Government Summit in Lisbon in November 2010 (Lisbon Summit) endorsed a timetable for drawing down ISAF forces by the end of 2014. This proposal accelerates the timeline, but does not depart from this framework, nor does it nullify core commitments from the Bucharest and Strasbourg Summits of 2008 and 2009 respectively.4 In fact, CNP calls for a renewed, recalibrated focus on the principles of NATOs vision for Afghanistan endorsed at the Bucharest Summit, envisioning forms of commitment more in line with U.S. interests: A firm and shared long-term commitment. Support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility. A comprehensive approach by the international community. Bringing together civilian and military efforts. Increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistans neighbors, especially Pakistan.

Lisbon Summit Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 20, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm; Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 4, 2009, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease; Bucharest Summit Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 3, 2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.

Flawed Assumptions
These principles are not best served by a full-scale, counterinsurgency campaign or a prolonged drawdown of foreign forces. The benefits of either option are not worth their costs. While CNP insists that the U.S. remain true to its international obligations, we question the simplicity of the core assumption of successive NATO summit declarations: that NATO must create a stable, democratic, and peaceful Afghanistan in order to ensure the security of NATO member homelands. If that is the case, then the security of the U.S. homeland is premised on an impossible goal.

Outsized Ambitions
The course of action that currently has the most traction in the Pentagon and ISAF Headquarters a gradual drawdown that may see as many as 68,000 US military personnel in Afghanistan by the end of 2013 outsizes American interests in the region. It represents a further commitment to an untenable and expensive overly-militarized strategy that has not worked. It is our judgment that keeping 68,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan through 2013 will not result in appreciable and durable gains in consolidating the Afghan governments hold over the country. Therefore, the costs in blood and treasure associated with a more gradual drawdown are simply not worth the meager gains they will deliver. As such, ongoing strategic partnership negotiations with the Afghan government should focus on achieving consent and partnership for the plan offered in this report. The American-led strategy in Afghanistan has been, in essence, a nation-building strategy. Creating a viable state in Afghanistan where one has not previously existed may have been possible if commitments made in 2002 had been fulfilled. But a decade into a stop-start process of engagement has left the Afghan public leery of further promises and citizens in NATO nations reluctant to incur further costs. While it may be unpalatable to recognize this, regional stability in South Asia is better ensured through reinforcing Pakistani stability and providing channels for Pakistan to pursue its immutable interests in Afghanistan through less destabilizing means than the support of sub-state armed proxies.

A Nation-Building Strategy by Any Other Name

The campaign in Afghanistan, centered on Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), was neglected by policy-makers from 2003 to 2006. From 2006 onward, it was defined by poor thinking and bad strategy. The more bounded resources of OEF continued, but were joined by an expansive, NATO-led ISAF strategy. This strategy was premised on inconsistent statements of American interests in the region by policymakers and senior military leaders. Richard Rumelt identified the characteristics of bad strategy: Conflicting goals, dedicating resources to unconnected targets, accommodating incompatible interests, and generating laundry lists of desirable outcomes rather than coherent and compatible goals.5 The United States and its allies have committed all of these strategic sins in Afghanistan and more. When President Obama took office in 2008, he initiated a series of Afghanistan policy reviews. He concluded that the core American goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda. Its not to defeat every last threat to the security of Afghanistan, he insisted, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure their country. And its not nationbuilding, because it is Afghans who must build their nation.6 However, implicit in President Obama's remarks is that absent an Afghan state that can resist an insurgency, al Qaeda will eventually resume international operations from Afghan territory. It thus logically follows that the U.S. and its allies must build a state that forestalls this possibility. This ambiguity is the origin of a disconnect between the stated ends of American policy in the region and the ways and means designed to achieve them. This disconnect has cascaded from Washington to our allies and down the entire chain-of-command, from the President of the United States down to company-level operations. Indeed, while the Presidents remarks have focused on the core goal of defeating al Qaeda, he has not translated his stated ends into the most appropriate ways and means. It seems as if ways have driven ends. Various NATO mission statements and declarations of successive NATO Heads of State and Government Summits betrayed an overt nation-building intent. Indeed, these declarations are conspicuous for omitting the term, al Qaeda. The mission statement of ISAF explains: In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.7
5

Richard Rumelt, Good Strategy, Bad Strategy, The Difference and Why It Matters (New York: Crown Business, 2011), p. 20. 6 President Barack Obama, "Statement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review," The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, December 16, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2010/12/16/statement-president-afghanistan-pakistan-annual-review; See also: "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan," Eisenhower Hall Theatre, United States Military Academy at West Point, West Point, New York, December 1, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistanand-pakistan 7 "About ISAF," International Security Assistance Force, http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html.

If this is not nation-building, what is? To argue this is simply the distinction between OEF and ISAF ignores disjunction at the policy level between the White House and ISAF. This report proposes a strategy that gets the United States back on course in Afghanistan and the surrounding region in conformity with the principles of sound strategic thinking by eliminating disconnected end states expressed by President Obama and ISAF, and reconnecting ends with ways and means.

Interests-Based Strategy
There were 130,939 ISAF military personnel in Afghanistan on March 31 of this year. 86,692 were American military personnel. The total number is scheduled to drop to approximately 108,500 by September 2012, of which 68,000 will be American, largely due to the planned redeployment of surge forces - especially US Marines from Regional Command-Southwest.8 Based on the policy ends of containing transnational terrorist threats and sufficient regional stability, this report provides the ways and means, including a detailed political-military drawdown plan and a focused mission for the post-2013 phase of American and Allied involvement in Afghanistan. This is not a rush for the exits, but a responsible and carefully considered strategy based on American interests. By April 2013, ISAF will transition itself out of existence.

The Political Strategy

The political strategy in Afghanistan and the surrounding region has become overly conflated with the technocratic campaign to build and mentor Afghan governance capacity and run development programs. These tasks are outside the scope of core U.S. and NATO interests in Afghanistan. Therefore, the governance and development mission will transition to the full authority of the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). A U.S. and NATO political strategy should be aimed at maintaining the conditions for the relentless pursuit of transnational terrorist networks and ensuring regional stability, particularly in regards to Pakistan. Placing all governance and development planning and programs under UNAMA led by an appropriate and effective senior diplomat can eliminate a great deal of confusion stemming from overlapping chains-of-command and roles and missions. UNAMA will coordinate most non-military aid to Afghanistan, conduct continued anti-corruption operations, and lead international efforts to strengthen the role of Afghan institutions in democratic governance, the rule of law, control of drugs, human rights, humanitarian assistance and related areas.9 Admittedly, this may be beyond the UNs capacity, but success in these areas is in the hands of the Afghan people and preventing failure is beyond the abilities of the international community. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will be largely dissolved with some components transitioned into support teams for Afghan line ministries at the provincial level to retain continuity of knowledge. Other components will be fully integrated into UNAMA in accordance with extant and future agreements with the Afghan Government. A larger remit for UNAMA does not mean the role of the U.S. Department of State will be eclipsed. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul simply will be far less engaged with mentoring and building governance capacity and managing development programs. The Embassy must be led by an ambassador with experience in the region and its languages, as well as experience working with the American military without acquiescing to military-driven policies. They will be focused on diplomatic support for the U.S. core interests stated above. The State Department will continue to staff key civilian advisory roles through UNAMA.
8

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, April 2012, pp. 10-11 9 "Mandate," United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Chttp://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1742

The Military Mission

The military mission will transition to the command of Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) via Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, (CJSOTF-A) in April 2013. ISAF will be disbanded with key components, particularly the National Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), integrated into CFSOCC-A. At that point, CFSOCC-A will be elevated to a two- or three-star level command. CJSOTF-A will be supplemented by elements of the US Air Force (USAF) and General Purpose Forces (GPF) as necessary from the other services. This will place NATO officers and personnel under a CFSOCC command. The number of nations participating in the military operations in Afghanistan, currently at 50 (28 NATO nations and 22 partnering nations), will need to decrease to those best able to work within a U.S. special operation command structure. The CFSOCC-A-led military mission will be security force assistance including embedded advising for the ANSF as well as logistics, the provision of embedded Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs), associated fire and air support as well as force protection and continued partnered direct action against Taliban, Hizb-i-IslamiGulbuddin (HiG), and Haqqani Network targets. Most importantly, in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), CFSOCC will also Soldiers from the Afghan National Army lead the primary mission: the continued intelligence and direct action campaign against Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is similar to Special Operations Command plans that have recently been reported in the media.10 It should be remembered that security force assistance/foreign internal defense (FID) are not mutually exclusive with counterterrorism and direct action. An Office of Security Cooperation should be "carved out" of the NTM-A and moved into the U.S. Embassy. Once NTM-A dissolves, this new component will continue to acquire military equipment and services for the Afghans through Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Funds. The military personnel staffing this office will be assigned to the Embassy and will not count against figures for the CFSOCC-A/CJSOTF-A mission.

10

Kimberly Dozier, "Special operations draft war plan continues counterinsurgency by other means in Afghanistan," Associated Press, April 12, 2012, http://www.startribune.com/nation/147134485.html

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While the numbers might change, both the political and military missions will continue well beyond 2014, in accordance with current U.S. plans and agreements.11 The exact size of a NATO footprint remaining in Afghanistan by the Spring of 2013 is less important than the need to transition the mission by then. However, CNP proposes that based on an accelerated transition, the total non-Afghan military footprint should be down to approximately 30,000 troops, with 6,000-8,000 of those from non-U.S. countries. A larger commitment of forces is not necessary to pursue core U.S. and NATO interests and will not result in a more durable Afghan state. These numbers are based on leaving brigade-sized elements with enablers at each of the three large air bases (see below); security force assistance teams with ANSF brigade and kandak headquarters and manuever units; advisers in Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior; in addition to supporting Village Stability Operations (VSOs) and the direct action campaign against al Qaeda and associated groups. The total number of advisers will be kept at approximately 7,000. With the ANSF, the United States and Allies will continue to maintain strategic bases, including Kandahar Air Field (KAF), Camp Bastion/Leatherneck (LNK) in Helmand Province, and Bagram Air Field (BAF). CJSOTF-A can continue to provide and coordinate air support for the ANSF and other functions inherent to their mission from these locations. However, the umbrella for mentors and special operations forces in terms of medical evacuation and quick response forces will not be as large and capable. This should be reflected in the spread of dispersed forces and may leave some kandaks without mentors and sufficient support. The nature of the VSO mission must change dramatically. Afghan Local Police units (ALPs) must either be integrated into the Afghan Uniformed Police as soon as possible or disbanded (see Figure 1). The current make-up of the Afghan Local Police (ALPs) force threatens to compromise the institutional integrity of the larger ANSF particularly the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). Efforts must be made to accelerate the formal incorporation of the ALPs into the AUP and to disband those factions within various ALP that cannot be recon- Figure 1: Afghan Local Police units as of March 31, 2012 (Source: Report ciled with the AUP and Minis- on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, U.S. Departtry of the Interior. This ment of Defense, April 2012) means that new Village
11

Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2012.

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Stability Platforms (VSPs) should no longer be launched beyond summer 2012. For more on the VSO conundrum, see the forthcoming CNP report on the subject (Summer 2012).12 In order to avoid the fatal mistakes of the Soviet Unions withdrawal from Afghanistan and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the United States and allies will continue to provide enduring, substantial financial and material support for the Afghan government and, especially, the ANSF. U.S. material support will consist primarily of weaponry, ammunition, fuel, vehicles, and funding for salaries.

12

An as yet unreleased DoD report addresses the many problems of the VSO mission: David S. Cloud and Laura King, "Afghan police units tangled in criminal activity," Los Angeles Times, May 14, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghanistan-police-20120514,0,6941.story

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Logistics: The Central Challenge

The challenge in an accelerated drawdown and transition of the mission lies not in re-deploying NATO troops from Afghanistan, but in removing military equipment from Afghanistan. Indeed, a substantial proportion of the drawdown can simply be accomplished by not replacing units that are already scheduled to re-deploy back to the United States. From Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs) to Stryker vehicles to helicopters to howitzers to maintenance trailers, there is substantial rolling stock that must be removed from Afghanistan. Unlike Iraq, where the United States trained the Iraqi Security Forces largely on American military equipment, the ANSF are trained largely on military equipment from former Soviet states. Even if they had been trained on more American equipment, more advanced vehicles and weapons systems are simply beyond the competency of ANSF to operate and maintain. In order to make a drawdown possible, the President of the United States must prioritize efforts to re-open Pakistani supply routes. This should be a policy priority of the highest order.

Do Not Cut and Run: The Need for Enduring Support for the Afghan State and Security Forces Post-2014
The United States must learn the lessons of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the American withdrawal from Vietnam. In both cases, states collapsed after financial and material support from outside sponsors collapsed. After having decimated the Viet Cong insurgency, the U.S. withdrew its support of the South Vietnamese government.13 Similarly, the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan held on for two years after the USSR withdrew its forces. Financial support dried up when the USSR collapsed and Russia refused to continue the subsidies. The Afghan state then succumbed to the factional divisions within its armed forces as well as the mujahideen who took Kabul.14 Accepting the strategic shortcomings of the counterinsurgency campaign does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the United States should cut and run, to borrow a phrase popular in the context of another war. We propose the following forms of support beyond 2014: Enduring CJSOTF-A (OEF) mission. Financial support to the institutions of the Afghan state via UNAMA. Financial and material support to the ANSF. Development aid for small-scale projects, not large infrastructure projects, also via UNAMA. These projects should be targeted to incentivize and maintain the institutional coherence of the Afghan state.

13

On Vietnam, see: Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (Mariner Books, 2007); Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam (Bison Books, 2007); J.R. Burlington, "Assessing Pacification in Vietnam: We Won the Counterinsurgency War!" Small Wars Journal, March 23, 2012, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-pacification-in-vietnam-we-won-the-counterinsurgency-war. 14 nd On Afghanistan, see: Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 2 ed (New Haven, Yale nd University Press, 1995, 2002); William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, 2 ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); The Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (2011);

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Accepting and Managing Risk

There are inherent risks to this strategy, but all of them are acceptable and manageable in the context of NATO interests. The key takeaway for all of these risks is that none of them can be meaningfully averted by a slower withdrawal that sees as many as 68,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan by the end of 2013.

Fragmentation of the ANSF

In the years after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, President Najibullah's Afghan security forces fragmented along factional lines. This precipitated and, indeed, led to a civil war that did not end until the Taliban took most of the country in 1994-96. There is a high risk that the current ANSF will experience a similar fragmentation as many of the same factions and more are represented in their ranks. These include factions based on ethnicity, region, tribe, other forms of qawm, former Khalqi and Parchami affiliation, former mujahideen party membership, and more. As long as the U.S. and allies stay abreast of these factional politics, they can mitigate this fragmentation to some degree through proactive in-country diplomacy, firm mentoring, and appropriate mechanisms for the distribution of funding and supplies. However, fragmentation in the ANSF cannot be entirely avoided, particularly within the AUP and ALPs, both of which are more prone to local factional politics and clashes. The AUP and ALP are likely to experience both inter- and intra-unit fragmentation. ANA units are more ethnically-balanced, but still disproportionately Tajik. As such, ANA units are less likely to experience inter-unit fragmentation, but may be prone to intra-unit tensions particularly along TajikPashtun lines. ISAF and CJSOTF-A must begin planning efforts to maintain ANSF coherence now. ALP militias, hailing as they do from a constellation of competing local factions, may pose a particular threat to the institutional cohesion of the ANSF. As recommended earlier, ALP militias must be integrated into the ANP. Those that cannot be integrated in the short-terms must be disbanded. As the ALP force currently stands, it poses an unacceptable risk to the long-term integrity of the ANSF. NATO military planners must closely study the efforts of the Soviets and the Najibullah regime to create local and regional militias as proxies for official security forces. While they had some

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initial tactical successes in securing the Ring Road for the Soviet withdrawal, these programs planted the seeds for the civil war of the early 1990s.

Civil War in the South and Southeast

Much of Afghanistans south and southeast, which have never been fully under the control of the central government in Kabul in the last few decades, will likely fall into a state of low grade civil war, with different factions competing for pockets of control and influence, including factions within the ANSF and the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Border Police (ABP) in particular, networks based on past mujahideen party membership, tribal networks, as well as the Taliban and Haqqani Network. The Taliban and Haqqani Network may even achieve de-facto control of some areas of the rural south and southeast. Arguably, the Haqqani Network already holds sway in most of the eastern provinces of Kunar, Paktia, and Paktika despite the presence of substantial ISAF and ANSF forces. Key bases in the south, KAF and LNK, are sufficiently remote enough to insulate themselves from the impact of such a civil war with Afghan National Army (ANA) cooperation. CJSOTF-A can also leverage development funds and access to other resources in order to mitigate factional conflict. The ANSF and CJSOTF-A can maintain control over Kabul, the immediate approaches to the city and the northern and western provinces. Moreover, the ANSF have already formed rings of steel around key southern urban centers, including Lashkar Gah and Kandahar City. The situation will be far from perfect, but it will be tolerable and manageable for NATO member states.

Pakistan
Pakistan will continue to be a source of instability in Afghanistan. However, stability in South Asia is better ensured through reinforcing Pakistani stability rather than trying to create a thus far fictive modern state in Afghanistan. Pakistan has three immutable interests in Afghanistan: (1) Avoiding strategic encirclement by India; (2) Maintaining strategic depth against India; and (3) Blunting Pashtun nationalism. Pakistan's support for Afghan insurgents helps them accomplish all three. No matter how many billions of dollars the U.S. funnels into the Pakistani military, Pakistani civil society, and Pakistan's civilian government, it cannot change how Pakistan views the world, short of a miraculous sea-change in Pakistani-Indian relations. Elements of Pakistans national security structure will never cease support for the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network until they are no longer effective vehicles for Pakistani interests. As noted, the Taliban and Haqqani Network may achieve de-facto control of much of the south and southeast, which means Pakistan will have some level of control over these areas. As long as the U.S. can continue to effectively target violent transnational actors, this situation is tolerable from the U.S. point of view.

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In Search of a Political Settlement: Talking to the Taliban?

The hopes of policymakers lately have focused on the prospect of reconciliation with the Taliban through negotiation. There is considerable excitement in DC and London on what negotiations can deliver, not least from a White House that has firmly believed in the utility of engagement from the beginning. As one administration official recently commented, we see reconciliation as the most important pillar of our effort. Its one thats intertwined with everything else were doing, especially the military elements.15 Prospects for a negotiated settlement are slim for the following reasons: The timing could not be worse. With ISAF drawing down, there are few incentives for the Taliban to enter into meaningful negotiations. The U.S. is in an untenable position for successful negotiations: our opponents know what we want, how bad we want it, and when we need it. Talks may have borne fruit a decade ago, when the U.S. was clearly on the winning side. Despite the best efforts of brave military and civilian personnel from ISAF nations and the Afghan government, these conditions have not existed since the Taliban government suffered its initial defeat. Aspiring peacemakers must view this from the perspective of their opponents. One of three. The Taliban are one of three main Afghan insurgent groups. The others, Hizb-eIslami Gulbuddin and the Haqqani Network are different groups with different bases of support. The latter, which remains potent in eastern Afghanistan, is not interested in negotiations. The Taliban is not a coherent movement. It is doubtful that the Quetta Shura can deliver peace if it were willing to agree to it. The Taliban insurgency is not a coherent organization controlled by the Quetta Shura. Like the Afghan mujahideen parties of the 80s and early 1990s, mid- and low-level commanders and fighters are engaged in conflict for predominantly local reasons. The Taliban provide a useful structure, some ideological legitimacy, and most importantly a vehicle for funds, weapons, and training. Afghan and Western interests may not link up. For negotiations to succeed, the Taliban would presumably be included in government. President Karzai has been difficult enough to cajole into the negotiations process. Tajik and Uzbek powerbrokers as well as many Pashtun leaders find the very idea unacceptable. The Afghan government is an exercise in delicately managed consensus held together by embezzlement of Western funding and the presence of ISAF troops.

15

Karen DeYoung, "U.S. deal with Taliban breaks down after Afghan president balks at the terms," Washington Post, December 23, 2011.

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Conclusion
It is understandable that after a decade of combat operations in a distant land with limited discernible strategic interest to the United States, the American people and the citizens in nations allied with our cause do not believe efforts in Afghanistan have been worth it. The cost to the families of the fallen and in opportunities foregone has been great. Yet is it also important to remember that the very reason why American and allied troops went to Afghanistan in 2001 still remains valid-to punish those who attacked us on September 11th and prevent such an attack from ever again emanating from that land. American leaders began this decade of war with high hopes for the transformation of Afghanistan from a land shattered by a generation of war and characterized by grinding poverty into a modern functional state able to provide opportunity and security for all its citizens. The reality has been very different, and now is the time to align American security interests with the reality that is Afghanistan in 2012. We propose this course of action as the best way forward to protect American security interests, complete an allied mission with a level of strategic success and give the people of Afghanistan a chance to build a better future. Our plan would be a clear signal to all that the United States and NATO allies have no interest in playing a dominant role in Afghanistan, yet will protect our own interests while providing sustainable support to the Afghan people.

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