Biodiversity

“Biodiversity” is often defined as the variety of all forms of life, from genes to species, through
to the broad scale of ecosystems (for a list of variants on this simple definition see Gaston 1996).
"Biodiversity" was coined as a contraction of "biological diversity" in 1985, but the new term
arguably has taken on a meaning and import all its own. A symposium in 1986, and the follow-
up book BioDiversity (Wilson 1988), edited by biologist E. O. Wilson, heralded the popularity of
this concept. Ten years later, Takacs (1996, p.39) described its ascent this way: "in 1988,
biodiversity did not appear as a keyword in Biological Abstracts, and biological diversity
appeared once. In 1993, biodiversity appeared seventy-two times, and biological diversity
nineteen times". Fifteen years further on, it would be hard to count how many times
"biodiversity" is used every day by scientists, policy-makers, and others. The global importance
of biodiversity now is reflected in the widely accepted target to achieve a significant reduction in
the rate of loss of biodiversity by the year 2010 [see 2010 Biodiversity Target].
While the history of this term is relatively short (compare it to other terms covered in this
encyclopedia), it already has raised important, distinctive, philosophical issues. Some of these
are entangled in the very definition of "biodiversity", an issue treated in the first sections below.
A challenge is the reconciliation of process-based and elements-based perspectives on
biodiversity. Overall, the major issue for biodiversity is how its conservation may be integrated
with other needs of society.
1. Concepts of Biodiversity
The sequel to that first biodiversity book, naturally titled Biodiversity II (Reaka-Kudla et al.
1997), documents the rapid rise of the term "biodiversity" in importance and influence. But it
also traces the study of aspects of biodiversity back as far as Aristotle. To some extent,
biodiversity merely offers a new, emotive, term for some older ideas and programs. In fact,
"biodiversity" is now used sometimes to mean "life" or "wilderness" or other conservation
values. "Biodiversity" also has served on occasion as a catch-all for "conservation" itself.
The scientific literature illustrates how most any conservation activity might use the label
"biodiversity". On the one hand, workers taking advantage of the acknowledged importance of
the term have expanded its meaning to capture concerns at a fine scale, such as that focussing on
a favourite single species. This focus might be referred to more accurately as one of
"biospecifics". At the coarser scale, one important interpretation, discussed below, advocates a
primary linkage of biodiversity to the maintenance of ecosystem processes — what might be
called the "bio-processes" approach.
The nub of the problem of defining biodiversity is that it is hard to exclude anything from a
concept that is taken so easily to mean "everything". Sarkar (2005) has argued that interpreting
biodiversity across all biological levels, from genes to ecosystems, amounts to considering all
biological entities, so that biodiversity absurdly "becomes all of biology.
The idea that the choice of a measure of biodiversity depends on values finds support in Sarkar
(2005). He argues that biodiversity operationally amounts to whatever is the valued target of
conservation priority setting for different localities.
Biodiversity may be a catch-all for various aspects of conservation, but the fresh perspectives
arising from recognition of "biodiversity" suggest possible unifying concepts. E. O. Wilson
(1988) sees "biodiversity" as corresponding to a dramatic transformation for biologists from a
"bits and pieces" approach to a much more holistic approach. Wilson describes this change in
perspective as a realization that biological diversity is disappearing and, unlike other threatened
things, is irreversible. Wrapped up in the term therefore is the idea of a "biodiversity crisis".
Ehrenfeld (1988) similarly reinforces this idea of the value of diversity in the aggregate. He
argues that diversity previously was never regarded in itself to be in danger, but that biodiversity
now is recognised as endangered in its own right. Wrapped up in the term therefore is the idea of
a "biodiversity crisis". While the case for such a crisis itself raises debates about measures and
definitions (see Sarkar, 2005), the definition of "biodiversity" sometimes explicitly reflects these
links to an extinction crisis. Takacs (1996) reviews cases where the definition of biodiversity is
wrapped up in the idea of strategies needed to preserve variation. In accord with this perspective
is a shift to a focus on valuing ecosystem processes. This focus arguably will ensure maintenance
and ongoing evolution of these systems, and therefore all of biodiversity.
Holistic perspectives on biodiversity have emerged also through another important focus. For
Wilson (1988), biodiversity captures the idea of a "frontier of the future", presenting a dazzling
prospect of largely unknown variety, with unanticipated uses. Biodiversity is seen by many as a
symbol for our lack of knowledge about the components of life's variation, and their importance
to humankind (see Takacs 1996)..
Focussing on this important aspect of biodiversity does not throw away the other possible
"biodiversity" values that might be listed (process-based "resilience" of ecosystems, current
commodity values of species, etc.), but facilitates integration of biodiversity's option values with
those other values. These possibilities are discussed further in the section on Integrating Process
and Elements Perspectives.

2. From Species Values to Biodiversity Values

2.1 Species Values and Triage
In developing ideas about the overall value of biodiversity it has been natural to draw on existing
arguments about values of individual species (for review, see World Conservation Union 1980;
Norton 1988). Commodity value and other direct use values have intuitive appeal because they
reflect known values. But a key problem is that species need to be preserved for reasons other
than any known value as resources for human use (Sober 1986). Callicott (1986) discusses
philosophical arguments regarding non-utilitarian value and concludes that there is no easy
argument to be made except a moral one. Species have some "intrinsic value" — reflecting the
idea that a species has a value "in and for itself" (Callicott 1986, p.140) — and there is an ethical
obligation to protect biodiversity.
A philosophical issue is whether such species values depend on a human-centered perspective.
The environmental ethics entry notes that assessments of issues concerned with biodiversity
allow for "commitment either to a purely anthropocentric or purely non-anthropocentric ethic".
Regan (1986) argues that we need "duties that are independent of out changeable needs and
preferences." Callicott (1986) sees the intrinsic value of species as not independent of human
values, because such values can be linked to Hume's theory of moral values. Norton (1986) sees
all species as collectively embraced by an environmental ethic that is anthropocentric.
Randall (1988, p. 218) has argued that preference is the basis for value and that it is possible to
treat all species values as preferences of humans. Preferences-based approaches to valuation can
provide economic (dollar) estimates of value. This valuation process may include methods for
assessing and quantifying option values. A claimed advantage of such approaches is that the only
good way to protect species is to place an economic value on them. Randall argues that such
quantification is advantageous because the species preservation option will fare well when the
full range of values is included in conservation priority setting.
The context for many of these arguments has been a consideration of various criteria for placing
priorities among species for conservation efforts. These considerations have led to debates about
the role of "triage" based on species prioritization. Triage recalls the medical context in which
priorities are set for investments in saving patients. Applied to conservation, individual species
are differentially valued and assessed relative to differential opportunity costs. The best
conservation package is to be found through a process of calculating costs and benefits of
protection of individual species.
2.2 Species as Equal Units and SMS
Many biologists have rejected the idea of triage and argue that we must try to save all species
(Takacs 1996). Philosophical issues arise in the debate as to whether biodiversity should be
approached through the process of differentially valuing species, so that choices could be made
in the face of a budget, or regarding species as the fundamental unit and trying to protect them
all. The latter option is arguably more holistic and in accord with a focus on all of biodiversity
(the individual species focus is sometimes viewed as the first of three phases of growth in
biological resources assessment; see the section on The Shift from Elements to Processes).
If one nominated a "prequel" to Biodiversity (1988) it might be The Preservation of Species
(Norton 1986). The title suggests a species focus, but the book's subtitle refers to biological
diversity. This book documents an attempt to move from values of species to some overall value
of biodiversity, rejecting typical triage arguments based on benefits versus costs for individual
species. Here, Norton criticizes the "benefit — cost" approaches as piecemeal because every
species must exhibit actual or potential use to justify itself. He argues that every species arguably
has utilitarian value and that species perceived values are hard to estimate. For this reason, trying
to place dollar values is "doomed to failure" (1986, p. 202). Norton concludes that we can't try to
sum up values (in accord with his general advocacy of no aggregation of biodiversity values). It
is argued that we should abandon the "divide and conquer" approach and look at total diversity,
with species as a unit: "each species in an area can be viewed as a unit of total diversity."
Ehrenfeld's (1988) position is even more sharply defined: "value is an intrinsic part of
biodiversity; it does not depend on the properties of the species in question."
This perspective demands some alternative to species-based triage that will still accommodate
the reality of limited resources. The idea of a "safe minimum standard" (SMS) for biodiversity
has been proposed as a suitable alternative to triage. Norton advocates an SMS based on unit-
species, interpreted to mean that all species are saved unless costs are intolerable; he argues for
"preservation of species as a general policy". Wilson (1992, p. 310) also has advocated an SMS
in which all species are to be protected unless costs are too high. He argues that we "treat each as
an irreplaceable resource for humanity". This is directly in preference to a cost-benefit approach,
characterized as examining single species and their properties and deciding how much to invest.
The SMS leaves the idea of "too high a cost" open to different interpretations. These vary with
philosophical perspectives about the nature of values. For example, "deep ecology", where
biodiversity is independent of human value, responds differently to "utilitarianism", where
biodiversity might be preserved to extent that measurable benefits to humans exceed costs (see
The Preservation of Species). Randall's (1986, p. 103) utilitarian position considers intrinsic or
option value of unit-species in conjunction with any recognized utilitarian value: all species not
already distinguished in having recognised human-use values "would be treated as having a
positive but unknown expected value; implicitly all would be treated as equally valuabe."
In conclusion, the SMS is compatible with an all-of-biodiversity perspective that views species
collectively, avoiding the seemingly arbitrary "bits and pieces" approaches to individual species
priorities that arguably are poorly justified given our poor knowledge. The SMS approach,
however, arguably suffers from a double-barrelled arbitrariness of its own, in the choice of a
level of variation (species) and the choice of a threshold on costs. Alternative approaches are
considered in the next section.
3. Alternatives to Unit-species
We can recognize two alternatives to the use of species as equal-weight units for an SMS. One of
these (see the section on The Shift from Elements to Processes) consciously moves further away
from units or items of any kind. Here, the valuation of species is seen as problematic, with
arbitrary solutions. Valuation is to encompass all of biodiversity but through a functional
perspective, shifting the focus to ecosystems processes (Norton 1994, 2001).
The other alternative [see the section on Option Value and Hierarchy of Variation] might be
viewed as going to the other extreme. Units or elements of biodiversity are seen (at least
implicitly) at every level of biological variation, and the quantification of variation is to provide
relative valuations (e.g. of different places) for priority setting.
These two perspectives provide different responses to the issues concerning taxonomic
distinctiveness valuations on species — so providing one benchmark for comparisons. In the
ecosystem processes case, this has provided a prototype example of problems with attempts to
value species-units. In the hierarchical variation case, it has provided a prototype example of the
quantification of unknown variation and option value at one nominated scale of biodiversity.
3.2 Option Value and Hierarchy of Variation
The other alternative to the unit-species approach departs from it by increasing not decreasing
our focus on items or elements. The unit-species perspective has been justified through option
values and a response to a lack of knowledge — we do not know enough to differentially value
species. But consideration of option values also has been used to justify a move away from a
species-as-units approach, to embrace a whole hierarchy of possible units. Suppose, for example,
that the units of interest are features of species (a feature might be some morphological
characteristic shared by all members of that species). These features in general have unknown
future values. It follows that total option value would be increased by having more features
protected. If we apply the rationale that all these features should be treated as units of equal
value, then some species (those that are phylogenetically distinctive; see below) will make larger
contributions to the overall feature diversity represented by a set of species. thus, equal value at
the fine scale among features leads to differential values at the coarse scale among species. We
see that the same argument used to justify species as equal-value units can be used to justify
differential valuation of species (Faith 1994).
Feature diversity can provide a basis for valuation, but it raises measurement challenges. Not
only do we not know, in general, the future value of different features, but also we cannot even
list the features for most species. Phylogenetic pattern provides one way to estimate and quantify
variation at the feature level. A species complements others in representing additional
evolutionary history (Faith 1994), as depicted in the branches of an estimated phylogeny. The
degree of complementarity reflects the relative number of additional features contributed by that
species. For example, given some subset of species that are well-protected, and two species in
that taxonomic group that are endangered, the priority for conservation investment may depend
on the relative gains in feature diversity (the complementarity values) expected for each species.
We do not know in practice what all the actual features are, but can make a prediction about
relative gains and losses. The predicted total feature diversity of a set of species is referred to as
its "phylogenetic diversity" (PD; Faith 1994).
A conclusion is that a taxonomic/phylogenetic distinction among species is not a fruitless
distraction from "biodiversity" — it is all about biodiversity. Features of species quantified in
this way are just one part of a whole hierarchy of variation. Sarkar and Margules (2002)
emphasize that, when we speak of genes, species, and ecosystems, it is not that these form the
specific entities of interest but instead are benchmarks for the full hierarchy of variation: "there is
heterogeneity at every level" (2002, p. 301).
The value of all of biodiversity is in this full hierarchy of variation — measuring one measures
the other. These values may also encompass intrinsic values of biodiversity. Callicott (1989) and
others have followed Aldo Leopold's (1949) work in arguing that all levels of biological
organization (species, biotic communities, ecosystems) have intrinsic value. This suggest that
any calculus of relative option values (indicating relative value contributions made by species,
places, etc) is also a calculus of relative intrinsic values.
An appealing property of unit-species approaches was that quantification of option values
allowed the political process to balance these with other values of society. A full hierical
perspective suggests a continuum of variation rather than a countable number of objects. The
relative complementarity value (say, of a place) is not the relative number of different species but
the relative amount of the hierarchy of variation gained in that place. Thus, quantifying
complementarity values provides the ability to balance these with other kinds of values, through
the political process and the use of tools such as multi-criteria analyses [e.g., see A Biodiversity
Conservation Plan for Papua New Guinea Based on Biodiversity Trad e-offs Analysis] that work
with values naturally expressed in different measurement units. This capacity potentially helps
integrate option values with process-based values, as discussed in the next section.
4. Integrating Process and Elements Perspectives
The functional/process (see the section on The shift from Elements to Processes) and
elements/inventory perspectives (see the section on Option Value and Hierarchy of Variation)
each try capture all of biodiversity, but have different emphases. Consideration of biodiversity
option/intrinsic values will not in general capture all important considerations about processes.
Also, taking processes into account will not always capture option values defined at the level of
elements. Here, the danger in ignoring elements-option values is that priority-setting and
management in a given place may be able to address ecosystem resilience and other process
goals, but still also allow loss of components of biodiversity of global value.
The two alternatives, presented as dichotomous above, may be viewed as partly overlapping, and
not mutually exclusive. An option value approach based on units does not neglect process. The
descriptor, "static", has been used to describe this so-called "inventory" approach (e.g. Norton
2001), with clear negative connotations relative to the desirability of "dynamic" approaches. But
the biodiversity measures based on phylogeny, for example, capture evolutionary processes that
support future variation. Consideration of a hierarchy of elements of biodiversity can be expected
to include diversity of processes (following Noss 1990; but see Angermeier and Karr 1994).
Further, "static" entities of biodiversity typically are protected using dynamic approaches to
biodiversity conservation, as in methods that set conservation priorities on different places taking
climate change into account. Such links between what we protect and how we protect it suggest
that concerns about biological integrity (see the section on The Shift from Elements to Processes)
may be reconciled with biodiversity goals. Management focussed on biological integrity will be
critical for the persistence of biodiversity in those places recognised as having high
complementarity values.
An alternative to a proposed preference for local values of "biodiversity" is to pursue balanced
trade-offs (and synergies) among local and global values. As long as local values and
opportunities, whatever their source, are given weight in these trade-offs, there is no need to try
to define (or re-define) the "important" values of biodiversity as local not global. Apparent
conflict is resolved also by realizing that often the local values and opportunities have little to do
with the biodiversity (biotic variation per se) of the place (though they typically will link to its
"biospecifics").
Recent work has suggested that the most effective pathway to achieving the 2010 biodiversity
target for a significant reduction in the current rate of biodiversity loss [see 2010 Biodiversity
Target] is to find balanced trade-offs and synergies between biodiversity and other needs of
society. (See “Actions for the 2010 biodiversity target in Europe: How does research contribute
to halting biodiversity loss?”) The Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) has a major
campaign to address the 2010 target, based on mobilising extensive museum species collections
data to form the biodiversity calculus needed for exploring trade-offs and synergies in different
regions [see GBIF 2010 Campaign]
In conclusion, a possible resolution of the conflict between elements-based and processes-based
interpretations of biodiversity may be part operational, part conceptual. Operationally, trade-offs
processes can balance different values, whatever their labels. Conceptually, biodiversity may
retain its original connotation of biotic variation at all levels. This does not deny that attention to
processes is a good way to protect biodiversity, nor that ecosystem services represent important
values of society, including provision of resources. It is interesting that Takacs (1996) points to
Ehrenfeld and others as making early attempts to move beyond the "resource" school in valuing
biodiversity as a whole. Yet Norton (2001) and others, in linking "biodiversity" to maintenance
of ecosystem processes, move back to the resource perspective — as evidenced in Norton's
reference to three phases of "biological resources", not "biodiversity", protection.
An earlier section (Concepts of Biodiversity) referred to a call for "post-positivism" and greater
focus on advocacy in the context of a biodiversity concept seen as properly value-laden. Such a
perspective has some compatibility with trade-offs; advocacy and society's values may determine
how well biodiversity conservation fares in the course of trade-offs. But a "new positivism" may
be required also, in trying to better estimate and quantify unknown aspects of biodiversity in
order to better inform the inevitable trade-offs processes. The final section of this SEP entry
addresses this problem of growth of knowledge, which itself has raised philosophical issues.
5. Biodiversity and Growth of Knowledge
The sections above highlighted the role of complementarity — the additional contribution made
by a place (or other entity, such as a species) to the overall representation of the hierarchy of
variation that makes up biodiversity. But the true biodiversity complementarity of a place
inevitably is unknown and must be estimated using some known, "surrogate", information. We
may not know enough in a particular case to consider surrogates that are to reflect a fine scale of
variation. For example, at a whole country scale, to a first approximation all species may be
judged equal in comparing biodiversity contributions of different places. A whole country study
may not focus directly on variation at the genetic or even species scales, but might use ecosystem
types or similar as the surrogates to assess representativeness of its protected areas system. If the
assessment reveals that a whole ecosystem type is not represented, then this directs priorities for
land acquisition. If all types are already represented, then variation within these can be the focus,
perhaps as indicated by representation of species.
Sarkar and Margules (2002) discuss the role of biodiversity surrogates, arguing that even the
relative concept of complementarity has a "conventional" element built into it because it relies on
"estimator" surrogates (say, a set of butterfly species) for "true" surrogates (say, the use of
species as the basis for assessing complementarity of places). Whereas estimator surrogates, they
argue, are subject to empirical justification, true surrogates are still dependent on convention.
They defend this conventional element: "a philosophical point, widely appreciated by
philosophers of science, but often not explicitly acknowledged by scientists, deserves to be noted
in relation to this: conventional elements almost always enter into theoretical reasoning in
science (Nagel 1961; Sarkar 1998). But ‘conventional’ does not mean ‘arbitrary’: it means that
there were choices to be made, no single option was dictated by the facts at hand, and a choice
was justified instrumentally by its ability to achieve the purpose for which it was intended"
(2002, p. 307).
The empirical approaches for determining effective "estimator" surrogates for biodiversity have
raised philosophical issues as well. There are plenty of observations about the congruence (or
not) of surrogates with other components of biodiversity (for review, see Faith 2003), but what
constitutes good evidence for an effective biodiversity surrogate?
Popperian corroboration provides one pathway to assess evidence for such hypotheses.
Corroboration is attractive because it does not attempt to assign probabilities of truth to
hypotheses (Popper 1982, p. 346), but instead focuses on the evaluation of the particular
evidence at hand. Proposals have focussed on the idea that corroboration assessment asks
whether apparent good evidence for an hypothesis is "improbable" without the hypothesis — it
cannot easily be explained away by other explanations (possible explanations suggested by our
"background knowledge"). Popperian background knowledge is assigned an important role in
this interpretation — the investigator is obligated to try to discover any background knowledge
that would suggest that the evidence is probable even without the hypothesis (for discussion, see
Faith and Trueman 2001; Faith 2006).
The interest in the role of corroboration in biodiversity studies has prompted debates about its
role and meaning. As background to these issues, it is revealing to examine one of Popper's own
examples of falsification/corroboration, as presented in the entry on Karl Popper. This example,
based on the discovery of the planet Neptune, effectively highlights the limited prospects for
actual falsification, but may be under-appreciated as an example of corroboration. The
hypothesis of interest in this example is Newton's theory, and the evidence is the observation of
the new planet, in a position predicted by this hypothesis. .
This example supports the idea that Popperian corroboration for a biodiversity hypothesis arises
only if the evidence is judged to be improbable — in spite of attempts to identify background
knowledge that suggests that the evidence is probable even without the hypothesis. For
biodiversity surrogates, a common hypothesis is that the pattern of species "turnover" over
different geographic areas for one taxonomic group will indicate the pattern for all biodiversity.
Good evidence for the surrogacy hypothesis is typically claimed when the pattern for the
surrogate taxonomic group is congruent with that of some target set of taxa. However, on many
occasions such evidence can be explained away as probably arising simply because of a shared
bias in the geographic sampling of the surrogate and target taxonomic groups (for review, see
Faith 2003). The evidence based on congruence can be explained away as a probable result even
without the hypothesis. Based on such evidence, corroboration for the surrogacy hypothesis is
low.
The following sections address the potential role of such corroboration assessments in two other
areas of biodiversity assessment: phylogenetic inference and species inference (discussion of
corroboration assessment in the context of biodiversity monitoring can be found in Downes et al.
2002). The section, Biodiversity and DNA barcoding, then links all these issues to the
controversies surrounding an emerging area of biodiversity assessment, called “DNA barcoding”.
.
5.2 Species Hypotheses
Testing an hypothesis that a set of populations is a single species is important to conservation
management. Also, sets of recognised species often form the basis for surrogates for geographic
priority setting. Corroboration may play a role in the ongoing debates about the definition of a
species and how species status is to be determined. The entry on species discusses the issue of
species pluralism — the idea that there is not just one correct species concept. While twenty or
more different concepts have been identified (some based on a designated species discovery
process), a possible emerging consensus (e.g. see Claridge et al. 1997; Mayden 1997) is that all
of these may be unified under an evolutionary lineage concept. This is based on the idea of an
evolutionary species, defined as: "a single lineage of ancestor-descendant populations which
maintains its identity from other such lineages and which has its own evolutionary tendencies
and historical fate." (Wiley 1981, p. 25).
This "primary" concept arguably is compatible with most other proposed species concepts (for
discussion, see Mayden 2002). However, a difficulty is that this seems to simply produce many
so-called "secondary concepts", corresponding to all the previously proposed ways of detecting
and/or defining species. For example, Mayden (1997) refers to these as "operational concepts"
that are "tools" for discovering all the different ways to realize the primary concept. The
unconstrained use of these tools suggests a "grab-bag" that amounts to reliance as much as ever
on expert opinion. An issue therefore is whether a unified species concept can be matched by
some unified operational framework for identifying species. Mayden (2002) does claim that
there is Popperian "testability" and possible "falsification" for species hypotheses. He argues that
the typical process is one in which we do not reject species status if there is no falsification.
Corroboration assessment may be an important missing element in this framework. In much the
same role it plays for phylogenetic hypotheses, it can allow many different kinds of evidence
(suggested by different secondary concepts), all brought to bear on a single species concept.
Evidence for a species hypothesis will be some fit of observations to the hypothesis, and
corroboration will depend on the improbability of such goodness-of-fit without the hypothesis
(Faith and Trueman 2001; Faith, 2004). This supports a unified species concept as something
more than just a shifting of the pluralism problem down one level — the inevitable pluralism
now properly reflects the various kinds of evidence that may bear on the same concept. There are
no a priori restrictions on the form of the evidence for species hypotheses, but assessment of
improbability of evidence is important in avoiding an arbitrary, grab-bag, approach. Further, over
time, experience in corroboration assessment in different contexts — for example, for different
kinds of organisms — may have lessons about the context-dependent pitfalls of certain kinds of
evidence. This process will help evaluate new kinds of evidence, such as that from DNA
barcoding, discussed below in the section on Biodiversity and DNA barcoding.
5.3 Biodiversity and DNA barcoding
The philosophical issues concerning biodiversity surrogacy, phylogenetic inference, and species
inference are all relevant to a new, and controversial, source of biodiversity information — DNA
barcoding. A DNA “barcode” refers to a short region of a gene that changes over evolutionary
time at a rate that results in measurable distinctions among species (analogous to the barcodes on
products in stores). The Consortium for the Barcode of Life [see CBOL] has brought together
natural history museums and other research organizations with the goal of producing DNA
barcoding information for all named species on the planet. Such a large-scale DNA barcoding
program potentially offers a wealth of new information for biodiversity assessment, filling both
taxonomic and geographic knowledge gaps. However, much of the controversy over the past few
years (for review, see Rubinoff et al., 2006) arises from the proposed link from one short bit of
DNA (e.g., approximately 600 base pairs of mitochondrial DNA) to the supposed identification
and discovery of actual species. While some recent reviews (e.g., Vogler and Monaghan 2007)
have pointed to the success of DNA barcodes over many different taxonomic groups, there
remains the concern that the use of one small bit of molecular data cannot be used to determine
species status.
DNA barcoding programs can address two different goals. First, such programs may be
concerned about diagnosis and identificaiton of already-known species (e.g., invasive species
that are difficult to identify by morphological characters). Second, such programs may be
interested in the discovery of new species, including "cryptic" species that may not be revealed
by morphological or other characters. The second goal raises issues about species concepts and
the nature of DNA bracoding based evidence for species status..
The philosophical arguments for total evidence would seem to place severe limits on the role of
DNA barcoding for biodiversity assessment. An alternative argument is that DNA barcoding, in
providing one form of valid evidence for species hypotheses, clearly can be charactersied as
“hypothesis driven”. .
Missing from emerging DNA barcoding programs is any well-defined process for such
Popperian corroboration assessments of species hypotheses. This limits the capacity to combine
corroborated evidence for species hypotheses from DNA barcoding with corroboration derived
from evidence from other data sources.
While the definition of “the barcode of life” is clearly focused only on the species level ("a short
DNA sequence from standardized portions of the genome, used as an aid in identifying species";
see the Consortium for the Barcode of Life — CBOL), others have suggested that this wealth of
new information need not be tied to species hypotheses in order for it to be useful for
biodiversity assessment.
The vast biodiversity knowledge gap suggests that DNA barcoding applications makes it
tempting to consider barcoding data for any one taxonomic group as valuable information for
making predictions about other taxonomic groups. .
6. Conclusions
There is a nice parallel to be found in the debates about the definitions/concepts of species and
the broader definitions/concepts of biodiversity. In both cases, an unnecessary pluralism has
developed because operational issues have become intertwined with definitions (for species —
the meaning sometimes is to include information about the process of species detection; for
biodiversity - the meaning sometimes is to include information about the process of biodiversity
protection). In both cases, there is perhaps a good case for monism regarding the concept, with
pluralism welcomed at the operational level (for species — many kinds of evidence for
hypotheses; for biodiversity — many kinds of protection strategies and many kinds of values of
society to be traded-off).
Despite a wide range of usage, biodiversity remains a concept strongly linked to the idea of
biological variation that is largely unknown in its extent, and its future values. Any "calculus" of
biodiversity providing quantitative estimates of this unknown variation automatically provides at
the same time a measure of those values that link to the need to maintain variety — option values
and intrinsic values. Such values broadly reflect values of elements of biodiversity having
unknown present value. These quantified values typically will not be in conventional units (e.g.
dollars), but nevertheless can be balanced with other values of society. Decision making (for
example, deciding whether we should invest in conservation of area A or area B) may require
only estimates of relative gains in represented variation offered by different places (their
"complementarity" values). Complementarity helps integrate biodiversity option values with
other values attributed to biodiversity, and with values of society more generally. This integrative
process, together with processes for the growth of knowledge about components of biodiversity,
provide an alternative to the "post-positivism" perspective that sees biodiversity conservation as
predominantly value-laden.
The perspective that biodiversity reflects option and intrinsic values, to be balanced with other
values, appears to be compatible with the broader discipline of conservation biology: "the field is
rooted in a philosophy of stewardship rather than one of utilitarianism or consumption. The latter
has been the basis of traditional resource conservation, that is, conserving resources solely for
their economic use and human consumption" (Meffe 2000)