Europe beyond Partition and Unity: Disintegration or Reconstitution?

Author(s): Pierre Hassner Reviewed work(s): Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 66, No. 3 (Jul., 1990), pp. 461-475 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2623068 . Accessed: 02/08/2012 12:56
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Europebeyond partition and unity:disintegration or ? reconstitution

PIERRE HASSNER

writes Thereis a raceon in Europetoday, Hassner,between integration the in East and West.In this in between West,disintegration theEast, and rapprochement situation keyto thedecline revivalofEuropeas a wholeis thestrengthening the or and opening Western of Europeto Eastern Europe. The responsibility the West of in thisregard theshortness timeavailablecannot overemphasized. and be Hassner of traces three phasesin Europeanand Russiandevelopments fromtheending the of withdisillusion, Cold War to all-European collaboration then, and backto and in differentiation newfrustrationsEast and West. 'The moment when I speak has alreadyescaped me': No one can writeabout Europe today without acknowledging that thiseternaltruth, borrowed from a verse in a Frenchpoem, has never been more valid. Indeed, it is impossible today to speak of Europe in the presenttense: thebipolar Europe, based on the divisionbetween two alliances,two economic organizations, two superpowers and two Germanies,is already past. Some of us thoughtwe knew the Europe of tomorrow,symbolizedby the about the date of the 1992 magical figureof 1992. But to new uncertainties horizon as Ralf Dahrendorf has said, '1992 will surely come, but when?' are now added new doubts about its direction,as peacefulintegration and democraticprosperity become universally accepted goals in the East as well as in the West. Secondly, the goal of 1992 has been reaffirmed reinforced and by the Kohl-Mitterrand declaration of April I990 aiming at the creation of a European political union, includingcommon security institutions, the same by date. Thirdly,the road taken by the European Community looks more than ever like the only promisingone forthe whole continent. Yet the liberationof EasternEurope, theunitingof Germanyand the decolonizationstruggles the of Soviet Empire have raised in many minds the question whether,ratherthan will not be succeededby the Europe of the day beforeyesterday rather thanby that of tomorrow. Of course,Balkanizationand disintegration, war and revolution, civil may be confinedto one part of the continent;and they can, at any rate,only last for
International 66, Affairs 3
(1990)

towards1992, we are not headedtowards1914; whether yesterday's Europe

46I-475

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Pierre Hassner a time. The real question is less that of tomorrow than of the day after tomorrow.The timesof troublesmay lead, as theydid in WesternEurope, to condition, with a post-warlike,post-revolutionary and even post-nationalist the victory of liberalism and rationality.Or, on the contrary unless the the meetingof East and West fulfils Hegelian dream of reconcilingunityand virtuewith modernfreedomand peace- it may be WesternEurope which will be 'East Europeanized', 'Third Worldized' or, simply,thrownback to itsown heroic or barbaric past, complete with new religions and new wars, new prophetsand new Caesars. The reader may findthese speculationsidle and suspectthat they represent task of building a new European architecture; an evasion of the necessary and he may not be entirely wrong. Yet theydo serveto point out thatin a Europe which is moving in so many directions, where so many ages of historyand dimensionsof politicsare coexistingin so littlespace, the rulesof the game for transformed. Political institution- model-building and have been fundamentally decisionsand institutions more necessary are thanever,but the time-dimension has become both more decisive and less predictable.During the Cold War, processeswere constrained,repressedor channelled by state and, above all, alliancestructures; are today,old and new structures being driven,transformed or emptied by contradictory processeswithin,between and across societies. In the abstract,it may be useful to distinguishthree such processes: the of the of interaction strategies (both diplomaticand military), interdependence and the interpenetration societies (parof interests(particularly economic), the and ideas.' The point is ticularly affecting movementof people, aspirations timethat all threeof these processeswork at different paces or on different scales. Yet theyinterfere with each other,and while each of them has its own result theircombination political of that logic and dynamic,it is theunpredictable decisions (which are naturallybiased towards immediateproblems and deadlines) and institution-building (which inevitablyworks forthe long run and is slowed down by the need for multilateralconsensus) have to take into account or, even worse, to anticipate. An example is theprocessof Germanunification, which virtually everybody thoughtwould take decades and could be 'managed' fromabove or fromthe of it outside. Yet the interpenetration societiesprecipitated in two successive the twin impact of Westernprosperity and of Soviet liberalization ways. First, led to popular impatience,expressedby escalatingemigrationand dissent;and thenthe opening of the Austrianborderlast summerand thenthe Berlin Wall increasedthe interdependence between the two German economies and made the East German one quite unworkable. Chancellor Kohl acted decisivelyin and Germany's neighboursand using this situationto speed up unification, triedto slow down the tide,are runningbehindit, allies,having unsuccessfully or tryinghastily to adapt old institutions to build new ones in order to accommodate a united Germanyin the middle of Europe.
discussion of these processes see Pierre Hassner, 'Modelling while Rome burns?', For further unpublished paper. 462

Europebeyond partition unity and To put it anotherway: There is a race on today between the rapprochement between the two Germanies,the two Europes and the two superpowers;the of integration WesternEurope; the disintegration EasternEurope; and the of of trendto the disengagement the two superpowers.Of these,the only clear and speed have taken everybody by and irreversible trends,whose strength are surprise, the end of communistrule in EasternEurope (and hence of the Warsaw Pact) and the unitingof Germany.The fateof the Soviet Union itself (both as a communist regime and as a multinationalempire) and that of a WesternEurope (both regardingits abilityto unite and thusconstitute valid and also counterweightto increasingGerman power and Soviet instability, regardingits linkswith the United States)now hang in the balance. It is these the themesthatwill constitute main concernsof the early I99os, just as Eastern Europe and Germanyhave provided the headlinesof the late I98os. Going from West to East, we can distinguishthree possible dialectical sequences concerning the relation between Western and pan-European the evolution of Eastern Europe in its attempt to rejoin the institutions, and European mainstream, theevolutionof the Soviet Union betweenimperial In power and democraticreform. each case, our conclusionwill be that,while is of course the future unknown, whatever WesternEurope mustboth happens, to give much higherpriority itsrelationwith theEast and clingto itsenterprise of buildingan autonomous centreof power withinthiscontinental framework.

i. The West: from Cold War victory to all-European cooperation and back to deterrence

The root of the problem lies in the double-facedresultof the I989 revolutions. has moved On the one hand, the centreof gravityof the European continent fromEast to West; or, put in a more brutalway, the West has won over the East. It is East Germany which has disintegrated ratherthan West Germany, thanthe European Community,theWarsaw Pact rather than Comecon rather NATO. On the other hand, the centreof gravityof the respectiveWestern halves of these pairs has, by the same token, moved eastwards,or at least towards Central Europe, and in the process Germany,the Community and severeproblemsin digesting their NATO are encountering victories. respective While in thelong and even medium runit is likelythatthe absorptionof the former GDR will increase Germany's total economic power and political influence,and with them those of Europe as a whole, in the shorterrun Germanyis likelyto be less stableinside,less active outside and less reliableor dedicated a partnerfor European integration in spite of Chancellor Kohl's determination because of the difficult cultural, psychological, social and of integrating17 million people whose spiritual and economic problems for materialexperienceshave been different 45 years. This same problem reverberates the European Community as a whole, on though perhapsin a more seriousway. While for Germanythisstage is likely 463

PierreHassner to last no more thana few yearsin its acute form,forthe Community it may lead to basic structural changes. While the Monnet method of combining and economic interdependence common institutions ensurepeacefulpolitical to the integration a striking is success storyand indeed represents only hopeful road forthe less peacefuland prosperouspartsof the continent, is not likely it of extensionto thatthe institutions the Community and stillless theirfuture political union and military security can be successfullycombined with indefinite enlargement, particularly countrieswhose levels of development, to orientation qualitativelydifferent. economic traditions and international are

Deepeningversus enlarging Yet it is just as unlikelythat the priorityof 'deepening' over 'enlargement' stronglyadvocated by the French government,and to some extent by the BrusselsCommissionand by all thoseEuropeanists who are primarily concerned and the creationof a West European with the functioning the institutions of can be maintainedfor very long. If the formerGDR is in, can federation, Austria be refusedaccess? If Austria is in, can Hungary be far behind? If does thisnot necessarily Germany's weight withinthe Community increases, draw the lattermore towards Central Europe? Can it then turna deaf ear to the unanimousaspirations CentralEuropean nations?Can it, forverylong, of be content with offeringhelp from outside and well-meaning advice on forming union of theirown which would enterinto some kind of association a with the EC? If and when these nations progresstowards democracy and a marketeconomy, will theynot be even more insistent than today upon being treatedas fullyfledgedEuropeans, and will theynot have a point? Once the Cold War and the divisionof Germanyare over, is thereany good reason for the restricting Community to WesternEurope, otherthan the pragmaticones of based on considerations optimal size and on justifications the 'Firstcome, of first while less and served' variety?-Though thesepragmaticconsiderations, retaina certaintechnicalvalidity. less psychologicallyand morallydefensible,

and Strengthening opening The only way out of this dilemma must be to combine broadening and daring deepening,to make thechallengeof broadeninginto a reasonforgreater and energyin the directionof deepening that is, of endowing Europe with structures. This is what the majority common monetary, politicaland security of the EC governments(not to mention the Commission, whose president, Jacques Delors, is the author of the so-called 'Bruges formula' according to which any progressin reunion with the East should lead to a speeding up of in integration the West)2 claim to be aiming for.
2 See his speech to the College of Europe, Bruges, I7 Oct. 1989.

464

Europebeyond partition unity and Of course thisis easiersaid than done, if only because the deepeningand the enlargingcannotbe done quite by the same partners quite on thesame timeor scale. Hence 'variable geometry',Europe 'a la carte' and 'multiple speeds', all thosesloganswhich at one time or anotherhave been applied to the processof European integration, even more valid today,particularly are when applied to the problem of dealing with EasternEurope. But the directionmust remain clear: that of an ultimateextensionof the Community to the whole of the continent(with, I believe, the permanentor at least longer-term exception of the Soviet Union, which we shall discuss later), preceded and guided by a double process of a political strengtheningof the Community and a reorientation its activitiestowards the East. I would emphasize that the of of successor failure thiscombinationholds thekey to thedeclineor revivalboth of the Community and of Europe as a whole. After NATO The problem is even more difficult, the prognosisrather and less sanguine,for the Atlanticalliance, or at least for NATO. While the Community can easily survivethe demiseof Comecon and even prosperfromit,the dissolution the of Warsaw Pact and the decline of the Soviet militarythreat,at least in its immediateand visibleform,pose much more seriousquestionsforthe survival of NATO. Afterall, a military alliance, let alone a military organization,can hardly thrive without a potential adversary.This does not mean that the presence in Europe of American troops and nuclear weapons, which have constitutedthe cornerstoneof NATO, has outlived its usefulness; and a different voluntaryalliance of freenations with origins fundamentally from those of the Warsaw Pact is under no logical compulsion to follow the fateof the instrument the Brezhnev Doctrine and Soviet domination.But, valid as of are theyare, thesearguments not necessarily convincingforthe generalpublic. for transforming NATO into a political organization Secondly, arguments whose missionwould be to negotiatearms controlagreements likelyto be are challengedby theobjectionthat,witheach countryof theWarsaw Pact having a more independentpolicy, even on arms control, every day, it is hard to imagine futurearms control being handled essentiallyat the alliance level, rather thanpoliticalrelationstakingplace primarily eitherat the bilateralor at the CSCE level. Finally,even if NATO and nuclearweapons do retaina role, and thisrole constitutes hard core of Europe's military the security, theycan no longer provide the primary structuringframework of West-West and East-West relations. They will recedeinto the backgroundand appear, at best, as necessarybut discreteinsurancepolicies. The limelightwill belong to panratherthan to purelyWesternones; to economics rather European structures than to security; and above all, to bilateral relations or to universalistic organizationsratherthan to alliances. Besides the crumblingof the Warsaw Pact and the decline of the Soviet the military threat, primaryreason forthisevolution is, of course,the uniting 465

Pierre Hassner of Germany.It is likelythat,contrary thestatedSoviet preferences, to Germany But thepricefornot havinga neutralGermanybetween will not be neutralized. the two alliances may well be a neutral Europe, or the dissolution of the alliancesthemselves. Let us assume that, contraryto theirposition at the time of writing,the Soviets accept thatunitedGermanyshould belong to NATO, with the former GDR remaining or or non-integrated, demilitarized, even hostingsome Soviet assume that Chancellor Kohl wins the December I990 troops. Let us further West German elections and that NATO's presence in Germany remains and operational(ratherthan essentially substantial symbolic,as it would seem of to be in the discussions the SPD). How long is thissolution,which may look on satisfactory paper, likely to last in realityunless the Soviet Union again threat? Germanpublic opinion may be lessunited appearsas a crediblemilitary in its commitmentto unification than is sometimesassumed; but it definitely on is unitedin wantingto eliminatethelimitations Germany'ssovereignty that were linkedwith its defeatin the Second World War and with the Cold War. Faced with the disintegration the Warsaw Pact and with a Soviet Union of or which, whetherthroughfriendliness absorptioninto its own internalstrife, no longer appearsas a threat, how long will the Germanstoleratethe presence of foreigntroops and nuclear weapons, particularly American ones, on their soil? And how long is Americanpublic opinion equally confronted with the evolution in the East, but also with thatof German attitudes and with its own and priorities going to keep its troops and nuclear budgetary constraints weapons in Europe, let alone in a reluctant Germany?

A collective security system is To the feebleextentthatany prediction possiblein today's Europe, it should safeto predictthatin a few yearstherewill be no nuclearweapons be relatively and perhaps no foreigntroops on German soil; and that those which may remain would justifytheirresidual presencein termsof 'reassurance' rather of than deterrence,3 arms control ratherthan defence,of contribution the to collectivesecurity advocated by suchdiversevoices as Mr Shevardnadze, system number of German voices coming fromboth Vaclav Havel and an increasing government and opposition, rather than to an alliance committed to the defenceof the West. This development would in many ways be a welcome and salutaryone. in While theold problemsof European security termsof theEast-West balance have not reallydisappeared,it is certainthatthe waning of the Cold War has opened up a whole seriesof new security problems.Without even mentioning dimensionsof security economic, social, ecological and yet the non-military
3 Cf. M. Mandelbaum, Reconstructing Europeansecurity the order(New York: Council on Foreign

Relations, I99o-I,

'Critical issues'), p.

22.

466

Europebeyond partition unity and so on it is clear that the dangersof violence in the new Europe come more states fromthe riseof nationalismin the East, fromthe decay of multinational like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and from the minorityand border problems of the Balkans. There is littlethat NATO (or, for that matter,the French or British national nuclear deterrents)can do about civil war in Yugoslavia, Soviet interventionin the Baltic states or conflict between uses Romania and Hungary. All thesepotentialdomesticor inter-state of force have more to do with the problems of prewar Europe or of today's Third of World than with the East-West confrontation the last 45 years. to Hence in order to prevent,solve or, more realistically, manage and limit theseproblems,the experienceof the League of Nations or thatof the United time in postwar Nations is more relevantthan that of NATO. For the first at Europe (with the exceptionof Cyprus), attempts mediation,the sendingof observersor international peace forcesmay be the order of the day. The questionthenis whetherto look in the directionof a revivalof the UN and at an extensionof its activities Europe, or to look to the endowmentof to a tegional organization like CSCE with a true security role. Given the of identification the Helsinki process both with human rightsand with the of Cold War divisions in Europe, it is likely that an overcoming institutionalization CSCE will be the road chosen to give 'Europe fromthe of Atlanticto the Urals' or the 'Common European Home' its collectivesecurity system. The troubleis thatnobody reallyknows what such a systemwould consist at is of,and thattheactual recordof previousattempts collectivesecurity pretty While thereare many reasonswhy today's Europe, even without depressing. military alliances,should be less war-pronethanthe Middle East or yesterday's organization Balkans, thereis no reason to believe thatany collectivesecurity if in would be more effective, particularly it consists mobilizingall the statesof or theinternational communityto punishan aggressor, in delegatingtheuse of forceto a standingcommon authority. factthe lesson of the postwar years In is that boththe classical systems a flexiblemultipolarbalance of power and world peace throughworld law are too unreliable,and thatonly permanent or preventiveintegration,or entanglementthrough physical presence, can based on predictability. bring a new quality of stability and of the Hence the dilemma: The overcoming of the East-West conflict likeitspresent role divisionof Europe makesthesurvivalof NATO in anything unlikely; yet no substitutebased on East-West cooperation and on the of reunification Europe is likely to provide the same degree of securityand predictability. are Many currentconceptual efforts directedat solving or mitigatingthis and physicalpresencewith all-European dilemma by combining integration structures. One proposal is common membershipof Germany (and possibly other European states) in both alliances. Another, broached by the West in GermanSPD leader Oskar Lafontaine some campaignspeechesalthoughnot is a kind of multiple tous azimuts bilateral part of his officialplatform, 467

Pierre Hassner integration, with a German-Polish brigade, for instance,being added to the ones. Multiple reciprocalstationing forces, of existingFranco-German national or multinational, European stateson each other'sterritories a 'reassuring' in by or preventivefunction anotherversionof the same idea. is A return Western to deterrence None of theseideas shouldbe rejectedout of hand, as theirhybridor seemingly characterdoes reflect paradoxes of the emergingEuropean the contradictory if situation. Yet none of themseemsverypractical, what is needed goes beyond weaknessof collectivesecuritysymbols.They do not escape the traditional thattheyare plausibleonly if theyare not reallyneeded, if European divisions and imbalanceshave alreadybeen overcome. and But suppose the Soviet Union is becoming again more militaristic Or is threatening. suppose thatthe Easternpart of the continent in the throes of civil conflict and revolution,while the Western one continuesits progress towardspoliticaland economic union. Or suppose theextremes catastrophic of decline in the East and of revolutionary unityin the West do not materialize, but thelogic of nationalpower reasserts in itself thelong runand, as in thepast, of Germanyand Russia (or a federation Slavic republicsor a largelypreserved USSR) emerge as the two dominant statesin Europe. In all these cases, it is likely that neitherthe CSCE nor any of the various schemes for reciprocal in would prove very effective restoring and balance to entanglement security the continent.It is, rather,likely that Western Europe, possibly including if Germany,would tryto reactivateor reconstitute, not NATO, at least some Westernstructure mechanismfor military or deterrence and political action. It is in this thirdphase- afterbipolarityand the Cold War, and afterthe of euphoria and the disappointment all-European cooperation that the time for a reassertion a West European defenceidentity(which is unlikelyto of a for in constitute priority any country thepresent atmosphere)may come. Put after of differently, the thesisconstituted NATO and the antithesis CSCE, by some kind of European Defence Community may come to representa All synthesis. the more so since this mightbe conceived as a West European pillareitherof NATO or of CSCE, dependingon America's wish to maintain in itspresence Europe and Germany'swish to maintain speciallinksin theWest. theprecisepriority betweenthesetwo directions and whateverthe Whatever precise institutionalarrangements,the idea would be that the European tied Communityshouldbe structurally both to theUnited Statesand to Eastern Europe, but that under whateverroof it should maintaina distinct identity of its own. This would be desirablenot only as a counterbalanceagainst a potentially re-emerging Soviet superiority,not only as a framework for discouraging German temptations,but also in the perspectiveof the new role in security agenda. If WesternEurope is to exerta mediatingor stabilizing EasternEurope, its freedom of diplomatic action will need to be protected againstblackmail by its own counter-deterrence. 468

Europebeyond partition unity and

2.

Eastern Europe: beyond liberation

It is all the more urgent for Western Europe to preservethis latteroption because its relations with Eastern Europe may well become increasingly both complex and unpredictable the only certainty being the improbability of complete separationthrough a new Iron Curtain or Berlin Wall and of freefrominequalitiesand conflicts. harmoniousintegration The rushto the West For EasternEurope, the Cold War represented both the impositionof alien regimesthroughSoviet occupation and a forcedsocial, culturaland economic fromtheWest. Liberationobviouslyleads thevariousEast European separation countries a rushtowardsthe West-which impliessimultaneously to claiming their European identity (and hence the recognition of their full rights as of as Europeans and of the incompletecharacter European integration long as it is limited to the Western half of the continent),adopting democraticand parliamentarian institutions, private propertyand the market,and expecting theirstandardof living to rise,in turn,to Westernstandards. It is clear that, however justifiedthe immediate urge and the long-term direction may be, short- and middle-run expectations are bound to be of disappointed,at least in part. This is due first all to the objective difficulties of the transition, which will involve government consent,thento the inner by tensions between politicaland economic reforms, which will involve hardships and inequalities,and then to the lack of appropriatetraditions and the longof lastingeffects the communistsystem.But it is due just as much to the likely West European reaction. The North-South East-West of For the reasons quoted above, the EC is reluctantto accept the immediate admissionof all thenewly democraticEast European countries membership. to It is willing to help, but not on the scale theEast Europeans expect. Moreover, to the extentthat they realize that West European standardswill be hard to even further attain,while conditionsin theirown countriesare deteriorating individualEast Europeans are temptedto tryto findforthemselves theWest in the freedom and prosperity that elude them in their own countries. This-movement from East to West was afterall the main single factor behind German unification.But while the Federal Republic, legally and politicallyunable to stem the flood of Ubersiedler (from East Germany) and Aussiedler (ethnicGermansfromEasternEurope and the Soviet Union), saw no other solution than a fuiteen avantinto unity,this perspectiveis not open to otherEast Europeans. On the contrary, while the East European countriesare Tens of opening up theirborders,the Westernones are tendingto close theirs. fromEasternEurope and the Soviet Union millionsof would-be immigrants enter into competition with hundreds of millions from Africa and Latin 469

Pierre Hassner America foraccess to the prosperousand democraticWest. To thatextent(as of withtheproblemof debt and investment, tradeand aid), East-West relations are losing theirspecific character and are appearingmore and more as a special between the richcentreand the poor case of North-South ones, or of relations Hence the dangerthatthe Wall and the Iron Curtainset up by the peripheries. set East forpoliticalreasonscould be replacedby new barriers up by the West for economic and demographic ones. But of course the self-isolation that evaded totalitarian statesis not a viable option for democraticsocieties.They dictates have to live with thisuncomfortable problem; and theirown interest active cooperation in improvingconditionsin the home countries. seem to be increasing out of Even betweenEast and West Germans,tensions about the amount of help fromthe West and of disruption mutual resentment or competitionfrom the East.4 In turn,both partsof Germany are united in irritation or workers(particularly againstPoles or otherimmigrants temporary fromthe Third World), who are accused of unfaircompetitionthroughblack marketor cheap labour. East-East tensions the And thisonly illustrates second type of tensionsand inequalitiesarisingin of Clearly theresults the Europe: thosebetweentheEast Europeansthemselves. encounterwith Western Europe will combine with permanentor resurgent as national characteristics promote an increasingdifferentiation,5 compared to to the forcedhomogeneityof the communistpast and to the sentimental but of European reconciliation. partlysuperficial unity As in the Third World, but in a much more compressed space, several playingthe role of the region's categoriesare likelyto emerge: some countries 'little dragons', and some being in danger of becoming Europe's Africa. More than ever, the East Germanswill be a class in themselves, no other as or countryis likelyto finda level of salaries,investment access even remotely comparable to that provided by unity with the FRG and the enthusiasmof West German business. Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for different reasons, return Mitteleuropa.The case of Poland hangsvery to may well succeedin their much in the balance. It enjoys,with Solidarity,a unique basis of political and which moral legitimacythanksto which its population has accepted sacrifices and would be unthinkableamong its neighbours;but its economic structures and rigidity traditions itsdiplomaticstyle(as evidencedby thenervousness and of itsdiplomaticactionsover Germanunityand borderand minority issues)are very serious handicaps. Romania and Bulgaria encounter no less serious difficulties. Those of multinationalcountrieslike Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are, of course, the most seriousof all. For theNorth-South divide runsnot only acrosstheEuropean continent and withinits Easternpart,but within some of its countriesthemselves.Slovenia
4 Cf. David Marsh, 'Angst ulberalles', Fituancial Times, 28 Apr. I990.
5

For an excellent analysis of emerging inequalities between East-Central European states,see L. Vol. 66, No. 2, Apr. I990. Lengyel, 'Europe through Hungarian eyes', Initernational Affairs,

470

Europebeyond partition unity and and Croatia, the Baltic statesand Georgia are much more readyto be co-opted into the efficient prosperouscentrethan theirpoorer,more numerousand and militarily more powerfulorthodox counterparts like Serbia and Russia,not to mentionthe more backward Muslim republics. Economic rivalriesand jealousies, then, are added to traditionalnational antagonismsand minorityproblems. Here the relation with the West, and particularly with WesternEurope, can play an important role in steering the in rightor thewrong direction. Usefulattempts regrouping at along regionallines are being undertaken, sometimes with Western participation, like the November I989 Budapest meetingof theSouthernFour (Hungary,Yugoslavia, Italy and Austria) organized by Italian Foreign Ministerde Michelis, or the BratislavaCentral European conference called in April I990 by Vaclav Havel of (with the participation Hungary and Poland and observerstatusfor Italy, Austria and Yugoslavia),6 or Poland's contacts with the Nordic countries. in Yet differences situation,in political approach (nothing is more striking than the differences diplomatic conceptionsand stylebetween Poland and in Czechoslovakia) and to some extentin interests (while PresidentHavel is the most active proponent of Central European confederal structures,his balk at theidea of freeentry Poles into Czechoslovakia) as well for countrymen as traditional rivalriesmake it more likely that,basically,each East European countrywill undertake hard and long journey to theWest alone- unlessthe its undertakes encourage theirunityby channelling help, to its Communityitself as the United Statesdid with the MarshallPlan, throughcommon institutions. Disillusion This would be all the more desirableas relationswith the West are likely to become a major, perhapsthemajor politicalstakein the domesticlifeof former in communistcountries.Particularly the cases where attemptsat promoting democracy and marketeconomy and, more generally,at 'rejoining Europe' will be perceived as failures,these failureswill tend to be blamed on an and selfishWest. The question then is likely to be what kind of ungrateful regime will intervenein this third,post-disillusionment phase. Will it be an to at attempt some kind of social democraticcompromise,or a return a national populism of the left or, more plausibly,of the right? Afterall, thiswould only repeat traditional patterns. Contraryto common the of Westernbeliefs, countries Central and EasternEurope are not devoid of democratic traditions.But their prewar historyis made up of alternations between formallydemocraticregimes that were patternedon the French or Britishmodel but weak and corrupt, and dictatorships reactedto thefailure that of the formerin the name of moral regeneration,efficiency and national identity. Already now, the stillprevalentopposition between communistsand nonor communists being supplemented replacedby an articulation is along linesof
6

See 'Un avenir commun pour les "petits" pays d'Europe centrale?', Le Monde, Io Apr.

I990.

47'

Pierre Hassner economic interests(hence the rise of peasant parties); but still more along Russia), traditional lines between 'slavophiles' and 'Westernizers' (as in tsarist between urbanists and populists(as in Hungary), or between the 'blacks' (i.e. of the Church) and secularmovementslike the intellectual founders Solidarity in Poland. In other words, the articulationemergingin Central and Eastern Europe is one between national or religiousneo-traditionalist populism, and liberalism. pro-Westerndemocraticor rationalist The pessimistictone of these remarks,reinforcedby the currentrise in national clashes in most of these countries,should not be interpretedas the forces.Afterall, in the predicting victoryof xenophobic or anti-democratic interwarperiod three models competed for the soul of these peoples: the Western democratic one, which looked tired and declining; the fascistone, which looked energetic and on the rise; and the communist one, which to appearedas a dangerousthreat most and as an inspiring hope to some. Today are dead or discredited,and the liberal the fascistand communist models world looks to be not only the only model available but also highly capitalist successful economically and politically.This is why it is so vitallyimportant or of thatit should not appear indifferent worse closed to the aspirations its newly won disciplesin the East. The responsibility the West in thisregard,and the shortness the time of of Unlike thepast,when the Soviet bloc was available,cannotbe overemphasized. inaccessible to Western direct influence; unlike the future, when the glow Community and Western-style democracy may lose their triumphant in and thecrisis theEast may lead to uncontrollable crises and resentments now is the time when political help to pro-Westernforces,economic and cultural help to theircountries and, above all, a coordinatedpolicy of gradualadmission of the whole region to West European marketsand institutions can make a decisive difference. Even at the diplomatic and securitylevel, WesternEurope may be highly useful through mediation, warning or surveillance- in defusing national conflicts, provided it has another message beyond 'Leave it to Moscow', as seemed to be the case duringthe Romanian revolutionin December I989 and the Lithuaniancrisisin April/May I990. 3. The Soviet Union: beyond perestroika Of course,Moscow is at least as much the problem as it is the solution. Most in projectionsof the European future, particularly Germany,seem to proceed either from a complacent view according to which the Soviet Union will satellites towardsdemocracyand the marketand follow the path of its former in become a stableand cooperativepartner a common European order,or from the worry thatthesepositive developmentsdepend on the person of Mikhail Gorbachev, whose power is under threat,so that Western policy should consistin helping him out. essentially Both perceptionsmay well correspondto a period which, as Michel Tatu
472

Europebeyond partition unity and among othershas pointed out, may already be past.7Of the various possible for Soviet futures the coming years,the two most positive are not the most likely. In particular,extrapolatingthe last three years does not seem very plausible,as difficulties resistances and againstthepolicy of retreat mounting are as one approachesthehardcore of Soviet power. A revolutionary breakthrough in the directionof a Soviet Commonwealth based on independentrepublics, genuine multi-party democracy and Polish-style economic reformis the best hope on paper, but the chance may already have been lost, and Gorbachev's current hesitations may well be foundedon a correctawarenessof the limitsof his power over Soviet society in spite of his constant gains in intra-elite
struggles.8

Repression retrenchment and Some of the Western observers who refuse the optimisticscenarios often denounce the whole Gorbachev enterpriseas a plan designed to capture Westerngood will and technology,only to resumethe attack (in the formof a Third World War, as Zinoviev asserts, less extravagantly, the formof in or, a Brezhnev-likepolicy of military and pressure)once Moscow has expansion overcome itstechnological and lulled theWest into dismantling defences. its lag This interpretation has the advantage of serving to justify the survival of NATO and the attemptsat European defence.But it is highlyunlikelythat even the most hostileand militaristic Soviet leadershipcould eitherrestorethe Brezhnev Doctrine or reconquerEasternEurope or starta bid for global and on strategic primacyagain. Perhapsit could become lessforthcoming a German and settlement insiston maintaining troopsin the former its GDR indefinitely, althoughit is hard to imaginehow it could undo Germanunification. Certainly it would tryto keep the inner empire,including the Baltic republics,and it would have itshandsfullwith trying repress variousnationalist social to the and movementsand to stop the Soviet Union's slide into anarchy. Such a situation-of a Soviet Union thatwas nasty, brutish and weak, neither the West's friendlyand cooperative neighbour in a 'Common European Home', nor a threatening empire occupying half of Europe and bidding for continentalor global dominance, but a hostile yet inner-directed powerwould raisemany unansweredquestionsabout the statusof EasternEurope, of NATO and American troops and of East-West relationsin general.It would be rather reminiscent theinterwar of communist period,minustheinternational movement and the threatfromGermany.
8

Michel Tatu, 'Le troisieme Gorbatchev', Le Monde, 28 Apr. I990. See also Z. Brzezinski, 'The Soviet Union: three scenarios', US News and WorldReport,23 Apr. I990, p. 46. On the other hand, the fact that the Russian Republic, under Boris Yeltsin's new leadership,seems to be taking the lead in the movement for independence and reform,and to be engaging in direct negotiations with other republics, would seem to indicate that the revolutionarydecolonization Gorbachev has so far refusedmay occur in spite of him, from below. If Russian nationalism evolves in this direction ratherthan in the imperial one, a new balance may then be found without the agonies of repressionor civil war. The question remains, though, whether a political game based on compromise would not be overtaken by the mounting economic and social tensionsand the bloody ethnic clashes at the periphery. i8 June I990.

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Pierre Hassner Collapse One wonders,however, if it could last very long, and whetherit would not precipitate threatof imperialand social collapse into the anarchyand civil the war which it was meantto prevent.Of course,the way in which nationaland social confrontations leading to revolution or secession would combine is impossible to predict, and so, even more than for the 'repression plus retrenchment' hypothesis, are the consequences for Eastern Europe and the West. Clearly the latter would do its best to avoid repeating its half-hearted interventions I9I7 to I920. The nucleardimensionwould increaseboth the of need forrestraint theneed forcommunication;theproblemof refugees and and the dangersof territorial overflowwould requiredelicatehandlingboth at the diplomaticand at thehumanitarian level. Peace-keepingforces theshortrun, in and perspectives integration whateverislandsof peace may emerge,are of for not to be excluded. But theinstitutional inclusionof the Soviet Union or what would be leftof it into an all-Europeansecurity systemor peacefulordersuch as Mitterrand's 'confederation'would have, at best,to wait untilone or several politicallyand economically manageable entities-perhaps Russia, perhapsan independent Ukraine, perhapsa Slavic federation-eventuallyemerged out of the turmoil. A stableRussia This last scenariowould probably have a chance, then,only in a thirdphase, afterthe repressionand the anarchyrepresented the two precedingones. by There is no way of predicting when and how Russia would thus complete if, its democratizationand its Europeanization. One can only assertthat these more likelyafter 'time of troubles' thanthroughgradual a processesare rather reform or radical revolution in the present phase, although a voluntary fragmentationthrough 'implosion rather than explosion', to use Enders Wimbush's phrase,is no longer to be excluded. Even democratized and 'cut down to size' throughtheloss of itsinnerempire followingtheexternal in one, Russiais likelyto be different size and population, in armamentsand in domestic institutions from the rest of Europe. Former German Chanceller Kiesinger'sformulaabout Germany-that it has always been eithertoo weak or too strongforthepeace of Europe-may be even more applicable to Russia. Unless it is in the throesof anarchyand civil war, it may be too strongto be includedin an institutional structure fromwhich theUnited Stateswould be absent,as would seem to be the case in de Gaulle's notion of 'Europe from the Atlanticto the Urals' or in some versionsof Mitterrand's ambiguous proposal for a confederation. Who would want such an unpredictablepartner,unless this confederation was only another name for CSCE?

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and Europebeyond partition unity

of The reasonI have given such stress theunpredictabilities Soviet evolution to is thatit seems to me thatthis,along with European politicalunion, holds the key to the evolution of the continent. We are back, then,to where we started. is The reason formy scepticism about all-Europeanarchitecture thatwe have and War, theSoviet Union was a separateworld,isolatedin itsbarbaricrigidity in its domination over Eastern Europe, while Western Europe, including if and Germany,could be decisivelyinfluenced, not shaped by theinstitutional economic hand of a powerfuland eager United States.Afterthe FirstWorld War, by contrast,the real question was not that of the precise institutional formula for the League of Nations, but that of American presence or withdrawal,and above all thatof the domesticevolution and the ultimatefate of Germanyand the Soviet Union. The difference today is thatthe first problem-Germany-is happilysolved for the time being. Nuclear weapons, economic interdependence, democratic would seem to make a education and, last but not least,European integration resurgence of German totalitarianismand military expansionism almost unthinkable. The evolution of EasternEurope is rather more unpredictable, the range but of variationsand theirimpact on the restof the continentare stilllimitedby weakness. size, economic and socio-culturaldependence,and military of The real question-mark hangs over the vast stretches an empire which is ill terminally while stilla nuclear superpower. should also determine degreesof intimacy These degreesof unpredictability and of institutionalization. would be foolishto believe thatEurope should cut It priorities the are itself fromthe two superpowers.Yet it is clear thatitsfirst off of economic and political union of Western Europe and the establishment structuralties with Eastern Europe leading to its eventual integration. and linkswith theUnited Statesshould be maintained Meanwhile, institutional entertained;and the prospectof similarties with the Soviet Union should be keptopen fortheday when Europe and thewhole civilizedworld can celebrate 'the end of Soviet exceptionalism'.
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to the entered periodwhichis closer I9I8 thanto I947. After SecondWorld a

May I990

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