1AC

Observation 1 is Desire It is insufficient to discuss space exploration only at the macro level. This is because the power which creates decisions does not begin at the state, it begins with the self. Current space policy is a product of an active force called desire. Deleuze and Guattari 77 (Anti-Oedipus 26-29)
In a word, when the theoretician reduces desiring-production to a production of fantasy, he is content to exploit to the fullest the idealist principle that defines desire as a lack, rather than a process of production, of "industrial" production. Clement Rosset puts it very well: every time the emphasis is put on a lack that desire supposedly suffers from as a way of

defining its object, "the world acquires as its double some other sort of world, in accordance with the following line of argument: there is an object that desire feels the lack of; hence the world does not contain each and every object that exists; there is at least one object missing, the one that desire feels the lack of; hence there exists some other place that contains the key to desire (missing in this world)."29

If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production. The real is the end product, the result of the passive syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious. Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack
its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression. Desire and its object are one and the same thing : the
machine, as a machine of a machine. Desire is a machine, and the object of desire is another machine connected to it. Hence the product is something removed or deducted from the process of producing: between the act of producing and the product, something becomes detached, thus giving the vagabond, nomad subject a residuum. The objective being of desire is the Real in and of itself.* There is no particular form of existence that can be labeled "psychic reality ." As Marx

exists in fact is not lack, but passion, as a "natural and sensuous object." Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire: they are counternotes, what

products within the real that desire produces. Lack is a counter-effect of desire; it is deposited, distributed, vacuolized within a real that is natural and social. Desire always remains in close

touch with the conditions of objective existence; it embraces them and follows them, shifts when they shift, and does not outlive them. For that reason it so often becomes the desire to die,
whereas need is a measure of the withdrawal of a subject that has lost its desire at the same time that it loses the passive syntheses of these conditions. This is precisely the significance of need as a search in a void: hunting about, trying to capture or become a parasite of passive syntheses in whatever vague world they may happen to exist in. It is no use saying: We are not green plants; we have long since been unable to synthesize chlorophyll, so it's necessary to eat. ... Desire then becomes this abject fear of lacking something. But it should be noted that this is not a phrase uttered by the poor or the dispossessed. On the contrary, such people know that they are close to grass, almost akin to it, and that desire "needs" very few things-not

those leftovers that chance to come their way, but the very things that are continually taken from them-and that what is missing is not things a subject feels the lack of somewhere deep down inside himself, but rather the objectivity of man, the objective being of man, for whom to desire is to produce, to produce within the realm of the real. The real is not impossible; on the contrary, within the real everything is possible, everything becomes possible. Desire does not express a molar lack within the
subject; rather, the molar organization deprives desire of its objective being. Revolutionaries, artists, and seers are content to be objective, merely objective: they know that desire

clasps life in its powerfully productive embrace, and reproduces it in a way that is all the more intense because it has few needs. And
never mind those who believe that this is very easy to say, or that it is the sort of idea to be found in books. "From the little reading I had done I had observed that the men who were most in life, who were moulding life, who were life itself, ate little, slept little, owned little or nothing. They had no illusions about duty, or the perpetuation of their kith and kin, or the preservation of the State.... The phantasmal world is the world which has never been fully conquered over. It is the world of the past, never of the future. To move

forward clinging to the past is like dragging a ball and chain ."30 The true visionary is a Spinoza in the garb of a Neapolitan revolutionary. We know very well where lack-and its subjective correlative-come from. Lack (manque)* is created, planned, and organized in and through social production. It is counterproduced as a result of the pressure of antiproduction; the latter falls back on (se rabat sur) the forces of production and appropriates them. It is never primary; production is never organized on the basis of a pre-existing need or lack (manque). It is lack that infiltrates itself, creates empty spaces or vacuoles, and propagates itself in accordance with the organization of an already existing organization of production. The deliberate creation of lack as a function of market economy is the art of a dominant class. This involves deliberately organizing wants and needs (manque) amid an abundance of production; making all of desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one's needs satisfied; and making the object dependent upon a real production that is supposedly exterior to desire (the demands of rationality), while at the same time the production of desire is categorized as fantasy and nothing but fantasy. There is no such thing as the social production of reality on the one
hand, and a desiring-production that is mere fantasy on the other. The only connections that could be established between these two productions would be secondary ones of introjection and projection, as though all social practices had their precise counterpart in introjected or internal mental practices, or as though mental practices were projected upon social systems, without either of the two sets of practices ever having any real or concrete effect upon the other. As long as we are content to establish a perfect

parallel between money, gold, capital, and the capitalist triangle on the one hand, and the libido, the anus, the phallus, and the family triangle on the other, we are engaging in an enjoyable pastime, but the mechanisms of money remain totally unaffected by the anal projections of those who manipulate money. The Marx-Freud parallelism between the two remains utterly sterile and insignificant as long as it is expressed in terms that make them introjections or projections of each other without ceasing to be utterly alien to each other, as in the famous equation money = shit. The truth of the matter is that social production is
purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions. We maintain that the

social field is immediately invested by desire, that it is the historically determined product of desire, and that libido has no need of any mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation, any
transformation, in order to invade and invest the productive forces and the relations of production.

Even the most repressive and the most deadly forms of social reproduction are produced by desire within the organization that is the consequence of such production under various conditions that we must analyze. That is why
There is only desire and the social, and nothing else. the fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely the one that Spinoza saw so clearly, and that Wilhelm Reich rediscovered: "Why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?"

How can people possibly reach the point of shouting: "More taxes! Less bread!"?

Desire manifests itself at the local level the unconscious and resonates into a group order, powering politics. Failure to investigate motivations at the level of desire abandons any possibility of understanding how political formations come to be and ensures serial policy failure. Ballantyne 2007 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 27-28)
So these

habits of thought, once they are planted in us, take over and refract our view of the world and all our dealings with it. It is probably becoming clear by now how the capitalism and schizophrenia project,
across the two volumes Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, was caught up in every aspect of life. It is set up not as a set of dogmas or even of questions, but as a set of values. It is a work of ethics, and the link with Spinozas Ethics is strong. It too is a project based around immanence rather than transcendence. The desiring-machines that figure so

prominently at the opening of Anti-Oedipus, are the machines that operate without our noticing them to produce the desires that we do notice, and that we would like to act upon. But as mechanisms that operate to produce consciousness, the machines can be pulling in different directions and producing incompatible desires, which might be resolved at a preconscious level, or might surface as conflicted conscious desires. There are thousands upon thousands of these mechanisms, of which we become aware only as they produce effects that approach the level of consciousness, and what goes on amongst them is a micropolitics thousands upon thousands of rhizomatic connections, without any clear limit on where the connections would stop, and without any necessity to pass through a centralized arborescent hub. The scale of operations builds up from a preconscious

sub-individual, who is already a swarm of desiring-machines, to a social group, or a crowd, where certain aspects of the people involved connect together to produce a crowd-identity that is unlike that of any of the individuals in the crowd . Crowds will do things that individual people would not (Canetti, 1973). The individuals are to the crowd what desiring-machines are to the individual. Except
that one could alternatively say that it is certain of the mass of individuals desiring-machines that, upon being brought together in the crowd, they are found to be able to act together to produce the group identity. The crowd is a body.

Some of the mechanisms that would come into play in the individual acting alone are somehow switched out of the circuit, and become irrelevant to the crowd, and having been switched off cannot inhibit the crowds actions. So the sense of the individual is even further problematized, and we see it to be highly
divisible. But nevertheless the idea of the individual is deeply ingrained in our language, and if were trying to explain ourselves, we might find that its the most direct word to be using. If were trying to connect with others then we need to be able to allow ourselves, from time to time, to speak like everyone else. As we follow Deleuze and Guattari further into their world, it becomes increasingly difficult to do that, as each straightforward utterance seems, from an alternate view, to have an inaccurate aspect.

The way desire is relegated in the status quo allows for colonialist ideology to manifest within a state structure. Current space exploration policy has been grounded within nationalist ideology the desire to expand and research space has been justified by the idea of technological transcendence and accomplishment. Dinerstein 2k6 (Dinerstein, Joel [Assistant Professor of English at Tulane University ] Technology and Its Discontents: On
the Verge of the Posthuman American Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 3, Septermber 2006, pp. 581)

Columbia was the name of the command ship of Apollo 11 and the third space shuttle connects the so-called Age of Exploration with the age of space travel: visionary quests for new worlds rationalized by the search for new economic markets (domestic or foreign), historicized as the pursuit of "pure" knowledge, and informed by a search for God (and directed by Him). [End Page 580] Whether the Adamic of the seas or the skies, this mythic concept is still concerned with the same dialectic of individual and national accomplishment: it's still about being the first body on some new frontier, planting seed and flag, and rationalizing national fantasy in the quest to redeem Fallen Man on a land claimed for Edenic purification. Think of Star Trek's opening
That as a spell or a chant that reproduces the Adamic in space, the final frontier. "These are the [spiritualized] men of theStarship Enterprise. Their ten-year mission . . . [is] to boldly go where no man has ever gone before." Again, the first body (or bodies) in (a new) space. Again, the muted martial trumpet cry to the future and imperialist dominion over new spaces. As Sobchack points out, "one need only remember that the first American space shuttleThe Enterprisewas named after (and perhaps carried the same ideological baggage as) the flagship of . . . Star Trek." 32 It may seem like a long jump from Erigena to Columbus to NASA, but it is an identifiable (and ongoing) tradition. The posthuman Adamic reproduces the tradition's three elements: (1) the valorization of the "mechanized arts" through the thrill of scientific discovery and exploration; (2) the shadow Christian tradition of redeeming Fallen man (or an exhausted geography); and (3) the

competitive challenge of being the first body in a new environmentwhether physically on a new continent or a new world, or now, mentally, in cyberspace. This is not an essentialist genealogy, but a record of cultural practices vetted by ideology. This white mythology has already produced a posthuman Adamic discourseand myththat promises nothing less than the technological transcendence of the individual human organism. It bears repeating: technology is the American theology. As Rosalind Williams states succinctly,
"to affirm that technology drives history is to deny what [or that] God does." 33

Once fascist ideology is encompassed within a governmental structure, a despotic state is achieved all surplus is owed to despot, including money, lives, and even the womb. The impact is no value to life and limitless slaughter. Holland 1999 (Eugene, Associate Professor of French and Comparative Literature at the Ohio State University; Deleuze and Guatarris Anti-Oedipus and introduction to Schitzoanalysis) Pg 74

In despotic society, the forces of anti-production operate via undisguised political domination. Despotism results from conquest and the formation of empires, and its mode of anti-production involves superimposing the relations of conquerors to conquered over the existing social dynamics of the latter: the essential action of the [despotic] Stateis the creation of a second inscription by which the new full body [of the despot]appropriates all the forces and agents of production (198/235). Remnants of the older, non-power, social relations remain in force locally and co-exist, to a greater or lesser extent, with the new power-relations of the empire, but they do so only within its limits, and so it is on these powerrelations that we will focus here.28 In brief, whereas savage anti-production ensured the sharing of fruits of labor, imperial antiproduction enforces the extraction of tribute from its subject-peoples for the sake of glorious expenditure (dpense) on the part of the despot. The general law of despotic social organization is not the savage law that anything of value must circulate in horizontal circuits of debt and obligation, but that everything is owed to the despot. The despot imposes this infinite and unilateral debt by transforming the general syntax of the savage communities beneath him, seizing its patchwork of alliances and lineages and re-aligning all of them on himself. The figure of the
despot thus replaces the earth as the socius and original ground of all lineages, in direct filiation with what is characteristically a monotheistic deity, and supplements the networks of savage alliance with a new alliance from above that links him not with this or that specific family or clan, but with his subject-peoples as a whole, and as an un-differentiated mass. Rather

than owe one another reciprocal and dischargeable debts, they now all owe the despot everything.29 This includes their lives, for one thing, inasmuch as the power of the despot includes the power of life and death over his people: under despotism, the debt becomes a debt of existence, a debt of the existence of the subjects themselves (197/234). And it includes tribute, of course, which although paid in money, as we have said, remains a surplus-value of code in that it is extracted by seizing the existing circuits of debt and expenditure obligations and turning them all toward the coffers the despot. But the infinite debt therefore also includes wombs and the women who bear them (e.g. the ten virgins owed to the Minotaur annually), inasmuch as they circulate in the very same circuits of debt and expenditure as material goods do. Our discussion must begin with Desire. It is worthless to talk of state politics without recognizing our responsibility in shaping the current political landscape. Fascism is not handed down from the USFG to the masses; rather it originates in the desires of the masses. Thus Deep and I advocate that the United States federal government should substantially increase its exploration of space beyond the earths mesosphere as a line of flight. We spread outwards creating new offshoots and branches as a way of experimenting with desire. Our politics is one of disrupting the static and invoking a multiplicity of change constantly shifting the way desire is invested within the social field. Observation 2 is Space We should engage space as an abstract concept; something that can be explored metaphorically. By exploring the vast ground of infinite possibilities within a spacial realm we will be able to escape from social and political binaries. Land 2005

(Christopher Land, Published in Ephemera: Theory and Politics in Organization, 2005, Apomorphine Silence - Cutting Up Burroughs' Theory of Language and Control.) In Burroughs work we can see the explicit relation of the production of anxiety and time through the drive to verbalize. In a move that appears to invert the Bergsonian notion that we should reject space in favour of time, Burroughs wants to escape from time. But the inversion is only apparent. Bergsons

object of critique is spatialised time, geometrically laid out as a line composed of discrete points (Bergson, 1910). In a sense, Burroughs extends this rejection, by
expanding upon the ways in which this conception of linear time is produced through the operations of language and expanding upon the subjective effects of linear time. Where Bergson sought a non-spatial conception of time as duration, however, Burroughs

rejects the idea of time entirely and turns his attention to a rethinking of space, not in terms of geometry, but as outer-space: the final frontier. If it is the word-image lines that lock us into identity and tie us to the ground, then cutting these lines can let us escape the bounds of the Earth and move into space. It is this drive to escape a logic of identity, control and limitation that led to Burroughs oft-quoted catch phrase This is the space age and we are all here to go (e.g. Burroughs, 1990). But Burroughs conceptions of space travel are about as far from NASA as you can get and he railed against current attempts at space travel for trying to take the Earth into space. Indeed, at times when he is discussing space travel, Burroughs seems to be talking about a more abstract conception of space that is only explored metaphorically as outer-space in those of his novels that owe the most to the genre of science-fiction. As Burroughs put it himself he was primarily a cosmonaut of inner space (Douglas, 1998: xxviii). Setting himself quite obviously against the American space programme Burroughs makes several indications that his concept of space is wider than the literal outer space of interstellar exploration and included all attempts to free oneself from past conditioning (Burroughs and Odier, 1989: 21). At the same time however, Burroughs plays with science fictional tropes in his
writing from this period, leading some critics to accuse him of a crass post-humanism that itself perpetuates a Cartesian mind-body dualism in its drive to escape the meat of corporeality (Dery, 1996). If we ignore this apparent similarity of imagery however it is clear that Burroughs

concerns are far from those of the post-humanists. Indeed, in his conception of inner-space he is closer to Buddhism. Unlike the Buddhists however, Burroughs is less patient
and more technologically oriented, seeking a quick, technical fix to the problems of identity and language (Burroughs, 1986: 47).

Nevertheless, his goal is the same: silence. As he puts it, distancing himself again from the religious patriotism of NASA: To travel in space you must leave the old verbal garbage behind: God talk, country talk, mother talk, love talk, party talk. You must learn to exist with no religion no country no allies. You must learn to live alone in silence. Anyone who prays in space is not there. (Burroughs, 1989: 21) In short then, Burroughs conceptions of language and subjectivity posit identity as a linear-time bound constraint placed on the inhuman becomings that constitute life and creativity. The human form is a product of viral infection and is perpetuated by the neurotic subvocalizations that are symptoms of this infection and which produce identity. In addition to his analysis of this system of control and subjectivization however, Burroughs also sought to escape it through the development of new artistic engagements with words and images. We have the ability to create smooth space through our affirmation open territories that are not constricted by rigid borderlines. We are against divisions and articulations of place and order. Our exploration of space is essential in breaking down the hierarchies, binaries, and striations that are existent in the status quo. Conley in 2006 (Verena Andermatt, professor of literature at Harvard, Borderlines; Deleuze and the Contemporary World, 95-100)

In their dialogues and collaborations, Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari enquire of the nature of borders. They summon principles of inclusion and exclusion associated with borderlines. They eschew expressions built on the

polarities of eitheror and in their own diction replace binary constructions with the conjunctive and. Furthermore, in Rhizome, the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, they argue for rhizomatic connections fostered in language and by andandand to replace what they call the arborescent model of the ubiquitous Western tree (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). In constant movement, the tissues and tendrils of rhizomes call attention to the horizontal surfaces of the world in which they proliferate. They bring to their observer a new sense of space that is seen not as a background but a shape that, with the rhizome, moves and forever changes. In the field of play Deleuze and Guattari often
produce hybrid, even viral connections and downplay the presence of genealogies conveyed in the figure of the tree bearing a stock-like trunk. Rhizomatic connections form open territories that are not constricted by the enclosing frame of a rigid borderline. In the same breath the two philosophers argue for smooth spaces of circulation. They take a critical view of striated spaces, replete with barriers and borders that are part of an arborescent mentality. Striated spaces cross-hatched by psychic or real borderlines drawn by the state (social class, race, ethnicities) or by institutions (family, school), prevent the emergence of new ways of thinking. Crucial , Deleuze and Guattari declare, is the mental and social construction of new territories and the undoing of inherited barriers. Institutional, familial and even psychoanalytical striations that impede a persons

mobility in mental and physical spheres need to be erased or, at least, drawn with broken lines. When guilt is at the basis of the unconscious, productivity and creativity are diminished. Movement is also arrested wherever the state erects barriers between social classes, races and sexes. To facilitate connections and erase mental or physical borders, Deleuze and Guattari want to do away with the state as well as its institutions. It is as anarchists of sorts and with an insistence on aesthetic
paradigms that Deleuze and Guattari argue for making connections and for an ongoing smoothing of striated spaces. In the pages to follow, I will argue that today the problem of borders and barriers is as acute as ever. I will probe how Deleuze and Guattaris findings on rhizomes and smooth spaces elaborated in a post-1968, European, context might work today in a changed world-space. Is the struggle still between a paternal, bourgeois state and its subjects? Are the state and its institutions still targeted in the same way? Is the undoing of the subject often through aesthetics still valid, or is there a need for a more situated subject? We will first rehash the Deleuzian concepts of rhizome and smooth space before investigating whether and how these concepts are operative in the contemporary world. Since 1968, the world has undergone many changes. Over

the last few decades, decolonization, transportation, and electronic revolutions have transformed the world. They have led to financial and population flows. Financial flows seem to be part of a borderless world. Today, human migrations occur on all continents. They are producing multiple crossings of external
borders that in many places have resulted in local resistance and, in reaction, to the erection of more internal borders that inflect new striated spaces in the form of racism and immigration policy. The

ultimate goal for the utopian thinker espousing the cause of rhizomatic thinking is smooth space that would entail the erasure of all borders and the advent of a global citizenry living in ease and without the slightest conflict over religion or ideology. In the
transitional moment in which we find ourselves arguing for smooth space can easily lead to a non-distinction between alternative spaces in which goods and currencies circulate to the detriment of the world at large. To account for the transformation specifically of the state and its subjects in a
global world, I will argue by way of recent writings by Etienne Balibar for the continued importance of rhizomatic connectivity and also for a qualified notion of smooth space. Striated spaces will have to be continually

smoothed so that national borders would not simply encircle a territory. Borders would have to be made more porous and nationality disconnected from citizenship so as to undo striated space inside the state by inventing new ways of being in common. Such a rethinking of borders would lead to further transformations by decoupling the nation from the state. It would open possibilities of rhizomatic connections and new spaces. It would produce new hybrids everywhere without simply a withering away of the state as advocated by Deleuze and Guattari. Currently, subjects (defined as humans who are asseuttis [subjected] to paternal state power) also want to be citizens (who can individually and collectively define the qualities of their habitus or environment). Yet, the latter are still part of the state. They are not yet entirely global, transnational citizens or cyber-citizens. While information networks seem to operate like rhizomes, it is of continued importance to retain the notion of state but to define it with more porous, connective borderlines so as ultimately to disconnect citizens from nationality. Deleuze and Guattari figure with other philosophers, anthropologists or sociologists who, following 1968,
pay renewed attention to space. Their focus on space reappears at the very time Cartesian philosophies undergo radical changes due to the acceleration of new technologies and rapid globalisation. Many thinkers Henri Lefebvre, Michel de Certeau, Jean Baudrillard, Paul Virilio condemn what they perceive as the increasing encroachment of technologies that quickly replace more traditional ways of being in the world. People who find themselves out of synch with their environment

urge recourse to the body and new ways of using language. Deleuze and Guattari insert themselves into that line of thinking. Their criticism of the static order is twofold. They criticise an inherited spatial model defined by vertical

orderings that has dominated the West. In that model, space was considered to be pre-existing. It became a simple dcor for human action. Deleuze and Guattari propose not only a criticism of the static model but also invent an entirely new way of thinking space. They propose a more horizontal and, paradoxically, if seemingly two-dimensional, even more spatial thinking of the world in terms of rhizomatic lines and networks. In accordance with Deleuze and Guattaris way of thinking through connections, the two regimes always coexist in an asymmetrical relation. They can never be entirely separated or opposed . In
Rhizome, first published in French in 1976 and translated into English as On the Line, Deleuze and Guattari claim that for several hundred years it was believed that the world was developing vertically in the shape of a tree (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). The choice of a tree limits possibilities. The mature tree is already contained in the seed. There is some leeway as to form and size, but the seed will become nothing more than the tree that it is destined to be. In lieu of the tree, Deleuze and Guattari propose an adventitious network, a mobile structure that can be likened to underground filaments of grass or the mycelia of fungi. A rhizome moves horizontally and produces offshoots from multiple bifurcations at its meristems. It changes its form by

connecting and reconnecting. It does not have a finite or ultimate shape. Space does not pre-exist the rhizome; rather, it is created through and between the proliferating lines. Rhizomes connect and open spaces in-between which, in the rooted world of the tree, an inside (the earth) is separated from an outside (the atmosphere). Unlike the tree, the rhizome can never be fixed or reduced to a single point or radical core. Its movement is contrasted with the stasis of the arborescent model. In Rhizome the vertical, arborescent model contributes to the creation of striated spaces . In the ebullient imagination of the two authors it appears that the latter slow down and even prevent movement of the kind they associate with emancipation and creativity. Instead of imitating a tree, Deleuze and Guattari exhort their readers to
make connections by following multiple itineraries of investigation, much as a rhizome moves about the surface it creates as it goes. Rhizomes form a territory that is neither fixed nor bears any clearly delimited borders. In addition to this novel way of thinking, rhizomatically, the philosophers make further distinctions between smooth and striated spaces. Smooth spaces allow optimal circulation and favour connections. Over time,

however, smooth spaces tend to become striated. They lose their flexibility. Nodes and barriers appear that slow down circulation and reduce the number of possible connections. Writing Anti-Oedipus in a post1968 climate, Deleuze and Guattari propose rhizomatic connections that continually rearticulate smooth space in order not only to criticise bourgeois capitalism with its institutions the family, school, church, the medical establishment (especially psychiatry) but also to avoid what they see as a deadened or zombified state of things. They criticise the state for

erecting mental and social barriers and for creating oppositions instead of furthering connections. Institutions and the state are seen as the villains that control and immobilize people from the top down. They argue that when the family, the church
or the psy instill guilt in a child, mental barriers and borders are erected. The childs creativity, indeed its mental and physical mobility are diminished in the process. Such a condition cripples many adults who have trees growing in their heads. Deleuze and Guattari cite the example of Little Hans, a child analysed by Freud and whose creativity, they declare, was blocked by adults who wrongly interpreted his attempts to trace lines of flight within and through the structure of the family into which he had been born (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 14). The state, too, functions by ordering,

organizing and arresting movement, by creating relations of inclusion and exclusion. The state facilitates the creation of rigid and often ossified institutions. It enacts laws of inclusion and exclusion that order the family and the social in general. It tries to immobilize and dominate the social world. Yet the social cannot be entirely dominated. The organising rgime of the order-word is never stable. It is constantly being transformed. Lines detach themselves from fuzzy borders and introduce variations in the constant of the dominant order. These variations can lead to a break and produce lines of flight that bring about entirely new configurations. Of importance in the late 1960s and 1970s is the doing away
with institutions and the state that represses subjects. In Anti-Oedipus, the philosophers show how institutions like the family and psychiatry repress sexuality and desire in order to maximize their revenue. They argue for the creation of smooth spaces where desire can circulate freely. In A Thousand Plateaus, the bourgeois state ordered by the rules of capitalism is criticised. Deleuze and Guattari rarely contexualise the state in any specific historical or political terms. Constructing a universal history of sorts, the philosophers note that the state apparatus appears at different times and in different places. This apparatus is always one of capture. It appropriates what they call a nomadic war machine that never entirely disappears. The nomadic war machine eludes capture and traces its own lines of flight. It makes its own smooth spaces. Here Deleuze and Guattari have faith in subjects who undermine control by creating new lines of flight. These subjects deviate

from the dominant order that uses order-words to obtain control. Order-words produce repetitions and reduce differences. They produce molar structures and aggregates that make

it more difficult for new lines to take flight. Yet something stirs, something affects a person enough to make her or him deviate from the prescriptive meanings of these words. Deleuze and Guattari would say that the subject molecularises the molar structures imposed by the state. People continually trace new maps and invent lines of flight that open smooth spaces. Deleuze and Guattari call it a becoming-revolutionary of the people. In 1980, the philosophers also claim that humans inaugurate an age of
becoming-minoritarian. The majority, symbolized by the 35-year-old, white, working male, they declare, no longer prevails.

A new world is opening, a world of becoming-minoritarian in which women, AfroAmerican, post-colonial and queer subjects of all kinds put the dominant order into variation. Changes of this nature occur at the limit of mental and social territories, from unstable borders without any clearly defined division between inside and outside. They occur in and through affects, desire and language. For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-minoritarian must be accompanied by a withering of the state and its institutions without which any generalized transformation would be impossible. Thought they make clear in Rhizome that the connections they advocate
are different from those of computers that function according to binary oppositions, the philosophers keep open the possibilities of transformations of subjectivities by means of technologies (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 475).Deleuze and Guattari are keenly aware both of the ways that technologies transform subjectivities and of writing in a postcolonial, geopolitical context. Nonetheless, they write about the state in a rather general and even monolithic way without specifically addressing a given nation-state. It is as if the real villain were a general European concept of state inherited from the romantic age. The institutional apparatus of the state dominates and orders its subjects, preventing them from being creative or pursuing their desires. It keeps them from making revolutionary connections (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 473). To construct rhizomes and create smooth spaces for an optimal circulation of desire, the state, armed with its order-words, has to be fought until, finally, it withers away and, in accord with any and every utopian scenario, all identity is undone.

Observation 3 is Framework The logic of facile, uncritical affirmation of the resolution is founded by a managerial discourse bent on maintaining stifling, predictable order at all costs. The point of policies advocated in this manner has never been their explicit aims but to leave unchallenged and uncontested our fundamental assumptions about our political reality. Our affirmative instead attempts to speak in a critical language of desire. Our goal is not to begin a political movement in the liberal-democratic sense but to invoke new tropes of political reality. This process, once begun, escapes from the blind alleys of pre-established political identities. Goddard in 2k6 (July 6th, 2006: The Encounter between Guattari and Berandi and the Post Modern Era Felix and Alice in Wonderland; http://www.generationonline.org/p/fpbifo1.htm)
What this type of radio achieved most of all was the short-circuiting of representation in both the aesthetic sense of representing the social realities they dealt with and in the political sense of the delegate or the authorised spokesperson, in favour of generating a space of direct communication in which, as Guattari put it, it is as if, in some immense, permanent meeting placegiven the size of the potential audienceanyone, even the most hesitant, even those with the weakest voices, suddenly have the possibility of expressing themselves whenever they wanted. In these conditions, one can expect certain truths to find a new matter of expression. In this sense, Radio Alice was also an intervention into the language of

media; the transformation from what Guattari calls the police languages of the managerial milieu and the University to a direct language of desire: direct speech, living speech, full of confidence, but also hesitation, contradiction, indeed even absurdity, is charged with desire. And it is always this aspect of desire that spokespeople, commentators and beaureaucrats of every stamp tend to reduce, to filter. [...] Languages of desire invent new means and tend to lead straight to action; they begin by touching, by provoking laughter, by moving people, and then they make people want to move out, towards those who speak and toward those stakes of concern to them. It is this activating dimension of popular free radio that most distinguishes it from the usual pacifying operations of the mass media and that also posed the greatest threat to the authorities; if people were just sitting at home listening to strange
political broadcasts, or being urged to participate in conventional, organised political actions such as demonstrations that would be tolerable but once you start mobilizing a massive and unpredictable political affectivity

and subjectivation that is autonomous, self-referential and self-reinforcing, then this is a cause for panic on the part of the forces of social order , as was amply demonstrated in Bologna in 1977. Finally, in
the much more poetic and manifesto-like preface with which Guattari introduces the translation of texts and documents form Radio Alice, he comes to a conclusion which can perhaps stand as an embryonic formula for the emergence of the post-media era as anticipated by Radio Alice and the Autonomia movement more generally: In Bologna and Rome, the thresholds of a revolution without any relation to the ones that have overturned history up until today have been illuminated, a revolution that will throw out not only capitalist regimes but also the bastions of beaureaucratic socialism [...] , a revolution, the fronts of which will perhaps embrace entire continents but which will also be concentrated sometimes on a specific neighbourhood, a factory, a school. Its wagers concern just as much the great economic and technological choices as attitudes, relations to the world and singularities of desire. Bosses, police officers, politicians, beuareaucrats, professors and psycho-analysts will in vain conjugate their efforts to stop it, channel it, recuperate it, they will in vain sophisticate, diversify and miniaturise their weapons to the infinite, they will no longer succede in gathering up the immense movement of flight and the multitude of molecular mutations of desire that it has already unleashed. The police have liquidated Aliceits animators are hunted, condemned, imprisoned, their sites are pillagedbut its work of revolutionary deterritorialisation is pursued ineluctably right up to the nervous fibres of its persecutors. This is because the revolution unleashed by Alice was not reducible

to a political or media form but was rather an explosion of mutant desire capable of infecting the entire social field because of its slippery ungraspability and irreducibility to existing sociopolitical categories. It leaves the forces of order scratching their heads because they dont know where the crack-up is coming from since it doesnt rely on pre-existing identities or even express a future programme but rather only expresses immanently its own movement of autoreferential self-constitution, the proliferation of desires capable of resonating even with the forces of order themselves which now have to police not only these dangerous outsiders but also their own desires. This shift from fixed political subjectivities and a specified programme is the key to the transformation to a post-political politics and indeed to a post-media era in that politics becomes an
unpredictable, immanent process of becoming rather than the fulfilment of a transcendental narrative. In todays political language one could say that what counts is the pure potential that another world is possible and the movement towards it rather than speculation as to how that world will be organised. As Guattari concludes: The point of view of the Alicians on this question is the following: they consider that the movement that arrives at destroying the gigantic capitalist-beaureaucratic machine will be, a fortiori, completely capable of constructing an other worldthe collective competence in the matter will come to it in the course of the journey, without it being necessary, at the present stage to outline projections of societal change.

We will argue there is no higher power to determine language for us, and instead we should question what that language DOES, not what it MEANS. We should question what these political affirmations DO, not whether can even discuss them. Finally, this affirmation is a record. Philosophy is always changing its outlook, content, and sound. Certainly a core is retained, but the excesses to that core have a way of evolving. Brian Massumi, 1983 (Professor at U of Montreal, Masters and Doctoral degrees in French Literature from Yale University and completed postdoctoral work at Stanford University.; Ph. D., is a political theorist, writer and philosopher; A Thousand Plateaus, Introduction)
"State philosophy" is another word for the representational thinking that has characterized Western metaphysics since Plato, but has suffered an at least momentary setback during the last quarter century at the hands of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and poststructuralist theory generally. As described by Deleuze,16 it reposes on a double identity: of the thinking subject, and of the concepts it creates and to which it lends its own presumed attributes of sameness and constancy. The subject, its concepts, and also the objects in the world to which the concepts are applied have a shared, internal essence: the self-resemblance at the basis of identity. Representational thought is analogical; its concern is to establish a correspondence between these symmetrically structured domains. The faculty of judgment is the policeman of analogy, assuring that each of the three terms is honestly itself, and that the proper correspondences obtain. In thought its end is truth, in action justice. The weapons it wields in their pursuit are limitative distribution (the determination of the exclusive set of properties possessed by each term in contradistinction to the others: logos, law) and hierarchical ranking (the measurement of the degree of perfection of a term's self-resemblance in relation to a supreme standard, man, god, or gold: value, morality). The modus operandi is negation: x = x = not y. Identity, resemblance, truth, justice, and negation. The rational foundation for order. The established order, of course: philosophers have traditionally been employees of the State. The collusion between philosophy and the State was most explicitly enacted in the first decade of the nineteenth century with the foundation of the University of Berlin, which was to become the model for higher learning throughout Europe and in the United States. The goal laid out for it by Wilhelm von Humboldt (based on proposals by Fichte and Schleiermacher) was the "spiritual and moral training of the nation," to be achieved by "deriving everything from an original principle" (truth), by "relating everything to an ideal" (justice), and by "unifying this principle and this ideal in a single Idea" (the State). The end product would be "a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society"17each mind an analogously organized mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State. Prussian mind-meld.18 More insidious than the well-known practical cooperation between university and government (the burgeoning military funding of research) is its philosophical role in the propagation of the form of representational thinking itself, that "properly spiritual absolute State" endlessly reproduced and disseminated at every level of the social fabric. Deconstruction-influenced feminists such as Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray have attacked it under the name "phallogocentrism" (what the most privileged model of rocklike identity is goes without saying). In the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari describe it as the "arborescent model" of thought (the proudly erect tree under whose spreading boughs latter-day Platos conduct their class). "Nomad thought" does not immure itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority; it moves freely in an element of exteriority. It does not repose on identity; it rides difference. It does not respect the artificial division between the three domains of representation, subject, concept, and being; it replaces restrictive analogy with a conductivity that knows no bounds. The concepts it creates do not merely reflect the eternal form of a legislating subject, but are defined by a communicable force in relation to which their subject, to the extent that they can be said to have one, is only secondary. They do not reflect upon the world but are immersed in a changing state of things. A concept is a brick. It can be used to build the courthouse of reason. Or it can be thrown through the window. What is the subject of the brick? The arm that

throws it? The body connected to the arm? The brain encased in the body? The situation that brought brain and body to such a juncture? All and none of the above. What is its object? The window? The edifice? The laws the edifice shelters? The class and other power relations encrusted in the laws? All and none of the above. "What interests us are the circumstances."19 Because the concept in its unrestrained usage is a set of circumstances, at a volatile juncture. It is a vector: the point of application of a force moving through a space at a given velocity in a given direction. The concept has no subject or object other than itself. It is an act. Nomad thought replaces the closed equation of representation, x = x = not y (I = I = not you) with an open equation:.. . + y + z + a + ...(...+ arm + brick + window + . . .). Rather than analyzing the world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the One of identity, and ordering them by rank, it sums up a set of disparate circumstances in a shattering blow . It synthesizes a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging (to the contrary). The modus operandi of nomad thought is affirmation, even when its apparent object is negative. Force is not to be confused with power. Force arrives from outside to break constraints and open new vistas. Power builds walls. The space of nomad thought is qualitatively different from State space. Air against earth. State space is "striated," or gridded. Movement in it is confined as by gravity to a horizontal plane, and limited by the order of that plane to preset paths between fixed and identifiable points. Nomad space is "smooth," or open-ended. One can rise up at any point and move to any other. Its mode of distribution is the nomos: arraying oneself in an open space (hold the street), as opposed to the logos of entrenching oneself in a closed space (hold the fort). A Thousand Plateaus is an effort to construct a smooth space of thought. It is not the first such attempt. Like State philosophy, nomad thought goes by many names. Spinoza called it "ethics." Nietzsche called it the "gay science." Artaud called it "crowned anarchy." To Maurice Blanchot, it is the "space of literature." To Foucault, "outside thought."20 In this book, Deleuze and Guattari employ the terms "pragmatics" and "schizoanalysis," and in the introduction describe a rhizome network strangling the roots of the infamous tree. One of the points of the book is that nomad thought is not confined to philosophy. Or that the kind of philosophy it is comes in many forms. Filmmakers and painters are philosophical thinkers to the extent that they explore the potentials of their respective mediums and break away from the beaten paths.21 On a strictly formal level, it is mathematics and music that create the smoothest of the smooth spaces.22 In fact, Deleuze and Guattari would probably be more inclined to call philosophy music with content than music a rarefied form of philosophy. Which returns to our opening question. How should A Thousand Plateaus be played? When you buy a record there are always cuts that leave you cold. You skip them. You don't approach a record as a closed book that you have to take or leave. Other cuts you may listen to over and over again. They follow you. You find yourself humming them under your breath as you go about your daily business.

***Framework***

A2: Framework
1) We Meet: We affirm the resolution by advocating an exploration of space. 2) Counterinterpretation: A. Debate is a forum for epistemological growth. B. Resolved is to reduce through mental analysis. To reduce something via mental analysis means to analyze it intellectually, break it down, and construct a solution/decision from it. Random House Unabridged Dictionary 2006 (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)
Resolve: 1.To come to a definite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to
the full. 2.to separate into constituent or elementary parts; break up; cause or disintegrate (usually fol. by into). 3.to reduce or convert by, or as by, breaking up or disintegration (usually fol. by to or into). 4.to convert or transform by any process (often used reflexively). 5.to reduce by mental analysis (often fol. by into).

C. The context of the resolution is determined before the colon Peck 96 (U of Ottawa; http://www.uottawa.ca/academic/arts/writcent/hypergrammar/colon.html) The colon focuses the readers attention on what to follow , and as a result, you should use it
to introduce an idea that somehow completes the introductory idea.

3) Counterinterpretation Superior: A. Unlimiting inevitable There are an infinite number of satellites, planets to research, and technologies to develop. Critical affirmatives narrow the topic down to only a few schools of competing ideology. B. They always have offense we affirm a topical plan text which they can read DAs against. Literal interpretation of the plan means they get K ground and strategic counterplans. C. Fairness is a product of time spent under the assumption that debate is a certain way, as long as there is evidence on both sides, the debate becomes fair because people will adapt to the new assumptions of debate. D. Aff choice good key to ground. They have the structural advantage of the block and no neg resolution means infinite prep time is made irrelevant by unpredictable neg offense. E. Be reasonable ground prevents limits explosion if they have the ability to debate us you shouldnt vote on framework.

F. Education Our interpretation allows for new political thought processes to be constructed. Critical education is a prerequisite to policy education because ideology constructs policy. G. They still have to win a DA in this framework to win the debate if they win framework you just weigh the critical portions of the aff against the policy questions of the negative. H. Potential Abuse is not a voter its like voting on a DA they havent even read. I. Education outweighs fairness If we win the content of our 1AC we win an impact turn to their fairness argument the current model of debate encourages a political strategy which dooms us to fascism. Even if we make everyone quit it would be a good thing.

A2: Interpretation
Turn: Singular usage of language is the ethic of the despot. Their limitations on what ideas can and cannot be discussed only re-entrench the fascist behavior we criticize. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 207
Desire no longer dares to desire, having become a desire of desire, a desire of the despot's desire. The mouth no longer speaks, it drinks the letter. The eye no longer sees, it reads. The body no longer allows itself to be engraved like the earth, but prostrates itself before the engravings of the despot, the region beyond the earth, the new full body. No water will ever cleanse the signifier of its imperial origin: the signifying master or "the master signifier." In vain will the signifier be immersed in the immanent system of language (la langue), or be used to clear away problems of meaning and signification, or be resolved into the coexistence of phonematic elements, where the signified is no more than the summary of the respective differential values of these elements in the relationships among themselves. In vain will the comparison of language to exchange and money be pushed to its furthest point, subjecting language to the paradigms of an active capitalism, for one will never prevent the signifier from reintroducing its transcendence, and from bearing witness for a vanished despot who still functions in modern imperialism. Even when it speaks Swiss or American, linguistics manipulates the shadow of Oriental despotism. Ferdinand de Saussure does not merely emphasize the following: that the arbitrariness of language establishes its sovereignty, as a servitude or a generalized slavery visited upon the "masses." It has also been shown that two dimensions exist side by side in Saussure: the one horizontal, where the signified is reduced to the value of coexisting minimal terms into which the signifier decomposes; but the other vertical, where the signifier is elevated to the concept corresponding to the acoustic image-that is, to the voice, taken in its maximum extension, which recomposes the signifier ("value" as the opposite of the coexisting terms, but also the "concept" as the opposite of the acoustic image). In short, the signifier appears twice, once in the chain of elements in relation to which the signified is always a signifier for another signifier, and a second time in the detached object on which the whole of the chain depends, and that spreads over the chain the effects of signification. There is no phonological or even phonetic code operating on the signifier in the first sense, without an overcoding effected by the signifier itself in the second sense.

Overcoding language by creating the parameters of the political through linguistic relations fails to answer the question of borders and places us in the bounds of imperialism through representative despotism. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 207-209
There is no linguistic field without biunivocal relations-whether between ideographic and phonetic values, or between articulations of different levels, monemes and phonemes-that finally ensure the independence and the linearity of the deterritorialized signs. But such a field remains defined by a transcendence, even when one considers this transcendence as an absence or an empty locus, performing the necessary foldings, levelings (rabattements), and subordinations-a transcendence whence issues throughout the system the inarticulate material flux in which this transcendence operates, opposes, selects, and combines: the signifier. It is curious, therefore, that one can show so well the servitude of the masses with respect to the minimal elements of the sign within the immanence of language, without showing how the domination is exercised through and in the transcendence of the signifier.* There, however, as elsewhere, an irreducible exteriority of conquest asserts itself. For if language itself does not presuppose conquest, the leveling operations (les operations de rabattement) that constitute written language indeed

presuppose two inscriptions that do not speak the same language: two languages (langages), one of masters, the other of slaves. Jean Nougayrol describes just such a situation: "For the Sumerians, [a given sign] is water; the Sumerians read this sign a, which signifies water in Sumerian. An Akkadian comes along and asks his Sumerian master: what is this sign? The Sumerian replies: that's a. The Akkadian takes this sign for a, and on this point there is no longer any relationship between the sign and water, which in Akkadian is called mil. ... I believe that the presence of the Akkadians determined the phoneticization of the writing system ... and that the contact of two peoples is almost necessary before the spark of a new writing can spring forth."55 One cannot better show how an operation of biunivocalization organizes itself around a despotic signifier, so that a phonetic and alphabetical chain flows from it. Alphabetical writing is not for illiterates, but by illiterates. It goes by way of illiterates, those unconscious workers. The signifier implies a language that overcodes another language, while the other language is completely coded into phonetic elements. And if the unconscious in fact includes the topical order of a double inscription, it is not structured like one language, but like two. The signifier does not appear to keep its promise, which is to give us access to a modern and functional understanding of language. The imperialism of the signifier does not take us beyond the question, "What does it mean T"; it is content to bar the question in advance, to render all the answers insufficient by relegating them to the status of a simple signified. It challenges exegesis in the name of recitation, pure textuality, and superior "scientificity" (scientificite). Like the young palace dogs too quick to drink the verse water, and who never tire of crying: The signifier, you have not reached the signifier, you are still at the level of the signifieds! The signifier is the only thing that gladdens their hearts. But this master signifier remains what it was in ages past, a transcendent stock that distributes lack to all the elements of the chain, something in common for a common absence, the authority that channels all the breaks-flows into one and the same locus of one and the same cleavage: the detached object, the phallus-and-castration, the bar that delivers over all the depressive subjects to the great paranoiac king. 0 signifier, terrible archaism of the despot where they still look for the empty tomb, the dead father, and the mystery of the name! And perhaps that is what incites the anger of certain linguists against Lacan, no less than the enthusiasm of his followers: the vigor and the serenity with which Lacan accompanies the signifier back to its source, to its veritable origin, the despotic age, and erects an infernal machine that welds desire to the Law, because, everything considered-so Lacan thinks-this is indeed the form in which the signifier is in agreement with the unconscious, and the form in which it produces effects of the signified in the unconscious.* The signifier as the repressing representation, and the new displaced represented that it induces, the famous metaphors and metonymy-all of that constitutes the overcoding and de territorialized despotic machine. The despotic signifier has the effect of overcoding the territorial chain. The signified is precisely the effect of the signifier, and not what it represents or what it designates. The signified is the sister of the borders and the mother of the interior. Sister and mother are the concepts that correspond to the great acoustic image, to the voice of the new alliance and direct filiation. Incest is the very operation of overcoding at the two ends of the chain in all the territory ruled by the despot, from the borders to the center: all the debts of alliance are converted into the infinite debt of the new alliance, and all the extended filiations are subsumed by direct filiation. Incest or the royal trinity is therefore the whole of the repressing representation insofar as it initiates the overcoding. The system of subordination or signification has replaced the system of connotation. To the extent that graphism is flattened onto the voice-the graphism that, not so long ago, was inscribed flush with the body-body representation subordinates itself to word representation: sister and mother are the voice's signifieds. But to the extent that this flattening induces a fictitious voice from on high that no longer expresses itself except in the linear flux, the despot himself is the signifier of the voice that, along with the two signifieds, effects the overcoding of the whole chain. What made incest impossible-namely, that at times we had the appellations (mother, sister) but not the persons or the bodies, while at other times we had the bodies, but the appellations disappeared from view as soon as we broke through the prohibitions they bore-has ceased to exist. Incest has become possible in the wedding of the kinship bodies and family appellations, in the union of the signifier with its signifieds.

A2: Predictability
Predictability Bad We should experiment with politics we should challenge various norms and realities with potential variations that upset our framing of the political. Our act of political defiance is effective because it challenges normalized prescriptive politics which ignore the question of desire the same form of politics responsible for their framework arguments. Ballantyne 2007 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University, "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 98-99)
At certain moments, small changes in the initial conditions or in the balance between the forces that act can produce results that are very different. The ecology of ideas and the flow of capital that produces our dwellings and our cities, that produces a glittering citadel of mirrored towers here, and a flowering of neocolonial suburbs there, can be accepted uncritically or can be opposed, but it helps to understand that the surface appearances are produced by little mechanisms driving greater ones without immediate reference to a wider picture. This is the level at which Deleuze and Guattari give us an apparatus with which to make an analysis of what is going on, and to see how everything is connected without every part being conscious of having wider connections. In a way these processes are already finding expression in everything around us, including the things we think and do. However another challenge for the architect as an artist would be to find ways to make us feel the reality of these processes, as Czanne made the landscape speak of its formation: Look at the mountain, once it was fire (Czanne, quoted by Deleuze, 1985, 328, n. 59). Buildings are inescapably expressions of the great forces that shape them, whatever one might try to do about it, and someone looking back at them would be able to see immediately when they were built and maybe understand why, and they would be able to infer these things whatever the intention of the buildings designer. The processes involved in globalization, for example, would escape an individuals control, but could be importantly at work in producing the building and shaping it. But other aspects of the programme might be expressible given the right guidance. One could aim to give voice to the song of the Earth, to show by way of some glimpse of chaos how there were other possibilities, and how the building that emerged was actualized from the chaos of virtualities. A great monument would restructure the world, based on a little order taking a hold in its chaos, and working its way through into the form of the building and into the kinds of lives that can be led by the people who come into contact with it, making a framework for those lives, or part of a framework. A building is formed in a milieu, but it also has a milieu within and around it, where new concepts and new ways of living can be shaped. The formative territorializations here, though, are things that Deleuze and Guattari themselves would be trying to go beyond, to mobilize and deterritorialize, so that, having developed to a certain extent, one opens up to chaos, makes oneself receptive to what one finds there, steps outside the structured world of habits and common sense, and sees what happens. Just as the subject, oneself, is more clearly and comfortably a self when it is unselfconscious playing backgammon so the object can reach its best form when the designer is dispersed into a multiplicity, that has its minds on other things.

A2: Pragmatism
Turn: Local disruption is the only means to effect political change the neg traps us in the mindset of representations by the governing class, that only those in power can influence change destroying all movements. Colebrook 2002 (Claire, Understanding Deleuze, Pg. xxxviii)
Human freedom became the problem. If human beings are free, does this mean that there is some ultimate man who can be liberated from the forces of production; or does radical freedom mean that there is no longer any human essence to which politics can appeal? All this came to a head in the student sit-ins and disruptions of 1968. There were protests throughout Europe in the late 1960s which were random, unthought out, and motivated not by the economically defined class of workers so much as by students and intellectuals. In the aftermath of these disruptions it was realized that politics was no longer the affair of economic classes and large or molar groupings. Local disruptions at the level of knowledge, ideas and identity could transform the political terrain. Deleuze and others opened the politics of the virtual: it was no longer accepted that actual material reality, such as the economy, produced ideas. Many insisted that the virtual (images, desires, concepts) was directly productive of social reality. This overturned the simple idea of ideology, the idea that images and beliefs were produced by the governing classes to deceive us about our real social conditions. We have to do away with the idea that there is some ultimate political reality or actuality which lies behind all our images. Images are not just surface effects of some underlying economic cause; images and the virtual have their own autonomous power. This is where structuralism and post-1968 politics intersected. We need to see our languages and systems of representation not just as masks or signs of the actual, but as fully real powers in their own right. The way we think, speak, desire and see the world is itself political; it produces relations, effects, and organises our bodies.

Turn: The affirmative is a prerequisite to political action we cant bring issues to the state without speaking about them first. Weissberg 2004 (Robert Weissberg is Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Illinois-Urbana., Society Abandoning Politics, May/June, http://transactionpub.metapress.com/app/home/content.asp)
The conventional wisdom tells us that Americans are generally politically apathetic and, judging by re- cent voting trends this situation may be deteriorating. Self-appointed civic
guardians predictably express pro- found unease about this disengagement and offer up a plethora of remedies, everything from user-friendly ballots to electronic versions of democracy to reenergize political life. Academics seem especially alarmed that apathy will impede impoverished minorities from climbing up

the socio-economic ladder while allowing special interest to ride roughshod over the common good. Alas, these discussions are quite superficial and misdirected. At most, those damning apathy glibly offer unproven clichs about rising alienation and similar banalities as if Americans were suddenly paralyzed to shape the world around them. Laments about lethargy fail to grasp that this disengagement only reflects a shift in choice of weapons, not laziness. Those grumbling about idle parents reluctant to pressure government for better schools incorrectly assume that rejecting politics will necessarily guarantee shoddy education. Ditto for those who seem indifferent about crime, the environment, high taxes and just about all other maladies misery awaits those who sit on the sidelines. Reality is more nuanced and, critically, this reflexive bewailing of
apathy reflects a state centered view of progress so, ipso facto, political disengagement preordains failure. Fortunately, the United States is not a totalitarian system in which the government is the only game in town. This myopic focus on statecentered solutions also obscures an important emerging fact. To the extent that abandoning politically directed remedies is

not ideologically uniform, the civic landscape will soon be profoundly altered. In a nutshell, the Left with its deep commitment to political solutions will continue to dominate policy-making while the nation as a whole quietly moves rightward.

A2: Fiat Good

1. This argument is irrelevant You can still evaluate the result of the plan and the possible advantages in our framework. Our only argument is that we should evaluate the ways in which the assumptions and methodologies behind the plan affect its outcome. There is fundamentally no difference between fiat debate and non-fiat debate. These are all arguments that argue for and against the plan. 2. Education Extend our Goddard in 2k6 evidence from the 1AC which talks about how we invoke new tropes of political reality. The notion of fiat leaves us devoid of action, making us mere puppets. Their interpretation forces us to look through only the lens of government action which prevents us from questioning the assumptions of state based politics, and finding alternate means of having our voices heard. This is a disadvantage to their interpretation.

Role of the Ballot

They will attempt to limit what our ballot means but our ballot is important for one reason. Our rounds are not mimicries of each other where we try to continuously demand the improvement of civil society. Rather, our project returns over and over again to the root structure of connection and mobility within the revolutionary movement which means that every connection you make toward joyous schizophrenic identity is key. Deleuze and Guattari 1980 (A Thousand Plateaus 10-11) How could movements of deterritorialization and processes of reterritorialization not be relative, always connected, caught up in one another? The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid's reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. It could be said that the orchid imitates the wasp, reproducing its image in a signifying fashion (mimesis, mimicry, lure, etc.). But this is true only on the level of the strataa parallelism between two strata such that a plant organization on one imitates an animal organization on the other. At the same time, some-thing else entirely is going on: not imitation at all but a capture of code, surplus value of code, an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp. Each of these becomings brings about the deterritorialization of one term and the reterritorialization of the other; the two becomings interlink and form relays in a circulation of intensities pushing the deterritorialization ever further. There is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an exploding of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome that can no longer be attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying. Remy Chauvin expresses it well: "the aparallel evolution of two beings that have absolutely nothing to do with each other."4 More generally, evolutionary schemas may be forced to abandon the old model of the tree and descent. Under certain conditions, a virus can connect to germ cells and transmit itself as the cellular gene of a complex species; moreover, it can take flight, move into the cells of an entirely different species, but not without bringing with it "genetic information" from the first host (for example, Benveniste and Todaro's current research on a type C virus, with its double connection to baboon DNA and the DNA of certain kinds of domestic cats). Evolutionary schemas would no longer follow models of arborescent descent going from the least to the most differentiated, but instead a rhizome operating immediately in the heterogeneous and jumping from one already differentiated line to another.5 Once again, there is aparallel evolution, of the baboon and the cat; it is obvious that they are not models or copies of each other (a becoming-baboon in the cat does not mean that the cat "plays" baboon). We form a rhizome with our viruses, or rather our viruses cause us to form a rhizome with other animals. As Francois Jacob says, transfers of genetic material by viruses or through other procedures, fusions of cells originating in

different species, have results analogous to those of "the abominable couplings dear to antiquity and the Middle Ages."6 Transversal communications between different lines scramble the genealogical trees. Always look for the molecular, or even submolecular, particle with which we are allied. We evolve and die more from our polymorphous and rhizomatic flus than from hereditary diseases, or diseases that have their own line of descent. The rhizome is an anti- genealogy. The same applies to the book and the world: contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of the book and the world; the book assures the deterritoriahzation of the world, but the world effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world (if it is capable, if it can). Mimicry is a very bad concept, since it relies on binary logic to describe phenomena of an entirely different nature. The crocodile does not reproduce a tree trunk, any more than the chameleon reproduces the colors of its surroundings. The Pink Panther imitates nothing, it reproduces nothing, it paints the world its color, pink on pink; this is its becoming-world, carried out in such a way that it becomes imperceptible itself, asignifying, makes its rupture, its own line of flight, follows its "aparallel evolution" through to the end. The wisdom of the plants: even when they have roots, there is always an outside where they form a rhizome with something elsewith the wind, an animal, human beings (and there is also an aspect under which animals themselves form rhizomes, as do people, etc.). "Drunkenness as a triumphant irruption of the plant in us." Always follow the rhizome by rupture; lengthen, prolong, and relay the line of flight; make it vary, until you have produced the most abstract and tortuous of lines of n dimensions and broken directions. Conjugate deterritorialized flows. Follow the plants: you start by delimiting a first line consisting of circles of convergence around successive singularities; then you see whether inside that line new circles of convergence establish themselves, with new points located outside the limits and in other directions. Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialization, extend the line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane of consistency. ("Go first to your old plant and watch carefully the watercourse made by the rain. By now the rain must have carried the seeds far away. Watch the crevices made by the runoff, and from them determine the direction of the flow. Then find the plant that is growing at the farthest point from your plant. All the devil's weed plants that are growing in between are yours. Later. . you can extend the size of your territory by following the watercourse from each point along the way."

***Topicality***

A2: ASPEC
1. We meet we identify our agent Andrew and I advocate the USFG. 2. Prefer USFG is the agent specified by the resolution. 3. Standards A. Ground Theres no ground loss. CX checks they could have asked us what agent we use. B. Predictability Identifying the USFG alone isnt unpredictable. C. Be reasonable they still have the ability to debate us and theres evidence on both sides. 4. T isnt a voter Dont vote on potential abuse its like voting on a DA they didnt read.

A2: T Exploration
A. We Meet We explore space beyond the Earths mesosphere. B. Counterinterpretation Exploration is the process of acquiring a deeper understanding of a subject. CSU Fresno
October 19th 2003 EXPLORATION "Discovery of Knowledge, Self, and Society Through Expanding Horizons"

The theme exploration is intended to convey the concept of acquiring a deeper understanding of the individual and society by pushing out the boundaries of awareness. For students, this means becoming conscious of new ideas and possibilities.
For faculty, it involves extending the frontiers of knowledge and creating new expressions of culture as scholars and artists. For staff and administrators, exploration includes mastering and improving organizational support systems that contribute to educational effectiveness of the university. In each instance, both effort and results are stimulating and meaningful. The alignment of this theme with the university Vision and, particularly, paragraphs two and five of the Mission Statement, is evident. It is most strongly reflected in the fifth Institutional Purpose and the second and third Educational Goals. The two features of university activity targeted in this particular Thematic Features section are Service-Learning and Research.

C. This interpretation is superior: 1. Education Critically exploring space as an abstract concept is key to learning about topic specific education and different political possibilities. They will say that they dont we dont learn about the USFG developing and exploring space, but yes we do. We learn about the construction of ideology on which the USFG policies are predicated upon. Thats Ballantyne. 2. Limits Our interpretation is key to limiting aff plans. We allow debate on a few types of critical ideology. 3. Real World The ideology behind a plan is more important than the actual decision. Our interpretation is key to experimenting with logic. Cross apply Colebrook local disruption is key to manifesting real change. 4. Ground the neg still has the ability to run off case arguments against the plan. They can always read DAs, CPs, Ks, and case specific arguments against our methodology. 5. Education outweighs fairness If we win the content of our 1AC we win an impact turn to their fairness argument the current model of their education makes fascism inevitable. D. Potential Abuse is not a voter unless they prove a specific abuse story dont pull the trigger on topicality.

A2: T Beyond the Earths Mesosphere

A. We Meet We explore space beyond the Earths mesosphere. B. Counterinterpretation The mesosphere is a striation created by humans and to move past and break down that mental border is to move beyond it. That is Land. C. This interpretation is superior: 1. Education To identify the mesosphere as a mental border allows us to explore new possibilities which are key to escape logics of identity, control and limitation. This type of education outweighs that of traditional policymaking because to invoke new tropes of political reality would mean to learn how policy making is even formed. 2. Limits Our interpretation is key to limiting aff plans. We allow debate on a few types of critical ideology affs under their interpretation could explore physical space to any length which is abusive. 3. Real World Cross apply Weissberg moving beyond mental borders must happen in order to challenge current issues and bring them to the state. 4. Ground the neg still has the ability to run off case arguments against the plan. They can always read DAs, CPs, Ks, and case specific arguments against our methodology. 5. Education outweighs fairness If we win the content of our 1AC we win an impact turn to their fairness argument the current model of exploration encourages a political strategy which dooms us to fascism. Even if we make everyone quit it would be a good thing. D. Potential Abuse is not a voter unless they prove a specific abuse story dont pull the trigger on topicality.

A2: T Substantial
A. We Meet Our advocacy specifies a substantial increase. B. Counterinterpretation Substantial means considerable or to a large degree prefer common meanings because substantial is not a term of art. Arkush 2 (David, JD Candidate Harvard University, Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the Freedom
of Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Winter, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 131) Plaintiffs should argue that the term "substantially prevail" is not a term of art because if considered a term of art, resort to Black's 7th produces a definition of "prevail" that could be interpreted adversely to plaintiffs. 99 It is

words that are not legal terms of art should be accorded their ordinary, not their legal, meaning, 100 and ordinary-usage dictionaries provide FOIA fee claimants with helpful arguments. The Supreme Court has already found favorable , temporally relevant definitions of the word "substantially" in ordinary dictionaries: "Substantially" suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large degree." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining "substantially" as "in a
commonly accepted that substantial manner" and "substantial" as "considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified to a large degree or in the main"); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial": "relating to or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of ample or considerable amount, quantity or dimensions"). 101

Substantial is an imprecise term anything sizeable applies. Hartmann, 07 Judge, Hong Kong (IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, 8/20, http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=58463&currpag e=T The word substantial is not a technical term nor is it a word that lends itself to a precise measurement. In an earlier judgment on this issue, that of S. v. S. [2006] 3
HKLRD 251, I said that it is not a word that lends itself to precise definition or from which precise deductions

To say, for example, that there has been a substantial increase in expenditure does not of itself allow for a calculation in numerative terms of the exact increase. It is a statement to the effect that it is certainly more than a little but less than great. It defines, however, a significant increase, one that is weighty or sizeable.
can be drawn.

C. Counterinterpretation Superior 1. Limits Specifying substantial as a numerical value is improbable and cannot assume the different affs on this years topic. To define substantial as a large degree allows a sufficient amount of affs to be topical without limiting the topic to only a few affs. 2. Education Defining substantial as a large degree allows the incorporation of critical affirmatives which are essential to learning about political ideology and how policies are formed.

3. Predictability They should be able to predict affs which change space ideology and policy. 4. Ground the neg still has the ability to run off case arguments against the plan. They can always read DAs, CPs, Ks, and case specific arguments against our methodology. D. Potential Abuse is not a voter unless they prove a specific abuse story dont pull the trigger on topicality.

***Case***

A2: Authoritarianism Turn

Lines of flight are not intimately and inherently good or bad, rather, the concept of a "line of flight" is a neutral concept. Their Barbrook evidence explains the example of Pol Pot of where a line of flight was used for a negative thing such as violence. However that's a very essentialist understanding of Deleuze and Guattari in the context of the aff. We are not simply affirming "lines of flight are always good," instead we are defending a specific process modeled as a line of flight, as a resonance, as an echo in the sense that the 1AC uncovers the potentiality of a line of flight, and then utilizes that model to challenge fascism. Two implications: 1. The examples in their Barbrook evidence were not intentional utilizations of this model; they were simply instances which could be described as a line of flight. This proves that we have to uncover the preconscious desire which creates those strands and then find ways to utilize that model positively as per the 1AC. 2. The 1AC is a good line of flight, and the negative hasnt answered any part of the 1AC. Their extremely generic DnG blocks do not take into consideration our Conley evidence which says how our affirmation is an echo of a larger struggle against the mechanism of State Fascism. Their Barbrook evidence literally has no warrants stating how Deleuze and Guattari are elitists. Their evidence revolves around European avant-gardes, and doesnt specifically talk about our authors.

A2: Cede the Political

1. Micropolitical fascism gives power the macropolitical fascism. Our discourse redirects the way fascism is orientated throughout the system, thus preventing a cooption of the right. 2. Their justifications for rejecting our movement serve to maintain a managerial discourse bent on keeping stifling order at all costs. Even if the right does move in, that is not a reason to reject our dissent against the current order of the state. 3. We control uniqueness their political strategy of seeking increasing levels of order is the political strategy of the status quo because human desire is naturally inclined to create order and avoid the unpredictable. Our methodology is the only one that can make a change to the status quo. Ballantyne 2007 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 49-50
For all I knew this might be the one so long awaited by the orchid, coming to bring it that rare pollen without which it must remain a virgin. And then the metaphorical orchid reappears: I was distracted from following the gyrations of the insect, for, a few minutes later, engaging my attention afresh, Jupien [. . .] returned, followed by the Baron (Proust, 191327, 4, 7). The refrain, ritournelle, returns repeatedly in a poignant little phrase composed by the fictional character Vinteuil. As it is a fictional little tune, we have never actually heard it, but in the novel we come to recognize it in precisely a musical way when it returns and brings with it a trailing cloud of memories, which are, by the time it happens, our own as well as those of the books characters. We require just a little order to protect us from chaos (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 201). We are highly predisposed to recognize order and attach significance to it.

We feel secure when there is some order of a kind that we recognize, and at the same time we discount everything else as being somehow beside the point. We are surprisingly susceptible to conspiracy theories, which see an underlying order in unconnected events, and the paranoid sees order everywhere, organized so as to persecute him. There are times when chaos might seem to be on the point of overwhelming us, but if we have managed to regulate our lives in such a way that we have habits that help us to do the things were trying to do, then these eruptions of chaos will be rare, and will be experienced as crises. If I miss my usual
train, then I feel disappointed and inconvenienced; I might need to make a phone call, but I dont feel that chaos is upon us. But when, on my way to the station, I start to feel my body changing into a wolfs, then whether I panic or not I experience something much more like chaos; at least until I have worked out what is going on. Chaos in the Deleuze and Guattari world is a

body without organs, the schizophrenic body, the plane of immanence, where things are forming and being taken apart as fast as they form. Emergent order is held at bay, and never emerges. A little order a tune, a heartbeat and the chaos recedes; a possibility emerges from a plateau of stability. Deleuze and Guattaris image of chaos is far from inert. It is continually making and unmaking: Chaos is defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a nothingness but a virtual, containing

all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, which spring up only to disappear immediately, without consistency or reference, without consequence. Chaos is an infinite speed of birth and disappearance. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991,
118)

A2: Co-option
1. Their Atteberry evidence is basically saying that the way Deleuze articulates his philosophy of immanence is futile since it results in the trappings of immanence. However their author has failed to realize that Deleuze specifically states that his writings are written in a rhizomatic way, a way in which nothing is constrained. That was our Massumi in 83 evidence. 2. Extend our Lambert in 2k6 evidence which talks about how many authors have undermined the potential of Deleuzes work. Atteberry fails to consider how Deleuze himself had set up a line of flight when writing his series of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 3. Their evidence had no specific link to our affirmative plan, and failed to consider the revolutionary potential of it. The only malicious end that their evidence talks about is misinterpreting Deleuzes philosophy and repeating metaphysical tradition. Our aff solves for this. 4. Fear - The negs reliance on fear based rhetoric (e.g. co-option) are part of a fear based politic which makes government reliance and war inevitable. Louis Rene Beres, Professor of International Law at Purdue, Self-Determination, International
Law and Survival on Planet Earth, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Spring 1994
Humankind is different. Of course, the

spectacle of catastrophe and annihilation has been with us from the beginning, and the seeming insignificance of individual life appears to be confirmed by every earthquake or typhoon, by every pestilence or epidemic, by every war or holocaust. Yet, each of us is unwilling to accept a fate that points not only to extinction, but also to extinction with insignificance. Where do we turn? It is to promises of immortality. And from where do we hear such promises? From religion, to be sure, but also from States that have deigned to represent God in his planetary political duties, 46 and that cry out for "self-determination." How do these States sustain the promise of immortality? One way is through the legitimization of the killing of other human beings. And why is such killing the ostensible protection of one's own life? An answer
is offered by Eugene Ionesco as follows: I must kill my visible enemy, the one who is determined to take my life, to prevent him from killing me. Killing gives me a feeling of relief, because I am dimly aware that in killing him, I have killed death. My enemy's death cannot be held against me, it is no longer a source of anguish, if I killed him with the approval of society: that is the purpose of war. Killing is a way of relieving one's feelings, of warding off one's own death. 47 There are two separate but interdependent ideas here. The first is the rather pragmatic and mundane observation that killing

someone who would otherwise kill you is a life-supporting action. Why assume that your intended victim would otherwise be your assassin? Because, of course, your own government has [*17] clarified precisely who is friend and who is foe. The second, far more complex idea, is that killing in general confers immunity from mortality. This idea, of death
as a zero-sum commodity, is captured by Ernest Becker's paraphrase of Elias Canetti: "Each organism raises its head over a field of

death fear of the ego is lessened by the killing, the Sacrifice, of the other; through the death of the other one buys oneself free from the penalty of dying, of being killed." 49
corpses, smiles into the sun, and declares life good." 48 Or, according to Otto Rank, "The

A2: Deleuze Bad

Their Hallward evidence is flawed. Their card talks about how there is no time for change in Deleuzes philosophy, but in reality Deleuze is in favor of a head on revolution, one that is direct and immediate. Extend our Conley in 2k6 evidence which says that our affirmation is key to challenge the dominant hegemonic order of the state. Hallward has failed to understand Deleuze - while he may be correct in his criticism of specific lines, texts, or metaphors displayed in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, he ignores the revolutionary potential of our philosophical concepts as formed beyond the limitations of text. Lambert 2006 (Greg, "Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?")
The above points of impasse are obvious to anyone who is familiar with the debates that have surrounded the early reception of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes. It will not come as any great surprise to learn that part of my answer to the question will be because these works were misunderstood or so badly represented. Even though this sounds like the occasion for offering a fresh commentary as a corrective to previous interpretations of these works, interpretations that were badly botched or misplaced in their major conclusions, in fact, I feel just the opposite: that most interpretations so far have been right on the money and their conclusions have been sound. Perhaps, where they have

led us astray and this is partly the responsibility of a certain marketing rationale that dominates academic publishing these days with a preference for commentaries on major figures and classroom textbooks is that they remain at the level of interpretation, if not explication de texte. They dont seem to take into their account that Deleuze and Guattari didnt write books together, but rather attempted to trace intensities in the process of becoming revolutionary. The former is a fairly static process, and already poses that the end of the process occurs when the object of interpretation is explained and fairly well understood; however, understanding has never been a goal of Deleuze and Guattaris writing s, but rather something that they have called by different names, all of which amounts to an active process of becoming-x and is involved with the fundamental issue of desire . But what is desire? Here we begin the process of real learning that their writings aim to address. After all, Deleuze and Guattari say that a book isnt produced in order to be understood, but is rather a machine for producing desires. (I will argue
that Jameson was alone in understanding this, even better than most Deleuzians, and, therefore, also knew what kind of threat this book might pose for his own programme of political interpretation.) We can find all kinds of desires

expressed around and in response to their works revolutionary and reactionary alike but the real question doesnt concern the interpretation of these books but what kind of desires they are associated with and what they can be plugged into. As Deleuze himself once remarked concerning the status of Anti-Oedipus as a book: Its not as a book that it could respond to desire, but only in relation to what surrounds it. A book is not worth much on its own. Its always a question of flow: there are many people doing work in similar fields. I doubt they will buy the current type of discourse, at once epistemological, psychoanalytic, ideological, which is beginning to wear thin with everyone . . . In any case, a book responds to a desire only because there are many people fed up with the current type of discourse. So, its only because a book participates in a larger re-shuffling, a resonance between research and desire. A book can respond to desire only in a political way, outside the book.
(Deleuze and Guattari [hereafter DG] 2004: 220)

Their card literally has no warrant dictating how our plan is bad, and fails to accurately portray Deleuzes concepts. If you look in the un-underlined portion of the text, Hallward explicity states that he payed little attention to the complexities of context or the occasional inconsistencies that must accompany the development of

so large and wide-ranging a body of work. His failure to consider every aspect of Deleuzes work puts him in a position in which he cannot accurately describe it.

A2: Deleuze Not Immanent

This doesnt answer our affirmative. They have conceded our Massumi evidence which talks about how philosophy is always changing its outlook, content, and sound. As long as a common core of philosophy is maintained we can combine the ideas.

A2: DnG Not Falsifiable

1. If we win a risk an empirical example we win this argument a. Deleuze and Guattari adapted the basis of schizophrenic politics from the lifestyle of nomads. Nomadic tribes always use a schizophrenic idea in which they should always be changing and moving. b. Our Conley evidence indicates why schizophrenic politics solves and can successfully overcome the status quo. They have to win a reason why our alternative is false to win this argument. c. Apart from the evidence we read, there is a huge literature base on Deleuze and Guattari. It is the burden of the negative to prove that our methodology cannot solve. 2. Falsifiability isnt a reason to reject the team or the argument a. Nothing in debate is falsifiable, theres really no way to tell if anything is true or not, the only way to come close enough is to have evidence that says your methodology is good or solves and that is what our alternative does.

A2: Fear Based Rhetoric

No link Their evidence criticizes the same notion of fear base rhetoric which we do. Their evidence is specific toward State centered authority and how language is manipulated by the government to inflict fear into the minds of people. Our affirmation calls to move away from government action and a singular usage of language. Their epistemology is flawed. Our claims of fascism leading to mass suicide and butchery is not an attempt to gain control of the masses, but is instead a passageway which introduces people to the concept of combating fascism at the preconscious level. We are not some typical policy orientated affirmative which supports governmental action. The act of the 1AC is a gesture towards the schizophrenic never becoming a schizo, but learning from the potential provided by the freedom of insanity. The consideration itself of being completely unfettered to reality, always reimagining concepts, is enough to make a change in reality. Deleuze and Guattari 1972, Anti-Oedipus, 366-8
The fourth and final thesis of schizoanalysis is therefore the distinction between two poles of social libidinal investment: the paranoiac, reactionary, and fascisizing pole, and the schizoid revolutionary pole. Once again, we see no objection to the use of terms inherited from psychiatry for characterizing social investments of
the unconscious, insofar as these terms cease to have a familial connotation that would make them into simple projections, and from the moment delirium is recognized as having a primary social content that is immediately adequate. The two

poles are defined, the one by the enslavement of production and the desiring-machines to the gregarious aggregates that they constitute on a large scale under a given form of power or selective sovereignty; the other by the inverse subordination and the overthrow of power . The
one by these molar structured aggregates that crush singularities, select them, and regularize those that they retain in codes or axiomatics: the other by the molecular multiplicities of singularities that on the contrary treat the large aggregates as so many useful materials for their own elaborations. The one by the lines of integration and territorialization that arrest the flows, constrict them, turn them back, break them again according to the limits interior to the system, in such a way as to produce the images that come to fiIl the field of immanence peculiar to this system or this aggregate. the other by lines of escape that follow the decoded and deterritorialized flows, inventing their own nonfigurative breaks or schizzes that produce new flows, always breaching the coded wall or the territorialized limit that separates them from desiring-production. And to summarize all the preceding determinations: the one is defined by subjugated groups, the other by subject-groups. It is true that we still run up against all kinds of problems concerning these distinctions. In what sense does the schizoid investment constitute, to the same extent as the other one, a real investment of the socio-historical field, and not a simple utopia? In what sense are the lines of escape collective, positive, and creative? What is the relationship between the two unconscious poles, and what is their relationship with the preconscious investments of interest? We have seen that the unconscious paranoiac investment was grounded in the socius itself as a full body without organs, beyond the preconscious aims and interests that it assigns and distributes. The fact remains that such an investment does not endure the light of day: it must always hide under assignable aims or interests presented as the general aims and interests, even though in reality the latter represent only the members of the dominant class or a fraction of this class. How could a formation of sovereignty, a fixed and determinate gregarious aggregate, endure being invested for their brute force, their violence, and their absurdity? They would not survive such an investment. Even the most overt fascism speaks the language of goals, of law,

order, and reason. Even the most insane capitalism speaks in the name of economic rationality. And this is necessarily the case, since it is in the irrationality of the full body that the order of reasons is inextricably fixed, under a code, under an axiomatic that determines it. What is more, the bringing to light of the unconscious reactionary investment as if devoid of an aim, would be enough to transform it completely, to make it pass to the other pole of the libido, i.e., to the schizorevolutionary pole, since this action could not be accomplished without overthrowing power, without reversing

subordination, without returning production itself to desire: for it is only desire that lives from having no aim. Molecular desiring-production would regain its liberty to master in its turn the molar aggregate under an overturned
form of power or sovereignty. That is why Klossowski, who has taken the theory of the two poles of investment the furthest, but still within the category of an active utopia, is able to write: "Every sovereign formation would thus have to foresee the destined moment of its disintegration.... No formation of sovereignty, in order to crystalize, will ever endure this prise de conscience: for as soon as this formation

By way of the circuitous route of science and art, human beings have many times revolted against this fixity; this capacity notwithstanding, the gregarious impulse in and by science caused this rupture to fail. The day humans are able to behave as intentionless phenomena-for every intention at the level of the human being
becomes conscious of its immanent disintegration in the individuals who compose it, these same individuals decompose it . ... always obeys the laws of its conservation, its continued existence-on that day a new creature will declare the integrity of existence.... Science demonstrates by its very method that the means that it constantly elaborates do no more than reproduce, on the outside, an interplay of forces by themselves without aim or end whose combinations obtain such and such a result. ... However, no science can develop outside a constituted social grouping.

A2: I Love Life!

Humanity is psychologically conditioned to lie to itself. The intuitive belief in lifes value is worthless. Benatar 06 (David, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Cape Town, Better Never to Have Been, pg 99-101)
Those cases in which the offspring turn out to regret their existence are exceedingly tragic , but where
parents cannot reasonably foresee this, we cannot say, the argument would suggest, that they do wrong to follow their important interests in having children. Things would be quite different, according to this argument, if the majority or even a sizeable minority of people regretted coming into existence. Under such circumstances the above justification for having children certainly would be doomed. However, given that most people do not regret their having come into existence, does the argument work? In fact, the argument is problematic (and not only for the reasons that Seana Shiffrin raises and which I mentioned in Chapter 2). Its form has been widely criticized in other contexts, because of its inability to rule out those harmful interferences in people's lives (such as indoctrination) that effect a subsequent endorsement of the interference.

Coming to endorse the views one is indoctrinated to hold is one form of adaptive preference - where an interference comes to be endorsed. However, there are other kinds of adaptive preference of which we are also suspicious. Desired goods that prove unattainable can cease to be desired ('sour grapes'). The reverse is also true. It is not uncommon for people to find themselves in unfortunate circumstances (Being forced to feed on lemons) and adapt their preferences to suit their predicament ('sweet lemons'). If coming into existence is as great a harm as I suggested, and if that is a heavy psychological burden to bear, then it is quite possible that we could be engaged in a mass self-deception about how wonderful things are for us. If that is so, then it might not matter, contrary to what is claimed by the procreative argument just sketched, that most people do not regret their having come into existence. Armed with a strong argument for the harmfulness of slavery, we would not take the slaves' endorsement of their enslavement as a justification for their enslavement, particularly if we could point to some rationally questionable psychological phenomenon that explained the slaves' contentment. If that is so, and if coming into existence is as great a harm as I have argued it is, then we should not take the
widespread contentment with having come into existence as a justification for having children.

A2: Intrinsic VTL

Our argument may seem counterintuitive, but you still have to hold the neg up to the same standard of argumentation you would with your affirmative position. Impassioned stories of the delight theyve found in life or pleas to common sense and intrinsic value arent arguments theyre excuses for debate. Make the neg logically justify their stance that existence is good.

A2: Harrington 00 Nomadism Fails

No link Dont grant them their Harrington evidence. In the un-underlined portion of the text, their author clearly states that nomadism may be understood BOTH literally and figuratively. Their evidence then goes on to explain how this one author, Rosi Braidotti, wrote about the nomad as a state of mind in her book Nomadic Subjects. This is only one example of nomadism.

A2: Mann 95 Nomadism Fails

This was the wrong piece of evidence to read against our affirmative Extend our Massumi in 96 evidence which talks about how our affirmation is a concept to be played with and combined with other concepts. Their Mann evidence concedes that nothing is more crucial to philosophy than escaping the dialectic. The body without organs is forever entwined with the concept of becoming. Rather than maintain the rigid structure implicit in our everyday lives we have to traverse every border culturally, socially, racially, and even geographically. This form of identification takes us on the journey of becoming-minoritarian through the theater of violence and ends on the plane of immanence: every point connecting to the other and the politics of schizophrenia. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 85-86 The first things to be distributed on the body without organs are races, cultures, and their gods. The fact has often been overlooked that the schizo indeed participates in history; he hallucinates and raves universal history, and proliferates the races. All delirium is racial, which does not necessarily mean racist. It is not a matter of the regions of the body without organs "representing" races and cultures. The full body does not represent anything at all. On the contrary, the races and cultures designate regions on this body-that is, zones of intensities, fields of potentials. Phenomena of individualization and sexualization are produced within these fields. We pass from one field to another by crossing thresholds: we never stop migrating, we become other individuals as well as other sexes, and departing becomes as easy as being born or dying. Along the way we struggle against other races, we destroy civilizations, in the manner of the great migrants in whose wake nothing is left standing once they have passed through although these destructions can be brought about, as we shall see, in two very different ways. The crossing of a threshold entails ravages elsewhere-how could it be otherwise? The body without organs closes round the deserted places. The theater of cruelty cannot be separated from the struggle against our culture, from the confrontation of the "races," and from Artaud's great migration
What is the nature of this order? toward Mexico, its forces, and its religions: individuations are produced only within fields of forces expressly defined by intensive vibrations, and that animate cruel personages only in so far as they are induced organs, parts of desiring-machines (mannequins)

And can Zarathustra be separated from the "grand politics," and from the bringing to life of the races that leads Nietzsche to say, I'm not a German, I'm Polish. Here again individuations are
brought about solely within complexes of forces that determine persons as so many intensive states embodied in a "criminal,"

ceaselessly passing beyond a threshold while destroying the factitious unity of a family and an ego: "I am Prado, I am also Prado's father. I venture to say that I am also Lesseps .... I wanted to give
my Parisians, whom I love, a new idea-that of a decent criminal. I am also Chambige-also a decent criminal. ... The unpleasant thing, and one that nags at my modesty, is that at root every name in history is 1."34 Yet it was never a question of identifying oneself with

It is a question of something quite different: identifying races, cultures, and gods with fields of intensity on the body without organs, identifying personages with states that fill these fields, and with effects that fulgurate within and traverse these fields. Whence the role of names, with a magic all their own: there is no ego that identifies with races, peoples, and persons in a theater of representation, but proper names that identify races, peoples, and persons with
personages, as when it is erroneously maintained that a madman "takes himself for so-and-so...."

regions, thresholds, or effects in a production of intensive quantities. The theory of proper names should not be conceived of in terms of representation; it refers instead to the class of "effects": effects that are not a mere dependence on causes, but the occupation of a domain, and the operation of a system of signs. This can be clearly seen in
physics, where proper names designate such effects within fields of potentials: the Joule effect, the Seebeck effect, the Kelvin effect.

History is like physics: a Joan of Arc effect, a Heliogabaius effect-all the names of history, and not the name of the father.

A2: Microfascism Inevitable

1. This argument is just another reason to vote aff. Sure, microfascism may be inevitable, but thats not a reason to reject the aff. Our politics is key to keeping microfascism at bay so that it doesnt resonate back into the macro level. Voting aff may not change every bit of microfascism but it does prevent the implications of mass war that starts with microfascism. There is a HUGE difference between a World War III and a small scrimmages. 2. Our Conley evidence indicates that even if we dont solve every ounce of microfascism we solve the major implications which are a result of microfascist impulses such as conflicts over religion and ideology. 3. We are not stupid we realize that there can never be an end to the harms of the world, there is no utopia, but in this instance our violent utopian vision allows us to shoot for the stars and settle for what little change is possible. Felix Guattari 1989, Pierre was a French militant, institutional psychotherapist and philosopher, a founder of both schizoanalysis and ecosophy. "The Three Ecologies", pp. 59-60 I am not so naive and Utopian as to maintain that there exists a reliable, analytic methodology that would be able to fundamentally eradicate all of the fantasies leading to the objectification of women, immigrants, the insane, e t c . , or that might allow us to have done with prisons and psychiatric institutions, e t c . 6 8 However it does seem to me that a generalization of the experiences of institutional analysis (in hospitals, schools, the urban environment) might profoundly modify the conditions of this problem [les donnees de ce piobleme]. There will have to be a massive reconstruction of social mechanisms [rouages] if we are to confront the damage caused by IWC. It will not come about through centralized reform, through laws, decrees and bureaucratic programmes, but rather through the promotion of innovatory practices, the expansion of alternative experiences centred around a respect for singularity, and through the continuous production of an autonomizing subjectivity that can articulate itself appropriately in relation to the rest of society. Creating a space for violent fantasies brutal deterritorializations of the psyche and of the socius won't lead to miraculous sublimation, but only to redeployed assemblages that will overflow the body, the Self, and the individual in all directions. Ordinary approaches to education and socialization won't weaken the grip of a punitive superego or deathly guilt complex. The great religions, apart from Islam, have an increasingly insignificant hold over the psyche, while almost everywhere else in the world, we are seeing a kind of return to totemism and animism. Troubled human communities tend to become introspective and abandon the task of governing or managing society to the professional politicians, while trade unions are left behind by the mutations of a society that is everywhere in latent or manifest crisis.

A2: Miller 03 Authority Over LoF Bad

If you look at the un-underlined portion of their Miller evidence, all of Millers assertions are regarding the reading of A Thousand Plateaus, and not Deleuzes philosophy in it of itself. Their Miller evidence literally has no warrants stating how DnG sets up a hierarchal authority over lines of flight, not to mention the card doesnt even have an impact. This does not answer our 1AC at all. Our affirmation is a step against the mechanisms of State Fascism. We are not taking power over any line of flight, instead we are defending a specific process articulated as a line of flight, as a resonance, as an echo in the sense that the 1AC uncovers the potentiality of a line of flight, and then use that model to challenge fascism.

A2: Minority Force

Even if we only represent a small minority of potential revolutionaries, history can learn from our political movement the expressions of the minority contain potential to be investigated Lambert 2006 (Greg, "Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?")
Kafka, moreover, is a particularly apparent case of a writer for whom all the forms of language available to him are either
closed off or over-determined by the particular political and cultural situation that defines Prague at the turn of the twentieth century. He has no choice except to invent another way, to escape the choices that have been given to him, because none of the languages are adequate to the task. In accordance with the criticisms that have been levelled against Deleuze and Guattari for a certain romantic notion of the writer, they do ascribe to the

position of the writer a certain populist vocation as the voice of the people, particularly in those situations where a popular consciousness only exists by means of its literature . This
corresponds to a major thesis that has been ascribed to many different colonial situations, from Ireland to Algeria, a thesis that actually has its origin in the causes that have been ascribed to the birth of German romanticism and can be paraphrased as follows: in the absence of political and civil institutions to house the function of national or

collective consciousness, and its political and juridical language, it is the popular form of culture, and of a peoples literature, in particular, that assumes this institutional function in the experience of Diaspora. With regard to the temporality of national consciousness, since it is absent in the present moment, it exists only in the form of memory and anticipation of a coming community in the future. Thus, the expression of a peoples literature is defined as one of most intensive experiences of exile, memory and hope in a future; its function is both curative and protective (it preserves collective memory and traditions from extinction under the brutal forces of repression and oppression) and properly utopian (as the repository of collective aspirations and hope in a future that is liberated to its own present). This is why the concept of minor literature must not be understood as a genre that naturally belongs to minorities, since these groups can often assume an expression of a major or dominant form of literature as well (particularly in its critical representation).

A2: Nomadic Politics Exists

Their Diken and Lausten evidence is flawed. Extend our Lambert in 2k6 evidence which says how many authors have misinterpreted the full potential of Deleuzes philosophy. This doesnt answer our affirmative at all. Their uber-generic evidence doesnt have any link to our affirmative and doesnt take into consideration our plan. They have conceded our Conley in 2k6 evidence which talks about how we are an echo of a greater movement against State Fascism. Their entire evidence is revolved around the concept of Fight Club. Extend that there are different types of war machines, and that we are trying to change the way we deal with fascism at the preconscious level.

A2: No Root Cause of War

The root cause of war is microfascist impulses which begin with the way desire is invested in the social field. Deleuze and Guattari 1980 (A Thousand Plateaus 214-215)
It is not sufficient to define bureaucracy by a rigid segmentarity with compartmentalization of
contiguous offices, an office manager in each segment, and the corresponding centralization at the end of the hall or on top of the tower. For at the same time there is a whole bureaucratic segmentation, a suppleness of and communication between offices, a bureaucratic perversion, a permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced even against administrative regulations. If Kafka is the greatest theorist of bureaucracy, it is because he shows how, at a certain level (but which one? it is not localizable), the barriers between offices cease to be "a definite dividing line" and are immersed in a molecular medium (milieu) that dissolves them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into microfigures impossible to recognize or identify, discernible only when they are centralizable: another regime, coexistent with the separation and totalization of the rigid segment s.I0 We would even say that fascism implies a molecular regime that is distinct both from molar segments and their centralization. Doubtless, fascism invented the concept of the totalitarian State, but there is no reason to define fascism by a concept of its own devising: there are totalitarian States, of the Stalinist or military dictatorship type, that are not fascist. The concept of the totalitarian State applies only at the

macropolitical level, to a rigid segmentarity and a particular mode of totalization and centralization. But fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State. Rural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism

and war veteran's fascism, fascism of the Left and fascism of the Right, fascism of the couple, family, school, and office: every fascism is defined by a microblack hole that stands on its own and communicates with the others, before resonating in a great, generalized central black hole.1' There is fascism when a war machine is installed in each hole, in
every niche. Even after the National Socialist State had been established, microfascisms persisted that gave it unequaled ability to act upon the "masses." Daniel Guerin is correct to say that if Hitler took power, rather

then taking over the German State administration, it was because from the beginning he had at his disposal microorganizations giving him "an unequaled, irreplaceable ability to penetrate every cell of society," in other words, a molecular and supple segmentarity, flows capable of suffusing every kind of cell. Conversely, if capitalism came to consider the fascist experience as catastrophic, if it preferred to ally itself with Stalinist totalitarianism, which from its point of view was much more sensible and manageable, it was because the segmentarity and centralization of the latter was more classical and less fluid. What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism. American film
has often depicted these molecular focal points; band, gang, sect, family, town, neighborhood, vehicle fascisms spare no one. Only microfascism provides an answer to the global question: Why does desire desire

its own repression, how can it desire its own repression? The masses certainly do not passively submit to power; nor do they "want" to be repressed, in a kind of masochistic hysteria; nor are they tricked by an ideological lure. Desire is never separable from complex assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, from microformations already shaping postures , attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems, etc. Desire is never an undifferentiated instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered setup rich in interactions: a whole supple segmentarity that processes molecular energies and potentially gives desire a fascist determination. Leftist organizations will not be the last to secrete microfascisms. It's too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective.

A2: Plan Doesnt Assume Technology

Barbrook got it wrong; Deleuze and Guattari criticize the production of technology through the capitalist system. Their own evidence cites a perfect scenario of how technology continues to segregate our world, about how there needs to be things such as state intervention in order to give everyone access to certain technologies such as the Net. No link The call for technology, is not neutral these drives are existent everywhere around us but continue to fail. And as we pile up our new toys, fresh out of the package and already broken with no warranty, the disparities between worlds grow. The problem is not technology, rather it is the self. Flix Guattari 1989 Pierre-Flix Guattari was a French militant, institutional psychotherapist and philosopher, a founder of both schizoanalysis and ecosophy. "The Three Ecologies" 1989, pp. 31-32
So, wherever we turn, there is the same nagging paradox: on the one hand, the continuous development of new technoscientific means to potentially resolve the dominant ecological issues and reinstate socially useful activities on the surface of the planet, and, on the other hand, the inability of organized social forces and constituted subjective formations to take hold of these resources in order to make them work. But perhaps this paroxysmal era of the erosion of subjectivities, assets and environments is destined to enter into a phase of decline. The demands of singularity are rising up almost everywhere; the most obvious signs in this regard are to be found in the multiplication of nationalitary claims which were regarded as marginal only yesterday, and which increasingly occupy the foreground of the political stage. (We note, from Corsica to the Baltic States, the
11

conjunction of ecological and separatist demands.) In the end, this rise in nationalitary questions will probably lead to profound modifications in East- West relations, and in particular, the configuration of Europe, whose centre of gravity could drift decisively towards a neutralist East.
The traditional dualist oppositions that have guided social thought and geopolitical cartographies are over. The conflicts remain, but they engage with multipolar systems incompatible with recruitments under any ideological, Manicheist flag. For example, the opposition between the Third World and the developed world is being completely blown apart. We have seen with the New Industrial Powers that productivity is becoming on an altogether different scale from the traditional industrial bastions of the West, but this phenomenon is accompanied by a sort of Third-Worldization within developed countries, which is coupled with an exacerbation of questions relative to immigration and racism. Make no mistake about it, the great disorder and confusion surrounding the economic unification of the European Community will in no way impede this Third-Worldization of considerable areas of Europe.
12

A2: Politics Good

We are not retreating from the political sphere. Extend our Conley in 2k6 evidence which talks about how we affirm a politics of continuation a politics in which we constantly seek new outlets and investigate their potential. We are against the dominant hegemonic order of the state; against divisions and articulations of place and order. We are not trying to escape the realm of the political, instead, by facing fascism at the preconscious level and being aware of our desires, we aim to create something new. A new form of politics in which we are thought and actions are not controlled by some higher power.

A2: Prediction Good

This argument has no link to our affirmative. Their Rescher evidence revolves around not being able to predict daily commonplace matter not political strategies.

A2: Psychoanalysis Turns

1. No link Group the turns. All their evidence assumes Lacanian psychoanalysis. Their authors ignore the context that Deleuze and Guattari were writing under psychoanalysis was concerned with the power of the signifier as a theoretical tool and was largely unconcerned with political formations. Deleuze and Guattari paved the way for the more revolutionary lens of psychoanalysis our alternative takes the patient out for a walk and provides legs to their models. We engage in real world change. 2. Our politics is revolutionary from the perspective of the unconscious because it learns from clinical settings to create change and engage in the world around us. Lacanian strategy is one largely of interpretation of seeing what there is and then commenting upon it. We will concede that this is a futile strategy which prevents change. Colebrook 2008 (Claire, U of Edinburgh "Review: Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?" http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12605)
Deleuze and Guattari do not, Lambert insists, want us to read, interpret, diagnose or even see as symptomatic, the unconscious; and so the error of all errors would be to see politics as encapsulated in a sexual scene. If we have turned the sexual relation into the scene whereby my being is fulfilled
through some other body that must actualise my fantasies, then the revolutionary plane of the virtual has been reduced to some private scene, and we produce the unconscious as nothing more than a relation among bodies. What we need to

do then is not interpret the unconscious in Deleuzian rather than Lacanian terms, but see the ways in which institutions (from literature departments to Oprah Winfrey and heterosexual pornography) present desire as fantasy instead of seeing the positive power of desire that produced the social and political scene (with a reduced and institutionalised sexuality) in the first place. So language is important, and the reading of literary language especially so, because it is through order words and the incorporeal transformations that crystallise events -- such as 'September 11' -- that bodies are organised in relation and, most importantly, an unconscious is produced . This is Lambert's critical bet: we failed to read Lacan because instead of seeing the analytic scene as one in which mastery was produced through readings that claimed to 'interpret' an unconscious, we turned the analytic scene into an industry. iek now 'reads' any number of texts, events and phenomena as symptoms of an unconscious topology that can be readily unveiled by a hermeneutic master. Deleuze and Guattari, Lambert insists, were not anti-Lacanian, for they wanted to save Lacan from such religious and ready-made interpretation machines. The same needs to be done for Deleuze and Guattari.

A2: Reject War Machines

1. The War machine is like a wild beast - something a state can take hold of and use, but not something it can ever fully control. Rejecting our affirmation will only lead to the stratification and organization of our population in the way in which we cannot escape the capitalist hegemonic state. It leaves the fascist global capital untouched and makes the obliteration of others inevitable. Thats Conley. 2. Their Hallward evidence has no warrants; it talks about how we should respond to techniques of invasion and penetration and not align ourselves with the war machine. This has no relevance. 3. We solve the impact of their turn; extend DnG in 1980 which says that it is insufficient to discuss policy at the macro level. War impulses begin with desire and we are the only ones who actually question the way it resonates into the social field. 4. Even if they win their turn, well still win the impact debate. No value to life outweighs any risk of death that could come along with our plan.

A2: Schwartz
Even if life has inherent potential value, we exist in a varying degree of comforts, joys, and happiness. Their understanding of life precludes an evaluation of life upon that spectrum, ensuring suffering. Lanza 2009 (Robert Lanza is considered one of the leading scientists in the world. He is currently Chief Scientific Officer at Advanced Cell Technology, and a professor at Wake Forest University School of Medicine. "No BS Theory of Life: Pain And Holiday Blues Are Money In The Bank" http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-lanza/no-bs-theory-oflife-pain_b_399220.html)
The answer lies in your own backyard. Look at the shrubs, tangled with vines, with here and there a sumac jutting out from the maze. Look at the pines pressed against the shingles for want of more sunlight, their roots reaching under the house to the length of 20 feet. In an effort to maintain themselves, I have known willows near the foundation to break into the cellar pipes for want of water. What is a tree, after all, but a trunk with so many

roots and leaves bringing food and water to the organism? After billions of years of evolution, it was inevitable that life would acquire the ability to locomote, to hunt and see, to protect itself from competitors. Observe the ants in the woodpile. They can engage in combat just as resolutely as any human. Our guns and ICBMs are merely the jaws of a more clever ant. The goal of life is life. Every impulse and thought is a device developed towards that end. Consider our own species. We hunt and gather, do the dishes, and have sex. By day and night, we are serenaded by the notes of Beethoven modulating over the trump of the bullfrogs and the songs of the mating bird. Even poetry and art reflect our humanity and are impelled by instincts - by forms of fear and powerlessness, of pugnacity and mastery, of association and love. To many creatures there are but a few necessities of life: food, water, shelter . To a bumblebee, these are a few flowers full of nectar. Even humankind is led by these primary drives, although we have invented not only the house and clothing but fire to cook our food. What pains we take during the holidays, with our mincemeat pies and rum cakes. The poor are wont to complain that

they have no food for their families, and we devote a great deal of our economy to agriculture and housing. Of course, the effort for self-preservation is vague and varied. There is, for instance, the need for understanding and knowledge to guide our emotions, to tame the beast in our animal nature. What shameless and chaotic lives many of us would live if we were not awakened by better desires from within. Our behavior is motivated by needs and wants. Pleasure and pain consist in the
extent to which these desires are satisfied or hindered. "Pleasure" according to Spinoza, one of the greatest
philosophers of all time "is man's transition from a lesser state of perfection to a greater. Pain is man's transition from a greater state of perfection to a lesser." Here is a goal -completeness and power - that is wonderfully

attractive to us at a time of recession, and when many lack the means to feed and clothe themselves. And when we have found all power, we may not be happier for it. When we have overcome our struggles and have no ambitions and no defeats, what do we do next? Build taller and more splendid houses, weave finer clothing? Where does the power to act come from when desire has been quieted?

A2: Schwartz/VTL Subjective

Even if value to life is subjective, their framing of life leaves individuals powerless to decide their own values. Only we allow for the possibility of viewing life as an experience with both positive and negative values. We empower the individual to control their own relationship towards life, no longer strangled by the demand to survive. Ballantyne 2007 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 57-58
The blocs of experience and sensation that shape a persons development, are turned into an image of building-blocks that construct the novelists characters, and they develop with reference to rhythms and amplitudes. The novelist simplifies of course, but one of the reasons we respond to Jamess characters is that we feel as
though we know them. We have witnessed various formative experiences along with them, so to some extent we vicariously share their intuitions. It is a lesson that the film industry has brilliantly learnt, so that we can emote at the same time as the characters on the screen. Part of the skill in screen acting is being able to look blank enough for the audience to project its emotions on to the actor, and part of the editors skill is knowing how long the audience needs. The mainstream film Thelma and Louise (1991) is a story about deterritorialization, where the characters are taken

out of their common-sense routines, have various life-enhancing and traumatic experiences, which we witness with them, and they end by embracing death by driving off a cliff into the Grand Canyon. The canyon is the culmination of a series of breathtaking landscapes, including Monument Valley, where the majesty of the earth in desert conditions is evoked by the combination of images and music. After the desert has worked on the women, it seems preferable to them to choose death absolute deterritorialization to going back home to resume the old routines. There is a moment when Thelmas old life territorializes around the sound of her husbands voice on the telephone, and we feel it trying to take hold of her again; but she resists it and breaks off the conversation . The story could have been told as a descent into madness and despair, but we are taken through the characters experiences in a way that allows us to feel, with them, that suicide is the optimistic option. So the film ends with
a freeze-frame on their car, after it has driven off the cliff, but before it has started to fall. The montage of their happiest moments together, and the up-beat music, leave one with the impression that deterritorialization is the answer. In this case it is the sound of the husbands voice that is the territorializing tune, that structures Thelmas mental space into the frame of the domestic routines that used to shape her life. The clutter of terrible furniture in the house, and the husbands assumption that he has the right to issue orders to her, contrasts with her freedom and the profundity of emotions she has experienced on the road as her horizons have broadened. Establishing territory is architectures great and normal role. The monument is a song. A building usually establishes a practical domain, and often marks out the extent of a proprietors property, but aside from establishing ownership, the territory it marks out is a zone where a certain ethos applies: a work place, a drill ground, a dance hall, a quiet hotel lounge, a convivial bar, a cocooned bedroom . . . almost little hurdy-gurdy places. The architecture helps us to do the things that need to be done, and reinscribes the established order. The clutter stops one seeing beyond it. This is the architecture of Thelma before her escape. Or the architecture of Theseus, the heroic princely embodiment of the ordinary jock, who shows physical courage and ingenuity, who has spent time in the gym and has put on the muscle that will defeat a superior being. He never understands the labyrinth or the Minotaur, but he outwits them by a ruse the thread supplied by Ariadne in her cheerleader days. Establishing territories in this way is a necessary developmental phase, and it is the role that buildings normally have. Art begins not with flesh, but with the house. That is why architecture is the first of the arts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 186). Having established a house, one can take steps outside it towards

an architecture where the territories tremble, where the ethoses get mixed up, but it seems to be more like work on oneself than on buildings each of the higher men leaves his domain the structures collapse. Dionysus knows no other architecture than that of routes and trajectories. He has no territory because he is everywhere on the earth.

A2: Tyler Durden DA

1. Their Diken and Laustsen Evidence is LAUGHABLE. We attempt to break away from current political norms by introducing new methods of discourse. Thats Goddard. There is no spilling of blood in this methodology. We are not attacking the white house with torches and homemade cannons, instead we are a bottom-up revolution. 2. No link Their entire card talks about Fight Club being a Deleuzian War Machine. The war machine is a term Deleuze uses to talk about nomadic tribes challenged state structures by constantly reformulating what it meant to be in war. In the un-underlined portion of their card, it states how Fight Clubs secret is the culmination of the fetish character of the commodity. This doesnt answer any part of our affirmative; we do not recreate objects of desire. 3. Questions of only body counts allow the continuation of the worst things in the world so long as people dont die. We never stopped slavery, just exported it to sweatshops, never ended fascism just hid it under materialism, and never stopped genocide, just labeled it peace actions. The negatives impact framework justifies the worst forms of fascism by repressing our desires in the name of life as continuing to breath. The impact is no value to life. Seem 83 (Mark, Intro to Anti-Oedipus, xvii, Murray)
To be anti-oedipal is to be anti-ego as well as anti-homo, willfully attacking all reductive psychoanalytic and political analyses that remain caught within the sphere of totality and unity, in order to free the multiplicity of desire from the deadly neurotic and Oedipal yoke. For Oedipus is not a mere psychoanalytic construct, Deleuze and Guattari explain. Oedipus is

the figurehead of imperialism, "colonization pursued by other means, it is the interior colony, and we shall see that even here at home ... it is our intimate colonial education." This internalization of man by man, this "oedipalization," creates a new meaning for suffering, internal suffering, and a new tone for life: the depressive tone. Now depression does not just come about one fine day, Anti-Oedipus goes
on, nor does Oedipus appear one day in the Family and feel secure in remaining there. Depression and Oedipus are agencies of the State, agencies of paranoia, agencies of power, long before being delegated to the family. Oedipus is the figure of power as such, just as neurosis is the result of power on individuals. Oedipus is everywhere . For antioedipalists the ego, like Oedipus, is "part of those things we must dismantle through the united assault of analytical and political forces."4 Oedipus is belief injected into the unconscious, it is what gives us faith as it robs us of power, it is what teaches us to desire our own repression. Everybody has been oedipalized and neuroticized at home, at school, at work. Everybody wants to be a fascist. Deleuze and Guattari want to know how these beliefs succeed in taking hold of a body, thereby silencing the productive machines of the libido. They also want to know how the opposite situation is brought about, where a body successfully wards off the effects of power. Reversing the Freudian distinction between neurosis and psychosis that measures everything against the former, Anti-Oedipus concludes:

the neurotic is the one on whom the Oedipal imprints take, whereas the psychotic is the one incapable of being oedipalized, even and especially by psychoanalysis. The first task of the revolutionary, they add, is to learn from the psychotic how to shake off the Oedipal yoke and the effects of power, in order to initiate a radical politics of desire freed from all beliefs. Such a politics dissolves the mystifications of power through the kindling, on all levels, of anti-oedipal forces-the schizzes-flows-forces that escape coding, scramble the codes, and flee in all directions:

orphans (no daddy-mommy-me), atheists (no beliefs), and nomads (no habits, no territories). A schizoanalysis schizophrenizes in order to break the holds of power and institute research into a new collective subjectivity and a revolutionary healing of mankind. For we are sick, so sick, of our selves!

4. Dont grant them their Rasch evidence, in the un-underlined portion of the text Rasch concedes that the revolution would be bloodless.

A2: Util Good

Turn: Relying on strict utilitarian calculus justified suicide bombing, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, continued genocide, and other atrocities. Farer 2008 (Tom,former President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, is Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver; "Un-Just War Against Terrorism and the Struggle to Appropriate Human Rights": Human Rights QUarterly, Volume 30, Number 2; MUSE)
American leaders who thought of themselves as thoroughly decent people, as exemplars of the values of the West, authorized the incineration of the inhabitants of those cities, and years afterwards continued to defend the decision, defended it in the only way they could, on grounds that in doing so, they were saving American lives170 and carrying out the purposes for which the long and terrible Second World War was fought. It is a pure consequentialist argument unless one takes the position that through their
passive support for the government of Japan, all of the Japanese were in some sense guilty, a position that cannot be reconciled with the distinction between combatants and non-combatants that, as Elshtain rightly argues, is central

to just war thought. Palestinian suicide bombers and their defenders make exactly the same consequentialist argument: "We are illegally and unjustly occupied. We are penned into what amount to
open-air concentration camps run by the inmates but surrounded by guards. We tried passive resistance and were beaten down.171 We tried negotiation, but did not delay by one second the seizure of our land and the proliferation of armed colonies in our midst.172 We threw stones and were shot down and had our limbs broken.173 Thousands of us are imprisoned without due process of law;174 thousands have [End Page 401] been subjected to cruel and inhuman interrogation.175 We have no army, no air force. We cannot attack combatants, so we must drive

up the cost of occupation by attacking non-combatants." And they could cite as precedents the actions of pre-state Jewish military formations, primarily the Irgun which numbered among its leaders a future Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin. The hawkish historian, Benny Morris, writes of a dialectic of terrorism between Israelis and Arabs beginning in mid-1937: "Now for the first time, massive bombs were placed in crowded Arab centers, and dozens of people were indiscriminately murdered and maimed."176 In one exemplary case "an Irgun operative dressed as an Arab placed two large milk cans filled with TNT
and shrapnel in the Arab market in downtown Haifa. The subsequent explosion killed twenty-one and wounded fiftytwo."177 Referring to this period the political philosopher Hannah Arendt, favorably and repeatedly cited by Elshtain, wrote: "They think it is all right to murder anyone who can be murderedan innocent English Tommy or a harmless Arab in the market of Haifa."178 Defenders of human rights must in the end reject consequentialist arguments no matter who makes them. The right of the innocent to life is trumps. But those of us who in the name of human rights deny weak objects of alien domination the only means they may have to make their oppressors recalculate costs and benefits have a special obligation to help them. It is in part because their recognition of that obligation is so selective that the neo-conservatives' claim to be champions of human rights seems meretricious. In the particular case

of Palestine, they are not simply indifferent to the status quo of subordination and misery that is the Palestinians' lot; rather they are among its advocates.179 When as members of the Reagan administration they saw continued US support for Saddam Hussein even as he waged genocidal warfare against the Kurds, they did not resign. When the government of El Salvador massacred peasants they saw no evil.180 They have repeatedly proven that they are consequentialists; for them human [End Page 402] rights are not trumps, and that is a second critical difference between them and liberal advocates of human rights.

A2: Utopianism
We do not believe reading the 1AC in this one debate round will change the world. not about eradication or elimination or even final goals and processes - it's about direction. What direction should we be moving towards? This aff argues that we should always be moving towards less hierarchy, less fascism, and less categorization. No link this isnt anti-realist theory; its a philosophical connection to the world at large that allows our movement to have real implications. Colebrook 2002 (Claire, Understanding Deleuze, p.69)
This is not an anti-realist theory. Deleuze is not arguing that reality is just an image or is constructed by mind. On the contrary, reality in all its difference and complexity cannot be reduced to the extended images we have formed of it. Nor can the mind be seen as the author or origin of all images. Reality itself is an infinite and inhuman plane of imaging: when one cell responds to another, or when a plant grows toward the sun, or when a virus mutates, we can refer to each of these as imaging. One event of life has apprehended a different event, creating two points, and each point of imaging has its own world. There are not subjects who then perceive; there is an impersonal plane of perceptions from which subjects are folded. It is from the specific manner of perception, its style or inflection, that the point of view of the soul or subject is effected: the whole world is only a virtuality that currently exists only in the folds of the soul which convey it, the soul implementing inner pleats through which it endows itself with a representation of the enclosed world. We are moving from inflection to inclusion in a subject, as if from the virtual to the real, inflection defining the fold, but inclusion defining the soul or the subject, that is, what envelops the fold, its final cause and its completed act (Deleuze 1993, p. 23). Human life or thought is just one type of imaging or perception among others; the error has been to think that the world is simply there, or transcendent, only to be viewed by the human knower. If we begin from immanence then there is no privileged point such as mind, thinking or representationthat can adopt such an external point of view .

A2: Value to Life Inevitable

Despite what you may think, there are lives out there that are not worth living. Sometimes, existence is so terrifyingly horrible that no amount of good can ever make up for the bad. Benatar 06 (David, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Cape Town, Better Never to Have Been, pg 63-64)
There is a further (non-distributional) consideration that can affect an assessment of a life's quality. Arguably, once a life reaches a certain threshold of badness (considering both the amount and the distribution of its badness), no quantity of good can outweigh it, because no amount of good could be worth that badness. It is just this assessment that Donald ('Dax') Cowart made of his own life - or at least of that part of his life following a gas explosion that burnt two-thirds of his body. He refused extremely painful, life-saving treatment, but the doctors ignored his wishes and treated him nonetheless. His life was saved, he achieved considerable success, and he reattained a satisfactory quality of life. Yet, he continued to maintain that these post-burn goods were not worth the costs the enduring the treatments to which he was subjected. No matter how much good followed his recovery, this could not outweigh, at least in his own assessment, the bad of the burns and treatment that he experienced. The point may be expressed more generally. Compare two lives - those of X and Y - and consider, for simplicity's sake, only the amount of good and bad (and not also the distributional considerations). X's life has (relatively) modest quantities of good and bad - perhaps fifteen kilo-units of positive value and five kilo-units of negative value. Y's life, by contrast, has unbearable quantities of bad (say, fifty kilo-units of negative value). Y's life also has much more good (seventy kilo-units of positive value) than does X's. Nevertheless, X's life might reasonably be judged less bad, even if Y's has greater net value, judged in strictly quantitative terms - ten kilo-units
versus twenty kilo-units of positive value. This shows further why the assignment of values in Figure 2.4 (in the previous chapter) must, as I argued there, be wrong.

A2: Zizek Indicts

1. Turn: Zizek is a novice the alternatives provided by Deleuze and Guattari use schizophrenia as a political and revolutionary process carefully separating the term from the clinical version Zizek believes they are talking about. This doesnt mean we all get voices in our head, it means we accept the rhizomatic structure and abandon the arborescent. Holland 1999 (Eugene, Associate Professor of French and Comparative Literature at the Ohio State University; Deleuze and Guatarris Anti-Oedipus and introduction to Schitzoanalysis) Pg 100 This does not mean, Deleuze and Guattari are quick to point out, that they consider schizophrenics to be revolutionaries: they do not romantically idealize schizophrenia and madness as being revolutionary in themselves. For schizoanalysis carefully distinguishes between the schizophrenic as a clinical entity and schizophrenia as process: There is a whole world of difference between the schizo and the revolutionary: the difference between the one who escapes, and the one who knows how to make what he is escaping escape.... The schizo is not the revolutionary, but the schizophrenic process in terms of which the schizo [as clinical entity] is merely the interruption, or the continuation in the void is the potential for revolution.21 2. Their evidence isnt credible its from an interview, has exactly zero warrants, and doesnt provide a coherent link.

***Kritiks***

2AC K Frontline
1. Perm Do Both. Our affirmation is a concept to be played with and combined with other concepts. There is no such thing as a mutually exclusive advocacy against our politics of affirmation. The very function of our affirmative is to learn from and play with the content and ethos of their alternative, to combine the function and form of their political strategy with our own, creating something entirely new. Thats Massumi. Double Bind: A. Either the criticism doesnt solve our arguments made above about decoding identity, ideology, structures of fascism because it doesnt decode the boundaries of reality in the ways that the United States federal government ratifies they still approach the same imperial grammar that their evidence indicts. Or B. The permutation solves best. 2. Perm do the plan then alt: We need a change in the way that desire is invested; in the way collectives are formed, before any change can occur. Even if the 1NC may seem revolutionary from the perspective of class and community, it is not revolutionary from the lens of desire. Post 1NC desire and mindsets do not change, at best they are only papered over with a new name and a new regime. A failure to focus on desire of the individual, and the repressions of those desires, makes the 1NC social change impossible and renders their roadmap for change not only futile but also counterproductive. Deleuze and Guattari 1972, Anti-Oedipus, 347-8
Not only can the libidinal investment of the social field interfere with the investment of interest, and constrain the most disadvantaged, the most exploited, to seek their ends in an oppressive machine, but what is reactionary or revolutionary in the preconscious investment of interest does not necessarily coincide with what is reactionary or revolutionary in the unconscious libidinal investment. A revolutionary preconscious investment bears upon new aims, new social syntheses, a new power. But it could be that a part at least of the unconscious libido continues to invest the former body, the old form of power, its codes, and its flows. It is all the easier, and the contradiction is all the better masked, as a state of forces does not prevail over the former state without preserving or reviving the old full body as a residual and subordinated territoriality (witness how the capitalist machine revives the despotic Urstaat, or how the socialist machine preserves a State and market monopoly capitalism). But there is something more serious: even when the libido embraces the new body-the new force that corresponds to the effectively revolutionary goals and syntheses from the viewpoint of the preconscious-it is not certain that the unconscious libidinal investment is itself revolutionary. For the same breaks do not pass at the level of the unconscious desires and the preconscious interests. The preconscious revolutionary break is sufficiently well defined by the promotion of a socius as a full body carrying new aims, as a form of power or a formation of sovereignty that subordinates desiring-production under new conditions. But

even though the unconscious libido is charged with investing this socius, its investment is not necessarily revolutionary in the same sense as the preconscious investment. In fact, the unconscious revolutionary break implies for its part the body without organs as the limit of the socius that desiring-production subordinates in its turn, under the condition of an overthrown power, an overthrown subordination. The preconscious revolution refers to a new regime of social production that creates, distributes, and satisfies new aims and interests. But the unconscious revolution does not merely refer to the socius that conditions this change as a form of power: it refers within this socius to the regime of desiring-production as an overthrown power on the body without organs , It is not the same state of flows and schizzes: in one case the break is between two forms of socius, the second of which is
measured according to its capacity to introduce the flows of desire into a new code or a new axiomatic of interest; in the other case the break is within the socius itself, in that it has the capacity for causing the flows of desire to

circulate following their positive lines of escape, and for breaking them again following breaks of productive breaks, The most general principle of schizoanalysis is that desire is always constitutive of a social field. In any case desire belongs to the infrastructure, not to ideology: desire is in production as social production, just as production is in desire as desiring-production. But these forms
can be understood in two ways, depending on whether desire is enslaved to a structured molar aggregate that it constitutes under a given form of power and gregariousness, or whether it subjugates the large aggregate to the functional multiplicities that it itself forms on the molecular scale (it is no more a case of persons or individuals in this instance than in the other). If

the preconscious revolutionary break appears at the first level, and is defined by the characteristics of a new aggregate, the unconscious or libidinal break belongs to the second level and is defined by the driving role of desiring-production and the position of its multiplicities. It is understandable, therefore, that a group can be revolutionary from the standpoint of class interest and its preconscious investments, but not be so-and even remain fascist and police-like-from the standpoint of its libidinal investments, Truly revolutionary preconscious interests do not necessarily imply unconscious investments of the same nature; an apparatus of interest never takes the place of a machine of desire.

The perm is the only true function of the strata attempts to fully break risk obliteration Message 2005 (Kylie, The Deleuze Dictionary p. 33)
In reference to the first point, Deleuze and Guatari explain that although the BwO is a process that is directed toward a course of continual becoming, it cannot break away entirely from the system it desires to escape from. While it seeks a mode of articulation that is free from the binding tropes of subjectification and signification, it must play a delicate game of maintaining some reference to these systems of stratification, or else risk obliteration or reterritorialisation back into these systems. In other words, such subversion is a never completed process. Instead, it is continuous and oriented only toward its process or movement rather than any teleological point of completion. Consistent with this, and in order to be affective (or to have affect) it must exist -more or lesswithin the system it aims to subvert.

We have to keep small parts of the system in place in order to prevent catastrophe the suicidal attempt to escape the strata in all forms leads only to its bearing down heavier than ever. Instead we should make a playful and strategic resistance as our paradigm. Deleuze and Guattari 1987 (A Thousand Plateaus pp.160-161)
You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep small supplies of significance and subjectification, if only to turn them against their own systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, persons, even situations, force you to; and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality . Mimic the strata. You don't reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying .
That is why we encountered the paradox of those emptied and dreary bodies at the very beginning: they had emptied themselves of their organs instead of looking for the point at which they could patiently and momentarily dismantle the organization of the organs we call the organism. There are, in fact, several ways of botching the BwO: either

one fails to produce it, or one produces it more or less, but nothing is produced on it, intensities do not pass or are blocked. This is because the BwO is always swinging between the surfaces that stratify it and the plane that sets it free. If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe. Staying stratified-- organized, signified, subjected-- is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata is demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them down on us heavier then ever. This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorializations, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times .

1AR EXT: 2AC K Frontline

Perm do both. Our Massumi evidence goes conceded. Our affirmative is about combining new ideas and concepts. Theres no such thing as mutual exclusivity against our new politics. We need to change the way desire is invested before we can do anything. No matter how amazing the alternative is its rendered useless unless we change desire first. A failure to address this and attempting the alt is counterproductive. Thats Deleuze and Guatarri 72.

1AR EXT: Perm

The negatives conception of the alternative and its need to function alone ensures its failureDeleuze and Guattari opposed total opposition of the state and the nomadtreating the nomad as a complete outsider is narcissistic and impossible. Mann, 95 (Professor of English at Pomona, Paul, Stupid Undergrounds, PostModern Culture 5:3, Project MUSE)
Intellectual economics guarantees that even the most powerful and challenging work cannot protect itself from the order of fashion. Becoming-fashion, becoming-commodity, becoming-ruin. Such instant, indeed retroactive ruins, are the virtual landscape of the stupid underground. The exits and lines of flight pursued by Deleuze and Guattari are being shut down and rerouted by the very people who would take them most seriously. By now, any given work from the stupid underground's critical apparatus is liable to be tricked out with
smooth spaces, war-machines, n - 1s, planes of consistency, plateaus and deterritorializations, strewn about like tattoos on the stupid body without organs. The nomad is already succumbing to the rousseauism and orientalism that were always invested in his figure; whatever Deleuze and Guattari intended for him, he is reduced to being a romantic outlaw, to a position opposite the State, in the sort of dialectical operation Deleuze most despised. And the rhizome is becoming just another stupid subterranean figure. It is perhaps true that Deleuze and Guattari did not adequately protect their thought from this dialectical reconfiguration (one is reminded of Breton's indictment against Rimbaud for not having prevented, in advance, Claudel's recuperation of him as a proper Catholic), but no

vigilance would have sufficed in any case. The work of Deleuze and Guattari is evidence that, in real time, virtual models and maps close off the very exits they indicate. The problem is in part that rhizomes, lines of flight, smooth spaces, BwOs, etc., are at one and the same time theoretical-political devices of the highest critical order and merely fantasmatic, delirious, narcissistic models for writing, and thus perhaps an instance of the all-too-proper blurring of the distinction between criticism and fantasy. In
Deleuze-speak, the stupid underground would be mapped not as a margin surrounding a fixed point, not as a fixed site determined strictly by its relation or opposition to some more or less hegemonic formation, but as an intensive, n-dimensional intersection of rhizomatic plateaus. Nomadology and rhizomatics conceive such a "space" (if one only had the proverbial nickel for every time that word is used as a critical metaphor, without the slightest reflection on what might be involved in rendering the conceptual in spatial terms) as a liquid, colloidal suspension, often retrievable by one or another technometaphorical zoning (e.g., "cyberspace"). What is at stake, however, is not only the topological verisimilitude of the model but the fantastic possibility of nonlinear passage, of multiple simultaneous accesses and exits, of infinite fractal lines occupying finite social space. In the strictest sense, stupid philosophy. Nomad thought is prosthetic, the

experience of virtual exhilaration in modalities already mapped and dominated by nomad, rhizomatic capital (the political philosophy of the stupid underground: capital is more radical than any of its critiques, but one can always pretend otherwise). It is this very fantasy, this very narcissistic wish to see oneself projected past the frontier into new spaces, that abandons one to this economy, that seals these spaces within an order of critical fantasy that has long since been overdeveloped, entirely reterritorialized in advance. To pursue nomadology or rhizomatics as such is already to have lost the game. Nothing is more crucial to philosophy than escaping the dialectic and no project is more hopeless; the stupid-critical underground is the curved space in which this opposition turns back on itself.

A2: Lacan
What are you critiquing? Their evidence at best draws a distinction between clinical approaches. Their authors ignore the context that Deleuze and Guattari were writing under psychoanalysis was concerned with the power of the signifier as a theoretical tool and was largely unconcerned with political formations. Deleuze and Guattari paved the way for the more revolutionary lens of psychoanalysis their alternative affirms their alternative takes the patient out for a walk and provides legs to their models. We can fundamentally agree with this type of affirmation. Our politics is revolutionary from the perspective of the unconscious because it learns from clinical settings to create change and engage in the world around us. Their strategy is one largely of interpretation of seeing what there is and then commenting upon it. This is a futile strategy which prevents change. Colebrook 2008 (Claire, U of Edinburgh "Review: Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?" http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12605)
Deleuze and Guattari do not, Lambert insists, want us to read, interpret, diagnose or even see as symptomatic, the unconscious; and so the error of all errors would be to see politics as encapsulated in a sexual scene. If we have turned the sexual relation into the scene whereby my being is fulfilled
through some other body that must actualise my fantasies, then the revolutionary plane of the virtual has been reduced to some private scene, and we produce the unconscious as nothing more than a relation among bodies. What we need to

do then is not interpret the unconscious in Deleuzian rather than Lacanian terms, but see the ways in which institutions (from literature departments to Oprah Winfrey and heterosexual pornography) present desire as fantasy instead of seeing the positive power of desire that produced the social and political scene (with a reduced and institutionalised sexuality) in the first place. So language is important, and the reading of literary language especially so, because it is through order words and the incorporeal transformations that crystallise events -- such as 'September 11' -- that bodies are organised in relation and, most importantly, an unconscious is produced. This is Lambert's critical bet: we failed to read Lacan because instead of seeing the analytic scene as one in which mastery was produced through readings that claimed to 'interpret' an unconscious, we turned the analytic scene into an industry. iek now 'reads' any number of texts, events and phenomena as symptoms of an unconscious topology that can be readily unveiled by a hermeneutic master. Deleuze and Guattari, Lambert insists, were not anti-Lacanian, for they wanted to save Lacan from such religious and ready-made interpretation machines. The same needs to be done for Deleuze
and Guattari.

Psychoanalysis cannot achieve anything their strategy is limited to reframing and reinterpreting events. Hoenisch 06 (Steve, PhD, The Myth of Psychoanalysis: Wittgenstein Contra Freud, http://www.criticism.com/md/tech.html)
My central thesis is that if, as Wittgenstein says, Freudian psychoanalysis is based in myth, its application to actual psychological problems does not, indeed cannot, resolve them. Instead, all it can do is clarify them or present them in a different light. Implicit in my argument is that this is how Wittgenstein
thought of the results of psychoanalysis, much like he thought of the application of his philosophical technique to philosophical problems, especially those of metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. As such, Wittgenstein is also subverting a larger myth: that the insights gained in psychoanalysis lead to the scientific resolution of psychological problems. One of Wittgenstein's remarks about psychoanalysis, made in 1938, explicitly confirms that he saw the

results of psychoanalysis not as a resolution of psychological problems, but as merely a way of changing the way they are seen, thereby dissolving them through clarification: "In a way, having oneself psychoanalyzed is like eating from the tree of knowledge. Knowledge acquired sets us (new) ethical problems; but contributes nothing to their solution ."12 Although Bouveresse cites this
passage, he, I believe, misses the significance of it. As Bouveresse invokes Brian McGuinness's view that an essential feature of Wittgenstein's attitude in life, philosophy, ethics, and aesthetics was "an extreme restraint and reserve that were utterly opposed to all forms of exhibitionism and explain his deliberate renunciation of theory in philosophy,"13 he uses the quotation in an attempt to sum up Wittgenstein's attitude (a renunciation of theory) that stretched toward psychoanalysis. Yet, I believe, the context in which Bouveresse uses the remark leads him to

belittle its import and neglect its substance: that psychoanalysis does not and cannot resolve problems but only alters the way they are seen, perhaps clarifying them in the process. The substance of the remark is more intimately connected to Wittgenstein's position on the role of philosophy in relation to age-old metaphysical problems than to his attitude toward psychoanalysis: Philosophy, Wittgenstein believed, can alter the way metaphysical problems are seen by putting them in sharper relief, but cannot solve them. For one thing, the metaphysical problems may be unsolvable. For another, they may not be problems at all, but only appear, through the haze of language, as problems.

The Lacanian alternative results in conservatism it merely changes our relation to the world while the surrounding conditions remain the same. Robinson 2005 (Andrew, PhD in political theory at the University of Nottingham, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack, Johns Hopkins University Press)
It is in this pragmatism that the ambiguity of Lacanian political theory resides , for, while on a theoretical level it is based on an almost sectarian "radicalism", denouncing everything that exists for its complicity in illusions and guilt for the present, its "alternative" is little different from what it condemns (the assumption apparently being that the "symbolic" change in the psychological coordinates of attachments in
reality is directly effective, a claim assumed wrongly to follow from the claim that social reality is constructed discursively). Just like in the process of psychoanalytic cure, nothing actually changes on

the level of specific characteristics. The only change is in how one relates to the characteristics, a process iek terms 'dotting the "i's"' in reality, recognizing and thereby installing necessity32. All that changes, in other words, is the interpretation: as long as they are reconceived as expressions of constitutive lack, the old politics are acceptable. Thus, iek claims that de Gaulle's "Act" succeeded by allowing him 'effectively to realize the necessary pragmatic measures' which others pursued unsuccessfully33. More recent examples of iek's pragmatism include that his alternative to the U.S. war in Afghanistan is only that 'the punishment of those responsible' should be done in a spirit of 'sad duty', not 'exhilarating retaliation'34, and his "solution" to the Palestine-Israel crisis, which is NATO control of the occupied territories35. If this is the case for iek, the ultra-"radical" "Marxist-Leninist" Lacanian, it is so much the more so for his more moderate adversaries. Jason Glynos, for instance, offers an uncompromizing critique of the construction of guilt and innocence in
anti-"crime" rhetoric, demanding that demonization of deviants be abandoned, only to insist as an afterthought that, 'of course, this... does not mean that their offences should go unpunished' 36. Lacanian theory tends, therefore, to

produce an "anything goes" attitude to state action: because everything else is contingent, nothing is to limit the practical consideration of tactics by dominant elites.

EXT: Lack
The constitutive lack is self referential it is only justified because it is assumed and any arguments to the contrary are disregarded for not accepting it. Robinson 2005 (Andrew, PhD in political theory at the University of Nottingham, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack, Johns Hopkins University Press)
More precisely, I would maintain that "constitutive lack" is an instance of a Barthesian myth . all, the function of myth to do exactly what this concept does: to assert the empty facticity

It is, after of a particular ideological schema while rejecting any need to argue for its assumptions. 'Myth does not deny things; on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it is a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact'37. This is precisely the status of "constitutive lack": a supposed fact which is supposed to operate above and beyond explanation, on an ontological level instantly accessible to those with the courage to accept it. Myths operate to construct euphoric enjoyment for those who use them, but their operation is in conflict with the social context with which they interact. This is because their operation is connotative: they are "received" rather than "read"38, and open only to a "readerly" and not a "writerly" interpretation. A myth is a second-order signification attached to an already-constructed denotative sign, and the ideological message projected into this sign is constructed outside the context of the signified . A myth is therefore, in Alfred Korzybski's sense,
intensional: its meaning derives from a prior linguistic schema, not from interaction with the world in its complexity39. Furthermore, myths have a repressive social function, carrying in Barthes's words an 'order not to think'40. They are necessarily projected onto or imposed on actual people and events,

under the cover of this order. The "triumph of literature" in the Dominici trial41 consists precisely in this projection of an externally-constructed mythical schema as a way of avoiding engagement with something one does not understand. Lacanian theory, like Barthesian myths, involves a prior idea of a structural matrix which is not open to change in the light of the instances to which it is applied. iek's writes of a 'pre-ontological dimension which precedes and eludes the construction of reality'42, while Laclau suggests there is a formal structure of any chain of equivalences which necessitates the logic of hegemony43. Specific analyses are referred back to this underlying structure as its necessary expressions, without apparently being able to alter it ; for instance, 'those who triggered the process
of democratization in eastern Europe... are not those who today enjoy its fruits, not because of a simple usurpation... but because of a deeper structural logic'44. In most instances, the mythical operation of the idea of "constitutive

lack" is implicit, revealed only by a rhetoric of denunciation. For instance, Mouffe accuses liberalism of an 'incapacity... to grasp... the irreducible character of antagonism '45, while iek claims that a 'dimension' is 'lost' in Butler's work because of her failure to conceive of "trouble" as constitutive of "gender"46. This language of "denial" which is invoked to silence critics is a clear example of Barthes's "order not to think": one is not to think about the idea of "constitutive lack", one is simply to "accept" it, under pain of invalidation. If someone else disagrees, s/he can simply be told that there is something crucial missing from her/his theory. Indeed, critics are as likely
to be accused of being "dangerous" as to be accused of being wrong.

A2: Identity Politics

4. Perm: We can create a permutation of their ideology and our methodology. This solves the criticism 100% - we are a material movement that is searching more with what we can do by our own interpersonal actions. We need to take the active stance and start the revolution via a line of flight. This proves their criticism is a link of omission because it is predicated off the assumption our thought experiment cedes the political. 5. The body is a sight for the production of an unfettered being their understanding of identity rivets being and prevents its creative journey through the infinite. We should not seek to understand identity; we should seek to reach the point where identity itself is meaningless. Ballantyne 2007 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 78-79)
Landscape reappears with another role in imaging the schizoanalytic subject, if a subject remains. Just as Lenz found himself in machinic engagement with his surroundings, so that there was no sense of separateness between his self and the snowflakes, stars and mountain peaks, so Deleuze and Guattari describe themselves as deserts, inhabited by concepts that wander across them and move on their way, so they are being continually reconstituted and remade. We are deserts, said Deleuze but populated by tribes, flora and fauna. We pass our time in ordering these tribes,

arranging them in other ways, getting rid of some and encouraging others to prosper. And all these clans, all these crowds, do not undermine the desert, which is our very ascesis; on the contrary they inhabit it, they pass through it, over it. In Guattari there has always been a sort of wild rodeo, in part directed against himself. The desert, experimentation on oneself, is our only identity, our single chance for all the combinations which inhabit us. (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 11) The individual here is explicitly seen as multiple and political, and the process of subjectification is presented as dynamic and continuing, never as something that has reached or could reach a satisfactory conclusion . For Deleuze and Guattari living is always a process of becoming, never of contemplating an achieved being. Deleuze describes Guattari as a man of the group, of bands or tribes, and yet he is a man alone, a desert populated
by all these groups and all his friends, all his becomings (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 16). There is something of the fluidity of identity of the man of the crowd in Edgar Allen Poes story, where the man participates in the identities of the various tribes and crowds that swarm through the city (Ballantyne, 2005, 2049). He takes to an extreme, and embodies a principle in a way that only a fictional character can: the principle that we are not formed in isolation, but socially, and

we are constituted by way of ideas and practices that do not originate in us but which pass through us and inhabit us and influence the things we do, occasionally perhaps consciously, but for the most part without our having any particular awareness of it happening . So the individual is seen as not so much a political entity as a politics (a micropolitics) populated and engaged, harmonious or conflicted. The image is always of lines and intensities, intersecting planes and multiple colours, atmospheres, flows never hard dry objects, bounded forms or clear contours. And the
face, this white screen/black hole assemblage, is a means of engaging with others, a way of putting into circulation certain sorts of signification that our little parliament, our pandaemonium, feels will help it on its way.

6. Emphasis on localized identity feeds into state based forms of oppression by masking the enemy and precluding global solutions to global exploitation. Hardt & Negri, 2000 (*Michael, Professor of Literature and Italian, Duke University, Ph.D in Comparative Literature,
University of Washington, and *Antonio, Former professor in State Theory, Padua University Empire P44-45) We maintain, however, that its proponents, is

today this localist position, although we admire and respect the spirit of some of both false and damaging. It is false first of all because the problem is

poorly posed. In many characterizations the problem rests on a false dichotomy between the global and the local, assuming that the global entails homogenization and undifferentiated identity whereas the local preserves heterogeneity and difference. Often implicit in such arguments is the assumption that the differences of the local are in some sense natural, or at least that their origin remains beyond question. Local differences preexist the present scene and must be defended or protected against the intrusion of globalization. It should come as no surprise, given such assumptions, that many defenses of the local adopt the terminology of traditional ecology or even identify this local political project with the defense of nature and biodiversity. This view can easily devolve into a kind of primordialism that fixes and romanticizes social relations and identities. What needs to be addressed, instead, is precisely the production of locality, that is, the social machines that create and recreate the identities and differences that are understood as the local.4 The differences of locality are neither preexisting nor natural but rather effects of a regime of production. Globality similarly should not be understood in terms of
cultural, political, or economic homogenization. Globalization, like localization, should be understood instead as a regime of the production of identity and difference, or really of homogenization and heterogenization. The better framework, then, to designate the distinction between the global and the local might refer to different networks of flows and obstacles in which the local moment or perspective gives priority to the reterritorializing barriers or boundaries and the global moment

It is false, in any case, to claim that we can (re)establish local identities that are in some sense outside and protected against the global flows of capital and Empire. This Leftist strategy of resistance to globalization and defense of locality is also damaging because in many cases what appear as local identities are not autonomous or self-determining but actually feed into and support the development of the capitalist imperial machine. The globalization or deterritorialization operated by the imperial machine is not in fact opposed to localization or reterritorialization, but rather sets in play mobile and modulating circuits of differentiation and identification. The strategy of local resistance misidentifies and thus masks the enemy. We are by no means opposed to the globalization of relationships as suchin fact, as we said, the strongest forces of Leftist internationalism have effectively led this process. The enemy, rather, is a specific regime of global relations that we call Empire. More important, this strategy of defending the local is damaging because it obscures and even negates the real alternatives and the potentials for liberation that exist within Empire. We should be done once and for all with the search for an outside, a standpoint that imagines a purity for our politics. It is better both theoretically and practically to enter the terrain of Empire and confront its homogenizing and heterogenizing flows in all their complexity, grounding our analysis in the power of the global multitude.
privileges the mobility of deterritorializing flows.

7. The worst perversions of capitalism rely on the production of difference to sell units the affirmation of a specific minority identity is not liberating, it just creates a new target market. We are already responsible for the creation and maintenance of global fascist capitalism only challenging the formulations of desire can effectively redirect the forces of globalization. Zalloua, 2008 (Zahi,Assistant Professor of French at Whitman College , "The Future of an Ethics of Difference After Hardt and Negris Empire" MUSE)

The merits of Empire lie in its desire to reconfigure the center/periphery model of analysis, and, more importantly, to complicate the identification by postcolonial theorists of globalization with neo-imperialism (or the U.S.) by examining more closely how repressive power currently functions. At the heart of Hardt and Negris critique is their contention that the nation-state is an outdated notion, belonging
to a prior era of modern, imperialist sovereignty that has been superseded by the new, imperial sovereignty of an Empire structured by the flow of capital. Any

critique of globalization based on the assumption that nation-states are the primary locus of power is misguided: We insist on asserting that the construction of Empire is a step forward in order to do away with any nostalgia for the power structures that preceded it and refuse any political strategy that involves returning to that old arrangement, such as trying to resurrect the nation-state to protect against global capital (43). No one is immune from the logic of global capital. Inside/outside and local/global dichotomies are, strictly speaking, illusory, since we all feed into and support the development of the capitalist imperial machine (45). It is therefore not [End Page 128] only false, but counterproductive and damaging, to claim that we can (re)establish local identities that are in some sense outside and protected against the global flows of capital and Empire, that is, to think difference in terms of a particular locale resisting a general global trend (45). As a corrective to
this misguided vision of the nation or the locals capacity for resistance, Hardt and Negri argue for a reconceptualization of globalization as a regime of the production of identity and difference, or really of homogenization and heterogenization (45). This understanding of globalization relies more specifically on Foucaults notion of biopower, which manifests itself through an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations (1978, 140). Contrary to prior models of power, Foucaults conception underscores powers productive or positive nature. As he writes in Discipline and Punish, We

must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it excludes, it represses, it censors, it abstracts, it masks, it conceals. In fact, power produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth (194). Under what they call the society of control (23), a formulation they borrow from Deleuze, Hardt and Negri uphold powers productive principle ([Empire] produce[s] not only commodities but also subjectivities [32]), and extend the scope of Foucaults analysis of the normalizing effects of power beyond disciplinary institutions (such as the prison and the asylum). In the society of control, along with its unprecedented flexible and fluctuating networks, the normalizing apparatuses of disciplinarity intensify, becoming more general, more democratic, ever more immanent to the social field, distributed through the brains and bodies of the citizens (23). Given the nature and dominance of global power, described again in Deleuzian terms as an imperial machine, Hardt and Negri deny the possibility of transcendence, that is, of adopting a critical position from nowhere, a subject position uncontaminated by ideology; such an external standpoint no longer exists (34). A critique of Empire must remain immanent and
resist the temptation of transcendence. It is this failure to recognize that modern sovereignty has given way to Empire that typically gives social critics the transcendental urge to posit a form of discourse that could oppose the informational colonization of being (34), the assimilative, instrumental rationality prevalent in American capitalism (Jrgen Habermas theory of communication would be one example).

The appeal to difference common to postmodernist and postcolonial circles seems to suffer from precisely such a sense of transcendence, a desire to embrace differencethe margin, the excluded otheren-soi, outside of Western hegemony. One of the refrains of Empire is the need to know our true enemy
[End Page 129] (137). With the end of colonialism and the disappearing powers of the nation-state, the new enemy is Empire, an enemy which

The passage to Empire and its processes of globalization offer new possibilities to the forces of liberation . . . . Our political task . . . is not simply to resist these processes but to reorganize them and redirect them toward new ends. The creative
nevertheless holds the promise of a better, more democratic future: forces of the multitude that sustain Empire are also capable of autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political organization of global flows and exchanges. (xv) Globalization . . . is really a condition for the liberation of the multitude. (52) In other words, globalization (re-invent) on the

is not an obstacle to overcome but a system to struggle with and transform plane of immanence. Rather than arguing for a politics of difference, for the truth of the others difference, postmodernist and postcolonial theorists would do better to recognize that they are playing into the hands of their enemies and perpetuating Empire, which gladly celebrates difference: This new enemy not only is resistant to the old weapons but actually thrives on them, and
thus joins its would-be antagonists in applying them to the fullest. Long live difference! Down with essentialist binaries! (138). Hybridity, then, the once cherished strategy for combating identitarian boundaries and antagonisms, has become the new norm of globalization; as a result, hybridity as a concept has lost its critical edge. It can no longer serve as an effective means of resistance to the homogenizing force of Empire, since it is neutralized and absorbed by the very system it purports to contest.

8. Identity is irrelevant in the world of capitalism as the telos of the market pushes us towards cultural homogenization and mediations through capital. We must first engage our desire for this force. Ballantyne 2007 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 85)

The ideas need a milieu, made up of other ideas and practices, and a given milieu will allow some ideas to flourish while others do not stand a chance . The particular milieu for ideas that Guattari sees threatening diversity is that of Integrated World Capitalism, which we would now normally call globalization. It has a tendency to make us all want the same things, wherever we are in the world , and whatever
our cultural differences would have been in the past. This homogenizing of the subject by the mass media presents the same sort of danger as threats to biodiversity. We

are educated all to swoon at the sight of the same film stars, to order the same carbonated drinks and wear the same perfumes. At one level it is pleasurable and innocuous, and too anodyne to look as if it could possibly do any harm. On the other hand whole species of ideas and cultures of behaviour are eliminated from the planet, never to be seen again, driven out for want of attention because we were thinking about football scores, or celebrity gossip.

A2: Cap Bad

Cap bad is a bad argument against our aff. Deleuze and Guattari claim that they never stop to be Marxists only with a different scope. They were writing Anti-Oedipus at an interesting time for French academia in the post 68 environment. The revolution of 1968 was one of the most horrible things for the communist party in France while a huge amount of people just stopped trying to work and revolutionized against the state. It got so bad that de Gaulle had to send the military to France to suppress the people. And during this time the communist party was saying no, the conditions arent right GO BACK TO WORK. The question is what went wrong? There are two major things that went wrong party identification and a bad methodology. 3. First the focus on a party identification inherently negated formless desire that our Goddard 2k6 card says is necessary to create revolution. The communist party tried to relegate and determine when revolution was possible; killing the so-called movement before it even began. 4. Second, there is no socialist revolution. Their uniqueness describes a non-event no one is revolting in the streets, even Americans hit hard by the recession are just complaining and going out to eat less. Their alternative cant solve because Marx ignores that there are more things to life then human sociology. That there is desirein fact everything is desire. We desire to be little reformists striving for change. We desire for the little fascist tendencies like laughing at West Texas teams in the K debate or suppressing other schools. Desire cannot be controlled or transformed to a static point; it just changes on its own. The reason we had gulags was because there was a revolution in Russia that changed the economy to communism but didnt change the way people desired. These communist revolutions just changed the skin. In the same way, the negative is not addressing desire. 5. We control uniqueness on the question of revolution looking to the future inherently fails. May 68 was stopped by the communists because they believed conditions could be better later. 2 impacts to this argument: a) No alt solvency to the critique their actions are inevitably co-opted or forgotten as their ivory tower intellectualism calls for us to do nothing or wait for the next chance to strike. Prefer our advocacy of joining the becoming revolutionary of the people in order to undermine the state and fascizing apparatus NOW. b) You affirm our politics no matter what: even if we are doomed to failure eventually, its better to rearticulate our positions towards fascist capitalism and create whatever small change we can in the microcosm of ourselves.

6. We can create a permutation of their ideology and our methodology by creating both a politics of desire and a politics of the economy. This solves the criticism - we are a material movement that is searching more with what we can do by our own interpersonal actions. We need to take the active stance and start the revolution via an affirmation of the politics of nomadism. This proves their criticism is a link of omission because it is predicated off the assumption our thought experiment cedes the political. 7. Our affirmation is necessary to challenge the changing face of capitalism. High theory and the Marxist fold are incapable of challenging capitalism because they ignore the immanent nature of capitalism. Our act of affirming schizophrenic politics is a localized resistance to capitalism mirroring and replicating this political strategy can effectively undermine capitalism and create free space for revolutionary change. Zalloua, 2008 (Zahi,Assistant Professor of French at Whitman College , "The Future of an Ethics of Difference After Hardt and Negris Empire" MUSE)
What is not Nietzschean about this vision, however, is its alleged democratic appeal. Hardt and Negris injunction to transform and appropriate the truth of hybridity, difference, and migration at the level of production follows a critique of the elitism of postcolonial theorists, clearly presenting itself as a democratic alternative: In our present imperial world, the liberatory potential of postmodernist and postcolonial discourses . . . only resonates with the situation of an elite population that enjoys certain rights, a certain level of wealth, and a certain position in the global hierarchy (156). It is the multitude who will be most receptive to this revolutionary call. But who is the multitude? The multitude is the new agent of change and resistance, the new proletariat of globalization (402). Unlike that of its predecessors, the labor of the multitude is not confined to the factory; rather, their labor is said to be immaterial or affective, reflecting the shift from industrial to post-industrial capitalism. It is the type of labor that immediately involves social interaction and cooperation, a type of labor, for example, common in service industries: Since the production of services results in no material and durable good, we define the labor

involved in this production as immaterial laborthat is, labor that produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge, or communication (294, 290). Revising the meaning of
the subject of labor (and its potential for revolt), Hardt and Negri define the proletariat of Empire to include all those whose labor is directly or indirectly exploited by and subjected to capitalist norms of production and reproduction (52). What

purportedly brings the multitude together, constituting them as a collective entity, is their will to contest: [End Page 131] One element we can put our finger on at the most basic and elementary level is the will to be against. In general, the will to be against does not seem to require much explanation. Disobedience to authority is one of the most natural and healthy acts. To us it seems completely obvious that those who are exploited will resist andgiven the necessary conditionsrebel. (210) This rebellion also takes a new form appropriate to its new enemy: If there is no longer a place that can be recognized as outside, we must be against in every place . . . . Whereas in the disciplinary era sabotage was the fundamental notion of resistance, in the era of imperial control it may be desertion . Whereas
being-against in modernity often meant a direct and/ or dialectical opposition of forces, in postmodernity being-against might well be most effective in an oblique or diagonal stance. Battles

against the Empire might be won through subtraction and defection. This desertion does not have a place; it is the evacuation of the places of power. (21112) Migration is, of course, a value long advocated by postcolonial theorists. Postcolonial literary studies treats migration generally in terms of its epiphanies: new sight, new knowledge, a new understanding of the relativity of things. All of which, of course, must be true in many respects, writes Andrew Smith (257).6 However, on Hardt and Negris account, the
experience of displacement is no longer simply the privilege of the cosmopolitan elite (intellectual

or writer), who recognizes no necessary or eternal belongingness (Hall 1998, 10; qtd. in Bhabha 1994, 177); nomadic migrationconceived here both as literal displacement and as figurative parallaxis potentially available to all, to any member of the multitude .

1AR EXT: Cap Bad

Extend the Goddard in 2006 evidence. Our affirmative speaks in a critical language of desire. Our politics process escapes from established political identities. Cap bad is a bad choice against our affirmative. Deleuze and Guatarri are Marxists in a different lens. The 68 revolution failed because they waited too long, what we need to do is take immediate action by redirecting desire to a revolution. Focusing on a party negates desire which is imperative for a revolution, thats Goddard 2006. Their uniqueness describes a non event, there is no revolution. The negative isnt addressing desire. We control uniqueness, two implications: 1. No alt solvency they call for waiting, prefer our undermining of the state that happens NOW 2. You affirm politics no matter what if we all die anyway we might as well create whatever small change we can Extend Zalluoa in 2008. Our move toward a schizophrenic politics is key to taking down capitalism. Echoing this strategy can effectively undermine capitalism.

A2: Marxism
The case is a prerequisite to the alternative failure to engage in the molecular revolution of desire ensures the resurgence of capitalism. Revolution solely at the state level is insufficient to challenge a system the masses brought upon themselves. Capitalism is not a space monster invading a once pure land it is an economic system corrupted by individuals and desired by most. Before we can alter that system, we must alter the individuals who resonate together to inform it. Lambert 2006 (Greg, "Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?")
Is it really the displacement of disguising of a true image of action, or rather is it the apprehension of the act that belongs to a new series and a new form of subjectivity that continues to resonate with the first series, causing it to become transformed, with new elements
added that might allow us to apprehend the manner in which the desire associated with transformation continues to insist and become socially creative? Returning to the traditional explanations of the Foreword: Why the Revolution (of Desire) Did Not Take Place 9 defect that is made to account for great historical failures, and to desire as the ground where this defect remains as a wound that cannot be healed by the work of memory or by renewed action. The workers desire their own repression. All of the great ideology-critiques of the twentieth century begin with this fundamental premise. From very early on, Deleuze and Guattari were never satisfied with these answers and even went so far as to reject the concept of ideology itself as a causal factor (about which I will say more later on). No one wants to be repressed; therefore, if the workers

desired repression and became fascist as a result of this positive desire, the answers must be sought at another level than in the organization of collective interests. As Deleuze and Guattari write: Only microfascism provides an answer to a global question: why does desire desire its own repression, how can it desire its own repression? The masses certainly do not passively submit to power; nor do they want to be repressed, in a kind of masochistic hysteria; nor are they tricked by an ideological lure. Desire is never separable from complex assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, from microformations already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems, etc. Desire is never an undifferentiated instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered setup rich in
interactions: a whole supple segmentarity that processes molecular energies and potential gives desire a fascist determination. Leftist organizations will not be the last to secrete microfascisims. Its too easy to be antifascist on a molar

level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective. (DG 1987: 215) The above passage, which is repeated
in many different variations throughout the volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, constitutes the significance of Deleuze and Guattaris intervention into the field of this historical debate, as well as what could be called their positive discovery.

This concerns the positive discovery of desire itself which does not exist merely at the level of its representations, nor even at the level of the subject who feels, perceives, believes, acts. It also exists at a molecular level composed of an entirely different multiplicity, made up from all the little perceptions, feelings, habits and the little actions like an organic body. Therefore, what Deleuze and
Guattari name as the molar and molecular can be seen as another variation of the two repetitions above, this time located within the two levels of what they call the socius. Early on in Deleuzes career he edited a collection called Instincts and Institutions (1952), in which he wrote a preface under the same title. I will come back to this work often, since I consider it to be a blueprint for some of the ideas that appear in the later work by Deleuze and Guattari. Institutions are only the

sedimentation of the instincts that populate and compose them, down to the desires, the habits, the dreary and mundane routines. This is what Deleuze defines as the first synthesis that constitutes the present in time, and yet it is a passive synthesis. It is made up of all our rhythms, our reserves, our reaction times, the thousand intertwinings, the presents and the fatigues of which we are composed . . . (Deleuze 1994:
77). But, as Deleuze writes in a passage that immediately follows, there must be another time in which the first synthesis can occur. This refers us to a second synthesis, which is the passive synthesis of memory, more profound than the passive repetition of habit. There can be no revolution of the level of institutions without a concomitant

revolution of on the level of instincts: a molecular revolution!

A capitalist revolution is insufficient capitalism has infiltrated the way we think and relate to the world, manifesting itself into our very desires.

Ballantyne 2007 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 85)
The ideas need a milieu, made up of other ideas and practices, and a given milieu will allow some ideas to flourish while others do not stand a chance . The particular milieu for ideas that Guattari sees threatening diversity is that of Integrated World Capitalism, which we would now normally call globalization. It has a tendency to make us all want the same things, wherever we are in the world , and whatever
our cultural differences would have been in the past. This homogenizing of the subject by the mass media presents the same sort of danger as threats to biodiversity. We

are educated all to swoon at the sight of the same film stars, to order the same carbonated drinks and wear the same perfumes. At one level it is pleasurable and innocuous, and too anodyne to look as if it could possibly do any harm. On the other hand whole species of ideas and cultures of behaviour are eliminated from the planet, never to be seen again, driven out for want of attention because we were thinking about football scores, or celebrity gossip.

Their alternative ultimately collapses to identity politics repeating endlessly the trials of the proletariat, trapped in a tragic cycle of failed revolutions. The Marxist material revolution cannot escape the figure of the proletariat constantly linking every social movement to the larger exchange of capital. Unfortunately for the Marxists that figure is antiquated. Instead, we affirm a revolution of desire a revolution which undoes the causal foundations of capitalism. Their historical lens is unable to answer the question why did the masses desire their own repression only our framing of the past can account for the fascist tendency inside the masses to demand less bread and more taxes Lambert 2006 (Greg, "Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?")
Here, I will return again to the major problematic that will guide my exposition of the reception of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project: why the revolution of desire did not take place. But then this begs a more preliminary question: a

revolution of desire? Would this not take the form of a farce? To assume the image of a revolutionary desire is already to situate the concept of revolution itself into another order of repetition, one that is quite different from the historical Marxist problematic concerning the repetitions and the failures of political revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries . I
would argue that this repetition and this difference, enunciated in the idea of a revolutionary desire that would not take the form of the previous series, is properly comic in its historical significance. To say that it is comic, however, is not to remove it from its historical precedent, but rather to claim that it belongs to the movement of history itself. How so? In a remarkable and very telling note that appears in Difference and Repetition, midway through the chapter Repetition for Itself, Deleuze comments on Marxs theory of historical repetition from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. First, according to Deleuze, historical action must be understood from the basis of repetition; thus, according to Rosenberg, historical

actors or creators can create only under the condition that they identify themselves with figures from the past. It is in this sense that history is theatre . . . (Deleuze 1994: 91). It is also in this sense that Marx introduces the possibility of comic repetition, when an action, rather than leading to metamorphosis and the production of something new, forms a kind of involution, the opposite of authentic creation (Deleuze 1994: 91). The idea of a revolution of desire already presupposes the failure of a metamorphosis of the first order the outward and historical transformation of social and political institutions and in this sense it is properly a comic repetition because the historical agent has already confronted that the act required for the first kind of metamorphosis is too big and thus chooses another manner of metamorphosis or repetition of the act itself. Clearly, I am writing according to the law of the second repetition, a comic repetition. Correctly grasped,
a comic repetition of the act must be understood from the perspective of a defect in the original historical actor or in a profound caesura in time between the failed Foreword: Why the Revolution (of Desire) Did Not Take Place 7 action and the present metamorphosis which appears as its comic double. We might understand this, for example, in the sense that the

identification with an original historical figure (the proletariat) today has achieved the dimension of comic repetition, of theatre, in which so many actors have emerged upon the stage to claim this identification as the basis of their own identity (women, minorities, the oppressed, etc.). As a result, however, history has become mythic in form if not also in content : their action becomes the spontaneous
repetition of an old role; it is the revolutionary striving for something entirely new that causes history to become veiled in myth (Deleuze 1994: 91). And yet, this does not make this form of identification any less profound, or

historical, any more than it demotes the nature of the desires that are the new expressions of revolutionary striving. In fact, in the number of repetitions of the original figure, an even more profound metamorphosis occurs that belongs to the present and to the present alone: by which the identity of this actor dissolves, becoming no one, a modern Oedipus who searches for the scattered members of the great victim (Deleuze 1994: 91). It is important to understand that the
relationship between these two moments, or between these two repetitions, is not dialectical. In one of the most beautiful statements that occurs in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes, the negative is the image of difference, but a flattened and inverted image, like the candle in the eye of an ox the eye of the dialectician dreaming of a futile combat?(Deleuze 1994: 51). The negative is only the product of a genetic affirmation. It is not, as many of Deleuze and Guattaris most severe critics would have it, that desire is simply displacement of the authentic act, or its

disguised ideological representative, but rather the repetition of the act itself in the present, and the manner in which both the agent and the action must undergo a more profound metamorphosis in order to achieve a third synthesis, in which the defective agent and the tragic image of the failed action dissolve in favour of a future that presupposes that such a metamorphosis of the agent and the act is already completed. Here, Deleuze reverses Marxs original sequence: comic repetition actually precedes truly
tragic (or dramatic) metamorphosis; the contemporary historical agent, finding the magnitude of the original act too big, enters into a becoming that produces a state of being equal to the action. He writes: In effect, there is always a time when the imagined act is supposed too big for me. This defines a priori the past or before. It matters little

whether or not the event itself occurs, or whether the act has been performed or not: past, present and future are not distributed according to these empirical criteria . Oedipus has already carried out the act,
Hamlet has not yet done so, but in either case the first part of the symbol is lived in the past, they are in the past and live themselves as such so long as they experience the image of the act that is too big for them. The second time, which relates to the caesura itself, is thus the present of metamorphosis, a becoming-equal to the act and a doubling of the self, and the projection of an ideal self in the image of the act. (Deleuze 1994: 89) Returning to the original actor, the one

who failed to live up to the act due to some fundamental defect or tragic flaw: is not the nature of this defect or tragic flaw desire itself? This constitutes the standard complaint of all great revolutionary failures: the workers were a little too fascist in their desires; they were dupes who were tricked into desiring their own oppression. Consequently, from the second or comic
repetition, in identifying with the original historical actor as the basis for the present action, it would make sense that this action would be situated on the plane of desire itself. However, this second repetition aims at the total

metamorphosis of the ground (desire) and, each time, the figure that belongs to this moment is only a figure that appears against this ground, causing the ground to appear as a multiplicity of desires that take it up and attempt to transform it . Thus, the revolution of desire would be defined as a present of metamorphosis, a becoming-equal of the actor as well as projection of an ideal self in the image of the act itself, which no longer appears, from the perspective of a past that is already finished, and in the image that remains too big for me. Are not all the ideal figures that Deleuze
and Guattari create to represent this metamorphosis of the present those figures whose identities dissolve in favour of the process or the act itself becoming-woman, becoming-animal, becoming-molecular, lastly, becoming-imperceptible? Moreover, does not the image of the act that belongs to the process of becoming take place purely in a present that has no clearly definable relation to a past or to a future, a present defined only in terms of an indefinite time or duration of the act itself? And yet, this time only belongs to the image of the action itself, to the process of becoming. Yet, very few readers have linked this image of becoming to Deleuzes earlier writings on the three repetitions, or have discerned the identity of figure of becoming-x as the projection of an ideal actor in the image of the act itself.

The alternative fails - political and academic blueprints are not politics, they are only text. The judge would do better to affirm our active politics. Lambert 2006 (Greg, "Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?")
In part, it is my thesis that Deleuze

and Guattaris works were never intended for the institution, or to become institutionalized. Taking this last statement to heart, if what follows can be understood in any way as a
commentary on this or that book written by Deleuze and Guattari, then its aim is to comment on what has taken place and what continues to take place outside the book. Of course, outside the book, inevitably, one first finds other books that have been written on or which take up the first book in their line of flight . But this is

where desire enters in as well, which will be the true object of the following observations. It is clear that politics does not take place in books but in spaces that are exterior to the books volume. It seems, however, that many have forgotten this simple notion, and this has led to many books being written lately that attempt to grasp the political as a theory of a yet-unknown practice or event. Politics begins in those places that Deleuze and Guattari speak of in terms of their concept of a minor literature: in heated

conversations and exchanges, in quarrels between lovers and friends, or between parents and children, etc. These are places that are less formalized than a discourse one finds in a book, in which the political is already annulled by the principle of communication. As a form of expression, politics is closer to a scream than to an academic presentation.

Capitalism is not an external force, it is internally produced and created by the desires of the masses. Nor is capitalism necessarily a force of pure evil rather, the resonant forces of desire shape the power of globalization for beneficial or malicious purposes. Our challenge to dominant forms of desire is a necessary precondition to understanding and affecting capitalism for the better. Zalloua, 2008 (Zahi,Assistant Professor of French at Whitman College , "The Future of an Ethics of Difference After Hardt and Negris Empire" MUSE)
The merits of Empire lie in its desire to reconfigure the center/periphery model of analysis, and, more importantly, to complicate the identification by postcolonial theorists of globalization with neo-imperialism (or the U.S.) by examining more closely how repressive power currently functions. At the heart of Hardt and Negris critique is their contention that the nation-state is an outdated notion, belonging
to a prior era of modern, imperialist sovereignty that has been superseded by the new, imperial sovereignty of an Empire structured by the flow of capital. Any

critique of globalization based on the assumption that nation-states are the primary locus of power is misguided: We insist on asserting that the construction of Empire is a step forward in order to do away with any nostalgia for the power structures that preceded it and refuse any political strategy that involves returning to that old arrangement, such as trying to resurrect the nation-state to protect against global capital (43). No one is immune from the logic of global capital. Inside/outside and local/global dichotomies are, strictly speaking, illusory, since we all feed into and support the development of the capitalist imperial machine (45). It is therefore not [End Page 128] only false, but counterproductive and damaging, to claim that we can (re)establish local identities that are in some sense outside and protected against the global flows of capital and Empire , that is, to think difference in terms of a particular locale resisting a general global trend (45). As a corrective to
this misguided vision of the nation or the locals capacity for resistance, Hardt and Negri argue for a reconceptualization of globalization as a regime of the production of identity and difference, or really of homogenization and heterogenization (45). This understanding of globalization relies more specifically on Foucaults notion of biopower, which manifests itself through an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations (1978, 140). Contrary to prior models of power, Foucaults conception underscores powers productive or positive nature. As he writes in Discipline and Punish, We

must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it excludes, it represses, it censors, it abstracts, it masks, it conceals. In fact, power produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth (194). Under what they call the society of control (23), a formulation they borrow from Deleuze, Hardt and Negri uphold powers productive principle ([Empire] produce[s] not only commodities but also subjectivities [32]), and extend the scope of Foucaults analysis of the normalizing effects of power beyond disciplinary institutions (such as the prison and the asylum). In the society of control, along with its unprecedented flexible and fluctuating networks, the normalizing apparatuses of disciplinarity intensify, becoming more general, more democratic, ever more immanent to the social field, distributed through the brains and bodies of the citizens (23). Given the nature and dominance of global power, described again in Deleuzian terms as an imperial machine, Hardt and Negri deny the possibility of transcendence, that is, of adopting a critical position from nowhere, a subject position uncontaminated by ideology; such an external standpoint no longer exists (34). A critique of Empire must remain immanent and
resist the temptation of transcendence. It is this failure to recognize that modern sovereignty has given way to Empire that typically gives social critics the transcendental urge to posit a form of discourse that could oppose the informational colonization of being (34), the assimilative, instrumental rationality prevalent in American capitalism (Jrgen Habermas theory of communication would be one example).

The appeal to difference common to postmodernist and postcolonial circles seems to suffer from precisely such a sense of transcendence, a desire to embrace differencethe margin, the excluded otheren-soi, outside of Western hegemony. One of the refrains of Empire is the need to know our true enemy
[End Page 129] (137). With the end of colonialism and the disappearing powers of the nation-state, the new enemy is Empire, an enemy which

The passage to Empire and its processes of globalization offer new possibilities to the forces of liberation . . . . Our political task . . . is not simply to resist these processes but to reorganize them and redirect them toward new ends. The creative
nevertheless holds the promise of a better, more democratic future: forces of the multitude that sustain Empire are also capable of autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political

organization of global flows and exchanges. words, globalization

(xv)

Globalization . . . is really a condition for the liberation of the multitude.

(52) In other

is not an obstacle to overcome but a system to struggle with and transform (re-invent) on the plane of immanence. Rather than arguing for a politics of difference, for the truth of the others difference, postmodernist and postcolonial theorists would do better to recognize that they are playing into the hands of their enemies and perpetuating Empire, which gladly celebrates difference: This new enemy not only is resistant to the old weapons but actually thrives on them, and
thus joins its would-be antagonists in applying them to the fullest. Long live difference! Down with essentialist binaries! (138). Hybridity, then, the once cherished strategy for combating identitarian boundaries and antagonisms, has become the new norm of globalization; as a result, hybridity as a concept has lost its critical edge. It can no longer serve as an effective means of resistance to the homogenizing force of Empire, since it is neutralized and absorbed by the very system it purports to contest.

EXT: Perm
The alternative has abandoned true Marxism they have failed to effectively politicize the situation only the insertion of a critique of desire can solve. Lambert 2006 (Greg, "Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?")
I believe I have developed my evidence for reading Deleuze and Guattaris treatise partly as a response to the dominant judgements that determined the interpretations of Kafkas works. Therefore, it is crucial to see that the four classifications that they argue Kafkas writing process tries to evade (political allegory, folk or ethnic expression, religious or symbolic meaning and, finally, Once More for a Minor Literature 15 high modernist form) are precisely the regimes of interpretation that have dominated how Kafkas works have been read by twentieth-century critics. In terms of their critique of Marxist interpretation, Deleuze and Guattaris manifesto for the concept of minor literature turns the

question of politicizing literary expression on its head by explicitly appropriating all the staples of Marxist analysis and condemning dominant practices of interpretation for not being immanent enough to the real sense of the political in the literary work, and for failing to live up to its own categorical imperative to always politicize . And yet, if I mentioned above that this was the
strongest gesture that defined Deleuze and Guattaris treatise on Kafka as an argument with Marxist hermeneutics, it is interesting to note that this is an argument that was never perceived by French Marxists to any great degree; certainly not to the degree that the Lacanians perceived the attack on psychoanalytic interpretation several years earlier and took up arms against it. Perhaps it was too subtle? Or perhaps they didnt read it because it was on Kafka, after all and they probably burned their only copies long ago! or maybe they just dismissed it as being typical of a couple of bourgeois philosophers to pick an author so corrupted in his politics as to be of absolutely no use for the cause of revolution. However, I will argue below that this gesture was not missed altogether.

The marxists are too quick to exclude what they dont understand - even if our political strategy is ineffective at challenging capitalism, the texts we invoke contain revolutionary potential. The combination of our political strategy and the force of the revolution is necessary to make concrete and tangible gain. Lambert 2006 (Greg, "Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?")
It is obvious from the narrative I have just recounted of what I would consider to be the first dominant reception of Deleuze and Guattaris philosophy in the United States that I do not, on face value, accept Jamesons interpretation, which I have determined as belonging to a strategy of containment (or Once More for a Minor Literature 25 to employ Barthes term, a strategy of inoculation). Nevertheless, I find this reading highly intriguing and even remarkable in its effectiveness, somewhat like the plot of a spy novel by John Le Carr. (Perhaps a better comparison would be in reference to the famous story by Poe, concerning the clever device of a certain minister who steals a letter and hides out in plain sight.) Of course, I

cannot help but to disagree strongly with its characterization of Deleuze and Guattaris antihermeneutic programme, which already prefigures the misreading of their proposal for a minor literature. Even if I wanted to agree, I could not, since as Jameson clearly announces, the basis for any agreement would be political (or rather, ideological), and since I do not profess to being a Marxist, I already find myself cast in the role of occupying the position of a rival hermeneutic. This does not imply that I would choose to occupy the category of the postmodern either, however, since this category has already been pre-manufactured and politically contrived from the very beginning, and Im not sure it was made to accurately describe anything whatsoever, except to function as a nomenclature for locating any ideology of the text that does not serve the objectives of political interpretation tout court. In this sense, I completely agree with Jamesons definition of the text as a libinal apparatus for future investment Guattari themselves called a desiring machine and it is at this level of understanding of what the text what Deleuze and is and what its cultural function might be, that I wish to challenge Jamesons image of political pragmatics on theoretical grounds, that is, to stand their image of antiinterpretation back on its feet! As my precedent, again I must recall the maxim that Jameson offers as the
condition for understanding his own theoretical position: that the privileged form of alliance politics is the strict practical equivalent to the concept of totalization on a theoretical level.

EXT: Immanence
Capitalism is not an external being the forces of the market interact with individuals at the most personal levels, tracing effects to the core of being. Failure to engage in the immanence of capital dooms their alternative to failure. Deleuze and Guattari, 1972 (AO, 3-4, Murray)
It is probable that at a certain level nature and industry are two separate and distinct things : from one point of view, industry is the opposite of nature; from another, industry extracts its raw materials from nature; from yet another, it returns its refuse to nature; and so on. Even within society, this characteristic man-nature, industry-nature, society-nature relationship is responsible for the distinction of relatively autonomous spheres that are called production, distribution, consumption. But in general this entire level of distinctions, examined from the point of view of its formal structures, presupposes (as Marx has demonstrated) not only the existence of capital and the division of labour, but also the false consciousness that the capitalist being necessarily acquires , both

the real truth of the matter the glaring, sober truth that resides in delirium is that there is no such thing as relatively independent spheres or circuits.
of itself and of the supposedly fixed elements within an overall process. For

A2: Cap Good

Capitalism is the root of all impacts it controls the military by creating the desire for war to deposit surplus capital and it engineers genocide to check the human surplus. Their warrants for capitalism good are mired in an insanity that believes the capitalisms benevolent actions are apolitical when in reality the greatest benefits of capitalism exist only as a facade to allow the systems most cruel actions. Deleuze and Guattari 1972, Anti-Oedipus, 372-4
In the capitalist formation of sovereignty-the full body of capital money as the socius-the great social axiomatic has replaced the territorial codes and the despotic overcodings that characterized the preceding formations; and a molar, gregarious aggregate has formed, whose mode of subjugation has no equal. We have seen on what foundations this aggregate operated: a whole field of immanence that is reproduced on an always larger scale, that is continually multiplying its axioms to suit its needs, that is filled with images and with images of images, through which desire is determined to desire its own repression (imperialism); an unprecedented decoding and deterritorialization, which institutes a combination as a system of differential relations between the decoded and deterritorialized flows, in such a way that
social inscription and repression no longer even need to bear directly upon bodies and persons, but on the contrary precede them (axiomatic: regulation and application); a surplus value determined as a surplus value of flux, whose extortion is not brought about by a simple arithmetical difference between two quantities that are homogeneous and belong to the same code, but precisely by differential relations between heterogeneous magnitudes that are not raised to the same power: a flow of capital and a flow of labor as human surplus value in the industrial essence of capitalism, a flow of financing and a flow of payment or incomes in the monetary inscription of capitalism, a market flow and a flow of innovation as machinic surplus value in the operation of capitalism (surplus value as the first aspect of its immanence), a ruling class that is all the more ruthless as it does not place the machine in its service, but is the servant of the capitalist machine: in this sense, a single class, content for its part with drawing incomes that, however enormous, differ only arithmetically from the workers' wages-income, whereas this class functions on a more profound level as creator, regulator, and guardian of the great non-appropriated, non-possessed flow, incommensurable with wages and profits, which marks at every step along the way the interior limits of capitalism, their perpetual displacement, and their reproduction on an always larger scale (the movement of interior limits as the second aspect of the capitalist field of immanence, defined by the circular relationship "great flux of financing-reflux of incomes in wagesafflux of raw profit"); the effusion of anti-production within production, as the realization or the

absorption of surplus value, in such a way that the military, bureaucratic, and police apparatus finds itself grounded in the economy itself, which directly produces libidinal investments for the repression of desire anti-production as the third aspect of capitalist immanence, expressing the twofold nature of capitalism: production for production's sake, but under the conditions of capital). There is not one of these aspects-not the least operation, the least industrial or financial mechanism-that does not reveal the insanity of the capitalist machine and the pathological character of its rationality: not at all a false rationality, but a true rationality of this pathological state, this insanity, "the machine works too, believe me". The capitalist machine does not run the risk of becoming mad, it is mad from one end to the other and from the beginning, and this is the source of its rationality. Marx's black humor,
the source of Capital, is his fascination with such a machine: how it came to be assembled, on what foundation of decoding and deterritorialization; how it works, always more decoded, always more deterritorialized; how its operation grows more relentless with the development of the axiomatic, the combination of the flows; how it produces the terrible single class of gray gentlemen who keep up the machine; how it does not run the risk of dying all alone, but rather of

making us die, by provoking to the very end investments of desire that do not even go by way of a deceptive and subjective ideology, and that lead us to cry out to the very end, Long live capital in all its reality, in all its objective dissimulation! Except in ideology, there has never been a humane,
liberal, paternal, etc., capitalism. Capitalism is defined by a cruelty having no parallel in the primitive system of cruelty, and by a terror having no parallel in the despotic regime of terror. Wage increases and improvements in the standard of living are realities, but realities that derive from a given supplementary axiom that capitalism is

always capable of adding to its axiomatic in terms of an enlargement of its limits: let's create the New Deal; let's cultivate and recognize strong unions; let's promote participation, the single class; let's

take a step toward Russia, which is taking so many toward us; etc. But

within the enlarged reality that conditions these islands, exploitation grows constantly harsher, lack is arranged in the most scientific of ways, final solutions of the "Jewish problem" variety are prepared down to the last detail, and the Third World is organized as an integral part of capitalism. The reproduction of the interior limits of capitalism on an always wider scale has several consequences: it permits increases and improvements of standards at the center, it displaces the harshest forms of exploitation from the center to the periphery, but also multiplies enclaves of overpopulation in the center itself, and easily tolerates the so-called socialist formations. (It is not kibbutz-style socialism that troubles the Zionist state, just as it is not Russian socialism that troubles world capitalism.) There is no metaphor here: the factories are prisons, they do not resemble prisons, they are prisons. Everything in the system is insane: this is because the capitalist machine thrives on decoded and deterritorialized flows; it decodes and deterritorializes them still more, but
while causing them to pass into an axiomatic apparatus that combines them, and at the points of combination produces pseudo codes and artificial reterritorializations. It is in this sense that the capitalist axiomatic cannot but give rise to new territorialities and revive a new despotic Urstaat. The great mutant flow of capital is pure

deterritorialization, but it performs an equivalent reterritorialization when converted into a reflux of means of payment. The Third World is deterritorialized in relation to the center of capitalism but belongs to capitalism, being a pure peripheral territoriality of capitalism. The system teems with
preconscious investments of class and of interest. And capitalists first have an interest in capitalism. A statement as commonplace as this is made for another purpose: capitalists have an interest in capitalism only through

the tapping of profits that they extract from it. But no matter how large the extraction of profits, it does not define capitalism. And for what does define capitalism, for what conditions profit, theirs is an
investment of desire whose nature unconscious- libidinal-is altogether different, and is not simply explained by the conditioned profits, but on the contrary itself explains that a small-time capitalist, with no great profits or hopes, fully maintains the entirety of his libidinal investments: the libido investing the great flow that is not convertible as such, not appropriated as such-"nonpossession and nonwealth," in the words of Bernard Schmitt, who among modern economists has for us the incomparable advantage of offering a delirious interpretation of an unequivocally delirious economic system (at least he goes all the way). In short, a truly unconscious libido, a disinterested love: this machine is fantastic.

A2: Statism/Realism
The state is inconsequential to change. Our desire and the political potential within it determines the power and direction of the state, not the other way around. The state and the global order of politics are ultimately only the manifestation and condensation of individual desires, resonating into a collective force. To challenge these structures, we must begin at the origin of the desire for fascism. Ballantyne 2007 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 87-92)
The state is presented as something quite different, having a tendency to disconnect from the wider networks: The State indeed proceeds otherwise: it is a phenomenon of intra-consistency. It makes points resonate together, points that are not necessarily already town-poles but very diverse points of order, geographic, ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, technological particularities. It makes the town resonate with the countryside. It operates by stratification; in other words, it forms a vertical, hierarchized aggregate that spans the horizontal lines in a dimension of depth. In retaining given elements, it necessarily cuts off their relations with other elements, which become exterior, it inhibits, slows down, or controls those relations; if the State has a circuit of its own, it is an internal circuit dependent primarily upon resonance, it is a zone of recurrence that isolates itself from the remainder of the
network, even if in order to do so it must exert even stricter controls over its relations with that remainder. The question is not to find out whether what is retained is natural or artifical (boundaries), because in any event there is deterritorialization. But in this case deterritorialization is the result of the territory itself being taken as an object, as a material to stratify, to make resonate. Thus the central power of the State is hierarchical, and constitutes a civilservice sector; the centre is not in the milieu, but on top, because the only way it can recombine what it isolates is through subordination. Of course there is a multiplicity of States no less than of towns, but it is not the same type of multiplicity: there are as many States as there are vertical cross sections in a dimension of depth, each separated from the others, whereas the town is inseparable from the horizontal network of towns. Each State is a global (not local) integration, a redundancy of resonance (not of frequency), an operation of the stratification of the territory (not of the polarization of the milieu). (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 433) So it is in principle a straightforward business to draw a map of nations on a sheet of paper, because except in disputed territories there is a boundary that cuts the state off from the surrounding states. The boundaries might be redrawn from time to time, but in principle the centrally determined laws operate up to the states limit and not beyond.

The crucial point here is that the centre where the decisions are taken is not in the milieu, but above it, outside it, on another stratum. So this description of the state and its organization correlates with
the hylomorphic conception of form derived from Aristotles ideas, and here importantly to be contrasted with the idea of emergent form, or immanence. The substance of the state is formed by a power that acts from a

higher stratum than the substance. The town-networks are immanent in their milieux. The state has form, the town is formless. Of course towns can have order imposed upon them from a higher stratum, but that is
not what makes them work, and it is no way to understand urban design. Towns make the milieu for individual buildings, and one needs to understand the interdependence of building and milieu if one is to design a successful building a building that sustains life, and that becomes a thriving organism. The factors that make people, or buildings or towns

live and work and thrive are formless and need to be understood, but they operate in milieux that are cut across by various apparatuses that act like the state, tending to separate a part of the network from its wider surroundings. For example, the ownership of land is regulated in ways that are like the
setting up of state boundaries, and in some respects my state-defined legal responsibility stops at the edge of my land. Certainly if I am inclined to act as a non-transgressing citizen then that is going to be where my building has to stop. Traditionally architecture has been preoccupied with form, for example in Le Corbusiers definition: Architecture is the masterly, correct and magnificent play of masses brought together in light (Le Corbusier, 1923, 29). This is delivered from a higher stratum: magnificent is clearly above the milieu, and masterly and correct behaviours conform to a pattern determined from above. And we have learnt to see form (here masses) as what the man in command has thought to himself, and has been able to express. So Le Corbusiers definition of architecture belongs entirely to the mindset of the state, and we can enlist him to the service of the fonctionnariat and have him design buildings as limited well-defined objectparcels that tend to separate themselves from their surroundings. The cult of pure form, of beautiful shapes that enchant us with their other-worldly promise of an unencumbered life, is the staple of the glossy architectural magazines. The immanent order in the life played out in buildings remains undiscovered in these images, which prefer to show how closely one can aspire to live in surroundings that have geometric definition or well-defined pictorial qualities. Immanent order might emerge at a domestic scale if unselfconscious housekeeping routines were the exclusive determinant in forming the house, but, if we

can, we usually try to shape things so as to lay claim to status of one sort or another, for example by making the house in some way look like a house. Most of us, most of the time, have an idea of what a house looks like. Our sense of form

derives not only from the emergent properties of the milieu, but also from the regimes of signs that surround us, and that we deploy. Where human buildings are concerned, emergent form is more evident at
the scale of the city, where the individual buildings might be self-conscious but where the wider picture is often left to take care of itself. Friedrich Engels described this happening in nineteenth-century Manchester, when there was an astonishing boom, and over the course of only a few decades it was transformed from a village into a metropolis. The surprising thing here was that despite the evident free-for-all, a clear order did emerge. The town itself is peculiarly built, so that someone can live in it for years and travel into it and out of it daily without ever coming into contact with a working-class quarter or even with workers so long, that is to say, as one confines himself to his business affairs or to strolling about for pleasure. This comes about mainly in the circumstances that through an unconscious, tacit agreement as much as through conscious, explicit intention the working-class districts are most sharply separated from the parts of the city reserved for the middle class [. . .] Manchesters monied aristocracy can now travel from their houses to their places of business in the centre of town by the shortest routes, which run right through the working-class districts, without even noticing how close they are to the most squalid misery which lies immediately about them on both sides of the road. This is because the main streets which run from the Exchange in all directions out of the city are occupied almost uninterruptedly on both sides by shops, which are kept by members of the middle and lower-middle classes. In their own interests these shopkeepers should keep up their shops in an outward appearance of cleanliness and respectability; and in fact they do so [. . .] Those shops which are situated in the commercial quarter or in the vicinity of the middle-class districts are more elegant than those which serve to cover the workers grimy cottages. Nevertheless, even these latter adequately serve the purpose of hiding from the eyes of the wealthy gentlemen and ladies with strong stomachs and weak nerves the misery and squalor that form the completing counterpart, the indivisible complement, of their riches and luxury. I know perfectly well that this deceitful manner of building is more or less common to all big cities [. . .] I have never elsewhere seen a concealment of such fine sensibility of every thing that might offend the eyes and nerves of the middle classes. And yet it is precisely Manchester that has been built less according to a plan and less within the limitations of official regulations and indeed more through accident than any other town. (Engels, 1845, 846)3 Engels explains how the pattern of the city is generated not by the imposition of form from a higher level, but by decisions taken within the milieu, especially but not exclusively by the small shopkeepers. He calls the manner of building deceitful, and in doing so places himself on a higher stratum, because from within the milieu that is not the way it looks. If anybody does notice what is going on (and Engels leads us to believe that they dont) then what they would tell us, if we asked, would be that appropriate judgements were being made about what type of building belonged in each type of place. It would look like a matter of decorum, not deceit or hypocrisy. The milieu in which one lives is inhabited not only

by other people with whom one interacts, but also by animals, vegetation, flakes of snow and mountain peaks, and by ideas including on occasion ideas about how to deal with buildings that are part of our ecology. So here in the Manchester that Engels saw, but of which he was not altogether a part, the ideas
about architectural decorum were widely shared among the people who had the means to act upon them. They did not need to take an overview of the whole, but only to see where it would make sense to open up shop, and how to run the place in order to make a decent living. It involves no radical thinking, but a pervasive common sense that within the milieu seems to remain unchallenged. From outside and above it looks deceitful and as though there has been some sort of brainwashing. From within it looks as if things are going swimmingly. The city this city, at least in this account of it is a self-organizing system, whose order is immanent. In the same way the account of the schizo-analytic subject the individual person at the beginning of Anti-Oedipus, is a self-organizing system which under one description has a unified will and a personal name, but under another description is a teeming swarm of desiringmachines that have no way of forming a view of the whole. Just as a person can be coerced into the adoption

of inflexible social roles, such as those offered by the holy family the nuclear family unit, which is presented as useful to capitalism and Oedipalizing in its effects so can a city be given an appearance of correctness and magnificence that may not help it to live . The imposition of form might
give a city the appearance of respectability and high status, but if it does not mesh with the networks that generate the citys life then it will be left with deserted boulevards and windswept plazas that might look good in photographs but which will not help the place to flourish. It would be far better to find oneself in an unselfconscious city like Engelss Manchester that does what it has to do without making a claim to cultural status for itself. There were of course grave problems with Manchester, and many people lived in abysmal conditions, but there was no doubting the citys overall vitality. The surprise was the apparent clarity of its organization, given the lack of any centralized planning control. In order to generate another city like Manchester one would not specify a form, but would put in place the conditions: a world-beating commercial operation that has need of a large workforce (much of it with limited skill, and therefore poorly paid). The rest more or less follows as a consequence. The people who set things in motion become very rich, and although they are a small class of people they have the money to dispense to see that their desires are acted upon. The people on low wages have access to a different range of things, which cost less and are more widely available. The needs of every level of society are met by service-providers who are dependent on the central commercial operations, but at one or more removes. It is this middling class of the milieu which might have an official wing in a magistrature that seems to be critical in determining the decorum of the place, selecting the places where the shops will be set up, and making the best of their faades. So long as this lower-middle class has a shared sense of propriety, and the other classes do not overwhelm it, then its pervasive sense of order can prevail without reference to centralized control mechanisms. It is Middle England, and in Manchester especially the small shopkeepers, who seem to have the decisive impact on the city. Heroic architects design one-off oddities in the city, but its fabric is apparently unselfconscious emergent design, for which an individual can make no claim to authorship. It is the

outcome of thousands of local decisions, much as we see in ant colonies that build themselves

anthills, and slime-mould communities that seem to solve the problem of finding the shortest route across a labyrinth (Johnson, 2001).

A2: Levinas
Their politics is more religion than strategy. Levinass ethics collapse upon themselves when faced with political decisions. Their concept of ethics requires a concrete division between the self and others instead, we should affirm a porous understanding of the self which opens space for the affirmation of all identities. We should not seek a point where all identities are respected equally, we should seek a point where identity is no longer relevant. Zalloua, 2008 (Zahi,Assistant Professor of French at Whitman College , "The Future of an Ethics of Difference After Hardt and Negris Empire" MUSE)
In the ever-expanding War on Terror, a struggle that followed the publication of Empire and continues to serve as a critical test case for Hardt and Negris claims, the question of cultural difference and its incomprehensibility is both urgent and perilous. While

an affirmation of absolute difference functions, or is intended to function, to block the Wests reifying gaze, it is also susceptible to co-optation by the imperial machine of Empire. The Islamic Other, for example, is indeed
constructed as different in such a discoursehe or she is alien, savage, and less than human, not a hybrid mirror of his or her fellow global citizens. Such othering mechanisms also concretely demonstrate the risk of overemphasizing non-understanding, Glissantian opacity or alterity. Derridas well-known phrase that every
other is wholly other [tout autre est tout autre] opens itself up to this (mis)interpretation (1993, 22). The utterance seems utterly devoid of any context; in the words of Peter Hallward, it actually singularizes the other, stripping him or her of facticity, or historical specificity.23 In Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, Alain Badiou locates the source of this fascination, or rather obsession, with difference in the philosophy of Lvinas, taking issue with Lvinas dominant, cult-like status in ethical circles, and with his having almost single-handedly framed all of ethical discourse in terms of an ethics of difference. Badiou scrutinizes, in particular, Lvinas contention that the other is radically other (The Other comes to us not only out of context but also without mediation [Lvinas 1996, 53; qtd. in Badiou 2001, xxii]): The

other always resembles me too much for the hypothesis of an originary exposure of his alterity to be necessarily true (22). Badiou argues that for Lvinas the source of the others radical otherness must originate elsewhere, in an absolute Other, which can, in the final analysis, only be God: There can be no ethics without God the ineffable (22). Lvinasian ethics, then, turns out to be a religion, and if one is tempted to simply bracket the divine, secularizing Lvinas ethics of difference, as it were, what one is left with is but a decomposed religion, nothing more than dogs dinner (23). Such an ethics of difference treats all others qua others

abstractly and formally but distinguishes in practice between others who are like me and those who are not. As Badiou puts it, [T]his celebrated other is acceptable only
if he is a good other . . . . That is to say: I respect differences, but only, of course, in so far as that which differs also respects, just as I do, the said differences (24). [End Page 144] Lvinas own resistance to giving any content to the form of the other is perhaps made most apparent in a radio broadcast with Shlomo Malkin and Alain Finkelkraut, shortly after the massacres of hundreds of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Israeli-occupied Lebanon in 1982. News of the massacres shocked the world and deeply disturbed the Jewish community, leading Malkin to ask Lvinas, You are the philosopher of the other. Isnt history, isnt politics the very site of the encounter with the other, and for the Israeli isnt the other above all Palestinian? He answers, My definition of the other is completely different. The other is the neighbor, who is not necessarily my kin but who may be. But if your neighbor attacks another neighbor, or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on
another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. Lvinas response amounts to a dismissal of the question. Refusing

to compromise on his ethics of (absolute) difference, Lvinas opts for uncharacteristic simplicity, a straightforward commentary on a complex political reality. Howard Caygill observes in Lvinas
stance a coolness of political judgement that verged on the chilling, an unsentimental understanding of violence and power almost worthy of Machiavelli (2002, 1), while Michael Shapiro discerns in Lvinas comments a privileging of the Jew as the exemplary radical other and a blind spot (1999, 68), an inability to imagine any other in the position of exclusion and victimhood. For Lvinas, then, political choices, based on a criterion of religious and national

sameness, ostensibly trump an ethics of unyielding openness. For others still, Lvinas position reveals
more than Zionist ideology and a cold indifference to the plight of the Palestinians; it crystallizes the disjunction between theory and practice. What Levinas is basically saying, writes Slavoj iek, is that, as a principle, respect for

alterity is unconditional (the highest sort of respect), but, when faced with a concrete other, one should nonetheless see if he is a friend or an enemy. In short, in practical politics, the respect for alterity strictly means nothing (2004, 106).

Levinas amounts to nothing more than an elaborate identity politics. Their argument falls to the trappings of static identity they prevent revolutionary exchanges of identity which forces rigidity into politics, strangling the possibility of true interaction with others. Zalloua, 2008 (Zahi,Assistant Professor of French at Whitman College , "The Future of an Ethics of Difference After Hardt and Negris Empire" MUSE)
If Lvinas philosophy of the otheras it is elaborated in Totality and Infinity25seems to offer, then, either an unconditional (impossible) ethics or a (crude) pragmatic/nationalist/religious politics, Derridas blurs the boundaries between ethics and politics, pointing to the imbrication of the two. When, for instance, Derrida objects to identity politics (a group fighting for [its] own identity), he does so not because of its reliance on an outdated politics of difference (Hardt and Negris complaint), or its fixation on the other qua other (Badious complaint), but because it fails to address the question of difference adequately: Once you take into account this inner and other difference, then you pay attention to the other and you understand that fighting for your own [End Page 147] identity is not exclusive of another identity, is open to another identity. And this prevents totalitarianism, nationalism, egocentrism, and so on (1997c, 13). Derrida does not so much reject the desire for recognition and identity (in) politics (who could be against identity? he asks) as call attention to the potential effects of its exclusionary logic: Like nationalism or separatism, pro-identity politics encourage a misrecognition of the universality of rights and the cultivation of exclusive differences, transforming difference into opposition, an opposition which also tends, paradoxically, to erase differences (2005, 119). Informed by a deconstructive model of identity, one that underscores the historically contingent and discursive character of identity, Laclau and Mouffe argue for a post-Marxist politics that recognizes the necessity of some fixed meaning (a discourse incapable of generating any fixity of meaning is the discourse of the psychotic [112]) while, at the same time, insisting on its malleability through the critique of every type of fixity, through an affirmation of the incomplete open and politically negotiable character of every identity (104). For Laclau and Mouffe, one needs to provide an alternative to the false choice between identity and nonidentity, since neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible (111). What is possible for politics and ethics, however, is a reduction in the rigid fixity of meaning. Glissants rhizomatic or relational model of identity gestures toward that possibility: We have passed from a belief in single root identity to the hope for rhizome identity. We must have the courage to admit that rhizome identity or identity-Relation is neither an absence of identity nor a lack of identity nor a weakness. It is a dizzying inversion of the nature of identity. But here again, the peoples are afraid of it.

A2: Cosmopolitanism
The logic of a facile, uncritical affirmation of cosmopolitanism is ineffective at creating meaningful change. Our exploration for politics creates space for infinite identities to interact positively while constantly challenging the possibility of the cooption of cosmopolitanism. Zalloua, 2008 (Zahi,Assistant Professor of French at Whitman College , "The Future of an Ethics of Difference After Hardt and Negris Empire" MUSE)
Is Derrida, as well as Glissant, vulnerable to these same indictments against the viability of an ethics of difference? In Derridas case, the validity of this objection hinges on the meaning of wholly other. To put it as a question, what exactly does Derrida intend by tout autre est tout autre? When he affirms the radical alterity of the other, is he following Lvinas in asserting the transcendence of the other? In an earlier essay on Totality and Infinity, Derrida challenges precisely this aspect of [End Page 145] Lvinas philosophy, the dream of a purely heterological thought, a pure thought of pure difference (1978, 151), arguing that ones exposure

to the other always entails a degree of relationality; the other is not infinitely other but is always perceived as other than my self (126). Yet Derrida seems to have reversed his earlier position, insisting that the structure of my relation to the other is of a relation without relation. It is a relation in which the other remains absolutely transcendent. I cannot reach the other. I cannot know the other from the inside and so on (1997c, 14; emphasis added). This relationless relation (rapport sans rapport) is nevertheless a
relation of some kind, a paradoxical one involving both a relation and a non-relation to the other: it joins and disjoins. Thus,

while joining Habermas in his urgent plea for Europe to defend and promote a cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law against competing visions (294), Derrida can still legitimately warn against an uncritical investment in the idea of cosmopolitanism. For Derrida, the cosmopolitan spirit is not immune from critique, but something that must be perpetually scrutinized and endlessly perfected: If we must in fact cultivate the spirit of this tradition (as I believe most international institutions have done since World War I), we must also try to adjust the limits of this tradition to our own time by questioning the ways in which they have been defined and determined by the ontotheological, philosophical, and religious discourses in which this cosmopolitical ideal was formulated . . . . What I call democracy to come would go beyond the limits of cosmopolitanism, that is, of a world citizenship. It would be more in line with what lets singular beings (anyone) live together, there where they are not yet defined by citizenship, that is, by their condition as lawful subjects in a state or legitimate members of a nation-state or even of a confederation or world state.

A2: Realism
We have a discourse critique that operates independent of the alternative A. The negative constitutes a reality of inevitable conflict which effaces human agency. Burke 7 (anthony, prof @ jhu ontologies of war: violence existence and reason theory and event 10:2 proj muse)
This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy; because the very existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) This effaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as
independent of the conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to military violence. We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to

its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action. Secondly, the militaristic force of such an ontology is visible, in Schmitt, in the absolute sense of vulnerability whereby a people can judge whether their 'adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life'.38 Evoking the kind of thinking that would become controversial in the Bush doctrine, Hegel similarly argues that: ...a state may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to
injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. ....the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred. On the contrary, there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury...39 Identity, even

more than physical security or autonomy, is put at stake in such thinking and can be defended and redeemed through warfare (or, when taken to a further extreme of an absolute demonisation and dehumanization of the other, by mass killing, 'ethnic cleansing' or genocide). However anathema to a
classical realist like Morgenthau, for whom prudence was a core political virtue, these have been influential ways of defining national security and defence during the twentieth century and persists into the twenty-first. They infused Cold War strategy in the United States (with the key policy document NSC68 stating that 'the Soviet-led assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and ... a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere')40 and frames dominant Western responses to the threat posed by Al Qaeda and like groups (as Tony Blair admitted in 2006, 'We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we didn't. We chose values.')41 It has also become influential, in a particularly tragic

and destructive way, in Israel, where memories of the Holocaust and (all too common) statements by Muslim and Arab leaders rejecting Israel's existence are mobilised by conservatives to justify military adventurism and a rejectionist policy towards the Palestinians.

B. The violent quest to overcome uncertainty in the international arena is doubly dangerous: It has both created the implements that make human extinction possible and the political context that renders it necessary and inevitable. Dillon and Campbell 93 (Michael, Professor of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, and
David, Professor of Cultural and Political Geography at Durham University, The Political Subject of Violence, pg 163-165) This interpretation of violence as constitutive of identity might, paradoxically, offer the only hope of some amelioration of the worst excesses of violence exhibited by the formation of (political) identity. The orthodox rendering of such

violence as pre-modern abdicates its responsibility to a predetermined historical fatalism. For if these ethnic and nationalist conflicts are understood as no more than settled history rearing its

ugly head, then there is nothing that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except to repress them again. In this view, the historical drama has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature violently plays itself out. The only alternative is for
nature to be overcome as the result of an idealistic transformation at the hands of reason. Either way, this fatalistic interpretation of the relationship between violence and the political is rooted in a hypostated conception of man/nature as determinative of the social/political: the latter is made possible only once the former runs its course, or if it is overturned. It might have once been the case that the prospect of a transformation of nature by reason seemed both likely and hopeful - indeed, many of the most venerable of the debates in the political theory of international relations revolved around this very point. But, having reached what Foucault has called society's 'threshold of modernity',

'we' now face a prospect that radically re-figures the parameters of politics: the real prospect of extinction. As Foucault argues, we have reached this threshold because 'the life of the species is wagered on its own
political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity of a political existence: modern man is an animal whose politics place his existence as a living being in question.' How the

prospect of extinction might materialise itself is an open question. That increasingly it can be materialised, militarily, ecologically, and politically, is not. The double bind of this prospect is that modernity's alternative of transformation through reason is not only untenable, it is deeply complicit in the form of (inter)national life that has been responsible for bringing about the real prospect of extinction in the first place. The capacity of violence to eradicate being was engendered by
reason's success; not merely, or perhaps even most importantly, by furnishing the technological means, but more insidiously in setting the parameters of the political (la politique, to use the useful terms of debate in which Simon Critchley engages) while fuelling the violence practices of politics (la politique). The reliance on reason as that

which could contain violence and reduce the real prospect of extinction may prove nothing less than a fatal misapprehension. In support of this proposition, consider the interpretive bases of the Holocaust.
For all that politics in the last fifty years has sought to exceptionalise the Nazis' genocide as an aberrant moment induced by evil personalities, there is no escaping the recognition that modern political life lies heavily implicated in the instigation and conduct of this horror. In so far as modernity can be characterised as the promotion of rationality and efficiency to the exclusion of alternative criteria for action, the Holocaust is one outcome of the 'civilising process'. With its plan rationally to order Europe through the elimination of an internal order, its bureaucratised administration of death, and its employment of the technology of a modern state, the Holocaust 'was not

an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residence of pre-modern barbarity. It was a legitimate resident in the house of modernity; indeed, one who would not be at home in any other house. The paradoxical nature of modernity is suggested by the emergency of a Holocaust from within its bosom.
And there can be no better indication in contradistinction to those 'modernists' who would like to brand so-called 'postmodernists' with the responsibility for all and future Holocausts - that a reliance on established traditions of reason for ethical succour and the progressive amelioration of the global human condition may be seriously misplaced. The comfort we have derived from the etiological myth of modern politics has occluded the way in which the 'civilising process' of which that myth speaks has disengaged ethics from politics. As Bauman concludes: 'We need to take stock of the evidence that the civilizing process is, among other things, a process of divesting the use and deployment of violence from moral calculus, and of emancipating the desiderata of rationality from interference of ethical norms and moral inhibitions.'

A2: Ivory Tower

Like it or not the intellectual elites control popular opinion. Becoming intellectuals increases our ability to influence policy and ideology. Farer 2008 (Tom,former President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, is Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver; "Un-Just War Against Terrorism and the Struggle to Appropriate Human Rights": Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 30, Number 2; MUSE)
Iraq's gory shambles has by no means halted the competition between liberals and neo-cons to appropriate "human rights." Like all ideologues, that is people such as old-time Marxists so intoxicated by their visions of noble ends as to scruple little (if they think in quotidian terms at all) about means, hardcore neo-cons like the irrepressible Richard Perle are thoroughly unchastened by events in Iraq.43 As I suggest above, not entirely without reason they attribute the terrible effects on human rights of the adventure they helped to launch to tactical failures fathered by the president and the secretary of defense or other previously eulogized actors.44 A democracy, they argue (undeterred by the prominent positions members of their sect like the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz occupied in the principal war-planning institution, the Department of Defense) could have been built if only the occupation had been conducted effectively. In any event, their narrative continues, however ugly things may look, however great the incidental violations of the right to life, the right not to be tortured, the right not to be punished without due process, on balance human rights has been furthered by Saddam's overthrow.45 Those scholars and publicists, like Francis Fukuyama,46 who

disagree with this diagnosis, or who believe that whatever the effect on human rights the effect on the US national interest is deplorable, have simply dissociated themselves from the sect, at least in Fukuyama's case by decrying the second generation betrayal of neo-conservatism's founding distrust of ambitious social projects like the war on poverty.47 What makes close study of the competition both fascinating and important is the light it casts on two deeply incompatible ways of seeing the world and, more specifically, two clashing ways of conceptualizing the ferocious engagement between, on the one
hand, the governments and [End Page 364] the great majority of peoples in the West and, on the other, networks of megaterrorists. I suppose one might regard the contending diagnoses and prescriptions stemming from the agents of these different ways of seeing the contemporary world as hardly more than a struggle in a puddle of tiny but very complex creatures. But that view would be entirely wrong. Intellectual elites give coherent form to the deeply held values and

causal assumptions of great numbers of people; and through the mass media they also reinforce, modulate, or undermine popular explanations and nostrums. In other words, intellectual elites are both agents and architects of popular opinion, registering views already formed and helping to form the views that they then register. So in studying and critically assessing the views of the few, we understand better the premises of the many and thus a key dimension of the opportunities for and limits on change in public policy.

A2: Deleuze and Guattari Bad

Their authors have failed to understand Deleuze - while their author may be correct in their criticism of specific lines, texts, or metaphors displayed in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, they ignore the revolutionary potential of our philosophical concepts as formed beyond the limitations of text. Lambert 2006 (Greg, "Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?")
The above points of impasse are obvious to anyone who is familiar with the debates that have surrounded the early reception of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes. It will not come as any great surprise to learn that part of my answer to the question will be because these works were misunderstood or so badly represented. Even though this sounds like the occasion for offering a fresh commentary as a corrective to previous interpretations of these works, interpretations that were badly botched or misplaced in their major conclusions, in fact, I feel just the opposite: that most interpretations so far have been right on the money and their conclusions have been sound. Perhaps, where they have

led us astray and this is partly the responsibility of a certain marketing rationale that dominates academic publishing these days with a preference for commentaries on major figures and classroom textbooks is that they remain at the level of interpretation, if not explication de texte. They dont seem to take into their account that Deleuze and Guattari didnt write books together, but rather attempted to trace intensities in the process of becoming revolutionary. The former is a fairly static process, and already poses that the end of the process occurs when the object of interpretation is explained and fairly well understood; however, understanding has never been a goal of Deleuze and Guattaris writing s, but rather something that they have called by different names, all of which amounts to an active process of becoming-x and is involved with the fundamental issue of desire . But what is desire? Here we begin the process of real learning that their writings aim to address. After all, Deleuze and Guattari say that a book isnt produced in order to be understood, but is rather a machine for producing desires. (I will argue
that Jameson was alone in understanding this, even better than most Deleuzians, and, therefore, also knew what kind of threat this book might pose for his own programme of political interpretation.) We can find all kinds of desires

expressed around and in response to their works revolutionary and reactionary alike but the real question doesnt concern the interpretation of these books but what kind of desires they are associated with and what they can be plugged into. As Deleuze himself once remarked concerning the status of Anti-Oedipus as a book: Its not as a book that it could respond to desire, but only in relation to what surrounds it. A book is not worth much on its own. Its always a question of flow: there are many people doing work in similar fields. I doubt they will buy the current type of discourse, at once epistemological, psychoanalytic, ideological, which is beginning to wear thin with everyone . . . In any case, a book responds to a desire only because there are many people fed up with the current type of discourse. So, its only because a book participates in a larger re-shuffling, a resonance between research and desire. A book can respond to desire only in a political way, outside the book.
(Deleuze and Guattari [hereafter DG] 2004: 220)

A2: Jameson
Jameson's understanding of totality limits political expression to the goal of centralized parties, preventing the possibility of a politics of desire. Lambert 2006 (Greg, "Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?")
Here, one

might think that I am accusing Jameson of knavery and this might be true if not for the realization that it is not a question of correct interpretation as the logical deduction truth of the other system that is at issue, but rather the political usefulness of this system in the national and cultural situation of the United States. Above all, we must not forget the maxim that Jameson clearly announces in the conclusion of the footnote cited earlier that alliance politics is the strict practical equivalent of the concept of totalization on a theoretical level , which means that any attack on the concept of totality in the American framework poses the serious threat of undermining the only realistic prospect that a genuine Left could come into being in this country. In other words, for Jameson, theory is equal (the strict equivalent) to practice again, it is only in the ideological field of consciousness that they appear to belong to separate spheres and for this reason any attack on totality as a theoretical notion is to be treated on a practical level as an attempt to forestall or to repress the formation of an alliance politics that would reunite the already molecular collective forms of social and political interests that define the situation in the United States. Therefore, all attacks on totality must either be theoretically contained or must be adjusted to fit within a systematic political strategy that serves the practical goals of alliance and reunification of the Left in the United States.

A2: Hillman
Our love of war derives from a force called fascism. The war machine we speak of begins with the self and is a natural result of microfascist impulses. Ignoring this desire causes fascism to continue untouched, inevitably resulting in destructive tendencies. The war machine is representative of the power at large. The war machine, like power, has no initial objective and no final goals until it is ascribed positive or negative purpose. The state uses violent final goals, striations, containments, etc, on the war machine turning it into a negative force capable only of inflicting pain. Instead, the forces of war and power should be turned free we should engage in our inner lust for war and express power in positive ways to counter negative forces. Deleuze and Guattari 1987 (A Thousand Plateaus, pg 230-231)
There are many reasons to believe that the war machine is of a different origin, is a different assemblage, than the State apparatus. It is of nomadic origin and is directed against the State apparatus. One of the fundamental problems of the State is to appropriate this war machine that is foreign to it and make it a piece in its apparatus, in the form of a stable military institution; and the State has always encountered major difficulties in this. It is precisely when the war machine has reached the point that it has no other object but war, it is when it substitutes destruction for mutation, that it frees the most catastrophic charge . Mutation is in no way a transformation of war; on the contrary, war is like the fall or failure of mutation, the only object left for the war machine after it has lost its power to change. War, it must be said, is only the abominable residue of the war machine, either after it has allowed itself to be appropriated by the State apparatus, or even
worse, has constructed itself a State apparatus capable only of destruction. When this happens, the war machine no longer draws mutant lines of flight, but a pure, cold line of abolition. (Later, we will propos e a theory of the complex relation between the war machine and

war.)31 This brings us back to the paradox of fascism, and the way in which fascism differs from totalitarianism. For totalitarianism is a State affair: it essentially concerns the relation between the State as a localized assemblage and the abstract machine of overcoding it effectuates. Even in the case of a military dictatorship, it is a State army, not a war machine, that takes power and elevates the State to the totalitarian stage. Totalitarianism

is quintessentially conservative. Fascism, on the other hand, involves a war machine. When fascism builds itself a totalitarian State, it is not in the sense of a State army taking power, but of a war machine taking over the State. A bizarre remark by Virilio puts us on the trail: in fascism, the State is far less totalitarian than it is suicidal. There is in fascism a realized nihilism. Unlike the totalitarian State, which does its utmost to seal all possible lines of flight, fascism is constructed on an intense line of flight, which it transforms into a line of pure destruction and abolition. It is curious that from the very beginning the Nazis announced to Germany what they were bringing: at once wedding bells and death, including their own death, and the death of the Germans. They thought they would perish but that their undertaking would be resumed, all across Europe, all over the world, throughout the solar system. And the people cheered, not because they did not understand, but because they wanted that death through the death of others. Like a will to wager everything you have every hand, to stake your own death against the death of
others, and measure everything by "deleometers." Klaus Mann's novel, Mephisto, gives samplings of entirely ordinary Nazi speeches and conversations: "Heroism was something that was being ruled out of our lives. . . . In reality, we are not marching forward, we are reeling, staggering. Our beloved Fiihrer is dragging us toward the shades of darkness and everlasting nothingness. How can we poets, we who have a special affinity for darkness and lower depths, not admire him? . . . Fires blazing on the horizon; rivers of blood in all the streets; and the frenzied dancing of the survivors, of those who are still spared, around the bodies of the dead!"32 Suicide is presented not as a punishment but as the crowning glory of the death of others. One can always say that it is just a matter of foggy talk and ideology, nothing but ideology. But that is not true. The insufficiency of economic and political definitions of fascism does not simply imply a need to tack on vague, so-called ideological determinations. We prefer to follow Faye's inquiry into the precise formation of Nazi statements, which are just as much in evidence in politics and economics as in the most absurd of conversations. They always contain the "stupid and repugnant" cry, Long live death!, even at the economic level, where the arms expansion replaces growth in consumption and where investment veers from the means of production toward the means of pure destruction. Paul Virilio's analysis strikes us as entirely correct in defining fascism not by the notion of the totalitarian State but by the notion of the suicidal State: so-called

total war seems less a State undertaking than

an undertaking of a war machine that appropriates the State and channels into it a flow of absolute war whose only possible outcome is the suicide of the State itself. "The triggering of a hitherto unknown material process, one that is limitless and aimless. . . . Once triggered, its mechanism cannot stop at peace, for the indirect strategy effectively places the dominant powers outside the usual categories of
space and time. . . . It was in the horror of daily life and its environment that Hitler finally found his surest means of governing, the legitimation of his policies and military strategy; and it lasted right up to the end, for the ruins and horrors and crimes and chaos of total war, far from discharging the repulsive nature of its power, normally only increase its scope. Telegram 71 is the normal outcome: If the war is lost, may the nation perish. Here, Hitler decides to join forces with his enemies in order to complete the destruction of his own people, by obliterating the last remaining resources of its life-support system, civil reserves of every kind (potable water, fuel, provisions, etc.)."33 It

was this reversion of the line of flight into a line of destruction that already animated the molecular focuses of fascism, and made them interact in a war machine instead of resonating in a State apparatus. A war machine that no longer had anything but war as its object and would rather annihilate its own servants than stop the destruction. All the dangers of the other lines pale by comparison.

A2: Baudrillard
Extend Deleuze and Guattari in 1980. Everything is desire. We desire to be little reformists striving for change. We desire for the little fascist tendencies like laughing at West Texas teams in the K debate or suppressing other schools. Focus on the state ignores the fascism hidden in the every day. It is too easy to not even see the fascist tendencies inside you. Only a focus on the self and our relation towards repression can begin to account for the operations of desire. Concepts of representations create the image of a real world that is divided into images. This concept makes no sense in the context of being and can never interact with the political or the philosophical. The epitome of representations creates life as continuous images, creating an existence of objects and events destroying its value. We need to move to the point of pure perception and positive difference in order to maintain the images in a manner that preserves value to life. Colebrook 2002 (Claire, Understanding Deleuze) Pg 163-164 It makes no sense to say that there is a real world which we then perceive through representations. It is not as though there is a world in itself which we then grasp and synthesize through time. The world is a temporal flow or duration, never identical to itself; but there are points of imaging where one flow intersects with another. A human being perceives an object; the flow of human life is slowed down in order for us to image ourselves as subjects, while the flow of things we perceive is slowed down so that we can think of extended matter. Deleuzes idea of the image changes the standard notion of a real world that is doubled by a human viewers representations. When a human being (or any perceiver) experiences an object, there is an event of imaging or perception. One flow on the univocal plane of being is affected by another. When we think about this event of perception we tend to imagine two points: the perceiving brain and the thing perceived. But both these pointsthe viewer and the viewed are images abstracted from the event of perception. According to one of Deleuzes main commentators, it is the cinematic time image that frees life from any ordered or actualized sequence to its power of becoming: The plane of consistency of the time image is best characterized by seriality: the irrational interval assures the incommensurability of interval and whole. Succession gives way to series because the interval is a dissociative force; it strings images together only as disconnected spaces (Rodowick 1997, p. 178). In his book on Bergson, Deleuze argues that we need to begin with the hypothesis of a pure perception, where there is just the image or affect (Deleuze 1988). There is not a brain that perceives or a subject that is affected. Life is just this pure perception, the affection of one event of becoming on another. But this ideal of a pure perception without delay or reflection, a pure flow of life in and for itself, is only half the story. (It is similar to the notion of absolute deterritorialization, which does not exist in fact but can only be thought; it is a virtual whole.) If there were nothing more than a flow of images without delay or interruption, life would be purely actual; there would simply be the active, productive and undivided continuum of stimulus and response. We could still

refer to this single plane as one of images. But these images would not be recorded. One molecule might respond to another, and so we might say that there has been imaging. But there would be no delay or hesitation whereby that molecule might perceive the other in an unexpected or not already given manner. For localized perception to happen there must be a delay and an interruption of the pure flow of perception by the virtual. (This can occur at the molecular level, where not all aspects of code pass from one connection to another, so that not all the flow has been actualized.) Only the permutation can account for any change. Baudrillard concedes that his alt can never solve he has no means of creating political change. Kellner 03 (Douglas, George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education at UCLA, "Jean Baudrillard," The Blackwell companion to major contemporary social theorists, p. 315) Baudrillard's focus is on the "logic of social differentiation" whereby individuals distinguish themselves and attain social prestige and standing through purchase and use of consumer goods. He argues that the entire system of production produces a system of needs that is rationalized, homogenized, reification, domination, and exploitation produced by capitalism. At this stage, it appeared that his critique came from the standard neo-Marxian vantage point, which assumes that capitalism is blameworthy because it is homogenizing, controlling, and dominating social life, while robbing individuals of their freedom, creativity, time, and human potentialities. On the other hand, he could not point to any revolutionary forces and in particular did not discuss the situation and potential of the working class as an agent of change in the consumer society. Indeed, Baudrillard has no theory of the subject as an active agent of social change whatsoever (thus perhaps following the structuralist and poststructuralist critique of the subject popular at the time). Nor does he have a theory of class or group revolt, or any theory of political organization, struggle, or strategy.

A2: Schlag
Normativity is a bad argument to run against our affirmative. 1. No Link We don't engage in a normative question -- we engage in a critical discussion itself so we might learn about how microfascist desire become justifications for state based policies. Schlag critiques macro politics and legal processes because things on the macro level are different than on the micro level. Our affirmative can fundamentally agree with Schlags type of criticism; we change desires on the micro level. 2. Debate is more than a game. Intellectuals are responsible for the thinking that shapes the moral consciousness. Ketels 1996 Assc Prof of English @ Temple Violet B.-former Director of the Intl Heritage Program;
The Holocaust: Remembering for the Future: Havel to the Castle! The Power of the Word; THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE; November; 548 Annals45 "THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTELLECTUALS" ABSTRACT: This article argues the virtue of Vaclav Havel's striking idea "that the world might actually be changed by the force of truth, the power of a truthful word, the strength of a free spirit, conscience, and responsibility." We are not powerless when we recognize the power of words to change history for good or ill. Intellectuals, whose work is inherently linguistic, bear unique responsibility for the thinking that shapes the general moral consciousness. Havel calls intellectuals to account for vacuous verbal games that erode faith in human communication, for complicity in subversive linguistic manipulation, and for ethical indifference. We must become Cassandras, he urges, "warriors of the pen," predicting, warning, bearing witness on the side of truth against lies, holding ourselves and others to account for the integrity of words and for fidelity between words and action. Only such scruple can change moral consciousness enough to make violence rare and human life sacred again.

3. Every year on every topic in every debate round we begin with 1AC a plan of action for the world to become a better place. Throughout this midst, we become intellectuals striving to make a better 1AC. We are engaged in a form of production; our words construct a life-world that we have to inhabit and are also a plane of contestation unto themselves rather than just a transparent medium that communicates ethical and political imperatives. Hardt and Negri in 2k (Terrorists, awesome dudes, profs at places of respectable respectedness; Empire)
Ether is the third and final fundamental medium of imperial control. The management of communication, the structuring of the education system, and the regulation of culture appear today more than ever as sovereign prerogatives. All of this, however, dissolves in the ether. The contemporary systems of communication are not subordinated to sovereignty; on the contrary, sovereignty seems to be subordinated to communication-or actually, sovereignty is articulated through communications systems. In the field of communication, the paradoxes that bring about the dissolution of territorial and/or national sovereignty are more clear than ever. The deterritorializing capacities of communication are unique: communication is not satisfied by limiting or weakening modern

territorial sovereignty; rather it attacks the very possibility of linking an order to a space. It
imposes a continuous and complete circulation of signs. Deterritorialization is the primary force and circulation the form through which social communication manifests itself. In this way and in this ether, languages become functional to circulation and dissolve every sovereign relationship. Education and culture too cannot help submitting to the circulating society of the spectacle. Here we reach an extreme limit of the process of the dissolution of the relationship between order and space. At this point we cannot conceive this relationship except in another space, an

elsewhere that cannot in principle be contained in the articulation of sovereign acts. The space of communication is completely deterritorialized. It is absolutely other with respect to the residual spaces that we have been analyzing in terms of the monopoly of physical force and the definition of monetary measure. Here it is a question not of residue but of metamorphosis: a metamorphosis of all the elements of political economy and state theory. Communication is the form of capitalist production in which capital has succeeded in submitting society entirely and globally to its regime, suppressing all alternative paths. If ever an alternative is to be proposed, it will have to arise from within the society of the real subsumption and demonstrate all the contradictions at the heart of it. These three means of control refer us again to the three tiers of the imperial pyramid of power. The bomb
is a monarchic power, money aristocratic, and ether democratic. It might appear in each of these cases as though the reins of these mechanisms were held by the United States. It might appear as if the United States were the new Rome, or a cluster of new Romes: Washington (the bomb), New York (money), and Los Angeles (ether). Any such territorial

conception of imperial space, however, is continually destabilized by the fundamental flexibility, mobility, and deterritorialization at the core of the imperial apparatus. Perhaps the monopoly off force and the regulation of money can be given partial territorial determinations, but communication cannot. Communication has become the central element that establishes the relations of production, guiding capitalist development and also transforming productive forces. This dynamic produces an extremely open situation: here the centralized locus of power has to confront the power of productive subjectivities, the power of all those who contribute to the interactive production of communication. Here in this circulating domain of imperial domination over the new forms of production, communication is most widely disseminated in capillary forms.

4. Our act of moving toward schizophrenic politics goes against the normative policy orientated framework debate has traditionally been engaged in. We open up the space to question why we allowed ourselves to become entrenched in fascist global capital and demand a more efficient tomorrow. 5. Before action can take place we must reframe the way debates are carried out under the current political conditions. Debates in the west have spiraled into simple dichotomies of good and bad, codifying the potential for debate to create effective change. Instead, we should affirm problematization a constant auto-critique, the new enlightenment which questions moral clarity and seeks to challenge what we are powerless to change. Zalloua, 2008 (Zahi, Assistant Professor of French at Whitman College , "The Future of an Ethics of Difference After Hardt and Negris Empire" MUSE)
With his concept of altermondialisation (or alterglobalization, the French word for globalization being derived from world [monde], a term that evokes the globes inhabitants more so than its geography), Derrida similarly foregrounds the continued need to think globalization in terms of alterity and its preservationthe need to think globalization otherwise (altermondialisation) than its current manifestation as a homogenizing capitalism that domesticates difference. In a brief essay entitled Une Europe de lespoir [A Europe of Hope], Derrida challenges the terms of

the debate imposed by a hegemonic and arrogant American power, who frames global struggle as a battle of good and evil. To this model Derrida opposes an engaged Europe, a Europe that is more social and less mercantile (2004, 3) and that realizes the promises of the Enlightenment.20 Here, the term Europe does not refer toor rather, is not limited toa geographical space with fixed [End Page 141] boundaries, but rather a critical ethos based on the ideals of democracy, human rights, and freedom of thought 21: It is once again a question of the Enlightenment, that is, of access to Reason in a certain public space, though this time in conditions that technoscience and economic or telemedia globalization have thoroughly transformed : in time and as space,

in rhythms and proportions. If intellectuals, writers, scholars, professors, artists, and journalists do not, before all else, stand up together against [the violence of intolerance], their abdication will be at once irresponsible and suicidal. (2003, 125) Like Glissants archipelagoes, which serve as a productive model for rhizomatic thought, Derridas Europe becomes a trope

for a deconstructive mode of reading, an example of what a politics, a reflection, and an ethics might be, the inheritors of a past Enlightenment that bear an Enlightenment to come, a Europe capable of nonbinary forms of discernment (2004, 3). To read like a European (a subject position open to allto Americans, for example, who draw their hope from the civil rights movement) is to contest what passes for moral clarity today. Against post-9/11 doxa and its resurrected rhetoric of good and evil, Derrida calls for a productive skepticisma skepticism that does not entail paralysis and nihilism in the face of our powerlessness to comprehend, recognize, cognize, identify, name, describe, foresee (2003, 94), but vigilance and self-critique, a more rigorous mode of analysis, one that resists the lure of moral absolutes and bears witness to the specificity and complexity of sociopolitical reality . Just as Foucault
had before him defiantly refused the blackmail of the Enlightenment (the notion that one is either for it or against it [1984, 42]), Derridas valorization of a European Enlightenment, on one hand, may have surprised if not shocked some of his readers, especially those for whom the father of deconstruction is a nihilist, obscurantist, textual idealist, or more generally, an enemy of Reason. On the other hand, this turn to the Enlightenment does not really represent a deviation in Derridas philosophical path. It is quite consistent with his demystifying critique of the yearning for purity, absolute (that is, ahistorical) meanings or transcendental signifieds (ousia, eidos, consciousness, etc.). For Derrida, this critique takes place first and foremost at the level of language. As Iain Chambers puts it, If what [End Page 142] passes for knowledge

emerges within language, then, critical knowledge involves an exploration of language itself
(32).22 As such, Derrida recognizes that his genealogical investigationshis denaturalization of key normative concepts (nature, culture, democracy, etc.)never constitute a transgression in the pure sense of the term, as a stepping outside of metaphysics:

There is not a transgression, if one understands by that a pure and simple landing into a beyond metaphysics, at a point which would be, let us not forget, first of all a point of language or writing . Now, even in aggressions or transgressions, we are consorting with a code to which metaphysics is tied irreducibly, such that every transgressive gesture reencloses usprecisely by giving us a hold on the closure of metaphysicswithin this closure. (1981, 12) Nevertheless, despite (or because of) the impossibility of transcending the closure of metaphysics, Derrida tirelessly works to forestall what postMarxists Laclau and Mouffe call the desire for an ultimate fixity of meaning (112), rethinking creatively and critically (under erasure) the inherited concepts of metaphysics within that very tradition: a mutation will have to take place in our entire way of thinking about justice, democracy, sovereignty, globalization, military power, the relations of nation-states, the politics of friendship and enmity in order to address terrorism with any hope of an effective cure (Derrida 2003, 106; emphasis added). While calling for an effective curethat is, for a critique that will have a positive impact on the worldDerrida is careful to frame his observation in tentative terms as a hope, cognizant that he is not proposing a blueprint for rational political action. Along these lines, Derridas appeal to the Enlightenment, then, is not

to be understood as a wholesale acceptance of its Reason, but as a tactical use of its tools in an effort to reframe the terms of current debates (about globalization, democracy, cosmopolitanism, hospitality, hybridity, difference, etc.), to prepare if not provide an urgent opening, to see the present as holding some ability to becomeother (Nealon 2006, 79). [End Page 143] 6. Dont vote neg on presumption. Presumption is the most normative thing in the round. At the end of the debate, if there is a tie and the judge is trying to decide who to vote for thats the most normative thing in debate.

A2: Feminism
Feminist concepts of gender misses the point rather than confiding ourselves to 2 sexes we need to view N sexes an infinite rhizome of sexuality without a definable right and wrong. This is the only method of sexuality that avoids negative difference. Holland 1999 (Eugene, Associate Professor of French and Comparative Literature at the Ohio State University; Deleuze and Guatarris Anti-Oedipus and introduction to Schitzoanalysis) Pg 43-44 Deleuze and Guattari then take the case against exclusive disjunction one step further, arguing against one of the cornerstones of Lacans structural psychoanalysis, the binary opposition involved in what he sometimes called the Real difference between the sexes: the necessity of being either male or female.32 Deleuze and Guattari categorically deny the validity of the opposition. No one is really exclusively male or female any more than they are exclusively heterosexual or homosexual; everyone is at the same time neither and both: neither in the sense of remaining irreducible to any single essence, while still entertaining elements of both, yet without combining the two into any kind of synthesis that would eliminate the differences between them. Such is the form of subjectivity produced by inclusive disjunctive synthesis. As in the case of illegitimate conjunctive syntheses which fail to completely segregate the nuclear family, exclusive gender disjunctions even within the nuclear family ultimately fail to impose binary sexuality. The family supposedly starts with only two sexes available for identification: male and female. But that illegitimately excludes homosexuality: if we include homosexuality, the number of sexes increases to four (in alphabetical order: heterosexual female, heterosexual male, homosexual female, homosexual male). But then there are also two modes of relation object-choice and identification so the possibilities for sexual identity multiply yet again: we could distinguish male-identified homosexual females with female object-choice (butchfemme relations) from male-identified homosexual females with male object-choice (butchbutch relations); male-identified heterosexual males with female object-choice (normal Oedipal relations) from maleidentified heterosexual females with male object-choice (a kind of inverted Oedipal relation), and so on. Even on this level, which still presupposes the validity of a global distinction between male and female, binary sexual identity has mushroomed into multiplicity.33 Yet even if on what Deleuze and Guattari call the molar level, the level of external object-choice and identification, there may still be recognizable sexual identities (though clearly many more than two), on the molecular level sexual identity is comprised of a multiplicity of internal features (including what are sometimes called secondary sexual characteristics) that are not reducible to the reproductive organs alone. These may include body-hair, bone and muscle mass, breast size, propensity to aggression or passivity, to the emotional or rational, and so forth.34 Here, too, there are no longer just two sexual identities but rather diverse ways of being a man which go far beyond being just straight or gay, a variety of ways of being a lesbian, say, which go far beyond being butch or femme. The

result, Deleuze and Guattari insist, is that there are not one or even two, but n sexes (296/352): there is no such thing as sexual identity, no such thing as heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bi-sexuality except as gross approximations only multiplicity or what they call trans-sexuality. It is never really a question of being either a man or a woman, either straight or gay, and so on, but of affirming a multiplicity of innumerable differences; with legitimate disjunctive syntheses, it is never a question of being either this or that, but of constantly exploring real alternatives and of (whatever one once was or is now) always becoming-otherwise: thisor thisor this or this. Our philosophy calls for the end of the nuclear family this is the best way to solve patriarchy. Holland 1999 (Eugene, Associate Professor of French and Comparative Literature at the Ohio State University; Deleuze and Guatarris Anti-Oedipus and introduction to Schitzoanalysis) Pg 118-119 In any case, the intersections between feminism and schizoanalysis regarding the role of the nuclear family in reproducing patriarchy suggest at least one concrete practical measure: dissolve the nuclear family. Feminists have long argued that the segregation of the nuclear family from the rest of society warps attitudes toward women (and have called for more egalitarian and socialized child-rearing arrangements, among other things64). Schizoanalysis concurs, albeit on somewhat more general grounds: the nuclear family places the mother in a subservient position, as the figure from which children must be weaned by the paternal interdiction, to be sure. But it restricts all types of libidinal investment identification and sexual orientation as well as object-choice within parameters so narrow that desire not only gets warped but risks getting stifled altogether: asceticism. For schizoanalysis, what is crucial is whether a given type of libidinal investment engages desire in the Oedipal impasses of the couple and the family in the service of the repressive machines, or whether on the contrary it condenses a free energy capable of fueling a revolutionary machine (293/349). The dissolution of the nuclear family by desegregating biological and social reproduction (e.g. integrating child-rearing into wider community relations at work and/or in neighborhoods, housing cooperatives, extended families, etc.) would produce several benefits, from the point of view of schizoanalysis. Socializing reproduction would, for one thing, improve the position of women as mothers and in relation to men: children would not be as desperately attached to one source of nourishment and affection, and would therefore suffer and resent less the process of weaning and the paternal interdiction associated with it; the interdiction itself would not be concentrated in one person holding absolute authority (within the family) but would be diffused throughout a broader network of social relations. Perhaps most importantly, more socialized reproduction would sharply reduce the asceticism resulting from the restriction of desire within the nuclear family to precisely those objects that are taboo (parents and siblings): breaking the stranglehold of the nuclear family on desire would enable it to more freely and easily invest social relations at large, thereby breaching the wall between desiring-production and social-production and enabling the former to better saturate and inform the latter.

Deleuzian thought solves feminism. Colebrook 2002 (Claire, Understanding Deleuze) Page xxxix-xl Feminists have also seen the work of Deleuze as helpful in thinking beyond the closed questions of humanism. Often, movements like feminism are divided over the question of whether to include women within humanity, arguing that we are all equal, or to argue for womens essential difference. The feminisms that followed existentialism and phenomenology, such as the work of Simone de Beauvoir (190886), argued that women were Other: always defined in opposition to, or as negations of man (Beauvoir 1969). Deleuze-inspired feminists have challenged this negative account by insisting that the images of both men and women are the result of prehuman and micropolitical productions; both are produced through a multiplicity of relations and connections, with neither grounding or preceding the other. One of the famous phrases from A Thousand Plateaus, a thousand tiny sexes, has been taken up by writers like Elizabeth Grosz, who sees the unified human body as the effect of processes of desire and becoming (Grosz 1994a). Against existentialism and phenomenology, Deleuze argued that whatever image we have of ourselves, we are affected by forces that lie beyond our active decision. Freedom needs to be redefined, not as the isolated decision of self-present human agents, but as the power to affirm all those powers beyond ourselves, which only an expanded perception can approach. Feminist critique fails because of its ground in identity rather we must focus on alternating intensity in order to create the positive difference. Colebrook 2002 (Claire, Understanding Deleuze) Page 45 By contrast, Deleuze produces a politics of desire. Intensities may not be meaningful, but they are no less political; it is not the message that we consume in culture but the investment in intensities. Society is ordered not by the imposition of meanings but by the production of styles. Deleuze argues for a micropoliticshow do specific qualities such as whiteness, softness, curvaceousness signs of a desire that is singular and impersonalcome to be coded as signs of the feminine? We have femininity not because we have imposed difference but because we have abstracted certain qualities and taken them as signifiers. The problem comes when desired intensities such as the image of Monroeare taken to be a signifier for woman in general; this is how the social machine, according to Deleuze, overcodes desire. It reduces intensive difference the investment in impersonal qualities such as blondeness, curvaceousness, vulnerabilityto extensive differencethe investment in woman or femininity. We can look at Andy Warhols repetition of Monroes image in relation to this reduction of intensive difference. Warhols art takes the signifiers of modern Americaeverything from Marilyn Monroe to Campbells soup tinsand repeats them as intensities. Monroe becomes a certain shape of lips and hair. The soup tin becomes the design-label, its colours, lettering and logo. The repetition of the image precludes us from seeing its uniqueness or being; we are given imaging and appearance itself. So that it is not that we have identities such as femininity or American home-life that we then signify through imagesthere is no woman or America other than the proliferation of intensities. Identity occurs with the reduction of intensities to a signifier, when we imagine the intensity as the image of somethingwhen we think our love of apple pie

signifies our Americanness. The reverse is the case; identities are formed from desires, such as investments in colours, body-parts, tastes and styles. Desire is originally productive, connective and intensive, the investment in qualities that are neither masculine nor feminine but singular. Through repetition and coding these qualities are read as signifiers of some individual essence that precedes and governs the intensities.

A2: Security
What is the negative critiquing? We seek a mode of analysis that critiques the same ideas which the negative does. We are not passive subjects in the face of immutable necessities, rather, we are the authors of history and it is in the process of mutual self-care, the creative shaping of yourself as desiring subjects, that we will find a more joyous form of social interaction that does not mutilate life. This violent hatred of the present produces a desire to be led that Deleuze and Guattari call fascism. As we come to view chaos and disorder as more harms to solve, we are willing to do worse and worse things to the world to preserve our stasis. Though we may achieve some degree of safety through the production of the desire for fascism, it comes at the cost of mass violence against anything and everything viewed as dangerous which, ultimately is everything in life. Our affirmation helps combat the force of fascism which makes us want to preserve our stasis. This is a process of making something that was formerly seen as true into a complex and uncertain mess of questions, making further action impossible because we have an ethico-political deadlock in the form of a problem. Extend our Conley in 2k6 evidence which talks about how we open up the space to question why we allowed ourselves to become entrenched in fascist global capital and demand a more efficient tomorrow. The act of the 1AC is a political gesture towards the schizophrenic never becoming a schizo, but learning from the potential provided by the freedom of insanity. Considering the possibility of being completely unfettered to reality, always reimagining concepts, is enough to make a change in reality. Deleuze and Guattari 1972, Anti-Oedipus, 366-8
The fourth and final thesis of schizoanalysis is therefore the distinction between two poles of social libidinal investment: the paranoiac, reactionary, and fascisizing pole, and the schizoid revolutionary pole. Once again, we see no objection to the use of terms inherited from psychiatry for characterizing social investments of
the unconscious, insofar as these terms cease to have a familial connotation that would make them into simple projections, and from the moment delirium is recognized as having a primary social content that is immediately adequate. The two

poles are defined, the one by the enslavement of production and the desiring-machines to the gregarious aggregates that they constitute on a large scale under a given form of power or selective sovereignty; the other by the inverse subordination and the overthrow of power . The
one by these molar structured aggregates that crush singularities, select them, and regularize those that they retain in codes or axiomatics: the other by the molecular multiplicities of singularities that on the contrary treat the large aggregates as so many useful materials for their own elaborations. The one by the lines of integration and territorialization that arrest the flows, constrict them, turn them back, break them again according to the limits interior to the system, in such a way as to produce the images that come to fiIl the field of immanence peculiar to this system or this aggregate. the other by lines of escape that follow the decoded and deterritorialized flows, inventing their own nonfigurative breaks or schizzes that produce new flows, always breaching the coded wall or the territorialized limit that separates them from desiring-production. And to summarize all the preceding determinations: the one is defined by subjugated groups, the other by subject-groups. It is true that we still run up against all kinds of problems concerning these distinctions. In what sense does the schizoid investment constitute, to the same extent as the other one, a real investment of the socio-historical field, and not a simple utopia? In what sense are the

lines of escape collective, positive, and creative? What is the relationship between the two unconscious poles, and what is their relationship with the preconscious investments of interest? We have seen that the unconscious paranoiac investment was grounded in the socius itself as a full body without organs, beyond the preconscious aims and interests that it assigns and distributes. The fact remains that such an investment does not endure the light of day: it must always hide under assignable aims or interests presented as the general aims and interests, even though in reality the latter represent only the members of the dominant class or a fraction of this class. How could a formation of sovereignty, a fixed and determinate gregarious aggregate, endure being invested for their brute force, their violence, and their absurdity? They would not survive such an investment. Even the most overt fascism speaks the language of goals, of law,

order, and reason. Even the most insane capitalism speaks in the name of economic rationality. And this is necessarily the case, since it is in the irrationality of the full body that the order of reasons is inextricably fixed, under a code, under an axiomatic that determines it. What is more, the bringing to light of the unconscious reactionary investment as if devoid of an aim, would be enough to transform it completely, to make it pass to the other pole of the libido, i.e., to the schizorevolutionary pole, since this action could not be accomplished without overthrowing power, without reversing subordination, without returning production itself to desire: for it is only desire that lives from having no aim. Molecular desiring-production would regain its liberty to master in its turn the molar aggregate under an overturned
form of power or sovereignty. That is why Klossowski, who has taken the theory of the two poles of investment the furthest, but still within the category of an active utopia, is able to write: "Every sovereign formation would thus have to foresee the destined moment of its disintegration.... No formation of sovereignty, in order to crystalize, will ever endure this prise de conscience: for as soon as this formation

By way of the circuitous route of science and art, human beings have many times revolted against this fixity; this capacity notwithstanding, the gregarious impulse in and by science caused this rupture to fail. The day humans are able to behave as intentionless phenomena-for every intention at the level of the human being
becomes conscious of its immanent disintegration in the individuals who compose it, these same individuals decompose it . ... always obeys the laws of its conservation, its continued existence-on that day a new creature will declare the integrity of existence.... Science demonstrates by its very method that the means that it constantly elaborates do no more than reproduce, on the outside, an interplay of forces by themselves without aim or end whose combinations obtain such and such a result. ... However, no science can develop outside a constituted

In order to prevent science from calling social groups back in question, these groups take science back in hand ... [integrate it] into the diverse industrial schemes; its autonomy appears strictly
social grouping.

inconceivable. A conspiracy joining together art and science presupposes a rupture of all our institutions and a total upheaval of the means of production.... If some conspiracy, according to Nietzsche's wish, were to use science and art in a plot whose ends were no less suspect, industrial society would seem to foil this conspiracy in advance by the kind of mise en scene it offers for it, under pain of effectively suffering what this conspiracy reserves for this society: i.e., the

breakup of the institutional structures that mask the society into a plurality of experimental spheres finally revealing the true face of modernity-an ultimate phase that Nietzsche saw as the end result of the evolution
of societies. In this perspective, art and science would then emerge as sovereign formations that Nietzsche said constituted the object of his countersociology-art and science establishing themselves as dominant powers, on the ruins of institutions

A2: Stavrakakis
We are not stupid we realize that there can never be an end to the harms of the world, there is no utopia, but in this instance our violent utopian vision allows us to shoot for the stars and settle for what little change is possible. Felix Guattari 1989, Pierre was a French militant, institutional psychotherapist and philosopher, a founder of both schizoanalysis and ecosophy. "The Three Ecologies", pp. 59-60 I am not so naive and Utopian as to maintain that there exists a reliable, analytic methodology that would be able to fundamentally eradicate all of the fantasies leading to the objectification of women, immigrants, the insane, e t c . , or that might allow us to have done with prisons and psychiatric institutions, e t c . 6 8 However it does seem to me that a generalization of the experiences of institutional analysis (in hospitals, schools, the urban environment) might profoundly modify the conditions of this problem [les donnees de ce piobleme]. There will have to be a massive reconstruction of social mechanisms [rouages] if we are to confront the damage caused by IWC. It will not come about through centralized reform, through laws, decrees and bureaucratic programmes, but rather through the promotion of innovatory practices, the expansion of alternative experiences centred around a respect for singularity, and through the continuous production of an autonomizing subjectivity that can articulate itself appropriately in relation to the rest of society. Creating a space for violent fantasies brutal deterritorializations of the psyche and of the socius won't lead to miraculous sublimation, but only to redeployed assemblages that will overflow the body, the Self, and the individual in all directions. Ordinary approaches to education and socialization won't weaken the grip of a punitive superego or deathly guilt complex. The great religions, apart from Islam, have an increasingly insignificant hold over the psyche, while almost everywhere else in the world, we are seeing a kind of return to totemism and animism. Troubled human communities tend to become introspective and abandon the task of governing or managing society to the professional politicians, while trade unions are left behind by the mutations of a society that is everywhere in latent or manifest crisis.

A2: Disarmament
No link Our affirmative does not endorse an arms control approach to nuclear weapons; we dont agree with the government disarmament movement. Our affirmative is an echo of a larger movement against state fascism. We steer away from and criticize in the 1AC a capital S- state. Extend Deleuze and Guattari 72. It is insufficient to discuss war only at the macro level. It is worthless to speak in terms of enemy position, securing targets, or strategic assaults. The power which concocts war does not begin at the state, it begins with the self. War is an outlet for a force called fascism. The only way to truly solve for the development of nukes is by redirecting our desire war for into something more productive. The development of military technology takes place upon the backdrop of acceleration as more advanced weaponry is developed, the human element of war becomes more and more minimal. Instincts are sacrificed for precision tools, human compassion and reason replaced with systems to analyze probability. Weapons themselves enhances an ontology of war that seeks to depersonalize violence, ushering in a new system of ethics which can end only in massive wars and the deployment of super weapons to erase populations. The only way to prevent this is to redirect our desire for war. Virilio 98 (Paul, crazy guy who doesnt have email or an answering machine, The State of Emergency, The Virilio Reader, pg
48 57) The ancient inter-city duel, war between nations, the permanent conflict between naval empires and continental powers have all suddenly disappeared, giving way to an unheard-of opposition: the juxtaposition of every locality, all matter. The

planetary mass becomes no more than a critical mass, a precipitate resulting from the extreme reduction of contact time, a fearsome friction of places and elements that only yesterday were still distinct and
separated by a buffer of distances, which have suddenly become anachronistic. In The Origin of Continents and Oceans, published in 1915, Alfred Wegener writes that in the beginning the earth can only have had but one face, which seems likely, given the capacities for interconnect ion. In the future the earth will have but one interface ... If speed thus appears as

the essential fall-out of styles of conflicts and cataclysms, the current arms race is in fact only the arming of the race toward the end of the world as distance , in other words as a field of action. The term deterrence points to the ambiguity of this situation, in which the weapon replaces the protection of armor, in which the possibilities of offense and offensive ensure in and of themselves the defense, the entire defensive against the explosive dimension of strategic arms, but not at all against the implosive dimension of the vectors performances, since on the contrary the maintenance of a credible strike power requires the constant refining of the engines power, in other words of their ability to reduce geographic space to nothing or almost nothing. In fact, without the violence of speed, that of weapons would not be so fearsome. In the current context, to disarm would thus mean first and foremost to decelerate, to defuse the race toward the end. Any treaty that does not limit the speed of this race (the speed
of means of communicating destruction) will not limit strategic arms, since from now on the essential object of strategy consists in maintaining the non-place of a general delocalization of means that alone still allows us to gain fractions of seconds, which gain is indispensable to any freedom of action. As General Fuller wrote, When the combatants

threw javelins at each other, the weapons initial speed was such that one could see it on its trajectory and parry its effects with ones shield. But when the javelin was replaced by the bullet, the speed was so great that parry became impossible. Impossible to move ones body out of the
way, but possible if one moved out of the weapons range; possible as well through the shelter of the trench, greater than that of the shield possible, in other words, through space and matter. Today, the reduction of warning time that

results from the supersonic speeds of assault leaves so little time for detection, identification and response that in the case of a surprise attack the supreme authority would have to risk abandoning his supremacy of decision by authorizing the lowest echelon of the defense system to immediately launch anti-missilevmissiles. The two political superpowers have thus far preferred to avoid this situation through negotiations, renouncing anti-missile defense at the same time. Given the lack of space, an active defense requires at least the material time to intervene. But these are the war materials that disappear in the acceleration of the means of communicating destruction . There remains only a
passive defense that consists less in reinforcing itself against the megaton powers of nuclear weapons than in a series of constant, unpredictable, aberrant movements, movements which are thus strategically effective for at least a little while longer, we hope. In fact, war now rests entirely on the deregulation of time and space. This is why the technical maneuver that consists in complexifying the vector by constantly improving its performances has now totally supplanted tactical maneuvers on the terrain, as we have seen. General Ailleret points this out in his history of weapons by stating that the definition of arms programs has become one of the essential elements of strategy. If in ancient conventional warfare we could still talk about army maneuvers in the fields, in the current state of affairs, if this maneuver still exists, it no longer needs a field. The invasion of the instant succeeds the invasion of the territory. The countdown becomes the scene of battle, the final frontier. The opposing sides can easily ban bacteriological, geodesic or meteorological warfare. In reality, what is currently at stake with strategic arms limitation agreements (SALT I) is no longer the explosive but the vector, the vector of nuclear deliverance, or more precisely its performances. The reason for this is simple: where the molecular or nuclear explosives blast made a given area unfit for existence, that of the implosive (vehicles and vectors) suddenly reduces reaction time, and the time for political decision,

to nothing. If over thirty years ago the nuclear explosive completed the cycle of spatial wars, at the end of this century the implosive (beyond politically and economically invaded territories) inaugurates the war of time. In full peaceful coexistence, without any declaration of hostilities, and more surely than by any other kind of conflict, rapidity delivers us from this world. We have to face the facts: today, speed is war, the last war. But lets go back to 1962, to the crucial events of the Cuban missile crisis. At that time, the
two superpowers had fifteen minutes warning time for war. The installation of Russian rockets on Castros island threatened to reduce the Americans warning to thirty seconds, which was unacceptable for President Kennedy, whatever the risks of his categorical refusal. We all know what happened: the installation of a direct line the hot line and the interconnection of the two Heads of State! Ten years later, in 1972, when the normal warning time was down to several minutes ten for ballistic missiles, a mere two for satellite weapons Nixon and Brezhnev signed the first strategic arms limitation agreement in Moscow. In fact, this agreement aims less at the quantitative limitation of weapons (as its adversary/partners claim) than at the preservation of a properly human political power, since the constant progress of rapidity threatens from one day to the next to reduce the warning time for nuclear war to less than one fatal minute thus finally abolishing the Head of States power of reflection and decision in favor of a pure and simple automation of defense systems. The decision for hostilities would then belong only to several strategic computer programs. After having been (because of its destructive capacities) the equivalent of total war the nuclear missile- launching submarine alone is able to destroy 500 cities the war machine suddenly becomes (thanks to the reflexes of the strategic calculator) the very decision for war. What will remain, then, of the political reasons for deterrence? Let us recall that in 1962, among the reasons that made General de Gaulle decide to have the populations ratify the decision to elect the President of the Republic by universal suffrage, there was the credibility of deterrence, the legitimacy of the referendum being a fundamental element of this very deterrence. What will remain of all this in the automation of deterrence? in the automation of decision? The transition from the state of

siege of wars of space to the state of emergency of the war of time only took several decades, during which the political era of the statesman was replaced by the apolitical era of the State apparatus.
Facing the advent of such a regime, we would do well to wonder about what is much more than a temporal phenomenon. At the close of our century, the time of the finite world is coming to an end; we live in the beginnings of a paradoxical miniaturization of action, which others prefer to baptize automation. Andrew Stratton writes, We commonly believe

that automation suppresses the possibility of human error. In fact, it transfers that possibility from the action stage to the conception stage. We are now reaching the point where the possibilities of an accident during the critical minutes of a plane landing, if guided automatically, are fewer than if a pilot is controlling it. We might wonder if we will ever reach the stage of automatically controlled nuclear weapons, in which the margin of error would be less than with human decision. But the possibility of this progress threatens to reduce to little or nothing the time for human decision to intervene in the system. This is brilliant. Contraction in time, the disappearance of the territorial space, after that of the
fortified city and armor, leads to a situation in which the notions of before and after designate only the future and the past in a form of war that causes the present to disappear in the instantaneousness of decision. The final power would thus be less one of imagination than of anticipation, so much so that to govern would be no more than to foresee, simulate, memorize the simulations; that the present Research Institute could appear to be the blueprint of this final power, the power of utopia. The loss of material space leads to the government of nothing but time. The Ministry of Time sketched in each vector will finally be accomplished following the dimensions of the biggest vehicle there is, the State-vector. The whole geographic history of the distribution of land and countries would stop in favor of a single regrouping of time, power no longer being comparable to anything but a meteorology. In this precarious fiction speed would suddenly become a destiny, a form of progress, in other words a civilization in which each speed would be something of a region of time. As Mackinder said, forces of pressure are always exerted in the same direction. Now, this single direction of geopolitics is that which leads to the

immediate commutation of things and places. War is not, as Foch claimed, harboring illusions on the future of chemical explosives, a worksite of fire. War has always been a worksite of movement, a speed-factory. The technological breakthrough, the last form of the war of movement, ends up, with deterrence, at the dissolution of what separated but also distinguished, and this non-distinction corresponds for us to a political blindness. We can verify it with General de Gaulles decree of January 7, 1959, suppressing the distinction between peacetime and wartime. Furthermore, during this same period, and despite the Vietnamese exception that proves the rule, war has shrunk from several years to several days, even to several hours. In the 1 960s a mutation occurs: the passage from wartime to the war of peacetime, to that total peace that others still call peaceful coexistence. The blindness of the speed of means of communicating destruction is not a liberation from geopolitical servitude, but the extermination of space as the field of freedom of political action. We only need refer to the necessary controls and constraints of the railway, airway or highway

infrastructures to see the fatal impulse: the more speed increases, the faster freedom decreases. The apparatus self-propulsion finally entails the self-sufficiency of automation. What happens in the example
of the racecar driver, who is no more than a worried lookout for the catastrophic probabilities of his movement, is reproduced on the political level as soon as conditions require an action in real time.2 Let us take, for example, a crisis situation: From the very beginning of the Six Days War in 1967, President Johnson took control of the White House, one hand guiding the Sixth Fleet, the other on the hot line. The necessity of the link between the two became clearly apparent as soon as an Israeli attack against the American reconnaissance ship Liberty provoked the intervention of one of the fleets aircraft carriers. Moscow examined every blip on the radar screens as attentively as Washington did: would the Russians interpret the air planes change of course and their convergence as an act of aggression? This is where the hot line came in: Washington immediately explained the reasons for this operation and Moscow was reassured (Harvey Wheeler). In this example of strategic political action in real time, the Chief of State is in fact a Great Helmsman. But the prestigious nature of the peoples historical guide gives way to the more prosaic and rather banal one of a test pilot trying to maneuver his machine in a very narrow margin. Ten years have passed since this crisis state, and the arms race has caused the margin

of political security to narrow still further, bringing us closer to the critical threshold where the possibilities for properly human political action will disappear in a State of Emergency; where telephone communication between statesmen will stop, probably in favor of an interconnection of computer systems, modern calculators of strategy and, consequently, of politics .
(Let us recall that the computers first task was to solve simultaneously a series of complex equations aimed at causing the trajectory of the anti-aircraft projectile and that of the airplane to meet.) Here we have the fearsome telescoping of

elements born of the amphibious generations; the extreme proximity of parties in which the immediacy of information immediately creates the crisis; the frailty of reasoning power, which is but the effect of a miniaturization of action the latter resulting from the miniaturization of space as a field of action. An imperceptible movement on a computer keyboard, or one made by a skyjacker brandishing a cookie box covered with masking tape, can lead to a catastrophic chain of events that until recently was inconceivable. We are too willing to ignore the fact that, alongside the
threat of proliferation resulting from the acquisition of nuclear explosives by irresponsible parties, there is a proliferation of the threat resulting from the vectors that cause those who own or borrow them to become just as irresponsible. In the beginning of the 1 940s, Paris was a six-days walk from the border, a three-hours drive, and one hour by plane. Today the capital is only several minutes away from anywhere else, and anywhere else is only several minutes away from its end so much so that the tendency, which still existed several years ago, to advance ones destructive means closer to the enemy territory (as in the Cuban missile crisis) is reversing. The present tendency is toward geographic disengagement, a movement of retreat that is due only to the progress of the vectors and to the extension of their reach (cf. the American submarine Trident, whose new missiles can travel 8 to 10,000 kilometers, as opposed to the Poseidons 4 to 5,000). Thus, the different strategic nuclear forces (American and Soviet) will no longer need to patrol the area in the target continents; they can henceforth retreat within their territorial limits. This is confirmation that they are abandoning a form of geostrategic conflict. Alter the reciprocal renunciation of geodesic war, we will possibly see the abandonment of advanced bases, extending to Americas extraordinary abandonment of its sovereignty over the Panama Canal... A sign of the times, of the time of the war of time. Nonetheless, we must note that this strategic retreat no longer has anything in common with the retreat that allowed conventional armies to gain time by losing ground. In the retreat due to the extended reach of the ballistic vectors, we in fact gain time by losing the space of the (stationary or mobile) advanced bases, but this time is gained at the expense of our own forces, of the performances of our own engines, and not at the enemys expense, since, symmetrically, the latter accompanies this geostrategic disengagement. Everything suddenly happens as if each protagonists own arsenal became his (internal) enemy, by advancing too quickly. Like the recoil of a firearm, the implosive movement of the

ballistic performances diminishes the field of strategic forces. In fact, if the adversary/partners didnt pull back their means of communicating destruction while lengthening their reach, the higher speed of these means would already have reduced the time of decision about their use to nothing. Just
as in 1972, in Moscow, the partners in this game abandoned plans for an anti-missile missile defense, so five years later they wasted the advantage of swiftness for the very temporary benefit of a greater extension of their intercontinental missiles. Both seem to fear all the while seeking the multiplying effect of speed, of that speed activity so dear to all armies since the Revolution. In the face of this curious contemporary regression of strategic arms limitation agreements, it is wise to return to the very principle of deterrence. The essential aim of throwing ancient weapons or of shooting off new ones has never been to kill the enemy or destroy his means, but to deter him, in other words, to force him to interrupt his movement. Regardless of whether this physical movement is one that allows the assailed to contain the assailant or one of invasion, the aptitude for war is the aptitude for movement, which a Chinese strategist expressed in

these words: An army is always strong enough when it can come and go, spread out and regroup, as it wishes and when it wishes. For the last several years, however, this freedom of movement has been hindered not by the enemys capacity for resistance or reaction, but by the refinement of the vectors used. Deterrence seems to have passed suddenly

from the fire stage, in other words the explosive stage, to that of the movement of vectors, as if a final degree of nuclear deterrence had appeared, still poorly mastered by the actors in the global strategic game. Here again, we must return to the strategic and tactical realities of weaponry in order to grasp
the present logistical reality. As Sun Tzu said, Weapons are tools of ill omen. They are first feared and fearsome as threats, long before being used. Their ominous character can be split into three components the threat of their performance at the moment of their invention, of their production; the threat of their use against the enemy; the effect of their use, which is fatal for persons and destructive for their goods. If these last two components are unfortunately known, and have long been experimented with, the first, on the other hand, the (logistical) ill omen of the invention of their performance, is less commonly recognized. Nonetheless, it is at this level that the question of deterrence is raised. Can we deter an enemy from inventing new weapons, or from perfecting their performance? Absolutely not. We thus find ourselves facing this dilemma:

The threat of use (the second component) of the nuclear arm prohibits the terror of actual use (the third component). But for this threat to remain and allow the strategy of deterrence, we are forced to develop the threatening system that characterizes the first component: the ill omen of the appearance of new performances for the means of communicating destruction. Stated plainly, this is the perpetual sophistication of combat means and the replacement of the geostrategic breakthrough by the technological breakthrough, the great logistical maneuvers. We must face the
facts: if ancient weapons deterred us from interrupting movement, the new weapons deter us from interrupting the arms race. Moreover, they require in their technological (dromological) logic the exponential development, not of the number of destructive machines, since their power has increased (simply compare the millions of projectiles in the two World Wars to the several thousands of rockets in contemporary arsenals), but of their global performances . Destructive capabilities

having reached the very limits of possibility with thermonuclear arms, the enemys logistical strategies are once more oriented toward power of penetration and flexibility of use. The balance of terror is thus a mere illusion in the industrial stage of war, in which reigns a perpetual imbalance, a constantly raised bid, able to invent new means of destruction without end. We have proven ourselves, on the other hand, not only quite incapable of destroying those weve already produced (the waste products of the military industry being as hard to recycle as those of the nuclear industry), but especially incapable of avoiding the threat of their appearance. War has thus moved from the action stage to the conception stage that, as we know, characterizes automation. Unable to control
the emergence of new means of destruction, deterrence, for us, is tantamount to setting in place a series of automatisms, reactionary industrial and scientific procedures from which all political choice is absent. By becoming strategic, in other words, by combining offense and defense, the new weapons deter us from interrupting the movement of the arms race, and the logistical strategy of their production becomes the inevitable production of destructive means as an obligatory factor of non-war a vicious circle in which the inevitability of production replaces that of destruction. The war machine is now not only all of war, but also becomes the adversary/partners principal enemy by depriving them of their freedom of movement. Dragged unwillingly into the servitude without honor of deterrence, the protagonists henceforth practice the politics of the worst, or more precisely, the apolitics of the worst, which necessarily leads to the war machine one day becoming the very decision for war thus accomplishing the perfection of its self-sufficiency, the automation of deterrence. The suggestive juxtaposition of the terms deterrence and automation allows us to understand better the structural axis of contemporary military- political events, as H. Wheeler specifies: Technologically possible, centralization has become politically necessary. This shortcut recalls that of Saint-Justs famous dictum: When a people can be oppressed, it will be the difference being that this techno-logistical oppression no longer concerns only the people, but the deciders as well. If only yesterday the freedom of maneuver (that aptitude for movement which has been equated with the aptitude for war) occasionally required delegations of power up to the secondary echelons, the reduction of the margin of maneuver due to the progress of the means of communicating destruction causes an extreme concentration of responsibilities for the solitary decision-maker that the Chief of State has become. This contraction is, however, far from being complete; it continues according to the arms race, at the speed of the new capacities of the vectors, until one day it will dispossess this last man. In fact, the movement is the same that restrains the number of projectiles and that reduces to nothing or almost nothing the decision of an individual deprived of counsel. The maneuver is the same as the one that today leads us to

abandon territories and advanced bases, and as the one that will one day lead us to renounce solitary human decision in favor of the absolute miniaturization of the political field which is automation. If
in Frederick the Greats time to win was to advance, for the supporters of deterrence it is to retreat, to leave places, peoples and the individual where they are to the point where dromological progress closely resembles the jet engines reaction propulsion, caused by the ejection of a certain quantity of movement (the product of a mass times a velocity) in the direction opposite to the one we wish to take. In this war of recession between East and West contemporary not with the illusory limitation of strategic arms, but with the limitation of strategy itself the power of thermonuclear explosion serves as an artificial horizon for a race that is increasing the power of the vehicular implosion. The impossibility of interrupting the progress of the power of penetration, other than by an act of faith in the enemy, leads us to deny strategy as prior knowledge.

The automatic nature not only of arms and means, but also of the command, is the same as denying our ability to reason: Nicht raisonniren! Frederick the Seconds order is perfected by a deterrence that
leads us to reduce our freedom not only of action and decision, but also of conception. The logic of arms systems is eluding the military framework more and more, and moving toward the engineer responsible for research and development in

expectation, of course, of the systems self- sufficiency. Two years ago Alexandre Sanguinetti wrote, It is becoming less and less conceivable to build attack planes, which with their spare parts cost several million dollars each, to transport bombs able to destroy a country railroad station. It is simply not cost-effective. This logic of practical war, in which the operating costs of the (aerial) vector automatically entail the heightening of its destructive capability because of the requirements of transporting a tactical nuclear weapon, is not limited to attack planes; it is also becoming the logic of the State apparatus. This backwardness is the logistical consequence of producing means to communicate destruction. The danger of the nuclear weapon, and of the arms system it implies, is thus not so much that it will explode, but that it exists and is imploding in our minds. Let us summarize this phenomenon: Two bombs interrupt the war in the Pacific, and several dozen nuclear submarines are enough to ensure peaceful coexistence.. This is its numerical aspect. With the appearance of the multiple thermonuclear warhead and the rapid development of tactical nuclear arms, we see the miniaturization of explosive charges... This is its volumetric aspect. After having cleared the planet surface of a cumbersome defensive apparatus by reducing undersea and underground strategic arms, they renounce world expanse by reducing the trouble spots and advanced bases... This is its geographical aspect. Once responsible for the operations, the old chiefs of war, strategists and generals, find themselves demoted and restricted to simple maintenance operations, for the sole benefit of the Chief of State... This is its political aspect. But this quantitative and qualitative scarcity doesnt stop. Time itself is no longer enough: Constantly heightened, the vectors already quasisupersonic capacities are superseded by the high energies that enable us to approach the speed of light... This is its spatio-temporal aspect. After the time of the States political relativity as nonconducting medium, we are faced with the no-time of the politics of relativity. The full discharge feared by Clausewitz has come

about with the State of Emergency. The violence of speed has become both the location and the law, the worlds destiny and its destination.

A2: Empire
No link Our affirmative doesnt agree with the militaristic giant that state fascism causes. Our affirmative is an echo of a larger force against it. The affirmative solves for imperialism The despot is what creates the rule of terror and absolute control. Our affirmation prevents us from being tied down to one idea or form of government, making it so that imperial expansion cannot exist. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 211-213 One might think that the system of imperial representation was, in spite of everything, milder than that of territorial representation. The signs are no longer inscribed in the flesh itself but on stones, parchments, pieces of currency, and lists. According to Wittfogel's law of "diminishing administrative returns," wide sectors are left semiautonomous insofar as they do not compromise the power of the State. The eye no longer extracts a surplus value from the spectacle of suffering, it has ceased to evaluate; it has begun rather to "forewarn" and keep watch, to see that no surplus value escapes the over coding of the despotic machine. For all the organs and their functions experience a detachment and elevation that relates them to, and makes them converge on, the full body of the despot. In point of fact the regime is not milder; the system of terror has replaced the system of cruelty. The old cruelty persists, especially in the autonomous or quasi-autonomous sectors; but it is now bricked into the State apparatus, which at times organizes it and at other times tolerates or limits it, in order to make it serve the ends of the State, and to subsume it under the higher superimposed unity of a Law that is more terrible. As a matter of fact, the law's opposition or apparent opposition to despotism comes late-when the State presents itself as an apparent peacemaker between classes that become distinct from the State, making it necessary for the latter to reshape its form of sovereignty.*The law does not begin by being what it will become or seek to become later: a guarantee against despotism, an immanent principle that unites the parts into a whole, that makes of this whole the object of a general knowledge and will whose sanctions are merely derivative of a judgment and an application directed at the rebellious parts. The imperial barbarian law possesses instead two features that are in
opposition to those just mentioned-the two features that Kafka so forcefully developed: first, the paranoiac-schizoid trait of the law (metonymy) according to which the law governs nontotalizable and nontotalized parts, partitioning them off, organizing them as bricks, measuring their distance and forbidding their communication, henceforth acting in the name of a formidable but formal and empty Unity, eminent, distributive, and not collective; and second, the maniacal depressive trait (metaphor) according to which the law reveals nothing and has no knowable object, the verdict having no existence prior to the penalty, and the statement of the law having no existence prior to the verdict. The trial by

In vain did the body liberate itself from its characteristic graphism in the system of connotation, for it now becomes the stone and the paper, the tablet and the currency on which the new writing is able to mark its figures, its phonetism, and its alphabet. Overcoding is the essence of the law, and the origin of the new sufferings of the body. Punishment has ceased to be a festive occasion, from which the eye extracts a surplus value in the magic triangle of alliance and filiations. Punishment becomes a vengeance, the vengeance of the voice, the hand, and the eye now joined together on the despot-the vengeance of the new alliance, whose public character does not spoil the secret: "I will bring down upon you the avenging sword of the vengeance of alliance." For once again , before it becomes a feigned
ordeal presents these two traits in a raw state. As in the machine of "In the Penal Colony," it is the penalty that writes both the verdict and the rule that has been broken .

guarantee against despotism, the law is the invention of the despot himself: it is the juridical form assumed by the infinite debt.

A2: Schmitt/Rasch
No link our affirmative does not seek to punish those who do not fall under our revolution. Our affirmation instead seeks to set the ground for a new form of politics. Remember that capital is a self-propelled system; it somehow grows without any input. How? Because it doesn't just increase quantitatively but qualitatively, it finds new forms of capital and redefines its own limits. Even the discourse in this round ties to the capitalist symptom of being. We are engaged in a form of production; our words construct a life-world that we have to inhabit and are also a plane of contestation unto themselves rather than just a transparent medium that communicates ethical and political imperatives. Hardt and Negri in 2k (Terrorists, awesome dudes, profs at places of respectable respectedness; Empire)
Ether is the third and final fundamental medium of imperial control. The management of communication, the structuring of the education system, and the regulation of culture appear today more than ever as sovereign prerogatives. All of this, however, dissolves in the ether. The contemporary systems of communication are not subordinated to sovereignty; on the contrary, sovereignty seems to be subordinated to communication-or actually, sovereignty is articulated through communications systems. In the field of communication, the paradoxes that bring about the dissolution of territorial and/or national sovereignty are more clear than ever. The deterritorializing capacities of communication are unique: communication is not satisfied by limiting or weakening modern territorial sovereignty; rather it attacks the very possibility of linking an order to a space. It
imposes a continuous and complete circulation of signs. Deterritorialization is the primary force and circulation the form through which social communication manifests itself. In this way and in this ether, languages become functional to circulation and dissolve every sovereign relationship. Education and culture too cannot help submitting to the circulating society of the spectacle. Here we reach an extreme limit of the process of the dissolution of the relationship between order and space. At this point we cannot conceive this relationship except in another space, an

elsewhere that cannot in principle be contained in the articulation of sovereign acts. The space of communication is completely deterritorialized. It is absolutely other with respect to the residual spaces that we have been analyzing in terms of the monopoly of physical force and the definition of monetary measure. Here it is a question not of residue but of metamorphosis: a metamorphosis of all the elements of political economy and state theory. Communication is the form of capitalist production in which capital has succeeded in submitting society entirely and globally to its regime, suppressing all alternative paths. If ever an alternative is to be proposed, it will have to arise from within the society of the real subsumption and demonstrate all the contradictions at the heart of it. These three means of control refer us again to the three tiers of the imperial pyramid of power. The bomb
is a monarchic power, money aristocratic, and ether democratic. It might appear in each of these cases as though the reins of these mechanisms were held by the United States. It might appear as if the United States were the new Rome , or a cluster of new Romes: Washington (the bomb), New York (money), and Los Angeles (ether). Any such territorial

conception of imperial space, however, is continually destabilized by the fundamental flexibility, mobility, and deterritorialization at the core of the imperial apparatus. Perhaps the monopoly off force and the regulation of money can be given partial territorial determinations, but communication cannot. Communication has become the central element that establishes the relations of production, guiding capitalist development and also transforming productive forces. This dynamic produces an extremely open situation: here the centralized locus of power has to confront the power of productive subjectivities, the power of all those who contribute to the interactive production of communication. Here in this circulating domain of imperial domination over the new forms of production, communication is most widely disseminated in capillary forms.

The war machine is representative of the power at large. The war machine, like power, has no initial objective and no final goals until it is ascribed positive or negative purpose. The state uses violent final goals, striations, containments, etc, on the war machine turning it into a negative force capable only of inflicting pain. Instead, the forces of war and power should be turned free we should engage in our inner lust for war and express power in positive ways to counter negative forces. Under the politics of schizophrenia, we are detached from the state. This makes their impacts impossible to occur, since it is predicated of the States military power. Deleuze and Guattari 1987 (A Thousand Plateaus, pg 230-231)
There are many reasons to believe that the war machine is of a different origin, is a different assemblage, than the State apparatus. It is of nomadic origin and is directed against the State apparatus. One of the fundamental problems of the State is to appropriate this war machine that is foreign to it and make it a piece in its apparatus, in the form of a stable military institution; and the State has always encountered major difficulties in this. It is precisely when the war machine has reached the point that it has no other object but war, it is when it substitutes destruction for mutation, that it frees the most catastrophic charge . Mutation is in no way a transformation of war; on the contrary, war is like the fall or failure of mutation, the only object left for the war machine after it has lost its power to change. War, it must be said, is only the abominable residue of the war machine, either after it has allowed itself to be appropriated by the State apparatus, or even
worse, has constructed itself a State apparatus capable only of destruction. When this happens, the war machine no longer draws mutant lines of flight, but a pure, cold line of abolition. (Later, we will propos e a theory of the complex relation between the war machine and

war.)31 This brings us back to the paradox of fascism, and the way in which fascism differs from totalitarianism. For totalitarianism is a State affair: it essentially concerns the relation between the State as a localized assemblage and the abstract machine of overcoding it effectuates. Even in the case of a military dictatorship, it is a State army, not a war machine, that takes power and elevates the State to the totalitarian stage. Totalitarianism

is quintessentially conservative. Fascism, on the other hand, involves a war machine. When fascism builds itself a totalitarian State, it is not in the sense of a State army taking power, but of a war machine taking over the State. A bizarre remark by Virilio puts us on the trail: in fascism, the State is far less totalitarian than it is suicidal. There is in fascism a realized nihilism. Unlike the totalitarian State, which does its utmost to seal all possible lines of flight, fascism is constructed on an intense line of flight, which it transforms into a line of pure destruction and abolition. It is curious that from the very beginning the Nazis announced to Germany what they were bringing: at once wedding bells and death, including their own death, and the death of the Germans. They thought they would perish but that their undertaking would be resumed, all across Europe, all over the world, throughout the solar system. And the people cheered, not because they did not understand, but because they wanted that death through the death of others. Like a will to wager everything you have every hand, to stake your own death against the death of
others, and measure everything by "deleometers." Klaus Mann's novel, Mephisto, gives samplings of entirely ordinary Nazi speeches and conversations: "Heroism was something that was being ruled out of our lives. . . . In reality, we are not marching forward, we are reeling, staggering. Our beloved Fiihrer is dragging us toward the shades of darkness and everlasting nothingness. How can we poets, we who have a special affinity for darkness and lower depths, not admire him? . . . Fires blazing on the horizon; rivers of blood in all the streets; and the frenzied dancing of the survivors, of those who are still spared, around the bodies of the dead!"32 Suicide is presented not as a punishment but as the crowning glory of the death of others. One can always say that it is just a matter of foggy talk and ideology, nothing but ideology. But that is not true. The insufficiency of economic and political definitions of fascism does not simply imply a need to tack on vague, so-called ideological determinations. We prefer to follow Faye's inquiry into the precise formation of Nazi statements, which are just as much in evidence in politics and economics as in the most absurd of conversations. They always contain the "stupid and repugnant" cry, Long live death!, even at the economic level, where the arms expansion replaces growth in consumption and where investment veers from the means of production toward the means of pure destruction. Paul Virilio's analysis strikes us as entirely correct in defining fascism not by the notion of the totalitarian State but by the notion of the suicidal State: so-called

total war seems less a State undertaking than an undertaking of a war machine that appropriates the State and channels into it a flow of absolute war whose only possible outcome is the suicide of the State itself. "The triggering of a hitherto unknown material process, one that is limitless and aimless. . . . Once triggered, its mechanism cannot stop at peace, for the indirect strategy effectively places the dominant powers outside the usual categories of
space and time. . . . It was in the horror of daily life and its environment that Hitler finally found his surest means of governing, the legitimation of his policies and military strategy; and it lasted right up to the end, for the ruins and horrors and crimes and chaos of total war, far from discharging the repulsive nature of its power, normally only increase its scope. Telegram 71 is the normal outcome: If the war is lost, may the nation perish. Here, Hitler decides to join forces with his enemies in order to complete the destruction of his own people, by obliterating the last remaining resources of its life-support system, civil reserves of every kind (potable water, fuel, provisions, etc.)."33 It

was this

reversion of the line of flight into a line of destruction that already animated the molecular focuses of fascism, and made them interact in a war machine instead of resonating in a State apparatus. A war machine that no longer had anything but war as its object and would rather annihilate its own servants than stop the destruction. All the dangers of the other lines pale by comparison.

Our affirmation solves for the construction of dichotomy. The body without organs is forever entwined with the concept of becoming. Rather then maintain the rigid structure implicit in our everyday lives we have to traverse every border culturally, socially, racially, and even geographically. This form of identification takes us on the journey of becoming-minoritarian through the theater of violence and ends on the plane of immanence: every point connecting to the other and the politics of schizophrenia. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 85-86 The first things to be distributed on the body without organs are races, cultures, and their gods. The fact has often been overlooked that the schizo indeed participates in history; he hallucinates and raves universal history, and proliferates the races. All delirium is racial, which does not necessarily mean racist. It is not a matter of the regions of the body without organs "representing" races and cultures. The full body does not represent anything at all. On the contrary, the races and cultures designate regions on this body-that is, zones of intensities, fields of potentials. Phenomena of individualization and sexualization are produced within these fields. We pass from one field to another by crossing thresholds: we never stop migrating, we become other individuals as well as other sexes, and departing becomes as easy as being born or dying. Along the way we struggle against other races, we destroy civilizations, in the manner of the great migrants in whose wake nothing is left standing once they have passed through although these destructions can be brought about, as we shall see, in two very different ways. The crossing of a threshold entails ravages elsewhere-how could it be otherwise? The body without organs closes round the deserted places. The theater of cruelty cannot be separated from the struggle against our culture, from the confrontation of the "races," and
What is the nature of this order? from Artaud's great migration toward Mexico, its forces, and its religions: individuations are produced only within fields of forces expressly defined by intensive vibrations, and that animate cruel personages only in so far as they are induced organs, parts of

And can Zarathustra be separated from the "grand politics," and from the bringing to life of the races that leads Nietzsche to say, I'm not a German, I'm Polish. Here again individuations are brought about solely within complexes of forces that determine persons as so many intensive states embodied in a "criminal," ceaselessly passing beyond a threshold while destroying the factitious unity of a family and an ego: "I am Prado, I am also Prado's father. I venture to say
desiring-machines (mannequins) that I am also Lesseps .... I wanted to give my Parisians, whom I love, a new idea-that of a decent criminal. I am also Chambige-also a decent criminal. ... The unpleasant thing, and one that nags at my modesty, is that at root every name in history is 1."34 Yet it was never a question of identifying oneself with personages, as when it is erroneously maintained that a madman "takes himself for so-

It is a question of something quite different: identifying races, cultures, and gods with fields of intensity on the body without organs, identifying personages with states that fill these fields, and with effects that fulgurate within and traverse these fields. Whence the role of names, with a magic all their own: there is no ego that identifies with races, peoples, and persons in a theater of representation, but proper names that identify races, peoples, and persons with regions, thresholds, or effects in a production of intensive quantities. The theory of proper names should not be conceived of in terms of representation; it refers instead to the class of "effects": effects that are not a mere
and-so...."

dependence on causes, but the occupation of a domain, and the operation of a system of signs. This can be clearly seen in physics, where proper names designate such effects within fields of potentials: the Joule effect, the Seebeck effect, the Kelvin effect. History is like physics: a Joan of Arc effect, a Heliogabaius effect-all the names of history, and not the name of the father.

A2: Racism
No link in a world of the plan, pure difference prevents us from classing or identifying people by race, meaning the affirmative does not create a racial other. Our affirmation solves for the construction of dichotomy. Thats Conley. The body without organs is forever entwined with the concept of becoming. Rather than maintain the rigid structure implicit in our everyday lives we have to traverse every border culturally, socially, racially, and even geographically. This form of identification takes us on the journey of becoming-minoritarian through the theater of violence and ends on the plane of immanence: every point connecting to the other and the politics of schizophrenia. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 85-86 The first things to be distributed on the body without organs are races, cultures, and their gods. The fact has often been overlooked that the schizo indeed participates in history; he hallucinates and raves universal history, and proliferates the races. All delirium is racial, which does not necessarily mean racist. It is not a matter of the regions of the body without organs "representing" races and cultures. The full body does not represent anything at all. On the contrary, the races and cultures designate regions on this body-that is, zones of intensities, fields of potentials. Phenomena of individualization and sexualization are produced within these fields. We pass from one field to another by crossing thresholds: we never stop migrating, we become other individuals as well as other sexes, and departing becomes as easy as being born or dying. Along the way we struggle against other races, we destroy civilizations, in the manner of the great migrants in whose wake nothing is left standing once they have passed through although these destructions can be brought about, as we shall see, in two very different ways. The crossing of a threshold entails ravages elsewhere-how could it be otherwise? The body without organs closes round the deserted places. The theater of cruelty cannot be separated from the struggle against our culture, from the confrontation of the "races," and
What is the nature of this order? from Artaud's great migration toward Mexico, its forces, and its religions: individuations are produced only within fields of forces expressly defined by intensive vibrations, and that animate cruel personages only in so far as they are induced organs, parts of

And can Zarathustra be separated from the "grand politics," and from the bringing to life of the races that leads Nietzsche to say, I'm not a German, I'm Polish. Here again individuations are brought about solely within complexes of forces that determine persons as so many intensive states embodied in a "criminal," ceaselessly passing beyond a threshold while destroying the factitious unity of a family and an ego: "I am Prado, I am also Prado's father. I venture to say
desiring-machines (mannequins) that I am also Lesseps .... I wanted to give my Parisians, whom I love, a new idea-that of a decent criminal. I am also Chambige-also a decent criminal. ... The unpleasant thing, and one that nags at my modesty, is that at root every name in history is 1."34 Yet it was never a question of identifying oneself with personages, as when it is erroneously maintained that a madman "takes himself for so-

It is a question of something quite different: identifying races, cultures, and gods with fields of intensity on the body without organs, identifying personages with states that fill these fields, and with effects that fulgurate within and traverse these fields. Whence the role of names, with a magic all their own: there is no ego that identifies with races, peoples, and persons in a theater of representation, but proper names that identify
and-so...."

races, peoples, and persons with regions, thresholds, or effects in a production of intensive quantities. The theory of proper names should not be conceived of in terms of representation; it refers instead to the class of "effects": effects that are not a mere dependence on causes, but the occupation of a domain, and the operation of a system of signs. This can be clearly seen in physics, where proper names designate such effects within fields of potentials: the Joule effect, the Seebeck effect, the Kelvin effect. History is like physics: a Joan of Arc effect, a Heliogabaius effect-all the names of history, and not the name of the father.

A2: Race/Performance K
3. No link in a world of the plan, pure difference prevents us from classing or identifying people by race, meaning the affirmative does not create a racial other. 4. Deleuze creates a better framework for addressing racism by analyzing specific power relations and how fascism can rearticulate bodies and populations by racial categories. Adams 2009
(Jason Adams, Dr. Jason Michael Adams is a theorist working at the intersection of politics, media and culture. He is currently Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Theory at Williams College (2011-2012). Adams's graduate studies were conducted in Hawaii, Switzerland and Canada, earning a Ph.D in Political Science at the University of Hawaii in 2010, A.B.D. status in Media & Communication at the European Graduate School in 2007 and an M.A. in Political Science at Simon Fraser University in 2004, All that is Solid for Glenn Rikowski, September 27, 2009, Deleuze and Race. http://williams.academia.edu/JasonAdams/Books/443199/Deleuze_and_Race_Under_consideration)

While the relevance of Gilles Deleuze for a materialist feminism has been amply demonstrated in the last two decades or so, what this key philosopher of difference and desire can do for the theorization of race and racism has received surprisingly little attention. This is despite the explicit formulation of a materialist theory of race as instantiated in colonization, sensation, capitalism and culture, particularly in Deleuzes collaborative work with Flix Guattari. Part of the explanation of why there has been a relative silence on Deleuze within critical race and colonial studies is that the philosophical impetus for overcoming eugenics and nationalism have for decades been anchored in the conventional readings of Kant and Hegel, which Deleuze laboured to displace. Through the vocabularies of psychoanalysis, deconstruction, and moral philosophy, even the more sophisticated theorizations of race today continue the neoKantian/neo-Hegelian programme of retrieving a cosmopolitan universality beneath the ostensibly inconsequential differences called race. Opposing this idealism, Deleuze instead asks whether the conceptual basis for this program, however commendable, does not foreclose its political aims, particularly in its avoidance of the material relations it seeks to change. The representationalism and oversimplified dialectical frameworks guiding the dominant antiracist programme actively suppress an immanentist legacy which according to Deleuze is far better suited to grasping how power and desire differentiate bodies and populations: the legacies of Spinoza, Marx and Nietzsche; biology and archeology; Virginia Woolf and Jack Kerouac; cinema, architecture, and the fleshy paintings of Francis Bacon. It is symptomatic too, that Foucaults influential notion of biopolitics, so close to Deleuze and Guattaris writings on the state, is usually taken up without its explicit grounding in race, territory and capitalist exchange. Similarly, those (like Negri) that twist biopolitics into a mainly Marxian category, meanwhile, lose the Deleuzoguattarian emphasis on racial and sexual entanglement. It would seem then, that it is high time for a rigorous engagement with the many conceptual ties between Foucaults lectures on biopolitics, Deleuze and Guattari, and Deleuzeinfluenced feminism, to obtain a new materialist framework for studying racialization as well as the ontopolitics of becoming from which it emerges. While it will inevitably overlap in a few ways, this collection will differ from work done under the postcolonial rubric for a number of important reasons. First, instead of the mental, cultural,

therapeutic, or scientific representations of racial difference usually analyzed in postcolonial studies, it will seek to investigate racial difference in itself, as it persists as a biocultural, biopolitical force amid other forces. For Deleuze and Guattari, as for Nietzsche before them, race is far from inconsequential, though this does not mean it is set in stone. Second, as Fanon knew, race is a global phenomenon, with Europes racism entirely entwined with settler societies and the continuing poverty in the peripheries. The effects of exploitation, slavery, displacement, war, migration, exoticism and miscegenation are too geographically diffuse and too contemporary to fit comfortably under the name postcolonial. Rather, we seek to illuminate the material divergences that phenotypical variation often involves, within any social, cultural or political locus. Third, again like Nietzsche, but also Freud, Deleuze and Guattari reach into the deep recesses of civilization to expose an ancient and convoluted logic of racial discrimination preceding European colonialism by several millennia. Far from naturalizing racism, this nomadological and biophilosophical geology of morals shows that racial difference is predicated on fully contingent territorializations of power and desire, that can be disassembled and reassembled differently. That race is immanent to the materiality of the body then, does not mean that it is static any more than that it is simple: rather what it suggests is that its transformation is an always already incipient reality. 5. No alt solvency and link turn. The articulation of desire between individuals is the cause of all macro-level fascism, subjugation, and identity based politics. Only our affirmation questions how desire functions. 6. Perm: do the methodology of the 1NC with the ideology of the 1AC. We can engage in their movement of moving away from white norms of debate while embracing identity as a static notion this solves any risk of reorganizing people. 7. Double-bind: Either the alt cant solve the case and our impacts are turns to the alt or the alt can solve the case, meaning we can combine our advocacy and theirs and the perm solves. 8. Turn - Our affirmation solves for the construction of racial identities by breaking down borders and deconstructing social norms. Thats Conley. 9. The body without organs is forever entwined with the concept of becoming. Rather than maintain the rigid structure implicit in our everyday lives we have to traverse every border culturally, socially, racially, and even geographically. This form of identification takes us on the journey of becoming-minoritarian through the theater of violence and ends on the plane of immanence: every point connecting to the other and the politics of schizophrenia. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 85-86 The first things to be distributed on the body without organs are races, cultures, and their gods. The fact has often been overlooked that the schizo indeed participates in history; he hallucinates and raves universal history, and proliferates the races. All delirium is racial, which does not necessarily mean racist.
What is the nature of this order?

It is not a matter of the regions of the body without organs "representing" races and cultures. The full body does not represent anything at all. On the contrary, the races and cultures designate regions on this body-that is, zones of intensities, fields of potentials. Phenomena of individualization and sexualization are produced within these fields. We pass from one field to another by crossing thresholds: we never stop migrating, we become other individuals as well as other sexes, and departing becomes as easy as being born or dying. Along the way we struggle against other races, we destroy civilizations, in the manner of the great migrants in whose wake nothing is left standing once they have passed through although these destructions can be brought about, as we shall see, in two very different ways. The crossing of a threshold entails ravages elsewhere-how could it be otherwise? The body without organs closes round the deserted places. The theater of cruelty cannot be separated from the struggle against our culture, from the confrontation of the "races," and
from Artaud's great migration toward Mexico, its forces, and its religions: individuations are produced only within fields of forces expressly defined by intensive vibrations, and that animate cruel personages only in so far as they are induced organs, parts of

And can Zarathustra be separated from the "grand politics," and from the bringing to life of the races that leads Nietzsche to say, I'm not a German, I'm Polish. Here again individuations are brought about solely within complexes of forces that determine persons as so many intensive states embodied in a "criminal," ceaselessly passing beyond a threshold while destroying the factitious unity of a family and an ego: "I am Prado, I am also Prado's father. I venture to say
desiring-machines (mannequins) that I am also Lesseps .... I wanted to give my Parisians, whom I love, a new idea-that of a decent criminal. I am also Chambige-also a decent criminal. ... The unpleasant thing, and one that nags at my modesty, is that at root every name in history is 1."34 Yet it was never a question of identifying oneself with personages, as when it is erroneously maintained that a madman "takes himself for so-

It is a question of something quite different: identifying races, cultures, and gods with fields of intensity on the body without organs, identifying personages with states that fill these fields, and with effects that fulgurate within and traverse these fields. Whence the role of names, with a magic all their own: there is no ego that identifies with races, peoples, and persons in a theater of representation, but proper names that identify races, peoples, and persons with regions, thresholds, or effects in a production of intensive quantities. The theory of proper names should not be conceived of in terms of representation; it refers instead to the class of "effects": effects that are not a mere dependence on causes, but the occupation of a domain, and the operation of a system of signs. This can be clearly seen in physics, where proper names designate such effects within fields of potentials: the Joule effect, the Seebeck effect, the Kelvin effect. History is like physics: a Joan of Arc effect, a Heliogabaius effect-all the names of history, and not the name of the father.
and-so...."

A2: Skepticism
Turn- Skepticism stops social change their paranoia forecloses upon revolution. Berman 01
(Paul Schiff, Assoc. Prof. Law @ U. of Connecticut, Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, LN)

Of course, one might view this as a positive development. One might think people should stop being lulled into a false sense of believing that the rhetoric of public life really matters. If people began to view such rhetoric as a construction of entrenched power, so the argument might go, they would form the nucleus of a truly revolutionary political movement. I doubt that such an eventuality is likely to occur. Moreover, I am

not sure that a culture of suspiciousness is the most effective way to seek political (or personal) change anyway. Suspicious analysis seeks to expose the dangers of our enchantment with reason or truth or collectivity, but there are dangers that arise from relentless disenchantment as well. As [*123] Richard K. Sherwin has observed, Without the means of
experiencing more profound enchantments, without communal rituals and social dramas through which the culture's deepest beliefs and values may be brought to life and collectively reenacted, those beliefs ultimately lose their meaning and die... . Forms of enchantment in the service of deceit, illicit desire, and self-gratification alone must be separated out from forms of enchantment in the service of feelings, beliefs, and values that we aspire to affirm in light of the self, social, and legal realities they help to construct and maintain. 112

Reject their epistemology- it leads to suicidal impracticalities. Newall 05 (Paul Newall, The Galilean Library- Introducing Philosophy: Epistemology 20, http://www.galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43798, 2005) Even if we accept that skepticism cannot be dismissed outright, is it not a highly inconvenient if not downright impractical position to hold? Suppose we have to make our way to the top floor of a building and are thoroughgoing skeptics. We could take the lift, but how do we know it will work? Shouldn't we climb up instead? Then again, how do we know climbing will work, or even that the building is there at all? What about when we want to get down again? Isn't jumping just as sensible an option as taking the lift or stairs, given that we dont really know anything? These are the kinds of questions that were and still are raised to skeptics, and they are usually intended to be reductios just like the ones skeptics use themselves. It seems like a ridiculous idea to jump rather than use the stairs, but the suggestion is that this kind of impractical (if not absurd) idea is what skepticism leads to. How can we answer it? Their rejection alternative is illegitimate and a voting issue for the following reasons: A) Ground trade-off They can find anything wrong with the affirmative as reasons to reject it and generate uniqueness but we dont get to generate any offense which means they will always control the direction of offense. B) Education loss We dont get to discuss possible venues to solve the problems they are indicting. If their criticism is so important, then we should be able to debate and learn strategies that are compatible with it - instead

they make debate a normative activity where we do nothing which their authors would indict. The alternative opts for inaction in the face of domination. It lets fascism continue unabated, eventually leading to mass suicide and butchery: Political strategy can look any way at all not necessarily a pragmatic change in doctrine or charter, but a strategy to re-determine intensity, desire, and our understanding of the world. Our affirmation is a journey through madness a halting of our fear of the uncontained and uncontrollable. There is potential in the process of madness madness as breakthrough, madness as undoing of our own self-inflicted castration. We should abandon a search for certainty and stability, and instead affirm the mixing and confusing of the concepts we hold sacred, and affirm the free space which emerges when the sanity we have taken for granted disintegrates into the nothingness it always was. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 131-132
The schizo knows how to leave: he has made departure into something as simple as being born or dying. But at the same time his journey is strangely stationary, in place . He does not speak of another world, he is not from another world: even when he is displacing himself in space, his is a journey in intensity, around the desiring-machine that is erected here and remains here. For here is the desert propagated by our world, and also the new earth, and the machine that hums, around which the schizos revolve, planets for a new sun. These men of desire-or do they not yet exist? -are like Zarathustra. They know incredible sufferings, vertigos, and sicknesses. They have their specters. They must reinvent each gesture. But such a man produces himself as a free man, irresponsible, solitary, and joyous, finally able to say and do something simple in his own name, without asking permission; a desire lacking nothing, a flux that overcomes barriers and codes, a name that no longer designates any ego whatever. He has simply ceased being afraid of becoming mad. He experiences and lives himself as the sublime sickness that will no longer affect him. Here, what is, what would a psychiatrist be worth? In the whole of psychiatry only Jaspers, then Laing
have grasped what process signified, and its fulfillment-and so escaped the familialism that is the ordinary bed and board of psychoanalysis and psychiatry. "If the human race survives, future men will, I suspect, look back on our

enlightened epoch as a veritable age of Darkness. They will presumably be able to savor the irony of this situation with more amusement than we can extract from it. The laugh's on us. They will see that what we call 'schizophrenia' was one of the forms in which, often through quite ordinary people, the light began to break through the cracks in our all-too-closed minds. Madness need not be all breakdown. It may also be breakthrough. The person going through ego-loss or transcendental experiences may or may not become in different ways confused. Then he might legitimately be regarded as mad. But to be mad is not necessarily to be ill, notwithstanding that in our
culture the two categories have become confused.... From the alienated starting point of our pseudo-sanity, everything is equivocal. Our sanity is not 'true' sanity. Their madness is not 'true' madness. The madness of our patients is an

artifact of the destruction wreaked on them by us and by them on themselves. Let no one suppose that we meet 'true' madness any more than that we are truly sane. The madness that we encounter in 'patients' is a gross travesty, a mockery, a grotesque caricature of what the natural healing of that estranged integration we call sanity might be. True sanity entails in one way or
another the dissolution of the normal ego."* The visit to London is our visit to Pythia. Turner is there. Looking at his paintings, one understands what it means to scale the wall, and yet to remain behind; to cause flows to pass through, without knowing any longer whether they are carrying us elsewhere or flowing back over us already. The paintings range over three periods. If the psychiatrist were allowed to speak here, he could talk about the first two, although they are in fact the most reasonable. The first canvases are of end-of-the-world catastrophes, avalanches, and storms. That's where Turner begins. The paintings of the second period are somewhat like the delirious reconstruction, where the delirium hides, or rather where it is on a par with a lofty technique inherited from Poussin, Lorrain, or the Dutch tradition: the world is reconstructed through archaisms having a modern

function. But something incomparable happens at the level of the paintings of the third period, in the series Turner does not exhibit, but keeps secret. It cannot even be said that he is far ahead of his time: there is

here something ageless, and that comes to us from an eternal future, or flees toward it. The canvas turns in on itself, it is pierced by a hole, a lake, a flame, a tornado, an explosion. The themes of the preceding paintings are to be found again here, their meaning changed. The canvas is truly broken, sundered by what penetrates it. All that remains is

a background of gold and fog, intense, intensive, traversed in depth by what has just sundered its breadth: the schizo. Everything becomes mixed and confused, and it is here that the breakthrough-not the breakdown-occurs.

EXT: Social Change Turn

Extend that skepticism castrates social change. Group their answers; our Berman in 01 evidence is SUPER SEXY when it says that the paranoia prevents social changes, allowing nihilism to replace revolutionary transformations. Hermeneutics work against social change and kill social movements Berman 01 (Paul Schiff, Assoc. Prof. Law @ U. of Connecticut, Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, LN)
The second drawback of the hermeneutics of suspicion is perhaps even more important. As some scholars have noted, the hermeneutics of suspicion can easily slip from healthy skepticism into a kind of rhetorical paranoia. Paranoia, of course, is a loaded term, and

probably a bit unfair. Nevertheless, because it is used frequently in the academic literature about the hermeneutics of suspicion, I will use it as well - though I want to make clear that I believe paranoia to be the hypothetical extreme in the movement toward skeptical scholarship. I do not mean to imply that any actual scholars necessarily display such paranoid logic. Critics of the hermeneutics of suspicion describe the "paranoid style of functioning" 104 as "an intense, sharply perceptive but narrowly focused mode of attention" that results in an attitude of "elaborate suspiciousness." 105 Paranoid individuals constantly strive to demystify appearances; they take nothing at face value because "they regard reality as an obscure dimension hidden from casual observation or participation." 106 On this vision. Such a paranoid style may, over time, have a potentially corrosive effect on society. 108 Consider the long-term consequences of repeated exposure to suspicious stories. An appeal to religious ideals is portrayed as an exercise of political power or the result of deluded magical thinking. A [*122] canonical work of art is revealed to be the product of a patriarchal "gaze." The programs of politicians are exposed as crass maneuverings for higher office or greater power. 109 The idealistic rhetoric of judicial opinions is depicted as an after-the-fact justification for the exercise of state-sanctioned violence. And the life choices of individuals are shown to be responses to psychological neurosis, or social pathology. All of these are exaggerations, but they increasingly represent the rhetoric that is used to describe human interaction both in contemporary society and in the past. As Richard Rorty describes. In this vision, the two-hundred-year history of the United States - indeed, the history of the European and American peoples since the Enlightenment - has been pervaded by hypocrisy and selfdeception. Readers of Foucault often come away believing that no shackles have been broken in the past two hundred years: the harsh old chains have merely been replaced with
slightly more comfortable ones. Heidegger describes America's success in blanketing the world with modern technology as the spread of a wasteland. Those who find Foucault and

Heidegger convincing often view the United States of America as ... something we must hope will be replaced, as soon as possible, by something utterly different. 110 If that is one's viewpoint, it will inevitably be difficult to muster one's energy to believe in the possibility of positive action in the world, short of revolution (and even revolution is probably inevitably compromised). As Rorty points out, though the writers of supposedly "subversive" works "honestly believe that they are serving human liberty," it may ultimately

be "almost impossible to clamber back down from [these works] to a level of abstraction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy."

EXT: Epistemology
Extend that we should reject their epistemology; group their answers, Our Newall 05 evidence specifically answers their Galilean philosophy of Skepticism. He says that suppose we were on top of a building, how would we get down? We dont KNOW that we can climb down, we dont KNOW we can walk down stairs the only sensible thing would be to jump off because we dont KNOW we will die this is only an example but these are the kinds of impracticalities their argument justifies.

A2: Primitivism
No link Our affirmation is in favor nomadic politics. We wish to deconstruct the hegemonic capitalist state in which we currently live in and instead affirm the politics of the schizo; being completely unfettered from reality. Our affirmation is a journey through madness a halting of our fear of the uncontained and uncontrollable. There is potential in the process of madness madness as breakthrough, madness as undoing of our own self-inflicted castration. We should abandon a search for certainty and stability, and instead affirm the mixing and confusing of the concepts we hold sacred, and affirm the free space which emerges when the sanity we have taken for granted disintegrates into the nothingness it always was. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 131-132
The schizo knows how to leave: he has made departure into something as simple as being born or dying. But at the same time his journey is strangely stationary, in place . He does not speak of another world, he is not from another world: even when he is displacing himself in space, his is a journey in intensity, around the desiring-machine that is erected here and remains here. For here is the desert propagated by our world, and also the new earth, and the machine that hums, around which the schizos revolve, planets for a new sun. These men of desire-or do they not yet exist? -are like Zarathustra. They know incredible sufferings, vertigos, and sicknesses. They have their specters. They must reinvent each gesture. But such a man produces himself as a free man, irresponsible, solitary, and joyous, finally able to say and do something simple in his own name, without asking permission; a desire lacking nothing, a flux that overcomes barriers and codes, a name that no longer designates any ego whatever. He has simply ceased being afraid of becoming mad. He experiences and lives himself as the sublime sickness that will no longer affect him. Here, what is, what would a psychiatrist be worth? In the whole of psychiatry only Jaspers, then Laing
have grasped what process signified, and its fulfillment-and so escaped the familialism that is the ordinary bed and board of psychoanalysis and psychiatry. "If the human race survives, future men will, I suspect, look back on our enlightened epoch as a veritable age of Darkness. They will presumably be able to savor the irony of this situation with more amusement than we can extract from it. The laugh's on us. They will see that what we call 'schizophrenia' was one of the forms

in which, often through quite ordinary people, the light began to break through the cracks in our alltoo-closed minds. Madness need not be all breakdown. It may also be breakthrough. The person going through ego-loss or transcendental experiences may or may not become in different ways confused. Then he might legitimately be regarded as mad. But to be mad is not necessarily to be ill, notwithstanding that in our culture the two categories have become confused.... From the alienated
starting point of our pseudo-sanity, everything is equivocal. Our sanity is not 'true' sanity. Their madness is not 'true' madness. The madness of our patients is an artifact of the destruction wreaked on them by us and

by them on themselves. Let no one suppose that we meet 'true' madness any more than that we are truly sane. The madness that we encounter in 'patients' is a gross travesty, a mockery, a grotesque caricature of what the natural healing of that estranged integration we call sanity might be. True sanity entails in one way or another the dissolution of the normal ego."* The visit to London is our visit to
Pythia. Turner is there. Looking at his paintings, one understands what it means to scale the wall, and yet to remain behind; to cause flows to pass through, without knowing any longer whether they are carrying us elsewhere or flowing back over us already. The paintings range over three periods. If the psychiatrist were allowed to speak here, he could talk about the first two, although they are in fact the most reasonable. The first canvases are of end-of-the-world catastrophes, avalanches, and storms. That's where Turner begins. The paintings of the second period are somewhat like the delirious reconstruction, where the delirium hides, or rather where it is on a par with a lofty technique inherited from Poussin, Lorrain, or the Dutch tradition: the world is reconstructed through archaisms having a modern function. But something incomparable happens at the level of the paintings of the third period, in the series Turner does not exhibit, but keeps secret. It cannot even be said that he is far ahead of his time: there is here something ageless, and that comes to us from an eternal future, or flees toward it. The canvas turns in on itself, it is pierced by a hole, a lake, a flame, a tornado, an explosion . The themes of the preceding paintings are to be found again here, their meaning changed. The canvas is truly broken, sundered by

what penetrates it. All

that remains is a background of gold and fog, intense, intensive, traversed in depth by what has just sundered its breadth: the schizo. Everything becomes mixed and confused, and it is here that the breakthrough-not the breakdown-occurs.

A2: Nietzsche
Nietzsches philosophy inherently favors the fascist ethos. Golomb and Wistrich 2001, Jacob, professor of philosophy at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Robert S.
Neuberger Professor of Modern European and Jewish History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem,

(Nietzsches Politics, Fascism, and the Jews. Journal of Nietzsche Studies. V.30. p.305321.)
Nietzsche was clearly an elitist who believed in the right to rule of a good and healthy aristocracy, one which would if necessary, be ready to sacrifice untold numbers of human beings; he sometimes wrote as if nations primarily existed for the sake of producing a few great men, who could not be expected to show consideration for normal humanity. Not suprisingly, in the light of the cruel century which has just ended, one is bound to regard such statements with grave misgivings. From Mussolini and Hitler to Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot and Saddam Hussein, the last 80 years have been riddled with so-called political geniuses, imagining that they were beyond good and evil and free of any moral constraints. One has to ask if there is not something in Nietzsches philosophy with its uninhibited cultivation of a heroic individualism and the will-to power, which may have tended to favor the fascist ethos. Musssolini, for example, raised the Nietzschean formulation live dangerously (vivipericolosamente) to the status of a fascist slogan. His reading of Nietzsche was one factor in converting him from Marxism to a philosophy of sacrifice and warlike deeds in defense of the fatherland. In this mutation, Mussolini was preceded by Gabriele dAnnunzio, whose

passage from aestheticism to the political activism of a new more virile and warlike age, was greatly influenced by Nietzsche. Equally, there were other representatives of the
First World War generation, like the radical German nationalist writer, Ernst Jnger, who would find in Nietzsches writings a legitimization of the warrior ethos.

Extend our Deleuze and Guattari evidence from the 1AC which talks about how ignoring desire causes fascism to continue unabated, eventually leading to mass suicide and butchery. Instead of simply embracing suffering, we have the ability to tune into our inner desires and to redirect the energy we use for war and violence into something more productive. Our affirmation of desire is necessary to understand the nature of evil. Our framing of the individual believes desire motivates our actions and informs moral choices our answer is to affirm the opacity of life, the special muchness, the excesses of life that make an individual unique. Operating at the level of desire is necessary for a joyous affirmation of existence which crowds out a depressive tone of life. Colebrook 2002 (Claire Colebrook, Prof. Of English Literature at the University of Edinburgh, Gilles Deleuze pg. 131-132
Everyday moral narratives, such as fables, parables and soap-operas, operate with the fixed terms of good and evil, and do so from a shared point of view of common sense and human recognition. Literature destroys this border between perceiver and perceived. We are no longer placed in a position of ordering judgment but become other through

a confrontation with the forces that compose us. This is freedom: not a freedom to judge which comes from knowing who we are, but a liberation from our finite self-images, an

opening to life. At its simplest level we can see how ethical becoming or freedom is limited by a fixed image of thought. If we accept who we are and what we should do, then we can simply exclude those who are evil; we can remain good, holy and pure from the forces that supposedly work against life. Alternatively, we can demand a perception of impersonal joy and sadness. Here we affirm what increases our power to become (joy) and only say no to what limits us (sadness). The power we affirm through joy is the power of a life beyond our specific self. (If I affirm my actions as
part of the womens movement then I expand the power of the whole of life; this is because such affirmations aim to include, expand and create relations. If, by contrast, I assert my power as a killer, rapist or judgmental moralist, then

I diminish the forces of the life and lives that lie beyond me; this is because I do not recognize those powers beyond me; I reinforce , rather, than expand, my perceptual boundaries.) Against good and evil, as moral opposites, Deleuze follows Spinoza in arguing for an ethical relation between joy and sadness. Sad perceptions are those which diminish my power, and the power of all life; in joy I perceive what is not myself and in so doing expand who I am and what I might become. There would be sadness, of course, in the image of the serial killer, in American Psycho, the sadness of a being who can only devour other bodies and who cannot respond to all the perceptions or worlds opened by other persons. But there would also be a sadness in the moralizing observer or reader who saw the evil of another as simply evil, as simply opposed to ones own innocent life. Far from moralizing condemnation, Deleuze suggests that we gain an adequate idea of the inhuman forces that produce sadness. This means not seeing evil as located within characters but recognizing the desires and investments that turn life against itself. In the case of American Psycho we see the serial killer figure of Bateman as
composed of images and investments which are never simply his and never entirely other than ourselves. His violence and frenzied self-investment comes from an investment in the hardened American individual. His gym-cultivated body, his desperate attempt to experience a highly individualized intensity, and his language of self-promotion are not so much personal features added on to his character as they are impersonal forces from which his character is effected. American Psycho is the diagnosing or symptomology of a collection of investments. In reading we become imperceptible, not by judging characters, but by experiencing the forces of life from which judgments of good and evil are derived. Becomingimperceptible is not something that can be achieved once and for all; it is a becoming, not a being. It is the challenge

of

freedom and perception: of opening ourselves to the life that passes through us, rather than objectifying that life in advance through a system of good and evil.

A2: Heidegger
1. No link a. We dont utilize calculative thought in our 1ac. If anything we move away from such ideologies by metaphorically exploring new political possibilities. I dare them to articulate how our reorientation of desire causes technological thought. b. We do not attempt to dominate nature. 2. We solve the root cause of technological thought desire is what causes technological thought ideologically sustained fantasies that the subject strives for. The call for technology, is not neutral these drives are existent everywhere around us but continue to fail. And as we pile up our new toys, fresh out of the package and already broken with no warranty, the disparities between worlds grow. The problem is not technology, rather it is the self. Flix Guattari 1989 Pierre-Flix Guattari was a French militant, institutional psychotherapist and philosopher, a founder of both schizoanalysis and ecosophy. "The Three Ecologies" 1989, pp. 31-32
So, wherever we turn, there is the same nagging paradox: on the one hand, the continuous development of new technoscientific means to potentially resolve the dominant ecological issues and reinstate socially useful activities on the surface of the planet, and, on the other hand, the inability of organized social forces and constituted subjective formations to take hold of these resources in order to make them work. But perhaps this paroxysmal era of the erosion of subjectivities, assets and environments is destined to enter into a phase of decline. The demands of singularity are rising up almost everywhere; the most obvious signs in this regard are to be found in the multiplication of nationalitary claims which were regarded as marginal only yesterday, and which increasingly occupy the foreground of the political stage. (We note, from Corsica to the Baltic States, the
11

conjunction of ecological and separatist demands.) In the end, this rise in nationalitary questions will probably lead to profound modifications in East- West relations, and in particular, the configuration of Europe, whose centre of gravity could drift decisively towards a neutralist East.
The traditional dualist oppositions that have guided social thought and geopolitical cartographies are over. The conflicts remain, but they engage with multipolar systems incompatible with recruitments under any ideological, Manicheist flag. For example, the opposition between the Third World and the developed world is being completely blown apart. We have seen with the New Industrial Powers that productivity is becoming on an altogether different scale from the traditional industrial bastions of the West, but this phenomenon is accompanied by a sort of Third-Worldization within developed countries, which is coupled with an exacerbation of questions relative to immigration and racism. Make no mistake about it, the great disorder and confusion surrounding the economic unification of the European Community will in no way impede this Third-Worldization of considerable areas of Europe.
12

3. Perm do the methodology of the 1ac with the ideology of the alternative. 4. Turn: They utilize calculative thought as a standing reserve to win the ballot. Means they link back to themselves and justifies the permutation. 5. Alternative cant solve A. Desire maintains itself via preserving distance between it and the object. The alternative will only generate more anxieties and seek scapegoats to escape its failure. Dean, Department of Political Science Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2005 (Jodi, Enjoyment as a Category of Political Theory,) As I mentioned before, desire depends on a missing enjoyment, on its lack. Fantasy is the framework through which some empirical content, an object, person, experience, or practice, say, comes to function for us as it, as what we desire. Although we are accustomed to thinking about fantasies as the stories we tell ourselves about getting what we want, having it all, say, or achieving our goals, Zizek follows Lacan in emphasizing the operation of fantasy at a more fundamental level. This more fundamental fantasy, insofar as it tells us how to desire, keeps our desire alive, unfulfilled, intact as desire. Thus, fantasy provides us with an explanation for why our jouissance is missing, how we would have, could have really enjoyed if only . . . Such fantasmic explanations may posit another who has stolen our enjoyment or who has concentrated all the enjoyment in his hands, preventing the rest of us from enjoying (as in Freuds account of the primal father in Totem and Taboo). What is crucial, though, is the way that the fantasy keeps open the possibility of enjoyment by telling us why we arent really enjoying. B. Heidegger proposes ideas to rethink thinking through traditional methods of thinking this logic is circular and offers no end point. C. Heidegger concedes technological thought is everywhere. The negative displays it in their structured arguments, their flowing, even the way they dress. D. The negative links to their own kritik- this takes out the alternative and proves a performative contradiction - thats a voter because it destroys our ability articulate a consistent strategy. E. Its inevitable they offer no method endorsable in this round to break down technological thought, even on an individual level. 6. Perm do the plan and reject all other instances of technological thinking. Either the alternative is strong enough to solve the residual link of the

permutation and the perm can solve or the alternative cant solve and the impacts are inevitable.

***Disads***

A2: DAs Generic

1. No link We dont fiat a policy option. Make them specify how our advocacy of exploration specifically links. 2. The affirmative outweighs. Ignoring the desire for nationalism will leave fascism unabated, making violence, suicide, and despotism inevitable. Thats Deleuze and Guattari. And no value to life outweighs any impact because if life is a living hell death becomes desirable. Loss of human self-assertion would be worse than nuclear omnicide. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy @ Tulane, 1994 (Michael, Contesting Earths Future, p 119-120) SC
Heidegger asserted that

human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth." This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's
soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring. Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological

damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide , for it is
wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by humanity.

3. Desire First Desire manifests itself at the unconscious and resonates into the macro level, powering political structures. A failure to question our motives of desire constricts any possibility of understanding how political formations come to be and ensures continuous policy failure. Thats Ballantyne. 4. No war no benefits, rising costs, democracies, common security, clear power divisions make escalation unlikely. Mandelbaum, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, 1999
Michael, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations Is Major War Obsolete?

Why is this so? Most simply, the costs have risen and the benefits of major war have shriveled. The costs of fighting such a war are extremely high because of the advent in the middle of this century of nuclear weapons, but they would have been high even had mankind never split the atom. As for the benefits, these now seem, at least from the point of view of the major powers, modest to non-existent. The traditional motives for warfare

are in retreat, if not extinct. War is no longer regarded by anyone, probably not even Saddam Hussein after his unhappy experience, as a paying proposition. And as for the ideas on behalf of which major wars have been waged in the past, these are in steep decline. Here the collapse of communism was an important milestone , for that ideology was inherently bellicose. This is not to say that the world has reached the end of ideology; quite the contrary. But the ideology that is now in the ascendant, our own, liberalism, tends to be pacific. Moreover, I would argue that three post-Cold War developments have made major war even less likely than it was after 1945. One of these is the rise of democracy, for democracies, I believe, tend to be peaceful. Now carried to its most extreme conclusion, this eventuates in an argument made by some prominent political scientists that democracies never go to war with one another. I wouldnt go that far. I dont believe that this is a law of history, like a law of nature, because I believe there are no such laws of history. But I do believe there is something in it. I believe there is a peaceful tendency inherent in democracy. Now its true that one important cause of war has not changed with the end of the Cold War. That is the structure of the international system, which is anarchic. And realists, to whom Fareed has referred and of whom John Mearsheimer and our guest Ken Waltz are perhaps the two most leading exponents in this country and the world at the moment, argue that that structure determines international activity, for it leads sovereign states to have to prepare to defend themselves, and those preparations sooner or later issue in war. I argue, however, that a post-Cold War innovation counteracts the effects of anarchy. This is what I have called in my 1996 book, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, common security. By common security I mean a regime of negotiated arms limits that reduce the insecurity that anarchy inevitably produces by transparency-every state can know what weapons every other state has and what it is doing with them-and through the principle of defense dominance, the
reconfiguration through negotiations of military forces to make them more suitable for defense and less for attack.

Some caveats are, indeed, in order where common security is concerned. Its not universal. It exists only in Europe. And there it is certainly not irreversible. And I should add that what I have called common security is not a cause, but a consequence, of the major forces that have made war less likely. States enter into common security arrangements when they have already, for other reasons, decided that they do not wish to go to war. Well, the third feature of the post-Cold War international system that seems to me to lend itself to warlessness is the novel distinction between the periphery and the core, between the powerful states and the less powerful ones. This was previously a cause of conflict and now is far less important. To quote from the article again, While for much of recorded history local conflicts were absorbed into great-power conflicts, in the wake of the Cold War, with the industrial democracies debellicised and Russia and China preoccupied with internal
affairs, there is no great-power conflict into which the many local conflicts that have erupted can be absorbed. The great chess game of international politics is finished, or at least suspended. A pawn is now just a pawn, not a

sentry standing guard against an attack on a king.

5. Nuclear war is survivable apocalyptic theories have no scientific basis. Nyquist, regular geopolitical columnist for Financial Sense Online, 1999
(J.R., regular columnist for WorldNetDaily from 1999 until 2001, Is Nuclear War Survivable? http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=19722)
As I write about Russia's nuclear war preparations, I get some interesting mail in response. Some correspondents imagine I am totally ignorant. They point out that nuclear war would cause "nuclear winter," and everyone would die. Since nobody wants to die, nobody would ever start a nuclear war (and nobody would ever seriously prepare for one). Other correspondents suggest I am ignorant of the

nuclear war would not be the end of the world. I then point to studies showing that "nuclear winter" has no scientific basis, that fallout from a nuclear war would not kill all life on earth. Surprisingly, few of my correspondents are convinced. They prefer apocalyptic myths created by pop scientists, movie producers and journalists. If Dr. Carl Sagan once said "nuclear winter" would follow a nuclear war, then it must be true. If radiation wipes out mankind in a movie, then that's what we can expect in real life. But Carl Sagan was wrong about nuclear winter. And the movie "On the Beach" misled American filmgoers about the effects of fallout. It is time, once and for all, to lay these myths to rest. Nuclear war would not bring about the end of the world, though it would be horribly destructive. The truth is, many prominent physicists have condemned the nuclear winter hypothesis. Nobel laureate Freeman Dyson once said of nuclear winter research, "It's an absolutely atrocious piece of science, but I quite despair of setting the public record straight." Professor Michael McElroy, a Harvard physics professor, also criticized the nuclear winter hypothesis. McElroy said that nuclear
world-destroying effects of nuclear radiation. I patiently reply to these correspondents that

winter researchers "stacked the deck" in their study, which was titled "Nuclear Winter: Global
Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions" (Science, December 1983). Nuclear winter is the theory that the mass use of nuclear weapons would create enough smoke and dust to blot out the sun, causing a catastrophic drop in global temperatures. According to

In truth, natural disasters have frequently produced smoke and dust far greater than those expected from a nuclear war. In 1883 Krakatoa exploded with a blast equivalent to 10,000 onemegaton bombs, a detonation greater than the combined nuclear arsenals of planet earth. The
Carl Sagan, in this situation the earth would freeze. No crops could be grown. Humanity would die of cold and starvation. Krakatoa explosion had negligible weather effects. Even more disastrous, going back many thousands of years, a meteor struck Quebec with the force of 17.5 million one-megaton bombs, creating a crater 63 kilometers in diameter. But the world did not freeze.

Professor George Rathjens of MIT, a known antinuclear activist, who said, "Nuclear winter is the worst example of misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory." Also consider Professor Russell Seitz, at Harvard University's Center for
Life on earth was not extinguished. Consider the views of International Affairs, who says that the nuclear winter hypothesis has been discredited. Two researchers, Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider, debunked the nuclear winter hypothesis in the summer 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs. Thompson and Schneider

"the global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level of probability." OK, so nuclear winter isn't going to happen. What
stated: about nuclear fallout? Wouldn't the radiation from a nuclear war contaminate the whole earth, killing everyone? The short answer is: absolutely not. Nuclear fallout is a problem, but we should not exaggerate its effects. As it happens, there are two types of fallout produced by nuclear detonations. These are: 1) delayed fallout; and 2) short-term fallout. According to researcher Peter V. Pry, "Delayed

fallout will not, contrary to popular belief, gradually kill billions of people everywhere in the world." Of course, delayed fallout would increase the number of people dying of lymphatic cancer, leukemia, and cancer of the thyroid. "However," says Pry, "these deaths would probably be far fewer than deaths now resulting from ... smoking, or from automobile accidents." The real hazard in a nuclear
war is the short-term fallout. This is a type of fallout created when a nuclear weapon is detonated at ground level. This type of fallout could kill millions of people, depending on the targeting strategy of the attacking country. But

short-term fallout rapidly subsides to safe levels in 13 to 18 days. It is not permanent. People who live outside of the affected areas will be fine. Those in affected areas can survive if they have access to underground shelters. In some areas, staying indoors may even suffice. Contrary to popular misconception, there were no documented deaths from short-term or delayed fallout at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. These blasts were low airbursts, which produced minimal fallout effects. Today's thermonuclear weapons are even "cleaner." If used in airburst mode, these weapons would produce
few (if any) fallout casualties. On their side, Russian military experts believe that the next world war will be a nuclear missile war. They know that nuclear weapons cannot cause the end of the world. According to the Russian military writer, A. S. Milovidov, "There is profound error and harm in the disoriented claims of bourgeois ideologues that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war." Milovidov explains that Western objections to the mass use of nuclear weapons are based on "a subjective judgment. It expresses mere protest against nuclear war." Another Russian theorist, Captain First Rank V. Kulakov, believes that a mass nuclear strike may not be enough to defeat "a strong enemy, with extensive territory enabling him to use space and time for the organizations of active and passive defense. ..." Russian military theory regards nuclear war as highly destructive, but nonetheless winnable. Russian generals do not exaggerate the effects of mass destruction weapons. Although nuclear war would be unprecedented in its deathdealing potential, Russian strategists believe that a well-prepared system of tunnels and underground bunkers could save many millions of lives. That is why Russia has built a comprehensive shelter system for its urban populace. On the American side as well,

there have been studies which suggest that nuclear war is survivable. 6. No Impact Quantum physics proves death is not a non-event - your fear is sadly misplaced. Lanza 2009 (Robert Lanza is considered one of the leading scientists in the world. He is currently Chief Scientific Officer at Advanced Cell Technology, and a professor at Wake Forest University School of Medicine. "Does Death Exist? New Theory Says 'No'", http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-lanza/does-death-exist-new-theo_b_384515.html)
Many of us fear death. We believe in death because we have been told we will die. We associate ourselves with the body, and we know that bodies die. But a new scientific theory suggests that death is not the terminal event we think. One well-known aspect of quantum physics is that certain observations
cannot be predicted absolutely. Instead, there is a range of possible observations each with a different probability. One

mainstream explanation, the "many-worlds"

interpretation, states that each of these possible observations corresponds to a different universe (the 'multiverse' ). A new scientific theory - called biocentrism - refines these ideas. There are an infinite number of universes, and everything that could possibly happen occurs in some universe. Death does not exist in any real sense in these scenarios. All possible universes exist simultaneously, regardless of what happens in any of them. Although individual bodies are destined to self-destruct, the alive feeling - the 'Who am I?'- is just a 20-watt fountain of energy operating in the brain. But this energy doesn't go away at death. One of the surest axioms of science is that energy never dies; it can neither be created nor destroyed. But does this energy transcend from one world to the other ?

7. Turn: Relying on strict utilitarian calculus justified suicide bombing, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, continued genocide, and other atrocities. Farer 2008 (Tom,former President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, is Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver; "Un-Just War Against Terrorism and the Struggle to Appropriate Human Rights": Human Rights QUarterly, Volume 30, Number 2; MUSE)
American leaders who thought of themselves as thoroughly decent people, as exemplars of the values of the West, authorized the incineration of the inhabitants of those cities, and years afterwards continued to defend the decision, defended it in the only way they could, on grounds that in doing so, they were saving American lives170 and carrying out the purposes for which the long and terrible Second World War was fought. It is a pure consequentialist argument unless one takes the position that through their
passive support for the government of Japan, all of the Japanese were in some sense guilty, a position that cannot be reconciled with the distinction between combatants and non-combatants that, as Elshtain rightly argues, is central

to just war thought. Palestinian suicide bombers and their defenders make exactly the same consequentialist argument: "We are illegally and unjustly occupied. We are penned into what amount to
open-air concentration camps run by the inmates but surrounded by guards. We tried passive resistance and were beaten down.171 We tried negotiation, but did not delay by one second the seizure of our land and the proliferation of armed colonies in our midst.172 We threw stones and were shot down and had our limbs broken.173 Thousands of us are imprisoned without due process of law;174 thousands have [End Page 401] been subjected to cruel and inhuman interrogation.175 We have no army, no air force. We cannot attack combatants, so we must drive

up the cost of occupation by attacking non-combatants." And they could cite as precedents the actions of pre-state Jewish military formations, primarily the Irgun which numbered among its leaders a future Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin. The hawkish historian, Benny Morris, writes of a dialectic of terrorism between Israelis and Arabs beginning in mid-1937: "Now for the first time, massive bombs were placed in crowded Arab centers, and dozens of people were indiscriminately murdered and maimed."176 In one exemplary case "an Irgun operative dressed as an Arab placed two large milk cans filled with TNT
and shrapnel in the Arab market in downtown Haifa. The subsequent explosion killed twenty-one and wounded fiftytwo."177 Referring to this period the political philosopher Hannah Arendt, favorably and repeatedly cited by Elshtain, wrote: "They think it is all right to murder anyone who can be murderedan innocent English Tommy or a harmless Arab in the market of Haifa."178 Defenders of human rights must in the end reject consequentialist arguments no matter who makes them. The right of the innocent to life is trumps. But those of us who in the name of human rights deny weak objects of alien domination the only means they may have to make their oppressors recalculate costs and benefits have a special obligation to help them. It is in part because their recognition of that obligation is so selective that the neo-conservatives' claim to be champions of human rights seems meretricious. In the particular case

of Palestine, they are not simply indifferent to the status quo of subordination and misery that is the Palestinians' lot; rather they are among its advocates.179 When as members of the Reagan administration they saw continued US support for Saddam Hussein even as he waged genocidal warfare against the Kurds, they did not resign. When the government of El Salvador massacred peasants they saw no evil.180 They have repeatedly proven that they are consequentialists; for them human [End Page 402] rights are not trumps, and that is a second critical difference between them and liberal advocates of human rights.

***Counterplans***

A2: Counterplan Generic

1. Perm Do Both. 2. There is no net benefit to the counterplan if we win that their DA doesnt have an impact. 3. Cross apply our Ballantyne in 2007 evidence. A failure to investigate motives at the level of desire prevents any possibility of learning about how political formations come to be and ensures serial policy failure. They dont analyze desire which means they are doomed to re-entrenching nationalist goals. 4. No Solvency: This counterplan is a pretty silly strategy against this affirmative. The negative cant actually _______ making their counterplan functionally useless. They cant access our movement. 5. Extend our Deleuze and Guattari evidence from the 1AC which talks about how a focus on the state ignores the fascism hidden in the every day. Only a focus on the self and our relation towards repression can begin to account for the operations of desire independent DA to your counterplan. 6. Local disruption is the only means to effect political change the aff traps us in the mindset of representations by the governing class, that only those in power can influence change destroying all movements. Colebrook 2002 (Claire, Understanding Deleuze, Pg. xxxviii)
Human freedom became the problem. If human beings are free, does this mean that there is some ultimate man who can be liberated from the forces of production; or does radical freedom mean that there is no longer any human essence to which politics can appeal? All this came to a head in the student sit-ins and disruptions of 1968. There were protests throughout Europe in the late 1960s which were random, unthought out, and motivated not by the economically defined class of workers so much as by students and intellectuals. In the aftermath of these disruptions it was realized that politics was no longer the affair of economic classes and large or molar groupings. Local disruptions at the level of knowledge, ideas and identity could transform the political terrain. Deleuze and others opened the politics of the virtual: it was no longer accepted that actual material reality, such as the economy, produced ideas. Many insisted that the virtual (images, desires, concepts) was directly productive of social reality. This overturned the simple idea of ideology, the idea that images and beliefs were produced by the governing classes to deceive us about our real social conditions. We have to do away with the idea that there is some ultimate political reality or actuality which lies behind all our images. Images are not just surface effects of some underlying economic cause; images and the virtual have their own autonomous power. This is where structuralism and post-1968 politics intersected. We need to see our languages and systems of representation not just as masks or signs of the actual, but as fully real powers in their own right. The way we think, speak, desire and see the world is itself political; it produces relations, effects, and organises our bodies.

A2: PICs Generic

1. Interpretation competitive advocacies must be both textually and functionally competitive: A. Textual Competition kills AFF ground hard to garner offense against CPs that textually competes. B. Text Comp allows the NEG to PIC out of limiters in the plan to generate plan-plus CPs. That kills AFF ground, jacks 100% of the aff. C. Text Comp causes functional severance can functionally sever out of DAs mooting our offense. D. Err Aff on theory. Structural side bias The negative has the structural advantage of the neg block and we only get ONE constructive after hearing the 1NC, they get two after hearing the 1AC. 2. PICs are a voting issue: A. Moots the 1AC. PICs force the AFF to argue against themselves. This makes it impossible for the AFF to generate offense. B. NEG Ground. Encourages vague plan writing, because specificity gives them PIC ground. This hurts the ability for the negative to generate DA links and specific case turns. C. Predictability. PICs encourage debate over trivial aspects of the plan. The functional nature of most PICs makes the research burden impossible. 3. Perm Do Both. 4. Language is amorphous their focus on linguistics and the definition of each word re-entrenches language barriers. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 207-209
There is no linguistic field without biunivocal relations-whether between ideographic and phonetic values,
or between articulations of different levels, monemes and phonemes-that finally ensure the independence and the linearity of the deterritorialized signs. But such a field remains defined by a transcendence, even when one considers

this transcendence as an absence or an empty locus, performing the necessary foldings, levelings (rabattements), and subordinations-a transcendence whence issues throughout the system the inarticulate material flux in which this transcendence operates, opposes, selects, and combines: the signifier. It is curious, therefore, that one can show so well the servitude of the masses with respect to the minimal elements of the sign within the immanence of language, without showing how the domination is exercised through and in the transcendence of the signifier.* There, however, as elsewhere, an irreducible exteriority of conquest asserts itself. For if language itself does not presuppose conquest, the leveling operations (les operations de rabattement) that

constitute written language indeed presuppose two inscriptions that do not speak the same language: two languages (langages), one of masters, the other of slaves. Jean Nougayrol describes just such a situation: "For the Sumerians, [a given sign] is water; the Sumerians read this sign a, which signifies water in Sumerian. An Akkadian comes along and asks his Sumerian master: what is this sign? The Sumerian replies: that's a. The Akkadian takes this sign for a, and on this point there is no longer any relationship between the sign and water, which in Akkadian is called mil. ... I believe that the presence of the Akkadians determined the phoneticization of the writing system ... and that the contact of two peoples is almost necessary before the spark of a new writing can spring forth."55 One cannot better show how an operation of biunivocalization organizes itself around a despotic signifier, so that a phonetic and alphabetical chain flows from it. Alphabetical writing is not for illiterates, but by illiterates. It goes by way of illiterates, those unconscious workers. The signifier implies a language that overcodes another language, while the other language is completely coded into phonetic elements. And if the unconscious in fact includes the topical order of a double inscription, it is not structured like one language, but like two. The signifier does not appear to keep its promise, which is to give us access to a modern and functional understanding of language. The imperialism of the signifier does not take us beyond the question, "What does it mean T"; it is content to bar the question in advance, to render all the answers insufficient by relegating them to the status of a simple signified. It challenges exegesis in the name of recitation, pure
textuality, and superior "scientificity" (scientificite). Like the young palace dogs too quick to drink the verse water, and who never tire of crying: The signifier, you have not reached the signifier, you are still at the level of the signifieds! The signifier is the only thing that gladdens their hearts. But this master signifier remains what it was in ages past, a transcendent stock that distributes lack to all the elements of the chain, something in common for a common absence, the authority that channels all the breaks-flows into one and the same locus of one and the same cleavage: the detached object, the phallus-and-castration, the bar that delivers over all the depressive subjects to the great paranoiac king. 0 signifier, terrible archaism of the despot where they still look for the empty tomb, the dead father, and the mystery of the name! And perhaps that is what

incites the anger of certain linguists against Lacan, no less than the enthusiasm of his followers: the vigor and the serenity with which Lacan accompanies the signifier back to its source, to its veritable origin, the despotic age, and erects an infernal machine that welds desire to the Law, because, everything considered-so Lacan thinks-this is indeed the form in which the signifier is in agreement with the unconscious, and the form in which it produces effects of the signified in the unconscious.* The signifier as the repressing representation, and the new displaced represented that it induces, the famous metaphors and metonymy-all of that constitutes the overcoding and de territorialized despotic machine. The despotic signifier has the effect of overcoding the territorial chain. The
signified is precisely the effect of the signifier, and not what it represents or what it designates. The signified is the sister of the borders and the mother of the interior. Sister and mother are the concepts that correspond to the great acoustic image, to the voice of the new alliance and direct filiation. Incest is the very operation of overcoding at the two ends of the chain in all the territory ruled by the despot, from the borders to the center: all the debts of alliance are converted into the infinite debt of the new alliance, and all the extended filiations are subsumed by direct filiation. Incest or the royal trinity is therefore the whole of the repressing representation insofar as it initiates the overcoding. The system of subordination or

signification has replaced the system of connotation. To the extent that graphism is flattened onto the voice-the graphism that, not so long ago, was inscribed flush with the body-body representation subordinates itself to word representation: sister and mother are the voice's signifieds. But to the extent that this flattening induces a fictitious voice from on high that no longer expresses itself except in the linear flux, the despot himself is the signifier of the voice that, along with the two signifieds, effects the overcoding of the whole chain. What made incest impossible-namely, that at times we had the
appellations (mother, sister) but not the persons or the bodies, while at other times we had the bodies, but the appellations disappeared from view as soon as we broke through the prohibitions they bore-has ceased to exist. Incest has become possible in the wedding of the kinship bodies and family appellations, in the union of the signifier with its signifieds.

***Theory***

2AC Conditionality
Unconditionality is the best option. Its a voter. a. 2AC Time and Strat Skew only time to read our best offense. b. Argumentative Responsibility Running one unconditional advocacy forces indepth neg research, increasing education on both sides. c. Presumption shifts aff when the neg reads a counterplan.

2AC Floating PIKs Preempt

Double-bind: Either the alt cant solve the case and our impacts are turns to the alt or the alt does solve the case. Thats a voter. a) Advocacy Skills defending our plan without certain aspects prevents honest advocacies and damages the deliberative democratic potential of debate. b) Grants perm solvency It they win that they can do the plan except _____, we can too and the perm solves. Not allowing this creates an unfair neg bias.

***Card Summations***

Holland 99 Card Summation

Extend our Holland in 99 evidence. Despotism is when fascism resonates into the totalitarian state. Our evidence highlights how in a despotic society, all surplus is owed the despot including money, lives, and even reproduction. Holland talks about how despotism results from undisguised political domination such as microfascist tendencies and then eventually results to the formation of empires. The despotic state has been depicted through history; Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini all created a State so horrendous that suicide became desirable. The impact is no value to life and a world which ushers a depressive tone of existence.

Conley 06 Card Summation

Our Conley evidence indicates that rigidness and borders is what creates barriers and conflicts over social classes, races and sexes. To be constantly changing political outlooks in a rhizomatic world prevents the possibility of a stable state from being constructed. Institutions of the state control and immobilize people from the top down making a bottom up approach of rhizomatic politics the only hope of solving. Our methodology is the only one that takes into consideration the question of desire and prevents microfascist urges from culminating.

Ballantyne 07 Card Summation

Extend our Ballantyne in 07 evidence. Desire is what manifests itself at the local level and is what power politics. The only way to understand how political formations come to be would to investigate motivations at the level of desire. Ballantyne talks about how The scale of operations builds up from a preconscious sub-individual, who is already a swarm of desiring-machines, to a social group. This means that the ways State fascism comes to resonate all begins with the desire of the individual and how he or she deals with microfascist impulses.

DnG 72 Card Summation

Extend our Deleuze and Guattari in 1972 evidence. Even if the 1AC may seem revolutionary from the standpoint of class and community it is not revolutionary from the standpoint desire. Deleuze and Guattari talk about how a group can be revolutionary from the standpoint of class interest and preconscious investments, but not be so-and even remain fascist and police-like-from the standpoint of its libidinal investments. This means that post the 1AC desire and mindsets do not change and at best they are papered over with a new name and a new regime. Fascism is just shifted from one form to another and the microfascist tendencies which power forces of imperialism are left unabated. Our Deleuze and Guattari evidence goes on the say that the libidinal break is defined by the driving role of desiring production. This means that a group can only be fully revolutionary from the lens of desire if they are able to change the way they deal with microfascist impulses. Any other revolution would leave microfascism unabated, making their call for change not only futile but also counterproductive.

Goddard 06 Card Summation

Extend our Goddard in 2k6 evidence. Goddard talks about how our speech act bears revolutionary potential when we invest new tropes of political reality. He says how once you start mobilizing a massive and unpredictable political affectivity and subjectivation that is autonomous, self-referential and self-reinforcing, then this is a cause for panic on the part of the forces of social order. Our act of political defiance is effective because it allows new thinking to emerge and engages in new forms of political reality. Goddard then goes on to say that the shift from fixed political subjectivities and a specified programme is the key to the transformation to a post-political politics and indeed to a post media era. Our discourse is necessary in challenging the faces of state based linguistic parameters. Our discourse does not function to try to gain utopian society within this one round; rather we use it as means to move toward the direction. We should be constantly moving toward less fascism, hierarchy, and discrimination. The fact that our discourse allows you to engage in this thought means that we are opening the space for epistemological growth.

Massumi 83 Card Summation

Extend Massumi 83. We should be debating about what the 1AC does, not what it means. Our thought gets us out of ideas of sameness and constancy and allows for continually shifting ideas with an open equation. The philosophy of the 1AC is one similar to music where we should always be shifting ideas and there are always parts you leave cold, with some parts you listen to over and over again. Our politics replaces the idea of a closed equation with an open equation of always shifting ideas.

Ballantyne 07 Summation (Identity Politics)

Extend our first piece of Ballantyne in 07 evidence. Their understanding of identity prevents its creative journey. Identity is something that isnt static; instead we are in a constant state of becoming. Becoming-Man, Becoming-Woman. Difference in it of itself is what identity is and that difference is always changing. Instead of trying to find our identity we should seek to reach a point where identity itself meaningless. Ballantyne talks about how we are not formed in isolation, but socially, and we are constituted by way of ideas and practices that do not originate in us but which pass through us and inhabit us and influence the things we do. This means that our identity is not something that can be found, but instead is something that is created through the experiences we go through. To try to understand identity would mean that we would have to classify ourselves through a certain lens such as a lens of race or sexual orientation. To understand identity would mean to lump together certain characteristics and label ourselves in a certain way. This directly contradicts the essence of identity for it keeps identity trapped in bounded forms. Ballantyne goes on to say that experimentation on oneself is our only identity, our single chance for all the combinations which inhabit us. Living is always a process of becoming, never of contemplating an achieved being. Each and every one of us are a mixture of emotions, intensities, and experiences; to try to find identity would be futile for it would never be able to depict every facet of our individual lives.

Hardt & Negri 2000 (Identity Politics)

Extend our Hardt & Negri in 2000 evidence. Their emphasis on a local identity only serves to mask the enemy and prevents global solutions from occurring. This is because focusing on a single identity makes it easier for the State to impose forms of subjugation upon that specific group. In the status quo there are many micropolitical movements occurring. Gay rights, civil rights, anti war protests all with their own goals and destinations. However, individual protests are futile and have less of a chance at overcoming state policies. Instead we should be forming coalitions a combination of many micropolitical movements in the status quo directed as a horizontal movement against the state. To create change we must first focus on ourselves and how we deal with forms of oppression. It is better both theoretically and practically to enter the terrain of the state and confront its homogenizing and heterogenizing flows in all their complexity, grounding our analysis in the power of micropolitical organizations.

Zalloua 08 Card Summation

Extend our Zalloua in 08 evidence. It indicates that the creation of the capitalist system and the macro government operates from a stand point of the production of difference to give it sustenance. We need to see the body of sight as a production to fluid identity. Only challenging desire at the micro level can change the forces of single units of the system that replicate fascism. Instead of arguing for politics of difference, the key is actually to recognize how single units are playing into the role and perpetuating the state.

Ballantyne 07 Summation (Identity Politics 2)

Extend our second piece of Ballantyne in 07 evidence. The capitalist society has pushed us into cultural homogenization making identity irrelevant. Ballantyne talks about how integrated world capitalism has encompassed the world. We are all educated to order the same carbonated drinks, to swoon as the sight of the same film stars. Whole species of ideas and cultures of behavior have been eradicated from the planet. A focus on individual identity would be futile in this sense for it would just be overcome by the globalization. Desire must be understood first in order to create progressive social change. Their act alone is unable to create effective change because they will just be overcome by global homogenization. We must first be able to question why we have become entrenched in the global capital system before any other change can occur; horizontal movement instead of a vertical one in order to redirect desire.