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COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
Published at FortLeavenworth, Kansa
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IWI. JUNE 1943 VOL.23
1943
Volume XXIII
N~mber 3
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
MILITARY
REVI&W
MONTHLY REVIEW OF MILITAR Y LITERA TtiRE
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COLONEL F. M. BARROWS, Field Art{llerti ... ... .... .............. .. ..... ..........Editor
MAJOR JOSEPH DASKER, Infantry . ... . . . ..Assistant Editor
CAPTAIN DON E. GRIBBLE, Field Artillery... . . ..Assistant Editor
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June 1943
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THE COMMANDANDGENERALSTAFFSCHOOLMILITARYREVIEW Publishedmodfdy by the Comrrumdaad GeneralStaffschool
at Fort kzvenworth, Kmmx.. Enteredw second-class matter Ausu8t31, 1934,at tbe Post OH- at Fort .b..nwortb, Kan.w, undertbe Act of
March3, 1s79. Sub,criptiourate: S3.03per ye8r for 12ienuesin tbe UnitedStates and ~iom. Forwgn.wb.criptiom$4.50.
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Acknowledgment ~
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The editors desire to express their thanks and appreciation to those persons who have valuably as
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sisted in the preparation of material for this issue. The work of contributors has been done in addition to
their regular duties and gratuitously on t$eir own time. We are very grateful to the following officers
for their generous donations:
COLONEL H.P. CARTER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..- . . . . . . . . .. fifedica[ Problems in Jungle warfare
COLONELJ.G. COWLEY, BRITISH ARMY. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. The Supply of a Mobile Division in Open Country
COLONELD.S. ELLERTHORPE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..- . . ..---- . . . . .. Sevvice Aveasof thelnfantw llivision
COLONEL W. H. HARDY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Aviation in Suppovt of Ground Troops
COLONEL J.F. HOWELL. . . . . . . . . . . . ..- . . . . . . . . . . ..-. - . . . .. Antiaircraft Artillerv With the Diwisiott
COLONELA. ST. JOHN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. RanUOOn Fmlk
COLONEL S.T. SUTTON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-Defense of a River Line
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J.H. BAGMAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Armored Field ArtiUerv in Combat
I,IEUTENANT COLONEL R.O. FORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ezploitation of Local Resources
LIEUTENANT COLONEL G. GARBER. . . . . ..-... - . . . ..-- . . . . ..- . . . . .. The Silent Partner {n the AAF
LIEUTENANT COLONEL D.A. RASH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-lli[itaw Relations With Civilian Defense
LIEUTENANT COLONELM.J. REYNOLDS. . . . . . . . . . . . .Application of Air Trrwspo?t to Problems of Supply
MAJOR B.E. Prescott... -__.. - . . . ..- . . . . . . . ..-_... - . . ..-- . . . . . . . . ..&f?s-The Staff viewpoint
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Contents
A VIATION IN SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS ___ :. ____ _
'\. 'MILITARY RELATIONS WITH CIVILIAN DEFENSE ______________ _
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY WITH THE DIVISION __ _
THE SUPPLY OF A MOBILE DIVISION IN OPEN COUNTRY _______ _
EXPLOITATJON OF LOCAL RESOURCES _______ _
MEDICAL PROBLEMS IN JUNGLE WARfARE _____ _
SERVICE AREAS OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION __
DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE __________ _
ARMORED FIELD ARTILLERY IN COMBAT _________ _
RANGOON FALLS _____ _____ _
MP's-THE STAFF VIEWPOINT ____________________________________________ _
THE SILENT PARTNER IN THE AAF __________________ _
ApPLICATiON OF AIR TRANSPORT TO PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY ______________ _
REINFORCING ARTILLERY EMPLOYED IN MASS ____________ _
JAPANESE USE OF CHEMICALS ______ - ________________ - - - -- -- ----
MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS _______ _
Open Stghts 01 Afumbo-Jumbo?
Use of Smail Tank FOl'UJrdlOns ill Wooded Ihll Countl'Y ___ _

_ ________________ ______ 11
16
21
25
_ ________________ 28
_ ____________ 32
35
37
_______ ________ ""_ 40
_ 46
49
54
59
. ___________ 61
62
_ ____________________________ . _ 66
66
67
E.rperif.l1Ce in Action German ,l1(l1 tals ___ - -- -- - - - -- - - - --- - - - - - - - -- ---- - ---
. _________ . _____ 69
Counteraction Against Tluning und Flankmg 1Hot'f'ments m the .l!O/fnfaW8 ---------- ____ _ 69
Bmlding the BI-idge ACl088 the Seme at Les Audf'lys __
St1-ategy-A .Ua tel'W 1 "Aspect __ --- -----------
Tactics of Combat fOI" lnhohltf'd Places ____ _
ArttUe1'V Support fOI Tanks _
A ttaek By An Ili/antry Company With Tanks
71
73
74
_ _____________________ . 75
77
CO'inhut in a Ravine ______________________________________ . ____ ... _ ..... __ .. _______ __ .'_ .. _ .. __ ._. ____ 78
Supply in GCI'man Motonzed Untts _ __ _ - - - -- --- - - --- - - - - - - - - .-- - - - -- ------
79
80 German OP's in Russia: Lake Lisna ________ _
W1th a Field Ambulance in Lzbya _____________ _
. __________________ 81
Action Against Enemy Antitank ArtilleJ-Y ____________________ _______________ _ ______________ ________ 82
SOV1el Aeyo-Sleds _ ____ _ __ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _______ - -- - - - -- -- - - - - 83
Combat unth the Counterattacking Enemy ____ ____ _________ -------.,.------ 84
Attack on an Antitank Fonnatwn _________________________________________________________ - - -- -------- - --- 85
Man-Manageme11t ______ .,. ____________________________________________ . _______________ - - -- -- -- --_ - - ---- - 87
BOOK REVIEWS _________ __ __________________ ._ _ __ _ __ _____ _____ _ ________ _____ ---------- --.- 90
LIBRARY BULLETIN _____________ , _________ -------------------
_______________ .-------- 91
DIRECTORY OF PERIODICALS _____ - - - - - ----- - ----
. _______________________________________________ 91
CATALOG OF SELECTED PERIODICAL ARTICL!!S _______________ ________________________ _________________________ 91
SUBJECT INDEX ------ ________ _
_____________ ,,_ 93
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Command and General Staff School
MAJOR GENERAL KARL TRUESDELL. .-.. .- . . ..- .- ---------- . . . . . . . .. Commandant
~OLONEL M. C. SHALLENIERGER, f)ifa)ftr~- ------
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. ..__ .- .--__ ..--Assistant Commandant
COLONEL WILLIAM NALLE, (.uw[Yu . . . . . . . . .. Director, Ground Force Instruction
COLONEL W. A. PASHLEY, Qoa? tcrmaste? Corps . . . . . . . . Director, Service Force Instruction
CAPTAIN J. B. EARLE, Uuited .States IV(IUU.. . . . . . . . . . . . . ---... Director, ISaval Instruction
COLONELW. H. HARDY, Ai~ Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ----- -.. Director, Air Force Instruction
COI.O?WL 1). C. SCHMAHL, Field Arfi/lerv . . . . . . . ..--____ - . . . . . . . . . . . . .._-. __-Secretary
Class Directors
COLONEL WILLIAM NALLE, Cct,al?y . . ..-__ - . . . . . . . ..- . . . . ..-_ -_____ - . . . . . . ..-------General Staff
COLONEL J. H. VAN VLIET, l??fa??tru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. New Divisions
COLONEL W. A. PASHLEY, Quartw?nostw Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Service Staff
CAPTAIN J. B. EARLE, United Stat?. NavU. . . ..--_ -- . . . ..-__ . . . . . ..--... Army & Navy Staff College
Chiefs of Sections
COLONELS. T. SUTTON, l?IfCI~I@.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .---. --Administrative
COLONEL F. E. GILLETTE, Infflntru- . . . ..-_ . . . . . . . . ..-__ - . . . . . . . ..-.. Personnel and Administration
COLONEL B. Jf. LENNON, l?ztantry. - . . . . . . . ..-_ -._.. _. . ..__ . . . ..__ -_. -__. - . . . ..-_. _-Intelligence
COLONEL L. H. COOK, Infant~y__... -._-_ . . . . . . ..-_ . . . ..____ . . . . ..-. _-_.. Operations and Training
COLONEL D. S. ELLERTHORPE, Coast A?tillew Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Logistics
COLONEL H. E. KELLY, lnfantr#-_--___ -__-. --__ - . . ..---_ ._. ---- . . . ..-. --- . . ..1nfantry Divisions
COLONEL W. L. ROBERTS, Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-_ . . . . . .. Armored Divisions
COLONEL W. H. HARDY, Air Corps. -_ . . . . ..----... __ . . ..__.__ . . ..--... r----- . . . . . ..---Alr Forces
COLONEL C. R. BATHURST, Corps oj Engineers_ .._- _._- __-.. -_. -.. -___ ---___ -_-. --_ Service Forces
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Aviation in Support of Gr(mnd Troops
COLONEiLWILFRID H. HARDY, Air Corps
Instw?tm, Command and General Staff School
A
LL OR ANY part of the AAF may be used to sup.
port ground troops either under an appropriate
field commander or under an air force com
mander. To refresh your memory, Figure 1 shows the
organization of an air force. This organization is
and must remain, very flexible. In a theater of oper-
L
FIGURE1
ations will be found one or more such air forces. They
need not all have the four standard commands in each
case. We could have an air force containing say two
bomber commands while some other air force could
have two air support commands. Within each air
force, unils may be shifted around according to the
need. For instance, an air support command might
have need of medium bombardment units for some
particular mission. If that were the case, the medium
bombardment units could be lifted out of the bomber
command and attached to the air support command.
If that were not possible, due to the lack of either
control or base facilities, then the task would have
to be performed by the bomber command for tbe air
support command.
Whereas the designation of the general line of
action, or mission of the AAF, is a function of the
War Department, the capability to execute a mis
sion will, of course, vary with each command, due
to its equipment and training. But each command
should be employed so as to furnish the maximum
support, each class of aviation being employed
against targets best suited to its characteristics.
Properly located, adequately supplied, and well de
fended air bases are absolutely essential to air oper
ation. They not only furnish a starting point but ex
tend the striking power or range of our bombers. This
range should always be greater than the maximum
effective range of the enem}~s striking force.
As a vehicle o~our diecussicm we will use an air
force, because in it are contained all of the elements
of aerial combat. We will give it to, say, a theater
commander. Its joh will be to support the ground
forces in this theater and absolutely nothing else. Do
not confuse air support with independent air force
operations; that can be totally separate and con
ducted from the same or frmn some other theater.
Our very first step must be to form-an aviation plan
of support, and this plan must be based on the plan
of action of the supported unit.
But first of all, what is support? It may be de
fined as help or assistance to someone in carrying out
a mission, and a mission invelves a purpose to be
achieved in a certain period of time. The time is
either designated or implied in the mission. Note that
there is no distance or contact involved in this defi
nition; so whatever can be done to help accomplish a
mission is support. It does not matter ?me bit whether
the job is accomplished close to, or distant from, the
supported force, nor is it necessary that any part of
a helping force be eeen or heard by the element to.
be helped. It is all a question of capabilities and time.
When everything is said and done, we all agree that
military efforts have but one goalthat is to break
the enemys will to resistand to that en~ tbe air is
no exception,
Bearing the above in mind, and only for the pur
pose of analyzing, we will divide support into two
classes. The first we will call general sufiport. You
could call it distant support, or, in some cases, strate
gic support. It may be defined as support which is
planned and ordered by the higher headquarters for
the benefit of a large command. It is a part of the
general plan of the commander of the supported
forces. Lfucb of this class of support will be exe
cuted at some distance from the immediate sphere
of influence of ground forces. Some will ordinarily
precede the contact phase of ground forces, or at
least the major engagements, and of course, it may
have to be continuous during a campaign. But all of
the operations engaged in by supporting aviation
must, b,e pointed or directed with the one thought in
mindof furnishing the maximum help at a particu
lar ttme or over a ~period of time.
Lnder general support the first and very basic
mission to he accomplished is that of., counter air
force operations. The goal of this mmsion is the
total destruction of all of the enemys air force or
hw capability to replace that equipment. We would
like first to destroy bis factories so as td deny the
equipment at its very source; but this is seldom at
tainable, so counter air force operations must be
carried out progressively against his aircraft on the
ground or in the air. Tbe successful accomplishment
of this task would result in that all-important con
dition called control of the air. This control or
dominance of the air has now pretty well become the
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MII.ITA RY RRWE W
foundation or road for all other operations, either on
the ground, in the air, or on the seas. Gaining con
trol of the air is by far the very best way of support
, ing ground forces. Specifically:
a. It would deny to the enemy the use of a
~,,~~eapon which we ourselves want to employ.
b. Itwould remove the threat of air attack from
our troops or from onr installations,
c. It would permit the easy handling of our
troops and supplies. Our movements cou Id then be
largely by daylight instead of confined to hours of
darkness, and our columus could be of normal length
instead of stretched out three or fonr times their
normal length. Everything could be handled much
., easier and faster.
d. The work of our observation and reccmnals
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! sance agencies would be much easier and would fa
;
cilitate gaini]lg the all-important element of sur
t . . prise. Just imagine, for example, how well off you
would be if tbc enemy had no aviatiou and your own
observation could operate at will.
There is still another benefit to be derived from
ctonnter air force operations and it is sort of a double-
edged affair due to the fact that amation threatens
everything within range. For instance, aviation sta
tioned right here at Sherman Field would threaten
equally well the towns of St. Loum and Wichita, h
ing io opposite directions and separated by about fcmr
hundred miles. If they were held by the enemy and
contained vital objectives, he would be forced to keep
some part of his troops and supplies at those places
for their derense. The mere fact that aviat]on is at
Sherman Field would ]mpose that condition on that
enemy without our actually conducting a single mis
sion; simply because aviatinn threatens everything
within range. Naturally, since the enemy would have
no aviation to threaten our own installations, if our
counter air force operations had been successful,
then we could release our troops and supply from duty
in the rear areas and employ them to much better
advantage m the combat zone. You see, we gain both
w,ays prov]ding we have successfully carried out coun
ter air force operations.
Gaining air advantage M always the primary mis
sion of all air forces. To the ground commander it
furnishes security and facilitates offensive grnund
action.
The second part of general support is the deliv
ery of air attacks against objectives on the surface
of the earth. Those ob.lectives must be carefully se
lected with the view of rendering the greatest amount
of support at any particular time. There is absolute
ly no purpose, or anything to be gained by the indis
criminate bombing of everything in sight. Every
bomb should be aimed at something the destruction
of which will benefit our forces. Moreover, the vital
targets should be selected for attack in order to fur
nish the maximum help. And to find out when a tar
get is vital takes a careful and running estimate of
the situation. The supported commander should se
lect or pick out the system of objectives, the destruc
tion of which will be the greatest help, and then
the selection of targets within that system should
be left to the air commander. It then becomes the
job of the air commander to develop tbe designated
system of objectives and attack the proper targets
withirl the system in order to obtain the desired re
sult. By developing a system of objectives, we mean
the study and location of the sensitive points that
are vulnerable to air attacks.
For example, let us say that in the area of influ
ence of a theater commander there is a town such
as Kansas City. Without very much trouble we could
easily find that such a city had the following pos
sible targets: ( 1) an airplane factory, (2) important
bridges, (3) oil refineries, (4) a shoe factory, (5) ex
tensive railroad yards, and (6) an ammunition plant.
Obviously any one of these, if destroyed, would con
tribute to our success. For example, if we destroyed
the shoe factory, then the enemy, since he wotdd lack
shoes, would be less able to resist us; but that need
not tend to end a campaign very quickly.
The important point to remember is that the one
w al system shou Id be designated at tbe proper time.
At the beginning of operations, the airplane factory
would certainly be in very first priority because of
the counter air force mission that we just talked
about. But this airplane factory need not remain in
first priority throughout an extended campaign. For
example, wheu the theater commander decides to
attack on some part of his front, perhaps the big
gest contribution to the success of the attack could
be made by the air if means of transportation
were denied to the enemy. Of course the plan would
then be to prevent the arrival of reinforcements in
time and at the place where our attack is to take
place. If such a scheme of operations were adopted,
then the theater commander might designate the
transportation system as the one to be worked on by
the air. Now the air commander could select for
attack any one or more of several pointa in
the transportation system.
If an important
lmdge were destroyed it might prevent the
movement of troops for some time, so perhaps that
is the point that would be attacked. But it must be
remembered that if a bridge is that important, the
enemy is likely to defend it heavily, and its destruc
tion by air might be a very expensive proposition. So
the air commander continues to study the transpor
tation system, and in this case would find extensive
railroad yards that are comparatively easy to hit
from the air. Moreover, they are very vulnerable
even to the smaller types of demolition bombs. Also
their destruction would be quite permanent because
the switching facilities, of a railroad cannot be re
paired in a very short period of time; and the dislo
cation of a rail center such as Kansae City would un
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AVIATION IN SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS
doubtedly be felt all over the United States, But let
us suppose that even the rail center is so well de
fended that the job would be too expensive. Then per.
haps the air commander would be forced to cut indi
vidual rail lines lying outside the defended area. This,
of course, would not be as easily done since many
rail lines exist, and furthermore the attacks would
have to be repeated since repairs would probably take
place fairly rapidly.
At some other time the theater commander might
designate the supply system. In that case the air
commander might attack the oil refineries or the
ammunition plant. The oil refineries are very VUL
nerable to even small types of bombs, On the other
hand the ammunition plant is quite another story.
The buildings and shops themselves might be at
tacked from a very high altitude because they are ex.
tensive. Production could be greatly decreased or per.
haps stopped entirely; but it would not take away the
supplies which might he stored in the nearby maga
zines. The attack of the magazines themselves would
be a very difficult task because they are made of re
inforced concrete and are well dispersed and well
camouflaged. Each individual magazine prohahly
could stand several direct hits by medium sized
bombs.
The individual targets in any system of objectives
would he selected by the air commander, taking into
consideration the capacity of hir, force, the degree of
vulnerability of each target, and the time available.
It may be that attacks will have to be repeated in
order to maintain a sufficient degree of destruction or
neutralization.
The task of counter air force operations and am
attacks are executed largely by the first two com
mands of an air force, that is, the bomber command
and the fighter command. The bomber command, as
you know, is tbe basic part of an air force. It is the
backbone of any air force because it is the striking
part. Its offensive weapon is principally the aerial
bomb, of which there are four kindsthe demolition,
the fragmentation, the chemical, and the incendiary.
Bombs of all sizes up to 4,000 pounds and containing
approximately si.xt y-five percent explosives are avail
able in the service. A bomb of appropriate size is
capable of destroying, or effectively neutralizing,
anything on the surface of the earth. Some types of
bombers are used for low altitude attacks and in that
case their machine guns also become offensive weap
ons, but for all operations at higher altitudes the ma
chine guns on bombers are purely for defense. Bom
bardment never fights offensively in the air, it seeks
to avoid combat, and usually tlies in formation to af
ford mutual protection. Bombardment is ordinarily
sent out cm specific missionsthat is, we prescribe
the objective, the routes to and from the objective,
the time of attack, the altitude, and direction of at
tack (all items not necessarily prescribed).
The fighter commands operate the type of aviation
which is designed firimarily for air fighting. It is very =
seldom used against ground targets, bat can be used
when the situation is either very favorable or very
critical. For example the Germans used their fighters
against troop columns during the Greek campaign
because, first of all, there was no opposition in the
air, and secondly, the several machine guns on that
type of aircraft ire effective against such a tareget.
In a situation which might become so critical that
everything would have to be thrown at the enemy in
order to save the situation, of course fighters would
go out just the same as anything else. Whereas the
missions of bombardment are very specific, those of
fighters should be more general. Because ofi their
superior performance in speed, climb, and maneuver
ability, they have the initiative. That is, they can
start or stop a fight whenever they so desire. They
can attack at the time of their own choosing,
and from the direction, which they choose. The initia
tive is a tremendous advantage in air fighting, and
ordinarily no mission should be assigned to fighters
which would tend to take away this initiative. Re
member that nothing has yet been found to stop an
air attackthat to date fighters have been the most
effective counter-agent. You should keep them so by
giving as broad missions as possible.
The second type of support which we shall analyze
is direct support. It may be defined as air operations
against troops in contact, or capable of interfering
with the mission of the friendly troops.
This type of support cannot always be anticipated
and calls for quick decisions and actions. Itis a spe
cial phase of air operations which needs careful co
ordination and close control. The communications
must be rapid and absolutely positive. Simple but ef.
fective means of designating targets and identifying
troops must be pre-arranged. Speed and accuracy
in orders, in communications, and in operations, is
the very essence of this class of support. Some of this
support may take place on the immediate front or
flanks of a unit, and some of it may take place in
areas more removed from tbe supported unit.
In the employment of aviation in the support of
ground troops, it must be appreciated that
a. The hostile rear area is the normal zone of
operations for aviation. There are two reasons for
this. First, that is where all threats originate, and
secondly, all targets in the rear areas are more
concentrated and therefore more vulnerable to air
attack.
b. Aviation is a theater of operations weapori. If
bases are available the whole aviation effort can
be more qnickly concentrated and used against a
vital target than anything else.
c. The field of operations must not be restricted.
It must be kept sufficiently extended to take advan
tage of range, speed, and flexibility.
d. Like any other weapon, it should be employed
m masse. Mass employment requires large num
7
MILITARY REVIEW
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hers, or the repeated use of small forces. When the
amount of aviation is limited, the rate of employ
ment must be carefully watched so as to have the
maximum amount available at critical times.
Targets will appear literally by the thousands, as
practically anything on or near the battlefield may
be a proper target. You should be careful, however,
about accepting targets simply because they are
profitable. They need not be good targets at all. What
you must do is look for the vital target; and that is
the one which is the most dangerous to your com
mand at any particular time. Rather than expend
ypur aviation on doubtful targets, you should wait
until a really important one is found and then hit it
ae hard as poseib]e.
~ All of the above considerations mean hut one
thing, and that is centralized control. For the
support of ground troops we believe that the control
of aviation should be initially exercised from the
army, because all parts of an army can usually he
properly supported from there. To decentralize
would invite dispersion of effort and waste of air
fraft. The air support commander decentralizes only
when he is no longer able to control his units prop
erly. That may happen because of communications
difficulties, because of distance, or because closer c(,
operation and association can be had by the ground
and air.
This support that has been called direct support
is executed by tbe air support command. This is the
command which has the primary function of sup
porting ground troops, and is the one especially
trained and equipped for this task. In addition to
what might be termed service aviation, such as ob
servation and transports, the air support commands
may have two types of light bombers. First, the hor
izontal (present A-20 type) attacks targets from a
horizontal or gliding attitude, and employs a bomb
sight. Because of its greater speed, greate)- bomb
load, and lack of close-quarter maneuverability, we
say that it is best suited for the attack of area tar
gets, although there is no iron-bound rule. These
targets could he troops in column or concentrated.
They could be artillery in position, or they could be
ammunition dumps, etc. Tbe present A-20 can be
loaded with fragmentation bombs or demolition
bombs. These two bombs are tbe ones most com
monly used in support operations; the 30-pound
fragmentation being very effective against person
nel up to 75 feet, and the 100-pound demolition is
effective against practically anything movable which
is likely to be found on the battlefield. The smallest
area that can be covered by a squadron of nine
planes in salvo bombing, from one formation, is ap.
proximately 1000 by 80 yards.
The dive bombers attack objectives from a dive
and employ no bombsight, but use the airplane it
self as a sight. Because of its high speed of attack,
its rapid rate of descent, and its greater maneuver
ability, we say that it is better suited for the attack
of precision targets. Remember that it can cork
screw around during the first part of the dive and
change altitude so rapidly that it is a very difficnlt
target for anti-aircraft weapons except possibly
those that are right on the target. Precision targets
might include small bridges, practically any type of
small field fortifications, command posts, tanks, etc.
Targets not suitable for any type of aviation in
clude all small or well-hidden targets. No target can
be hit frOm the air unless it is visible to the crew.
One principle relative to the employment of avia
tion in support of ground troops can be stated about
as follows: Except in emergencies, aviation will be
employed beyond tbe effective range of friendly ar
tillery. To understand this principle and all its
implication takes at least a short analysis and com
parison of artillery and aviation. In Figure 2 is
shown an artillery piece. This gun is capable of af
fecting anything within its range. Moreover, it has
XA
I I
Ill
263
00
FIGURE2.
many advantages. First of all, it has a very stable
platform; then, volume or continuity of fire is ob
t ained by the expenditure of ammunition. Also, this
gun is capable of firing not only during hours of day
light but also during darkness, during rain, snow,
sleet, or any other kind of weather conditions. It is,
of course, incapable of reaching some target which
is beyond its effective range. Moreover, it is a weapon
which is ordinarily close to troops, and can usually
be figured, as available. By that I mean that if a com
bat team commander is told by his division com
mander that, for his attack plan the next day, a bat
talion of artillery will be available, then certanily the
combat team commander can be reasonably cure that
that artillery will be available to him when the at
tack jumps off.
On the other hand, the airplane shown here ia also
8
AVIATION IN SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS
capable of affecting any target within the range of
the gun; but it is also capable of taking on a target
far beyond the range of artillery. But it must be re.
membered that once the airplane has dropped its
bombs on this target, the airplane is of no further
value to anyone until it has returned to a base and
been rearmed and reservieed. In other words, the
fire is less continuous. Again, this airplane, while go
ing to or returning from this mission, is subject to
interruption by weather or enemy action. Its subse.
quent employment can never be predicted very far
ahead. The airplane is also more expensive and less
easily replaced than artillery, and while it is true
that airplanes can attack anything, also remember
that it is wry ditlicult from an airplane moving at
four or five miles a minute to recognize small terrain
features that are easily distinguishable to ground
personnel.
This comparison would tend to indi~afe that what
we should do would be to acquire enough artillery to
take care of everything within tbe range of those
weapons and to reserve the aviation for targets that
lie beyond the range of ground weapons. That is ex.
actly what our principle states; but there are ex.
ceptions. In the first place, any main effort will al.
ways require the massing of artillery fires in some
area to favor the main attack. If we mass tbe fire in
one area, it leaves some other area comparatively free
of fire, and if some target in that area must be kept
under fire, then it is perfectly proper to use aviation
for that purpose. Note, however, that the reason for
using aviation here is that there is an insufficient
amount of artillery, and that, if it is true that there
can never be enough artillery, it is also true that
there can never be enough aviation. The second ex
ception to our rule involves the element of time. Let
us say that well within tbe range of artillery there
is some target which could be destroyed by that
weapon if we gave it enough time to work on it; but
let us suppose that the commander prescribes that
this target be destroyed in much shorter time than
tible to destruction by that weaponfor instance,
heavy masonry, or targets on the reverse slope of a
hill. Aviation, because it can approach from any di.
rection and can carry heavy bombs eotdd take these
targets as well as any others.
Here is a little problem to illustr~te what is meant
by vital targets. Here we picture a corps attxcking
in a westerly direction (Fig. 3), We will suppose thM
t+ns action has been going on for some few days. To
day the corps commander, who is planning to attack
tomorrow morning from bis north flank and in a
southwesterly direction, is told by higher authority
that Red is capable of being reinforced during the
night b,y either armored or motorized units. He is
also tOld that he will be furnished one aviation unit,
say a group, by daylight tomorrow, and that this
group will be available for him for one mission only
any time after daylight tomorrow morning. Now, let
us move the situation to say 7:30 tomorrow niorn
ing. The attack was resumed soon after daylight,
which was 5 oclock, and the corps attack is making
satisfactory progreqs. By 7:30, information was re
ceived at corps headquarters that the three following
targets have been located. Close to our front has
been located a large groupment of artillery and, for
the purpose of our little problem, we will say that
they are well bunched up and, of course, firing upon
our troops. A little farther back there has been 10.
cated in this area a large reserve that we will say
consists of at least a brigade and perhaps more
again a large group of men, well bunched up, in a
very small ravine. Still further back our observation
reports quite a traffic jam at tbe little town of E.
Some fhree or four hundred trucks are double or
triple banked on the road, presumably drawing sup.
plies. Remember that the aviation is available for
only one mission, and that we were told that Red
could be reinforced during the night; the question is
would you, as corps commander, employ your aviation
at this time against any one of these-targets, and if
so, which one?
FIGURE3.
Llnder the c~~diti~ns stated, it is beljeved that none
can be accomplished by artillery alone. Then, of
course, we would place both artillery and aviation
of the targets named should be accepted now, because
on tbe very same target for the purpose of attaining
they do not constitute vital targets. It is true that
the necessary destruction in the given period of time.
all three are very profitable targets, but rrot a single
Our third exception is that there may be targets
one of them is, at this time, dangerous to our com
within the range of artillery which are not suscep
mand; and if our aviation is employed against any
9
MILITARY REVIEW
one of them it will, of course, not be available later
on. In war it is likely that there will always , & ~r t il.
Iery firing at our ,troops, and that the enemy will have
reserves in tbe rear areas, and rail heads will prob
ably operateat sometime.
Let us move the situation to, say, 9 oclock. At that
i,~time a Red armored division force is discovered
emerging from the town of H where evidently it
had been hiding (Fig. 4). There is a target coming
right at our flank, which is dangerous to our CWII
mand. If that target is not opposed our entire com
mand is likely to suffer severely. This is the vital
target against which aviation should be employed.
it is true that tanks, moving at speeds of up to 25
miles per hour, if well dispersed and separated by at
,
,,,
least 200 yards, constitute a very poor target for
aviation since they areextremely diffic,ult to hit from
an airplane. The point is, however, that this target
must be opposed, and tbat nothing else but aviation
is capable of opposing it at this time. You see, we
have passed up three very profitable targets for the
sake of getting to a vital one.
Another point about this little problem has to do
with air-ground cooperation. Initially tbe armored
force would be opposed by aviationbut later when
the tanks come within range, they should be opposed
by ground weapons.
Th m . , , , . 1. , , t aken fr om a c.n fmmme jmes e.,ed a, t h e Comman d an d
General St a ff Sch .<>! ,$ fu r t h . r d>mu aemn .1 t h is wl>,ect %.>!1. . . . . . i
t h e . , x, , . , . ,

Battle
Ther e ar e t wo t ypes of per >.. lm. kmvlmizeable t h.
t hey suppose who have a lot t o bay about t be t r ai. mg of
Bnt ams t ight . r .. Tbe fir .t place. all t he emphasm on t he
t in!,ng wV, . t o Spcc, al Ser v,ce t vcmp.t he men who for ,
t be COmmandos, Tbe .econd wdl t ell YOU that what he Cdh
Sfbmmando t ,ammg is now Emma] t hlouxhout t he Ar my.
Bot h at e wlnng. t he fi, st because ibc+. M as much t o be
sad about t he t r mnmg of any infant r y umt a. t her e IS about
t hat of . Cmnmando; t he second, heca.~e .Conmmndo t ,a,n.
hIg, is specmlly de.lzned fm men wmb a pat t wula! job t o
do, and I. t her efor e not gcwe, al m an zumy made UP *f
count less unit s ser ving a gr eat many funct ]ons It is obvious.
for inst ance, t hat t b. men who go o Commando t alds have
cer t . m sPecIal Problem of .mb.,kat mn and d~.e,ha?kat mn
t o sur mount , and t hat much of t hwr t ,amlng mu.t be de.
vot ed t o gmmg t hem a mast er y of t hese pr oblem..
What IS t t ue IS t hat evet y unit of t be Field Ar my t oday
bas mt ens,vc ad mt hk%s t ~ammg uncle? mot wal,!mcally
war -l ihe condit mn. In It s ,ug~ecf. es.. m TM call on a mans
powe,. of endur ance, t he t r am, n~ of t he aver age mfant l j.
m;n i. compar able wit h t hat of t he Conxmando..
Today t his WV.?, sear cbmgt ~ammg IS conduct ed on a ver y
lar ge scale. All field umt % infant r y, pmvat es and senmr of
ficer s al,ke, ar e passed t h)ough t he new Bat t le Tr amlng
School., now est abhshed on t he has,s of one t o ever y !n
fant r y d]vlsmn. Two par t icular advant ages acct ue fr om t his
system: first, t he Inlt lat we of all t,o.ps ,s developed t o t he
ut t er most . and secondly, t he lar ge-scale exelcmes m whmh
whole ar my ct mps coopeiat e t each evmy man t he %or t of
par t he wdl be called on t o play dumng bat t le.
Schools

The exmmses ar e full-lengt h, ,eahst lc at TaIm. They last
for seve?al days ad wpr odce am.mt .ely t he codmcms n.
de, whwb moder n war IS waged. Ta.nkb support infantry
d~v,smns. Par achut e andglider t r oops come mt o play. Bomb.
mm ar my moper at w squadms (Spemd ai, for ce nnit b
eq,pped for and allot t ed t o dut y w?t b t he almy.Ed. ), unit s
of t he Royal Xavy t ale par t m t he oper at mns. The ag-g-r es
>, , sP, nt ,s fost e,ed, ad t r oops ar e t ogbened by I.
..s!.. p,act lces, cl~ff.scabng, r eck-climb, g, svummmg r iver s
I full kit , and mzuching set ct ist aces at t op .Qeed. lfat r y
me must show t hemselves at hcmm wdh Br msh ad fom,gn
maps. They have t o dest r oy at lt ak mmes ad balbed
vnr e They mast er t be aws of assault , b,ldxing, and st r eet
fight ,g, and lea!. bow t o r ecognize ancr aft ad det ect
camouflage. Dur ing an exer mse t hey double r ound a co, se,
ba>onet mg and fir ing at dummy t ar xet b hidden behind t r ees
and bu>bes
Such dmplays of agmessivencss ar e oft . st aged i
wal,st , c mmd,t mns, 1,, shells, qr enade,, ad car t r idges be
ing sect 0. a r ecent oceasmn an advance VJ .8 made by
t anks and infant r y behind a c,eepmg bavr age fr om a field
a,t dler y r egiment .
The r ]gmms ad mt ewve t r a,ing of t he mfat r y dlf.
fer s fr om t hat der gone hy men ,n Special Ser vice M,s
bt t he way in whmh t hese scddwys st ood p t o t he or deal
of Dieppe, shoulder t o shoul d., wit h men of t he Commandos.
shows t hat t he seve>it y IS equal, and t hat bot h kinds t , n
.t men who will not falt er m qm], however per ilous t he
t ask t hey ar e set (Fr om TIIe Fw k tmg Forces , Great Br it ain,
December 1942. )
Military Relations with Civilian Defense
LIEUTENANT COLONEL IXLLMAN A. RASH, Quartermaster Corps
In s t r u ct or ; Comnmd and Gener al St aff School

M
uCH has been written in the last three years
about the new type of war now being
wageda war in which every member of
a bell~gerent nation becomes in fact a participant, in
which all of a countrys forces are marshaled and
directed against the most vulnerable elements of the
enemys material and moral strength. This concep
tion of war is not new but is merely an up-to-date
version of the law of the jungle. The methods of
warfare used by our enemies contemplate the use
of every meansincluding the most effective ways
to damage, destroy and killnot only to defeat our
army and navy, but also to create terror and havoc,
panic and saffering among the non-combatant popu
lation. Their aim is the disruption of production, the
undermining of the fighting forces, the destruction
of national morale and the unconditional surrender
of our governmen t.. The headline writers have a
name for thisTota1 Warfare.
For every new type of offensive, an adequate de
fense is, in time. developed. The answer to Total War
fare in which we are engaged today is a complete,
all-inclusive system of ~Total Defense. Such a sYs
tem will include both active and passive measures.
Naturally, active defeyse is the duty and respon
sibility of the armed forces and their primary mis
sion is to meet and defeiat the army, navy and air
force of the enemy. An additional important respon
sibility is the protection of vital installations in the
Zone of the Interior from air attack by maintaining
an aircraft warning service and by operating all
types of antiaircraft meansantiaircraft artillery,
fighter planes and balloon barrages. Tbe prevention
of sabotage and protect inn from injury or destruc
tion of national defense materiale, premises and util
ities is shared by the armed forces and Civilian De
fense. An Executive Order (hTo. 8972) dated 12 De
cember 1941 imposed a large measure nf this respon
sibility on Corps Area (now Service Command)
Com~anders.
But the big job in the Zone of Interior is passive
defenseor as we will call ItCivilian Defense. Ci
vihan Defense is not aimed or directed actively
ugainst the armed forces of the enemy. It includes
measures which seek to limit the effect of hostile
actionfires, explosions and gas dangers caused by
aerial bombardmentso that such activities are not
profitable to the enemy. It embraces the air raid pre
cautions necessary for insuring the safety of per
sons and property so as, in turn, to iusnre continued
uninterrupted operation of defense industries. The
responsibility for civilian protectionfor passivk de-
fenserests as squarely on the civilian population as
does the accomplishment of active defense on the
armed forces. From the broader viewpoint, Total De
fense imposes a joint responsibi~ity for unified co
operative actinn on the armed forces and the civilian
population.
To meet this responsibility squarely and to ac
complish Total Defense, both elements must know
the responsibilities, capabilities and limitations of
the other. In order to understand present and poten
tial Military Relations with Civilian Defense; we
should know clearly the development, organization
and functions of the several phases of civilian de
fenseand the present setup of tbe important activ
ities. A very clese relationship exists between the.
Army and Civilian Defense and there are many
points of contact between these two important fac
tors in our Total Defense.
In July 1940 the War Department directed the
nine Corps Area commanders to advise and assist
the states and the principal municipalities in their
areas in organizing civilian protective measures. In
early 1941, the Division of State and Local Coeper- .
ation within the Council of National Defense dis
tributed. a memorandum entitled Basic plan for Ci
vilian Defense which had been prepared by the War
Department. By April 1941 Councils of Defense, or
Defense Coordinators, bad been established in forty-
four states and more than one thousand communi
ties, but much of the program existed onIy on paper
and lacked both coordination and public enthusiasm.
Based on the principle and general program of the
War Departments Basic Plan, an Executive Or
der dated 20 May 1941 established, within the Office
for Emergency Management, the Office of Civilian
Defense. The original purposes of this office were:
( 1) to assure effective coordination of Federal re
lations with State and local governments in defense
activities, (2) to provide for necessary cooperation
with State and local governments in respect to mea~
ures for adeqnate protection of the civilian popu
lation in emergency periods, (3) to facilitate con
structi~>e civilian participation in tbe defense pro
gram, and (4) to sustain national morale. ,
The general organization of tbe OCI) was set forth
in the initial executive order, and although there have
been some amendments and changes in that order,
the basic principles remain tbe same. Tbe present
framework of OCD is indicated on F]gure 1.
The Director is responsible directly to the Fresi
.
11
MILITARY REVIEW
dent: he is also Chairman of the Board for Civilian the army officers on duty at National Headquarters
Protection. The fnnctiou of the Board is to assist and of OCD are in the Civil Air Patrol.
advise the Director; it consists of the Secretaries of
The Protection Branch (formerly the Division of
,Wm and Navy. the f)irecto~ of Defense Health and
Civilian Protection) has always been the Armys
Welfare Services, the Attorney General, and repre-
baby. Since the formation of the OCD the Assistant
Director of Civilian Protection has been a General
Officeof iim D.f.n w
Officer of the Army. Nine officers were originally de-
S+a r d F. , C,, ,1,. P. . %, , , . .
tailed for duty with the OCD aad this number was
later increased to seventy; of the latter, fifteen
worked in the National Office while the remainder
U,m,.. Pu biK Ad,,, md C.u n s ?lIRR,,
r r . t mm.
I
k
were assigned to the Regional Offices. There are now
26 officers in the National Office (aside from the Civil
Air Patrol) and on Dec. 24, 1942, the allotment of
officers for duty with OCD, exclusive of Civil Air
Patrol, was fi>ed by the Secretary of War at i1. The
Assistant Director in charge of Civilian Protection
Cmou flag, an d Pr o, , , , , , , C. . , , ,
Con t r olan d (%mn .n >mt ,m, Sm. , , . n
and an f?xecutive Officer now head the Protection
E, a m.t ,u n an d Tr a mwt mon S?, , , < Branch while army officers are in charge of the En-
BEE::
t
gineering Section (research for which is conducted
Pr mu ,mmt an d D,s mbu t ,ms ect ,.,
l---!=:ann,n, ,
by the Engineering Board at Ft. F!elvoir), the Evacu
1; 345678 !
. .
ation and Transportation Section, the Procurement
and Distribution Section (responsible for the pro
cnremest and shipment of the $100,000,000 of pro
scntatwes of the .An)erican Municipal Association,
tective materials anxiliary tire apparatus, gas
tihe U. S. Council of Mayors, the Governors (confer-
masks, medmal supplies, helmetsto be lent to the
ence ant the American Red (h-oss.
local Civilian I)efem,e groups),, and the Training
Sect ion (which prepares training instructions and
The Clviliwl Wm Services f3ranch is concerned
handbooks to be nsed in training members of the
(ltizens Defense Corps). Fifteen officers are in
with developing Plain for the guidance of local De
fense Councils ]n mobihzmg all of the resources of
charge of the Facility Security Divisioneight in
their commllnities, illcli!ding volunteer manpower.
the National Office and seven in the field. This Di-
The \Tar Service Staffs of the Regional Offices of the
vision is designed to assure the development and
nine Civilian Defense Regions work dwectly with
state Defense (:ou)]cils,
giving organrzat ional ad.
execution of measures for the protection of essen
tial facilities from sabotage and other destructive
vice and com]sel in matters of state and local organi
acts and omissions. It also serves as the center for
zation. Through its Defense Council Division, the
coordination of plans sponsored or operated by the
Branch provides leadership in the development uf L)e
various federal departments and agencies and main
fense Councils through whicti local communities co
tains Iiaisou with the Service Commands.
ordinate both the protective services needed in case
of enemy adtion and the civilian war services such By an early admimstrative order, Mr. LaGuardia,
as salvage, wale of war bonds, day care for children the first Director of OCD, decentralized the work of
of working mothers, and recreation for service men.
the national otfice by establishing nine Civilian De-
Through its Orgamzations Division, the Branch de- fense Regions, coterminous with the nine Corps
velops Ijlans foc allyillg the strength of organized
Areas (now, Service Commands). The Regional Di.
gronps with local Defense (:ouncils and their proj- rectors were appointed by, and are employees of, the
ects. National OCD. It should be emphasized that the
line from the National Director to each Regional Di.
The Army has been particularly interested in two
rector is one of command. The regional offices, sub-
o~ the major branches-Civil Air Patrol, mld the
offices of the national OCD, were set up in the gen
eral form as shown in Figure 2.
Protection Branch.
The Civil Air Patrol was organized December 1,
1941, with the approval and cooperation of the War
Regional Boards for Civilian Protection bear the
I)epm+ment and now embraces twenty thousand ex-
same relationship to the Regional Dwectors as the
pel-iencid pilots with thousands of planes. These vol-
national Board bears to the National I)irector-ad
unteers are called on to perform in-share submarine
vice and assistance only. The regional Board is cor n .
patrol duty, courier service, observation of black.
posed of field representatives of the federal depart-
outs, towing of targets and many other pick and
ments and agencies represented on the national
shovel jobs. The Army Air Forces have been saved
Board. In July 1941 the War Department directed
many hours ot flying at the expense of a few War-
Corps Area and Air Force commanders to appoint
rant Officers, armorers and mechanics who man
officers to represent them on the regional Boards for
some of the Civil Air Patrol fields. About one-third of
Civilian Protection; these representatives were also
12
MILITARY RELATIONS WITH CIVILIAN DEFENSE
to act as liaison officers between their re~pective the same as that given to tbe Corps Area command-
commands and the regional Boards. The following in. ers by the 1940 War Department directiveto ad
structions accompanying this directive are interest- vise and assist, when requested, state and local gov
ing :no attempt should be made by Corps Area
ernments. This was natural when we see that one
Headquarters or other echelons of the Army to pre- of the original concepts of the local defense organi
zations was a civilian force of volunteers supple-
r OfiCe of c,,,],,. Defens e I
menting and reinforcing, as far as possible, the es-
I REG1ONAL I
tablished fire, police, and medical services of state
and local governments. This concept was in turn
based on the knowledge that the power to promulgate
and enforce protective measures springs from state
legislation and municipal ordinances. As a result of
the absence of central authority., each community was
autonomous in deciding whether it would have an
organization, and if so, the form of organization, ,
membership rules and training programs.
As Figure 3 suggests, it was originally contem
plated that the governors would he instrumental in
developing the state Civilian Defense Councils, and
1---EiEJ.J
that mayors or local authorities would have an im-
FIGURS 2.
portant part in forming the local Defense Council.
scribe the duties and functions of this Board or any
other activity under the jurisdiction of the regional
Local DefenseCouncil
Office. In all b(lt one of the Civilian Defense Re
gions this representative of the Commanding Gen
eral, Service Command, became Assistant Regional
Headof Gmemmenlal Unit
Director in charge of Civilian Protection. Originally,
the bulk of the army officers detailed to OCD were in
tm.d DefenseCounclt
the regional Offices and, specifically, in the Civilian
ExecutiveDirector
Protection Division thereof. They took orders from
the Assistant Regionkd Director in charge of Civil-
VolunteerOSicc
ian Protection and not from the Commanding Gen
s 1
eral, Service Command. The jobs of these officers em
braced:
(1) Advice to local defense councils through state
councils on organization, training, testing and oper-
ation, and
Consequently, politics has, more than once, rewed
(2) inspection and checking for the Chief of
its ugly head.
B~anch in the national Office.
As the organization of Civilian Defense progressed,
They exercised these functions as experts, as as-
differences in setup, standards of membership, and
sistants to Assistant Regional Directors in Charge
degree of preparednessas between various political
of Civilian Protectionnot as army officers or rep
subdivisionsbecame apparent. At the same time,
resentatives of the Commanding General, Service
it was realized that Axis planes would not bomb ,New
Command.
York harhor in accordance with borough, township,
The relationship between the Army and the Civil-
county and state lines. To function properly, protec
ian Defense organization was described by one Corps
tive forces of any community should be organized on
Area dommander as follows:
sound military lineswith a commanding officer, as
In Civilian Defense . . the CG of the Corps
sisted by a staff, exercising direct control through
Area is interested in results and to this extent
subordinate commanding off}cers of the various Ci
maintains close observation Over these activities vilian Defense agencies. Uniformity in organization
. . . Corps Area is (not) indifferent to the efforts
is desirable since one community may be called in to
of our civilian populace and is prepared at all times
help out a neighboring community which has been
to lend assistance or to give advice if requested . .
bombed. Moreover, military units which may oper-
These Headquarters have no responsibility from a
ate in any section of the country can cooperate more
supervisory standpoint but merely advisory, and
effectively if they can expect the same type of Citi
only then when requested.
zens Defense group everywhere.
It is interesting to note that the power and author-
In order to achieve this uniformity, Mr. Landis,
ity of the OCDas set up 20 May 1941was exactly
the present Director of OCD, in April 1942 took ad
13
MILITARY
vantage of a new federal statute and made official
the U. S. Citizens Defense Corps. His administrative
order set up certain requirements as to form of or
ganization, membership eligibility, training proced
ure and standards of performance. If the defense
corps or protective organization of a community doea
~~not comply with (1) the official approved solution
of or.srmization (Figure 4), and (2) tbe prescribed
standards and procedures for individual members in
the Citizens Defense Corps, it will not, in the words
of the OCD regulation, be an integral part of the
U. S. Citizens Defense Corps of the OCD. This
means that ( 1) its members will not be entitled to
wear or use prescribed and potential OCfl insignia,
(2) the or!+anization will forfeit its right to receive
and use protective supplies and equipment now beiug
\ lent by OCD, and (3) Civilian I)efense workers May
riot be eligible for civilian war aid, such as medical
care or cleatb and disability benefits. Consequently,
It, would appear that tbe OCD finally has attained
- reasonably potent means Of enforcing its directives.
Figure 4 shows the approved organization for a
local Citizens Defense Corpswith the control cen
ter (corresponding to a military headquarters) and
jbe various operating volunteer groups. Much could
beand certainly bas beenwritten on how these
local groups will work, Blue and Red warnings
are flashed from the District Warning (enter (under
the Army Air Force ) to the Control Center in
REVIEW
Ceedeeville, N. J. From the Contrnl Center, heads
of the various Emergency Services direct the opera
tions of their trained volunteers in the indicated jobs;
these jobs continue long after the air raid is over,
continue, in fact, until near-normal conditions are
reestablished. For those interested in the detailed
functioning of any of the installations, agencies or
volunteer groups, the OCD has prepared compre
hensive instructional pamphlets with titles ranging
from U. S. Citizens Defense Corps to The Mes
senger Manual.
Up to tbe present time the Army has had no di
rect relationship with these local corps except to give
advice through the State Council on organization
and training; regional office representatives have al
so inspected local units. In the event of emergency,
a liaison officer from a near-by army post or unit
would very probably be in the local Control Center
and will be expected to be an expert in Civilian De
fense. The Bomb Reconnaissance Unit~ on the Staff
of the Commander, Citizens Defense Corps, are suc
cessors to the Fhmb Squads, formerly under Emer
gency Police Service: tbe Bomb Squads (of trained
police) could cope with stink bombs but knew little
of the 2000-pounders. Now the Bomb Reconnaissance
Lnits will verify the reports of unexploded bombs
and report locations through channels; Ordnance
Bomb Disposal Companies (under the Commanding
CIVILIAN
&
EMERGENCY
Ft RE SERVICE
m
FC,,OS
-- .G%
..s w. -!. ,..
. . . . . . s-,
-.r., . t . c. . . .$..
~w. . . .
b
PROTECTION ORGANIZATION FOR A MUNICIPALITY
==
... w..=,.!.0!,s
I
w-
mm
FIGURE4.
14
7K
MILITARY RELATIONS WITH CIVILIAN DEFENSE
General, Service or Defense Command) will do the
removal job.
Up to this point, we have been primarily con
cerned with operations of Civilian Defense on the
Home Front: where the military is cooperating
with all agencies of the civil government. The prob
lems involved in. military relations with civilians
when rnle under martial law bas been invoked are
somewhat different, Under these circumstances, tbe
military authorities have the necessary power to
force communities to act for their own protection.
The existence of local Citizens Defense Corps will
relieve the military commander of that area or sec
tor of the burden of details and necessitate only gen
eral supervision. These trained volunteer groups will
be particularly helpful to the military if evacuation
of civilian population becomes advisable. The au
thority and responsibility to order and control evac
uat ion rests exclusively with tbe military com
manderbut well-considered plans, developed by
the state and local Defense Councils and coordinated
by tbe OCD Regional Offices with the Red Cross and
all federal departments and agencies, after consul
tation with the military, can mean the difference
between a well-ordered and successful movement and
chaos. Plans for civilian evacuation already developed
contemplate use of the Citizens Defense Corps down
to and including the Air Raid Wardens.
In summary, this article has emphasized:
(1) The responsibility of the military for active
defense to include protection of vital installations in
the Zone of the Interiorand the responsibility of
civiIians for passive defense-primarily protection
of the civil population and property against the effect
of air raids;
(2) The organization developed to accomplish
passive defense, or civilian protection, ~pd how it will
operate during an emergency; and
(3) The important part the Army plays in the
operation of the Civilian Defense organization.
In February 1942, at the time Mr. Landis became
Director, several bills were introduced in Congress
to turn the problem of Civilian Defense over to the
Army40ck, stock and barrel, Fortunately, this idea ~
never passed tbe discussion stage and it now appears
that the preeent sound and vigorous organization of
OCD, functioning smoothly and efficiently under
civilian leadership, requires no such radical change
in administration. However, necessary liaison be
tween the Service Commands and OCIJ Regional
Offices, operation of the Civil Air Patrol, coopera
tion with Bomb Disposal agencies and collaboration
on Facility Security and Civilian Evacua~ion plans
are sufficiently strong links in the relationship be
tween the Army and the OCD to justify OU; sincere
efforts to know and understand the Office of Civilian
Defensewhich in fact represents the organized ef
forts of the civilian population to assume their right
ful share of the burden of Total Defense.
How often have we not heard the genius ef Bonaparte slighted. and his
victories talked of zs destitute of merit, because at tbe point of the attack
he was superior in number to his enemies! This very fact, which bas so
often been converted into a sort of reproach, constitutes his greatest and
truest praise. He so directed his attack as at once to divide his enemy and ~
to fail with the mass of his own forces npon a point where their division.
or the distribution of their troops, left them unable to resist him. It is not
in man to defeat armies hy the breath of his mouth; nor is Bonaparte com
missioned, like Gideon, to confound and destroy a fort with 300 men. He
knew that everything depended ultimately upon physical superiority: his
genius is shown in this, that although outnumbered on the whole, he was
always superior to his enemies at the decisive point.
Napier.
Antiaircraft Artillery with the Division
COLONEL JAMES F. HOWSLL, CotiSt A?titkry Corps
In s t r u ct or , Comma n d ad General Staff School
,,
i{,i
M
ODERNCOMBAT.L~odern combat has proven
that, whenever an air threat is present, an
infantry division in the combat zone must
be protected by antiaircraft a~-tillery. The German
Stukas, the low Ie\,el bombers, and the strafers de
spise no target however small. In North Africa
-:n S& vehicles and small groups of personnel have,
on numerous occasions. been nttacked etl ectively by
hostile aviation.
I Since ~ divisio{, operating within range of hostile
adiat ion is sul]ject to air attacks, it should be provid
ed with adequate protection against such attacks w
that it can execute Its ass]gne~l mission,
..tIdon,<(ttr Wm[mtw B<lttf~ltc]>T.Attacbed antiair
craft artillery s(ipplernents passive measures of de
fense and tire from the organic vwtpons of mall
cal, ber. Because CI1VIS1OII trooIM and installations
are not remunerate IV Pargets for attacks made at
medium br high altitudes, the automatic weapons
battalion, mobile, is a uormai attachment.
This battalion contains 37- or IO-mm gLIu s a n d .50
caliber antiaircraft rn>wbine guns, It is completely
mobile, the 40-mm gum being towed by a prime
muver anLI tbe .50 caliber AA machine guns being
mounted in trucks. Normally one 37- or 40-mm guu
nnd its comlmninn .. 50 caliber ma[hlnc xun are wtecl
togetlfer and form one tire unit.
I?ltriligr7]cc Et~l]ll[]2/]>lc)tt.If employed in an in.
telligent mmlm+ by the division commander, the AA
automatic weapons battalion will provide him with
that vital protection necewtary to combat dive bomb.
ing, low level, aud strating attacks up to ranges of
1500 yards. In active theaters, it has been proven
that these weapons wdl reduce casualties in men and
vehicles from air attack and will, through their de.
structi~>e tire powe], act as a deterrent against future
attacks.
,ilnt!t(fuk Mis s io? t.- AA weapons are expensive,
special-pu rI ,ose weapons designed to countey the air
thi.eat. lVhile they possess many of the desirable
features of a good antitank vmapoN (high muzzle
velocity and rapidity of fire), they have many un
desirable features (high silhouette. towed mount,
and no shields). For this reason, AA artillery should
always be assigned a primary mission of air defense
and a secondary mission of ar].ti tank defense. In
practice this secondary mission is performed, where
possible, hy siting the weapons so that either hostile
air or ground targets can be engaged. When this is
not practicable, the weapons should be sited to per
form their primary mission of air defense.
In the absence of an air threat, the AA artillery
should be assigned other missions such as antitank
defense, accompanying infantry for the reduction of
small field fortifications, and firing against small
naval craft.
PLLI pose.-Tbe purpose here is to indicate certain
principles that divisiou and combat team command
ers should observe when employing antiaircraft
automatic weapons units in a tactical situation; to
present a tactical situation involving an infantry
division with an attached AA automatic weapons
battalion, molnle, in the advance and in the defense;
to apply the principle governing the tactical em
ployment of AA artillery in a practical manner; and
to illustrate the orders issued to tbe AA battalion by
the division.
~RINclPLEs
These principles are few and exceed]ngl y simple:
1. Tbe battalion should be employed under di\,i
sio!] control w henever practicable.
.. It should be used to furnish protection from air
attack to those elements vitial to the execution of the
mission, This is determinetf by setting up a relative
order nt priority of objective~ to he defended, and
then furni~hing adeq{]ate protection to the objectives
in that order.
,;. AA units should be in position prior to enemy
air attnck for most effective results.
i. When secrecy ih desirable, fire should be ordered
withheld except in the eve]lt of an actual air attack.
.5 Assignment of primary missions to the AA bat.
talion to provide protection against ground or sea-
borne attacks should b? made ont~ aftw camfut con
.,idem ti0r7,
Sif w t ion. -F,nemy located as shown on Situation
.Map A. Combat aviation is active on both sides.
Air advantage is being disputed.
The Ist Infantry Division, with the 9022d TD
Battalion and the 901st AA Automatic Weapons Bat
talion, Nobile, attached, has been given the mission
of protecting the debouchment of the remainder of
the I Corps through passes A and R on 26 May.
At 0100 May ?2, the Ist infantry Division rein.
forced is in bivouac at C having completed a march
stage, Routes to the southeast, assembly areas, and
defensive positions have been reconnoitered. The
defile (pass through the mmmtain) restricts move
ment throughout its length. .
The division commander has made a decision to
move CT-1 at 0300 by motor to a defensive position
16
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY WITH THE DIVIS1ON
as shown on Situation Map A in order to protect the
portance of the elements to be furnished protecticm.
passage of the remainder of the division through the
The orders are then prepared to accomplish this pro.
defile. The value of time being of the utmost impor-
tection in the most effective matiner. Dependent
tance, movement of the balance of the division will
upon the internal workings of the particular di~i-,
commence at 0600. Daylight is at 0500. Weather sion, this estimate may he made by the division com
is clear, night is dark.
.- mander, the chief of staff, or G-3; or it may be made
Regczimnzerrt.-The orders issued by the 1st In- by the AA battalion commander and presented to
fantry Division pertaining to the employment of the any of the three individuals menti; ned above.
901st AA Auto Wpns Bn for the march. ?i)rze Penoct Cooer-ed..-All estimates must cover
Discussion.Before the necessary orders can be a definite period to he effective. In our situation the
issued, an estimate of the situation from the point of first problem confronting the Commanding GeneraI,
view of AA artillery protection must be made, cul- 1st Infantry Division, is getting his command
minating in a decision as to the relative order of im. through the defile where it is most vulnerable to at-
SITUATION Mm A,
17
MILITARY REVIEW
tack both from the ground and from the air. Safely
through the defile, he will plan his next operation
based in large measure on the enemy situation at
that time. The AA estimate, therefore, should be re
$: >trieted to this time period, orders for the next phase
being issued in due course.
i) /.
Zst/ nzatc.As to combat strength, our forces and
the hostile forces are equaI. The distmce to the pro
posed posit ion for CT- 1 and for the opposing forces
is just about the same. To accomplish our mission,
therefore, we must get the bulk of our forces on the
position without delay and without undue losses. Air
attsck is probable and will adveraely affect this mis!
sion. The next point to consider is where our ovm
forces will be most vulnerable to attmk :in the old
I~ bivouac area, in the monntain pass, in the open ter
,rain to the east of the pass, in other defiles, or
in the detrueking areas. The answer is apparent:
in the mountain pass where movement and dispersion
is restricted and where a few disabled vehicles will
cause traffic Jams with consequent delay not to men
tion personnel losses.
P]vor/tl/.Our tirst pr]ority, therefore, should be
to provide adequate .4A protection for the bulk of
the di~ision in its march through the mountain pass.
Consicfem tion of Mm 77sApplying our principle
that AA units should be in position prior to an air
attack, let us first determine how much AA artillery
is necessary to provide adequate AA protection to
the troops while in the defile, and second, whether it
is practicable in th]s situation to emplace the weap
ons prior to the time the divisiou moves through the
pass. The pass is 1200 yards in length. As a rough
approximation. let us consider Vlacing our weapons
on both sides of the pass, 1000 yards apart, pushing
them out from the pass wherever practicatde to dis
tances of 300 to 900 yards. Sited in this manner.
2-I fire units are necessary to attain protection from
dive bombing and low level attacks delivered at alti
tudes up to 500 feet. As for aetti ng the weapons into
position, the AA artillery should not be sent out prior
to 0300, the hour CT-1 begins its movement. because
the mechanized cavalry to our front does not provide
sufficient seeurity for the protection of the AA artil
lery against ground attack. CT-1 does not require
AA protection in the pass as it will move under cover
of darkness. The night being dark, the danger of low
level or strafing attacks in mountainous terrain is
slight. Then, too, automatic weapons, when em
ployed without searchlights, are relatively ineffective
against air targets on dark nights. It is practicable,
however, to move the 901st AA Bn (less 1 btry) for.
ward immediately after CT-1. This method will
permit the AA units to move under cover of dark
ness and will provide sufficient time to emplace the
weapons in suitable positions prior to the time the
bulk of the division begins its daylight movement.
Control of 90fst Bn AA (-) .Since the 901st AA
Bn (less 1 btry) will move in the interval between
{ 18
CT- I and the remainder of the division, it should
move under division control.
Cow??ing Forvt?.-Af ter adequate protection has
been provided under the first priority, one AA bat
tery still remains unallotted. This should be used to
furnish AA protection for the element next in im.
portance to the execution of the mission, In thk
situation it is beIieved that the element having next
priority is CT-1. This unit has the importan~ mis
sion of covering the remainder of the divisio as it
+
emerges from the mountain pass. The enemy ground
forces are sufficiently close that combat may occur
prior to the time the remainder of the division can
negotiate its passage through the defile. Hostile corn.
bat aviation can be expected to support tbe ground
action. Computation of time and space indicates
that CT-I will be engaged in detrucking operations
at daylight and will thus be vulnerable to air attack
at that time. Additional AA artillery protection
should be furnished this unit.
Control of l?fry A, 901st AA Bn.Since Battery
A is to be detached from the remainder of the bat
t alien and is to provide AA protection for CT-1, it
should move with CT-1, and, for purposes of coordi.
nation during the march, it should be attached there
to. This point of control is important. If the com
mander of CT-1 is to be held responsible for the
movement of CT-1, he should exercise control of all
units moring in his column by command rather than
by coordination.
Etnplo~ment w ith CT.1.Because CT-1 will move
under cover of darkness, coupled with the fact that
one battery cannot provide adequate protection for
the defile, Battery A, 901st AA Battaliou, should
move near the head of the main body of CT-1 and go
into position early to protect tbe detrucking area.
lVhen this mission is completed, the commanding
oflicer of CT-1 should assign it another mission de.
pentient upon the situation that exists at the time.
.$tnff Duties of AA Oficer.-The commanding offi.
cer of the AA battalion attached to a division is avail.
able to assist the commander and staff officers of the
division in the tactical employment of the AA bat.
talion. For best results, his recommendations should
be considered. However, dependent on circum
stances and personalities, his recommendations may
or may not be called for or accepted. The force com
mander alone is responsible for the actions of his
division and he will employ the attached AA M he
sees fit. If he does not employ the AA intelligently,
his unit will suffer. This same principle applies to
the relationship between the commanders of CT-1
aud Btry A.
.Solufion.After making an estimate similar to
the one outlined above, the commanding officer of
the 901 st AA Bn submitted the above plan to tbe
chief of staff. The chief of staft directed the Division
G-3 to translate this plan into orders which he did
as follows:
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY WITH THE DIVISION
The 901st AA Auto Wpns Bn less 13try A follow
CT-1 provide protection remainder Div through de
file. Btry A attached CT-1 at once.
.Swnrnatiorz.-Please note that in the solution to
this problem the following principles were observed:
1. A relative order of priority of objectives to be
defended in this particular situation was set up.
2. Adequate AA protection was then furnished to
objectives according to this priority.
3. AA units were in position prior to the time air
attack could cause the most damage.
4. Tbe AA battalion was kept under centralized
control except when such control was not practicable.
AA A ?fillery in the Defenst.-Having provided
protection for the 1st Infantry Division during the
advance, let us project the time forward to 1000,
consider the situation confronting the division com
mander at that time, and discuss the employment of
the AA automatic weapons battalion to meet the new
situation.
Ertency.-Hostile forces, estimated to be a regi
mental combat team, are attacking our cavalry as
shown on Situation Map B. Two other hostile col
umns, estimated as combat teams, are moving for.
ward as shown. No enemy forces other than small
cavalry patrols have been reported close in on either
flank. Hostile combat aviation delivered two straf.
ing attacks on our columns in the pass but were
driven off by AA fire after inflicting slight damage
and causing minor delays.
Own TrooPs.CT-l is in position as shown on
Situation MaP A. CT-2 as cleared tbe pass. CT-3
will clear the pass at about 1100. Tbe division troops
are following CT-3.
Army plans to establish Class I, 111, and V truck-
heads in area by 0100.
Corps will take over AA protection of the passes
arriving at McConnellsburg at 0200 but will not pro
vide AA protection for the truckheads.
Decision.The division commander has decided
to defend the position shown on Situation Map B,
dispositions as indicated, without delay.
fZa,quirement.-The orders issued to the 901st
Automatic Weapons Battalion, Mobile, for the de
fense.
Estcnzate.-Once again an estimate of the situation
must be made in order to establish a priority of ele
ments or installations to be defended before the
necessary orders can be issued. Objectives to be
considered are:
1. Troops on the forward portion of the battle po
sition.
.?. Division reserves and their routes forward.
3. Division artillery.
1. Supply establishments. :
5. Division command post.
All of these elements and installations are vital to
the defense and should receive some protection. A
coordinated AA defense, protecting all of them,
would be the ideal solution. This is rawly possible,
so let us set up a relative order of priority and then
coordinate tbe fires of our weapons to the greatest
extent practicable.
Reserves must have first priority as the counter
attack is the vital element in our doctrine of the de
fense, and the reserves launch that attack.
Between the infantry in the most advanced def
sive localities and the artillery, there is little choic
as to which is the more important. The infant
3
troops gain some protection by dispersion and the
use of trenches. Artillery is better supplied with
organic machine guns but is more subject to air at
tack. Second priority is assigned to the infantry for
the following reasons: Automatic weapons shonld
be sited not closer than 800 yards to tbe forward edge
of the battle position. When so sited they will be able
to engage hostile low-flying aviation coming in from
the direction of the enemy and thys furnish a certain
amount of ident~cal protection to the artillery. Like
wise, when sited to protect elements on the forward
portion of the battle position, certain weapons will be
in position to provide AA protection for the reserves
in their movement forward to positions from which
to launch the counterattack.
Third priority goes to the artillery.
Supply installations for a division are small arrd
must rely upon dispersion and train defense weapons
for antiaircraft protection. Operation Qf SUPPIY
points should be under cover of darkness. Since the
night is dark, if counterintelligence discipline within
the unit is good, the chances of successful 16w level
attacks are remote. Similarly a division command
post is small and should be dispersed. It is normally
sited well forward so that it will receive incidental
protection from weapons providing defense pri
marily for other elements.
Control of AA Artillery Battal{om-Since the 1st
Division will be fighting as a nnit under divisiOn con
trol; since the AA artillery will be sited throughout
19


MILITARY REVIEW
the division area: and since the AA defense should E.wcution.-Tbe AA battalion commander sited
be coordinated to the fullest extent, control of the AA his weanons as shown on Situation Ma~ C in compli
artillery should be exercised by tbe division through ance with the above order.
~ the commanding otficer of the 901st AA Battalion.
Other Con.sidrmtiorh~.- Army will take over pro
~,~tection of tbe mountain pass by 0200. Our division
troops will clear the pass by 0100. The question
arises as to when to move the 301st AA Battalion
( less 1 battery) from position. For purposes of co
ordination, our battalion should move out prior to
arrival of the corps AA artillery in order to prevent
confusion.
In a defense, attack by armored vehicles is a par
ticularly dangerous threat However, it must be
, remembered that weapnns other than tbe A A artil
~Iery are available in the division for antitank
~ defense as a primary mission, to wit: the infantry
37-mm ant]tank guns, the attached tank destroyer
i bakdion, and the bazookas.
. .
As to the time AA units sbmdd be in position, here
again it is desirable to have the AA units in position
as early as possiblehence, they shoald be given
priority on roads.
.So?utio,/.-Fmgmentary orders written on an op
erations map (Situation Map B) received by the CO
901st AA Battalion at 1030:
Move 0100 to provide AA protection following
priority: LIiv Rex, front lines, arty. Secondary Atk
mission. Btry A reverts at D 0100. Priority on
roads 901st AA 13n 01000200.
I

SITUATION MAP C.
Sl,ntmation.-Applicati0n of the principles listed
below will pay dividends:
f. Employ the AA artillery under centralized con
trol whenever possible.
2. Establisb a relative order of priority of ele
ments or installations to be protected, and provide
AA protection for them in that order.
3. Arrange to have the AA artillerv
.
in uosition
prior to the~ime tbe protection is needed.
4. Assign the mission of antitank defense to AA
artillery units only after careful consideration.
In a dictatorship morale is a tender plant. All the time it seems to need
artificial heat; and for all its brave show it may well wither and die as rapid-
Iy as it Mooms. In a democracy, morale is a less impressive plant. It may
seem to grow slowly and may not be very responsive to the etTorts of the
gardeners. But it is hardy; and neither the summer sun ner the frosts of
fail will kill it.
Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States,
before the Foreign Policy Association.
The Supply of a Mobile Division in
Open Country
COLONELJ. G. COWLEY, Ro@ Engineers
Instructor, Command and General Staff School
The differences bet a,een the British system
descvibed below and the standard U.S. set-up
for an armored or motor division are not so
great as might appear at fimt sight. The main
difference is that in the British sgstem the stand.
ard practice is for division to have complete
control of thc~ ind line transport, thus corps
(OJ a?mu) only assumes responsibility up to and
including the F. M. L. This means that the divi
sional or mobile at ea w of a depth of some 50
miles. In the U.S. system the equivalent of the
end line link is under control of the higher for
mation, corps OYarmy. The division takes over
from the equivalent of the replenishment areas,
some %5to 35 miles back, to which army is ?e
.s pvns ible for sending up supplies as requested
by the division. Distances are altered to meet
conditions of combat.
The point of difference is the llandiny orer of
thi,s extra link in the chain of supply to the di
vision, The adrantage of the British system is
r.rt va mob$lit y and radiw of .opeva tion within
the rlir:sian; thr advantage of the U.S. system
{s more dirisiona[ freedom and economical use
a f t m nsport.-THE EDITOR.
G
ENERAL PERSHING, late in his career, wrote:
III each succeeding war there is a tew
dency to proclaim as new the principles on
which it is conducted . . but the principles of war
as I learned them at West Point remain un
changed. . . .
The development of modern war is characterized
by the word speed. The fixed lines of defense which
in past wars separated one side from the other are
being replaced by battle zones in which mobile ar
mored forces maneuver over many square miles of
gronnd, each side trying to outflank and threaten
the line of supply of the other. The German drives
through Poland, France, Weetern Russia, and mOre
recently in North Africa, are supreme examples of
this speed, and any army which expects to combat
the German Army of today must be prepared to face
these tactics, and to counter them by improving on
{he German methods.
Despite this increase of mobility, the saying that
;m arm y marches on its stomach is as true today as
It bas always been, even if the stomsch now requires
millions of gallons of gasoline and hundreds of truck
loads of ammunition to feed it. Ati army is dependent
on its supplies, and the speed and power of maneuver
of an army is only as great as the mobility of its
supply organization. Any force, however mobile its
fighting vehicles, has its radius of action limited to
a few miles if it is tied to fixed supply installations.
The British Army in Egypt, has, for the last three
years, been trying to work out a system of supply
sufficiently elastic to compete with the speed of mo
bile forces operating in open country. It has found
that such a syetem must be based on three funda
mental conditions:
1. Radio communication throughout the supply
system.
2. No fixed installations or dumps near the fight
ing zone.
3. A truck rather than a rail basis.
It is not necessary to dwell on the need for ra
dio communication. Telephone lines take time to lay,
and time to pick up again. In a fast-moving battle
there is seldom time to lay line, which once laid, is
more frequently than not left behind on the ground.
This applies, more obviously, to the withdrawal, but
it was found in the last advance throngh Libya and
Tripolitania that telephone communication within
the armored or motorized division was not normally
possible.
The principle that no fixed installations should be
near the fighting zone is a fundamental feature of
mobile supply. The distance which should be clear
behind the forward troops varies with the type of
country. In open desert it was found that 50 miles
was a fair average. -This would be reduced in more
close terrain. The basic fact is that a rapid enemy
thrust must not be allowed to overrnn supply instal
lations. All hospitals, work shops, and supply ten- .
ters within the area bebind the fighting zone must
be sufficiently mobile to get out of the way of a thrust
by an armored enemy column. It has been proved
that it is not possible to prevent these thrusts pene
trating to a considerable depth. If they are allowed
to capture important centers of supply they achieve
their object, which is to disorganize the force op
posed to them. A force cannot continue to fight once
its supply has broken down. A steady stream of.
baseline, ammunition and rations is esse@ial to keep
the combat troops in action; once thk stope, even
the bravest men and the best machinea soon cease
to have any fighting value.
The need for mobility of supply leads directly to
21
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I WE SUP P LY OF A MOBI LE DIVISION IN OP EN COUNTRY
su]t of the battle experience of the British 7th Ar
mored Division, which formation has seen more
service than any other British formation during the
present war. This system was not developed sud
denly. It was evolved, and is still evolving. In its
present state it has been adopted by all the armored
divisions in the British Eighth Army, and it is fair
to say that a considerable part of the recent success
of General Montgomerys forces has been due to the
soundness of their supply organization. It is not
suggested that this system is the only answer, or
tbe best answer, that can be found to the problem of
supply of mobile forces. It is given as a solution to
the problem, a solution that bas heen found tb work
in combat, and therefore a system that is V&wth
study.
Each mobile or armored division is based o
&
Field .Maintenance Center ( FMC ) which is an area
in which two days supply of gasoline, ammunition,
rations and water is held for the division. These
commodities are stacked on the ground ih well dis
persed dumps, all the gasoline in one area, ammuni
tion in another, rations and water in a third. In ad
dition, a small Divisional Reinforcement Camp, a
Divisional Salvage Dump and a Divisional Prisoner
of War Cage are located in the FMC area, which
covers several square miles. There is normally one
F&fC for each division, and the number of days SUP-
pl y held in it is decided by the higher formation and
not by the division. Usually the FMC contains two
days supply of each commodity for the dii,ision, and
the job of keeping the stores in the FMC up to tbe
correct figure is entirely the responsibility of tbe
higher formation.
In desert country the FMC for an armored or
motorized formation is normally about 50 to 70
miles from the fighting zone. This distance
@ ~ari-
able and depends largely on tbe speed at which truck
columns can travel between the FMC and the for
ward areas. In more close country this distance
would be reduced.
All installations forward of the FMC are mobile,
and, during periods of battle, at the maximum of
one hours notice. Divisional hospitals or work shops
which require longer than this to move are kept back
level with the FMC area. The FMC and all division
installations are in radio communication with Di
vision Headquarters, which is normally some 10 to
12 miles behind the fighting zone.
The supply system forward from the FMC to the
fighting troops is shown in tbe diagram. It is based
on two echelons of trucks for each Brigade Group. *
The rear echelon, known as the second line, works
between the FMC and tbe Brigade Group replenish
ment area some 30 to 40 miles ahead. The forward
echelon, known as the first line, works between the
replenishment area and the forward troops. There
*Combat Command.
is a separate replenishment area for ea~h Brigade c
Group and for Divisional Troops. The se~ond line
consists of trucks of the Service Corps driven -by
service drivers, but permanently allotted to the Bri
gade Group for which they work. The first line con
sists of trucks belonging to the combat units com
prising the Brigade Group, driven by unit drivers,
but collected, for ease of control, under the command
of one officer for each Brigade &-oup.
Each echelon has sufficient trucks to carry 100
m]les of gasoline, one days battle expenditure of am
munition, and one days water and rations for the
formation which it serves. This means that, apart
from the quantities of gasoline, ammunition, water
and rations actually held with the fighting troops ~
and in the fighting vehicles, there are, forward of
the F.MC, 200 miles of gasoline and two days sup
plies. These two echelons each make one round trip
in 24 hours. Every day one days supply of com
modities leaves the FMC in second line trucks, is
handed over to the first line trucks in the replenish
ment areas, and is carried in first line trucks to the
fighting troops.
Tbe second line trucks of the division are divided
into companies, one company for each Brigade
Group. The commander of. each second line com
pany is in constant radio communication with Di
vision Headquarters. The commander of the first
line trucks of each Brigade Group is a major, the
Brigade Group SuP@Y officer, who is in constant ra
dio touch with bis Brigade Group Headquarters.
Each unit first line trucks is under c~mmand of the
Unit SUPPlY Officer, who works under the Brigade
Group Supply Officer. These Unit Supply Officers
are in canstant radio touch with their own Unit
Headquarters.
The daily routine of each of the second line truck
companies is as follows. Tbcy refill from the FMC in
the afternoon with one days supply of gasoline, am
munition, rations and water for the Brigade Group
which they serve. After refilling, they drive to the
company bivouac area within 5 or 6 miles of the
FNfC area. During the late afternoon and evening the
truck drivers maintain their trucks and sort out the
rations from commodity loads int,o battalion loads.
Early the next morning the company goes forward
some 30 miles to the replenishment area where it
hands over its loads to the first line trucks of the
Brigade Group. This operation of replenishment
takes not, more than 40 minutes with trained men
and should be completed before rniddav, aftf?~ which
the second line trucks return to the FMC fdfwl with
returning empty gasoline and water containers,
salvage, prisonera of war, and leave personnel which
have been handed over to them by the first line trncks
at replenishment area. These they dump in the FMC
area, where they refill with supplies for the following
day.
The first line trucks, after replenishment, drive
. ... 22
MILITARY REVIEW
forward to the Brigade Group first line bivouac area
some 15 miles behind the fighting zone where, if
necessary, they further break down and reload the
rations into company or battery loads, Late in the
afternoon the unit columns go forward independently
from this area to their units, to whom they deliver
:,; ,one days supply at dusk or during tbe night, de
1pending on the tactical situation. After handing over
their supplies to the fighting troops these unit sup
ply columns return at night or early the following
morning to tbe Brigade C,roup first line bivouac
area. The Brigade Group Supply Officer waits till
all the unit columns have returned when he sets off
again with the complete Brigade Group first line to
tHe replenishment area. Here he hands over to the
second line all prisoners and salvage, mo~ring back
:, from the battlefield. The first line trucks load with
the next days supply, and so the cycle is repeated.
,At replenishment, the Unit Supply Otlicers hand
over to the second line company commander a COPY
of their ration strengths and estimated requirements
of gasoline and ammunition for the following day.
These act as a guide for the second line when re
filling at the FMC.
A feature about the system is that all supply
columns are at all times in radio touch with some
operational headquarters. The second line is in
contact with Divisional Headquarters.
The first
line when collected UP is in contact Aith Brigade
Group Headquarters, and the unit supply col
umns when they separate out to go to their
respective units are in touch with their Unit
Headquarters. This means that at any time any
column can be stopped or switched in any direction
according to the immediate tactical situation. The
necessity for this has been brought home again and
again during the fighting in North Africa. Truck
columns out of touch eventually find their way into
enemy hands. During the past two years the Ger
mans have captured many hundreds of British
trucks. At one time a large proportion of the sup
ply vehicles in tbe German Afrika Korps were
British. This was mainly due to independent columns
of trucks traveling up iu tbe forward areas, out of
touch with any operational headquarters, without
any means of knowing the rapidly changing tactical
situation, looking for units that bad already moved,
and eventually running into enemy armored columns.
It has happened again and again and will continue
to happen unless constant control of all truck
columns is insisted on.
Another feature of this system is its flexibility.
Replenishment areas for Brigade Groups can be
changed daily to suit operational requirements.
Normally they are decided on the previous evening,
sometimes in a fast moving battle they cannot be
fixed until the actual morning of replenishment.
Once the Divisional G-4 Staff Officer bas decided on
the areas and times for replenishment, the second
line company commanders are told by radio from
the Division Headquarters, who also tell the Brigade
Group Headquarters, who in turn pass tbe message
to the commanders of their first line columns. Five
minutes after replenishment areas and times have
been decided on, information should be in the hands
of all the necessary officers. A simple radio code,
changed every day, is used, which with practice
takes little longer to send and receive than speech in
clear.
This leads to the final point which this article is
intended to emphasize, the need for all officers who
serve with mobile formations to be highly trained in
talking on the ~adio. Radio talking is not like tele
phone talking. It requires hours of practice to be
come quick and efficient. One slip may endanger
many lives, as all conversations can be overheard
by enemy listening $ets. This fact makes many offi
cers scared to talk, and it is only by training that
this feeling of nervousness can be overcome. With
constant practice, however, radio talk becomes al.
most as quick as telephone talk, and its advantages,
especially in mobile operations, cannot be over
stressed.
The British system bas been explained in a cer
tain amount of detail. It is only a step in the evolu
tion of a supply system to fit the needs of modern
mobile warfare, and it is by no means perfect. It
fails to solve the difficult problem of how to prevent
waste of transport when dealing with intermittent
demands such as gasoline and ammunition, where
the number of trucks necessary for a day of heavy
expenditure is far too great for a day of little fight
ing or movement. The system described involves a
large number of trucks, of which a large proportion
stand idle except in periods of sustained battle. It
has, however, the ad~,antage of extreme mobility,
and it is given in the hope that it will stimulate
thought and discussion, as it is by intelligent think
ing, based on experience, and not by acceptance of
stereotyped systems, that the art of warfare is de
veloped.
An order shall contain everything that a commander cannot do by him
self, but nothing else.
Field Marshal von Moltke.
,~ 24
Exploitation of Local Resources
LIEUTENANT COLONEL R, O. FORD, Ordrwmcce fhpartmetet
instructor, Command and General Staff School
P
ARAGRAPH62 of Field Msnual 100-10 reads as
follows: Supplies are obtained in the theater
of operations by prearranged schedules of ship
ments from, or by requisitions on, the zone of the in
terior, or by exploitation of local resources, including
captured material and salvage of equipment partly
worn out or abandoned. Local resources are utilized
to the utmost especially supplies such as food, forage,
fuel, and engineer construction materials.
Let us take one phase of this as our text for this
discussion, Local resources are utilized to the ut
most.
This is not a new idea. Sun Tzu wrote The Art
of War about 500 B. C. It is probably the oldest
military treatise in the world. The following is a
quotation from a translation.
Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging
on the enemy. One cart load of the enemys provisions
is equivalent to twenty of ones own. Later he says,
iMake forays in fectile country in order to supPIY
your army with food.
The importance of the utilization of local resources
varies somewhat with the location of the theater of
operations. The farther away the theater is from
the zone of the interior, the more important it be
comes, as the transportation difficulties become in
creasingly greater. In a war situation such as we are
faced with today, the importance of utilizing local
resources is paramount. Every ton that we can se
cure locally means one more ton of previous shipping
space for essential material that cannot be obtained
overseas.
The types of resources that particularly lend them
selves to utilization are: shelter, utilities, transpor
tation, communications, swvices, and supplies.
These resources may be exploited by purchase,
requisition, contributions, billeting, or confiscation.
Purchase is in general the most advisable manner
of obtaining supplies. Purchase at the market price,
or in some cases even higher if necessary, is desirable
on the theory that this is probably cheaper than pur
chase pIus transportation from the zone of the in
terior. ,Tbis also has the advantage of improving
relations with the local people. Purchase is prac
tically always used when in our own. or friendly,
territory.
Purchase is the ideal system, even in enemy terri
tory. Some may take exception to this, feeling that
the conqueror is entitled to supplies at his own price.
But tbe offer of remunerative prices appeals to the
greed of tbe people, and they will bring out reserves
that may have been in hiding. Generally, the poorer
classes of citizens remain in an invaded country, and
paying them in ready cash for supplies taken from
them, results in a much more contented populace.
With money available, they will return more readily
to their normal way of living, and the problems of
military government will be greatly reduced. . An in
vading army should provide itself with enough money
which is current in the invaded country, to cover the
supplies that may be purchased.
Of course when purchase does not produce the de
sired results, requisition can be employed. Requi.
sitions are demands made on the inhabitants, which
differ from purchases, in that the buyer fixes the
price and the owner has no choice. It should be used
only when the method of purchase has not produced
tbe desired result. The requisition should be pre
sented to a recognized civil officiaI and only in ex
ceptional circumstances should it be presented to an
inaividuai. Under the Hague Conventions of 1907
requisition can only be employed under the anthority
of tbe local commander.
A requisition is an order for the delivery of cer
tain quantities of supplies, to a certain point, at a
certain time, for which a certain payment will be
made. A fair price should be paid, and if possible,
the payment should be made in cash at the time of de
livery, although if this is inconvenient, a receipt may
be given for later redemption.
Contributions involve the taking of money from
the population in excess of taxes. Under the Hague
Conventions these shall be collected only on the writ
ten order of a Commander-in-Chief, and shall as far
as possible, be in accordance with the assessment of
taxes in force. For every contribution a receipt shall
be given to the contributors.
Confiscation may be resorted to when all other
methods of obtaining required supplies fail. This
however, should only be used as an extreme measure,
as it creates a very hostile attitude in the inhabitants,
and frequently results in the hiding of large quanti
ties of supplies. An 1814 decision of the United
States Supreme Court has the following to say on
this subject:
That war gives to the sovereign full right to teke
the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy
wherever found, is conceded. The mitigation of this
rigid rule, which the humane and wise policy of mod
ern times has introduced into practice, will more or
, 25

I
MILITARY
less affect the exercise of this right, but cannot im
pair the right itself.
When, from lack of time or other reasons, requi
. sitions are not available, supplies in kind may be
j taken directly by fol-cefromthefieidsorotherplaces
~,: by foraging. This is usually only resorted to for the
, ,, supply of small parties and advance troops.
There is some thought that troops engaged in raids
and rapid movements should be permitted to forage
freely. But this does not give satisfactory results.
The troops will do it with the one thought uppermost
in their minds, that it is their privilege to provide
for their immediate needs to the maximum, and give
little thought to the ultimate problems created.
Marauding leads to concealment of supplies and total
cessation of production. It is very difficult to prevent
the troops from abusi~!-+ an! alienating the el]emy
population. Once fomqgng M permitted, it is diffi
I+lt to prevent it on the next occasiml. Absolute
prohibition of such practice is about the only system
to employ, except in dire emergency.
Billeting is the assignment nf troops for shelter in
private or public buildings. Tbe advantage of billet
ing is that it provides immediately available shelter,
ind the troops are not readily observed f Tom the air,
since no new buildings have be?n erected. However,
it tends to reduce the productive capacity of a re
gion, as the protecting presence of the male is usually
felt necessm-y in a home occupied by soldiers, and be
is kept from working in the factory or in the field.
In the l~nited States and in our possessions, billet
ing in private dwellings is hmited by the Third
Amendment to the Constitution, which reads:
NO soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered ia
any house without the consent of the owner, nor in
hme of war, bat in a manner to be prescribed by
law.
In friendly territory the local laws and customs
regarding billeting will be followed.
In hostile territory billeting is used when desirable,
and is handled as a form of requisition.
History substantiates the wisdom of the practice
of adopting a just policy toward the inhabitants of
am enemy country. As far hack as the 15th Century,
King Henry V of England farbade injuries to proP
er~y and insults to women. The justice of his military
government, aud the discipline of his troops con
tributed greatly to his success.
One of Frederick the Great; instructions to his
Generals was that they must prevent pillage, which
is the source of the greatest disorders.
In our owl] history, General Wi nfield Scotts cam
paign in Mexico, from his landing at Vera Cruz in
March 1847, to his capture of the City of Mexico the
following September, is one of the best examples of
almost entirely supplying an army in enemy cOun
try, and at the same time maintaining the friendship
of the inhabitants. A deputation of Mexicans offered
I
REVIEW
General Scott the dictatofahip of their country after
the fighting was over.
In the Civil War, the Federal government made an
error by deciding the policy of payment upon grounds
of loyalty. Receipts for supplies were given, but they
were only paid when the holder could prove loyalty.
This amuunted to confiscation of enemy property.
It resulted in concealment and destruction of prop
erty, and the production of the territory fell off to
practically nothing.
Under the terms of the Armistice of November 11,
1918, Germany was required to pay and subsist the
armies of occupation. This amounted, in effect, to
the levying of a contribution upon the whole of Ger
many. Our commanders used the proceeds of this
contribution to buy supphes from the German people
in the occupied territory. resulting in much friend
lier relations.
So far in the present war the obtainirig of supplies
locally for troops overseas has been tied up with the
Lend-Lease program by what is known as Reverse
Lend- Lease.
As far as possible American troops on foreign soil
are being fed, housed, and equipped out of United
Nations supplies. These are furnished on the same
basis as we supply Lend-Lease material, and this re
ciprocal aid rendered to as, is credited against the
Lend-Lease articles and services furnished by us.
Under these reciprocal Lend-Lease arrangements,
the services, sapplies, equipment and facilities ob
tained by the American troops are inventoried, as
sessed as to value, and receipted for by the receiving
American Unit. Agreement as to the estimated dol
lar value of the items, is settled with a responsible
representative of the foreign government concerned.
The supplying foreign government then receives
appropriate credit against its a ccou n t On t h e Len d.
I.ease books in this country.
This program is designed to provide a more equit.
able distribution among the United .Nations of shar
ing the cost of the war by utilization of a large scale
barter system, and to obtain as many supplies on the
scene as possible, thus saving valuable shipping space
and time. The procedure by which negotiations are
conducted directly w]th representatives of the foreign
governments mrill avoid bookkeeping details, and
delays which would occur if formal cash contracts
had to be arranged with private firms or individuals
for every item. The amount of such foreign assist
ance to our troops is determined solely by the indi
vidual countrys supply ability.
Ia England we are obtaining all types of supplies
from fan belts for trucks to squadrons of spitfires,
materials and labor for construction, weapons and
ammunition. It is estimated that last year over
Dict,onarg of Anw?wwLBiogvaphy. J. E. Smith, The
war With Mexico, 11:323.
26
EXPLOITATION OF LOCAL RESOURCES
200,000 tons of shipping a month was saved in trans.
portation of supplies to England.
Australia and New Zealand furnish most of the
food for our troops in th Southwest Pacific. Also
d
Anstralia is furnishing mqch of our requirements in
the line of woolen clothing.
What You may run into in some of the places now
occupied by American soldiers comes from the fol
lowing report from New Guinea:
Food is passable; almost all of it comes from cans.
There is no food obtainable in New Guinea beyond a
few paw paws, bananas, and coconuts. Supply otTi
cers laugh grimly over the suggestion from head
quarters that they supplement rations by buying in
the open market.
There are no civilians left in New Guinea.
Papuas white population was never more than
2,000. Those who were not taken into the Australian
Army, chiefly for such jobe as required dealing with
Repair of British
natives, were evacuated six months ago
There are no women. Even native women
sent back into the hills. Native men are
from their villages for two-month turns
light labor. They wear dirty skirts called
spend their idle moments combing their
four-prouged metal forks.
Considerable study must be given to the problem
of determining the availability of supplies. All avail
able statistics on the region must be secured. The
presence of cities and towns must he considered.
These are a drain on the food resources of the sur
rounding country but on the other hand they often
contain large res rves of such supplies. In any es
timate the needs of the inhabitants must be con
1
sidered. Supply, intelligence is very important to
this study. No information is more valuable than in
for mat ion by dist r ict s r egar ding supplies and cr ops.
Army Vehicles
and more.
have been
brought in
at simple,
rarnis, and
hair with
[Fr om t he London TZ,WS18 January 1943.]
Soon aft er t he pr esent war began t he wor kshops of t he
VZIIOUSar ms of t he Br it ish Ar my wer e ..at t e, ed under dif
fer ent cont r ols, some under t he Royal Engineer s, some under
t he Royal Ar my Or dnance CWPS, and some under t he Royal
Ar my Ser mce Cor ps. Today all r epams t o vehicles, t anks,
guns, cazmer s, r ange and heught finder s, indeed eve, yt hzng
fr om t he smallest wat ch t o t he lat est and heav]est t ank, ar e
done by t he Royal Elect mcal and Mechanical Engineer s,
( R. E.M.E. ). who cent , ol all wm kshops needed m t he Br it ish
Ar my. This new cor ps IS st all young, hut it is alr eady ver y
lar ge ad !s st all gmwmg.
The!. wor kshops ar e dw,ded lat . four echelons. one .$Or k
ing at t he f r cmt line; anot her just behind t he line; a t hir d
some way bebmd t he hne; and t he four t h pr obably at t be
base. Tbe fir st t wo echelons ar e mobile, t be t hir d semi
st m.lc, and t be four t h st at ic. The hght aid det achment s
( Lads of t be R.E. M. E. ) in t he bat t le of Egypt , which dr ove
Rommel fr om Egypt and Cyr cnalca, r epair ed and got hack
mt o act ion no fewer t han 1,200 t anks in t he fir st mont h of t hat
bat t le. They had heavy casuakws. Tanks, t r ucks, car ,m?r s, and
ot her t hm~s t hey could not r epair wer e sent back t o t he next
d.or kshopq and if t he r epaws wer e st all t oo heavy t hey wer e
knt back t o t he t hir d echelon and some fr om t her e t o t he base.
&Ie Lad% have t o fight as well as t o salve a~d IWWUI.
.,,
Each divimcm of t he Br it ish Ar my has 9 t o 12 l.a.ds, and
t hey ar e t r ained t o clear mine fields, fight Infant r y act ions,
demolish m,ht ar y object ives, r ecover t anks, t r ucks and car
r ier sall under fir e-fr om r iver s, shell holes, m whefever
t hey may have wander ed. I have iust seen a Chur chIll t ank
at t he bot t om of a dsep pm wit h plent y of wat er at t he
bot t om. It was easy t o see how in t he dar k or mist ~t bad
seal it s way int o it . It was difficult t o see how it was qo
mg t o be got t en out . The count r y cons,st ed of t hat kind of
clay which IS most difficult t o dig wit h a shovel. Yet an
I.a.d. came along wit h a t hr ee-t on lor r y, and, wit h t he aid
of st eel r opes, pulleys and winch, and r eally har d and most
ably d~r ect ed wor k, got t he Chur chdl
and sent n off t o t he second echelon
t oo heavy for t hem t o r epair .
In t he fir st t hr ee echelons t he
mdit ar y hut in t he heavy base-shops
employed on hght r epet it ion wor k
out and cm t o a t r ader
shops. The damage was
memhemhlp m ent mely
a number of women ale
and secr et ar ial wor k. A
Ialge per cent age of t he milit ar y cr aft smen ar e ar my t r ained.
These 1 a ds ar e at t ached t o tank, artillery, and r econnais
$ace r egiment s and t o infant r y br igades. Ever y member of
an Lad. must be a skdled cr aft sman, ar t lficer , fit t er , \ yelder ,
or ele.t mcmn He must also he a fight ing soldler .
,
27
Medical Problems in Jungle Warfare
COLONELHENRY P. CARTER, Medical Corps
Inst r uct or , Command and Gener al St aff School
I
N JUNGLE warfare the soldier tights two enemies:
Man and Natm-e, and of the two Nature is often
the more formidable. Where are American troops
carrying on active operations today? In the Solomon
Islrmds and in New Guinea, both areas located in the
tropics where jungle and mountain conditions pre
vail. Other potential theaters worthy of mention are
Java, Burma, Mindanao, and the Bataan Peninsula
~all tropical and mountainous. It would appear
that the matter of jungle warfare is becoming in
creasingly Important day by day, and should de
serve careful consideration.
There are certain sanitmy, medmal, and evacua
tion problems of great importance to all commanders
and staff odicers who will fight the enemy under con
ditions of Jungle terrain, climate, etc. These prob-
Jems are referred to at length in Field Manual 31-20,
which lras been extracted and rondensed to cover the
following:
HIGH Pki YSICAL STA iNDARDS
The jungle task for~e should be especially selected
as to physical fitness, and should be compuwd of
very young men who will be able to withstand the
hardships of this peculiarly exhausting type of serw
ice. The untit, physically weak, and elderly personnel
should be eliminated before this special military
operation is undertaken. Our troops on Bataan were
amazed at the extremely ynuthful appearance of the
Japanese prisoners of war.
SPECIAL TRAINING FOR JUNGLE WARFARE
Very important for all the forceincluding at
tached units, especially the medical troops attached.
Six to eight weeks are considered necessary to ac
climatize the troops to the increased temperatures.
the rains, humidity, etc., incident to the tropics. As
a further hardening fIrocess, two or three months
additional training under actual jz<tzgle condz timu
should be carried on before troops would be consid
ered ready for the special operations. Litter bearers
should also train in the jungle to be able to carry
loaded litters long distances over jungle trails. Com
bat troops will not enjoy littering the litter-hearers,
as sometimes actually happens. Pack animals should
be conditioned with their loads out on the hilly j ungle
trails in order to be fit.
It has been reported (unofficially) that the Jap
anese trained for about one year on the tropical
island of Hainan otf the China Coast before starting
their Philippine campaign. Apparently they were
well fit for their job.
2s
VACCINATION
This should be accomplished as prescribed by
Army Regulations and War Department Circulars,
and must be carefully checked to determine if all
the troops have complied. This should be attended
to by the medical officers prior to departure.
PERaoNAL HyGIENE
D@h@vat t on and Chilling.-High temperatures
and the humidity of the tropics cause a tremendous
amount of sweating, resulting in great loss of water,
salt, and vitamins from the body. A state of de
hydration may develop, with early symptoms of pro
nounced headache, exhaustion, abdominal and mus
cular cramps (soldiers call them salt cramps).
These symptoms may be confused with appendicitis,
and they may be aggravated by the rapid cooling of
tbe sweat-wet body of the individual.
Experienced soldiers with good water discipline
are seldom affected with these heat cramps, as they
have been trained how to take care of themselves.
In addition to the cramps and the accompanying
intestinal upsets, affected troops may also deveIop
respiratory infections, namely sinusitis, bronchitis,
or even pneumonia, often a result of sleeping io wet
clothing directly on the wet ground. Permit the men
to strip to the waist, remove the wet clothing, and
attempt to dry it out, thus reducing the chances of
becoming chilled after the days work. A dry under
shirt or shelter-half to cover the chest and abdomen
at night proves most useful for the men.
The troops must not sleep directly upon the wet
ground, and in Panama it has been the custom to
construct small platforms ( wiki-ups ) up off the
ground, place thereon a layer of palm fronds, then
erect the mosquito bars and shelter tents, thus insnr
ing a dry sleeping pIace for the men even in the
rainy season. Hammocks may be slung if available
and if the sitnation is favorable.
Water LJi.sctp/irze.-Good water discipline among
the task force should be required, and experienced
troops learn how to conserve their water supply and
how to avoid heat cramps and intestinal upsets.
From training they learn how to drink by the num
herstaking small swigs of water frequently and
at regular intervals. Gulping water should not be
permitted when men are overheated.
The medical service provides salt tablets and
chlorine tablets (Halazone) for the men, and the
placing of 1,~ teaspoonful of salt, plus one or two
chlorine tablets, in the canteen of watsr at the time
MEDICAL PROBLEMS IN JUNGLE WARFARE
the canteens are filled will be found simple and ef
fective. Increasing the amount of salt in che diet
may suffice to replace that lost from sweating and,
with sufficient water, thus help reduce the heat fa
tigue and exhaustion incident to severe exertion
on the jungle trails. A proper salt and water level
in the body assures better physical efficiency and
endurance.
Ability to Swcrn-Every man in the task force
should be able to swim, as there are a great many
streams to be crossed in the jungle and cases of
drowning ai-e not uncommon.
Feet and Skin.Feet should be inspected fre
quently, as numerous foot infections will be encount
ered, especially tryeophytosis ( Dhobie). A plenti
ful supply of sox should be available, troops should
change their sox daily, and foot powder should be
used freely. Some of the men will go barefooted, in
which case they should be examined later for hook
worm infestation. Before wading streams, the men
should remove their shoes and hang same around
their necks or over their shoulders. This helps save
shoe leather during the dry season. During the
rainy season this is of no value. as the shoes are
continuously wet anyhow. Armpits and groins
should be wasbed with soap and water daily, then
dried and powdered. Frequent skin inspections
are desirable precautions.
LMALARIAL FEVER
This is a very serious disease for troops, as it is
disabling and is not quickly cured. It is world wide,
notably in the tropics and subtropics and has been
a serious difficulty in the Carribean area, in Africa,
in the Southwest Pacific, in India, and elsewhere.
It is transmitted from man to man by mosquitoes
which have sucked up a drop of infected blood, the
malaria germs increasing in the mosquitos body
after about 10 days, when the infected saliva of the
insectafter a bite-will enter through the skin
into the mans blood and infect him.
What can a soldier himself do to prevent malaria?
Use sleeping nets, protective clothing, and repel
lents, and avoid infected native villages, which are
particularly dangerous after dark. American troops,
even with malaria, are still able t~ carry on combat
successfully, as was demonstrated in the Southwest
Pacific area.
Chemical Prophytaxie.-Tbe following is qunted
frnm Circular Letter No. 56, Surgeon Generals Of
fice dated 6-9-41: The use of quinine or atabrine
fnr prophylaxis is not recommended as a routine
procedure, as the available information indicates
that these drugs do not prevent infection. Hmvever,
they are of definite military value in that they do
prevent the appearance of the clinical symptoms nf
malaria so long as they are taken, and thus they
afford a meana of keeping troops on their feet dur
ing periods of emergency in the field. When admin
istered to troope in special situations in unsanitated
endemic areas either of the drugs may be used under
the personal supervision of a responsible officer, as
followe:
(1) Atabrine 0.2 gram (3 grains) twice a week
(every 3 or 4 days) or
(2) Quinine Sulpbate 0.3 gram (5 grains) daily.
Any toxic symptoms developing must be repnrted
to the medical nfficer.
Other- Measures.Men working in kitchens or on
picket lines at dawn and at dusk, should be protected
by requiring them to use gloves, headnets, and chem
ical prophylaxis as they are much more exposed.
Men sitting arnund company canteens at night
should be likewise protected. Headnets for night
patrols should be stained black to aid vision. The
use of mosquito bars (small 20-mesh bobbinet)
should be SOP for all troops while sleeping, and this
should be insisted upon by all commanders. This
cannot be tno greatly stressed, and should be care
fully checked and necessary disciplinary action taken
in the case of violators. Camp or bivouac sites sbonld
be carefully selected, fairly high up and at least one
mile away from swampy areas or natzw vitlages.
RepeUarcts.-Citronella-Camphor-Petrolatum mix
ture will be found useful by certain classes of night
working clerks wbo are unable to wear beadnets.
Others may use it.
DYSENTERY
Dysentery may be considered very prevalent
among natives, and the use of water and fnod from
native sources should be prevented. Food so ob
tained should be regarded infected, and this
would call for thorough cleaning and scrubbing, with
boiting of food before eating. The proper cleaning of
the messgear nf the troops after each meal will give
good results, and there will be times when only the
spoon will be available when subsisting on C ra
tions in the forward area of contact. Drinking water
must be disinfected thrnugb use nf one or two chln
rine tablets (HaIazone) to each canteenful.
VENEREAL DISEASES
Very prevalent amnng the natives, who$e moral
standard may be considered none too high. The bar
ter of cigarettes, tobacco, candy, chocolate bar or
other food, a cake of eoap, or even quinine tablets
(very much in demand by natives) may provide the
soldier with the desired sexual contact. Keep the
men away from the native villages, and have avail
able prophylactic statinns which should be well
marked and their location knnwn to the command.
Instruction in V.D. prevention and grind discipline
of troops will show results here.
INSECTS AND SNAKRS
Ticks, Leeches, and Ckiggem should be songht for
once or more daily, and ticks and leeches carefully
removed. A wet cigarette butt or some grease will
29
MILITARY REVIEW
loosen them, making removal easy and complete.
Tweezers may be used, then touch the wound with
tincture of iodine to disinfect it.
Ch iggem may produce extensive skin lesions.
Powdered sulphur in sox and around the waist band
\, ~may lessen the number of bites. Phenol ointment or
lotion or iodine may be used. Avoid sitting directly
on ground, dead stumps, or logs.
.% ad Flies are a nuisance at night, irritating and
persistent. Use mosqmto bars.
.S//akcs.-Jlany poisonous snakes thrive in the
tropics, in Central and South America, in Australia,
an:] in the East Indies. The Cobra is found in Ma.
Iaya, in India, and in the Philippines. Troops should
, be instructed how to prevent being hitten by snakes
I ahd they should be cautioned against walking around
\ baretooted m- placin~ hands on ledges or logs where
they are unable to see what is there. Most of the
~, ~bites are on hands and forearms, feet, ankles, and
lower part of legs. The actual number of persons
bitten is relatively smalldcatk.s rare.
Tbe company aid men should be well qualified to
gi Ye emergency treatment for snake bite by applying
some form of tourniquet (shoe lace), iucising the
wound, and mcissa~inq find s ack ing z t of once. Kill
the snake for identification and send for tbe medical
officer w,ithout delay. I{eep patient qutct. at Jes t.
NATIVE VILLAGES
Every native village in the tropics may be as
sumed to be infected with venereal diseases, typhoid
and dysentery, smallpox, malarial fever, intestinal
parasites (all types) ; and in the Southwest Pacific,
possibly p]ague, cholera, and typhus fever, During a
campaign these vdlages and native huts should be
shunned by the troops and patrols should be placed
to see that troops do not enter for pleasure purpose...
Off iimtts! Camping m the ]mmediate vicinity of
native villages is a very undesirable procedure. One
mile away for the camp ( bivouac) is good SOP.
FIELD SERVICE IN TROPICS
T1.oops should be relieved at short itervs.ls for
rest and r ecuper at ion if t he t act ical sit uat ion per.
mits, otherwise a large noweffectl\7e rate due to ill
ness will develop. Send them to a rest camp in the
hills to get some good food, rest, and sleep.
EVACUATION
III the jungle or in mountainous country this will
present many and varied difficulties on account of
the climate and terrain, and the flow of the disabled
will he along trails, streambeds, streams, and lakes.
It has been noted from past experience that there
may be three or more echelons of evacuation in get
ting casualties removed from the forward areas to a
point where definite treatment may be carried on
successfully. These echelons may fall into the foi.
lowing classes:
30
Is t Eche/on.-By hand carried litters, with prob
ably only two men to the litter on account of the
trail being so narrow and difficult. Supplement this
form of evacuation by using prisoners of war or im
pressed native coolies who are physically qualified
as porters or cargo bearers, The use of hammocks
slung on bamboo poles may prove effective, with
only a two-man carry. Litter relays will have to be
established for relief of th? litter-bearers if the dis
tance to be traversed is very great, as this work is
extremely exhausting.
zd fiche/on,-Animal transport, possibly from the
pack train, may be introduced here where the trail
becomes better and wider, using the following: (1)
The travoisl (old Indian type) may be used. (2)
The cacolet~ type of evacuation, 1st Cavalry Division,
may he employed. (3) With docile pack animals, an
ample supply of blankets, surcingles, and feed bags
(or gunny sacks) for patients feet, the disabled
may he strapped to the animals backshead facing
the rearas Allenby found necessary in the Pales
tine campaign, in order to get them out. A consid
erable degree of safety and comfort is thus afforded,
and the casualties may thus be gotten out to an
evacuation point called a ,jeep head where small
I , -ton ambulances take them to an established port
able hospital or field hospitai prnviding surgery.
Wd Ec}t~>lt,r/.Ari\,ingng later at a navigation head
on a river or lake, native cayucas, single or in con
voy, may then be introduced, with the iew to get.
ting patients to a point where army motor supply
boats, air transport, or hydroplanes should be able
to take over and transport patients to the hoepital
where definite treatment Wi]] be carried on.
This method of evacuation may seem rather crude
and lacking in the refinement of a metropolitan am
bulance sermce, but it is practical, bas been tried
out under actual jungle and mountain conditions and
it will work. NO one methnd of evacuation will do.
It is rather by a combination of the means available
that the collection and transportation of the sick
and wnunded can be accomplished.
SUMMARY
The following precautions ha~e been recommend
ed by surgeons for the troops fighting under j ungie
conditions in the Southwest Pacific area:
1. }Vear / rJ?w trousers and / onfl s hirt s leeves t
protect the skin. Disinfect skin abrasions or cuts
with Tincture Iodine carried by the soldier.
2. Sleep under mosquito bar, tucked in well, and
kill aau tmpped mosquitoes.
3. Sleep drg. Avoid lying on damp, wet ground.
Avoid using native huts.
. .
Tr avo, s: a vehicle consisting of &o t r ailing poles aer v
mg as shxft s and bear ing a plat for m, net , or bt t w for t he load.
Caeolet : .%hor se or mule lit t er used for t he t r anspor
t at ion of wounded.
~.
MEDICAL PROBLEMS IN JU&GLE WARFARE
4. Use head net and gloves when out at night. wound with Sulfa powder from 1st Aid packet and
Also use repellant ointment. apply dressing.
5, Don! fait to take your quinine daily at supper II. Move away several feet from the trail-out
helps prevent malaria. of sight of Jrzp sniperand call for help in quiet
voice.
b. Bathe daily using plenty of soap. Use powder
on sore or chafed spots. 22. Don t lose or forget your Jungle Medic&t Kit
7. Wasff and change so.r daily, and use foot pow-
(it mav save your life).
der on feet.
CONCLUSION
X. Was h clothing at least twice a week, and dru
Well disciplined troops, experienced with jungle
out same.
traiuing, will not find service under jungle condi
0. Don t drink water from unauthorized sources,
tions prej ndieial to a reasonable state of good health
unless properly disinfected. Use 1 or 2 Halazone
but they must he wetl distiplined in every sense of
(Chlorine ) tablets to each canteen of water. the word. Stud~l and fmow the jungle, and thus
If). If wounded take Sulfa tablets as directed, dust make it your u1lv! ! !
Notes on Mobile Surgical Units in the Middle East
[ F~om an mt wle m t he Jw I*,R1of thr Row l A, w .$f.cfIcaC Co, w (Great Bmt ai. )
J anuar y 1943.]
..
1. M.bdt Surgwal Units of all kinds
Jmuld be ffexdde i themselves and
should be handled fr eely and t lexifdy.
They should be equally capablv of wor k
,ng at t be Base (at Gener al Hospit als) or
m t he For war d .4r eas and t hey should be
d,. t r it ,.wd ar c.r dmg t o t he needs of t he
bmmt mn. If a par t mdar cor ps 1s sui+w.
,IW heavy cabualt ws a dozen t eams may
kc needed for a few days. .&t ot her t imes
a couple of t eams can eas,ly cope wlt k
all t he wovk And , ver y quint t imes
t her e will he ver y lit t le wor k at all m
t he Fmwzr d Ar eab; at such t m>e. most
t eznw wdl be bet t er employed at t be
Base. Should a bat t le be about t o st ar t
it is easy enough t o push up a dozen
t eams In a couple of day% Ther e IS no
need t o keep all t hese sur geons idle in
t he For war d Ar eas for weeks befor e and
Aft er a bat t le Whenevel possible e..h
t eam shot dd be specially t r amwi m some
sper ialt y t hat wiil ser ve t o keep It Ollt
of mischief in quiet t nnes. In bat t le each
t ~am can do gener al wor k as r eqmr ed.
2. The ~),es tm of bohlw g s w tmz s .
1s t be t eam t o car e for w own pat mnt s
or not ? 1f m, ,s it t o car r y it s own t ent
nge and ot her necessar y eqmpment and
t o have t he necessar y ext r a per sonnel?
My own vmw is t hat t he t eam should not
he r equir ed t o car r y accommodat ion for
pat ient s. It means ext r a t r anspor t and
wor k when t he t eams ener gms should
he devot ed solely t o t r eat ment of pat ient s.
Bm I do t hink t hat t he t eam should be
r esponsible for t be post -oper at ive car e
of It s pat mnt s and should have It s own
nr aing 01der l, es t r ained t o t his wor k.
$. Personnel of Surgical Taam.s.
Ther e is r oom for t wo t ypes of t eam
in t he F01war d Ar eas: t he e%t t emely
mobde t eam Lunning one t able, and t he
r at hw less mobile t eam r unm~ t uo
t ables, hut of much mor e t han t wwe t he
capac,t y and ver y emmonncal , per son
nel and equt pment .
4. It lt at is t lLe wfecd t kmt er UCCOWZ.
,,(odut ,on r - -It is not safe t o count on
finding buddmgs Should oper at ions be
done (a) I a t ent ? (b) m a pent -house
built ,ound a lor r y? or (c I inside bpe.
cially efp,lp~ed lor r ies? Tbe gr eat ac!
va.nt age of oper .t mg wit hin t he veb,cle
IS speed of get t ing t o wor k and of pack
mp up And packing up M far mor e in>
por t ant . You may have plent y of t m>e
t o pack UP and beat it if t he enemy is
appr oaching or t he fir st war r ug may he
a shell in t he camp. And five mmut ,s
may be .11 t he t ime one has t o get gomz
for t anks move fast . The t r oulde shout
t be few unit s possessing act ual oper at
ing lor r ies is t hat t he vehicles ar e far t oo
smaU (In KeUar s mut t be anest het ist
! old me t hat it was somet imes nece. saw
t o anest het ize t be pat ient befor e he could
he got inside t he vehicle and placed on
t be t able. ) Do You r emember my men
t ming t o You cer t a]n vehiclm used a,
Mohde Map Pr int ing Unt t s Thwe ar e
t he answer t o t he t heat er on wheels.
They ar e expandable so t hat t he floor
space can he quickly doubled. Such a ve
hmle, plus a similar vehicle fit t ed as a
st er ilizing van which could be joined
back t o hack would give space enough t o
r un t wo t ables concur r ent ly, wit h t he
advant ages of t his syst em.
The alt er nat e t o such mobile t he
at er s is, I t hink, t he specially desumd
pent -house t ent built r ound t be lor r Y, On
t be lmcs of our own. The lor r y it self
does not r eq. ne elabor at e fit t ings. Such
as t her e ar e should. be m~de accessible
fmn t he out side so t hat , when t he pent
hcmme is er ect ed r ound t be lor r y, equip- .
ment and st ows ar e r eadily and easily
avadable. Tbm-e IS an Aust r alian Mobile
SWYCS1 Umt van wh]ch embodies cQl,
t at n gmd point s on t hese bnes. The ma,.
feat ur e about t he cost r uct mn of t he ve
h,cle r ot e, ally is t hat all t he fit t ings,
cupboar ds, shelves, et c., ar e made of
uwt zl or met al.cover ed ply-wood, eom
bmmg he%t ne,~ and slimness wlt b gr eat
st t engt b and fr eedom fr onl w&umg.
Tmilels ar e a mist ake for t hey ar e t he .
WWY devil o ar r ow r oads and in t he
dewr t . On at r ow r oads t hey wont go
r ound t he hemis and in t he deser t t he
buinpb ar e always causing t he couphngs
t o snap.
.5. Other 7)01.!S c.nce8 ning t ? a7LS@.
Itis ver y bad policy t o over load ve
b,cles. 1n bad count r y lt is unsafe. If
a vehw]e m loaded t o t he r oof, pack]:g
and unpac!mw t ake t wice as long and,
If a par t lcula, ar t icle is r gt iuir ed in a
hur r y, d is always at t he bot t om of t he
pl!e.
i70mlusums. -Wer e I t o have t be de.
wgmng of my own Ideal umt , I should
plump for che expandable ]or nes, one as
t heat er , t he ot her as st er ilizing r oom,
and t be t wc>-t able syst em wit h t wo sur
geons. And 1 t hink t hat If t hat wer e not
obt ainable I would bave t he single-t eam
oper at ing lor r y fot t he. most advanced
spor ad,e wor k and t he t wo-t able pent
hr mse ar r angement for t he heavier wor k
a lit t le fur t her back. . . .
31
Service Areas of the Infantry Division
COLONEL DEAN S. ELLERTHORPE, Coast Artsllerv Corps
Inst r uct or , Command and Gener al St aff School
E
XPERIENCE in Nor t h Afr ica has indicat ed t he
necessity for clearing the fighting area of ser
vice and supply transport and personnel not
required for the immediate support of combat troops.
The presence of these elements in the forward area
operates as an obstacle to freedom of combat maneu
v$r and unnecessarily subjects them to hostile fire
and the action of raiding parties. The establishment
of a divisional service area permits freedom of ma
neuver of combat units within the division zone of
action and provides coordinated security and closer
control of administrative and service elements during
iombat.
Tables of organization do not provide personnel or
equipment for the specific purpose of coordinating
security measures and establishing central control
over the unit and service trains of the infantry divi
sion. A ~ystem designed to clear the division combat
area of transport and personnel not neceseary to
combat must be improvised from available means.
The following general plan has been developed with
a view to clearing the forward area and providing
central control and coordinated security for the ele
ments involved. No attempt has been made to estab-
Iisb minute details. Some are adaptable to standing
operating procedure while others are matters for
decision which should be made in conformity with
demands of the situation.
The entire scheme is based on the formation of a
Division Service Area ( DSA ). This area may be de
fined as an area in which are grouped all division
service and administrative elements, unit transport,
and personnel not required for the immediate C1OS6
support of combat (see schematic diagram). Follow
ing are listed factors which govern the location of
the DSA:
Relation to area required for combat maneuver.
Proximity of friendly troops and reserves.
Availability of supplies and services to combat
troops.
Location of terrain providing deftlade, natural
defensive strength, cover and concealment, and
suitable routes forward and to the flanks and rear.
Travel time of unit trains.
In offensive operations the L)SA may be located from
ten to tifteen miles in rear of front Iine troops. In
defense this distance may be increased to twenty
tive miles or more. Tbe foregoing distances should be
applied with caution. Troops must be adequately
served and at the same time be reasonably safe from
minor hostille ground action.
The division commander appoints a commander of
the DSA from available personnel. Following are
some of the more important duties of the DSA
commander:
Tactical command of all units and attachments
in DSA.
DSA security.
Control and security of movement of division
and unit service and supply transport from the
f)SA to point of release to units.
Movement of DSA to new location designated
by tbe division commander.
Selection of DSA when not designated by higher
authcrit y.
Submission of request for security attachments
when necessary.
Maintenance of Administration and Traffic Cir
culation Maps for own information; data fur
nished by G-4.
Transmission of orders from the division com
mander and commanders of service elements and
unit trains to individual units and groups under
his tactical command: be prescribes their routes
forward and provides armed escort when the situa
tion requires.
(The DSA commander has no jurisdiction over
the functional operation of the various trains and
services under his control. )
The following units and attachments are normally
grouped in the DSA:
Divisional and Unit Trains:
QM Company.
Rear echelon of Division Headquarters to in
clude attached personnel sections of units.
Elements of the Medical Battalion, Engineer
Battalion, Ordnance Company and Signal Com
pany.
Unit rear echelons and trains and personnel not
immediately essential to combat.
Non-divisional:
Attached organizations together with small
corps and army units may, for security, be in.
eluded in the DSA.
The organization of the DSA for security and the
conduct of security operations are the direct re
sponsibilities of the DSA commander. Security meas
ures are based on the following: .
32
SERVICE AREAS OF T2iE INFANTRY D1V1S1ON
Exploitation of the natural defensive strength
of terrain through the establishment of road
blocks, minefield, and other artitlcial obstacles.
Division of the area into sectors and the assign.
ment of responsibility for each sector.
Coordination of the employment of all available
weapons within the DSA.
Establishment of a mobile reserve. ( Resmwe pri
marily made up of clerks from division and at.
tsched unit administrative personnel. )
Application of passive defense measures such
as dispersion, camouflage, concealment, blackout,
and construction of fox holes.
t NLMY

b
t%~,,
F&-
05AQ.,
?
r AsB:gr
@
@@l@
t2i3
OIV{S(CW SEIWCE Af?EA
OIAGRAM
DIVISIONALSERVICE ANDSUPPORT ARE45
260
(SCHEMATIC- NOT TO SCALE I
The DSA is organized for all-around defense.
Organic weapons of all elements within the area are
accordingly sited. Elements of the antiaircraft ar
tillery battalion, attached to the division, should be
made available for air and ground defense. The DSA
reserve is promptly employed to prevent penetration
of the area and furnishes armed escort for train
movements when enemy raiding parties have suc
ceeded in penetrating the division position.
Under certain conditions of operation it may be
necessary to locate the DSA at such distance from
the combat units as to preclude e?ose support by unit
and service trains. When such conditions exist a
Support Area is designated. The Support Area may
be defined as a temporary advanced service area, in
termediate between the DSA aud front line troops,
from which essential unit train and division service
elements operate in close support of combat. When
feasible, it is located near tbe reserve for incidental
protection. Because the elements operating from the
Support Arsa furnish service and support CO all
combat units along the front of the division, this
area ebould be located centrally with respect to the
division front. When the tactical situation requires
that the division reserve be located toward a flank, it
may be necessary to provide a small detachment from
that reserve to provide additional security for the
Support Area. Division service installations which
may be located in the Support Area are the division
ammunition office, the clearing station, and division
[iumps and distributing points. Personnel carriers of
the motorized division are available for prompt use
when located in the Support Area.
Certain unit ~ehicles operate with their units dur
ing combat and are always retained in the unit area,
for immediate use, under direct control of unit com
manders. These are primarily weapons carriers, com
mand and reconnaissance, communication and am
munition vehicles. Remaining unit vehicles serve
their units from positions in the rear, and are classi
fied for convenience as A and B train vehicles.
A Trains cmwist of those unit tram vehicles and
personnel required for immediate combat. The fol
lowing types are included:
Ammunition (additional ).
Maintenance (2d echelon as needed).
Medical (unit).
FueI and lubicants.
The number of A train vehicles and personnel is
nut a fixed quantity. Each situation will generally
dictate the amount of immediate support required.
A train vehicles and supporting detachment of the
division supply and service units are grouped within
the Support Area when established.
B Trains consist of all ant? train vehicles and
personnel not required for immediate support of
combat. They are placed under division control in the
DSA prior to combat and are released to units as
required. Usual B train vehicles are kitchens, bag
gage trucks, and administrative vehicles.
Communications are requisite to the successful
functioning of the system. It is contemplated that the
primary plan for communications, in the functioning
3$
. .
MILITARY REVIEW
of the I)SA, will revolve around the facilities of the
port and per~onnel not essential to immediate com
rear echelon of division headquarters. Supplemen.
hat, thereby permitting greater freedom of maneu.
tary communications must of course be improvised
ver for combat units, and to coordinate security and
from signal equipment organic with units occupying
provide closer control for unit trains and elements
the DSA.
of the division rear echelon. The forward area must
Bear in mind that the general scheme outlined be kept clear of impedimenta not immediately con-
above is designed to clear the forward area of trans-
tributing to combat.
Antisubmarine Command
[Thin m a dlgezt of
April 1943.]
Pr ominent m t he Umt ed Nat Ions fwo
Yr am t o CO.t r Ol and elkmnat e submar ine
act ivuy ,s a r ecent ly announced com
ponent of t he Ar my AiI For cest he
Ant lsubnmr me Command,
Th,s command m t he only .mt of t he
AAF wlt hm Unlt e<i St at es cont inent al
limm+ havm~ a ma,or oper at ional mis
~,o, O, !C,hot ,ng job ,, J t s cr ews pat r ~l
all coast al wat er s and escor t nler chant
sh!ps humh eds of miles out mt o t he sea
1 t he offenswe aEamst U.boat s t hey me
ot only Pr nne at t ache!s but .wve a%
t he eye. and ear s for Amer ican sur fac.
vessels. Squadr ons of t he A.t isubmar me
Command also oper at e over seasin any
Par t of t he wor ld wher e ene,y sh, n,av
be found.
Dest myuw enemy submar mes fr om
t he air by land-based planes M definit ely
a development of t hm war The J ob It self
IS not ver y spect acular . Tedious pat r ol,
condur t ed for long hour s, %s t be mam
wmk of ant isubmar ine sq.adt ons, wit h
occasional bllr st s of fast and fur ious ac
t ion m which a plane has only J O t o G9
seconds t o accomplish t he sinking of a
sub.
Or igin of t he command dat es back t o
t he begmnir ux of t he war . On 8 December
1941 t he Fr ost Bomber Command began
oper at ions wit h t he f4.vy against enemy
submar mw off t he East er n coas t. A few
mont hs lat er , oper at mnal cont r ol of t he
Fr ost Bomber Command n,as pl.ced un
der t he Navys East er n Sea F] .nt l+r
and Gulf Sea Fr ont ier .
In t he four mont hs following Pem1
Har bor t he 1 Bomber Command ad
Naval amcr aft cooper at ed unt h shxps t o
pr ot ect unescor t ed mer chant vessels fr om
submar ine at t acks off mu East er n mast .
Finally, I Apr il 1942 t he Navy st ar t ed
an m t ,cle by t .ieut enat COloel C.A. Bur r ows in Ai, Fw W,
ewmt mg cm.t al convoys. wit h air es..
m, t s cent , nt ng, kpeam.bile, all oper a
t icms cot ,ued t o expand and, , Ot t o.
her 1942, t he At isubnmr ie C.mma<l
was for med vnt h t he Fir st Bomber Cor n.
nmnd as a .mles. The new and ekir ged
or can,zat mn w,, pr epar ed t o opew.t e o
a wor k-wide scale,
W,t hin t be Ct ,r emand t her e ar e a n u m.
h e, f W,nzs, wh,ch, fm t be pur pose of
,,w, vlllg complet e lt elhgece and op?,.
at mnal dat a, coor dinat e t heir pat r ol ar ea,
At ?Ie.et , planes of t he Ant ,submar ie
Command ar e coor dinat ed wit h t he ant ,.
suhn,ar , e oper a.t m of t he East er n Sea
F, ont ,ev, t he Gulf Sea Fr nt ier , ad t be
B, it lsh Coast al Command. Ot hm wir s
of an enlavged Ant isuhmane fomnmnd
car r y t he fight t o U-boat s wber t wer t hev
.. be found ,. t he wmkl.
The lob of t r ack,g ad locat ing subs
,> a J ow t .+- Sight ings fr om nmy
sozces ., e compiled t o give a complet e
Pict Ll, e of t be submar ine menace
Pat r ols m an ar ea of mor e t han a mil
lmn wwar e mdm ar e d,, eet ed fmm CO.
t r ol Iooms m New SoYk, M,ami, ad
ovet seas cent er s, 1 t hese moms lar pe
st affs of A, my, ~. ~, ad Alhed mm.
mumcatm experts, and plot t er s, mt eUl
gen~e .ffice~s Leceive and evaIuat e r e
por t s of U-boat s sight ed, Her e cont r ol.
ks gwe t he qu,ck or der s ,,h,cb wd
a,r claft and aal VeSSdS t o t he at t ack.
Somet mm messages aouncuxg sight .
,ngs pr ove t o be duds. HmveveI, t be
Navy and t he Ant isubmar ine Command
ar e car eful t o evaluat e a message befor e
wast ing manpower and equipment o
what might pr ove t o be a wdd Eoose
CIr ase.
E%pemence has shown t hat sbr mwie
cr ews fear air cr aft . They will t ake t heir
chances maneuvevimg wit h sur face cr aft ,
bt duck .der wat er if t hey see an a,,,.
plane m t r ee. Ad t hey geer a,lly st ay
udm if t hey know air planes ar e in t he
vicinit y However , o r ar e omasmm .,,
cr aft ar e t ir ed up. by t he guns of t be
U-boat s wbo t he submer ge aft er t be
plane has passed over headif t he plane
hasnk alr eady done t be submer ging joh
The t ouqh aspect of submar ine fight .
mg is t he flying day-aft er -day, i .11
kinds of weat her ad over wide st r et ches
of cold, t r ewher o, wat er . The st r a~
of t b,s sor t of wor k ,, bar d t o mea.,,,
01 dmar dy, t he aver age aw cr ew un
t r ained in spot t ing an ob~ect in t he wat [ r
will miss see,g scmet b,g act ually m
t he sur face. Thw happens for a number
of r easons. It may he because of t he
manner in wbwh t he sur face m ,waned
or because of a t ype of eye fat ,gw t hat
fails t o we what is in t he field of vIsm,
or because wba.t is seen fads t o r e~>st cr
. t he msciosess of t he per son r eal,.
nw t he obser vat ion.
1. or der t o r educe t o a mminm] t be.e
and ot her fact or s t hat t ended t o make
submar ine bombing fr om a,r cr aft i t he
ear ly days an ext ~emely hazar dous m,.
der t akmg, t he .4nt isubmar ie Command
has set p a spec,al t r aining pr ogr am
The pr oper met hod of s,mwmig t he ho, r
zon, t be cor r ect manw of dmpp, ng
bombs and ot her inst r uct ion m t act m
and t echnique ar e t aught by a wqadnm
skdl.d , t he business of tracking down
subs, When t he Ant isbinar me Cm,,.
mand r ecewes pilot s, m.pdot s, naw.
gat or s, bombar dier s, Fad,. operators ,
gunners , and engineer s fr om Ar my Air
For ce Schools. t hey am inuned,at elY
gwen t his addmional t r aining. Fmm t b,s
schoohng a new t ype of combat cr ew is
cr eat ed which is highly skilled m giv
ing t be business t o enemy U-boat s.
34
Defense of a River Line
COLONEL S. T. SUTTON, ln~ant yy
Inst r uct or , Command and Gener al St aff School
A
STUDY of milit ar y oper at ions dur ing t he past
t wo or t hr ee year s would pr obably lead t he
casual r eader to believe that a defense of a
~]ver~ine is not very much stronger than any other
type of defense.
Certainly there is some ground for this trend of
thought as many examples of successful attacks of
river line defenses are to be found while few ex
amples of successful defense of river lines exist.
The Germans were not stopped by rivers in Western
Europe nor in the Russian campaign until they
reached the Volga. The Japanese in the Far East
have certainly been successful in their attacks on
river defenses in China, Malaya, and Burma.
However, a river does not simplify the task of the
attacker. We know that even the smallest stream
(an constitute an obstacle and depending upon
the degree to which the defender has organized the
position, the more difficult the obstacle.
What, then, is the explanation of these unsuc
cessful attempts to defend river lines?
Instead of attempting to answer this question, let
us look into the tactical features of the defense of a
river line. With these in mind, perhaps some of
the reasons for the many unsuccessful river line de
fenses we know of will be made plain.
We will limit ourselves to the defense of wide,
unfoldable rivers, such as tbe Missouri or the Hud
son and not smalI streams 75 or 100 yards in width
like the Marne or some of our smaller streams shown
m the Gettysburg maps we are all familiar with.
Wide unfordahle streams restrict movement and
maneuver. The attacker must have special training
and equipment if he is able to negotiate the crossing
in tbe face of hostile resistance. Likewise, the de
fender will have to make special preparations, both
Iwtical and technical.
When is it possible to use a river as an obstacle
in front of your main battle position?
In the first place, adequate forces must be avail
able to conduct a defense along the entire stretch
of river line to be held. The Russians used this type
of defense and bad the necessary manpower to cover
wide stretches of river front and even then all they
accomplished was delay because the Germans wel e
able to force crossings in many places and the Rus
sians had to withdraw to new positions.
In using this type of river line defense, the bulk
of the troops are assigned to the main battle posi
tion with reserves fairly close to the river. The
enemy must be stopped at the river for if crossings
are forced at one or more points the defense has
failed.
Another type of river line defense is that in front
of a river such as the Russian defense at Stalingrad.
This type generally indicates that the offensive
is to be resumed at some time or other. This was
done at Stalingrad and all during the siege of that
rity the Russians were able to supply the defending
forces by sending mat&iel across the Volga River
although in some sections of the city they only held
a strip a few hundred feet wide on the west bank of
the ri~,er.
Another type of river line defense and the one
most common is that of defensive-offensive action..
One reason that it is the most frequently used i~
that it can be used with fewer troops than can th~
other types mentioned. The mere fact that we go on
the defensive impties that at that particular time
we are weaker than the enemy. The principle of
economy of force requires that we use a minimum of
men in the accomplishment of a mission and here
01 Man River may well become our able au; and,
by carefully planning our defense, we will be able,
with a minimum force, to hold a long stretch of

river.
The principle that a defense must have depth,
flexibility, mobility, and aggressiveness applies in
the river line defense just as in any other defensive
situation.
Depth is necessary to prevent the loss of the posi
tion in case a crossing is forced. Obviously, if we
put all we have right along the rivers edge, the eo
emy will find it extremely difficult to cross, but once
a crossing is forced at any point he can concentrate
his firepower and manpower on that point and get a
large force across, and we will have nothing in rear
to oppose him.
The defense must be ffetible and mobile as tbe two
go hand in hand. They enable us to shift our strength
rapidly from quiet areas to those that are in danger.
Since in the attack the enemy bas the initiative, he
can choose the place and time of his mai~ effort. Our
defense will have to he adapted to his actions. Of
course we can attempt to deceive him as to where
our strongest defense is located in order to influence
his decision or we may, from our own terrain esti
mates and reconnaissance, figure out likely crossing
places where he would be liable to attempt to force
a crossing. Many commanders have failed in the
defense of a river line because they knew when and
35
I
MILITARY REVIEW
where t!re enemy would cross, or thought they knew,
only to tind that the enemy did not agree w,ith them
either as to time or place. A clever enemy, and we
must admit that our present enemy is no fool, will
,in all probability plan crossings at several places at
!,
once hut will not divulge his main effort until he has
, ,<
/
a chance to study the reaction of the defender.
The necessity for aggressiveness is self-explana
tory. A passive defense behind a river in modern
war has proven a failure many times in Europe.
The French thought they were safe behind the Rhine
but were overrun in a short time. The Belgian
Fortress of f?ben Emael was thought to be im.
pregnable but lasted only a few hours under de
termined attack.
Some of the attacking force is bound to get across
the river in spite of all the defender can do, so the
use of fairly large mobile reserves is indicated in
order to counterattack and drive out or annihilate
any force which penetrates your position.
A successful defense may be maintained behinda
river line provided the commander employs all his
reconnaissance agencies to the maximnm in order to
kesp informed of the enemys actions, provided he
occupies and organizes disposition wisely, and keeps
knowledge of this organization from the enemy, and
provided that he has a strong mobile reserve which
can be used against the enemys main attack when
it develops: in effect, while he has one foot on the
enemys side of the river and the other on his own.
Functions of Engineers in a Breakthrough
Engineer dut ]es m a br eakt hr ough OII
er at i.n ar e especmlly heavy ad dnwion
engineer s should, t he! efove, be r ein
for ced k,y at t achment s of combat en.
.@FW unit s fr om t he cor ps. In add,t ion,
cor ps and ar my engineer s may t ake over
engmeev wor k m t he r ear ar eas as far
for wat d as possible wit hout encr oaching
upon t he command pr er ogat wes and t he
r equnement s for coor dinat ion by t be
fr ont -line dlvismn commander
The pnmpal funct ions t o he per
for med by t he division engineer s ( r ei
nfor ced) Pr om t o and dur ing t he at t ack
mar be list ed as follows:
a. Reconnaissance pat r ols t o de.
t er mlne t he nat ur e and ext ent of en.
mny for t ificat ion wit h a view t o pr e
Pa~lnE appr opr iat e nleans and select
,g appr opr iat e point s for t be br each
ing of obst acles.
b. Assignment of engineer ult s t o
make t he imt ial br each of obst acles
cover ing t he enemy main line of r esis.
t ance.
c. Engineer unit s t o accompany t ank
nIt s t o assist t hem m t he passage of
obst acles which can be expect ed t o be
encount er ed wit h,n t he enemy posit ion
and r ear ar eas.
d. Enguwer unit s t o accompany t he
assault ing infant r y element s and as.
sist in t he locat ion, mar king, and pas.
sage of obst acles which may bold p
t he infant r y.
e. Engmeemr element s t o follow up
t he infant r y at t ack and make a mom
ewewve sear ch of t be enemy posi.
t ,. , or der t o locat e sd mar k all
nue fields ad cleat passages for
wheeled s u pply vehicles and ot her
t r oo~.
f, En.gmem n~t s t o per for m t be
no, nml mar ar ea ser v,ces ic.ludlg
r naint emwe and r epa]r of mad?, ad
especially r einfor cement ad r econ.
st r uct mn of br idges topr omde for t be
:G::::!is::i:i
spec,al ,t ems such as bangalor e t o?.
pedoes.
Tbe engineer umt s which accompany
t anks must , if possible, be pr ovided wit h
ar mor ed half-t r ack per sonnel car r ier s in
or der t hat t hey may pass t hr ough diUi
clt t en-am ad ar eas swept hy t he fir e
of enemy small ar ms.
The employment of t be engineers in
such a oper at ion is closely t ied in ur it h
t he employment of all t be ot her element s
of t be dnwaon so t hat it is essent ial t hat
t he div>sion engineer keep himself con
st ant ly infor med of t he plans of t he di
vision cmmnader and of commander s of
lower nit s, especially of t hose of in
fant r y and t ank unit s. In addit ion, he
must keep t hese commander s infor med
of t be r esult s of t he engineer r econnais
sance since t he ir plans will he consider .
ably influenced by t his mfor mat im
Whew a at r ogly or ganized pomt io i,
t o he passed t hr ouzh, engineer r econ.
namsanc. will have t o he conduct ed over
a per md of sever al .ig_ht s m or der t
gain t he mfor mat lon essent ial for t he
success of t be oper at ion.
In p, ovidinq engineer unit s t o accom
pany t anks, t be t y?e of men r equir ed
ar e t hose wit h special skdl m t be hand.
h.g of demoht io equipment and pioneer
t ools, and special t r ammg m r ecognizing
ad deah.g wit h all t ypes of enemy
mmes. In addit ion, a few engineer ofi
cer s and noncommissioned officer s may
be cmr ied in leadlng t anks in or der t hat
t hey may be available for quick r econ
naissance and est imat es of t he sit uat ion
which will enable t hem t o expedit e t he
engineer wor k.
Engineers at t ached t o t he t anks wdl
nor mally r ide wit h t he t anks t hr ough
gaps in fr ont line obst acles whkb have
been cr eat ed by ot her engineer unit .
The oper at ion m clear ing obst acles m
t he enemy r ear ar eas must be char act m.
ized by gr eat speed and audacit y since,
>f t he enemy is given t ime t o or ganize
hls defense of t hose obst acles, t he t ank
at t ack WX1l pr obably bog dom and an
infant r y at t ack will be r equir ed befor e
t he obst acle can he clear ed and t he ad.
vance cont inued.( Fr om b Hell-Bug
gies and t he Engineer in The Militmu
Engineer Mar ch le4S.)
S6
Armored Field Artillery in Combat
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JULIAN H. BAUMAN, Field A~tillery
Instructor, Command and GenemI St aff School
ROLE OF THE ARMOREEARTILLERY
division, we say that artillery is never held in reserve,
T
HE TASKS of the field artillery in the armored
division can best be understood if you will look
at the table of organization of the division. You
wilI be impressed with the large number of cannon
that are in the division. In fact, tbe armored division
is really a cannon division. Most of these cannon are
intended primarily to be used as direct-fire weapons,
and a large part of them are mounted on the tanks.
These tank weapons are backed up by the assault
guns and mortars. Close behind this array of
cannon the division field artillery provides the mcMs
ed fires to neutralize hostile opposition that cannot be
readily overcome by direct laying methods. The ar
tillery can mass its fires only when operated as bat
teries and far better when operated as battalions.
To break it down and employ it as individual pieces
merely adds a small number of weapons to the al
ready large number of direct-firing guns. It prevents
the artillery from massing its fires and deprives the
commander of the great tfexibiIity of fire that is in
herent in the arm and that has been built in at such
a great price expressed in training time. Let me im
plore you, therefore, if you are ever in authority to
think twice before breaking an artillery battalion in
to batteries, and to think ten times before breaking
down a battery into individual pieces. It is better to
use some of your tanks or assault guns for such mis
sions.
GENERAL TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
The battalion is the basic tactical and fire unit.
IYhen one battalion comp6ses the artillery of a com
bat command, tbe artillery battalion commander be
comes the combat command artillery officer. Lia@on,
e}ther personal or by means of a liaison officef, s
maintained at the combat command post. At ti 28
t~~o or more battalions are made part of a combkt
command. In this case the division artillery com
mander can be sent to the command to take over the
artillery, or the senior battalion commander can act
in that capacity. It is considered better to send the
division artillery commander because tbe bulk of the
art dlery is now with the combat command and also
because a battalion commander has enough to do in
running his own battalion.
In this connection, let me remind you again that
th,: organization of the combat command is very flexi
ble and one command might have two artillery bat
talions now, but a few minutes later another com
mand would have the two battalions. In an infantry
l\ In an armored division it is held in reserve @ times,
! but only long enough for the division commander to
determine where he can best employ it. It is not held
in reser~re in the same way that an armored or in
fantry battalion is held.
, ,-r
+
OFFENSIVE COMBAT
Tbe pr imar y r ole of an ar mor ed division is offen
sive combat . It act s wit h speed and boldness, seeking
out t he host ile soft spot s and t hen st r iking suddenly.
Ar mor ed ar t iller y is or ganized, equipped, and t r ained
t o assist t hat t ype of act ion.
CL. March.-The division is organized into combat
commands and division troops for marches. Gen
erally one battalion will be with each major subdivi
sion. The artillery should march well to the front.
To be more sp+wific, there are several places it can
be placed:
1. Entire battalion immediately in rear of the
advance gnard. ,
.%.In the space between the tail of the advance
guard and the head of the main body.
$. One battery at tail of advance guard and re
mainder of battalion with main body.
4. Entire battalion at bead of main body.
There is little choice between these methods. I
personally believe that at the head of the main body
is best; however, take your choice. The important
thing is to have it well UP where it can be used early
in the action to cover the development ef the main
body.
37
MILITARY REVIEW
b. Meettng engagement.When the advance guard
is slowed down by hostile action, the artillery bat
talion quickly occupies position with one or more
batteries to assist in orereoming the resistance. The
number of batteries that are emdaced initiallv de
i M ,pends on tbe speed with which the advance guard can
: } continue its advance. Tbe slower the advance the
more batteries emplaced. As the advance guard con
tinues, it is supported by advancing batteries by leap
frogging them forward. An artillery observer is
always with the leading elements of the advance
guard. !Ie calls for fire in accordance with tbe needs
and desires of the advance guard commander. 1f tbe
hostile resistance stiffens and the column tom.
mander, acting either under mission-type orders or
as the result of a specific order for tbe division com
mander, decides to attack, tbe artillery gives close
support in the initial stages of the attack. An artil
lery preparation may precede the attack. At any
rate, the artillery will cocer the development. Once
the attack is launched, fires will be observed concen
trations delivered on hostile resistance holding up our
advance. These in most cases will originate with the
,artillery forward observers. The minimum number
of observers that must be out is one for each armored
or infantry battalion engaged. 1n most cases there
will be many more. Even though there is no artillery
observer near you, there is no excuse for you to be
without artillery support if you need it. Every offi
cer in an armored division mmt know how to adjust
artillery on targets of opportunity. The artillery has
develnped a very simple system of ad Iusting fire on
targets, a system that can be understood and applied
by anyone after an hours study. This is explaine{i in
FM 17-62. If You understand this s?st~nl YOUneed
never be without artillery support. If you become
confused and forget the exact commands that are
supposed to be used, just tell the artillery in your
own words what is wanted and they still will be able
to deliver the tires. Of course the latter method is
wasteful of ammunition, but if you can do no better
get the fire some way-that is the important thing.
As the attack progresses, batteries of the battalion
will be displaced forward frequently. New positions
ire boldly occupied close up on tbe leading wave of
tanks. Artillery stay close up behind the attacking
tanks, not only to insure better artillery support,
easier control, and simpler communication, but also
to minimize the inter fe~ence of enemy WWUPS which
the tanks have not been able to overcome.
After reaching the objective, or even before, it will
be necessary for the attacking units to occupy a rally
ing point in order to reorganize. At this time armored
units are most vulnerable. The artillery should be in
a position to protect the reorganization. At this stage
its fires will be in the nature of defensive tires in
cluding normal barrages.
c. A ftack against a j ortified yosition.h this type
of action, armored divisions will be used as an en
veloping force to atrike the hostile troops from the
rear while they are contained on the front by in.
fantry units, or the front will be ruptured by in
fantry divisions and the armored divisions only tom.
mitted to action after the infantry units have gotten
through the hostile organized defensive area. In the
first case, that is, the envelopment, the armored ar
tillerY is used as was described in the meeting en
gagement. In the latter case, that is, the penetration,
initially the armored division artillery will have a
minor role, if it fires at all. The preparation and
fires in support of the infantry division attack will
be coordinated by the corps artillery officer.
If the armored artillery is used during this phase
it must be released early enough to accompany the
armored elements when they advance.
After the hostile fortified area has been penetrated
and the time has come for the armored division (s)
to move forward, the artillery should move in rear
of the leading tank waves and should remain mobile
just as long as possible, the armored ftmmation get
ting artillery support initially from the artillery of
the infantry divisions that were used in the early
attack. The armored artillery should occupy positions
only when it is necessary to do so in order to assist
the tmk battalions which have run into opposition
that threatens to hold them up. The whole idea of
employment of armored artillery is to start it out
initially well forward in the formation and keep it
mobile as long as possible in order to be sure to have
tbe necessary artillery support for tanks after they
have gotten deep in the hostile position and run into
serious resistance.
d. Defwwe.-The primary role of the armored di
vision M offensive. In the defense its usual em
ployment is as a large counterattacking unit for tbe
higher headquarters. In such a role the division is
employed as in any other attack, and of course the
artillery will follow the methods that we have just
discussed.
There may come a time when the armored divi
sion does have to occupy a defensive position. In this
case it is customary to use the armored infantry regi
ment to occupy defensive areas, and the tanks are
used as a counterattack force. In this case the artil
lery should be in position to support the infantry but
with plans prepared to assist the counterattacks
when launched. The employment of the artillery to
support the infantry follows the same methods a+
when an infantry division is on the defense.
EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS AS ARTILLERY
As has been point ed out , t he ar mor ed division has
many cannon. The ar mor ed unit s ar e t r ained t o de
liver fir e pr imar ily by dir ect laying. However , t hey
do r eceive t r aining in simple indir ect met hods. As
a r esult of t his t he ar mor ed unit s ar e capable of as
sist ing t hemselves by massing fir es. . Reser ve t ank
bat t alions ar e par t icular ly capable of r ender ing t his
38
ARMORE bFIELD ARTILLERY IN COMBAT
assistance. Another time that tanks may be used to
tire artillerj-type missions is prior to the attack:.
say, during the preparation. What has been said ap
plies equally well to tbe assault guns and even to at
tached tank-destroyer units. Whkn using these weap
ons, consideration must always be given to ammuni
t ion supply.
TARGETS
The worst enemy of the tank is the antitank gun.
The mission of armored artillery like any other ar
tillery is to assist its supported unit in accomplish
ing its mission. Since armored units are employed
primarily in the attack, tbe primary mission of ar
mored artillery is to silence the hostile anti ank
*
guns. There will be other missions that it way and
shou!d be assigned, but above all it should always re.
member that if it knocks out the antitank guns our
tank attacks have a much better chance of success.
With its curved trajectory weapon it is far better
equipped to cope with the antitank gun than is the
tank itself.
Hitlers Bodyguard Battalion
[Tr anslat ed at t he Command and Gener al St aff School, For t Leavenwor t h, Kansas.
fr om a Ger man ar t icle m Die Weh rmacht 23 December 1942. ]
on 28 Decmnber 1939, t he Fuhr er ,s Bodyguar d Et at t al,on
was for med under t he command of t he fut ur e hem of Afr ica,
GGer al Rmmnel, for t he milit ar y s ecu r it y of t he Fiihr er k
headquar t er s and t he gener al pr ot ect ion of t he Fuhr er h,m
.elf Thus, above all ot her s, t he Fuhr er s Bodyguar d Bat
t ahon was given t he r espons,biht y of pr ot e.t mg t he Rr eat est
t , casur e of t he Ger man peoplet he Fuhr er fr om all har m.
Since t hat t xme t he companies of t hm hat t ahon have ac
companied and pr ot ect ed t heir spt eme commander cm mar .y
t j ,PS t o t he f, ont bot h in t he west and m t he east , and have
,It bchar ged t hem d, ffi.ult and glomous t ask w~t h t he gr eat est
.dmt ness. Under t heir pr ot ect mn t he Fuhr er has been able
t o pur sue hM st r enuous labor s in peace and t o lead t he Ger
man ammes . fr om vmt o,y t o vict or y, sur r ounded by his
fomhfu] soldler s who ar e always r eady for act ion.
The me ar e chosen fr om t he G, os s deuts chlcz nd infant r y d]
vt . mn and wb,le t hey ar e employed as an independent hat
t dbo, t hese bat t le. t est ed t r oops of t he Fuhr er s Bodyguar d
B,at t ahon have never lost cont act w,t h t he fr ont Officer s,
n,mcommlssioned officer s, and men fr equent ly change places
!, ~t h men fr om t he Gromdw ts chland infant r y dlvlslon and
, mr n t o t he fr ont for t he oppor t unit y of pr oving t hen)
M%s, m t he face of t he enemy, wor t hy of ser ving m t he
Fubr er ,s Bodyguar d Bat t alion.
Dur ing t he cour se of t he past wint er , on or der s fr om t he
F,,hr e t ., a combat gr oup was for med out of t he Bodyguat d
B.,t t ahon and employed m t he nor t her n sect or . Ther e, in
m:,ny bat t les, t he gr oup has added t o t he glor y of t he gr ena
d,cr s of t he Grms dads chl.nd infant r y dwismn.
r he par t icular dut ies of t he Fubr er ? Bodyguar d Bat t ahon
demanded a mque or ganizat ion such as is found in no ot her
ho ,y of t r oops in t he Ger man Ar my. Almost all t ypes of
a, ,,,s ar e r epr esent ed in t he bat t ahon-bght and heavy m
fmt r y wt %pons, ar mor ed scout ing car s, t anks, t he light ar my
A ,, cannon, t be best and most moder n weapons t hat t he
FI brer has Siven t o t he Ger man ar med for ces in accor dance
w,. h t he pr mc,ple of t he best ar ms t o t he best soldier s.
FI,Ily nmtmw?d and par t ly equipped wit h t he peoples car
wh,cb bas pr oven It s wor t h in all t heat er s of oper at ion, t he
F~,hr t @s Bodyguar d Bat t alion is r eady at any hour for ac
t mm It is highly mobile in any t er r ain and because of it s
excdent ar mament and equipment it possesses nusal eom
hat power . For )t IS t he highest aim of t he bat t alion, be
sides t he fulfihnet of ]t s fa,t hfl gmd ad secnt y ser vice,
t o ht . r eady at all t nnes ot only t o r epel bnt t o defeat and
ann,hdat e any enemy who may at t ack. The knowledge of t he
h,gh r espcmmb,bt y ad significance of t hk t ask is possessed
hy ~r er y $oldiel of t he bat t alion. Each one knows t hat at any
moment he may have t o Rive bls hf e m t his smvice.
Thus t he ser vme m t he Fhr er ,s Bodyguar d Bat t alion m
a wr v,c, of t he gr eat est honor f,w wh,ch only t hat per son ,s
called who has shown himself wor t hy of lt as a soldier . Of
con] se t he ckuly ser vice cannot be compar ed wit h t he fight ing
of our infant , y m t he fr ont lines. Rt i t he hour of da~er
t he mdiv,du ai t ight er M of mor e impcmt ace her e t han in
any ot hel place. Hence a pr oving per iod at t be fr ont M ohm
ously a r eqir emet for member ship i t he Fubi-er,s Body
guard Battalion The many wear er s of high, and even t he
h,ghest , decor s.t ios i t he r anks of t he bat t alion t est ify t o
t he spir it of t he f, ont line soldier who in t his place is in his
best place of dut y.
But honor and dmmct m come t o t be sold,er of she
Fhr ms Bodyguar d Bat t alion in ot her ways t oo. He plays
his par t m t he gr eat event s of t his, t he gr eat est of all war s,
m t he places of gi-eat eat decisions. He par t icipat es in gr eat
hist or ical event s at t he Ft ihr er s beadquar t em on t he occa
kon of Vlslt s of t he Ieadlng Ger man jwr soalit ies ad also
t hose of fr iendly st at es. Mdlions envy him t he good for t une
of being able t o see hls Fuhr er m per son, t o mmness how he
labor s day and mght w,t hout r est or r epose for t he welfar e
of t he Ger man people. All t hese t hings for m ineffaceable im-
PI essions t hat will st ay wit h bim his whole life long.
Thelmfor e, ser vice m t he Fubr er s Bodyguar d Bat t alion
m one of t he gr eat est honom t hat a soldier can have. To b~ a
soldler m t be Fuhr er s Bodyguar d Bat t alion means being t he
pick of t he ar my.
In accor dance wlt b t he will of t be Fuhr er , t he 1st r egiment
of t he Gros s dents chlancl in~nt r y dur ision has been given t he
appelat lon of G! omdeutschland Gr enadier Regiment .
To be one of t he Fuhr er s gr enadier s m his bodyguar d bat .
t alion is a hwh ?mblt ion which must st and out br ight ly be
for e t he eyes of t he Ger man soldier .
.
39
Rangoon Falls
COLONEL ADRIAN ST. J OHN, Chemical Warfare .%rvice
Inst r uct or , command
,,
! :7,
The writer was in corn mand of fJ.S,.Ckina
Lease-Lexd functions in Rangoon and on the
Burma Road, including Mundalau.
THE EDITOR.
T
HIs 1S NOT one of t hose Public Relat ions seen.
ar ios wr it t en t o glor ify some individual person
or group of men. It is a simple record of facts,
good and bad, miserable in spots and perhaps hum
. orous in others. It has an educational value some
,. where between the lines, but real military education
; is hidden and never can be just absorbed from num
bered paragraphs in field manuals.
i..
;,
It is diflkmlt to paint a word picture of the ~ity of
Rangoon and its vital importance. And yet tbe reader
must conceive that picture before he cm understand
this article.
Rangoon is situated on an inner bay, with a long
dockage area along the bay and into the mouth of the
1rrawaddy River which is no small stream but navi.
gabIe for 900 miles through the heart of Burma. Itan
goons population ,is about 500,000. To easterners, it
is comparable to Baltimore, the seventh city in size
in the T_nited States with a population of 692,700,
and it is in a similar geographic situation, except
that Baltimore taps many vital areas by rail, whereas
Rangoon must receive 90; of its snpport orer water.
Rangoon had great department stores comparable to
the best in Baltimore, and hotels superior, at least ]n
rooms if not in service. Everything found in any
typical American city of similar size could be fouud
in Rangoon.
Now visualize the removal of everything in Balti
more to, let us say, Albany, N. Y., with all roads de
stroyed except one main highway, with the railroad
and yards knocked out and the bay guarded by enemy
subs and surface vessels. Have YOUthe picture ? What
will the Mayor (or military ) do with his local prison
erb, the zoo animals, the fire department, tbe people
in; hospitals ? I have mentioned only a few odd items,
Never mind the stores and other businesses. That is
simple. Everyone locks the doors and departs. Ships
come in and deposit vast cargo on tbe docks, but it is
left there. No labor to move it, no clerks to receipt for
it, and no place to send it. It is free to the public If
they can come with labor and transportation to move
it.
Some one at this point will remark that it could all
have been moved earlier, but dont forget that there
were very few transportation lanes open, and for the
15 days prior to evacuation, every facility was con
trolled by the military for vital combat supplies. Your
. 40
>,
,,
and Gener al St aff School
1,
auto and your truck? You turned it in for tbe corn.
mon good and then you started walking.
The events leading up to the evacuation of Ran
goon will be briefly described, skirting tactical ef.
forts and failures. This is not a criticaI article and
it is not written in tbe manner of playing the faot
ball game from the grandstand, or alibiing the golf
game in the locker room. The British fought a mag
nificent battle all the way up the .Malay peninsula.
The Japs plodded along with a slow steady rhythm
until about 12 miles south of Moulmein (see map).
In this action they had superior stre@h and SU.
perior equipment for jungle fighting. The Japs had
complete air superiority, in fact the RAF seldom
entered the land combat even for reconnaissance.
Tbe American Volunteer Group was a Chinese unit,
operated by Americans in the pay of China, so their
duty was to protect Chinese interests in Rangoon
and along the Burma Road and they surely did a
superior Job.
Because of the complete lack of air support, the
Japs knew every move made by the British and
could plan accordingly. Military movements in jungle
fighting are slower than in desert fighting, and so
advance information is more definite and twice as
valuable. The Japs knew that the British were plan
niug On a defeuse line behind the river and salt
marshes at ?Joulmein, About 10 or 15 miles south of
t h!s defense line they threw in everything in rapid
aggressive action. Small groups of 8 tO 20 me tried
to sneak through all along a broad front. When this
infiltration was successful, the groups assembled at
predetermined rendezvous points and formed rear
assault forces. Other rear forces were sent around
by boat.
After the 10SSof Moulmein and the defense of the
Salween river line, the British kept swinging their
defense positions parallel to the river linesin other
words they were locating defense areas in corridors
rather than across corridors. They were not disposed
for carrying out the basic mission which, at that
time at least, was a defense of Rangoon, the Burma
Road, and the river and railroad lines northward
into China. Had they swung their line due east and
west the terrain would have been better for defense
and certainly much more difficult to outflank.. Ran
goon never had a chance after Moulmein fell.
At one time just before the action of Toungoo the
British were completely cut off to the northward,
south of the Sittang.Toungoo. Prome line, and it was
only through the action of the tanks th@ they broke
RANGOON FALLS
through and eventually amalgamated with the Chi
nese armies moving in from the north.
For the benefit of tank men, it must be said that
outside of this one operation the tanks and mechan
ized forces were absolutely useless in the entire cam
paign in Burma. They went into action many times
between the Salween and Sittang rivers where the
only terrain for their efficient operation was avail
able. Even here they carried no weight, for the Jap
anese merely evaporated in front of their assanlt
and later reformed behind the tank rendezvous: areas
and caused considerable damage to them. It must be
remembered also that these tank battalions were.
moved from Africa where they had been fighting for
41
MILITARY REVIEW
more than two years and they were no novices to
tank action. According to the British commander
they were from the best units in Africa, under the
theory that they couldnt send very many but they
would send the best.
>
; After the entire front collapsed north of .Manrfa
lay, the terrain forced these tanks to go into action
as defense artillery. That is, they sat on de
fense positions, held as long as possible, and then
retreated to another position. This also is no criti.
cism of the command or use of tanks. That type of
terrain and jungle fighting is no place for mechani
zation; a few mu Ies and horse cavalry would have
more value than any mechanized group. Americans
must not letthew minds go single track on mechani
1zation : the maneuver grounds of North Carolina and
a ~ Louisiana are not the standardized terrain of the en
tire wnrld. We must project rmr minds beyond tbe
\
, ~cdnfines nf army posts and camps, and not go all
ont for any single weapon. No machine ever had the
brains of a man and we must base our fighting on
the human being, aided by machines.
There were many other di~astrous contacts with
the Japar!ese but they can be covered at some other
time when the carnpalgn itself is written LIP. These
remarks in regard to the fighting just north of Ran.
goon me inserted because they have a direct bear.
ing on operations during the last days in Rangoon,
It was stated above that the defense lines were
parallel to the river and not east and west as pro
tective lines for Rangoon. Naturally when these de
f ense lines were tnrned on the north it was expected
that the Japanese would head south and drive di.
rectly into Rangoon. This, however, was not done be
cause the Japanese wisely attempted to dri~,e due east
and bottle the entree British Army in the southern
part of Burma. They knew they could get Rangoon
at any time they desired it. They did partly bottle
the British Army south of Toungoo but as men
tioned before the tanks smashed the bottleneck and
the British Army escaped to the north.
When the defenses in the Pegu area were de
molished. Rangoon itself quit. The Colonial Govern
ment by this time had already departed to the aorth
and about 80), of the British General IIeadqnartem
and all their supplies had beeu transported north to
Thazi and hlandalay or had been destroyed.
Now that the phases of the general tactical sit
uation causing the loss of Rangoon are understood,
let us go back to the early days m that city and
proceed forward to that pal-t in the campaign Just
covered, where the British broke through their en
circlement and started on the second part of the
action, namely the defense of North Burma.
The bad days of Rangoon started about December
16th with the first severe bombing and machine gun
ning. About 15,000 civilians were killed because the
natives were bewildered and stood in masses in the
, ~ squares and streets. There were no bomb-proofs
s 42
available at that time anyway. The next bad air at
tack came as a Christmas present on December 25th.
Many more thousands were killed and the popula
tion was at last educated, The construction of bomb
proof started. Then came another lull in air activi
ties. The AVG and the RAF were in action and they
knocked the Oriental Canaries out of the sky as fast
as they appeared. On January 1st and Zd more heavy
raids came over with plenty of fighter escort and the
city took a heating. From then on there were at least
three attempted raids every 24 hours. The workers
started leaving the city. Stores were closed. The docks
and factories w,ere deserted. But due to our protec
tive air force of AVG and RAF the efficiency of the
raids was greatly reduced, the peopie flocked back to
the city, and some stores opened. The population
grew accustomed to bombing and knew what to do.
Once organized, only a very few casualties resulted.
That condition is an interesting fact on recuperation
by masses when once they gain confidence and edu
cation.
During the early bombings our ships were unload
ing Chinese Lease-Lend military and civilian equip
ment on the docks. The American military mission
was operating three large truck and car assembly
plants in Rangoontwo in the heart of the city and
one in the open fields on the outskirts. Trucks were
coming off the line in rapid, orderly fashion, clearing
the civil demands, and grabbing up dock loads, and
rushing up the Burma Road for China.
There is an interesting fact to note here, and one
from which lessons can be drawn. Our military gov
ernment school would do well to consider it.
Under the British system the Colonial Governor
or representative ruler is snperior to the military
commander, even in a combat zune. He is the direct
envoy from the King, whereas the military are mere
ly representing a department of the government. This
situation exists until the Colonial government gives
UP.
This is different from our American system. The
American-Chinese group operated in the American
fashion and worked directly with British military
commanders, C,eneral Hutton at first and then Gen
era) Alexander (now in Africa), by-passing all gov
ernment rules and edicts. True, all civil institutions
and forces should operate as long as possible, but
the command, control, and operation of them should
come under the military. Peaceful, civilian ways of
life cease when actaal combat hits the area.
Only a little of the havoc wrought by civilian rules
(if followed ) will be covered. In the caee of car and
truck assembly, when trucks were ready to roll from
factory a long standard form had to be completed and
sent in for a Iiceuse. This form was similar to those
made out in this country in peace time. The Chinese
would send over these forms in bulk for cars as
sembled that twenty-four hours, along- with a gov
ernmen~ check to pay for operating the trucks up the
RANGOON FALLS
Burma Raad. Understand that these trucks in the
early days just cleared Burma into China and did
not come back. The trucks were assembled for use
in China.
After the check was received and the form checked,
a civilian otlkial visited the factory, checked engine
numbers: etc., and put a sticker on each engine and
windshield. This procedure, considering the fact that
the plant had to make up the tin license numbers, re
quired a minimum of 5 days. Now-visualize cars be
ing stacked up in the factory yards awaiting nothing
but a paper sticker! And heavy bombing daily to
wipe them out. Naturally the I@ houest solution
wasto bootleg the tin plate numbers and move the
cars. There were no police tocbeck them anyway. To
adjust this matter the Chinese sent a covering check
forevery groupof vehicles as they left the factory.
Details of difficulties are always boring and gen
erally give tbe impression of complaining. This is
not the case here as our own group had the armored
cars, guns, and ammunition, and operated as circum
~tances demanded. However, for information on sim
]Iar situations, one or two other difficulties will be
sketched in brief.
An attempt was made to apply all civilian rules re-
Rarding shipping. Docking was to be regulated
w usual and Iinder, peace time priorities. Gasoline or
oil could not be unkmded on docks even when it was
on hatches which held vitally needed machine guns
nnd ammunition and airplane parts for tbe AVG.
All ammunition and inflammable substances were to
he lightened ii], ar~[iall the lighters were upthelrra
waddy river witb tbousmdsof tons of dynamite des
tined for Chinese railroad construction. This move
it>elf had been instituter tat the request of the Colon-
MI Government. Also, ships could not clear without a
great deal of official red tape of a purely commercial
type. The nice thing abollt all this is that American
ships ~aPtaiIls ,.emained Americaus. They worried
about the commercial red tape but took orders from
the American mission officers, and these orders were
never given without the approval of the Britieh mil
}tary and the port naval authorities. There never was
ally real friction there.
Progress was made slowly from January 1st to
alrmt the 16th. There were 42 ships in the harbor
o!! January 5th, arid 5 were American. For some
rr~son none was ever hit, although the docks were
1) robed and accideatly burned twice.
From about January 16th tothe26th the Japanese
R iios from Thailand broadcast in English and Hin
d,. stanitbat they would take Rangoon between the
2!. hand 26th andcomplete]y demolieh it. Tbe natives
b, ]evedin these broadcasts andthe Buddhist priests
c:, ,ricd along and nursed the idea so that thousands
btxan leaving the city and work was about to stop.
S}.,ce the British Colonial Civil Government had left,
th,. Chinese Lend-Lease group brought in 2,000 semi-
m)!ltary laborers to carry on the work. Efforts had
been made to do this many times before, but it was
strongly opposed by the government and the Chinese
refused to move in without their sanction. Anyway,
with ~merican mechanics and Chinese semi-military
labor, tbe Lend-Lease group continued to function unt
il about February 18th when further work seemed
hopeless.
During this period the American-Chinese teams
assembled about 300 armored cars (used in all later
actions), over 700 jeeps, and on an average of 70
trucks per24 hours. All this in spite of heavy daily
bombing. The railroad, the river, and the road lines
were soon (after about February 5th) open to the
American-Chinese supplies as all the Ftritish army
equipment had been moved northward.
At this time it was clearly evident that the Chi
nese Lease. Lend material could not be moved all the
way from Rangoon to China and the evacuation of
all mat4riel completed, since tbe haul was too great.
From January 26th OU, many decisions were impor
tant and most of those decisions had to be based on
guess-work and luck since there was no such thing as
aviation to gather information and no intelligence
service toassemble or evaluate it, Everyone operated
in the dark so far as the enemy w:as concerned, and
yet at night their radio would tell us what We had
done during tbe day.
As an example of one decision, two ships contain
ing considerable arms and ammunition and parts
needed for the A\rG were permitted to dock, eveu
though this was a heavy gamble since all air units
had departed and rumors reported the Burma Road
closed to Pegu. By tremendous effort one ship was
completely unloaded (after February 15th), with
the exception of heavy rails and other railroad equip
ment in the bold. The deck loads of the oth;r sbip$
were removed and all machine guns and ammunition
and other essential military cargo wasdocked..It was
fortunate that practically all of this matexial was in \
onehold. The gamble was worth it since every bit of
this material eventually reached Lasbio; whether it
later got on into China is not known. Using the river,
railroad, and the Burma Road itself, 17,000 tons per
day were moved from Rangoon to Yamethin (see
map) during this late period.
Tbis deemion to stop, unload, and reload at Yame
thin was strongly contested, but. the fact remains that
tbe solution was successful. In the basic agreement
the Chinese wanted to move every truck and every
ounce of material clear to China, under the theory
that a bird in hand is worth two in the bush. All of
tbeterrain nortbas faras Mandalay is flat: none of
theroad grades would exceed a27 incline. This per-
m~tted 2V-ton trucks to carry from 5 to 7 tons de
pending on bulk. Every truck and every heavy rail
road car was loaded to its full capacity. Truck
springs were wired with two-by-four braces to help
carry some of the weight. Very few of these trucks
had any breakdowns in the body or springs on the
,. 43
MILITARY REVIEW
trip to Yamethin, but a great number of them had
accidents and engine trouble.
The system of moving the cargo was about as fol
lows: A dispatch and control point was built up in
~,>,a large flat area outside the limits of Rangoon. This
~ position was well covered by trees and other foliage
and had good road circuits. Two large groups of
drivers were assembled and temporarily housed and
partly fed there. A simple dispatch system was also
employed. One set of drivers would receive instruc
t ions with the number of cars Just completed and on
the release line at the factory. Drivers would go to
the factory in groups, pick up their trucks (Just as
sembled), drove to the truck destination listed on
their card, pick up the load, and return to the dis
1
patch or staging area on the outskirts of the city.
?
Here they would turn over their truckload to a road
driver already designated to take over. The city
1.. driver would receive another card and repeat the pro.
cess. This method worked very satisfactorily because
the city drivem soon learned tbe dock and city area
and very little time was wasted by lost drivers and
trucks. All of the Burma Road drivers were familiar
With the road and its hazards, and in each convoy
group there were a number of old experienced drwers.
All. truck groups going up the road contained 25 or
more vehicles, and bad a leader and a pay man for
ration money, etc. Sometimes a number of groups
would be sent out at 10-minute intervals, bt USual
lY after three groups there would be a wait of more
than an hour. The dock loading could not keep pace
with the dispatch, even though three dock loading
areas were used.
At Yamethin practically all trucks were unloaded
and returned to the lower circuit in Rangoon. This
gave us not only the trucks that were being assem
bled daily, hut also older trucks to work with. The
second circuit worked from Lashio to Yamethin and
also northward from Lashio to Paschin, Tbe author
ity of the Rangoon group only extended to Mandalay.
Since north of Mandalay there were steep mountain
roads, trucks would naturally have to be loaded to less
than capacity rather than over capacity as on the
lower road, but the entire operation was based on the
theory of rapidity of movement south of Mandalay
and availability of time for more leisurely movement
north of Mandalay. This worked out, because while
the American contingent and tbe last trucks moved
from Rangoon on the night of 26-27 February, the
Yamethin unit had until April to move that same car
go north into China. But naturally no one knew this
at tbe time.
As mentioned before, from January 26th on, work
began to cease as all the laborers were leaving the
city and it was impossible to obtain food and other
supplies. The British were evacuating personnel by
ship to Calcutta. By about 12-15 February the as
sembly plants had almost stopped work. Except for
the American mechanics there were very few native
, :
44
technical men and the few trucks being assembled
were not coming off the line in usable contiltion. The
American mechanics had to recheck and repair them
constantly hefore they could move out of the yard,
and this took them from their supervisory work. The
men were all clamoring for their pay. The labor situ
ation was bordering on revolt; the natives were en
titled to their pay and at liberty to leave the country
if they so desired. Orders were then given for the
plants to fix up pay rolls and cease activities, and the
men were paid off. There were no police or troops
available to guard the pay roll or keep order in tbe
labor lines, so tbe entire American officer personnel
in armored cars performed this duty. Everything can
off in a very orderly manner. There was the usual
bickering about overtime and underpay, but wisely
the p]ant operating personnel had a complaint de
partment and if the claim even had the semblance
of honesty tbe man was paid. This was a good
scheme because that attitude satisfied many of the
key men and they stayed on in the plant, rigged up
a number of partly assembled trucks, and helped
drive them out at tbe last minute to the staging areas.
Every nickel dispersed in this way saved many dol
lars in equipment.
On Washingtons birthday, February 22nd, de
struction of trucks started. By this time all of the
British army with the exception of three officers on
the staff and one transport plane bad departed. All of
the Colonial Government, fire department, police, etc.,
had left the city long before this date. Also all of
the Chinese Lease-Lend authorities had gone north
ward and so had our last load of Lease-Lend material.
There were some Wit isb sentries on the dock areas
protecting a few military supplies which the British
still hoped to move. The last ship load of evacuees
had left the harbor. The natives were going in to all
the stores and taking whatever they deeired and also
removing supplies from the dock. Personnel had been
released from the prisons, and the insane asylums
had been opened up. The reader can well imagine the
havoc that this wrought, with the people already
hungry and badly frightened. On the docks there
were a few hundred cases of wine and whiskey which
some of the natives had broken into and had grown
over-enthusiast ic.
On February 24th and 25th some of the American
group made a reconnaissance north to Pegu on the
Burma Road and were turned back hy the British
holding force south of Pegu with the statements that
the Japanese had already cut across tbe road, that
the fighting was still well to the north, and that ap
parently the Japanese were not going to attack to
ward Rangoon. Information as to whether or not the
road to Prome was open was not available, so the
group returned to Rangoon and that same night, aft
er blowing UP the last Chinese warehouse, moved up
the Prome road and encountered no en~my.
Food was plentiful, for the group had taken ham,
RANGOON FALLS
bacon, che}se, crackers, and cigarettes as well as
many other things from the dock area. In fact the
American group lived better during the next month
than any military personnel in Burma. The first des
tination was Prome asit was decided to check upon
all vehicle columns from Prome northward. But the
stoP in prome was not feasible since there were
thousands of refugees in that area and cholera and
plague had broken out. The reason for the congestion
in Prome was that the best westward trails lead from
Prome into India. Practically all of the American-
Chinese vehicle columns and their loads had reached
north of Pegu before the road was cut, or had taken
the Prome road.
None of the columns was encountered until the
group cut eastward to .Mandalay and sent some recon
naissance south toward Yamethin. The reports
showed very few trucks lost south of Yamethin, and
those were burned and the drivers carried along on
other trucks. Two members of the party were slight
]Y injured by an explosion in one of the buildings dur
ingthedestruetion on the last night. One officer was
m pretty bad shape so the party holed up for the
night at one of the forestry bungalows and took
plenty of time to repair all the damage, check the
cars and the loads, etc. It was thought that we were
now well ahead of the Japanese forces and could af
ford to move at leisure. This was based on tbe fact
that it was assumed even then that the Japanese
army had turned south for Rangoon. As a mat t er
of fact t he par t y was not ver y far ahead of t he J ap
anese advanced unit s which were moving north in
stead of south. On tbe afternoon of the second day
the party started nor.thwm-d again, crossed into Man
dalay, spent some time there in contact with our
American convoy leaders, in conference with the
Burma Oil Company stations, etc., and later that
night reached Maymyo, which a month later was to
be our headquarters when operating with General
St dwell.
The advance headquarters, or really the rear eche
lon of the Rangoon office, had moved out of Rangoon
for Maym yo early in February. All the records, type
umters, and office equipment, except desks, had been
moved. Allourextra officers, civilian girl stenograph-
CM, etc., had been moved at the same time. The Na
tional City Bank records and personnel and the
A man cannot learn his profession
especially for the higher ranks. When
American Consular Office had also been moved dur
ing this period. This had operated on a circuit system
with no waste of truck space.
At Maymyo the new headquarters had been set up
in the Baptist Mksion School area. Motor park, gas
storage, office space, and excellent sleeping rooms and
mess were all in operation. The new food from the
docks was a welcome addition, but the mess in return
provided fresh strawberries and fresh cream. It was
indeed a quick .return to luxury, but as everyone
knows there are as many ups and downs in a war as
there are in a hod carriers life.
Here the only duty was to get up reports, assemble
all cars that had been loaned out, and get them in re
pair andready formovement Indochina. Chungking
was contacted, and finally orders were received to
await the arrival of General Stilwell. This was the
first news that tbe General was reporting to China
and Burma.
Later in theweek orders were rereivedtoprdceed
to Kunming, China, picking up enroute about twelve
truck loads of supplies for the American Mission.
These had been stored at Lasbio at the Americ@n Red
Cross yards.
Two officers wel<e left at Maymyo as representa
tives to the British headquarters which had already
established itself there. Prior to leaving Maymyo
many of the Americans who had assembled there
were moved to Lashio where they were evacuated to
Calcutta by the China National Airways which was
still in operation. It is interesting to note in passing
that Lashio is the same number of miles east of New
York as it is west of New York, and everyone was
betting on whether it was better to get out eastward
or westward since the distances were the same, but
the American party knew the way they were to de
part as the orders were specitic-on to China.
This ends the story of the Lease-L&d operation for
China. The campaign went on for some time after
this. At this period General Stilwell had just arrived
at Kunming, enroute to Chungking to report. i30me.
of the officers of the Rangoon-Mandalay group re
turned with General StilwelI to operat~ once again
from the old headquarters at Maymyo, and to run
out nnce more, only this time westward on foot in
stead or northward on wheels. This part of the cam
paign may be told in a later story.
.,
without constant study to prepare
in a post of responsibility he has no
time to read; and if he comes
too late to fifl it.
to such a post with an empty skull, it is then
Napier.
45
MPs -The Staff Viewpoint j
JWAJORB. E. PRESCOTT, Infantry
Inst r uct or , Command and General Staff School
T
HE FUNCTION of t he milit ar y police is t o r en
der close suppor t t o t he combat ant ar ms.
Bemuse of supply requirements, the ranks
of the military police have been thinned to an abso
lute minimum. With such limited organizations,
e+ery general staff officer must strive for more highly
trained men used on more economical standards than
presently obtain. It is the duty of every general
staff officer to understand the functions of the mili
tary police and to put his American ingenuity to work
to devise more etficient methods for their employ
ment. This article is writtea with that purpose in
mind.
In order tu accomplish this, three general precepts
should be fullowerl. First: Dont frittev away
tmt2ncd mil{tc~y poltcc ON unlmportont tasks. Be
cause tlte military police unit is adjacent to the divi
sion command post, too many general staff officers
are apt to call upon this unit for messengers, order
lies, chaUffeLlrs, and other minor assistance. If You
want your military police to be of real service, resist
that temptation !
Second: Rcqu(I e the Provost .$ff~whal to mairl
tuitl clo~f, liu;.sm wfrlz er~r?t (%neml .%ofl .%ction.
As a special staff ufficer, the Provost Marshal is vital
ly concerned v ith the movement of the division, with
the haodlinz of I]rlwm>rs of war, with the prevention
of straggling, and with the control of civilians. He,
therefore, deserves a place in the command post
where he can keep abreast of the tactical situation.
Most of his time will be spent in reconnaissance. but
his home may well be located in the G-l section. 11hen
be is out on reconnaissance, one of his officers or his
staff sergeant takes his place for liaison purposes.
The Provost Marshal must have early and detailed
i~fOrmatiOn which he can transmit to hjS men on
post. Information for which the individual truck
d)river, the wounded soldier, the courier, the motor
column commander will ask must be at the disposal
of the Individual LIP One means of assuring this
information is to have the Provost Iklarshal prepal c
overlays for distribution to each traffic post. Such
a sketcl~ will be a combination administrative order,
circulation map, and station list. Information on it
WII1 come from every section. Such an overlay will
be kept current by having the officer or non-corn
making the rounds of posts, check with the staff be
fore commencing his tour. In order to avoid having
such a document fall into hostile hands, it will be
hidden under a stone or in a hole at the side of the
road.
Third: Lse md?torg police whew they can render
ma.rimum as.si,stnxce to combat troops. The whole
philosophy behind the employment of military police
should be to assist the divisional combat units so
that they ran concentrate on combat. For example,
is a squad of military police employed to control
tratlk for the movement of a combat team doing a
more vita] job than the same squad held to providr
guides for the movement of the division command
post ?
Close support means that mihtary police may
properly be sent along with a combat team when it
is given a mission. It certainly means that MP per
sonnel should visit regimental command posts fre
quently to see ~~hat assistance may be rendered.
LMany staff officers ar~ue that if military police are
sent to a regiment, they will be used for command
post guards and similar details. This may he true.
But it is true because in the majority of cases the
regimental staff has no idea what to do with military
police assigned to them. It is to the interest of the
entire division for the general staff and the Provo~t
Marshal to carry out an educational program m thiti
respect. Remember, staffs higher than those of regi
ments have heen known to he guilty of impotent USC.
Study the organization of your military police unit
and work out with the Provost Marshal a scheme for
giving each combat teem a detail of military police
witable fur its needs. Utilize uon-coms to the ut
most as lt, aders of these teams.
Before discussing the functions of the military
police. it is well to arrive at an understanding of the
basic fabric of an M P unit. Every organization has
a traffic uait and a police unit. Organizations val y
in size according to type organization. The smallest
unit is the platoon of the division, the largest the
battalion of the Army. Generally, the police section
handles prisoners of war and stragglers. The tratlic
unit mans traffic control headquarters under G-4 and
pml:ides for all traffic posts within the area.
TRAFFIC CONTROL.The most obvious need for
military police in combat is for trafic control. Hns
there been one critique at the conclusion of a lm.
neuver at which the subject of traffic jams has not
been mentioned ?
When mistakes occur in routing, or roads become
blocked, it is not uncommon to hear that it was the
fault of that dumb MP at the crossroads, or that it
occurred because no MPs were present to direct traf
fic. Actually, the blame can usually be placed at the
feet of the general staff officer who, in making his
46
.
MpSTHE STAFF VIEWPOINT
plans, failed to ascertain road conditions from the
Provost Marshal, or who failed to advise the Provost
Marshal of the movement in sufficient time to pro
vide adequate traffic eoutrol.
For example, in a recent maneuver it was known
to the division staff during daylight hours that a
motor movement would be made over a certain road
that night. It was not until several hours after
dark, when actual orders for the movement had been
issued and the commanding general had specifically
called attention to the need for traffic control, that
any thought was given to informing the Provost
Marshal. He was then ordered to post police on a
road which he had not reconnoitered. By the time
military police had been posted, tbe movement had
taken place. Infantrymen had been used by the regi
mental commander for traffic control. Is it any won
der that the doughboy officer or enlisted man ques-
Iions the value of military police? Had a traffic con
trol plan been ready when the movemen~ was or
dered, the regimental staff and commander would
have been free to center their attention on their com
bat mission. Many men, pulled out for traffic con
tml, would have been available for the Job for which
tl]ey were trained-tighting.
For movement of a division involving many points
nf potential traffic conflict, military police may Occa
sionally be posted singly. Remember that they a} c
}Iot posted CMguides butfor tmfic control. Within
o division area, it is wise and economical to post traf
fic police in teams of three men. This method has
.eYeraI advant ages, mentioned below. The post may
be maintained on a twenty-four hour basis without
requiring a vehicle to}make the rounds to post reliefs
vhich is a time-consuming factor.
On the basis of present equipment, each post may
1,,, furnished a quarter-ton vehicle for patrol pur
}mses between adjacent posts to apprehend speeders
and blackout violators and assist at accidents or
jams. Replacement is always available in case of
c:isualty of the man on post from bombing or inter
. d]ction fire. The men not on duty can maintain them-
s~l~,es comfortably in a sheltered position, not far,
f mm the post. If the post is near an installation,
arrangement can be made to feed them there; if
]nut, C ration can be used.
SIGNAL CLIM MUNICATIoNs.-The lack of ol-ganic
hignal communicat ion wit hin divisional milit ar y po
l!~e unit s handicaps oper at ions mat er ially. However ,
ii is not t he pur pose of ,t his ar t icle t o cont end f@r
changes, in cument tables of organization,or basic al-
Iuwances, The problem of finding sufficient wave
le)@hs for tactical operations is so acute that the war
dq)artment has determined that within the division
m, radios will be assigned to military police. This de.
cision should not be interpreted as a directive not to
use any signal communication for traffic control. Until
such time as radios can be furnished, it is a challenge
to the ingenuity of the general staff and to the Pro
vost Marshal and Signal Officer to work out a system
for the utilization of the radios and telephones of the
sigual company and of other units for traffic control.
In movements of the division, the majority of radios
may be silent. When this situation exists, there can
be no valid objection upon the part of lower head
quarters to utilizing their sets if assured that they
will get them back when the movement is completed.
A Provost Marshal who appreciates the importance
of traffic control should make every effort to experi
ment, in conjunction with G-4 and the Signal Officer,
to discover a satisfactory solution. It can be done. It
will pay dividends in the coordination of movement
thereby provided.
ROAD PRIORITIES.G-3 commonly assigns r oad
pr ior it ies t o vwious combat unit s, such as armored
units, tauk destroyers, and bridging equipment.
G-4 will make similar assignments for supply and
evacuation movements. Sometimes t&y fail to take
into consideration the technique of exeeuting such
priorities. The drivers of ammunition supply trucks,
ambulances, and similar vehicles seldom see the or
der creating such priorities. Even if they did, it
would mean nothing to them. The presence of an
other unit on the road is simply an extra traffic
hazard to them.
.Miscellaneous trains impede the rapid progress
of priority columns. This is particularly true ?n
narrow and rough roads. For example, in the case
of the tank destroyer battalion, G-3 makes advance
plans for tbe utilization of tbe unit. He does this in
order that precious minutes may be saved when an
armored threat appears. If those plans are made
known to the Provost Marshal, he will study the traf
fic situatiml and arrange for the establishment of
temporary traffic posts along roads which the TfJ
battalion may use as it rushes forward to joust with
the enemy armor. He will maintain close Iiaisori
with G-3 so that when tbe order for movement is
given, a control system can be placed in operation. ,
Only by advance planning on the part of tbe traffic
personnel, can the effectiveness of road priorities be
assured.
PRIS~NERS or WAR.-iMilit ar y Poli& oper at e t Ile
Division Pr isoner of War Collect ing Point t o which
regiments evacuate prisoners taken. G-1 selects the
location upon recommendation of tbe Provost Mar
shal and after consultation with G-2. The FieId
Manual states that the collecting point will be on or
near the straggler line. This general principle was
adopted so that guards, having delivered prisoners.
could return via the straggler collecting point, there
picking up stragglers for return to their units.
There are, however, other considerations which
should be taken into account in mobile warfare. Se.
lection will also depend upon the road net and tbe
movement of supply vehicles to the rear. When the
number of prisoners is not large, empty supply ve
hicles present the best means of speedy and economi
47
MILITARY REVIEW
cal evacuation, provided such use does not divert
them from their primary task. Captured enemy ve
hicles may also be used.
Evacuation from the division Prisoner of War
, , Collecting Point is the responsibility of army. When
Iythe Army Provost Marshal desires evacuation by
vehicles, the division G-1 must coordinate carefully
with his own G--t and Provost Marshal and with the
army G-1 to insure that vehicles are not diverted
from their primary mission. The norma~ method
of evacuation of large numbers of prisoners is by
marching.
G-2 may profitably show considerable interest in
the training of the pr]soner of war detail. By search
ing and segregating pcisoners, assisting in their in
, terrogation, and imposing discipline upon them. the
military police can greatly facilitate the job of ob
taining information.
t. An efficient urlsoner of war evacuation system
supports the tactical operation. It provides another
means of reducing friction in the militarv machine.
SrRAGGLING.-&nera] staff officers should under
stand that the number of military police detailed for
;traggler duty is not a constant factor. It varies,
particularly with the type of operation being con
ducted. For example, in a steady advance of a fresh
unit of high morale, stragglers will consist mainly
of personnel lost from their units. Traffic posts can
generally handle such individuals. on the other
hand, in retrograde movements, the most stringent
measures imposed by strong posts and patrols will
have to be maintained.
The current doctrine locates the straggler line in
rear of the ti.qkt artillery positions. Since there is
little difference between the location of the medium
and the light artillery of the division, the word light
need no longer be included.
The conception of a straggler line as a line which
remains constant during an operation until the next
field order is prepared, is just as erroneous as is the
illusion of the front line as a line of troups on the
ground. As the tide of battle sways to and fro, so
must the straggler line adrance and withdraw.
Therefore, unless the Provost Marshal keeps abreast
of the tactical situatiun he can not determine when
movements are necessary, or when posts are to be
reinforced.
Another phase of straggling requires mention.
Every intentional straggler is a potential looter.
E\rery looter is a straggler. British reports dwell up
on the damage done tu much valuable eqtiipment by
individual soldiers. They enjoin all commanders to
use the strictest measures to prevent looting. If,
then, looting is prevalent, patrola throughout the
area to protect equipment will be of more value than
placing all military police on a straggler line.
Straggling robs a unit of its combat efficiency. It
is prevented by aggressive action in accordance with
,,i
48
the curyent situation. Its prevention renders close
suPPort, to the combatant arms.
CIVILIAN CONTROL.-The French debacle of June
1940, when civilians so interfered with military
movement that units could not get to the front, is a
notable ,illustration of the need for civilian control in
the theater of operation. It may be expected that
the Axis will attempt to cause similar panic amongst
civilians and to drive them into the path of our ad
vancing armies. Enemy agents will be left behiud
to pose as natives, carry on sabotage, and furnish
information.
When the division occupies an area, G-1 plans for
the control of the civilian population. Hostages may
be taken and civilians known tu be hostile may be
placed under arrest. Local political leaders and po
lice officers will be required to bear most of the bur
den uf control, and instructions to the people will be
issued through them. In densely populated areas it
will be impossible for the division to provide enough
troops in each town to prevent movement of civilian
population. Therefore it may be found advisable
to cover tactically unimportant towns with occa
sional patrols. In others a few military police may
be stationed, and traffic control, posts will be issued
instructions concerning the handling of civilians.
For use in the event of panic, G-l should request
G-3 to alert some portion of the reserve so that in
terference with tactical operations may be prevent
ed. The unit chosen will depend, uf course, upon the
population density and the size of tbe area for which
the division is responsible. When the unit is alerted
the commanding officer reports to G-1 for instruc
tions. Generally the Provost Marshal will be given
authority over the unit if called out, and he will
work out the details for its employment with the unit
commander. A reconnaissance of the area is made
but the unit is not withdrawn from the reserve ml-
less a contingency arises making it absolutely neces
sary. Its primary mission continues to be employ
ment in combat.
Control of civilians aids the tactical operations.
Military police are primarily responsible for thi~
cent rol. When it becomes neces s ary to supplement
military police with other units, military police
should function in a supervisory capacity because
of their special training.
* **
It is only tJy looking ahead and anticipating what
ie likely to happen and preparing to meet it that effi
cient regulation and control can be accomplished.
The general staff anticipates the tactical situation
and prepares plans for the employment of the mill.
tary machine. The military police provide the com
mander and his staff with a means for its efficient
regulation and contrnl. It is only by the integration
of these two factors that the machine-like precision
so vital to victory is attained.
The Silent Partner in the AAF
LIEUTENANT COLONEL GARES GARBER, Air Corps *
Inst r uct or , Command and Gener al St at ? School
S
OMEof t he t act wal achievement s of t he Ar my Air For ces
in t he cur r ent unpleasant ness have been so spect acular
and t heir oper at ions so-t o bor r ow a per fect ly good
Hollywoodism-@mor ous, t hat r elat ively few out side t he
AAF know much about t he silent par t ner in t he cor pqr at , on,
t he Air Ser vice Command whose pr oud bonst IS We KCI?P
Em Flyin!
This ar t icle will attempt to lift the wd-within tbe scope
,f regulations affectins the release of military information.
There are a couple of old, familiar r efr ains t hat r inz in
t he ear s of ever y r mlit axy mz SSThe impet us of supply
.bouhl he fr om r ear t o fr ont and Wombat unit > should not
be bur dened vmt b t he pr oblem of supply and maint enance
all t heir effor t s should be devot ed t o t he oe xpecific pur pose
of finchng, fixing and figbt mg t he enmny. For bombar d
ment aviat ion t his means flying and bombing. For fight er
nv!at ,on it means t lymg and fight ing. FOI oh.., vat ion avia
t ,on st means flying and fmdig. Bt manifest ly sonwone
has t o t hink about Gas, Gr ub, and GadSet s, which IS t he
A AF ver sion of t he t ime-bon.r ed 4,Br ead, Beans, and Bul -
Ir t ,
Tbe r eader will axr ee t hat no at m pmse%es gr eat .,
f,,r t t md r nobdit y t han t he AA F; and, if he will t bik a mo.
wt , t hat no ar m possesses less 8t mt egical moblht y. Tbe
mmt t onnage of fuel and bombs r equir ed for air oper at ions,
t he r elat ive fr agdit y of equipment such as air planes and r a
dms, t he lar ge volume of r epair and maint enance, and t he
necessit y for ext enswe pr epar ed oper at ional ar ea.all of
t hw,e fact or s add up t o a t r emendous pr oblem of bupply aml
,,,.,.t mance for mr ~t s which must be cos~de r ed i
.!, at egical planning.
t And it must never bc for got t en t hat unle. s t he necessar y
.upphes ar e all pr ewnt atthe right tmw, at the rw ht Pk .<.
..,1 m tk e , tgk t qw mt@, t be mission is for ed.omed t o fail.
u t v It is per fect ly possible for a r elat ively poor t act ical
Op,r at i. n t o succeed because ever yt hing was at hand whe.
m F,led-but t he mxt pm-feet t act ical plan ever conceived
u ,11 fall absolut ely lf t he lo~wt mal plan suppmt mr l it fad..
Th . fin es t a,r planes and pilot s in t he wor ld ar e wor e t b%n
u., lms unless t hey can per fo, m t heil. pr ,mar y missmn of
fl$,ng ad fight in~. And t his t hey cannot do vmt hout at ln.
qu., t c supply and maint enance.
T,, .mar ize br iefly, t he Ioglst lcal funct ions necewmy t o
sb l.por t t act ical oper at ions ar e pr ocur ement , st or age, dis-
1, ,,ut mn, nmmt enance. and t r aining and supplying scwv! cc+
m, ..m.el And t hese in gener al, apphed t . AA F mat er iel,
a!, t be fuct ms of t he Air Ser vlw Command.
>AF Regulatim No. 20.4, 17 October 1941, was the autbor
it$ for establishing the AI. Semuw Command under the Com-
m,w,liE Gemml of the Ar my Air For ces. The or ganizat ion
of t he A IT Ser vice Command WM t o msist of a command.
[c gener a{ wit h t be necessar y st aff ad e.bor clinat e agen.
cl<. t oget her wit h t be facilit ies, umt s, t r oops, and per bonml
wh,, h had been asslged t o t he jur isdict ion of t he Air COIDS
M.t ,nt cnance Commad. The lat t er was t her eby inact ivat ed.
L)LTIES OF COMMANDING GENERAL, AIR SERVICECOMMAND
1 he CmnmandinE Gener al, Air Ser vice Command, pur suant
t o policies, dir ect ives, ad inst r ct iom i,qsed hy higher au
t hor it y-, is char ged Mt h t he following dut ies:
r . Super vision of all act ivit ies of t he AAF wit hin t he con
t inent al limit s of, t be Unit ed St at es isofm as t hey per t ain
t o st or aze and iwe of eqipt net and supphes pr ocur ed by
t be AAF.
9. The mzimmmm, r epair , over haul, ad salvage of all
AAF equipment and supplies which ar e aswgned t o AA F
it > beyond t be r esposihibt y for fir st ad semd ecbelos
of maint enance,
.
? Pr epar at ion and issue of all t echnical or der s and in
.t mmt ios per t inent t o aewxmut ical ma.t 4r iel.
J Except as ot her wise pmwded, coor d,nat lon wit h ot her
supply ar ms and set vices of t be ar my r elat ive t o st or age,
,s., r naint emmce, r epair , ad .alwige of equipment .ad
.upplim P, ocr ed by t hem for use by t he AA F.
5 Comput at mn of AAF r equiivmmt s for supplies t o ~e
pr ocur eci by t he AII Ser wce Command or t o he supphed t o
t he AA F by ot her ar ms and ser vices.
6. P, oclement of equqmwt ad .pplie. r equir ed i t be
oper at ion of t he AAF as may be dir ect ed by higher aut hor .
my. This cmbr amb all amoaut ical ecjipment except t he
complet e air plane, whmb is pr oe r ed hy t he Mat &wl Cmn.
mand.
7. Command cont r ol wlt bin t he Un,t ed St at es of all air
depot s, subdepot s, air depot gr o~s, ser vice gmps, and ser v.
Ice cent er s, t oget her wit h at t ached ser vice t r oops.
The Commandmg Gener al, Air %wce Command, pr ey
r wl es Plans for t he oper at mn of t hose clmnent b of t he AAF
wbwh ar e under bm cont r ol; and for ~mpr over nent s t her et o.
Included m t hese plans wdl be adeqat c pr ovision for ex
t endmi? Air $ier viec Command facilit ies and ser vice or gani.
zat iom t o t he combat zone t o msm-e t hat r ombat unit s will
at all t ,mm be pr ovided wit h xfeqat e logist ical suppor t .
ORGANIZATION w T!*EAIR SERVICECOMMAND
The Am Ser vice Command has just r ecent ly under gone a
I at hm- clr ast w reorganiz ation. The pr incipal feat ur es ar e
t he chin, nat mn of t he four Air Ser vice Ar ea Command. and
of t he A-st aff. This r eor ganizat ion !s effect ed by Gener al
0! der ?$. 142, IfQ, Alr Ser vice Command, dat ed 12 Decem
ber 1942. The r ea~ons behind t bm r eor gamzat wn ar e so im
p.r WIt t hat it may be well t o dzscss t hem bmefly.
The funct ions of t he Air Ser vice Command, as enumer at ed
muher m t his ar t ]cle, mor e near ly appr oach t hcwe of a manu
faciur r nfq cbst r ihut mg, commer cial or gamzat lon r at her t kn
t bow of a milit ar y or gamzat ion. Conheqycnt ly t be r e?r zasi.
zmt on of t he AIT Ser wce Command has been along indust r ial
funct ional lines and away fr om milit ar y line and st aff Or -
Kanimt ion Inst ead of t he m,ht ar y command and st aff or -
Tanlzat ion of unit s, we find ( r efet mng t o Fig. 1 ) t hr ee gr eat

IF,r ,t ech.inn r na,.t en.nce a. it er met ed b, Tc=h Ot der 00-26-4 Is
.DY nmmt i. . . . . whr .h can he .cc.m I!lt .hmIwt h wmlk and hand t ool.
car r ,{.d m t he cr ew ch,cf. kit Sccnd e.helon i, t hat t we .af main.
t ma. e whmh wumm m.lmeme. t of d.nm..d D.r t i. bot h for en.i es
..* .w.1...6. whm r ew!r w r e.lm.ment m .=f* minor n.t u.e
L&h
l.t and 2nd .chelon m.mt cnm!c. .?. t he wswn.nb,ht y ,,f t he . . .. .
wm,dr .n
The commandcvr llmi of BuM.,* her ebyaaai.nedt o t he ,Ur ,.dmt io.
f t he Comr n.ndi.. Ge.er al, Air S.r vim Command.M Iwn,kd t o t hat r e
w,md for t he ,0., fnct mnls of t he mbde.ot i It m 01 t o be cOl>
.t r ued t . alt er t he !mmxat ,va and r emon,ibilit ,euof t he st at km mm
r r mnder w,t b r -imct t o .ener al adm,nmt mt m. of t he post . c+w, r
et at io., The .Ubdeiwt r ,mmnanderlocat ed at . cnmbe.tor t mi.mz flel.1
r eceivm his mst r uct i?.s r elat ive t o .u.ply ..d r naInt enmmeof .,r cc.ft
mt KM.t at lon ft mn ht . cont r ol dwot car mn.nder mdv.
. .
49
MILITARY REVfEW
mam d,v!slons fir st , Per sonnel and Tr r +inig; second, Sup.
ply: and t hir d, 31aint enancet oget her w,t h admt nmt r at n, e,
cont r ol, and specml st aff elevmt s, Thl~, it will he seen, cor
zesponds Lat her closely t o t he indust r w,l concept of or gan iza
t mn along t he bnes of M.., .Mat emal, and Machiner y.
3~Q, A,r Smwce Command. locat ed at Pat t ei son Field,
,~, ,Oh,o, IS or gamzed as shown m Fw, 1. It unll be not ed t hat
~ Many of t hese <Iivlc+ionsand sect ior ,s ar e t he same as in any
Imlit ar y mgan, zat ]on, and !t e need not dt seuss t hem. How.
eve, , let ,. mke a look at some of t be odd.lookinz ones
F,r st , t be Cot mi Div,s,ml. The,,
~ob IS t o make st ud~es and r emnunenJ
at imm leadt ng t o t be est abhsbr nent of I
st andar d pohcw, pr amwe., and p,,,.

cedar . ,. per sonnel, ma, t manm, ad
I
s upply t hr oughout t he AI, Sesvme
Command. A not bw fqmt ,.n M t o co]
I~dmm,st r at y~ & { Cmt &l D,v,wm :1
Iwt , mt m p, et , ad ev.lat c in for m..
I Int clkg?.m office~-1 +>py~or ~.~l_ I
~ -- -
t mn r ezamhng pr om, emeut . SPPIY,
. and ma~nt mmnc, and r educe ,t t o
gr aph,c I epr esent .t w for use b>
Gxmnadsg (%wml, Am SeIvice
Oommand, m fdannmf? ancl In for mu.
t
- klt m.q pcd,r les.
The Budget Officer p, epar es budget
mt m,at cs, nmint ams r ecor ds of a.ll.t
,r wms ad obligat mns of funds, and
mamt a ins st at mt ,cal r ccm ds of st ock
balances and P<oper t > accmmt wx.
TbIs lat t t .k IS accompbsbed by means
of duphcat e st ocl. r ecor d car d, ma .
t ainwf at Pat t w sun Fmld and by a
dady ,r wct my as of mldn,ght .ac,b
day shmvmq t he st at us of AAF WIP
PIWS and ecpnpmmt at each of t bc an
depot s , t he co. t ,et al U. S. T,an.
mmmon M hy t r lct ype and t he punch-
car d ,,, acl,, ne-t al,ulat ,,,g syst m,, ,,
i)ll h,.
used. Tb,s makes pmmble r eady con
solidst mn of lfor nmt mn for 11,? hu(j
gct and pr ocur cmmt wct mns t o act 0.
I Cbcm,ct l L
s,,
eit her by t r ansfer fr om one depot h,
anot her , aut hor izing local pur chase h}
t he air dppnt s, m wpplying small lot
I F,,) .,,.>
sh, pm.nt s f, m,>a ..t r act alr eady let .
5,. -_
LI
TXF A m DEPOT COSTROL AREAS
The four Air Ser vwe Ar ea (on
mands a, aut bor lzed by A A F Reg.
20-4A, 27 May 1942, wer e u asked out
by t b r eor ganlzat mn of t he AII Scr
mwe L.omm andas of 15 December 19$2.
Funct mns of command cont r ol of t be
A>r , Ser v,ce Command for mer ly dclegat . ai t o A,? Swvxe AI e.
Commander s ar e now per for med by Cot ml A Im Cm,mmndws
at bmt r ol depot s.
Thme ar e nom eleven A,, Depot Cor ml A t ws as showt ~
by Figur e 2.
Sy de>iznat mn of ZII d~~ot s and subdepot s, .ont , ol ar ea>
w au bab=.. .t :lt l.ns, umt s. clet achmr .t b, et c . t he command.
ing Gener a], Air Ser t vce Command, places munedmt e re
spcms,bi<lt y on a ~PecIfic a h depot or subdepot for t he ser v
wes of maint enance and supply r equir ed by eaeb act ivit y of
t he AA F st at ioned or t empor ar ily oper at ing wit hin each Air
Depot Cont lol Ar ea Command. This pr ogr am was inst it ut ed
in an effor t fur t her t o decent r alize oper at ions of t be Alr
Ser vice Command hy delegat ing r esponmhilit y for as much
local pr ocur ement of supplies as t he ar ea offer ed; and t o
obt ain closer per sonnel and command cont r ol and super vision
a,,A]r dqcm,. and ,%o.t ml d,Dot s,, ., used ,. t bm ar t icle ar e
synolvzmus.
), ; 50
over t he air depot s, as well as t he lower echelons, wit h t he
r esult ant cur t dlment of t elet ype, r adio, and r out ine comes.
fmndence.
Figur e 3 is an appr oximat ion of t he set -up of an Air D+
pot Cont r ol Ar ea Command. The or ganizat ion of r dl AIt .
Depot Cont wl Ar eas is pr act ically ident ical. About t he only
dit fe, ence IS m t heir geowapbical size
of AAF inst allat ions wit hin t heir
t ?onally, t hey ar e all simdar ; alt hough,
nwnt ioed. sem-ar at e manmw t ables ar e
, CG. AIRSERVICE C=}~AND {
,4hST TO THE fOMMASfjING GENERAL I
and in t be number
boundar ies. Fnc.
due t o t he fact om
eceasar for eat -b.
+
Bi,d{et @icer
-+ ~t at ist ~n,t I
.
M.,T
! ; rir,gm,enng
! c,>t r ol
.
I
cIver se., L
: je.c._
Pkmn,nx _.4&.,ones
I (-t ,! k
t. L
_l Sec
I
,:
1
I
.J . t A Techr @ 1
j ,A~ept cnt*krea Or g.t zat lons + . Dgsec
Fr o, ., 1.
Not e t hat subdepot s ar e aswgned t o each cont r ol depm.
The subdepot s so assigned a,. mmm]ly locat ed wit h t he con
t r ol ar ea of each of t be depot s as designat ed by t he AI,
Ser wce Command, ht t her e ar e except ions, as shown >%,
I+,qur e 2. Tbe subdepot ccmmmder oper at es under . cont nd
of t he Air Depot Cont r ol Ar m Commander on SIl mat t e, .
per t ammg t o supply, engineer ing, nmcr enmt , fmwmn,l,
@t ,.
AIr Int r ansm Depot s ar e anot her act imt y t he Air Depot
Cont r ol Ar ea dir ect ly super vises and mt mls. The Int r as,t
Depot s ar e locat ed near por t s of embar kat ion (eit her wat t -r
or am) and ar e cbar gt -d wit h t be r espos~biht y of st or im!
and t m>ing movement of supplies and eqlpment t o ar r it e
at t he docks when bot t oms or air t r anspor t s me available m
t he por t s of embar kat ion for loading.
Tbe AIr Depot Cat r ol P, ma als o has dir ect sper visir m
and cont r ol of what we may call , Air Dead St o&e Depot s.
The funct ion of t his act ivit y is t wofold, I t he fir st place, it
THE SILENT PARTNER IN THE AAF
makes for smoot her oper at ion of t he Int r ansit Depot s, which The pr ocedur e in t he t r aining pr ogr am is int er est ing and
ar e gener ally over cr owded, bot h for floor space and t r ack- may be br iefly out lined as it exist s in a t ypical case. Eleven
age, by act ing as a holding point . Thus t hese ~4Dead St or age t r aining colleges and high schools in t he vicinit y of t his
Depot s help r elieve congest ion at t h~ Int r ansit Depot s as par t icular au depot , wit h t he r equmed equipment t o con-
well as at t he Por t of Embar kat ion. Then. second funct mn duct classes for t he voeat mnal t r aining pe~t inent t o t he neet ls
w t o st or e in bulk mat ir iel r eceived fr om cont r act or s but not of t be Supply and Maint enance Depar t ment s of t he Depot ,
ceded in cont r ol depot st ocks at t he moment . ar e engaged in what is r efer r ed t o as t he out -ser vice t r at n.
The Air Depot Cont r ol Ama also supe.r vmes t he Iet t mg of
ing. This involves t housands of st udent s. Inst r uct or per son-
cont r act s wit h commer cial ar cr aft and engine over haul con
nel is fur nished fr om quahft ed per sonnel of t be depot wher e
t r act or s for t he over haul of pr imar y t r a.imng air planes and
r eqmed. Tbe cour ses gn.en ar e in t he mam t heor et ical,
engines. Par t icukir at t ent ion is paid t o t he cont r act or s flout
..wt h z ver y Inmt ed amount of pr act ical inst r ct icm.
pace, t ooling, t r ained mechanics, account ing met hods, and When t be st udent has obt ained t he r equir ed pr oficiency
over haul met hods. The Air Ser vice Command fur nishes all beor abe,s gr aduat ed andist hen eligible t o r eceive in-ser vice
... -, .
UF.pot
smAnlmt ohlt Ik,wt
..e-
FIGURE 2.
w.ues necessar y for t he over hauls and t he.. a,. lhsued t <,
t r ammg, and may, ,f so desn-ed, be employed as a t em
t h, cont mct or I accot da.nce wit h exist ing cir chws and
por ar y Cwil Set vicemnployeein t he gr ade of Gener al HelPcI,
t mulat mnb In addit ion, t he An Depot Cont r ol A,ea his
($1,320 per annum) m t he Exxneer ing (or Maint enance)
,t . t epwsent .t ives at t be plant s t o r espect mcommg equ,v. Llepm!nwnt , or as a CAF-1, m Gener al F3elper ($1,260 per
m,,.t fm. d,spos,t mn, as well as for t he complmnce of t he a.num) m t he Su pply Depa r t men t of t be t 3epot . Tbe fir ht
co,, t ,act c,, w,t h t echn, cal or de,w a, phllshed by t he AI I t wo t o four weeks aft er t he employees r epor t for dut y at
Se,%.ice Command font t he ovwbwl of a,r planes, eng,nes, .ml t he depot , t hey ar e given inst mx~lon i. t he Depot Tr aininc
e(],l)pment , School Cent m, cover ing Civ,l Ser vice r equit ,ement s-cust oms
AIR DEP,IT
and what will be wper t ed of t hem, t he bandliqg of and fa
milializat io. wit h t ools, and r elat ed subject % At t he con
.<, much fm t he AI! Depot C.t zol AK?.. Xm. let s t ab.
clusion of t hat pemod t hey cont inue t heil t r aining in t he
. lb,ok at t he funct mns mwd., an .4AF depot . Cer t ain of it .
Indw+t r ml ar ea (SupPlY and Engmeer mg Depar t ment s)
.t u>, t ies will be dealt wit h ,n .Iet l,l.
whae t hey act ually per fmm t he dut ies of r egular e~..
),,8.,,..1 ad T>an,mg. Civil,: t r ar mE has expanded
ployes under t he ,mmedmt e supmvismn of what is r efer r ed
m Ike same pmpost mn as t he am de,.ot s. It s funct iot i is t o
t o aS a ,,lead man. If t he employee st udent s ser v]ces ar e
SUIOYVIWmst r uct mn of mvdmn per sonnel m t be qalifica
sat mfa.t or y, as r epor t ed by t he lead man t hr ough t be for e.
mms t hat ar e ceded at t he depot s and subdepot s. While
man of t he sect ion t he st udent is wor king m, he or she :S
fct ions of t he Tr a mmg Officer t ir e pr mmwdy out -ser vice
pr omot ed t o t he classificat ion speciakmd m, and ceases t .
t laninz ad classificat ion aft er t he st udent has obt ar wd
he a Ieat ner and car kes on as a full fledged employee.
pi~helency in hm pm-t vmlar specialt y, t he t r almng unit fol
10V. t br ogh up t o t he t nne t he individuals ar e employed
This ext ensive t r aining pr ogr am was r equir ed and
as t empor ar y Civd Ser vice employes of t he depot . for t unat ely was well under way some mont hs pr ior t o J J e
267
51
.... . . . . . .
REVfEW
mmber 7, 1941. It was necesmt at ed by t he l?wk of t r ained,
skdled aviat >on r nechan ics and s u pply per sonnel t . conduct
t he expanded r ecpmement s piaced on t he depot hy t he t r e
r mndmm expansion of t he AA F.
As an dlust r at ion, one air depot had m the vicinity of 150
employees in t he Su pply Depa r t men t and 800 in t he E13
gmeer mg Depar t t uent just ah.ut 2% year s ago, and hy last
J une had m.r eased it s employees to 2,500-odd in the Supply
D.psrtmrnt and 10,000 -oiici i. t he Engineer kw Depar t ment .
41R DEPOT {.OXTlfO1. AREI
r-- -, -,
owr h .u l by !
(.,,110
(o*tract r
I

F,,, n. 3.
w,~h a cor r esponding amount of incr eased p, .duct mn. Y-
will I eahze t her efor e t hat t he fully r ovnded. out aviat ion
mcwhzmc .! supply man m a t bmg of t he past , and t he
speeisdlzeJ cn>ployee came int o being m t he depot . Time did
ot pcwmit of ot her t han spemahzed t r ammg, .t r alght -hne
pr oduct ion, and such.
The r eade, maY wonder at t he amount of t ,me devot ed
t o mvdian employees. Of t he many t housands of wor ker s in
Air Ser v,ce Command, t he gr eat maymt y of t he per sonnel
ar e civdians, of whom 60,; ar e women. Consider able use is
also made of civilian pr r sonnel m Base An Depot s in cer
t ain of t be over seas Theat er s of Oper at ions.
Depot S$pply . The five main subdmsi.ns of t he Depot
Supply, conwst of Adnmnstration. Warehouse. lnsPectio..
Inventory, and Purchasing and Contracting.
2 The Admimst r at we subdivision cont ains a Per sonnel
Sect ion, ft equisit lon Sect ion, Memo Receipt Sect ion, a St ocx
Reco, d Depar t ment oper at ing in excess of 125.000 st ock zec
owl car ds, and a Wor k Or dez sect ion.
k. Included in t he War eh. use Secoon is t he shipping and
r ecwr ing sect in, having t o do wit h all t ypes of shipment
r a,l, commer cial van, depot van, combat and t r aining t r uck.,
a? ~ell as air sh,pment and t he movement of equipment and
supplies fo, wat er sb]pment A packing and cr at ing sect ion
IS also included.
.9. Then comes t he hmpect mn Sect ion. All supp~ies and
equipment , ot her t han or iginal cont ainer s bear ing an Ar my
lnspwt or k seal, ar e r espect ed, bot h incoming and out going.
In t hm sect ion one would find all dr awings, blue pr int s,
t echmcal or der s, st ock hst s, and par t s cat alogues necessar y
t o t he inspect ion funct ion.
L. Next IS t he Invent or y Sect Ion. Thm sect >on is r equir ed
t o invent or y, by t be r unning m.ent or y met hod, all st ock in
t he Depot Supply pr oper as weIl as in t he t echnieal supply.
The imwntory covers a one-year pemod.
5. And last ly, t he Pur chasing and Cont r act ing Sect ion.
This is a highly t echnical unit , involving t be expendit ur e of
many millions of dollar s annually t o cover cont r act s ne
52
got iat ed localIy and local pur chase as aut hor ized hy higher
aut hor it y and inst r uct ions cont ained in st ock list s, Car e is
exer cised t hat any pr ocur ement made, if iclr led in t he
Gener al Schedule of Supplies, is pur chased at t he list ed pr ice
and at one of t he list ed dealer s cm agencies, Wher e no defi
n it e inst r uct ions appear in t he st ock list , local pur chases
should be confined m st andar d r eccwer ahle and expendable
it ems.
Depot Xai%tmmzcs. The Engineer ing Depar t ment or , as
tt is now willed, Ma int enzzme Division, m composed of seven
ma m sect ions.
1. The Adminisr r at mn Sect ion includes t be sal enginee.t
in g cler ical st aff and t echnical file unit .
2. The PIanning Sect ion is, a ver y impor t ant nit . It s nmm
dut y, as. it s name implies, is t o plan and t o obt ain t he ueces
sar y mfomnat icm so t hat engines, air cr aft , pr opeller s, i.
st r ment s, et c., wdl m be held p on t be pr oduct ion km
de t o par t s shor t ages, lack f pwsonel, eqipnwnt being
used for ot her wor k alr eady under ~oing over haul or r eps it ,
available floor space, pr ior it ies, m ot her hot t leneeks. Wlt b
t he Maint enance Division opemt ing as it is under a pr odc
t mn Iine syst em, in so far as is possible al} t ypes of equip.
ment ar e wor ked on at t he same t ime. Wit h t he many t ypes
of engi es and air planes fr om t he puddle jwn per tot he
Flying For t r ess t hat am being over hauled at a depot . t his
ser vice pr oduct ion line policy put s a r eal load cm t he Plan.
nmg Sect ion. This sect ion wor ks ver y closely wit h t he Supply
Depar t ment , keeping t hat depar t ment infor med of t +nt ivi.
pat ed par t ., mat er ials, and t he Maint enance Dwism tools
wdl need, in ~ddlt ion t o t he st ock level maint ained in t he
supply. It also wor ks dir ect ly wit h t he Supply Depar t ment
t wt h mk+t i on t o Wor k Or der s, bot h r ot ie and emer gency.
3. The Pr oject Sect ion. Thk unit has set up skilled me
chamcs and helper s assigned in gr oups or t eams, wit h a
t hor ough knowledge of a par t icular t ype of e~ipment . These.
t eams ar e assigned t o pr oject s as t he eqwpment ar r ives at
t he depot for r epair , inspect ion, or new inst allat ions. When
no pr oject is being pr ogr essed t hmgh t he depot mquir i,,g
t hat pm-t it ular gr oups knowledge, t he individuals r emain at ,
and conduct , t heir r egular ly assigned dut y.
4. Cost Accounting. A record M maintamed of the cost of
t he r epair or over haul of each engine and mr pkme, ielw.
mg labor and supplies, as well as t he cost of r epaimng pmt .
and equipment fahmcat ed for t he Indst r id Ar ea, m ot hm
depot depar t ment s.
5. Plant Maint enance. This unit mnst r ct s specw.1
benches, r acks, and any equipment needed in t he Supply ,x
Maint enance Divisions for t he depar t ment s pmpm funct mn.
mg. In addit ion It makes r epair s o cr anes, nmchier y, and
equipment oper at ing wit hin t he plant . One m] d yefer t o
t his sect ion as an all-ar ound handy-ma depar t ment .
6. Tbe Par achut e Sect ion packs, inspect s, dr op t est s, w.
pmr s, and r epacks d] par achut es wit hin it s depot cont r ol
ar ea.
7. The Engine Over haul Sect ion is br oken dew mt o spe
cialized r out s. One handles car bur et or s, fuel pumps., and
et her equipment of t he fuel and lubr icat ing syst em. AncAh~z
handles elect r ical equipment such as magnet os, Xener at m%,
st ar t er s, and spar k plugs.
Inspect ion is made at t ime of t ear -down, condemning par t s,
r ecommending r epair of par t s or sur vey as t he git aat im
dict at es. All par t s ar e cleaned aft er t ear .dew and inspect ed
again, and placed in individual engine r acks. Th en if t hr
necessar y r eplacement par t s ar e available t he engine PI o
ceeds t hr ough t he pr oduct ion line for ne@ssar y wor k such
as cylinder gr inding, lapping, honing, bear ing smaping, and
ot her oper at ions. Upon t he engines ar r ival at t he final as
sembly sect ion all t he engine par t s in t h- r ack ar e as
sembled int o a complet e engine and pt on t he t est st and
THE SILENT PARTNER IN THE AAF
,
for t he necessar y number of run-up hour s at t he differ ent
RPMs specified in t hat par t icular engine% t echnical or der .
The Machine Shop is equipped wit h all t ypes of machine
shop equipment for t he manufact ur ing of par t s, incldmg
engine, air cr aft , accessor ies, and sheet met al, or skin wor k,
including wood and fabr ic.
Air plane Over haul ad Repai, ivcdves t he t ear -down, m
t lisassemhly, and inspect ion of air foils, st r ut s, ad a hn.
dr ed and one ot her par t s. Inst r ument s ar e inspect ed, over .
hauled, and r epair ed in t he Ist r ment Seet io and r et ur ned
t o t he air cr aft pr oduct ion hne for inst allat ion in t he final
Assembly Sect ion of t he Ak.plane Over haul ad Repair Sec
t ion. Aft er t he assembly of t be amplane, inspect or s go over
t he plane complet ely and indicat e by t heir init ials cm t he
many ispect io point s t hat it hss been r espect ed and by
whom,
Tbe air plane, OW complet ely assembled wit h engine ad
inst r ument s inst alled, is moved t o t he Final Inspect ion dock
wher e t t m again gone over fr om nose t o t ad, inside and
out , and t he final OK gwen by t hat sect ion, t her eby making
It r eady for flight , The air cr aft is t hen t r r wd over t o t be
Flight Test Sect ion for a t hor ough Sight t est , involving all
n~aneuver s t hat t be air cr aft is capable of doing as set up
],, t be t echmcal or der of, t hat par t ieukw mr phme and engine.
.4t t be conelsion of t he flight t est , ,f sat isfact or y, t he
.wplane is t ur ned over t o t he Supply Depar t ment for
emuppmg t he cr aft wmh xt s t ools, et c., wbieh wer e r emoved
IIr lor t o t he cr aft s being t ur ned over t o t be Mamt enanw
Ihvmmn for over haul, The next st ep IS t o infor m t he unit
t o wbmb t be mr cr aft has been assigned t hat ~t is r eady fm
dehver y Upon ar r ival of t be fer r y c=ew a hand r eceipt fm
t hea,r plane, complet e wit h accessor ies, is signed by t he fer r y
wlot and a sbr ppzg t icket fmwar ded t o t he subdepot mm.
mander of t be field t o whlcb t be a,r plane bas been assigned
for accomplishment ad i-et um t o t he depot , It sbold be
mmt mned t hat when eqmpmt mt is sent t o t he depot for Ye.
WIH or over haul, t be mount abiht y is t r ansfer r ed t o t be de
IN,t Upon complet ion of t he wor k t he equipment is t hen
.h; pped t o t he r eceiving AAF unit on shipping t icke,t .
SUBDEPOT
Tbe shdepot has t be s.megener al or ganizat ion as t be
Ct int r aI Depot except onasmaller scale, and it is not bar ged
mt h t he four t h echelon of maint enance but only it b t he
t h,, d. Tbe subdepot is an inst allat ion which IS desi ned t o
ope, at e t he supply and engineering (or maintenm1 e) %c.
t,cmes of m AAF station. It operates directly under thr
control of the Control Depot to which it IS assigned.
The subdepot is or ganized wit h commissioned officer s in
chnr ge and t wt h such number of civilian employees as ar e
nwcwsal.y t o oper at e t be act ivit y. The size of each subdepot
,$, !1t ber efm-e var y wit h t he nat ur e and ext ent of t he AAF
act ~vit ies at t he st at ion,
The r anking officer assigned t o a subdepot will he desig
nat ed Subdepot Commander t her eof. He will act as liaise
off,<.,, bet ween t be Cont r ol Depot Commander and t be cm,,.
m,,dmg officer of t he base at which he is st at ioned. In ad.
dnm. be may m. may not be t he supply officer himself m
t he engineer ing officer himself; however , when available, at
IPa<t ibr ee officer s sbold be assigned t o each subdepot .
The SUDDIV DeDar t r nent of t he subdeoot wdl cenduct all
AAF sup~iy-oper at ions and maint ain ~he account able r ec
or ds of t he st at >on. It will r eceive all incoming shipment s
and will make avadabk suppbes for d~st ~ibut io t o all AAF
unit s u pply officer s . The Maint enance Division of a sub
~pot will per for m all t hnd echelon r naint ens.me of air cr aft ,
AAF equipment , zd supplies. The ext ent of t be oper at ional
cont r ol of t be Engineer ing Depar t ment in t hir d echelon of
maint enance will be as dmect ed by t be Cont r ol Ar ea Com
mander .
THE AIR SERVICE COMMAND OVERSEAS
Now Iet ,s t ake a quwk look at t he AIr Ser vice Command m
an OVel.&M Theat er of Oper at ,os.
In gener al, t be funct ions ar e t he same as t hose pr eviously
dlseussed for t be Air Ser vice Comnumd i ;he Umt wf St at es
except t hat t hey ar e per for med by mibt ar y per sonm$ in.
st ead of civd, amAlso, t he Air Ser vice Commid nit s m a
Theat er of Oper at ions come dir ect ly under t he command of
t he Air For ce Commander , and be can modify t heir oper a
tmnsand employment as may be mqwr ed by t he Wat icm.
This at hor my (for changing t be phm of oper at ion) is ex.
pr essly delegat ed by AAF Regulat mn 65.1, 14 August 1942,
par . 1, which st at es, r It E. r ecognized t hat i. some t heat er s,
due t o local condit ions, air for ce commander s w,II find it ad
vmable t o make some deviat ions fr om t he @n pr e:cmbed m
or der t o obt ain best r esult s. Thm IS a command funct , on.
Tbe AI? Ser .nce Command m t he Umt ed St idt es is r e
spons~ble fm. act ivat ing, or ganimng, t r ammg, eQu,pping, and
supplying t o over seas Am For ce commander s t hese AA F
ser vice unit s: Ail Depot Gr oup; Ser vwe Gr oup; Quar t er
mast er Co., Ser vice Gr oup ( Avn ) ; Quar t er mast er Co., Tr uck
( Avn ) ; Or dnance Co., Med,cal Maint enance (Q) ( Avn ) ;
Or dnance Co., Ser vw-e Gr oup ( Avn ) ; Signal Co., Ser vice
Gr oup ( A.J ) ; and Chemical Co., Au- Oper at ions ( Avn ). To
get her wlt b t hese, t her e ar e sever al .t ber ser vie~ or gamza
t ions r equir ed for t be oper at ion and ser vices of an AH
For m Ser vice Command, Air Task For ce, A,r Depot , and AIT
Ser vice Cent er .
In gener al, t he t r ammg of t hese umt s is combmed and
concur r ent . Wher ever possibleand especially in t be final
t r aining phases ( t h,r d phase of OTU ) t his t r aining should
be car r ied out m conjunct ion wit h t be specific combat unit s
which t be ser vice unit s ar e t o suppor t m a t heat er of oper a
t ions. The pur pose of t his combined t r zinmg is of cour se t o
pr oduce a t r ained t eam, fully cogmzant of each ot her s ca
pabilmes and hmlt at lons. knowing each ot her . and used t o
wor king t oget her . Tbe advant ages t o be gamed fr om t his
t ype of t r aining should be ohviom.
CONCLUSION
It m hoped t hat t be r eader wdl r ealize fr om t he for egoing
t hat t he Air Ser vice Command is a lar ge or ganizat ion, com
posed of highly t echnical unit s; and t hat t he for ecast ing and
planmng for t he s u pply ,and maint enance of ,air c% ft . each
of which is composed of t housand. of par t s t he failur e of
near ly any one of which w ill gr ound t he amplane, is a r eal
un der t akmg and r equir es t be closest of coor dmat ,on bet ween
Air Ser vt ce Command echelons as well as wit h t he Tr aining
and Combat Commands. It is evident t hat t he Air Ser vice
Command has quit e a J ob t o d. t o fulfill It s boast . We keep
em flyin!
. .
53
Application of4Air Transport to
Problems of Supply
LIEUTENANT COLONELM. J. REYNOLDS,Corps of E?zgi?tee?%
Inst r uct or , Command and Gener al St aff SchooI
T
HE NEAREST approach to a perfect representa
tion of the Americaa eagle is an Americaa air
plane whether it be a Piper Cub or the giant
Mars flying boat. Air transport, however, is so young
that it is comparable to a young eagle: it has broken
its shell hut it bas not Jet lifted itself to the heights
where it is destined to swar as the monarch of the
skies.
There are many things to be said on both sides of
any discn.ssion concerning air transportation, Fhlthu
siasm for this means of rapid communication should
not lead one to go off the deep end and join the rela
t ively few who contend that the movement of all
personnel and all commodities should be by air. On
the other hand, the point of view which places air
transportation in the limited classification of pas
sen%er. carrier de Iuxe, with no practical application
to the handling of cargo, should likewise be treated
with reserve.
Unlike the locomotive or the steamship, the air
plane was first put to large-scale use, not in peace, but
in war. It was not until after the airplane had at
tained importance as an instrument of reconnais
sance and destrnetion in World War I that serious
development of its possibilities in peaceful traffic be
gan. Today military usefulness is again the dominant
factor in the progress of air transport.
Prior to World War 1 there had been only a few
attempts, of an experimental character, to use air
craft for transportation, the most noteworthy of
which was a series of flights in 1911-13 in Germany
by Zeppelin airships, and, in the United States, a
service between St. Petersburg and Tampa, Florida,
for three mont 1)s ia 1914. Suggest ions that aircraft
could be used to special advantage for the carriage
of mails were made quite early but the first regular
air-mail service was started in the spriag of 1918 be
aween New York and Washington, initially with
Army planes and pilots. About the same time. regu
larly scheduled air transportation was attempted in
Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, and Plms
were made for post-w al- international services in
Europe,
The first World War not only stimulated the tech
nical development of aeronautics: it increased im
The Ait?lane i,t the Scheme of Pos t War T) auportaticm
by W. A. Pat t er son.
1.termtwzdTxms po.t and National Policv by Ail
Lmsit zyn.
$
mensel y fhe product ive capacity of the aircraft
manufacturing industry and led to the training of
large numbers of personnel and an increase in the
number of airfields, especially in Europe.
The Treaty of Versailles itself influenced post-war
developments of air transport. For, by depriving Ger
many temporarily of military aviation, it turned
German efforts toward the development of civil air
transport; civil aviation then became the only means
of maintaining the existence of the aircraft manufac
turing industry in Germany. In manj remote cotm
tries Germans at once started developing air lines and
importing Junkers planes.
Domestic air transport is of greater relative im
portance in the United States, the So\,iet Union, Bra
zil, and the British Empire as a whole than it is in
the states of western Europe which have concen
trated on the development of international and co
lonial air services. With respect to the four countries
just meationed the following figures indicate the re
lationship of regularly established air-route miles to
areas and populations:
Area Z:; A;, R/ Area R ,PoI}
Co!,nirv Sg.:;l Miles
(md-
I1O?U) lions )
Umed St at es 3.0 l:;:; 72,632 1,s20
Br a d 3.3 9,182 3:; 4,%0
U. S. S. R. 8.8 192.7 65,365 134 2,90
Br it ,sh Empir e 13.6 504.7 8~1)) 154 5,650
J apanese Empir e .26 105.2 , 30 12,100
The significance of these comparisons is obvious.
The ratio of air-route miles to area is comparable
with the number of strings you wrap around a pack
age to hold it together. The ratio of air-route miles
to population indicates the average size of the group
of persons served by one air-roate mile. The former
is of political importance, the latter of economic im
portance.
Perhaps the readers thoughts are pointing to the
qnestion: Why talk about pre-World War II interna
tional air routes ?most of them do not exis t at the
present time. To that extent, the thought is correct.
However, if one were given the responsibility of de
signing and developing new supply routes, geared to
the tempo of modern warfare, would he just pick UP
a map of the world and etart right in without a mo
ments consideration of the routes men have traveled
before him ? Of course, the answer is in the nega
tive. A survey of all international air transport
routes, as of the latest available date, -will establish
I
54
APPLICATION OF AIR TRANSPORT TO PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY
those routes over which men have accumulated
actual experience including the locations at which
air transport facilities have been established.
The great importance of air routes was empha
sized by the fact that rapidly growing international
tension, even before September 1939, had led to the
suspension of many air services in Europe. The for.
tunes of mar made air routes on the perimeter of
Axis-dominated Europe (England; Lisbon, and trans.
Africa) of vital importance to the Allied cause. The
years 1939 and 1940 marked the turning point in the
history of world air transport as well as in world his
tory in general.
Our attention next focuses on the extent of our
Domestic Air Transport Service at the beginning of
our participation in World War 11. The exact num
ber of planes i{} commercial service hae never been
announced; but we do know from 1.1 to 14 of all the
planes regularly assigned to commercial service were
withdrawn therefrom and impressed into gOVel.II
ment service under the direction of the Air Trans
lmrt Command. The effect of this relocation of do
mestic aircraft may be misunderstood, eo we give you
a few figures to indicate the net result of this re
allocation:
AIRLINES RECORD
Per cen t
I
1941 1942 Ch a n ge
Reven u e
pa s s en ger
miles 1,491,734,671 1,700,577,524 PI. 14
Pa ::s s eydr s
4,060,545 4,446,!!97 Plus 9 5
.Miles flown 133,022,697 126,200,000 Minus 5
Se;::lw
2.316,205,507 2,230,000,000 Minus 3.76
Expr ess
poundage 19,209,671 40,340,319 pk18 110
St at ist ics for a recent ten-weeks period establish
the fact that the Air Command is handling an aver
,ige of more than one million pounds per week over
r ou t es entirely within the continental United States.
The value of this expedited service to the war effort
cannot be measured.
On the basis of the relationship of commercially
t .tablished air routes to war-dictated air lanes with
1)1the fJnited States, one would expect the routes of
OIIr Air Transport Command which reach beyond
[ ontinental limits to follow those established by our
,,wn and other nations in the development of inter
national air service.
Our global air routes may roughly be divided into
tour groups:
1. South Atlantic-Trans African Route.
2. Alaskan Route.
3. South Pacific Route.
4. North Atlantic Route.
Statistics mean little until they are illustrated.
I)uring the early spring of 1942 we were extremely
worried about the supply of block mica which is used
in aircraft magneto insulation and as insulation .in
spark plugs and radio tubes. Very little block mica
is produced in the United States and the supply
must be imported. Requirements had multiplied due
to the demands of the war effort, but ocean shipping
from India was too slow (two or two and one-half
months) and was becoming far too dangerous. Early
in March 1942, WPB received information from the
Army Air Transport Command that on their new
operations into India, there would be space on the
return flights for cargo, and they requested a list
of strategic materials in order of pri&.ity which
should be carried on the planes. WPB submitted to
them a list of requirements in order of priority, and
since that time Mnck mica has been flown all the
way from India to this country and has prevented
shutdowns of our radio and spark plug factories.
Some time ago radio manufacturers of fbis coun
trywere facing a desperate shortage of quartz crys
tals from which they manufacture radio oscillath-s.
Not only had ships from Rio been delayed for months
due to the submarine menace, but a]so many nf those
ships which had sailed for the United States, several
of them with large cargoes of quartz crystals, had
been sunk.
WPB transmitted to the Joint Air Transpoit Com
mittee of the Army and Navy its total r.equirements
for imports from Brazil of mica, quartz crystals,
tantalite, beryl, and other strategic materials which
we could not atTord to lose at sea, and for which the
demand was so urgent that prompt delivery was
necessary.
At that time there was only one passenger plane
a day from Rio to the United State?, which plane
was almost entirely filled with pas&ngers every day
and on which there was almost no space for the large
requirements which WPB specified for imports of
cargo.
The Joint Army-Navy Air Transport Committee,
therefore, allocated planes and put in operation a
special shuttle service of Army and Navy planes to
bring these materials from Brazil to the United
States. This service has literally kept our radio pro
duction in the United States going.
A further benefit derived from services along this
route is political rather than economic in natnre.
The advent of our entry into World War. II neces
sitated our withdrawal from the South Ameriban
service of practically all American flag shipping. This
strained our Good-.Neighbor relations to a critical
point. The appearance of aircraft of the American
Air Transport Command in the countries south of
the border might be compared to Noahs reception
of the Dove when it returned with the olive branch.
These planes carried back to the United States only
the highest value-per-pound commodities including
mica, quartz crystals, industrial diamonds, tantalite,
heryl, rubber, and tungsten ore. The value of these
55
MILITARY REVIEW
movements from an economic point of view is ob- speed and range--also restrict: the operation of
vious. We can only suggest the value of these services current type planee to routes which inclnde landing
from a political point of view. fields and fueling stations. Today is bringing forth
It would seem unnecessary to indicate any specific
a new airplane which will provide truly global serv.
illustration of the distinguished services provided by
ice without the restrictions imposed by the handi
air transport to Alaska. Ever since Floyd Bennett
caps of current types of airplanes.
!( flew his lif @-saving serum to Nome, Alaska has been Douglas Aircraft has done much valuable research
linked to the States by countless numbers of aircraft cm the possibilities of tram-polar air routes as illus
of all types and descriptions, using landing fields of trated on the accompanying chart. These routes are
every kind, and flying more often on unscheduled
and uncharted routes than otherwise.
This brings us to a consideration of the further
application of air transport to problems of SUpplY.
In this connection, one can do no better than repeat
the words of Rudyard Kipling: We are at the open
ing verse of the opening page of the chapter of end
less possibilities.
In the earlier part of this discussion it was sug
gested that it was only natural that supply routes via
air should follow the trails blazed by commercial air
lines as nations sought to tie empires more closely
together. Characteristics of aircraftthat is, air
radical but not to the extent of being fOunded on im.
possible ground support. They are still confined with.
in the present critical range of aircraft wwlch is 2fjo0
miles. Those which reach across the Arctic and trans
verse Russia must await the day when war is no
more, or when hostilities are declared between Rus
sia and Japan.
The Douglas chart reveals a previously unexplorea
service which ordinarily is not attributed to air trans
port. We usually measure the utility of air transport
in terms of time saved by reason of its sunerior sueed.
However, the airplane also can producg tremendous
savings in actual miles, in addition, of course, to time,
56
APPLICATION OF AIR TRANSPORT TO PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY
by reason of its speed, On the chart, note that Route
No. 1, New York to Chungking, aggregate 7,615
miles, whereas Route No. 2, New York to Chungking
via Cape Town, involves 16,120 miles. Also note that
the distance via Air Route No. 3 from New York tO
Moscow is 4,640 miles whereas the same two points
are separated by 16,600 miles when a shipment is
obliged to travel Route No. 4 via Cape Town, the Per
sian Gulf, the Iranian and Russian railroads to iMos-
Cow.
In passing, we might indicate some of the accomp
lishments of our enemies along these lines.
The application of air transport to supply has been
made to the greatest degree by the Germans. With
hundreds of Junkers 52s, the Nazis took Rotterdam,
held Narvik, and overwhelmed Crete. That type of
plane is able to get in and out of poor fields with a
minimum of difficulty. It can carry twenty men or
two and one-half tons of equipment three hundred
miles at 170 miles per hour. With two gliders in tow,
each with a ton of stores or ten men and another ton
in its own fuselage, it can cover five hundred miles
ULfive hours. With her almost undisputed air power,
Germany created her owu strategic situations in
Norway, Crete, and Libya. Last winter she delivered
5L[pp1ieS from the air to her Sixteenth Army which
had been encircled at Staraya Russa. The Nazis
have developed an effective method for transporting
tanks in planes. Turrets and guns are handled in one
plane, hulls in another, tracks and remaining equip
ment in a third.
The outstanding aerial achievement of the open
iug phase of the Allied African Campaign was the
1,~00-mile, non-stop mass flight of 44 Douglas Sky-
trooper Transports from England to an airdrome
uear Tunis. The mission of landing paratroops wae
completed successfully and not an airplane was lost.
No other paratroop attack in history has been made
over more than a small fraction of the distance!
A striking force at 300 miles per hour cannot suc
cessfully be supported hy a supply line which moves
a[ 8 knots. Amplification is unnecessary when we
compare the striking force of P-38s and B-17s with
L]berty ships and foreign railways of various gauges.
The average time required by a crossing from our
Ninth Atlantic ports to England is between 10 and
14 days. Since the American Export Airlines first
scheduled flight to Europe, .May 26, 1942, 3 Vougbt
Sil.orsky flying boats have made more than 100 At-
Iautic crossings and in the first six months of actual
opc+ratiops eclipsed every known record for transat
larlt ic comniercial aircraft, east-bound, west-bound,
and non-stop. Faetest eingle crossing, eastbound from
New York to Foynes, was 16 hours, 8 minutes, with
16 passengers, crew of 11, and cargo and mail. This
is startling when compared to Howard Hughes rec
ord-breaking 16 \lJ-hour trip across the Atlantic a
few years ago on his 3 l,+day round-the-world flight.
A record weethound flight was completed in 19 hours,
54 minutes flying time against prevailing head winds,
with passengers, cargo and mail.
The average convoy to Australia consumes 30 days
(one way) whereas regularly scheduled air service
negotiates the same distance in 4 days. Our present
all-water route around the Cape of Good Hope to
India requires 60 convoy days. Dependable air serv.
ice is being operated on the basis of 5 to 7 days. Since
the Mediterranean is cloeed to us, Cairo and Basra
are at least 75 days away from our east coast. The
Air Transport Command can provide service to both
of these cities on the basis of from 3\~ to 4 }~ days.
In connection with both rail and motor transporta
tion, it is customary to design and produce special
types of equipment to meet special shipping require
ments. The re-tooling of an automobile manufactur
ing plant is a major undertaking, but it is now ac
complished with mimimum delay because basic prin
ciples of manufacturing have been established. A
similar situation exists with reference to the develop
ment of special types of freight-carrying rail vehicles.
We do not enjoy the same freedom in the development
of new types of aircraft. In taking stock of what has
been accomplished and what has been learned about
the transport of troops and cargo by air during the
first year of thie war, it must be remembered that we
have no experience except with converted airplanes
which were not originally designed as cargo or troop
carriers. When the need for air transport became
desperate, we reached out to the commercial air lines,
took their equipment as it was, possibly installed
heavier floors, removed the de luxe interiors, loaded
them with critical freight, and took off for destina
tions never dreamed of by the designers of the air.
craft itself.
New types of planes are coming from production
lines at the present time, and more will come rolling
out onto the airfields of the world within the next .,
few monthsall of which are specifically desigued
for the efficient handling of cargo. How should an
airplane he measured with respect 10 the problem of
supply ? Three possible measurements are: (1) load-
carrying capacity per unit of strategic materials em
ployed in manufacture; (2) ratio of load~carrying
capacity to fuel capacity and consumption; (3) the
type of plane in relation to the job to be done.
Further analyzing tbe last mentioned measure
ment, we must consider: (1) the distance to be cov
ered; (2) the load to be carriedtroops, airborne or
paratroops; or cargo, type, packaging, loading, and
stowing; (3) the speed desired; (4) ground facilities
at origin, en route, and at destination, including fuel
bunker stations, take off and landing characteristics,
and available maintenance facilities. -
The layman characteristically thinks of the ca
pacity of a given airplane in erroneous terms. Or
dinarily we say that an airplane will carry so much,
so far, at a certain speed; and almost without excep
tion we described the ship in maximum terms with
57
MILITARY REVIEW
respect to each of these three measurementsand
thereby we fall into error. In describing one of our
prospective a% cargo transports we might say it will
carry 80,000 pounds pay load, it has a range of 6,000
miles, and an average speed of 210 miles per hour.
Wonderful though this airplane may he, it doesut
accomplish all three of these things simultaneously.
The truth is, it will carry 80,000 pounds for 3,000
miles, but if tbe distance to be carried is 7,500 miles
the maximum pa} load is reduced 75 per cent or to
20,000 pounds. Full speed is dependent upon either
economy in fuel consumption or upon emergency
where ntmost speed justifies any expense.
The freight-carrying characteristics of a plane are
described in terms of: ( 1) size and shape of cargo
compartment; (2) horsepower of the power plant;
(3) fnel capacity.
We cannot afford to overlook the importance of
applying the various types of air transports to the
jobs for which they were designed any more than
we can permit a square staff officer to be placed in a
round staff officers job. In emergencies any aircraft
may be ntilimd for any job within its operating ca
pacity, but, along hnes of supply, air transport should
be apilied from the point of view of the service for
n ,hich it was designed.
And finally, a brief summary of the types of air
craft now in service or production. The type most fa
miliar is the Douglas DC-3, a 21-passenger plane
operated by commercial air lines. When these ships
were commandeered by the Air Transport Command,
they put on their war paint and assumed the undig
nified designation of C-47 when employed as a cargo
carrier, and N-53 when used primarily as a personnel
carrier. The Cnrtlss Commando, C-46, is one of the
most effective cargo carriers in service today. It is a
high -weight, medmm-distance cargo plane, whereas
the C-54 carries substantially the same amount of
cargo but has a range which can be stretched to
twice the distance accomplished by the C-46. The
C-54 also is designed to handle more easily heavier
individual pieces of equipment since N has a hoist
which lifts its cargo vertically up to the side loading
$Oor.
Curtiss has now in mass production its model C-76,
known as the Caravan. This ship is constructed en
tirely of interchangeable sections built of plywood
with a negligible amount of strategic materials. It
carries a useful load of approximately 7 tons with a
maximum range of more than 3,000 miles.
Douglas has announced the production of a long-
r an ge combat transport designed to lift a gross
weight of 70 tons and to carry a useful load of 36 tons.
Consolidated has modified the design of its B-24 Lib
erator to develop the C-87 cargo transport. At the
present time, WPR has allotted materials sufficient
only for :he construction of a limited number of
these ships per month.
Finally, we look to Lockheed for the type C-60,
w,hich is a modification of the very successful Lode
star. Early in February Lockheeds C-69 was suc
cessfully flight-tested, when it was discovered that
this ship would carry between 15 and 20 tons pay
load at s]meds greater than accomplished by enemy
fighters.
It has been stated already that a striking force of
three hundred miles per hour could not be supported
by a supply line moving at eight knots. Above
all other considerations, war must be kept as
far from the continental United States as possible. To
this end we as a nation are bending every effort to
supply existing battle fronts so effectively that it will
not be necessary to defend our homes and country
within our own boundaries. Distance, therefore, is
basic to our deepest desires and most profound strate
gY. The effectiveness of distance, however, will be de.
termined solely by the speed of our supply lines. The
introduction of speed as an essential element to a SUP.
ply line makes Army Service Forces a competitor with
combat forces who depend on the same elements of air
transport to accomplish their tactical missions. In al
most any maneuver it is patent that tactical ground
forces must be supported by air forces, but who has
ever beard of the necessity for a supply line to be
sapported by an adequate air transport? Th]s
thonght, however, must pervade all thinking to the
extent that those responsible for the successful de
livery of supplies to the combat forces will auto
matically measure the effectiveness of their efforts
by the same terms of time and space as those used
by the striking forces.
A few campaigns thoroughly studied will do more to strengthen the
intellect, to develop a capacity for hard thinking, and to teach the art of
leading troops, than fifty campaigns that have been mereIy skimmed.
Colonel G. F. R. Henderson.
58
reinforcing Artillery Employed in Mass I
The Attack of an Organized Position
[Prepared for t he Military Review at t he Field Ar t iller y School, For t Sill, Oklahoma.] .
This is the second article from tlie origitd
text, the jirst section of which appeared in the
MaU number of the Military Review under the
title: The Emplo~ment of Corps A rtillemJ.
EDITOR.
G
E.NERAL.-a. The term r anfor cing ar t dkr y
applies to such additional artillery as may be
attached from a higher uuit to a lower. Ex
amples:
1. Artillery units attached by corps to divisions.
2. Large quantities of artillery that are attached
to a command as. required for a particular operation.
Such attachments are especially indicated in the at
tack of a strong defensive position; the following
paragraphs refer exclusively to this type of situa
tion.
b. Commanders of reinforcing units must be ag.
gressive in starting reconnaissance and in utiliziug
their own means for securing missions and battle
field intelligence. The more rapid the action, the
less the aid which may be expected from units al
ready committed.
Corwideration_s Involved in Attaching Large
.4 mocmts of Itetnforciny ArttUery.When large
quantities of reinforcing artillery are to be attached
to a command, several complex problems arise.
Among these are:
a. The requirements in weapons, additional head
quarters, and ammunition.
b. The time and space factors that will control
the movement of the units and ammunition to thew
respective areas of employment.
r. Tentative allocations to subordinate echelons,
based on the estimated requirements.
d. Final allocations to subordinate echelons, based
I,pon the reinforcing artillery and ammunition ac
t [ially allocated by higher headquarters.
e. Determination o the priorities of arrival and
!
of occupation of positron by the reinforcing units.
f. Preparatory work to be done, by units now in
]msition, to assist reinforcing units in getting ready
to fire.
g. Arrangements for receiving and maneuvering
tl]e reinforcing units upon their arrival in the tom.
Lit zone.
h. Coordination of all field artillery observation
means.
i. Release of the reinforcing units at the time
designated by the higher headquarters.
These matters are discussed separately in tbe
paragraphs immediately following.
Requirements in Weapons, Headquarters, Am
munitionsA correct determination of the require
ments in weapons, additional headquarters, and am
munition for the support of a particular operation
IS arrived at through careful calculations made by
tbe artillery commander and staff of the senior
echelon present. The commander considers, first,
the plan of attack; second, the general and special
missions that must be accomplished. The special
missions include specific missions ordered by the
commander, counterbattery, and missions that ie
quire super-power artillery. The calculations fcr
the ammunition requirements must be made con
currently with the requirements for the weapons
and the additional headquarters.
Time and Space Con.siderations. -When the esti
mated requirements are determined tbe artillery
commander, in cooperation with the general staff,
then determines whether tbe available time, and the
road and railroad nets available to bring the rein
forcing units and their ammunition into the area
will permit completion of the movements. A care
ful stucty of the transportation for ammunition pur
poses that can be made available from units now
present is a pertinent consideration.
Tentotire A locations to Submdins te Echelmw.
The calculations being completed, the artillery com
mander makes a tentative organization for combat,
based upon his estimates, in order to dete~mine tbe
allocationjj to subordinate echelons. His estimate
provides for the retention under his immediate con
trol of the minimum amount required to accomplish
the missions envisaged. The remainder of the rein
forcing artillery requested is tentatively allocated to
the several subordinate echelons. In making the al
locations to subordinate echelons the factors to bc
considered are: tbe fire-power needs of these units
to accomplish their missions; the particular units
ability to command additional artillery; position
areas svailable; and routes of access. The sqbject
of organization for cnmbat is presented in a sep
arate text.
Finai Allocation to Subordinate Echelons.-When
higher beadquarters announces the amcmnt of rein
forcing artillery and ammunition that will actually
be made available, the artillery commander and his
staff re~,ise the tentative allocations anod plan, with
tbe general staff, the movement of the reinforcing
units to the combat zone.
59
.... .- .. .. . . .... . .
respect to each of these three measurementsand
thereby we fall into error. In describing one of our
prospective air cargo transports we might say it will
carry 80,000 pounds pay load, it has a range of 6,000
miles, and an average speed of 210 miles per hour.
Wonderful though this airplaue may be, it doesnt
accomphsh all three of these things simultaneously.
The truth is, it will carry 80,000 pounds for 3,000
miles, hut ]f the distance to be carried is 7,500 miles
the maximum pay load is yeduced 75 per cent or to
20,000 pounds. Full speed is dependent upon either
economy in fuel consumption or upon emergency
where utmost speed ,iust ities any expense.
The freight-cam} ing cbaracterist ics of a plane are
described in terms of: ( 1) size and shape of cargo
compartment; (2) horsepower of the power plant;
(3) fuel capacity.
We cannot afford to overlook the importance of
applying the varioua types of air transports to the
.lObS for which they were designed any more than
we can permit a square staff cdlicer to be placed in a
round staff officers Job. In emergencies any aircraft
may be t}tilized for any J OlI within its operating ca
pacity. but, along iines of supply, air transport should
be applied from the point of view of the service for
u h ich it was designed.
And finally, a brief summary of the types of air
craft now in service or production. The type most fa.
miliar is the [)ouglas UC-3, a 21 -passeuger plane
operated by commercial air hnes. When these ships
were commandeered by tbe Au- Transport Command,
the} put on their war paint and assumed the mldig
nifted designation of C-47 when employed as a cargo
carrier, and N-53 Mhen used primarily as a personnel
carrier. The Curtiss Commando, C-46, is one of the
most effective cargo carriers in service today. It is a
high-weight, medium-distance cargo plane, whereas
the C-54 cmmes substantially the same amount of
cargo but has a range which can be stretched to
twice the distance accomplished by the C-46. The
C-54 also is designed to handle more easily heavier
individual pieces of equipment since it has a hoist
which lifts its cargo vertically up to the side loading
door.
, Cnrtihs has now in mass production its model C-76,

known as the Caravan. This ship is constructed en
tirely of interchangeable sections built of plywood
with a negligible amount of strategic materials. It
carries a useful load of approximately 7 tons with a
maximum range of more than 3,000 miles.
Douglas has announced the production of a long-
range combat transport designed to lift a gross
weight of 70 tons and to carry a useful load of 36 tons.
Consolidated has modified the design of its B-24 Lib
erator to develop the C-87 cargo transport. At the
present time, WP13 has allotted materials sufficient
only for the construction of a limited number of
these ships per month.
Finally, we look to Lockheed for the type C-60,
which is a modification of the very successful Lode
star. Early in February Lockheeds C-69 was suc
cessfully flight-tested, when it was discovered that
this ship would carry between 15 and 20 tons pay
load at speeds greater than accomplished by enemy
fighters.
It has been stated already that a striking force of
three hundred miles per hour could not be supported
by a supply line moving at eight knots. Above
all other considerations, war must be kept as
far from the continental United States as possible. To
this end we as a nation are bending every effort to
supply existing battle fronts so effectively that it will
not be necessary to defend our homes and country
wit h in our own boundaries. Distance, therefore, is
basic to our deepest desires and most profound strate
gy. The effectiveness of distance, however, will be de
termined solely by the speed of our supply lines. The
introduction of speed as an essential element to a sup.
ply line makes Army Service Forces a competitor with
combat forces who depend on the same elements of air
transport to accomplish their tactical missions. In al
most any maneuver it is patent that tactical ground
force. must be supported by air forces, but who has
ever heard of the necessity for a supply line to be
suppoqted by an adequate air transport? This
thought, however, must pervade all thinking to the
extent that those responsible for the successful de
livery of supplies to the combat forces will auto
matically measure the effectiveness of their efforts
by the same terms of time and space as those used
by the striking forces.
A few campaigns thoroughly studied will do more to strengthen the
intellect, to develop a capacity for hard thinking, and to teach the art of
leading troops, than fifty campaigns that have been merely skimmed.
Colonel G. F. R. Henderson.
58
Japanese Uge of Chemicals
A ReLort on Chemical Warfare ~actics Used Against the Chinese People
(Reprinted from the Chemical Warfare Eutletw Oct ober 1942)
T
HE CHINESE C,overnment has made extensive
claims that lethal and toxic chemicals have
been employed in battle against Chinese troops
since hostilities started. Investigations indicate that
smoke and tear gas compositions were employed by
Jap~nese from the start of the war, but no proof ex
ists that lethal or toxic chemicals were employed
prior to the fall of 1939.
Lethal chemicals definitely appeared on the battle
field in the summer of 1941 and were used extensive
ly wherever the Chinese were applying pressure and
the Japanese desired to conser~,e man-power. Vast
quantities were used in very restricted areasgen
erally to support Japanese counterattacks. The chem
ical actions were never widespread, seeming to be
concentrated in definite areas and to be repeated in
those areas. This, of course, may be duc to the tac
tical situation and tbe terrain; generally the Chinese
were exerting the greatest pressure on those fronts.
The Ichang area and the Changsha area received
the bulk of attacks. Chemical actions in those areas
were studied by American observers.
CHEMICALS USED IN BATTLE FOR ICHANG
In the Ichang action of October 1941 a heavy at
tack was launched by the Chinese to take the city and
carry the heights beyond where a defensive position
could be organized. Chinese reinforcements were
moved into tbe area in late September and early Oc
tober. This movement was observed by Japanese
planes and new dispositions were made on the de
fensive side, hut no great number of additional troops
were moved up. Artillery and mortar fire increased
in intensity and considerable quantities of lachry
matory and sneeze gases were reported mixed in with
the HE firing (none reported as mixed in shell with
HE). Between October 5th and 8th some additional
mortar companies were reported, and indications are
that the bulk of chemical munitions were fired from
these new locations. Chinese soldiers reported eye
trouble and stomach sickness from the gas, but no
deaths were reported prior to October 8th. Chinese
chemical defense officers report that lethal chemicals
were not used prior to the Chinese attack which was
initiated about October 8th.
The attack was launched and was a success as far
as taking the city of Ichang. The Japanese retired
to heights beyond the city, fighting a delaying action.
They organized and held a semi-circular ridge outside
tbe city. Lethal gases were not reported as being
used during tbe basic attack, but records, dates and
times are rather confused. Howevel-, when the Chin
ese pressed the attack to take the ridges necessary
to hold the city proper, the Japanese launched coun
terattacks from both flanks and great quantities of $
lethal gas were placed on the attacking Chinese and
in the low areas behind them. Between October 10th
and 12th, planes came in and dropped lethal gas
bombs all over tbe area. The Chinese were either
barefoot or wearing straw sandals and no gas masks
or protective clothing were available. In the attack
they were severely gassed and burned. Chinese in
reserve were heavily gassed and received many cas
ualties, most of which proved fatal. Retiring from
tbe attack, the Chinese had to proceed through low
areas to avoid machine-gun fire, and thus passed
through very heavily concentrated gas barriers.
GAS WAS MIXTURE OF MUSTARD AND LEWISITE
It is very difficult to obtain accurate strength
figures from the Chinese, but it appears that there
were over 2,OOO casualties due to gas and gun fire.
Of the casualties who came out of the area, 29 were
gas cases, twelve of whom died em-oute to hospital.
Later, sjx were located in hospitals and were able to
give an account of the action. Only two of the six
lived to return to their units.
Laboratory tests of samples of the gas and parts
of shells and bombs showed tbe gas to be a mixtnre
of mustard and Icwisite. All symptoms noted on the
casualties were those of persistent lethal gas.
A Chinese war communique reported two major
gas attacks by tbe Japanese on the Chekiang front
during the latter part of May. Attempting a forced
crossing of the Sinan River near Kienteh, three
Japanese planes dropped gas bombs on Chinese posi
tions while land batteries fired gas shells at the de
fenders. With one third of them falling victim to
tbe gas attack, Chinese defenders of Paishupa evac
uated tbe ri~wrside town.
Another gas attack, according to newspaper re
ports, took place at Tangki west of Kinhwa. After
an unsuccessful assault against the western Cbekiang
railway town, the invaders released a large volume
of gas on the defenders to open a way for their attack.
Tbe Chinese were forced to evacuate tbe town be
cause of tbe gas.
According to a survey, gas used by the Japanese on
the China front can be classified into six groups,
three belonging to the irritant category and three to
the toxic. In 1937 and early 1938, the Japanese used
mostly tear and sneeze producing irritants. Since
the Chinese victory at Taicrchwang, toxic gases have
been used with greater intensity. Gas units were at
tached to each Japanese regim$nt and storm unit,
and gas tactics were resorted to with much greater
frequency. Lethal and blistering gases are the main
agents employed by the invadere in recent years.
61
I
-m
MILITARY NOTES
.- .,.=
a
;
AROUND THE
$
;q ,
~.
............
WORLD
.............,-.,. ,.
)k_iY
5
$;{,
AFRICA
AUSTRALIA
T!,< 11., 8:?$0> t : Ca]d7, wd ,Wmm, Ma f&;cl. -.
The st , cn~t h of t he Aust r alian A ,my
was mo! e t han t r ipled In 1942, Ivfumt ions
h r ,oduct um wOs ,., eased t pfold, war
. .Ynm,l, t m.es amount ed t o 40 mr cent of )
$ t he nat mr ml income, Seyent y per cent of
t he ent we male poplat mn of Aust , ah.
bwwee t he ages of 14 and 65 ar e now
e!t her m t he armed sewrce m egaged I.
t he n a. ,ndust ,y. Mor e t han 500,000 per .
, . .ons ar e employed , t he Ast r ahan war
lr hlst r y.
, P3avd, J loscow)
INDIA
IWlmh [1.,, > Ef<,, t
lmlmn t ,oops nmbc wedonly 170,000
;hcn t he .wm begun. They now numbel
ova 1.250.000 exclus,ve of soldler s ser v
ing ah! oa<lall volunt cc!s, and mcl,eas
igly officer ed hy Indians Ret , mt s ar e
. . . ept ed at an aver age , at e of 50,000 a
mont h a, equipment becomes avwlable
for t hem. AKlploxinlat ely :<00,000 lndkan
SOMWI. ar c .er vmg over seas.
I n addmon t o t he RoYal A,> FOIce
. .
; ..
,J. -----
.-
Capt uled by t he Bllt lsh F,lght h Amw in t he West er n Deser t : A Rssw. gun
mount ed on a Czech t ank, used as z Ger M 50. mm at lt ank weapon.
, out es ape. Conswt mg of only t en or
t welve small sh!m at t he out hr eah of t he
war . t he Royal Imlmn havy has added
com-et t cs, nl,esm eepet s, and slot ips, m,t h
an mr r easc m sea.goit qg pemonnel of
e, 600, t The,, ar e also eve, 40,000
Ind!sm seamen smv,r ,x m t he wr chat
.IIIU.t he of Allr c.
J ndm ,, ,Lu<iu?ing W< ~ of hw mvn
,Va, ,q, p,mt , as ,wl) as SUp,>lymg
ot he, member . of t he Vn, t ed Xat mm
New ~,lust , ,e~ me hemc devekmed Ma
Gflf?4T BRITAIN
T/ c .>5.[,.,,,, <1<,,
The Bmt ,J , have
2&),0 U, IeI field g
,10,, mount ed
on t he chaws
t he,r
of a
L__ __ . ,
Vaient me t znl. t o give it Ki-eat er *no
bilit y. [ For a account of t his famous
gun we t he dfilt t ar v Review, for J anuar y,
1943, Pf). 62-63. ] (Newsweek)
Pi,+r ed above ist be ew Ge~man beavyt ak
Tunma. Among ot her weapons ,1 car r m~ t he
t r eads a~e designed for deser t war far e.
wnployed in t he ,ecent fight ing in
88.mm gnu. The wide cat er pillar
(Deuts che A Ugemeine Zeitw z g)
62
MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD
GERMANY
I,<epa, .t ,ou f, sea lia, fa>e:
The Lr mt ed St at es and Gt eat Biit an
,,,,,y look for war d t o Ger many launch.
,n~ her gr eat est sea and a,r at t ack cm
$o,<rcha.t- shfppin~ soon, The p!es eIIt
i;aman U-boat pack is conser vat mely
. <t imat ed at bet ween 300 and 400 vessels,
,,lt h new cr aft heinz c.nmlet ed at t he
n, t he La ft .
wife for some t ime has been developing
lnng-r ange, high-alt ]t ude, mdt i-engined
aer ial bat t leships such as t he Unit ed
St at es int r oduced t o t he wor ld at Line
I.mt Oct ober in t he Boeing F@g
Fr et , esws ad Consobdat ed Liberators .
Thr + Focke.Wulf ZOOK2 Kur ier , a four .
engi ined bomber , was act ive at t be st ar t
of t he war i >pot t ,g convoys and r e
por t ing t hmr Iocat mns t o IJ .heat s The
s.pemm ar mament and speed of Alhed
planm, however , placed t he Au,iet at a
<Ihwlvat age and dur ing t he past six or
mght mont hs ,t s act r nt y in long d,mace
d[xkt , at sea has dimimsbed consider
ably, Ger man designer s and plane fae.
t er m- have been wm-kingd ihget lyt ode
velop a plane capable of slugging it out
wit h t be For t r ess and t he I,i&, afor , The
Hemkel 177 bas been in D1C5WSS of de
velopment for sever al y&r s. It m a
monoplane \ wt b four l,l50.bor sepmvw
Mer cedes-Benz engles combmed int o
t wo nit s, each pair dr wmg a four -
bladed pr opeller , and is said t o have a
r ange of 7,000 miles which would qualify
it for long dist aime cooper at ion wit h
U-boat s in mid. At lant ic. This summer
Ger ma~y should have her new heavy
t ype air cr aft r eady for act ion, st r oking
at Alhed convoys in cooper at ion wit h
U-boat squadr ons far out in t he At lant ic.
(A,,. Digest)
Ai, -G, ottnd Tactw .s :
Accor ding t o Lieut enant -Colonel Niko
li, Demsov of t he Sov,et Air For ce, t he
Ger mans last summer used t heir air cr aft
bot h t o suppor t Iand? t r oops and t o at
t ack t he RussIan r ear and r eser ves.
When t he Ger mans met wit h t heir fir st
r ever ses, special hmnber squadr ons
ecpmpped vnt h impr oved J unker 88s and
Hkir ikel 111s wer e cr eat ed, t o st age
heavy r aids deep int o t he Russmns r ear .
However , as t he Ger man pool of skilled
pdot s gr ew less, t he r aids diminished.
Today t he Ger man Air For ce is con
centrating on s ingle sect or s in an effor t
t o deal an over whelming air blow. It no
longer engages m such cost ly exper i
ment s as t he use of Focke-Wulf 58 t r ain
er s for night bombing. Inst ead, heavy
bomber s ar e sent against specdic and
hmit ed t ar get s, t o pr ecede or suppor t
land at t acks.
(New s w eek )
Ro,,,me~s Gene, als;
Ihe eampalgn. in Nor t h Afr ica has
t ahen a r elat ively h,gh t oll of Afr ika
Kor ps senior and st aff officer s. Some
have been kdled in act mn: t hr ee Ger
man dwwmnal commander s ar e bur ied
,. Der na cemet er y alone. Some have been
h,lled in accident s, Some have been t aken
Pr lson:r Ot her s have not got on wit h
t hat ddficult per sonagv, Field Mar shal
Romm.1, and have been sent packing.
Take t be excellence, for inst ance, of
t he 21st Panzer Dnwsion,, ,at pr esent
commanded hy Genemdma~or von Ran.
dew, The fir st commander . Gener almajor
.Iohann von Ravenst em. was caDt ur ed by
t he Br it ish and is now a ukisoner of wai
m Canada, v.he. ce. by t he way, be has
\ w, t t en home explessmg consider able
wmsfaet lo wit h hli comfor t able and
car efr ee life. Van Ravcnst ein was suc
ceede~ as commander of t he 21st Panzer
DlvmonbyGener aln,a~ocGe or g\ WI Bis
mar ck, who was kdled m act ,on m Sep
t ember .
in fat al casualt ies, t he 15t h Panzer
Dimsicm has been even unluckier . Al
r eady t mo of It s commander sGener al.
mwor von P*lt t wit z and Gener .almajor
Neumann.Silkm. have been Idled m
act ,on.
Deat h, d.healt h, or a r umpus wit h
Rommel have caubed a number of
changes in t be command of t be 90t h
Light Division. One commander . Gener .
abwqor Smnmer mann, \ vas kdled in ?c
t ,on It M he, along wi!h Gene.r almad Or
vcm Pr it t wit z and Gener almaJ or Neu
mam-Silkow, who IS bur r ed in t he ceme
t er y at - -- ,,,,..
ln ad3dIt m t o t he shove. Gener al der
Panzer t mppen Ludwig Cr uwell, for mer .
ly G.O.C. Afnka Kor ps under Rommel,
and also Gener alquar t ier nielst cz. Schmit t
a]e bot h pr isoner s of war m Rylt lsh
hands.
.
Sow cabualt les have begun again in
Nor t h Afr ica Since t he. commencement .
of t he Eight h Ar mys at t ack, Gener al
R1t t er von Them=. commandev of t he
Afnk. Kor ps,
has been capt ur ed and
Geneml von St umnme killed. We hope
ot her gener als ,vIII follo!v.
(The Ft ft bt mg Fo?ce5)
TILe :.q~-w m Machzn. Gun, MG 34,
The MG 34 is t be st andar d machine
gun of t he Ger man Ar my. It is ashor t
r ecoil-oper at ed, belt -fed, air -cook%, duaI
63
pur pose gun wit h a cafiher of 7.92.mm
(Cal. :J 12 ). It has an over all lengt h of
48 inches and a bar gel lengt h of 23%
inches. The mflmg has four lands wit h
wght .hand t ur n. fhe gun has a r at e of
fir e of 800 t o 900 r ounds per minut e. It
is eqnipped wit h a blade for e sight and
an open L! r ear swht , gr aduat ed fr om
200 t o 2,000 met er s, and it also has
auxiliar y ant iair cr aft sight s. The gun,
. .
wit h biped, weighs 26>/, pounds. It is
.Lc.fe, ,ed t o Wal-pur s+c. it as pose.,
can be used as a light machine gun on
a 1,,pod m as a heavy machme gun w,t b
a t , ]pod nm.nt . On a r ent able mount H
,s also uhed for ant iair cr aft pur poses.
In some ea... a t \ vm ant lan. cr aft mount
w w] on which a pair of guns ,s mount
ed wde by .ule Belt feed is no, r eally en%
The above figur e shows t be t ype hoods,
hv t he Ger mans for mot ect ion against t he
,
MILITARY REVIEW
ployedr each belt cont aining fift y r ounds,
but it Is common pr act r ce t o jom as many
as five belt s ed t o end. A 75-pound car t
r idge dr um can also he used. Test s at
A be,deen Pr oving Gr ound led t o t he ccm
.Ision t hat t he gun is simple and easy
t o disassemble in t he field; ms gener al
funct ioning is excellent but It is ext r eme.
IY cr it ical t o adjust ment , Iubr icat mn, and
for eign mat t er ; it s st abilit y is good; it s
*.s. of changing a hot band is ewel
I,t ; -It t s bdt hft M mod, and it s r e
sist ance t o beat is ver -y good. However .
,t s full-aut omat ic accur acy m ver y poor
de t o t he sever e r ecoil. It s r at e of fir e
,. t oo bugh for a-light r nachme gun, and
t . fnct mm.g m dust ad in ext r eme
cold 1s POO,.
(Avmv Onfw mce)
face masks and st r aw over shoes dev,sed
sever e colds on t he Russw.n fr ont .
(Deuta.he Allgeme<?w Zeitung)
JAPAN
The Shinui?w Problem:
advance as t he minimum r eq-uir ement s
for vict or y. Dur ing t he fir st year aft er
Pear l Har bor she lost 1,000,000 t ons
definit ely dest r oyed by t he Allies, and am
ot her 1,500,000 t ons pr obably sunk.
For eign est mmt es place J apans annual
pmduet l.n .f mer chant ship!mg at 600.
000 t ons. \ vhich has mobablv heen r e
dcec! by t he ur gent n;ed for -mor e war
ah,p> and t be heavy demands o her
docks for sh,p r epai r .. When It ,is r e
called t hat t he Allies, i one per r od of
t welve dWS, s u n k 150,000 t on s of J a D
anese sb, pping , Rabat d har h.r alone,
r ep, escnt , ng about a quar t er of J apans
annual r eplacement canacit v. ,t WIII he
,1?.,, t hat t he 20,000,0Ofl-t Ollf@ai 1S 8
lon x way M.
The t igr es gwen above appemed in a
! epmt t o t he ,J lm, clt r st er G,ct ,s dm. fr om
t heir W+CRI mwqmndent at GHQ in
Idm. The r epor t st at es t hat t his in fm
mat m. IS hcmg br oadcast fr om India t o
t he monies Iiv, ns de, J ananese occu
pat & in t he k% East . These peoples
have seen for t hemselves what desper at e
met hods t he enemy is usxg t o alleviat e
bw md,t ,o by confiscat ion, by t be sal
vaze of wvecks m t he har bor s of Malaya
an~ J ava, and by pr essing it m his SeI:V
,ee wood. junks ad pr unmve r aft s t o
t r anspovt pr oduce for mer ly car r ied In
t he Er eat sh,ps of all nat ,ons.
Wt b a glut of r ice in Bur ma and of
sLt ga, >n J ava, all t hat J apan has been
able t o do has hem t o t ell t hese count r ,e~
t hat t hey must become self-sufficient .
The J ap;ese ..ncem at t hen own ,.
:A~ht y t o prcwde sh, ps for t heir amb,
t ,ons M plain for all t o see in r ecent
w, ,t , .Z. and b, oadeast s fr ol Tokvo.

xmv ZEALAND
.I;,l, ],st) tr,, mz gt h:
The New Zealand ar my M 160,000
>t , onz ah against 16,000 befor e t he war
Ther e me :%0,000 w in t he a,r fm W.
1(),oOO Se, Zealand sold,er s ar e fight ing
I,eymd t be boundanes of t h,s Island.
Th@ Xew Zealand navy M t en t imes
a. Woz m manpo\ ver as befor e t he
,, a,
( P1a71da,.Uos c.au)
L. S. S. R.
[,<, o,, Rz rs s m,t W., >,,,o,>,<t. t],,
.4 out st anding cause of RussIan SUC.
c,>. ha, been t he ,ncr ea,e , a,t dky of
t i,vuucms awf higher nit s., which ar t d.
baq st ays in br ie, wmh nmbiht y capable
of folhnmg t he t ype of dlv,sio t o \ vhIch
,t ,S at t ached. .4xainst t he Russian heavy
wt ,ller y, t he usual t ype of field for t ,fi.
cat ion has become. near ly useless.
Bot h sides m t h,s war we mcr easnw
t he per cent age of ar mor ed and mot or zzed
t r oop.. The danger of having a lar ge
block of foot t r oops in hne m shown by
what happened t o t be slow Ger man in.
fant r y diwslons ar ound -Vo%onezh. The
pr =en~ t ?ndency is t o r educe fOOt t r oops
t o a mnmnum.
64
I
MIL~ARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD ;
Repor & indicat e t hat guns and t anks
in line ar e st eadily becoming lar ger . The
small gun76-mm or lessand t he small
t ank st ill have r est r ict ed uses. In bat t le
J Fr om ,, The Campaigns
, Rum,+ an ar t icle by
Col. Conr ad H. Lanza in
t he Fwld Artillew Jour
nal Apr il 1943. )
1$42.194J Iit nfer Offensive:
Reslt sof t he Russian wint er offensive
br ought t he r econquest of 185,328 squar e
Ixles of Ger man-occupied Soviet t er r i
t or y. Tbe g~eat est dept h of penet r at ion
y t he RussIan Ar my was 435 miles.
UNITED STATES
WowaI1pcme3
It m est ,mat ed t hat 29$. of Amer mm
women can he classified as employed,
9,; of t hem m war wor k. In 1942, 23</0
we, e employed, 6(: in war wor k, and in
1940 t he figur es wer e 17% and 2?6 r e
spect ively. By way of compar ison, It is
,t er est mg t o not e t hat m 1939, at t be
beginning of t he war , 37% of Ger man
women wer e classed as employed.
(Tke A?mu and Navp Woman)
.411-llood A,mu Tr anspo, t .
The fir st mibt ayy t r anspor t plane of
t he pr esent war t o he hudt almost en
t ir ely of wood and ot her nonst r at egic
mat er ials M t he new air fr eight er
named t he Cur t iss Cnmt ,an (C-76) now
ear in% complet ion in a plant of t he
Cur t iss-Wr ight Cor por at ion. It is a h!gh
wing monoplane wit h a \ vig span of t r ader s for use iu ar eas wher e t her e ar e
108 feet , is 68 feet long, and IS power ed no eat ablisbed r ecr uit ing. st at ions They
wit h t wo 1,200 hp engines. It s landing car r y st r eamlined officw facilit ies and
zear is of t he r et r act able t r icvcle t vve cmbplet e hving quar t er s for five men. A
%sur ing maximum maneuver a-bllit y -;n var iet y of %mbiIe classr ooms ar e in
small Iandlg fields, and It s car go floor use. Those used for t r aining Ar my ofi
is only 36 inches fr om t he gr ound, t hus cecs m t r uck mechanics, for example,
facilit at ing r apid loading and loadig ar e st affed by a dr iver and t wo inst r uc
of car go. The cont r ol compar t ment is t or s, and ar e equipped as ~r aveEng me-
sit uat ed shove t he for \ var d sect ion of chamcal schocda wit h var mus t ype$. of
engines, t r ansmwsmw axle assembhes,
and ot her vit al par t s of t r ucks. In many
ot her ways mot or vehicles ar e being de
veloped for speeit iized fnc+ions in t he
ser vice of t he Ar my, apa-r t fr om t heir
well. est abt isbed uses as t anks and t r ans
Ilolt s
(SCie.Mc America:)
The n&haiz&ion and mot or izat ion
of t he Ar my is pr oducing a gr eat var iet y
of s w-cialw+d veh icles ,Tbwe is . for ex.
anpie, a complet e lubmeat ing syst em on
wheels, built t o t ,avel 51J males an hom
0,,. haml.su,,fawd r oads and cr +pahle of
per for ming m t he field any lubr icat ing
loh t hat can be done m t he shov. The
blimp on submar me pat r ol IS not speed.
It M ks abdit y t o hover over suipic~ous
object s and t o ?t ay aloft for a long t xme.
Tbeycanmmamo pat r ol dut y for days
or even \ veek?, ,f necessar y, for t hey can
be r efueled and ?ew cr ews can bet r ans
femedat s ea. BSmgint lat ed w,t b helium,
t hey ar e non-inflammable and in no
J anger of cat ching fir e if t he huge gas
bag ,s spr ayed wit h incendiar y bullet s
byan enimy plane.
The blimp car r ies dept h char ges for
use when a submar ine is spot t ed, but
gener ally a sur face sh]p is called by i-a.
s. ficiet t o supply about 8,000 m& in dIo t o do t hm t ask. For pr ot ect mn, t he
t he field wit h cigar et t es, candy, r azor blimp is also ar med \ vzt h a number of
blades, and some (30 ot her ar t icles. The machine guns,
Ar my r ecr uit ing ser vice has t r ucks and (Am. Digest)
GOODS W HAVE LEND LEASED
FROM MARCH1941 THROUGHFESRUARY1943
*X XWXYXXXXXXXX
c3c3000acfocraoo 4
~%\\%%%\%
*
~~
OF
LEND-LEASE SHARE
OUR 1942 FOOD SUPPLY
lmlmm Xw2M.dA
109%00TAL
_=LEND
FOOD SUPPLY
- LEASE SHARE
65
FOREIGN
,:
1$
MILITARY i131GESTS
Digests of avticles from foreign ntilita?y periodicals. Othe? items of interest f~om
foreign publications are indicated in the Catnlog of Selected Periodical Articles.
Open Sights or M~mbo-Jumbo ?
1
[Extractedfr om Tact ms of Ar t dler y. hy Lr lt nna Rat !., wh,ch
appear ed m J oP<mal ottheRoifnl
1942. ]
. .
That a, t ,ller y must lear n t come Out
,n t he open inst ead of doing mun,bo-
J umho beh, nt i a hall ,s t he afwce of a
Br msh mdwu y \ vr it er . Mdzsche, m Bl!t z
~VW, m, ongly mxes t hat at t dler y
bhould file over oven sieht s at ,act ual
t ar get s r zzt her t han at ar eas. He de
q!~cat cb .co,nphcat ed t whn,ques,, ad
point , out t hat d!r ect fiI e at bhor t mngm
.s?s 1.%. amn,unt t mn t han ,, hr ect fir e
at Iongev r anges.
The Ia.t ar gument we may concede at
once: but t he compemat mg advant ages
of fir inq f, on, cover ed pomt mns f r t her
Lack mom t han out wewh t he shght sav
ing of ammunm. Guns so s]t uat ed. n.
I c anmt he neut l ahzd or dewl OWCi
by t he same fue as r . net mhzmg m
dest r cvi. g t he )!lfant l y In fr ont Th,s
,s pat t ,culally ,mpor t a. t m defense;
t t . can t r ansfer t hmr fir e wit h gr eat
er flex ,b,ht y t o ot her sect or s of t he
f, ant ;
n? can inmat e or br eak off eng.gc=
ment . wwh gr eat er fr eedom;
w. can mm e easdy be supphed w,t h
an,, umt ion since, m sp,t e of t he %11
r ound fr ont . of modem war fw+, suP-
PIES st all come UP fr om t he r eal : and
u. can for m t he cor e of t he mldd]e
ave. .f t he defense in dept h lay-out .
The suggest m. t hat all mdnect lmmg
,, a,med at awas not %mt a] t ar get s
cannot , however , he admmt ed. It is t , ue
of IV,, elv I,, echct ed shoot s. bt \ vhen t he
gunner can obser ve and . . . r ect hi, ill e
he wdl always go far a dir ect hlt If t he
dmu+nsmns of t he t ar get , r he zone of t he
Eon. and t he t mw avadable ~ust ,fy t he
at t empt . And in t he absence of t hese
condlt >ons he wdl far e no bet t el \ vIt b
Ther e is, however , some ]ust ]ce m
M,ksches ~ener al condemat mn of t he
.gnner o~t cer once so dashing and
audacious-now become a geomet r ician
ad over -t heor et mal nmt hmnat mizn.s But
t hk. kmd of decadence is not , at any r at e
m t he Bmt ish Ar my, as univet sal as he
t hmk$
Tbe comphw.t ed t echniques elabor at ed
m peace-t ime have not , in fact , st ood
t he, & of nmde~n war . And it may be
claimed-m- admit t edt hat t he aver age
A;tz llc,g lGreat J uly Bmt amI
f+r ,t ,sb gunner pr efem ,dash,ng about t o
dmng sums. It ,S not vnt hot sigmfi.
mum. t hat a ~ent ence m t he pamphlet
&lmIc~,., od]h~q t he r ,t ual of t he St ages
no doubt welcome.
cba~e .
Wh,l+ t heve for e, N would be undemr
.,hle, f., , easons g,vm, t o adopt t he
,.f, ,Vayfi ~~ and op, sight s PohcY
a;it mat ed hy ilfd,sche, we m, by gr nng
cet t a~ umt s a specmbz.d I ok of, close
LPPOI t f, Imnor opm at mns, PI ovlde m
I eased scope for t be dash and audac,t y
of 0,, , gunner s.
The, ? must al\ vays he , egiment s t o
pe, fm m t he , out me t ad<. of de fenswe
fi ) L?,FIOWam ,hoot s, ?t c., ad t hey can
not be absolved fr om t hen mumbo
J umhn.r , But when t he gap M made, t he
spec,al bat t ,, ,es Can dash t hr ough and
play at hm sc al t dler y. They can r evel
m ,.half. co, k posmons and vmce cont r ol
01s. Thes can, If t hey hke, engage ma.
chine-gun e~t , over open sught s
t hough t hey would be welj advised t o do
so fr om beyond machme. gun r ange. But
t hey shoukj ne.e> low swht of t he pr u
clpies.
,. t hat t he -hell 1. t hmr weapon;
u t hat a t !oop i mt > 1s four
<Ur is ~,,t of =t iOn.
Whet her t he ot dma~y field gun %s a
wmable \ veapon for t h,s galloping r ole
, Mhet hm t he 18-ponder or 75-mill
m, , . ki be bet t el m a qe.t mn w b,ch can
not be d,smssed h.? e. But \ ve WIII not
d,sm,s. our special bat t er ws befor e
pomt mg out t hat t hey w.ld for m a
pawe!fj r einfor cement t o t he ar mt anh
defenses of t he d~v,wm.
ence, or even for ce, t he deemon.
These wer e t he t wo lessons on which
t he Reicbswehr br ooded dr i~ t he year s
of pmce. The Tr eat y of Ver sadles r e
st r mt ed t hem ar t iller y equipment , but
t hat only fr eed t hem t o devot e t hem
selves w]t hot d,st r act mn t o per fect ,g
t hei~ Infant r y infilt r at e t act m. whwh
we, e not dependent o mt dler y suppor t .
The Tr eat y also debar , ed t hem fr om
t he fmact lce of t sk t a,ct it s. bt t he t he.
o, mng t he~ did has bee pr oved ZOOCI
hy r esult s.
Then ar t iller y met hod, however , seems
t o show o development . Tbe Russian
Colonel, ?J al,t sky, has wwt ly descr ibed
t be Ger m. mct bods o t he East er
fr ont
.. Ar t dler y pr .pa, at mm, he says,
,cons,st of moving fir e at lt w vals of
100 t o 150 met er s. Such fir e is kept up
t o a dept h of 3 61 4 kdo,et e, s (2 or 2L.
mdm ) r epeat ed sever al t ,r n,s, an,l
concldecl wit h a amijler y at t ack on t be
,. .,. ,,. < ...... .. ,,
..,....,,,.. . . =..!....,,<.,
What ,s t h,s bt t he oki a,ea st r af e,,
f 1!117~
It seems, t hen, t hat Ger ,,m? gune, ,,
t hough t echmca!ly well eq,pped, am
t act ically ,t ,ll , t he ?iapoleon,c st age.
They a,,,, at t he a,hdat ,on of t he e.
wny hy concmt r at mk.
i t IS t , ue t hat t belr mnuals s~gcbt
a >wwdar y ob~ecx, wh.ch ,s t o st un t bc
d. fende!s ad make t h?m t empcmwdy
mmpable of u,mg t be,r ,W.POIIS. How.
,+,.. t h,s ,, bt a shght ,, fie, net on
t h, h]dwon ,t , eke.
For Cl,. bll~p.,t t hey >t ,ll adhe,, t o
t he o,,, s,gbt . ,et hod t o wh, ch. as has
~e~ll how wave except]on can he
t aken They have t r ,ed t o st r engt h,,
t he!, case hy mt r oducmg t he semi.ammr .
wi +,lf. pr opelled ,assalt gun.,, But t o
t h,s t he Br ,t ,sb zune, ,,,11 find obwc-
The gene, al t r end of t h,s m-t ide has
been t o mit ic,m t he Ger mans for t he con-
cent ~at , os met hod, of t he,, field and
,cd, um ar t ,!ler y and for t be opms,ght s
met hods of t hm~ close suppor t guns. Bt
cer t ain mnd,t ,os on t he opponent s, s,de
pr ovide favor able gr ound for t be s.c-
C.LS of t hese t act ,... These may be ind,
cat ed by consider ing t he following
point s:
z. Concent m.t mns ar e most dest r nc.
t me against t r oops who ar e massed in
well-defined Iocaht ,es.
?t Wbe t he aim is neut r alizat ion
by ~t unnlng. t he Ger man pr ocedur e is
likely t o be t o neut r alize oe of t wo
mut ually suppor t ing localit ies while
FORErGN MfLITARY DIGESTS
Use of Small Tank Formations in Wooded Hill Country
[An ar t icle by Major P. SIesar ev, Soviet Ar r +\ vhwb appear ed
bur nt . The Ger man t anks couldnt yfit b
st and our gunfir e and r et r eat ed. This was
t be moment wbe r eifor eement s ar r ived
at Ma,lkino mnsMt igof an ant ,t ank baL
t er y and sever al lor r y Ioad%of Soldler s,
amongst t hem sever al t ank dest r cr mr s
wit h iit it ank ~ifles.

The comr nader of t he t ank company
ar r anged w,t h t he ar t iller y and infat it r y
commander t o co ,dina.t e t beu- act ivit ies
for t be second Ge? ma at t ack which was
ant icipat ed.
The whole t ank company, excePt a
plat oon left m amhsh at t he r iver By.
st r aya, t ook p pomt mn amongst bushes
on t he slopes of t he hall. Gun.em and
z+t it ,ank men and t ommy-gunner s occ
pled t he t anks for mer posit ion.
The t anks wer e t o at t ack wbe t he
Gwma bat t le or der had been disr upt ed
hy fir e of ant it ank-guns, r ifles and t mm
my-.guns. The main dr ive was t o be
against t be Ger man infant r y which
hadnt been badly beat en in t he pr evious
at t ack. Aft er du+fx+r sing t he infant r y our
t anks wer e t o concent r at e t heir t ir e on
t he Ger man t anhs m coopkr at io wit h
t hem ant it ank guns and t ank dest r oy.
em. It was assumed t hat t he Ger mans,
caught het vmen t he fir e, of t anks and ar
t iilmy and being mmblet o get ont of t he
t r ap t hr r mgh t he bills would be for ced t o
t nr n shout and r et ir e- t o t heir own lines.
Two hour slat e r t he Gemnanqagiinat .
t acked t he vdlage of Malkir m advancing
in t he same for mat mn as befor e, one
company on eit her side of t he r oad, Tbc
only d, ffe?ence m met hod was t hat t heir
at t ack was ON suppor t ed bya bat t alion
of aut omat ic r iflemen advmt cmg 100
met er s behind t he t anks. Suspect ing a
t b>eat fr om t he flank t he Ger mans ad.
vmmeda. t f]] speed. Asscm.as t @ t anks
appr oached wit hin r ange of accur at e fir e
t be gunner s and wank dest r oyer s> wit h
t h?,r ant ,t ank. mfles got int o act ion and
opened r ,kher mg fir e on t he enemy t anks.
The eemy infant r y wer epumed t oeai-t h
by our fiIe but t he t anks separ at ed fr om
t hen, infant , y cont inued t o advance. Six
Ger man t anks wer e alr eady m flames.
Tbe,r column fcwnumon was d,sr upt ed
Many t anks left t he hat t leline. The er le
my %s obvmudy m a quandar y. The
t ime was suit able for a at t ack hy par t
of t be t ank company which was Iymg
under cover of bushes on t he slopes of
t he bill, On t he s,r nal being ziven our
t anks opened mach,ne-gun t ir ; on t he
enemy infant r y and cannon fir e cm t be
mxvny t anks. The effect of t his sudden
at t ack was so st r cnuz t hat t be r emaininz
Ger ms t ommy .gt uiimr s fled in gr oupi
and mdmdually. Sever al of our t anks,
complet mx t he r ow of t he enemy in
fant r y, ext er minat ed t hose wbo escaped
t hem nmchme ES w,t h t hem t r acks.
The Iemammg t anks concent r at ed t heir
fi, e o t he Ger man pan.e,~. The lat t er
t r lcdt o t ake cove~anmngst bnshes along
t he r wer Byst r aya bt came immediat ely
un,ier fir e of a t ank plat oon st at ioned
t her e and \ vh,ch had r er na.med all t his
t mw in ambusb. Tznks t ur ned left and,
s.Lxmm/z he,zht s, hid mt he woods whence
t hev r et ur ned t o t hem or izinal st ar t inz
po,it .
Fr om t he above it eanbese;nt hat t he
Ge]mans r an mt o a well planned fir e
t r ap. In t he second skir mish t hey last
over 200 men and 11 t anks. Alt oget her
t hat day t be enet iy lost half hls st r ik
ing for ce. This success wasnt accident al.
If t he commander had placed hm t anks
m t be fir st bat t le as he did int be second
t hen t hem fir e would have bee so weak
t hat t he Ger mans would undoubt edly
have @ t hr ough t o t he village of Mal
kmo.
67
t he ot her H at t acked or , bet t er st ill, t o
neut r alize bot h localit ies while in
fant r y or t anks infilt r at e bet ween
t hem.
iii. When t he localit ies ar e t hus out .
flanked t heir dest r uct ion can be under
t aken. Down come t he concent r at ions
azain: and. unde~ cover of t hem. close
s~ppor t w&pons ar e br ought UP t o
open posit ions at shor t r ange.
Them seems t o be a mor al in t hisfor
hedgehogs !
The gener al mor al, however , is t hat
.mce Br nish ar t dler y t act ws have been,
on t he wbr de, sounder t han Ger man, it
would be a mist ake t o abandon our s and
t o adopt t heir s.. The Br it ish met hod of
attackwg the fm,t fon u I,ieh @ bmng
,,ez<t,ohmct and w htle tt ,S bw z g %et,.
tralmed is hkely t o sur pr me t he enemy.
We cannot , per haps, except wit h six
mont hs bat t le expemeee, t r ain our in
fant r y t o follow less t han 100 yar ds be.
bir d t he bar r aze. Bt -W bawe car r ier s.
These can hang hack 200 yar ds behind
t be bar r age and yet , when t be lift comes,
cm cove, t hat space in half a mmut e.
Ad w, can cr owd quit e a few ext r a
men on t o t he car r ier s t o fo> m t he fir st
wave.
in The Ta%k (England) J anuar y
The use of r mmt .ed t anks m wooded hdl
count r y is ext r emely hmit ed. Slopes
st eeper t han 25 t o 30 degr ees hinder
movement of t anks, at t imes makmg it
,lune impossible. The enemy mines places
passable for t anks mor der t o hinder t heir
movement . Dense for est xd over baEinq
cbffs make obser vat ion ddIiclt ext ent at
W,y dose qr mt er s. In mwqen& of
v.., v,sibd,t y aimed fir e cano.ly be c.n
,Iuct cd fr om t he t ank at shor t r ange t ar
cet s, Exper ience has, however , sbo\ vn
t hat small t ank for mat ions fr om a Dia.
t oo t o a company of t anks oper at in~ m
\ aOeys ad mount ain r ,ve~ beds can, lf
t he at t ack has been well pr epar ed and
t he locaht y t hor oughly r econnoit er ed, be
\ er y effect ively used, Effect m, gr eat ly i.
cr eased by or gam.ed coor d,at io be
t ween t anks, ar t illmy and infant r y and
mzpr ise in t he t ank at t ack.
In one of t he mount ainous sect or s of
t he Soviet -Ger man fr ont , Ger man t anks
Imd fmced t heir way mt o a valley. Tbme
\ %me about 40 t anks mo,mx i colmn
along t he OIY r oad. A company of t anks
v,t h aut omat ic r dfemen under t he mm.
mad of Senior L,et enat Em feyev was
FIVP t he t ask of checking t he enemy at
t bc vdlage of Ivfalkmo. Tbe t ank ur ut
/
~hase l-#lR57 ENEMYA7TACK
r wwhed t he village aft er a t went y kdo.
met er mar ch ad deployed i hne o t he
!,cst er n side of t he village fr om which
dnect ion t he Ger man t anks wer e exnect
ed t ocmr m. Tommy gmmer sad mfaimr y.
mm in t be village t ook up t hem pow
t ]om On t he flank of t he t ank company,
Pr ot ect ing it fr om sudden at t ack by Ger
man t om~y.gunner s. Such dist mbt lonof
1943.]
for ces has fr equent ly ~ust ,iied ,t self. [n
wooded b,]] mt ,y t he Ger mans oft en
send ,fant r y ahead of t hen t anks. They
comb t he under Er o\ vt h st nmg t o m.
t er mmat e t be ct ews. of t he Sovr et an t i.
t an k gu n s an d t o po, n t ot t h e mor e n c
#ot f.ble SIOP,S t o t hew t anks, hemg at
t he bame t ,me a fight ,.g pat r ol and t he
iir .t at t acking wave. Fur t b,. mason
Ger ms t anks mnwt mws zppem suddenly
o t he flahs or i t he I car of t he Soviet
t r oops. infant r y obser ver s post ed on
flanks of mha.bit cd nomt mot wt ed t he
. .
t ank, fr om such sl.Pr , S,,.
In t he aft mmn Gmnmn t anks alI
P..1.ed OUt . f a COPS. s ome t wo kil~.
met er s me~t of Malkmo. W,t hout st opping
t hey moved t ,mvalds t he vdlage at full
sueed. Semm Lxmt enant Em fevt v,
seta. C].? as Iioswble ad t hen shell
t hem wit h ccmt lolled \ ,olle}s. This was a
cr mwt decmum for t he Ger mans wer e
advancnmz wit hout wcommiswce and d,d
o! expect wmh ,es,,t ct cc of tomeet
ar momxl vehicles at Malkmo.
Iihen t he enemy t anks we, e vnt hi
1,0110t o 1;200 met er . y t anks opened
h,, w,t b t he,, cannon. Aft ,, t he fir st
few volleys t wo Ger man t anks bur st mt o
205
flames. The r enmmder began t o deploy
hast ily on bot h sides of t be r oad. Deploy
ment and t he adopt lo.n of bat t le or der oc
cupled about five mmut es ad t he Ger .
mans advanced a fu~t hez, 300 or 400 me
t er s conduct ing unt ur ned fir e. Fir e fr om
our st at ,onar y t anks was so accur at e t hat
dur ing t his t ime anot her SIX enemy t anks
wer e knocked out . Half of t hem wer e
MILITARY REVIEW
@ x
.
Phese z-SECOND ENEMY A=ACK
Then t ah, ng advant age of h,, nmer ,.
ml wmr mnt y t he enemy \ .ould have de.
.t ,>mf t he t , t ank ~TUPS s e~ar i?t dy
for t hey \ ve,e left w,t hout a. mxd along
wh,ch t o ,,,t ,,e
J L%en r em fovcemet .s ar r , ved t her e
was .0 longw any seine , concet r at mg
fiw st r engt h in one place. DmIng t he ser .
,,,,,i at t ack at ,t ank gunfir e ad cannon
fir e of our t anks was, conduct ed Z1OX
cent er wmds r ed,, of cn?le m whr ch Ger .
mww wer e locat ed, The enemy cont er
ii, e d,it r , but ed in t hlee dir ect io~ wasn,t
Thu. cor r ect dr st r ,bt :o of fim
st r engt h m bot h phases of t he bat t le
enabled our commznder bt h t o mut t he
enemy ad ~epulse him as well, If aI
r ow mount al de fr ies me pr opeyly md
t he. a successful st r gEle can be mr ned
0 by small for ces w+ust super mr mw
my for ces.
In wooded bdl mut r y ever y t ank
nmmmer mmt be planned flom ever y
v,e\ . gomt , Tah at t achs ar e usually
easdy planned fr om an mgmeer uw we\ v
polnt on account of t he fact t hat t ank
Umt s fr o, plat oon t o company Swdly
at t ack m one dwect mn In nar t lcular each
t he Ger mans t o t b~mv mmes I t he pat h
of advancing t anks at t he ver y last m..
ment . Get t lg- t bmn clear ed m t une e.
>sur es complet e safet y of our t anks and
Pt eVent s mt et r upt m of t he act ,on.
.. .
infant r y.
Our t anks split mt o t wo gr oups and
t ook cover , allowing enemy t anks t o pass
t hen opened machine-gun fir e fr om bot h
flanks o t he Ger man t ommy-gunner s
who wer e advancing 50 t o 80 mat er s he.
205
b,d t hem t anks, The t ommy-gunner s
nmnt dwt ely dr opped zmudwar d t hink.
)?:s t hey wer e at t acked by Sowet ifan
t ry ad be<an t o fir e mr eply. The soviet
t anhs, wanmz nt d t he Ger man pamm
d,,appt -ar ,d m t he woods, at t acked t he
enemy ,fant r v fr om bot h flanks and an.
n,hdat eci .,,, i COmPally f t hem
Tbe znner s in t hem t ur n, havmx r e-
When t he Gmmw infant r y launches
an at t ack t be Soviet infant r y w]t h t heir
fim p, t he Ger mans down t o ear t h i
t he OP. space wher e t heyr e t hen at .
t acked by t he t ank fmm ambnsb. Tbe ef.
feet of such at t acks on infant r y ,s aIi t h,
Fr eat er if t ankmen baveaspplyof hand
Kr enades wh,ch t hey can t hr ow t hr ozb
t he hat ches.
LIEUT.POSTIKOVS ATTACK
PHASE f
Pt iAs E 2
EnemyT#nks
engagedby
Sowet Ar ~~M
t hy emer ge
t im cow.
68
FORErGN MfLITARY DIGESTS
Experience in Action Against German Mortars
[Tr anslat ed at t he Command and Gener al St aff School, For t
Leavenwor t h, Kansas, fr om a Rummn ar t ,cle in K, CZSMCWZwzda. ]

?vfOr t ar fir e CWfxes a ext r emely
pr ommen t place m t he fir e syst em of Ger
man infant , y. In bot h offensive and de
fensm.e act ion t he Ger mans widely em
ploy mmt ar s, st r iving t o neut r alize and
suppr ess our fir e agencies and defeat our
manpower ,
Combat expemence shows t hat dur ing
offenswe act mn t he Ger mans hegm t he
use of mor t ar s as soon as t heir ar t ilhwv
. ----.-.
complwes it s act ion s.gamst t he out er
edge of mm defense and t r ansfer s it s fir e
mt o our r ear . Oper at or s of Ger man mor
t ?m t hen pr oceed. t o t ry @ sdeme t hose
oi our fir inc ucmt mns whmh r evive aft er
t he ar t iller ~ btar r aze. and t hus t o IIr o.
wde pr ot ect ion fox. -t he advance of t ~eir
mfar it r y.. When t he enemy infant r y
launches it s at t ack, t he mor t a>.s t r ansfer
t heir fir e asamst our r ear defensive i.
st aIlat ions. At t he ?Sixht est r ever se of
t he at t ack t he Ger mans-r enew mor t ar t ir e
against our fr ont line defensive posit ions
m or der t hus t o pr ot ect t hem infant r y
flonl our fir e.
When cm t he defensive, t he Ger mans
open mor t ar fir e as soon as t hey dmmver
concent r at mns of our in fsmt r y or any of
our engineer act ivit y. When cmr unit s
a, e advancing t he emmy dir ect s his mm-.
t a, fir e f m t he most Dar t against t he
r ear of t hese unit s, while cm: advance
element s ar e subject t -d t o t he fir e of au
t omat ic weapons, r ifles, and mat hine
guns. Ther e ar e t imes when t he enemy
fir es simult aneously against all t ar get s,
but t his t akes place only when he has
avadahle a sufficient quant it y of light
and b@lly mor t sls.
I all inst ances t he Ger ma,ns t ry t o
employ t hIelr mor t ar s in mass. The mw
pose of t hk met hod is clear t o cr ~at e
power ful, insur mount able fir e. They car e
less for t he accur acy of t heir fir e t han
f<,? t he mozal effect bv t he de nr oduced
t onat ions of zL lar~enumber of pro
jectiles. They par t icular ly st r ive for t his
df ect when opposed hy inexper lenc-ed in
famr y. Rutwhen. wr per sor mel M com
posed of men wit h combat exper ience,
massed mor t ar fir e does mt fr icr ht en
t hem. Thev know how t o ur ot ect ~hem-
selves against mor t ar shelis.
Dur inc offensive act ion t he best met h
t ,d aga,n-st mor t ar fir e ,s a speedy for .
wa, d r novemet in or der t o escape t he
mm of enemy fir e. It is known t bst t he
Ger mans dkect t heir mor t ar fir e on a
definit e ar ea for a definit e t ime per iod.
To leave t hat ar ea as soon as possible
,mezms t o suffer fenw casualt ies. Good
pr ot ect ion against enemy mor t ar shells
,s pr ovided by t r enches and ir r egular it ies
IIIt he t er r ain. By hiding in t hem OF men
hd pi-cdwt ion t mr n shell fr agment a.
The company w.hlch I commanded was
mor e t han ome shj wt ed t o mor t ar fi FE.
Following t he r ules out lined her e it suf
ier ed bf small losses dur ing offensive
act ion, and no losses at all while on t he
, Iefensive. Once t he company was given
t he mission t o t hr ow t he Ger mans fr om
., hill which t hey wer e occupying. The
,mmpany,s at t ack was a sur pr ise t o t he
enemy who was compelled t o abandon his
t r enches o bot h t he fr ont and t he r ear
. lopes. However , t he enemy was only
I,r essed back, he was not defeat ed. We
wer e expect ing t hat at daybr eak t he Ger
mans would at t empt t o r est or e t heir po
~,t ion by comt er at t acks which would he
suppor t ed by mor t ar s. B. was t aken int o
conmder at wn t hat most fr equent ly t he
Ger mans dir ect ed t hem mor t ar fir e
against t he r ear of our unit s. Ther efor e
we t mmsf emed t he ent ir e mmpan y t o t he
r em slope of t he hill, int o t r enches
snwwed closer t o t he Ger mans.
This maner ?er fully just ified it self,
The Ger mans concent r at ed t he full for ce
of t hem mor t ar fir e on t he t r enches i
OU. r ear , o t he fmt slcqye, wher e t her e
was none of our per sonnel. The enemy
m f ant r y, when it launched it s mmlt er
at t aek, was met by t he coor dinat ed fir e
of t he t mt ir e company. Having lost about
one-half of t hem me, t he Gemnam wer e
r olled back. It is clear t hat t hev had
ant icipat ed t hat our for ces vm~ld be
placed in dept h and t hat par t of t hem,
pin?ed, dow,n by mor t ar fir e, vmnld m.
mam mact we. while our advame de.
ment s, t hus depr ived of suppor t fr om t he
r ear and unable t o wit hst and t he cr mnt e r .
at t ack would be mwshed. These expect s.
t mns of t he enemy wer e t hwar t ed.
Obser vat ion of enemy t act ics has es
t ablished the fallowing fact s: When t he
enemy car r ies On mor t ar fir e simult ane
ously fr om sever al posit ions for t en min
ut es it means t hat t heir nit s ar e well
supphed w,t h mor t ar s. When t he Ger .
mans r ot at e t hem fir e, opening m fir st
fr om om t hen anoihe? powim, each t ime
fir ing shout t en r ods, m may be es
sumed t hat t hey have few mor t ar s and
t hat t hey ar e t hus manewwr ing t hew
weapons , or der t o cr eat e t he impr es.
sion t hat t he fir e is massed. Even when
Iaekig a s@iciet number of shells t he
enemymakes effor t s t o conceal his t r ue
s,t at ion,
When t he f, ont m mor e or less quiet
t he Ger mans open mor t ar fir e at cer t ain
hour s of t he day. r n one sect or t hey
r egular ly subject ed .wr pos,t iom t o mm.
t ar fir e at 1200 oclock, and mor e fr e
quent ly at 1400 oclock. Wh.t was t he
r eason for t his ? Ver y simply hewmse at
t hat t ime OT field kit chen amived t o dis.
t r ibut e food. The men mmgr egat ed
anxmd t he kit chen and t he Ger mans
made at t empt s t o hit t hem.
At night t he GeimI& %re t hem mm.
t ar s as socm as t hey bear any suspicious
movement or noise on our side. However ,
imt ances wer e obser ved when ever y night
at 0200 oclock t hey would fir e t heir mor .
t ar s wit bot any visible cause. Appar ent .
lY t h,s was so-called fir e for ammyamx.
In mch cases we WAEIlly r eply wit h
similar t ir e for which pm-pose we ~desig
nat e t ar get s i t he dayt i,me and pr epar e
fir ing dat a.
Summing up t he above, t he following
conclusmns may be dr aw,,. Ynemv m~r
t ar fir e will not mt lct heavy losse; t o in
fzmt r y lf t he lat t er knows Genmm t act ics
and met hods of defense against nmr !,m
shells. Exper mnced soldmr s ar e not
afr a,d of mm-t ar fir e. When yo hear t he
shell making a shar p sound vddle on it s
cour se of flight , t hat shell is ot danger .
ous for n will Iamd mmmv t W. m t he
r ear , It m a differ ent st or y wher e t he shell
makes a low sound while in flight ; upon
hear ing it t he men should immediat ely
find shelt er . When i t be gewer al melee
of combat t he shell else is not audible
and it det onat es near by, advancing men
nmst mmwdiat ely move shar ply for war d
m or der t o escape t he zone of fir e, and
when on t he defensive t hey must im
mediat ely t hr ow t hemselves t o t he bot
t om of t he t r ench.
Enemy mor t ar fir e mwt be mwnt er ed
w,t hout de!. bv our own mor t ,, fir e . ,
by an ar t dl& Ybar r age. A ct im azainst
enemy mor t ar i will b~ par t icula~l~ suc
cessful if infant r y commandem ar e able
t o 1...?. t heir nomt ions quickly znd .t o
mdlcat < t hese t & r et . accur at ely t o t heir
own mor t ar s ad-ar t dle,y. -
It IS cc+~t a.im of cour se, t hat as t he
bat t les pr ogr ess, t he enenly wdl int r o
duce new met hods in employing mor t ar
t %. It m essemml fm. eveiy eommmdet
t o pay car eful at t ent mn t o t he act ions of
memy mor t ar s, t o st udy fhem dady, and
i! her ever necessar y t o impr ovise quickly
effect ive met hods of count er act ion,
Counteraction Against Turning and
Flanking Movements in the Mountains
[Tr amlat ed at t be Command and Gener al St aff School, For t
Leavenwor t h, Kansas, fr om a RussIan ar t mle by Major R. M,l
ovanov, Soviet Ar my, in Iir asnat m Zue.zda 9 December 1942.]
.
It m well known t hat foot hdls and
momt ams per mn t he cngamzat ,on of a
1,g,d imd st able defense. The ve, Y nat ur e
of t he l.cabt y, supplement ed wit h va, iom
sor t s of engineer -er ect ed obst acles and
t r aps, makes t he defense difficult t o over
come, But along wit h t hat , mount ain de
fense st d] has it s weak feat ur es
r n t he foot hills, which lepr esent a sw
iea of low, par allel cr est s dissect ed by
valleys, t be defense oft en has a d,scon
t inwms char act er because of t he isolat ion
of t he separ at e height s and t he limit ed
number of r oads and avor oaches fr om t he
r ea?, and is dr awn up on t he pr inciples
of defense on a br oad fr ont . These Pecu
liar it ies sr e gr eat ly accent uat ed m t he
t mwnt ains pr oper . Her e It is gener ally
impossible t o cr eat e a cont inuous fr ont
line, Unit s and somet imes even small
grtmpa OCCUPYonly t he individual pr om
cmt ar ms, mount am passes, r oads, and
t r ads, for mmg point s and cent er s of It
sr st ance, They ar e isolat ed fr om cme an
ot her and acqune a cer t ain independc+fce
of act ion. These cond,t lons cr eat e av?r .
able s,t uat lon for t ur ning and ankmg
t he de fens,ve umt s. Tur ning an !7 flank.
ing ar e fur t her helped by t he poor ffeld
of wsion and t he vr esence of dead sDaces.
Accor ding t o t ie Ger man field m~nual,
fnmt a.1 at t ack is by no means r equir ed
for seizing a height m, ot her mcmnt ain
posit ion. The Ger mans consider it emmgh
t o t ur n and flank t he height , and t he d
fenw manual r emmmneds a hmak.
t hr ough on a nanow sect ion of t h~ f r ent .
This M pr emsely how t be Ger t nas ac.
t ually dld oper at e in t he foot hills of t he
Nor t her n Caucasus. They t r ied t o ut ilize
ever y br eak in the defens, ve syst em,
eve~y convenient hidden appr oach and
dit ficuh pat hway leading t o t he flank or
r ear of t he de fens~, i or der t o flank and.
seize t he commandmg h,eight s. Somet ime*
t he Ger mans t r ied t o wedge -t hemselves
69
.
MfLITARY REVfEW
demor mg t . emer ge m t he hnes of com
nmnicat ,ons and mt a t he valleys, in mder
t hen t o spr ead t he gap an d creat e a
t hr eat on t he flanhs md r ear of t he unit s
defending t he mam pos>t mns on t he
mmmt a,lls ad .Iopes.
Despit e t hese vahwfabIe aspect s of
J J O
wwnt a,n defense, m can be made t he?
oghly m!p~ewmhle. Combat exper mnce
shows t hat rf t & commander ur gamze%
t he defense wmely zmd t akes <f fect ne
m.as.?.s again-t Imst de t ur n>g and
flanknw umt s, all t he effor t s of t he ene
my t o mme out m t he ffank aml ,w+,, ,nd
m failur e. Mor eover . t he ifanl.mg umcs
t hemselves oft en get int o an unfavor able
snaut lon and make t heir way !.meh t o
t he!, .\ \ n f., ceb wmh difficult y.
azamst t ur ning and fbnkms movement s
m t he mo.nt eins I>?t U, t l-y t o sh,,v
t h,a by t he act wxt ,m of a cm t am unit .
It s dcfr nse r uns al.r w t he slopes of t he
he,ght s, and at mm. places M on t he
sumnmt s of a low m e.t cover ed w,t h a
t h, ck mmvt h of scr ub. The defense M or -
F.~Iz~~ 0. . t he PI UICI.PICof cOmwny ar id
plat oon point s of I vs, st a. ct on t he se Pa
r at e ht ils and m t he nmunt .m pasbes The
d,st ance bet ween ihr sununms amount b at
t umes t o 1000 met e, s ( 1100 Yar ds). The
dr fcnw of each company and plat oon
ar ea is, as a r ule, cl, cular . FoI t he ,s+
cu?it y of t he int er vals bet ween unit s,
const ant I econna,ssa.ce explot es all t he
hidden appr oaches and dlzect ion. by
wh,ch t he enemy might filt er t hr ough 1.
small gr oups of aut mat ,c r dlemen, and
w cmnet , at e t o t he det cms, ve r ear . At t ht ,
jurict lon of de fensl\ ,e pos,t mns a syst enl
of ohser wmon IS set up t hat aswr es (m
insofaras t he locaht y per nnt s) t he pr ompt
det ect mn of t ummc and t kankmg n> Ove
ment s.
who-may be used co car r y out at t acks cm
t he. flanking enemy and t o int er cept h,s
mur se of movement The d,spos,t ,.n of
t he 1~S,lVt % IS, Of glcat lllIP<>IUUKCIll
t he umt of which we a, e sp?ahm!z, t hey
aye usually locat ed n?.ar mam h!sh\ ?ar s,
m mount am passes, and m valleys: t hat
m, m t hose places flonl \ vh%ch n IS Pos
s,ble t o send t hem r apidly t o meet t he
flanking e.enw.
Lar ge mt evval? bet ween la! ge and
smallm umt h, and t be holat ed uo:lt lon
, t he r ut ,
7J nfor t unat ely, t he same pict ur e is not
obser ved ever ywher e. Some commander s
n~glect t he exchange of in foymat mn, con
slder l~g t hat lf evelyt hmg m t hem sec
t ions IS m or der t he, e IS not hing t o wor r y
70
about . In t he foot hall. and mount ains
such a. mndit km is int oler able. When
t her e w no pr emw agwement and com
plet e ndt %t and,g het ,vwn ne,ghbor s,
a f~vor able at uat icm IS cr eat ed for t ur n.
Thus t he bmt met hod uf mt mt cr zct mn
aga, nst tu, and movement s nzng fia IIh,nc
,, a de>elo~,,,ent of defcnw ,n de~t b and
Wf, , c,,, fo, cd by oe o, t wo h eavy n , <n ,
machnm gun,, and so,,wt , mes br m., t ar s.
Thi. cove, lg f.,.. IS d,. fmscd m echelon
on t lw ffanl< muf m m m,al eonmnl=a.
t ,. ,v,t h t h. it bedms it out , and ,t s
t i, e ,, adjust ed t u t hat of t he lat t er Fcm
adq,at e t ,mr , t y of .mct ,us and flanks
,t ,. also ncce.,a, T t h.,,., cnt ,uo,
iemm,,azssan c,, , ihable ot p,,st s, ob.
st ach=s on t he ouw flank. and t o t he r em,
CO,, ect d~sp,,s,t mn of ,ewr ves, and con.
t t ,, nt commu n wat , ou w, t h ad~acen t u n , t s .
Bu t t h is s t ,ll is n ot all ?$(, exr wd,a,t s
,.,11 L.,. t he dcf,+nee f, o,,, t u, kg and
ffank,,,g n ,vem.t , If it act s lr les .lu t ,ly.
Pas.~ivny and vacdlat mn mwit ably lead
t o los3 of m,t mt ,ve, t o t be ,oemcnt of
t h,~ e,,,,,,> II t he flanks and , ear , t o t he
dr s]ut eg, at m of t he combat f., mat mn,
.<1 finally t o t he enc,, clcnwnt of md~
vidual uws by t he -mmm., Defense ,n t he
In t hat un,t mcwt mned befor e, t he
for ces ,. defense ot ing a~o seized ,e\ ,
w al halls. A plzt .cmn under t he command
of %mm Lieut enant Kamsj.ov, flakmg
a smal] hill held bv a r einfor ced Ger man
plat oon, dr ove t he- enc.my out \ v,t h a de.
t e, mmed at t ack o t he flank ad Year ,
and eapt nr .ad t hr ee machine guns and
t \ m fxiscmem. The Ger mans left 41 dead
on t he hIIl, whiIe our plat oon lost onlx
t wo men. wit h seven wounded.
We ment ioned shove t hat t be Ger mans
somet nyes t ly t o make a t hr ust on a nar
r ow sect mn, r nd?avor ing t o br eak t hr ough
zt o a valley and come out on t he flank
and r ear of ouv un?t s defending t he
he]ght s. Such an enemy maneuver is all
t he mm% danger cmx, as it N oft ,er ciwm.<
out wit h I,r ge number s of infant r y and
t anks, and mxy lead t o a deep flanking
of whole divi.mns. Consequent ly t he de
fense of mount ain valleys and passes
m t o t hem demands paxt icuhw ea?e fr om
CdfiW,,S of all r anks. The +3er ience of
fight ing in t he Caucasus has pr oved t hat
fm dir ect cont r ol of t he valleys it is fir st
necessar y t o secur e t he commanding
height s, abmg whwh t he valley usually
ext ends Cr oss fir e fr om t he adjt icet
m.. +..ins and slopes m t he best way t o
defend t he alley. ft ,s expedient t o leave
only small for ces, r einfor ced wit h ant i.
t ar d< and fir e umt s, cm t he floor of t he
1 u. ar ea our defense st r et ched along
t he nor hem slopes of a cr est ext ending
fr om e{st t o west , Thr ee r egnnent s of
host de infant r y, suppor t ed hy t anks,
br oke t hr ough on t he junct ion bet ween
mm nit s and made for t he pass, The
Ger mans seized It and moved out int o a
valley bet ween t be mo n t air m. Two days
lat e? mor e t han 100 t anks and about t wo
m fant r y r egmwnt s under t ook an at t ack
abmg a valley t o t he east , m or der t o
complet e s, deep ffak, g of t be r idge
f, mn t he sout h znd t o emer ge in t he r ear
of our ~s,t ,cms , t he mont a,ns. At
t his t ime mu command shift ed t he I.,,.
W, }W ,,k t o t he Place of t he PIOSpM
t ,ve hwakt hr ough.; t h,s shut off t he VZl
ley complet ely. R& a.r t dl.r y, and t ank
Un,t s ,,,., e mnsohdat ed . t he s]...s of
opened p on t hem wit h a concent r at ed
fite. Par t of t h e art illmw u mt s fir ed on
t hem w,t h a eocet r at ed ii,., Par t of t he
ar t dler y umt s fnwd on t he infant r y, mA
t ing ,t off fr om t he t anks. The Gemmam
t k cover , while t hwr t anks, having sf
fe, ed gr eat da.ma~e, wer e unable t o wit h.
st md t he powt wful bar r age fir e and I+.,
t r eat ed,
Aft er a while t he eemy r enewed t he
at t , .ack. SOW bn t anks and hfant r y sepa.
, at ed int o t b, . . g, ops. Two of t he,
moved alon~ t he slopes, hoping t o disr upt
our fir e element s and open t he ent r ance t o
t he valley. The t hir d g,oup at t acked i
t he cent er . Thus t he enemy had sw.t t er ed
h,. for ces, and or nIt s, t aking advan
t aze of t hat , cr u+hed all his gr oups in
d,t ad. At t he moment ,vhen t he enemy
at t a,?k had r eached it s maxinmm int en.
slt y and it s t empo was st ar t ing @ s]m,
,dovm unda t he effect of t he dest r uct ive
fir e fr om t hlee di~ect iom, our t anks
, ushed out of ambush and count er at
t acked on t he r ight -flank gr onp of Ger
man t anks. immediat ely sever al host de
vehicles %~er e set on fir e and t he r emzin
m~ r nach,?s fell back, not being able t o
wvt hst and t he pr essuq of mm t anks.
Th,s fier ce conflict last ed t he whole
day. The Ger mans d,d not succeed m
FOREr GN, MILITARY DIGESTS
br eaking t hr ough int o t he valley. They
moved off t o t be st ar t ing posit ion, having
lost many bur ned ad disabled t ank.. Tbe
success of our umt s was pr omot ed by
cor r ect ly or ganized defense o t he slopes
of t he height s and by ,t s dem echelon, ne
in t be valleys.
Fmt dly, one mor e obswwvit mn, comer .
mg t he defmw of mount mn passes. Hav
ing seized a pass, t he at t ack obt aim fr ee
dom of ll12wI,UV,, an d t be mms,bd,t v of
,w,,er ging m t he flank and ~ear of \ vbcde
umt s engaged m defense. For t bm r eason
t he defense of passes demands spec]al
for t mude of soldr .+r s and office,s.
Aft er capt u, e of t he hewht s veI look-
Buildiug the Bridge Across
[Tr a?J a.t @d at t he Command
in t he pass, t he unit s n,ust hold t hem at
al f cost s. Even ,f t he enemy br eaks
t hr ough t be pass and It s defendm-s am
cneir cled, t bcy must st ay cm t he spot and
dr aw p all-ar ound wcr it y on t he
helzbt s. Holdmz t hese heizbt s mav he of
deciwve m,pr <ame in t he bat t & wit h
t he secr md Cchelons of t he at t a:hmg en.
emY. Bes, dm t hat , t he gar r zsos of t he
he,ght s \ mO p, do\ vn lar ge for ms of t he
enemy, whmh wdl hel~ m t he lanchmw
of t he cout ma zt t ack. Upon wit hdi-awa~
of t be foe, t he ,ee, r clcd ga~r isons ~a
cause hull conslder a.blc damaze, since
t hey ,vdl keen ndm ,ncessat fir e t he
mum cour ik of t be host dc r m-ea~
t hmgh t h? mout zmn passm.
the Seine at Les Andelys
and Gwwml St aff S?1,..1, F., t
Lezzven\ vor t h, Kansas. fr om a. Gmman alt ,cle 1. .llt l, t a,. it ,, cit .,,.
bhz tt. ]
Com??t awfe.s of unttsfind tkat <m
genuzty and .eso~trcefulness a?e very
ofte,z ?eq?,ued adddzons t o the for
mal knowledge gained m the study
of tactics and stmtegg. Tbics cwticle
r,, oc{des .?? dhwt!at{ox of jwt such
reqm?cments and how tho p?oblans
yeo.;,met and ow?come.THE EDZ-
On 5 J une, t be ar my cor ps had made
a fo, ced cr ossing of t he Somme below
Amiens, and by t he evening of S J une,
had r eached t he r egion sout h of Gr and
viller s.
Tbe 41st Engineer Bat t alion, t be 2nd
and 3r & Companies, and t he headquar
t er s had been $ent ahead dur ing t be
night t o Feuqwer es for employment by
t he ar my cor ps. The 1st Company had
been assigned for dut y wit h a cavalr y
div,sion, and hr ldge columns 1 and 2 of
t he bat t ahon a? well as t be Ist Enmneer
column had been left behind in Cr ois
sault , t he for mer st at ]on of t he hat
t ahon. It was not planned t hat it should
go abead unt il mor ning, for it seemed
quit e impr act ical for t hese columns t o
eont mue t heir nm~ch hy night t hr ough
t he t own of Pmx which was st ill bur n
ing, st r ongly occupied by t r oops, and
bad been at t ached r epeat edly by planes.
It was not known t o t he commander
t hat t he Seine would be r eached hy t he
next day or be would cer t ainly have
had t h~ t wo br idge columns join t be
WJ mpames t hat same evening.
The or der s fr om t he ar my cor ps which
mer e issued at 4:00 AM on 9 J une, dld
not r each t he bat t alion unt d 8:40 Al!.
Among ot her t hings t hey st at ed t hat
t he bat t alion was at t ached t o a. division
ad t hat t he lat t er had t he nmssion t o
send ot advance det achment s and. caP
t ur e dur ing t his same day t he br ,dges
acr oss t he Seine at And&, Les Andelys,
and Com-celles.
The bat t alion was immedmt ely as.
sembled an< st ar t ed t owar d Gour nay.
Al?ove all lt was impor t ant t hat t he
br idge columns which. wer e st ill far in
t he r ear should soon J om t be bat t aff on.
They wer e sent an or der t o t his effect .
Tbe commander pr oceeded ahead t o t be
divisien command post at t he highway
for k west of Gour nay. The~e, he r e
ceived an or der fr om t he dnwon com
mander t o t ake t he bat t alion on ahead
as far as Saussay on t he mam highway
r unning t o Les Andelys for use by t be
advance det achment s which wer e t o go
ar ound Gour nay, whmh was par t ly in

t t ames, on t he west . A comespond,g
or der wax Issued t o t be bat t aho,
The commander PI weeded to Jeport to
t he commander of t be r emxmawsance
det a.cbmmt ad zet fur t her or der s. Tbe
namw and, m- many Places, deeply
r ut t ed r oad which we now had t o t ake
t hr ough Avesnes made t r avel ver y dit fi.
cult for ,t was cover ed w,t h t r oops
t hr cmghout ]t s ent ir e lengt h and t her e
was nmch t r affic I i t be opposit e d,r ec.
t ion. Even aft er r eaching t he lar ge
Go.r mzy.i,es Andelvs hwhwa. it was
~jb t be
t r at fic, even on a mot ;! cycle. In t be
cour se of t hhe effor t s t o move ahead, sev.
emIL. columns had come alongside cme
allot h er .
Aft er r eacblng Puchay, t be bat t alion
commander % car m fir st met m mor e
Gemu?.n t , 00PS. It was not mt d t be
commander was a few miles fr om Lm
Adelys t hat he met cawd?y, mot or .
cycle, and ar t dler y t r oops which had
been sent on ahead by t he divisir m. As
be r eachet i t he east ent r aee t o Les
Andelys, he lear ned t hat t he br idge had
been blown w and t hat t her e wer e bm
few Ger ma t r oops in t be cit v.
The commander of t he 41st Engineer
Company was mr e t hat since t he bi-idm
had been blown up, it was necessar y t o
put t k,e ent r ee bat t ahon con.mt ing at
t he t ime of t wo companies t o wor k at
Les Andelys ad t hat a deflect ion of
some of t be t r oops t o And6 m Comr dk+s
would only have meant a weakening of
t he for ces. Since t he last nmt cmeycl?
r ider had dr opped out shor t ly befor e,
t be commander went back t $ Saussay
and gave or der s for t be bat t alion head.
quar t er s which bad r eaehed t his point ,
t o cont inue on as far as t be br idge at
I<es Andelys and. t o .ee t o it t hat t he en.
t ir e hat t ah.n r et med t o t he east ent r ance
of t he mt y. As soon as t hey ar r ived, t be
company commander s wer e t o r epor t at
t he br idge.
As he passed t hr ou~h t he cit y. he saw
t hat a number of mot or vehicles wem
blocking t he st r eet s and t hat sever al
st r eet s could not be used being clut t er ed
up hy t he wr eckage of houses. Ther e
for e t be or der was immediat ely given t o
explor e t he t mvn and nick out sever al
us~ble st r eet s.
When t be commandc+ of t he 41st En
gineer Company r eached t be Seine at
about 4:00 PM, t be following p?ct ur e of
t be sit uat ion pr esent ed It self:
1
A few gr oups of an infant r y r egiment
bad cr ossed o pneumat ic r aft s and a
few hoa~s wbmh t hev had fcmmf t bew
for med secmt y on - t be far s,de of
t he r iver . . At t be moment t hey had no
cont act wit h t he enemy. Rumor s t hat
host ile r ifle t r oops wer e st all in t he
ho.., moved t o be f ak.e. Tbe Ior m
spanned. suspension br idge had beefi
blown up by t be Fr ench at t he moment
when t be comr qadw of t he infant r y
bat t abon wbwh had bee hur r ied t o t he
scene. was about t o at t mmt t o seize n
by at t ack.
As t o engineer s, t he 1st company of
an adjacent bat t aho \ vas wit h t he ad.
\ ace det achment . It had o hr ,dge eq,p.
ment at all at It s disposal, bt began t be
const r uct mn of fer r ies w,t b pnenmat ic
float s and such boat s as t hey wer e able
t o find. On t his fer n t be fir st ant it ank
cannon was cmmed, acr oss at abow 5
P.!! and ot her . mm followed it .
Since t her e was no me in ccmnt mg m
t h,s speedy amwal of t he br ,dge mluins
on account of t be gr eat dlff,eult ies m t he
way of nmvmg t he heavy vehicles over
t he r oads, t he 1st and 2nd Companies
of t he. 41S Bat t alion couhi at fir st da
ncdbing bt bwld fer r ies wmh pnenmt ie
float s and locally obt ained mat er ial. The
men of t he bat t alion beadmmr t et s r e
celved t he or der t o help gat her mat er ial
and t o br ing boat s acr oss fr om t be en.
mnvs side.
The or der was inmwdmt elv obt ained
fr om t he cm,,mader of t he a>vame de.
t achment , who was in t he vicinit y of t he
b, ldSe, t hat all vehicles should st op at
t be east ent r ance of~ Les Andelys and
t hat t empor ar y only vehwles belonging
t o t be egmeer s and t o t he br idge
ml.nm could pass t hr ough t he cit y. A
t r affic zar d at t he east ent ,a,ze +.
t he c,t $ had char ge of. tbe en for cmnen~
of t his r eglat mnwhlck soon was con
fimmd by an or der fr om t he division
commander ,
The fcdlow,ng phl~e, t o he wwd ,n t he
const r wt im of float m,g sect mns wer e a.
b,~ned t o t he company mmm,andem of
t he 41st Eng]eer Bat t at ion who ar r ived
at zbout 4,45 PM, as well as t he mm.
mandex f t he CCNWMSf, mn t he mxgb.
bot mg bat t akon. for t he men of t he
adjacem bat t ahon -jmt t o t he <r mt b of
t he Island: for t he 3r d Company of t he
41st Bat t ahon in t he v,cimt y of t he
w, ,ck,d br , dge ; for t he 2nd Cmnpany of
t he 41st Bat t alionbet ween t hese t wo
,,OmpalW (set . sket ch )
Wbe at about 5.30 PM, t be 2nd and
3r d Comvanies of t he 41st Bat t alio)l
, cached Les Amlelys, t he fir e fr om a
heavy bat t er y began t o fall at t he sit e
of t he wr ecked br idge. Ther efor e, t he
:31c! Cmnanv. was moved t o anot hm
place ,fowi st ~.eam fr om t he island. whmh
had alr eady been explor ed w,t h a VMW
t o mmg ,t as a br ]djw sit e, but was
, eallv not a vem favor able locat ion. It
was bly suit abl~ for t he {cr obsinr- of fom
t l ops.
About 6.30 PM and ?:30 PM, t he 2ml
and 3r d Companies, r espect we]y, wei.e
able t o begin fer r ying t r oops over cm
e,~lk!+~ felI, es. III t he r aw of t he 1%,.
WI c%niny a m-eat deal of t nne bad
bee lost ii ga~her ing emer gency ma
t enal.
The cot qmader of t be adjacmt bat .
t alir m and at t he same t ,me t he com
mander of t he dmist on, placed all pm.
nons of h,s bat t alion wblch wer e engaged
at Les Andelys at t he disposal of t be
commander of t be 41st Bngmee+ Bat .
t ahon, and char ged t he lat t er wit h t he
71
. .
; t ask of get t ing t he r einfor ced r egnnent
acr oss t he r iver and wit h t he bud{,ng
; of t he br idge which had t o he complet ed
soon. Al! fur t her or der s wer e Issued m
~ closest cooper at ion wit h t he commander
1 of t he infant r y r egiment who in t he
nleant une had ar r ived at t he r iver .
Sm.. t hen Command Post s \ ver e locat ed
{&Iose ~oget hey, close eOOP?Ta t iOnwas al
,
,
I
1.
0.
,,
vr a~s assur ed, When, almt midnight ,
t he r egiment al st aff cr ossed at t he west
t ,bor w, a ha.iw office, , enmied behiud
w,t h t he 41st Engineer Bat t a ho. who
gave t he or der s concemmg t he t r ansfer
of novt ions of t he r emment acr o.s t he
kr, as t hey ammwd~
Since a xough measur ement of t he
r iver est abb shed It s w,dt h at about 1?5
Far ds and only t he t hr ee br idge colmm.
wh~ch wer e pr esent could he count ed on,
at least for some t une, It was not pOs
sdJ e t o cont emplat e t he const r uct ion of
anyt hin~ mor e iha. an eight -t on br idge.
A euit able bmdge s,t e wit h a good aP
pr oach cm ember side was found about
500 yar ds upst r eam fr om t he wr ecke,l
bmdge. The company fr om t he nelghboY
ing hat t ahon, aft er t be ar mval of t he
fu zt of t he vebmles of t hem bmlge
column, was t aken fr om It s f er r yi nx
ope~at mns and about ,9:30 PM It be~an
t hq wor k of canst r uct uw t he br idge ap
pr oaches on eit her s,de of t be r iver .
The 21KI Company, par t s of t he 3r d
Company as well as t he one plat oon of
t he neighbor ing hat t ahon wer e engaged
m t he same t ime w,t h t he const r uct ion
of fom-t on float ing sect mns f, mu t he
nmt wml car r ied by t he br idge ml, nn
which had anmv?d m t he meant ~mt . At
10:15 PM. t he fir st float ing sect ,. was
finished. T,he t , ansfer &cr oss t he ziver
on all exz~t in g float in g s ect i.s con
s t ru ct ed w:t h p.n eu mat ,c float s an d . .
s ect , on s bu dt w, t h emer gen cy mat erial.
was con t in u ed. The t act ical sit uat ion
necessit at ed t he cont inuat ion of t he
movement of t r oops acr oss t he liver .
The enemy ar t iller y fir e st opped dur
ing t he evening. It was lear ned lat er ,
t hat t he bat t er y had beqn t aken hy por
t ions of an inf ant r v r emme.t .
Dur ing t he night , a company fr om an.
ot her gr oup was made avadable for use
72
MILITARY REVfEW
by t he bat t alion. It t ook char ge of t he
wor k of get t ing t he pneumst m r aft sec.
t mm acr oss t be r iver . Thk expedit ed t he
const vuct mn of t he t foat lg sect ions wit h
ar my br idge mat er ial.
Towar d midnight , t he job of fer r ying
t he 1st hat ~alim of a, ,nfat r y r egi.
ment wit h m. heawest mot or whicles,
was epded. The 2nd bat t alion followed
ii
/
.,. .
~CO,4fst .fngr L%
&Hrghway Br+e
V 8-ton Army Bridge
$$ 3dCo, 4! Engr Bn
(Ponfon ferries )
9?
immedmt cly aft e, mar d at t he cr ossing
,It e dmvnst r eam fr om t he Island
D, ,ng t he night , t he commander of
t he 41s1 Encmeer Bat t alion \ vas ot in.
fm med of t he wher eabout s of h,?. t wo
br , dge FOhllllnS Sever al t ,n ws m,s wn .
m,s wme s en t back t o meet t h e,. Con
st ant ly, ot iicws of t be bat t ahon st aff
wer e ot h.t ,g fm t he lnwfge clmns
It was not unt il 4:00 AM t hat t hey suc
ceeded m find, ng bmdge column No. 2
and i get t ing m up for war d. The ..1.
.,s had been fm ced t o bak for houls
on 9 J une out bide t hf! bur ning t own of
Pmx, and even t he had bee able t o
move for war d bt SIOWIVon account of
t hei, beady loaded t vu-cks At va, mus
t ,,,,,,, ot bev t , ucks and car s had pushed
t heir may mt o t he hne of t he column
affect ing It s umt y. A few of t he t r ucks
we, e st ,ll missmg. The dmmwon or der
t hat t he br idge columns had IDecedence
over all ot her ar ms, never r eached t hem.
Aft er t he ar r w.1 of br ,dee column No
2, ]t was possible t o cam? on t he fen Y
IK opc=r at ,on s at incr eased t empo. How
ever , since br ,dge column No. I had not
Yet all ived and ncdhmg could be lemed
of ~t s wher eabout s: t her e was no use
t hik,g of be~innmg t he con~t r ct mn
of a hndge, alt hough at about 5:00 AIM,
t he cons+.ct ron of t he appr oach I amps
t o t he br idge was mmplet ed.
In t he m,ant mw, t he 3r d Company of
t he 41st Iinmnw Rat t al,? had b,,n en.
gazed m t he const iuct lon of float ing
.ect ,ons of t he br idge about 500 yal,ds
upst l eam f, on, t he br idge sit e i or der
t o awmf a congest ion of br idge mat er ml.
It also becan fer r ying oper at ions in t he
ear ly hour s of t he mor ning. The officel
who had been left beh~d by t he infant r y
handled t he d,st r ibut lon of t r affic t o t he
t wo fer r ies wit h gr eat skill. St rjct r egu-
Int m of t r affic in Les Andelys, m whjch
since t he ear ly hour s of t he mor ning
field police had been engaged, pr even~
inz all t r affic j ar es. The t r affic cont r ol
pmt at t he east ent r ance t o t he cit y,
wbi ch had t o st op all veb icles not abso
lut ely r equir ed, had a difficult job, and
was occupied most of t he t ime by an
Ooi m,..
Aft er t he mat er ial fr om br id e col
umn No. 2 (vehicles which ha 3 been
separ at ed fr om t he r est of t he column
dld not ar r we unt il t he aft er noon) had
all been used up, it was possible t o give
a few hour s r est t o some of t he plat oons,
as all t he for ces \ ver e not needed in t he
fer r vinr oper at ions.
. . . . ...
1
It was not unt il 9:00 AM t hat t he fir st
vehmles of br idge column No, 1 began
t o ar r ive. Ther e \ ver e also a few pont on
t r ucks missins which had br oken awav
fr om t he colu-mn dur ing t he mar ch, s;
t hat t her e was ot quit e enough mat er ial
for finishing t he br idge. The ccmunader
of t be column had left ot hzg undone
t o get all h,s t r ucks and cam t o t heir
dest mat mn. It was necessar y t o speed
up t he fer r y]ng oper at ions, employmg
even vneumat lc float s for t he const r ue.
t ie . ? fer r ies.
I or der t o hast e t he const r uct ion of
t he br idge, t he diwsmn engineer made
t he 16-t on, double suppor t ed fer r y at
J !ids ava,~lable (t he mat er ial belonging
t o a pont on plat oon) and issued or der s
f., t h,s eqmpment t o be br ogbt t o Les
Andelys by t he wat er mut e.
By 1? .30 t he r ema,,~ ne~e,,a,y float
ing sect wns wer e finished wit h t he ma-
t m,al br ought by t he gr adr dly v.12,V,,,E
br ,dge column t r ck$. They could now b,
ix ought mt o place.
.
%
...
I
,, ,Ca,,,,.,,
~v .3 .,,
. .. . . .,-.,
,.,.,...,
/
4.
..,,w, -r
&.,
,.,,.,
. . 7,,. .,.,,
%,<
. .. ..,,..,
a
At 1:45 t he br idge was complet ed. Tbc
fir st vehicles wer e called by t elephone
fr om t be t r affic post at t he east ent r ance
t o Les Andelys. III or der t o avot d t be
occur r ence of t r at fic janm r esult ing fvom
t wo-way t r affic, one way t r affic bad been
est abhshed in t he cit y. EIence, t her e oc
cur r ed no t ie-ups wor t h ment ioning in
t he t r affic over t he br idge, not even
when t he br idge was mada available for
use by t he division which was on t he
left .
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
L Out of t he ma er ml on hand, four R.
ser ve sect ions wer e const r uct ed which
must be r egar ded as t he mmimum allow
:nbleu;eu)r nber (wit h t w,ent y-four sect ion.
A net bar r icade was also
placed in posit ion t o cat ch dr ift ing mines
of whmh t he Fr ench made ext ensive use
elsewher e.
On 11 J une at about 6:00 AM t he
br idge was at t acked in a t hick fog by
enemy planes. The, company which was
engaged m t h~ br idge ser vice suffer ed
sever al casualt ies. No damage was done
t o t he br ldze. All ot her air at t acks wel e
wt t hout ie%dt and made no mat em.1
differ ence in t he movement of t r oops
acr oss t he r iver .
The budding of t he hr ldge at Les
Andelys had t o be accomplished in t he
nndst of pur suit oper at ions. It was net .
essar y t o do ever yt hing as fast as Po>
slble. Limit s wer e placed on t hk, how
ever , hy t he impossibilit y of get t ing t he
br idge columns for war d fast enough.
The, efoi-e, in t heir well-meant effort s t o
advance, ot her br anches must be wdhng
t o let engineer s and t heir br idge equ]p
ment have t he r ight of way when mldgt !
const r ct mn is ahead.
StrategyA Material Aspect
[An ar t icle by Lt . Col, H. J . Cooper , R, A, S. C,, in Tke Fzgkt ing
F.) ces ( England) Oct ober 1942. ]
A shor t definit ion of war was once
~iven as beinE a cOnt inu.n.e of POIICY
by ot her means; t he wr mer was Clause-
w,t z. The mea. t o mh,ch ,, a, was a 511p
plement and for wh,ch ,t was a suhst ,
t ut e wer e supposedly d,plomat m and eco
nomic. Ther efor e m t hem fr equent r e
. ,e\ vs of pohcy st at esmen have t o decide
by what Ime of act um t hey may best be
able t o encomuass t heir ends. Whet her
war IS possible: pr act icable m oppot t e;
,vhet her by ,t s t hr eat or hy a d,splay of
it s pauapbemalza solidmy may he gwe t .
an ar gument Bnt befor e t he t hr eat may
he ut t er ed m t he par apher nalia. fkmt ed,
t he Pr udent will see t hat t he fizht mg
ser vices ar e so commanded, t r ained and
equipped t hat vict or y is cer t ain. In 1911
when t he Pmthtw appear ed at Agad,r
t he Fr ench had t o nm.ke a mp?d decismn~
as t o t he POI, CYt hey would adopt . Tbe
Pr une Minist er mmlt ed t he Gener al
St aff and asked ,! Fr ance m t he eent
of war could pcm,t wely count on vmt m-y.
He r eceived an evasive r eply. Thus he
adopt edindeed was fm ced t o zdopt a
pohcy of under st anding wit h t he GeY
mas, The cour se of hist or y of t hm coun
t , v shows t hat st at esmen have asked sir e.
,I;r quest ,ons of t hen, md,t ar y adv%er s
and have r ecewed simdar r eplies.
A sur vey of r ampalgns dr l~ t he past
t housand year s shows t hat of t he fact or s
SOIeming war t hose wluch ar e nor mal
.me supr eme; of t hose which r emam t he
mo>t unpmt at may be m. miet ly
daswd as polit ical ad adr mnist r at me. It
,. a mat t er of ext r eme du?ic.lt v t o for e
cas t even t he ear ly st ages of a campaign
t mm mt her belhger ent ,s point of view
The sur pr ise effect s of t he adnnmst r at it e
XIOUP wdl n ot be known, neit her will it
be demt ood bow far t heir expect ant
, mlt .s will he r elied m. by t he pot ,t wal
cmp.
The aPpea,%,e of axcher s at Cr eCy, t he
US(! of gunpowder hy Mabmnet 11 at t bc
s,c=ge of Const ant , ople, t he br ee&t oad-
I,,Z r ifle ad lit r mlleuw m 18?0, t he 17
,ch how,t zer ,. 1914, and t he d,e.
hor nber and miniat us submar ine t oday
I,,ouEht gr eat advat .ges t o t he,? llSer S.
But sr pr ,ws hat e not bee confined t o
mat t xwd t echnmaht v?s, The or gzmvn,t io
of Welligt o, t he of maneuve? of pow er
Xaolwm. t he mwams of t he Rssmns m
181l!!, {hi mar ksm& ship of t he Beers ,
t he mck]essness of t he J apanese in 1904,
t h e mIISZIng poweF of m&5t ance in de.
f,,nse by t be Tur ks ,n 1914.18 and t he
Rmmans t oday, and t he mor al st amina
of t he Gr eeks and Yzoslavs have power .
fally affect ed t heir t act ical oper at ms.
Axamst t his bt -mkgyond t he pr esent cam-
Pawn may convenient ly be set . It is al
r eady not able for t he eclipse of t he wor d
<gr eat . . applr ed t o war ad for t he
appear ance of global and %pat ,al as
descmpt we adr ect ,ves apphed t o war far e.
~t 1s even mor e not ewor t hy for t he dmn.
mst r at ion of what has ?or long been
Immv, t hat nat ,os of small mduzt l,,al
r apamt y ad but poor ly developed t echni
cal abdlt y ar e complet ely at t he mer cy
of newhbor s bet t er endowed and admim
,st r ?t &ly mor e compet ent . It m t o t his
admmibt r at !ve compet ence t hat at t ent ion
may pr ofit ably be g,ven. The admmlst r a.
t mw abdmv of a nat ion M closelv I e
lat ed t o t he t ecbmcal and invet ,& czi.
pwmt y of It s mdmdual member s. A de
mand for a fmr t ,cular pwce of appar at us
hy t he expanding l,fe of t he civd populz
t mn wdl cr eat e an or zaizat m t o supply
It , vihwh m m, t ur n \ vdl at t r act t be m
vet i. e geniusof t hose \ vho ar e int e
r est ed. t he demand m t hen sat mfied and
m ,t s t ur n will cr eat e ot her demands. The
r at e of wwduc-t ie when et sub.iect t o
leg,slat ,ie r est r ict ion m gover ned ent ne
h by Wlvat e financml conmdemt mt m, and
t he car e of t he r moduct is oft en of o
moment. E. t o be t r aced A s,m,ia~ D,O,P,S
m t be demand for ibe pr ovmon and t he
Me of t hose t echmcal aids t o fiI e and
nmvewt wb,cb ar e essent ml t o t he sue.
cessful mosecut io. of moder n war . An
exceot mk IS at once seen in t be limit ing
fact ;r s; t hey ar e ,mposed by t he fin...
mal pobcy of Gover nment .
Among t he a,ds t o indmldual fir e and
movement m e aer oplanes, ar mor ed fisbt
mg vehxles, ar t dler y, bot h t r ader and
self-pr opelled, t he advanced met hods of
s,znalhng, mechanical t r anspor t , chemi
cal war far e equipment , and pr eser ved
food. Ther e has for lon?z been a t endency
cr yst allized bv war mt o . r out ine. t o
t r &t t hese aI& and t heu component s ah
pawns of which t her e M an mexhaust ,ble
s u pply an d wbmh can be supphed, used
and d]scar ded at t he whnn of commander s
ad t heir st affs Ther e has been no open
r ecognm.n of t he fact t hat a st r at egical
PI. can only be t r anslat ed mt o t act ical
bper at lons byequ~pr nent de=gned for t he
t ask m hand. R IS insufficient t o r eceive
ad amnow t be designs of field enuim
mem,put t hem mt o p~oduct ,on and ih;n
devise a t act ical syst em for t hem use. If
t be pr oblem is t o defeat an enemy using
aer opkmes bot h for r econnaissance and
a, ver t ical ar t dler y, wielding eonsidel.
able fir e-power , displaying much abdlt y
m deploy mer it , exhib?t mg met lculousca, e
In maint enance and fel.t de r esour ce in
r ecover y and r eclamat ion, t he cd only
must our eaumment s be of a bi~her
st andar d but t he cont r ol of t hem must
also be m ever y way super , or . In Br it ain
t he assur ance of an init ial equalit y of
st andar d of er jipment wit h pot ent ial
er er nws can never be at t ained since
financial policy not only, and per haps
Pr udent ly, pr ecludes t he accumulat ion of
vast ar mament s, hut does somet hmg
much mor e effect we; It emasculat es r e
sear ch. Br it ish equipment dur ing war is
t her efor e much mor e :. a st at e of flux
t han t hat of t hose nat mm who ent er on
war bet t er pr epar ed. This st at e of fluid
it y r equir es a gr eat er and mot e exper t
measur e of cont r ol t han IS commonly suP
iwsed. Resear ch y cont r ol has also been
laekr .g, and t his. IS mor e sr pr ismg since
K r er pmed only mt ellect wd gift s and not
nmev for ,t s efficient r mact me.
It has bee object ed t hat t be r emoval of
t he Mast er -Gener al of t he Or dace fr om
t he Ar my Council has depr ived t hat body
of t he benefit of t @chnmal advice m t he
t or mnlat mn of war pohcy; but t echnical
adwce M r eqmr ed upon quest ions wh,ch
d]d ot .ome ,v,t hm t he scor e of t hat
officer . He was char ged, it t t c, aim w}t h
t h? scient ific develomnt .nt of war ma
t er ml, r ewai ch, expei,ment , design, pr oof
and mbpect lon of zyt icles as ~zyer se as
zuns and but t ons, wit h t he adml.nlst r at ,on
of ar ms and br anches and commit t ees, but
not wit h t echnlcaht les of st r at egical and
t act ,cal pkmnmg. HIS dut ies have been
dmdeif bet ween t he Mimst r y of Supply,
t be Deput y Chief of t be Impel ial Gener al
St aff, and t o some ext ent het we~ t he
Adjut ant -Genei-al, t be !,l,l,t zl y Secr et ar y
and t he Dir ect or of Md,t ar y Tr aining. To
app<,mt an officer \ .,t b t he Powms of t he
lat e &fast er -Gener al of Or dnance \ vdl not
sf3ce, since adv,se is not only r equmed by
t he Gener al St aff as t o t he const r uct ion
and maint enance of \ var l,ke appar at us
and st m es, ht also wit h r egar d t o t heu
capabdlt les, Ilmlt at lons and use. Thm a.d-
V,W ,s bet t er t ender ed by t be user s t han
by t he dm,gem, const r uct or s and plW
v,der s.
However much we disldt e it , we r mt st
face up t o t he far t t hat st r at ,gy M sub
wmwnt t o supply. Xt is not only eces
sar .. t o ensur e t hat s commander IS 1.o.
md;d w,t h p,per ly q,pped folmlat ios
m t he field, bt also t o nmke cer t ain t hat
t hey ar e but t r essed hy an efficwnt SYS.
t emof supply. ma,t eance, r ecover y and
lepam. The knowledge, expemece and
flar e r equir ed f.? t he cr eat mn ad .m.or k.
mg of t b]s syst em IS mm-e oft en t o be
found among t hose whose milit ar y kowl
edge ad expenmce ar e r emfc,med by an
ndast andmg of t he t echwal hm,t at ions
and capact t ,es of t heir equipmet 8 t han
among t hose wbo ar e int er est ed chiefly
m and have bee engr ossed wit h t hen
deswn and manufacfur e. Exact kowl.
of t heir ment al wpxpmet ,
The am-t ent r out nw of ha.mg mncen.
t r at ed a?, ar my clobe t o t he ewny . main
fr ees wit hout int elfe, ence qd by s.
, T},. w-o,d %ech n rca~ , t h e. Ar my& u I.as t fr e
,,u en t iy u sed m ,t s n a r r ow.r .en . e of .er t ai.in g
t o t h e r n . ch . . mal art s P.d ccmli.d s e,,..,. It m
h . , . u ,.(I m ,t a WKIQ, , , , . of be,. .h a r e.ct er .
mt k , >f a lx+!t iclar ar t or .r ofe,.ion t h a t of
,L71dwm,
2 SLIDDI, IS n ot u sed t o den ot e t h e Dr on e., of
P=.t dls food an d fu el, bu t t o embr .cc t h e fc
t io., of . 1. . 1. . at . .mmn a mder ,. d,,,c,s ,l, i.
IJ KJ . . ? .u a n t zt m% at t h e wow lace an d at t h e
r mowr t ime, all t h a t h e r en me. for t h e mai.
, , . . . . . of h , . for ce.
73
Mff.fTARY mlEW
The for m of t his or ganizat ion will not be
debat ed m t his essay; it is t o son,. of t he
admmist r at we ,mphcat i.ns of such con
t r ol t hat at t ent lo will be dir ect ed.
#.dminl~t r at lve dut ,es in field oper a
t ion> may convem.mt ly be dwided mt o
eight sexment s: cl?t h,ng, accommoda
t mn, equ, ppm~,, fet .dmg. maint ammg, r e
cla]mmg, r efkmr mg amd r ecupemt mg.
ha\ e an .d&fu aLe kno\ x.fm&e of K,, dfi.
They ar e t he same for t he enemy as fm
cer s. men and annnals in or der t o assess
OUIsclvm. The impor t ame of t he enemys
t heu abd!t y t o per for m t he t ashs whmh
al lanxement s ccnnposmg t hese segmems
he w,, about t set them. VffellSIVeS t O
mcr em++s w?t b t he dur at ion of t he cam.
wwn For lt M t he fut ur e capacit y of
t h, enmny whwh a commander must mm.
mcr easm~ speed of exist ence-and t he co.
sequem complexit y of war hke or gamza
Par e \ vlt b bm own: lt is not t he enemy
sr t uat wn t oday pm wh,ch he \ mll base
t xon aI e mspons,ble for t his delegat ion,
h,s Ilk for t omor r ow. Aft e, t he clea,
\ ~hmh , it s t ur n I equir cs at t he cent er
cmce of t he A .,s for ces fr om Cyr er mi.a
of affams some gwat m and mor e exact
in J aumy, 19M, t he enemy commander
measur e of cont r ol.
, e.or t ed t o one of t he most ac,et r uses
What , ,t wdi at once be asked, ,s t he
of ww SUIprwa HIS Dower of r eclaim.
p,act lcal apfdicat m. of t h$s analysis t o
m= ami r epa,r ig t he ecpxpn wn t of h ,s
day ? The bat t le me m now m wt de I.
for ?. exceeded t he expet t at ,ons of t he
ext ent t hat t he k,,d of t he bmt Iefi&f
M,ddle East Commade, and g~e ,,s, t o
has hemme t he vo,d of Eur ope. Tbe ad.
:,dmm,.wit ,ve swpr ,se wbleh t r ed t he
r mmst r at nw Int elhmme ser wce m vast lv
balance It ,s of wt al lut e, est t h a t t bew
expanded and t he ,~t elbwce M mw,d,s
n lan ifes t at ,on s of t h e pr,n ciple of mu -
E, of f$eawr volume and gr eit .+, m,.
PI 1S, should be cm, flly examined. If
u IIt a.ce. Aik3\ - It t o he supposed t hat a
we consider t he adm,,st r a.t ive Slt uat mn Pr .~PeI cSt lMat e has bw, made of t b,
of t he enemy at any moment ,t \ mIl at
capab, ht ws of t he emmv SIX mont hs ako
t his Inst zmt be fwnd, t o bomo,, a met ,.
t o pr oduct - sur face and wale, wat er maft ,
phm fr om appl,ed mecban, c., t o have a
a,r cmt t of all kind,, guns and wnall ar nm
bot h. of all cab ber s, t anks of all wemht s and
mst ama. w.s cent er : a fact or which at
The pinmpal dut y of a mmmandm IS t hat moment wdl be p, qmndet znt . The
t r anspor t of all Capamt ms. It m ~hs pos.
t o mahc, dm,?ums. t hese demwms ht . car mc,t y of t be ee,y t o wage war fr om
s,ble t o know what h, has t oday a<j ,vbat
ha.es pm] app, emat mn,, \ vhmh m t heir hm exmt !g dlsposit m. wdl at t hat t une
he wdl have m .,, r nont hb, t nne when t he
Iul n a, e d,penci,t for t hel! accr a.y he founded on t b,s fact or : t he oppos,ng
oPPosmK ..mmander has mat bhalled h!,
PO,, kno,,le<ig,, of t he capabdt t , m of t he comnmder must ?qat e t hr s ft m ca.
f or c.es for t he dw,sne blos. imo\ mg t he
,,ac, t v
plwpor t ,.m I %%hich t h,s amnamet ,?
en<uny, who ,.dl at t empt t o mt wfer e wkh
t o h,, ,.
them. If t he>e capahd,t w. ar e not known, The ce,ny ,8 a ],. and ,a,,able fat .
avadahle, t he ,Ize and t ypes of o!fensIt e
wh,ch he can ,nont can be det wr n, ned:
t hen t he comnmdet cannot kno\ v ,f hu
t o,, p,s,esbmz all t he mpabdd,es f o, ,,.
PI, ,s, ,n fact , capable of ach,evmg t he
t wn t hat t une and bpace allow hnn. When
d+fr at of t he e,w., v. for u,t hout t h, s
endeavor ing t o ascer t m what adnnls.
knox ledge n m IS r educed t o t he level of
t he gan,~w! t able T. t ake a n.k knowing
t he c.pamt y d t he en,my 1? t o make a
bld for \ lCLOII , ; t o t akr l1.k5 wt bout t h,s
Imo,+l edge I. w.t t o wmble. The a, t of
The nuht wy nupht of a at mn E ot
hy t he st ock of ,,,,, (?s ,<[ <{, g,,,, ,, but by
t bc t apldlt y wmh v blch a nail.. ca t ur n
fr om t he ar t s of peace :. t he bumness of
war , and by t heir r m.\ e, wccmsflly t o
pu rs u e ]t . Th e pr ow . . . of t h t s mibt my
n), ~ht ,s depcndwt ,n t he fnst ,w.t ame ccw+r mg It s dw,,g, pr odct lon, is ,, !..,
.,,,,. t he abd, t >, of t he comh,ed .,,,1 s t or age, u s e, ,ait enace amd rep%,..
Tactics of Combat for Inhabited Places
[Tmshit ed at t he Command ad Gener al St aff Sehoo,, Foyt
Leavenwor t h, Iiansas, fr om a Rusbmn ar t icle by Ma~or P. Slesa-w,
Sovwt Ar my, m K,ws?I.v. Zvezda 10 December 1942 ]
Figbt ms in t he r egIos of ve]lkiye
I,ukl xd Rzhev M char act er ized by st h
bov?ness and v]olence. in t he final analy
sis, n r educes t o a st r xEl@ for cont r ol of
separ at e ,nhabit ed places m of gnmps
of t hem, Many of t hese set t lement s had
P, evmuslY been t r ansfor med int o pow,..
ful cet er a of r esist amx by t be Fascist s
The Gemnans hold ont o ibabl fed places t hat m t hmr for ces t bsr e ar e & yet no
especially t eaciosly fm. a var iet y of unit ?, eqlpped for wint er . Thus not only
?
r easons, Fr ost of all, in a village it is t act ical comsider at mns, but also clirnztm
74
FORErGN MILITARY DIGESTS
conditions force the Germans to confine
t hemselves t o vdlages and fa,mst ead,
Befor e t he st ar t of cmqha.t for t he in
habit ed r mit . car eful r edonnmssace of
t he for w~r d edge and dept h of defense of
t he enemy must he car mdd out . Ther e IS
usually a fair ly dense ne Yor k of per ma.
k
nent 10E and ear t h for t , cat mns locat ed
on t he out er edee of t he Ger man defense
They cove? t h~ r t t r vals bet ween neigh
bor ing set t lement s which ar e adapt ed t o
all.avond defense. The number of dug
out s on t he for war d edge is ku ge. As
mt inv as 25 t o 28 of t hem have been
conn?ed near a small out er defense vil
lage. In o?der t o neut r abze all macbine
gun nest s and engineer ing const r uct mns
of t he er wmv m t be dit t -ct mn of t be DIo
infant r y and veh,cula. r t r anspor t ,
In t he cour se of painst aking st udy of
t he enemys fir e syst em, t he r econnam
sance par t ]es uncover ed one impor t ant
t act xal det ad. Building t hem defense m
t be fall, t he Ger mans as a I ule dld not
er ect pe,manent for t ificat ions m swampy
ar eas and on t he necks of land bw\ ~een
lakes. Our at t ack umt s t her efor e made
some use of t hk fact f? concealed ap
pr oach t o t he ?ear of t he for t died u
hablt ed places. Pr olonged and sy,t emat :c
r econamance of t he host de defense
made possible t he sur pr ise enmr clement
and speedy dest r uct mn of a ser ms of con
t r ol point s. But what , is t o be done m
cases wher e t he condmons of t he 1egIOII
do not make N possible t o br eak t hr ough
t o t he enemys r ear unobsm veal?
Gener ally speaking, t her e ar e t wo
t ypes of at t acks on mhablt ed places:
fr ont al at t ack, and out flanking move
ment on one or bot h sides. Fr ont al at
t acks, and all wer e r epulsed But no 8oon
er did t hey t ake advant age of bellows
and woods t o out flank t be enemy t han
t be village was t aken.
fant r y fr om t he r ear , t aking car e of t be
r evived mdde-xu nest s of t he enemv.
As soon as t he%. at t aek,ng t hr o~h
t he cxnmdmw t ur ned t o meet each ot her ,
t he Ger mans usually hast ened t o wit h.
dr aw t o t he next vdlaze. This moment m
pa~t icular ly advant ageous for t he de
st r uct ion of enemy pezwnnel and t he
capt we of mat &-iel. The r eason n t hat
t he Ger mzuIs. r et zeat incuder t het h, eat
of ?nclr dem~nt , oft en & not succeed m
secur ing t hel~ flanks, and do ot car r y
out ,eC0nna1s3anW. They md,amly m.
t r eat massed i close column, and at t b~s
moment t hev ar e most vulner able t o at .
t a ck,
Row o~por t e t he enveloping of one
or bot h flanks of t he enemy may be ,,
evidenced hyt befolloxvlng lnc,dent . Op. w
at m~ in a wmdw way, r ot s of a cer t ain
for ce of cmnbmed ar ms capt r edt ht ,t ee
,hab, t ed places ad advanced t welve
kilomet er s (seven males) m t wo days of
or al, ar y combat . At t he same t ime t hey
killed mole t han 1,200 Hit le, it es and
seized 28 guns, six t anks, and lar ge mm.
be,. of wglar and aut onw.t lc ,Mes.
However , t he r eg,on so,ct ,,es abods
, lakes and unf, ozm s,,amp,, whmh
hidw flanking man,uver s. Then t he
.lt u at ion neces s it at es r eco, se t o fr on t a l
at t .acl. Here , t IS impor t an t t h a t t be at
t ack be pr eceded by a adequat e ar t iller y
bombar dment of all r egist er ed object ives.
It i= most t o t mw t he at t ack advant ageous
by t ank and infant r y for t he appr oach
of da, kness o,r sno.wfzdls ad st or ms.
Such a bold mght at t ack in. t he r egion
of t he Vebkmw Luki-Novosokolnlki r ail.
way made po&ble t he capt ur e of sever al
for t ified vdlages which p t o t hen had
been comder ed impr egnable,
Or ganizing act ive day and night nmve
ment s and boldly leavmx individual log
and ear t h for t ificat ions of t he enemy
blockaded in our year , It is possible t o
fight t he Ge,,nr ms out of o, vdla~e af.
t er anot her . Bt h,,. t be commander
must know not only how t o st r ike down
an mhab~t ed place, but also how t o mn
solidat e it axkly bcbind him. The mat
t e~lsoccaslbnall~ qnlwd]ffer ent in pr ac
t ,c?: some Vd]aSe, have changed hands
many Ulm?s.
eell,y.
Consequent ly, PO vaking a r dkage t be
commder must mg.anim her e an all
a,ound defense ,,, t h t he pmxonnel of t he
umt s havinz sust ained t he bur den of
combat . At t hm t m,e t he r eset .es must
pur sue t he r et ]eat mg enemy cont mucms
lY. Wit h such alt er nat ion of act ivit y by
t he r ut s t he enemy WIO be t bmum back
so far fr om t he inhab, bad phl.e t hat su,
pllse count er at t acks can not be made.
Artillery Support for Tanks
[Fr oma.n ar t i&by Capt mn W. R. YounS, R.A,, m Tbe A,,,z u
Q,,.tdu (London) November 19&2.]
Tim deadhnesa of t he a.t mmk gun
calls for t he st udy of t he best means of
glvmk! .ur t anks suppor t when t hey ar e
faced wit h it s menace. Hence t he SuP
por t Gr oup m an ar mor ed divmon. But
t h,s body ,s found t o be mor e self-sup
por t lng t han a suppor t for t anks. It s
ar t dlevy cannot keep p mmh a mccess
fl t ank t hr ust and It s car ne%s ar e ex
t r e,ely vulner able t o Lhe ant ,t ank gun.
Km. met hods of sppcmt ar e t her efor e
being sought , One met hod is t he use of
dr , maft as close suppor t ar t dler y. Thm
moved ve, v successful m t be Ger man at
~acks m F,ance, but It has gr ave de
fect s. These ar e:
n. Tbe delay m commg mt o act ion IS
always consider able since t he air cr aft
have t o be summoned fr om t be er ound.
b. In face of st r ong fight t v a; ant i
air cr aft opposit ion t he ~ air cr aft \ vill
pr obably not ar mve at d].
c. Tbe suppor t affor ded must be sPas
modw and m effect iveness suffer s fr om
t he law of dt mmishing r et ur ns.
That t he Ger mans ar e not sat isfied
,wt b t h,~s met hod of suppor t for ar mor ed
for mat mns is shown by t hmr mt r oduc
t mn of t he self-pr opelled assault gun.
The ar gument s a~ainst t be self-pr o
pelled gun-t he field. gun mount ed on a
t ank cbassls ar e t hat :
a. If it is using indir ect fir e it is less
et fiment t han a field-gun on t be gr ound.
L, If It s fir e m dmect it IS o mat ch
fm. t he oppoung gn o t he g,quml,
sum. N p,esent s a lar ge, and mow mm.
spwuous t ar ~et , or for t he t ank $mce It s
ar mor M mfemor .
Never t heless t he field-gun, hght ly
ar mor ed and pmpellinz Rself o t r acks,
has capahdmes and pot ent mlit les of de
velopment . It can lllOVe vnt h r easonable
safet y over count r y whmh has not been
mopped upas, indeed, can t he Br en car .
,,el, But t he. field-gun can engage it s
t ar get wmh mdmect fiIe and al.o at
Ionger r anget ban t he Br en. In favor able
count , y t he self.pr opet ied gun could
t ake up a pmmon in t he open at 3,OOO
yar ds r ange fr om t be enemy% ant mank
gun and have t be bet t er of a duel over
open sight s. f3ut t his wdl he t he excep
t ion m most t heat er s of war . Indu-ec.t
m suppor t ing an infant r y at t ack. A
st r ong point IS holding up t he advance.
The ar t ille,y must dest r oy or neut r alize
m The fact t hat t he enemy may at any
75
MfLfTARY REVfEW
I
1
I
1
,.,s.
An y.
II,+ who da, m t o quest ,.. su!x
; gcs t , ou . foi mc, easing t he m.h,ht y of
OUI equlr ,nwnt s t 3 habir t o be I .Sar ded
!.!.
, > a r , a . t , . n . r y Bt t h e case for t h e
In . , e mr d,de sun has been obscur ed bv
!
falbe ad VOC.C; and : much of lt ,s has.;t
on neglect of a fundament al pr mclple,
.,,h, ch ,s t h a t t ke ,ce It Po77 of tk , u, t,lle, II
,s ,,,, t th<UC<?( t o bot the shell. It IS due
t h,s neglect t hat we have hear d s go.,]
,1?.1 of nonwnw about a,r cr aft hemg su
r J er mt t w a,t dlet y, nlesumaldy because
a,, ct aft can t t avel 250 nules an bout
whew.. t he e can Ol V do 20. The
shell. however : J oes mor e t han 950 r ndes
. . hour In ou r .lt ,llcr y t r ammg t oo,
we . , . h ah k t o ,,,a ke t h e wn e et , . , ;
an d , . ou r w, y lawiahk zeal fo, s peed.
, n z ,,,) t h e n lw.?du le Of C!J IIIl,Ig I, , t , , ILC-
t,a;h ive miy t en d to fo,gel t he m
Po!t a n ce of always havt nz gum ,(, .<.
t ,<,,?. Gwen r ood OP ( ob,m vauon Dost I
,,0, k and =! W t he vekmiy of :..;1 h]],
t he shell wdl bur wly t he speed ,n engag
,W t he t a, get
An at t ach by at my t ank., even ,f CM
, A o.t at fa,t t anh pace: WIII n ot
d,.. ppcat ,nt o t he blue fwyond t bc *a i<?
of t he s.ppcxt , ng mt dler y. AIn,y t anks
a, e .t dl Infant m t anks. .,,,3 t he dept h
f t hem advance-l. lm>ned ult nnat ely by
t he a bdIt Y of t he infant r y t o czt r h up
f{eie t hen E a clem case \ \ her e t he aL
t ,lle, v . . . ht . mot e us?f.1 hv I,emz in
Fr o, pc!.!t , on . abot it 3,000 W, ,1s hebimf
our st ar t hne, field guns c. cove. an
advact . of five O, &,x nnles. They need
not , t he] ef or e, move fm at least t hl m
hmms of an Infant r y at t ack even m t he
most f~m, c,mmmt anc On t he able es.
.t iwr hand t hey wt ll I. t he muI be .f
t he t hr ee h..!s fir e off a IavKe quant it y
o? ammumt mn: and t his sh&dd he ex.
wmled m t he Let ar lvant agc. Obsmvc I
fir e z. PI obably t he deal for m of a~t il
ler y suppo,t , but t ht s cannot be sppbed
m t he ear ly st ages of t be at t ack sinm
t he enemy. ant ,t ank guns w,lI abno.t
cwt a, nly he defdaded fr om t he fmn~ and.
m any c-vent , mull not d,sclase t heu Po
sit ions befor e t he at t ach m Iafichcd.
Sim$ t hese guns ar e easy t o couceal and
t o camouflage, it is unlikely t hat we
bball have sufficient mfm mat m befoz e-
hand, fr om gr ound or an obser vat ion,
on wb,ch t o base a t mxed pr ogr am of mn
cent r at lons. The hook solut lon for t hese
mndm. us m t he bar r age, since t hat
sear ches t he whole ar ea. ffut we ar e con
sider ing a t ank, not an Infant r y at t ack;
and t hat mahes a sr eat Mfer ence.
The easiest posit ion t o defend against
ifat r y at t ack is a glaclst he even or
,,. 76
concave slope wher e t he at t acker s ar e
under small ar ms fir e for t he whole of
t heu. advance. But t his advant age of J he
defense can he over come by t he cr eeping
MU, age wit h t he infant r y fcdlowmg close
behind m. It can alao be over come by
hllet -r o oof veh~cles. Tanks, in fact ,
nossess a bw t act ]cal advant a!ze m at
t aching u p a~lacis and r eqmr e ~o for mal
a, t dlel Y FUPPOIt since , t IS ,mpr obah le
t h a t an t it an k gu n s wdl be s it ed on t h e
for wal d slope Ar t dler y, h owever , mu s t
lx I eady even for t h ,s u n bkely event u al
it y, wh, ch wdl give t hem a chance of d,.
, emmg obser ved fir e on t o t be t ar get s.
It IS cfesmable, t her efor e, t hat t he ar t d.
leI v hhauld be not onlv in act ion hut also
weil r eg,bt er ed But n; case ca be made
out for a t mvad ar t iller y bar r age lead.
,ng t anks mt o act ion up a for war d slope.
If a bar , aze m demanded ,t can he 0,0
cr est . If t hat c;est IS at all shar p, t be
mg t he at t ack.
S,nee t be enemys dt sposlt ,ons ar e n
dwimt e o.! fir , must be equaBy mdefi
n,t c Tbe opening salvo must be widely
,Ilspmsed and t he subsequent pr ogr am
~houki allow for t he cover ing of t he
whole of. t he suspect ed ar ea hy, means
of s weepin g and sea, ching. Thm PI o-
EI am does n ot call fo: an excesswe ex
pcndlt u l e of amm.mt m mce t h e t a r .
get , , , ,]1 be s t a t ,,, n ot t leet , g. A do,,
rat e of f!!. w,t b o t wo r ou n ds diwact mf
at t be same s pot should, wit h Teason
M,le luck. succeed in knocking out some
of t he ant wank d@fensesguns m cr ews
But , of co.! se, not all of t hem: so we
must cot , nue or st udy of t he pr oblem
of suppor t . The value of a fir e plan is
see not m t he pr e!imm.r y bombat d
met but in t he suppor t which cover s t he
at t ad+mg t r oops r ight u p t o t h e en emys
pm,t mn In t h e condit ions visualized,
\ vheLe t be at t ack is t o be down a r ever se
slojw, \ vh e,e direct fir e or even obs erva
t mn of mdnect fir e cannot be depended
on, and wher e t he enemys .d]sposmons
a?. .nl.uown, a t imed cr eeping bar r age
ad~st ed t o t ank pace might be t he an
swer . But again we must r emember t hat
we ar e planig t o suppor t t anks and
t anks possess advant ages ot her t han t he
abd,t y t o move mor e qmckly t han m-
infant r y. They ar e also splint er -pr oof,
wher eas ant xt ank guns ar e not . Ther e
for e if we ar r anze, our fir e in such a way
t hat , whale t he sphnt er s t .nll be scat t er ed
over a wide fmt , t he shells t hemselves
will al) fall along c!ear ly defined lut es
Pa>alfel t o t h a.t t s ot rxiwmw, our t anks
\ vdl be able t o go for war d through t he
bar r age hy st ?ckmg t o t he lanes bet ween
t he lines. Thm Lme-ahead bar r age wdl
be n?or e t han a sews of flanking bar -
I ages since t be fr ont of t he advance will
also be fall IY effect ively cover ed by flying
snhnt er s. The seauence of event s mwht
b: . S fOl!O!Vs
Aft er t he pr elimnuu Y bombaz ,hmet ,t
ha. mt ,nued t dl t he t anks ar e J uht
shmt of t he cr est , t he suppmt ing
t , OPS of avt dler y wdl put down t he,,
hne-ahead bmr a!zes. The t ank con?.
Ar ccmding m pr esent t hem y t he ques
t ~on of ar t iller y Suppor t for t anks m open
count , y wdl seldom ar me. In such coun.
LLy, ar mor ed unit s v ill make use of t hen
mouilit y m w,de enct r chng movement s
\ vbmh wdl by-pass t he st r ongly defended
fr ont m or der t o come m fr om t he r eap.
Yet m t he L,hyan deser t t he Iight mg has
been hkened t o naval opemt lons in which
t be oppost nx fleet s seek t o dest r oy each
ot hm We r an alr eadv sense a clash of
de.s her e, ht we .eid cm PI es wne t o
s u gges t a chmce or a compt mn,se s,nce
we ar e pmna, dy st dymg suppo,t . Rat
t le exne] ,e.ce M t he best t eacher anyway.
ht t le t o fear fr om mst ant aneou- fuze,,
and bold following up will oft en save it
fr om t he ant hank gun wh.,e cr ews at .
i.wmo. has been dist r act ed by t he ar nvai
of a ?op]e of 25-poude, shells. U 1s,
indeed. pr obable t hat t his cb ar act er ist lc
of t he t ank. viz., it s invulner abilit y t o
non-al mor .pwming pr oject ile,5, will en
able us t o dispense \ vlt h all elabor at e
t ypes of fir e plan. Tanks can advance
tlu ongh a machine-gun bar r age; t hey
could equally \ vell do so t h, ough a shr ap.
nel bar l,aze Why not , t hen, t hr ough an
inst ant aneous fme HE bar r age?
Anot her r espomb,ht y wh]ch wdl fall
on t he ar t dler y t n It s suppor t of ar my
t anks wdl be t he neut r ahzat mn of ant r
t anh guns on t he flanks of t be main ad
vance. In t his t a.k t her a will be oppor
t umt t es for econommng m ammr i,iion
by t he use of smoke shell. This will ef
fcct ively neut zwdize ant it ank guns since
t hey ar e open-sight weapom whwh ar e of
lit t le be unless t hey can he laid on t h eir
t ar get . Fmmg t hem on fixed lines is not
a pr act ical pr oposit ion. Par t icular car e,
however , must be t aken of t he dir ect ion
of t he wmd since t anks hat e t o advance
t hr ou~h smoket hey am blind enough as
!t is-and t hey have a hor r or of being
silhouet t ed against a dr ift ing smoke
Attack By An Infantry Company With Tanks
[Tr anslat ed at t he Command and Gener al St aff School, For t
Leavenwor t h, Kansas, fr om t he Ger man in Mtlitcw . Wochmblat t,]
170REr GN MILITARY DIGESTS
scr een. Except in t hese point s, t he eu
t r ahzmg of flanks for a t ank advance
pr ovides no spemfic pr oblems. Nor is any
?pecific pr oblem pr esent ed when we find
t anks held up by an obzt aclemint t ield,
scar ped embankment , or r iver . Engineer s,
infant r y, and ar t dler y must come int o
act ion her e, and t heir oper at ion will be
of an old. fashimwd t ype.
Sit uat ion. The enemy has been pushed
back a d,st ance of 100 kdor net em [ about
60 t mles) by meam of daily at t acks for
fiVe days.
On t he last day air wmnaissance r ec.
ogpuzw field for t ificat ions on bot h sides
of t he highway r uing nor t h ad sout h
m Vlllaces AXS ad ,. B,, and in t he fa,.
t or y ar ea.
Rldmg t he t anks of a t ank r egiment ,
t he 2nd Company, minfomed by a heavy
machine-gun plat oon ad a heavy t r ench
mor t ar gr oup, is t he fir st company of t he
I st flat t ahm t o maeb t he sout h side of
t he vdkige.
The main body of t he bat t alion is fol-
Iowmg close behind.
The mission of t be 1st Bat t alion is
t o t ake t he fact or y ar e% at t acking t he
enemy along t be nor t h and sout h hlgb
way.
Condit ion of t he for ces: Fight ing day
and night for five days.
V.eat her : 41 degr ees Fahr enheit , sun
shine, good visibibt y, consider able ice.
Air Sit uat ion: Our own air for ce dur
ing t be at t acks. super ior so far .
An at t ack wit h t he t anks r equir es ver y
special combat knowledge on t he par t
of t he commander s of t be infant r y com
pany, quick r ecognit ion of t he sit uat ion
which m ccmst ant ly chagm~, and a wdl
,gess t o r ely o t he t anks for SUPPOIt
m a fear less at t ack.
The combat of t he 2d Cmnpay co.
smt s of t hese mt uat ions which ar e t ypi
cal of, t his t ype of fight ing. Each of t hem
pr oduces sur pr ises for t he infant r y mm.
msder ad br ings him face toface vnt h
new cmmnamd t asks.
A egager nem of t his kind wit h t anks
,s d, fficult for t he inst r uct m t o pr esent
as an exer cise. 1. combat fir ing ,t is also
dlt ficult t o at t ain t he int ended ob~ect lve,
For t his r eason t he exer mse is best pr e
sent ed in t he for m of a lesm m which
t he most essent ial and peculiar point s of
t ank combat ar e t bomughly discussed.hy
means of examples. The effect of t he
t ank at t ar k o t he mor ale of bot h fr iend
ad foe must be consider ed.
The t anks ar e mllig for war d over t he
nor ~h and sout h highway, t he 2nd Cmn.
pany r iding o t op of t hem. No oe is
r iding o t he leading t anks as t hey al.
\ vays dr aw t he heaviest fir e, Secause of
t be t anks t he enemy has cr awled int o h]?
holes.
St ukas ar e wat cbmg over t he at t ack.
They dme and shower bombs on cent er s
of r esist ance on t he r ight and left flanks,
800 t o 1,000 met er s fr om t he at t acking
infant r y. As t heir next t ar get t hey
choose t he nor t h ent r ance t o vdlage A
and in t his way do an excellent job of
subst it ut ing for t he ar t iller y.
In t he cent er of t he village shot s sud
denly come fr om all sides. Resist ance
flar es up wit h gr eat violence. The 2nd
Company leaps down fr om t he t anks
Wit h one plat oon on t he mght and an
ot her on t he left of t he highway t hey
advance, giving t he enemy all t hem
weapons ar e capable of and bear ing
down on t he houses wit h a yell. Tbe
t anks Iiqmdat e t he cent er s of r esist ance
t -wt h t heir guns at shor t r ange. Unified
command of t he plat oons or gr oups is
out of t he quest ion. Her e and t her e is a
gr oup of r apidly fir ing inf ant i-ymen r un
ning fr om house t o house behind t hem
officer s and NCOS. In t hk way t he vil
lage is in Ger man hands in a quar t er
hour s t ime. The enemys losses ar e es
pecially high; t be wounds caused by t he
t ank t ir e ar e sever e.
The 2d COmpay r ushes int o t he
fight wit h t he meed of liEht ning. Ther @
is no t ime for deliber a&. They %ave
t o t ear int o t he wor st and near est of t he
cent er s of r esist ance and as soon as t hat
is cleaned up go aft er t be next one. It is
impor t ant t hat young company com
mander s lear n t hat when at t acking wit h
t anks one get s int o t he fight much mor e
auicklv t han in anv ot her manner . but
.
. t he ot her hand t he engagement it
self is usually of shor t er dur at ion. Lead.
mg IS unpossible except by example since
on account of t he t anks, t he St ukas, and
t he fight ing, t her e w so gr eat a noise t hat
t he wince can no longer he hear d Also d
M t -cessa.y fir st t o get used t o t he as
t onis.bmgly gr eat d,sor &r r esukinx fr om
t be I apidly chmging sit uat ion.
Aft er t his vict or y t he mor ale of t he
company is gr eat ly incr eased. They
aga, n mount t heir t anks an,i cont inue
t mt b t he omgmal or ganizat ion.
J ust as t he fir st of t he t anks r eaches
t he br idge whmh cr osses a cr eek r unning
t hr ough t he woods, t be br idge is blown
p llachine-gn and r ,!% fir e m dnect ed
at t he t anks fr om t he oppos,t e side The
lat t er m,mediat ely deploy t o t he r ight
and left and open file. They %ZY down a
heavy fir e on ar eas of t he t er r ain when
t ar get s cannot immediat ely be discover
ed. They at t ain consist ent success in
t hem oper at mns.
The company has again dismmmt ed
fr om t be t anks and t akes p t he fight ,
movmg against t he enemy m t he low
por t ion of t he highway aft er wadmx
t hr ough t be cr eek w~t h t be w,at er up t o
t heir waist s.
On account of t he closeness of t he
t er r ain t he fir e of t he t anks cannot r each
t he low par t of t he h,ghway ad t he
enemy M dug m her e, well concealed and
disposed m dept h. Hli defense is st r ong
and danger ous.
Agmn t her e is close act wn. Ever y one
fir es on t he move. It M not posszble t o
t ake up a posit ion. The low por t wn of
t he h}ghway is cleaned up pr oper ly. The
men keep r unning ont o small gr oups of
host ,le machine-gun and r ifle t r oops con.
cealed m shelt er ed places and t hese ar e
t aken car e of hy our own machine guns
and machme pist ols, and hand gr enades.
In t his way t he highway is cleaned out .
1 village B i.eslst ance is again en.
count er ed. Again It M cr ushed m house
t o house fight ing.
Aft er t he init ial vr ct or y t he 2nd Com
pany is set t o cooper at e fulIy wft b t be
t anks. Along t he cr eek t he sr t uat ion
changes r apidly and in an unfor eseen
manner . The at t ?ck along t he low Por
t ]on of t he blghway, once begun, cannot
be st opped just because t he t anks ar e
not able t o follow. The company is left
t o It self ent ir ely. Nat ur ally t he losses
her e ar e gr eat er t han in village A.
77
The com PZ,, y commander mskes use
of t he cover affor ded by Hill 100 for r e
or gamzmg h,, for ces. On account of t he
casualt ies t he men ar e hur r iedly Ie
or gamzed in t wo plat oons. It is ver y ml
por t ant t hat t he commander s have a
clear z<!ea of t he object ives t o he at
t a,r wd At t he end of an ho,-s t ,me t he
t anks ZI.1le, fkt ad?d p]21B a>.e n.3w
made fm ofwr at m. s t o be d!r ect ed
against t he enemy ,. t he fact or y Th,,
fmohlem r evolves t he t \ %ofact or s, fir e and
R3,n,et , Shall t he ?.ZHlkS at t ack ahead
of t he mmp.my, at t he sam, t moe as t he
company, 0, fir st P, o,mde file pr ot ec t >. .
fo, t h e CON>pt UIY?
The 2nd Comfumy at t ach., pass{g t o
t he r mht and left of H d} 10(1. Tanks,
heavy macht ne-gu. plat oon, and heavy
t >.ench n%o!t ar z? OUP ~uppor t t he at t ack
wnh t hen fiI e. Because t he mf ant ry
t t mp~ at t acl, fir st , t he enmny is fawed
t o encage an five combat and cone.
quent ly t o wvc.al zt >elf. As a I esult .f
t h$%t he t anks ar e fnowded w%t b t a, get s
Hm,ce, dt ,vmg t he wm,w of t he at t ack
t hey ale able t o bee whe, e t hey must
help an<l can t hus as.,.t t he , dfe ,.,,,.
paw :n t hose vlacea wher e t hey a,?
abeut t o zr t \ vinded.
The plat oon on t he 1,ght has bmn st ol,.
IK11!,.s flanhl. g fir e fr om r each, ne wm.
.4ft er t he kft Plat o. has made good
p :d. t he t anhs help t he plat oon . t he
, lKht t o acfvanr e. Th? t anks must not TO
on alone at t ht s t une hut as a mat t e,
of fact .Ic ohlvge,l t o .huve t be Infant , s
Combat In
[T, anslat .<1 at t he Command
Lc;t vw,I\ m t h, Kanbas, fr om a Rummn m t,cle hy Major R. Bezhan.
~an, S,,vmt Ar my, in K, ns. au. Zc,wdu 11 Dwmnhe. 19c? ]
MILITARY REVD?.W
company ahead of t hem again, fmmmh.
mg t hem suppor t , since t heir combat
ab, ht y has been ccms,de,sbly r edmed as
a r esk of t he figbt m.g t hat has alr eady
t aken place. Ot her t anks t ake car e of
t he br eakt hr ough.
Izl?swns :
1. R,dmg on t op of t anks aqamst a
demor ah zaf f m is goad pr awir e. Bt
t he leading t anks should have no n,en
on t hem. Ther e sholcl be pklt y of
amnmnit ion and food.
2. The influence of t he bat t abo
comn,adw m smaller , Henr w, heavy
\ veapons should oft ? he placed r ide,
t he or der s of t be r %fle t r oops at t he
ve, y ou t s et .
3. Hes ,t ,at mn at t h e beg,,,n ms of
t h e act ion cost s casualt ms. The t mops
mwt leap down f, om t he t anks an,{
so aft er t he en,my nnmecimt ely, I e.
ga,dk=ss of disor der .
4, Ca>uzlt ,m mw.t at m,pede t he
,.., k of t he ccm,mad dur , g t he at .
t ad,. The t r oops must .he r wr gamzed
and must cont ie wt t k t he fight . In
t his way losses ,,,11 be less t han when
t hme m a b,eak ,n t he ope, at ios.
5. The 2nd Compan y had t hr ee en
gagement s of t hli lud , o. dsy It
always hot e t he mat . br unt of t h,
bat t le-. The md,vidual me t hemseh..
wei e of dem.t w m,po,t mme m close
ammn. Their t , aimg in close zet io
I> OH? fl,,,t .
a Ravine
a,] Gc, r al St aff School, F,,, t
The complex r elwf of mount amou. r <>
WMS makes t he use of at -t dlwy at b,gh
.Il,t udes ddficult and s.r nct , mt s mm ,nv
,,oswblc. I:ur t bct mow, t he nar r ow I a
, ,.c., t he st t wp ascmt i, and t ],. ahsenr e
of , oads f, equent ly d. not pwnut act ,.
by kmge fmces. Conwquent ly t be cm-
bat ,0, 1. of S1,>S11 n,t % mell-,(fu,pfwd
wit h ~fant r s wmwn. IY of specml m.
pm t ame. Thus, for ewmple, a company
c~t nff fIO!ll ot hc, un, t ? my accomplish
fm, IV s,plt lcat m,sslo.. Let 3 ,X.
<am,. on;such hat t k -.
The ev,my !,A, c,?~p~,,, a ,av,n,
t ht och which t a a t ,ad kwdmg t o a
pas,. Ac.., dlg t o , ecoat ssance r e
PO,t * t be Ger mans ba,i ahot one .OII.
Pam m t be t awne, .uppot t ed by a heavy
,,,achme g., ,e.e,al bght machme g,,,
ant i nmr t m-.. A const demble numh?r of
s, per . was also obser ved. It was d,s
,vIvc, cd t hat t he Ger mans had d,spo,ed
t be gr eat er pa%t of t hen fir e element s m
t he st eep SiOfX2S of bot h s,des f t he r a
\ ine,
It ,, aSt he t ask of o, company, w,.
for ced .wt h bat t al~n n,o,t ar s, t o dm.
lodge t he enemx fr om t he mv,e and
come out ,t o t he pass Tbe act ion \ vas
suppor t ed hy a bat t er y of mmmt ai a,
t dler y and mor t ar p. Car eful st udy of t he
locaht y .d t he $yst cm of bw,t de fir e
shoved t hat a day at t ack was inexpedient ,
t he mow so as t he Ger mans wer e cove?
,ng t he ent ~r e , awn. wt t h t he aid, ng of
flanl.,~ fi, ,,,g point ,. Ther efor e t he t om.
p,.b bezan t o at t ack at mght aft er ar t ll -
Im, bombs, dm<,t of t be eer ny,. p..,.
1,0.9.
The enemy d,d ot dr jplay par t icular
act ,,,,t y Mov,ng ,., o, 0311, pzIY had by
if.> br eak owmed t wo small elevat ions.
f, 6, \ \h,ch t & cmbzt out post , f t hi
t iw ma, had bee,, oust ed. The company
,,. s ., dmcd t ,, cosol! dat e be, e. The
~zond ,,. s except mally ha, d, so t he
t r op, used lar ge r ocks for t he e, ect ,o
of cover Du,ing t he day bot h SNI.S car .
I wd out shi.nmshes m whwh mor t ar s
WFW u.<>d, t be enely employing bis ,
,O\ , E fr +~hmn
/LS S.n as dar kness fell, t he V2,p.ny
ago, beg. t o at t ack. This t ,me t he
Ger mans shm,,ed ver y st bbor ,eS,St .
a.m. Tbe mw.bme. gun nest s disposed o
t he Ilank, w.we espemally t r oublesome. It
\ \as a clear . nmcmht ,ght . 1. addmon,
hwile r ocket s vow almost mnt xwmsly,
This enabled t he f% mans t o exer t auned
ft re at shor t dmt aces.
The ..mpa~ made scar cely any ad
vance all night . It became clear t hat , m
or der t o ach, eve ay success, it was
emssar y t o sdenee t he flakmg fl?ing
wer e st ar t ed as SOO as t he moon had
set . hehmd t he height s and it had become
quit e dar k in t be r avine.
The t hr ee soldier s began t o make t heir
way up t he st eep cliff. At t imes t he ene
my. cover ing t he appr oaches t o t he heavy
mach,e gun, fir ed at r andom at t be me,
and t hey had t o bide t heir t ,me. But at
last t hey had st olen UP almost t o t he
enemy; t hem each t hr ew t wo hand gr e
nadw+. Machine gun and cr ew wews de
st r oyed, Do\ vn below m t he mt ie ,
vmlmt bat t le was r aging, in which bot h
s!des wer e usinx hand gr enades ext e.
Slvel?.
This mght t he company again moved
fcwwzwd some d,st ace, ,vben suddenly
t he slt uat r on changed. The enemy, in a
endeavor t o nmint mn possession cd t he r ..
\ I., br ought p fr esh for ces> appmxv
mat ely a bat t a hon. Or nit init iat ed a
connt er -maneuver and t he cent er of com
bat sb,ft ed t o t be mgbt of t he COmpanj
of wh,.h we ar e speakinK. Finally t he
Gel mans wer e for ced t o wit hdr aw fr om
t he mm.. ( Her e t he descr ipt ion of t be
act m ends abr upt ly. Thk is a ehmact e?.
,.t ,c of bot h Russian and Ger man mdi
t a, y a,t,cl,snat ur e. of t h,s Xd. )
Thm t hr ee-day bat t le enabled us t o
d, aw a se, ws of nr act ~cr d conclusions.
FIIst of all zt showed t hat ext ensive use
of night oper at ions is feamble i mon
t ain ar eas. Occpymg posit ions s+eful for
defense, t he enemy holds all t he ap
PIo~ches. under d?.., fir e dur ing daylight ,
but at ,ght t he effect , ver wm of h,s fir e
I. sh. mdv ,edr ed.
The C,;, mans mim,d t he r avine. Or
t r oop% discover ed t his ad moved along
off t he t r a,l, which of cour se incr eased
t he d, fficlt ,m, Hence one conclsio: m
ay t l,t ,t IS CW.S,ZFY t have Wlppe,.,
who e~pl. re t h e area, especially t h e paad6
an d pat h s , an d IWIIIOV, t be r n , nes fr om
t hem. It IT t r ue t hat t her e was st all an
ot her wawm for avo, dix t he t r ad: Ger .
man smpe, s bad adjust ed fir e on all t he
pat hs br fombad. At t r ees t hese snim=m
fir ed . t he t r ad fr om lor m m.m ~ven
when t he, e ,=s nobody on ,t . Our t r oops
saw t r acer bilet s st zvke t be r ocks wher e
not a single scddmr st ood, Evident lv fin=
was hmg adjust ed fr om a new h.~. OU;
tlfmever y mea, t o det ect ~,, used
de-t , oy t he enemy Hl,pe, s, ad at t he
same t ,me t h, y emieavo,ed t o exped,t e
t he r mnoval of t he wounded fr om under
fir <>.
Fr , t heir posit ions t he Ger mans wer e
t be command post and m. t ; lt fr om t he
r ear in a dt ffer et dn-sct ion. If one line
we] e cut , t he second ,fct med. and
meawh,le t he cnunumat ions men W
P=, ed t he dama~e. Such. a met hod se
cur ed st ead,er commun, cat , c,ns,
In ver y d, fficult cod,t ios n waz neces.
sar y t o use r unner s, The Ger man sniper s
wer e on t be wat eb for and fir ed pOn
78
t hem. For t hk r eason, in dayt ime sp&ial
fir e secur it y had t o be developed for t be
, unner s. As soon as it was necessar y t o
send a sold,er wkh a r epor t t o t he head.
quar t er s of t he r out , mt enswe mor t ar fir e
was opened o t hose machine-gun nest s
which par t wular ly hinder ed movement t o
t he r ear . Tbe places wher e t he most act .
we G:r man smper s had been fmmd wer e
especially cover ed. Two r mmer .s wer e al.
waya sent wit h t he r epor t m t hat if cme
wer e disabled t he ot her could st ill del~ver
IL
po~it mn of a heavy machine gun. This a~
mce height ened t be effect ivemass of t he
mor t ar fir e, which inflict ed consider able
lmsm cm t be enemv
Sever al t act mal pecuh.r it ies of t he
Supply in German
FOREIGN MfLITARY DIGESTS
fight ing in t he r avine may, it seems t .
us,, be summed up as follows. The enemy
t r ies t o dispose his fir e element s so t hat
t hey will be on t he flanks of t he at t ack.
Purposely allowing the latter to advance
somewhat in depth, t he enemy hopes t o
get It int o a pocket of fir e. For t hk
r eason t he dest r uct ion of host ile machine-
gun nest s Iocat ed on t he flanks, and USU.
ally well-concealed, is a er y impor t ant
t ask.
1
Finally, it was demonst r at ed once
again t hat t he act ivit ies of small de
t achment s and somet imes of even a few
valmnt men play a gr eat r ole in nmn.
t am war far e. It is, however , necessar y
t hat t be unit s be well t r ained for oper a.
t lons m t be mount ains ad be out fit t ed
wit h special equipment (gr apnels, alpen
st ocks, MIE?, et c. ) which M of ,est imable
value. MOW3WT, t he sold,,, must ot
car r y any super fluous equipment \ vhmh
nught hamper h,s movemet ~, G,, am.
munit mn, ad spade: t hat m all t he scd
d,~r needs dur mr g t he at t ack m t he mou.
t ams.
Motorized Units
[Tr wMat ed at t he Comt mmd and Gcmei-al St aff School, For t
1xv+venwor t b, Kansas, fr om a Ger mm ar t icle i. Dw Panm t ? upfw
J uly 1942. ]
It is m agr e.anmt wlt b nuht my pr mci.
PIPS when lt is st ipulat ed In m,!it ar y
Iegul?t lons t hat t be cmmnr md,, M r e.
.~on=ble f., t be weapons and equipment
c,f h , . n , t .
Bt n owa da ys , m t h e mw.hanwd age
and t he ma of modem war far e. t he mm.
mandm of a umt ear mot be evwvwher e
at once, For t he var mus t echic ai br an.
ches, he must bane t echnical am,st ant s
who ar e able t o help him bear t he i-e
sponslhd,t y, i.e. per sons who wdl look out
for t he weapons and equipment m, ac.
mr dance wit h h]s or der s and r egulat ions.
J .?t as t he or dnance NCO looks out for
ar mammt and t he clot hing NCO has
T~. expermmx of t be aut hor at t ht -
Schmt of Ar my Mot or t zat lon show t hat
,,, t he chow, of t hose mm who am t o he
<mne supply ser geant s wit h t he mot or ized
,Im., a sut fiment ly st r ict st andar d IS not
always applwd. A c-good mot or supply
ser <eant and unit s should and must
Ikave only t hat kmd-shcmld be above
aver age bot h in body and mind. Tb,s
meam t hat t be Nf!O who H dest ined t o
b<, a supply ser geant w,t h a mot or ized
out fit ,mlv m MM cases should such a
Such a mot nr supply ser geant must he
t he super mr of hls dr wer s i. ever y t ech
nmd r espect , m pr act leal dr iving as well
a. , banclhng equipment , If he is t . he
at t he head. t hat m. t he commander of t be
men under him,
Tmelessly, ceaselessly, he must be t be
adwser and belpm of hm men. The dr iver s
of t he unit mmt r ealize t hat t he ~ot or
supply ser geant IS always r eady t o help
t hem wit bot r egar d for t mw or place H?
mnst he an example for t he dr wei-s, bot h
on and off dut y. Above all, he must be a
soldier and r emain om.
The peculiar nat ur e of t he dut ms f t he
Wpply ser geant , nmt or ,zed ,t s E,,%
hmn a uusal pmit m of t r ust w,t h t be
r ompany commander .
He ,s t he t wh,cal mast er ser geant of
t be unit , if ibis expi-ess!cm may be med.
He must ot only he able t o per at e mmf
wmk indepmdent ly hw, espemally r mw m
t ime of war : he IS oft en faced w,t h s,t ua.
t mns r eqir mg a decissim m bis par t t hat
t he aver age officer is seldom or nt -mr
faced w,t b, For t h,s r eason t he mot or
supply ser geant nmst not OIY be a good
plTICt lCal ma bm he mmt be a good
soldier w~t h t be ima.ht ws of a cot nnmmler .
nmnt s which t hese r n.ag have t a fulfill ar e
just ifiable. The poslt xon of t echnical oili
cial of t he aut omot ive br anches of t he
higher ser mces is fully open t o such mot or
supply ser geant s. On account of t his fact ,
n is necessar y t o be ver y car eful in se@t .
inr t hese men.
shop cmnpan,es We ;a see t h a t dw,s ,om
of t h,s kmd may he of gr eat m,po,t at
t imes, fr om t he point of vww of t he sb
sequmt engagement of t he par t ,cdar
u,t . Uswdly t hey must he made bv t be
mot or sr ppiy s&geant udm .I?.Ur n.
st ances wher e lt IS not always pmt wble
for t he commander of t he u,t t o leaim
fir st of t he damage done t o t he eqip
ment ad isme or der s r egar ding w,. Left
on bls mm, t he mot or supply ser geant
must be able t o make a clear dlagnosm
of t he t r ouble and t ake t he necessar v
st eps for It s cor r ect ion .
It oft en happem, however , t hat .Il.
wit h bm out fit . Tbee mot or
SUWJ IVser zeant t hen has t o be able t o
sh& t hat he M t he leader of his men.
Ee IS obl,ged t o find t be r out e, of maxh,
t o make mqumes concer ning, If or t o r e
commt er . In such cases no t ime must be
lost , for t her e IS sur e t o be some ot her
sack mot or veb,cl+ wait ing for him wit h
t he unit .
How oft en M happens t hat it r ecpmes
sever al hour s t o make t he r epaws on
some mot or vehwle and t he men of hm
79
I
I
MILITARY REVIEW
unit have halt ed ad r est ed. When t he
t not or supply sm-~eant cat ches up wit h
h,, un,t and r epmt s what has hap fmwd,
t he un,t ,S r eady t o ,t mt out again They
know no fat igue. Whm t he ult mar ches,
t hey also mar ch or help out vnt h t he
mot or vchwlm whwh t n-+ak do\ vn. When
t he umt halt s. t hey have t o make up
for lost t ,,,,, or maybe t her e ,s anot her
(f ?
car out of or der which r equu es t hem
ait ent mm Thus t he c ~scwnt ios mot or
supply w,xc,ant ha.. t o , wr mm at his pow,
fear lessly, st mdf.st ly, w,t h no t hought
of h]mself. a.d he must ,,,,.., age h,.
men hy his per sonal example and unquaJ i.
fit -d self. sacr ifice,
Itm IWII km% n what t he mat t er of
SUPPIWSmean? m t he pr esent mar and
~S~,,ldl~ ,11t he It US5,SIl .am Plu81, ~,r St
of all mot or s,r v,ce ,,,? ...? fuel supply,
t hen Ienbicwm?nl Dar t s. t lr ?s, and ,?.
Pbr+m,i,t have t o b~ zban. of ~~,S \ ;h,cl,
dwl
The mat i.m .f fud supply oft en IN,ngs
w,t k ,t p,ublc,,,, ,,,h,r h ,t ,<XCW,,Wa Eoud
head t o solve.
dew t her e m only one t hing for t he
dr iver t o do; t hat M, help h,mwlf. I t IS,
t hcr efol e, u.,! R t o awr gn t he poor er
dr , ver t o t hwe t r uckb.
The mm. m t , e of t he nmmmmlls
smnwl officer who M cmmw+nder over t he
a good t cchmcal t r ammg bt h. n<ust be
clear . ht w.ded. He must be able not only t o
solve t he r mohh+mof t he Iocat mn of suD
ply cet e;% and columns for oht am,~g
fuel, but also t o over come all Micukms
,. t he \ vay of oht amm,q w, and h, must
al\ vays locat e h!s r ut aga, ,. t mr + t o
SDDIV t hem ,, ,t b t he, fuel of \ \ hmh t hey
Wiy be g CkItly , md.
If t lww r ml,r t wwt s am m,%, t he unn
always has t el ad t he mot or supply
aer gt -ant v dl be able t o lmut hmmelf m
t his conwt io t o t he engagement of t be
t ank t r ucks at t he D,ODW t une
In addmm t o t h,s, t h~ SUPPIJ ser geant
of a mot or t zed un,t wall, m bis own a..
cord, do all , his po\ ver t . mamt am a
const ant fuel SUPIY f.> his mm. He wdl
not wa, t nt d t he or der ..,,,.s t o fill f,l
t ank. and r ephan.h suppl,es but will issue
fuel const ant ly m or der t o have empt y
t anks for us, m an mner ze.r y: for ex
ample, wheu t he oppor t unmy is offer ed
t o r eple,sh ones own st or es fr om cap.
t ur ed sLIppheY. In t his way he not only
saves liM dr over s fr om having t o t r avel
ahout m sear ch of dnusiona] d,st r ,but lon
cent er s. but he saves men and mat er r d
for t he hwher commands.
Bemdes ~he supply of fuel, t her e IS t he
mat t er of t he supply of r eplacement par t s
ad t ,r es aS ,,,11 as 1e~klcemet of veh,
cles whmh have t o be dr opped out of
ser wce.
Alt hough wit h but few except ions ]t
will always be possible t o make se of
capt ur ed fuel ~upplies, ,t is much mor e
d, fficult t o obt ain r eplacement par t s and
t ,r es. OT sit uat m vmt b r eswwt t o r aw
It ,. necessar y, t her efor e, for t he mot or
.UpPl~ S,r Eeant t o phl and t hink far
,t o t he ft r e. Ther e ,s a way m whmh
he ca h.lp h,mw+lf , h,s t ask and ,vb,ch,
when skdfully used, cd only benefit s hnn
hut t he ,t as well. By const ant effor t ,
he .a t r ain t he dr iver s t o be Spar u% of
eq,pment ad t ,r es, He must t ake pO
hunwlf t he r esponsihd,t y of a\ vakanng
,n t he dr ,vms t he ccmv,ct ,on t hat ,t IS
sunplm ad less cost ly t o avoid damage
t han t o r epair it . He must be t n+ess m
h,s effor t s t o ,ndce t be me t o t ake good
car e of t he equipment and espwmlly t in+.,
H. must keep t hem ccmscmus of t he d, ffi
cult ws involved m obt ain~ngcer t am kinds
of supphes. This ,ducat mnal wor k bear s
abndat fmut not onlv for ones cm umt
bt ~t Iixht ens t be loa~ also for t he ser v
,ces ivolvcd
As a r ule, r eplacement par t s znd t ,,,,
am m-dmwdoffic, ally and. spewdfomm
In makmg t hese 0,,1+,s, ,t ,S t he t ask of

t
t hemot or supply ser geant t o use t he cor .
r ect symbols and numbe;s m o~dw t hat
t her e may he no delay m r ecemmg t he
cor r ect par t s.
Also, what has been descr ibed r ep-e.
set s only t he dut ,es of a Supply ser .
geat of a mot mwed unit wit h s fully
mot cmzed for mat i.. Thm t ype of supply
set gea. t M found ,n many ot her places
in t he ser v]ce,
The supply ser geant of t be nmt or med
unit \ war s t he officer s <fr og, which sIg.
,fies double ohligat ] on, He must not only
he a shr ewd ass,st ant t o his cmnpsiy
ecmumidm, but he mum also be t he mm.
mader of t he man der him ad a ex.
ample t o t hem. He must hve hls hfe bp.
for e t he., and, lf t her e is an occasion
for m, d,e befor e t hem, t r ue t o h,s oat h
t o t he COb%.

German OF% in Russia: Lake Lisno
[Tr anslat ed at t he Command and Gener al St aff School, For t
Leavenwor t h, KaLah, fr om a Ger man ar t icle]n Artilleris tis chc
A%tds ck ,m May 1942.]
Thogb t he ,..,1s p t o t hat t ,me had
bee d, fficlt , east of Lake Osvmja (we
sket ch) t hey became mdesm,bahly bad
ad at t nnes had gr ades wh~ch hr o:ht
ever yt h,g, ,clud, g t he t r act or s, t o a
halt . Su, r onded by enor mous st r et ches
of for est , t ypmal swamp and lake t er .
lain, t bt =se r oads gave pr mmses of many
ex, )el,eces.
For sec~in~ t he advance I r eceived
t he OMler t o st at ion t he leading bat t er y
m t he v,llage of Kobdnica, but on ac
count of t be condit ,on of t he r oads r e
quest ed a fir ing po.wt ion t o t he sout heast
of (%r oddovmi The t wo ot her bat t er ies
got only t o t he st ~eam sout h of Zajelnir a
wher e t hey t ook up t he,. fir ing posi
t ,..
It was really impossible in this crazy
t er r ain t o find locat ions for obser vat ion
post s wit h good, compr ehensive views

over t he bat t er y obser vat ion sect or s. We
mzaged, howeve~, t o get glimpses ]nt o
t hm or t hat ar ea, The hat t ei-ies wer e d,.
vialed mnog t he differ ent bat t alions,
Each bat t er y commnder , t her efor e, ,vm.
b,. o,, advanced obser ver , hod t o o
cm. place hut moved at will fr om eont
pany t o company wher ever he CoId w
best ad be of t he ,.x help in fimng. At
last a pos,t mn was found for obwer vat m
t owar d t he nor t h t hat had all t he r egu.
Iat vm advant a~es, t he nar r ow pr omo.
t or y pr ohahly 50 met er s i height wb!ch
e.t ends ot ,t o Lake Limo east of t bt
villa~e of Zalcje. Ther e, i t he neig
hbor hood of t he bat t aho mmmad pmt .
t he call bat t er y (a bat t er y operat ing
wt hm calling dist ance of a mmmmd
postEd. ) had taken up it s posit ion t o
wat ch over t he east a:d nor t h shor es of
t he hike. This posit ion r eally affor ded a
80
FORErGN MILITARY DIGESTS
full view over t he whole ar ea since it
looked down upQn it from an elevated 10.
cation. In the shelter of t he wooded sum.
mit t he obser vat ion post was est ablished
wit hout t he knowledge of t he enemy. No
movement t o or fr om it could be obser ved
by t hem. It was possible i t his place t o
const r uct shelt er s wholly concealed fr om
our adver sar ies for pr ot ect ion against
enemy fir e.
If our posit ion had been subject ed t o
fir e by some clever unit on account of
it s being a pr ominent landmar k, t he
chance for a hk would have been ver y
sbght . Shor t shot s landing in t be lake
would have been har mless. Some of t he
longer shot s would have st r uck t he st eep
shor e which r ose almost per pendicular ly
out of t he lake, but most of t hem would
pr obably have missed t he summit whose
br eadt h was only 10 met er s (about 33
feet ) HOW would Ger man ar t dler y com
bat t bm highly inst r uct ive t ar get ? Per
haps by means of r ,cochet fir e on t he sur .
face of t he wat er wit h t he fuses set for
consider able delay !
However , t he enemy came out of t he
woods on t he shor es of Lake Lkno in t he
for m of bands of deser t er s. They at t ack.
cd only in an ent ir ely unexpect ed place
half t o t he r ear on our r ight flank on
Lake St r adno. A b,cyele company and
ant it ank t r oops wer e en~aged against
t he Russians who pour ed out of t be
woods in t his place, dug m, and wor ked
t heir way for war d.
For t unat ely, t he bad r oads had hin
der ed t he bat t er ies, in t aking up t hem
posit f ens, fr om goin~ t oo f a t o t he east
wher e t hey would have bee bit squar ely
in t he fl a.nk by t he enemy% dr ive. Hence
t he whole bat t ahon was now easdy able
t o swing ar ound t owar d St r adnoje fr om
t be neighbor hood of Zajelnika, 1 mydf
r ode int o t his ar ea vmh t he advanced
obser ver of t he t call bat t er y, t he young
est lieut enant of t he bat t abon. On a
wooded knoll bet ween Big and Lit t le
St r adno Lakes t he bwycle company was
st at t oned m excellent shelt er . The ob
seivat lon post wbicb was t o be set u p
her e wit hl 100 met er s of t he enemy af
for ded a s.ur pnsmgly good me,%. Lmkig
down fr om t he sunmut we could see t he
Rm.ians ddlgent ly dIzg,x t henmelves
in, In or der t o make t he sur pr ise com
plet e lt was necessar y t o avod loud t all.
lt was. cer t ainly not a mmple mat t er t o
dmect fi?e fr om t hh ext r emely advanced
post , but t he ver y fir st shot fr om t he
bal r els of OU, guns landed m t he t ar get .
And aft er he bad adjust ed t he fir e of
bat t er y aft er bat t er y, t b,s officer pound
ed t be enemy posit ,on wit h t be fir e of
t he whole bat t ahon, employmg r icochet
iiw f, mm t be flank, unt d t hings wer e so
bot for t he Russians t hat ever yone who
was able t o I un t ook t o t he woods. Then
t hm por t ion of t he woods It self was so
Syst emat ically combed by ar t iller y fir e
t hat t he enemy was car eful not t o show
himself again.
In any case, t he engagement s on Lake
I.lsno showed t he ,mpm t ance of advance
obser ver s in an impr esswe manner .

With a Field Ambulance in Libya (
[By Capt ain W. T. E. Blackmor e, R.A.M.C., Ass,st ant Inst r uc
t or Officer s Wing-Depot R. A. M. C., in t he Journal of tk r Roval A+ mu
M.dw al Corps (Gr eat Br it ain ).1
Command of a f&?ld Ambulance en
t ads t he car eful consider at ion and sat is
fact or y solut ion of a best of pr oblems,
var ying , t ype fr om t he cor r ect t me
pr essur e in a load car r ying vehkle t o t he
ingr edient s of t he evenini? st ew and, of
t hese, not t be least is t he pr oblem of d,s
t ances.
Disposit ion d,st ances for Advanced
lMe,wing St at ions and Main Dr essing
St at Ions and movement dist ances for
hounds m-e ot only t he subject of in
.pil ed calculat ion but also t be sour ce of
many a per sist ent headache, for t hey
must be consider ed not only fr om t he
medical a,gle bt also fr om t he Q A
po,n t of V, ew.
While t be oppor t umt ies for t r eat ment
WIII necessar ily be ~r nit ed by ,t he st r at e
gical sit uat ion, it m axiomat x t o st at e
t hat t be r ole of t he Field Ambulance, and
mor e especially t he I.ight Field Am
bnlame, must always he t he adequat e
t r eat ment of casualt ies and t heir r apid
evacuat ion out of t he for war d .a~ea wit h
out zt any t mw losing It s mobdlt y.
Event s in . t he pr esent confdct have
moved so r apidly t hat t be only t heat er of
oper at ions. which has so far pr esent ed
Oppor t umt les for t he st udy of Field Am.
bulance Lact ,cs m moder n \ var far e has
been t he kl~ddle East .
These not es ar e based upon my exper h
ences in t hm ar ea as second ,? command
of a Lwht Field Ambulance m addit ion
t o per uxis of dut y as Deput y Assist ant
Dir ect or of Med,cal Semnces and Em
bar kat ion Yfedlcal Officer dur ing t he
wavell campawn m L1bYa.
The campawn m Libya has been t aken
for analysls not only because It pr ov,des
an excellent exampl~ of a complet e
oper at ion over a de fimt e per iod of t ime
bt also since m was an oper at m of ad
vance and pr esumably t he PI ecu rs or of
sunikm fut ur e oper at ions.
The mat er ial gains fr om t his eam
paigp ar e not det aded nor has it been
ccmmder ed necessar y t o desm,be t be
local co.iht mns. t he compar at mw shor t .
age of r at ions and wat er or t he difficul
t ies of s u pply a n d r eplen is h men t , s in ce
t h es e a r e. bv n ow. common kn owledge.
It is Impossible also, f., secur it y 1ea
sons, t o descr ibe t he met hods employed
in supply and r eplenishment ot her t han
t o say t hat t hey wer e, i spit e of condi
t ions and consider able difficult ies, m ever y
way excellent .
t
The Ar mor ed Division t o which our
Field Ambhinw was at t ached went int o
act ion on December 9, 1940, and was r e
lieved on Mar ch 5, 1941, a per iod of
elgbt y -six days of bar d fight ing and
r apid movement .
The met hod of employment of Field
Amblaces dur ing t he ent ir e per iod was
t hat of using Main Dr essing St at ions m
echelon wit h some sect ions br igaded a,
Advanced Dr essing St at ions and ot her s
sit ed for ot her fact ions in abmdancw
wit h t he s~t at i o.
On sme r xcawms, when t he int emen
,s d,st aw was r at her gr eat , a s ect ion
was s it u at ed bet ween t be advanced and
I ear MaL Dr msmz St at ions ad on ot her
occasions sect ions wer e opened for wmi -
Iar r easons bet ween t be t ear lfain Dr e.sa.
Wmg St at ions and t be Casualt y CleamK
St at mn.
Tbe comb, at ion of t wo or t hr ee sec
t m.s t o f.ct ion cm a fomwmd Advanced
Mam I)r essmg St at m was oft en t %nd
advat r +geous, bot h for opwst ,on r easons
and as a founds.t m cm which t he Main
Dr eMmx St at mn pr oper could be built
At t he same t ,me gener al healt h r e
mamed, cm t be whole, sr pr isigly good.
Deser t sor es, lflmnmat mn of ar miar
t i>se, wer e fa,r ly common bt only i
sever e cases r esult ed in incapacit at ion.
It was not able t hat t hese sor es occur .
I ed only on t he exposed par t s-hands,
for ear m% knew and neckand it is IXE
mble t hat t be dewt alizat ion of t he ski
by over -exp?swe t o t he SU,, plus t he
abr aswe act mn of sand Dar t , cles. ma.v
have heen a causat ive fac{or .
Aseor hzc amd t ablet s \ ver e administ er
ed as a mut ie measur e vnt h some unit s
t o count er act any possible mt amm de fi
mency but , as cases occur r ed at mor e or
1,ss equal r at es m t r eat ed or unt r eat ed
umt s, t he value of t b, s vr ocedur e wa$
,doubt ful.
Mdd gast r w et emt is, t he Sgyppy
t ummy t ype, occmed fauly fr equent ly
but was as a r ule of moder at e sever it y
and onlv a small ner cent ase of eases FE.
quued &acuat mnt o t he b;%.?.
Cases of jaundm wer e not uncommon
t be cause of which was difficult t o test ab
bsh but it was consider ed likely t hat t he
wver t - fall of t emper at ur e at mght had
some bemine on t he codit mn. This is
r auiat io sin~e t he ext r emes in t emper a
t ur es ar e ver y sever e indeed, shor t s and
sbut s being qu,t e enough dur ing t he day
and pullover s, bat t le{ir ess and gr eat coat
hot enough at nmht .
R may he t hogbt t hat an eight y-six
day campaign m n?t a unduly lengt hy
P,, 10d but t be fat wue cOn!equen? u?On
t went y-four hour dut y dur ing t h]s Qme
has t o be exuer ,enced t o be believed.
It must be bor ne in mind t hat wher eas
in t be 191418 war , shor t per iods of
<fr ont -line dut y wer e alt er nat ed wit h
per mds of r est at t he basej t his eight y-six
day? r epr esent s cont inuous Sfsont -bne
dut r es wit h all t he st fl~ss and st r ain t hat
t h,s t r nphes, Plus t be absolut e absence of
any sense of secur it y of posit iont he
or der t o <UP st ick ,and away could be
expect ed at any t ime of day or night . In
addit mn, t oot t her e was t he ever pr esent
menace of am at t ack, t be super ior it y. at
t hat t ime held bv t he enemsr . enabhng
him t o at t ack mosi t ar get s wi~b cor npar i
t ive ease.
, 81
MILITARY REVIEW
The aver age lengt h of st ay m st at ions
was appr oximat ely six and half days but
dur ing t he int ensely act mw per mds. t wo
or t hr ee days only wer e spent m each
Dlace.
In t he light of t hese exper iences m t he
West er n Deser t . cemam conclusmns have
been anmed at , and ar e appended for
considw at lon by F,eld Ambulance Unit s.
!!WJ Reading
The value of t r ammg m map r eading,
w of bot h t he pr ismat ic ad sun com
pass, mnt h a good wm kmg knowimlze of
st ella, mnst ellat lons cannot be uder es
t ,mat ed.
All office]., Non-cmmmsmns Officer s
ad Ambla.. ce Lhuvet s r eceiv?d ,st r u?
t c in t b~s depmt ment and t he t une
spent m t r aminz wa, well r epaid.
(h many ccasmn~ when t he wor l. had
t o he call wd out dur ms khamsms, t he
h@ unpleasant dust . st or ms so fr equent ly
e.mut eved r t hn r eg!on, ei%ment
t r iwmng m t ht s, plus adequat e t r ack
makmg, saved many who would 01her
mse have been hopelessly lost .
The ?.hekm ,t self was dug in wher ever
poss]ble. or a low sand-bagged wall budt
a, mmd it s inside wzdl, and t he lowy P
gm+ WS.S pr ot ect ed w,t h a fur t her wall
of sandba$s.
A sbt t r ench dug under cover of t h~
shelt er Mel f, lar ge enough t o t ake a
st r et cher and cover ed vwt h boar ds unt il
r equir ed, pr oved t o be a valuable pmt ec.
t ion for casualt ies. Many Field Ambul
Ma,t ence of klot or Tr anspor t
nut , m. r ender iuch val.able assist sc;,
A common sense p, t -caut ]on adopt ed
,,%s 10 FLOU, .z ? t he wa~,m or der hes t o
l.a, n t o dr ive and maint ain a vehmle and,
, add,t mn, t t each t he dr t ver s some.
Lh mg of fr os t ald pr mc, p]+s ,
This r ot e, changing of dut ms was ver y
useful, t he nly dr awback, human na.
t u! e bmnx what it IS, was t hat t he dr mer s
melt + always mor e int er est ed m t he cas.
alt jm and Nr smg Or der lim mor e in.
t ., est ed m t he enr ie.
Action Against Enemy
[Tr anslat ed at t he Command
ous effect on t he condit ion of t he casual
,magines t hat t he use of for war d sn,.xl
cal ums, wt ed near t he main Dr essing
St at m. cm solve t h,s r woblem.
n willbe appr emat ?~ t hai some of t he
conclnsm.s dr awn cannot , for secnr r t y
r easons, be published and also t hat many
t hat . have been dr awn am, t o some e%.
t ent , applicable t o pr oblems peclmr t o
deser t war f~.e wit h ,t s gr eat er flwdlt y
of movement . At t he w&It t zme a st udy
of cont inent al, Russmn and J apaese cam
palgns t vdl show t hat a simdar degr ee of
mobdmy may be expeet ed ad t hat t he
moblems t hat wdl be encount er ed ma~,
not be so ver y differ ent .
1 conclsicm ,t is emphasized t hat per .
w nel of FLel<iAmbnlaee unLt s must be
r egar ded ad t r med pr mmr ily as sol.
diem; compet en ce in fir st aid, alt hou~b
essent m], must always he secondar y t o
t heu t r a, ig as Fmld Tr oops.
Antitank ArtilIery
ad Gener al St aff School, For t
L?avcwwor t h, Kansas, fr om . Russian ai-t ir le I Iir IXt LLZ3LI Zuw dcz
X Deccn,bm 1942 ]
Our t ank t r oops a, e e.%t mwely used
, at t ack oper at ic,s at St r dingr ad and cm
t he r ent ,.1 fr ont . They bleak t hr ough t he
Gel man defensive zones., dest r oy mist ed
cent e, 6 of t es:st ace. and st r oke at t he
, Pay and t be cmmmmmat mns of t he en.
emy W,t h nmchme. gu and gun f%, t he
Sov]et t ank t ] LIOpSkdl t housands of ee.
my s.ldwr s and officer s, whd: t hei~
t %cads cr ush dugout s and macbmt .. gun
e,t ,.
Duz infx t he cour se of t he war t he GeY
mans have oft en felt t he weight of t he
blowsaf or ar mot eduit s. Recent Iy t he
enemy has fever ishly begun t o equ~p hm
umt s w?t h var ious weapons for fight ing
t anks The Ger man or der s and ist r c.
t lons pr ovide a gr eat number of ent l.
t ank defense measur es. The enemy is
Slv?ng Par t mular at t ent m t o t he qafi.
t at ,ve and quant mat ive r em for r ement of
ant it ank ar t iller y as a basis for a syst em
of fir e in defense. Special 37- and 50-mm
guns ar e by no means always able t o
penet r at e t be ar mor of our medium and
heavy t anks, ad for t h,s r eam t he G.,.
ma,ns ar e szg lfant r y weapons of lar ge
cahber s and ant iair cr aft ar t iller y guns
m combat wit h t he Soviet ar mor ed ve
82
FORETGN MILITARY DIGESTS
mander of the unit, relying on the fire
power and str,king for ce of his t anks,
t hr ew. t hem dir ect ly m~o t he bat t le, r e
st mct mg hnnself toabr r ef ar t iller y bom
bar dment pf t he for war d edge of t he
host ile defense. The H1t ler it es allowed t he
at t acking t anks t o come up close, and
t hen t he hdl became alive wmh dozens of
guns at var ious r anges and dmect ,on.s.
The t anks, not having expect ed such r e
sist ance, slowed down and began t o an.
swer t he fwe. But in t he end t hey wer e
for ced t o w,t hdr aw t o t he st ar t ing Pos,
t mns. Thk same hill was easily t aken aft
er \ vell-planned pr epar at mn, and t he Ger
mans fled m dmor der .
In or der t o fight t be Ger man ant it ank
zwt dler y effect ively, it is nece?sar ,y t o
know It s t act ics. The Ger mans dmt r ,but e
t heir ant i~ank ar t il!er y bot h along t he
fr ont and m dept h, dw It mt o t he gr ound,
camouflage car efully, and open fir e at
bbor t r anges. All t hm incr eases t he dlt %
cuky of t he ar t iller y obser ver s. But w,t h
expwt , well.or gamzed r econnaissance
even t he most decept ively h~dden WI+
may be det ect ed fawly accumt ely.
It is impor t ant t o det er mine COI?ect ly
,vbich appr oaches t . t he enemy posit , ons
ar e most danxer ous fol t he defender s
as fa, as Vdnks at e concer ned, and wh,ch
places ar e best adapt ed t o ant it ank ob
st acles. The ,t wdl be evident whet e t o
look for hidden machme-gun nest s and in
what places unr em,t t mg obse, vat m. m
necessar y, It IS absolut ely essent ial t o m-
invest igat e m det ad t he mut es of t he pr o.
posed movement of t he t anks, t he foot and
ADZ? of each he,sht . t o find out hefor e
har id about all ihe suspicmus places,
slight elevat ions, ir r ewdmit ws of t he
r r ound, and ever yt hing else t hat mwht
pr .ve ~ be an ant it ank fir ,ng point . 1! M
nwessam t o make w]der use of femt lnc
nmvenmit s by our t anks, in or der t o fo) ce
t he enemy ant it ank ar t dlwy t o I mc.al
It self.
On t he basis of t he t ypes of I eeonna,s~
wnce ment med, t he suppo?t of t he t anks
by a,t ,lle, y fir e M planned. Th]s ,. t be
most vit aI st age of t be whole oper at mn.
The ar t iller y must sdcnce t he ant it ank
element s of t he defense wit h cer t aint v
and suppor t t he, r own vehicles cont m
UOUSIY,fr om t he begmnmg of t he ar t il
ler y at t ack t o t he complet ion of t he mis
smn. This, of cour se, does not mean t hat
t he t anks have Only t o s~onn t hr ough t he
posit ions of t be demor ahzed enemy. They
t ill must come t o bear vigor ously on t he
enemy machine-gvn nest s and per sonnel.
Ift t he r na.m bur den of pr epar at mn for
t ank at t ack K t he r espons,b!lit y of t he
.t r t iller y.
The ar t ille, y must closely cover w,t h
,t s fir e t he mcet r at mn of t anks in po
.,t ~ons of depar t ur e. For t en t o fift een
,nint e-s pr ior t o t he at t ack, ~t must come
,Imv o all poa~t ively t dmat ed enemy
:, nt it ank elc.met s on t he for war d edge
r md t hen accompany t he t anks fr om one
~)bject ive t o anot bcr w,t h a r oll~ng bar .
t age. The t ask of t he ait dler y Z> t o de
.t r oy t he ant ~t ank guns, t o deny visibilit y
n t he host de obser ver s, t o pel mit o
,,mwd fir e at our t anks, ad t o pt ,evet
t he anom?.ch of Ge, mm r aseiwa,
..
On t ank suppor t individual guns play
m impor t ant r ole, accpmpanymg t he ve
hicles by fir e and on wheels. Some t om.
mander s nder est , mat e t he effect iveness
of such accompaniment , and, r elying on
t he m,uwr fl axmavet of t he t anks
t bmn~ekws, t hey do not assign ar t il
lwy it s t o follow dir ect ly behind t he
t anks. But , o mat t er how st r ong t he fir e
fr om concealed posit ions, some undam
aEed or r evived guns of t be enemy always
r emain o t be field of bat t le. Wit h point .
blank fir e t hey may dest r oy mom t han
one at t acking zmncmed vehkle Tbe ac
cr nwmyiz Euns mustdeal w,t h t hese
weapmm hy fit ing point -blank at t hem
and movmg fomma, d by st ages, as t he
t anks advance,
Bt ot only t he at t iller y wdl car r y cm
t he t ight against t he enemys ant ,t ank
equipment , The t anks t hmmelvm ca ad
must shoot t he gun cr ews and cr ush t be
enemy eq, pment under t he~r t r eads. The
dut y of t he Soviet aut omat ic r dleme m
t o dest r oy t be per sonnel of t he Gwma
ant mank nit s. The c.mmande, \ vho m.
gam~ed t be hat t ie must , wit h Wnct con.
f., mmy t o t he sit uat ion, nwke full se
of t he means at hm disposal for t he hqt u.
dat mn of t he sy?t em of ant nanh defense
fir e bot h , t he pet imd f t he bleakt hlougb
and dur ing t be dcwwl.pmcmt of t he bat t le
m dept h.
We ft , for xet t h,s last <at t ,,. Whd,
t he t r oops a,r assembled and pmpang
for t he hr eakt hmgh, ]ecnna,ssance m
act wely seeking ad est ablishing t be PO.
mt ion of Ger man ant , t ank element s, t he
a.r t dle, y is bmnbmdmg t he host de pow.
t ,ons heavdy, and t be t ank, ar e t he, efor e
advanc, g well, Bt as so. as t he fm
war d edge ,. b,oken p and t be bat t le is
r aging m t he t aat ical dept h of t he de
fense, t he t anks ar e left t o t hemselves.
The ar t ilkr y me sor net nnes do not not ice
new object ives fr dm t heir main obser va
t ion ~ost s, t hey ar e slow t o br ing fir e t o
hear cm t hem, andt hey leave undist ur bed
t he flanking gm of t be enemy, which
ar e espemally danger ous for t anks. ,%cb
a slt uat icm cannot be t oler at ed. The shell
bmt s must be laid not t oo far fr om t he
t anks. A curtain of t it -e ~st be main-
t amed, ear t he fmt of nmvemet of
t he vehicles, and, when necessmy, alcm~
t heir flanks, The mdlnw for and comet i.
t mn of ar t iller y fiw s+hold be mor e
\ vldely pr act iced wit h advance ohsen.er s
placed ,n t anks. Then not a single gun
r t er fer ig \ v,t h t he movement of or
t anks w,llbeeglect ~d~ or a single shell
be used vnt h.ut effect .
Sviet t ank at t acks mspue fear in t he
enemy. The Gemm.ns make use of ever y
means. par t icular ly ant ,t ank ar t dler y.
t o nwt jahze t he penet r at ing power of
OUI t ank,. The pr oblem of t he Sov,e%
ar t dle?y men is t o Da, alyw t hese effor t s
of t he eemv. The fir e of our bat t er ies
must open awide pat h fm. t he ar mor ed
folces moving at t he head of at t acking
umt s of t he Red Ar my.
Soviet Aero-Sleds
(,.n dn ,on s fma.t cxnobde t r affic m t he
U.S.S.R. dnTer r adr all? m wint er fr om
SUmm@r . REWULWaut ;mohde or t r uck
t r affic b,t weenci~xs and village. depends
dwect ly on clear ing t he r oads of sno\ ,.
Roads not .Iealed wmet ,mes ar e impr ac
t ical f.? mot or t laffic dmnw t he ent i, e
,., ,!lt, r .
~ Int h<, nmt b, h,ckof t .adshasfor mmly
made do~, de?,, and ot her t ypes of t he
mor e pr mm,e
Pot t . Thr ee
mechanized
t mn bot h on
sleds ecr +ssa, y f.. t r ans.
ar e now bwz lepkic,d by
sled, which ba.w good t r ae
bald-pdcked snow and soft ,
newsno\ v. At fir st cat er pdlar t r acks (half
t r acks ), wer e employed, bt it has been
asce, t a,ed t hat for exclusive wr ot e,
t r anspor t aer o-sleds ar e fast er and mor e
efficient . At fwst , t hr ee-slm ae~o-sleds
wer e used, but of bit e a new four . ski
aer o-sled has been developed. It s desuy
w.. weat er m.bihm .nd mat - I..d
capamt y.
Aer o-sleds must sat ,sfy cer t ain me
chamcal demands. They must be able t o
t r avel d only on mow:f*ee m. c.nt r y
,oads but also on new snow. Hence t he
sppor t ,x sr fam of t he sk,s must mr l
plet ,ly safegua, d t he sled fr om falling
t h, oFh t he snow or get t ing st uck in ijJ
ExPwIece m t be U.S.S.R. has pr oved
t hat t he load wwght of t he sled while in
movement must at exceed 1,200.1,350
pounds per squar e yar d of suppor t ing
s, face. The t t al we,ght of t he loaded
sled must not exceed *J Dounds Der en
. .
zi., horsemwe:.
Ot her essent mls include dur abilit y of
const r uct ion fr om inexpensive, plent ifld
mat er ials. The dr iver and cr ew must be
pr ot ect ed fr om head winds and must be
able t e obser ve t he r oad t o t he fr ont and
S3
MILITARY REVfEW
on both std... B, ake. . . . nemkd to .S.
sure safe descent on steep mdmes, es
pecmlly on sbppery a] d rolled ,oads. The
propeller blades must be equipped ,v,t h
some for m of Eumd t o pr r .vent acmdent s
It may be sad t h a t t h e es wn t ,al qua!].
t ies of amo-. kd. ar c. sumphcdy of
mauf. ct ur e. 10,. cust , ,.., of Iefxm,
$ood dnv,. $? POWW, and abdt t y t o move
Uff t ndepmdet ly whm t he $k,s me f,,,
zen t o t be gr und.
The accompan yin g s ket ch ?h mvs a g, .
eral \ Ie\ % of t h e S.vIei fJ K1..l6 .er ...le,f
w, , t h , . >C-fl mot . , . All accept ed t ypes
f aWO-?!Cd. have a .los wf .t wa mh md
cab,. ( 11 ,*h,ch t ,ans~o, t . d t o 8 PC,.
sons plu~ fr ewht , depending o hor se
pmvel of t he m~t .1. ml ,des,qn of t he
sled. The cabin IS mount ed on shock ab.
so,hw~ (?) wh,ch ar e conner t ,d t o t he
t hi w (or four ) skm The mot or ( 4 I IS
r r nw.l IY n~o.. t mi <,n ,eab of t he calm
and has a pusher t ype PI. WIIH {3) mwh
a zuar d (G) The sk,s ar e m,nwc t ed t o t he
body al,<, hy mean> of .,>,, s,,1 joint
se,,,,-ailw ( ;} amf Wnkxidm conmsct g,,
,.K r od. IX).
?1,,. t hr r e-md t ype of t ,,,,t ,~ of t he
.k,s msm es p, OW, r shock zdmor pt mn and
fixes t he sk,> ligldlj In mlat ~.n t o t he
body of t he sled A t ur n of t he ,t eer ,ng
\ \ , ht .el 19) CR.V+. t h~ fr ont sk, t t r
f. t he four -sk, t ype a,, o.,led, of t he lat .
c,t d,s,g, t he t wo r vav sk,s gl,de ,. t he
t vwk. mad. by t he f, ont sht s. The hr ahea
- d, c applwci by pr m.ur .+ m a foot pedal
which cause. 1 t o 1 ,. ,nch met al , od. t .
!,r ot r wic fr o., t he bot t om of t he SI<ISand
engage , t he snow An LW. mot ,,, COole,]
,. W, o.elmt . ehmmat es r .admt or and t \ , a
t pl COn,P], Cat ,4>ll S ,. t he cyhmku s[.,., s
and lend. t o Imht de.,g
The quallt y of movement of t he a,r o.
sled depends P K. t he r at , of t he
t r act mn eflot t s of t he scr ew (E) t o t he
L-ener al t r acel wught of t ht . sled (Q I .,
k
h: for mula K = . This r at ,. cha, act e,.
Q
,7.,. t he Ilm,t mwffic, e,, t of t he f,,m, o of
fhe bole of t he .I,,* aca{st g,oud mhwh
can bc t r aver sed hy aer osleds. For t hr ee
.kl aer n. sleds N must not be less t han .2b
and for t he lat est four -ski models not
1,ss t han T2
The a.how t able ,bows t hat t he magni.
t ucks of t he coefficient of fr ict ion ar e
chnnzeabk.
The ,mpmvement of t t awl qualit ies of
aw ,,-.Iw1. m be awompbshed br : W-
dcuw t be \ ve,gbt of t he bled by hght er
mmt r ?t , on. r edc, g t he loaQ capae,t y
(a semms d~sad\ af++ w), m incr easing
t he t , avt mn power of t he scr ew The lat .
t e, may be +wompl,shed by. ,,np,mrmg
t he desjg of t he scr ew or using a mot m.
of q? eat ., power H nmy he consldmed
t h:,t t he pr esent models of aer o.sleds
3 wII] 10uchly a P,el effor t Of t he S.r e,,
eqmvdk>t t o 6 t . 6h pounds pe, mot or
ho, SCPO,V.,
Alt hough t he avmagt ! speed m act ual
work ,s lower., ,t ,S pos,, ble t O (f, ,.e ~e, o.
,Id at a sped of ?0 t o 30 m ph. de.
pencimg . t he $o\ v s, face and t he W.
r wr ,~>,)ce of t he dr nw.
Ak t he S<>v,et Unum lacks ,v,nt ,, , oads,
t he oppmt unmes for using aer o. sled
t , a.,), t at , on al, ver y r lmer o us. For
t hat r +awm, m sp~t e of t he favor able
acbr e\ emc. nt . r n des,r ~ and effkimey .Ver
,, r , <wgh s..,, ad me, many ,mp,.ove.
mct ,. Q. yet be nmcie. A swit ch t o t he
U>, f he.>,,, fd as ,ve)l aS t o s ,mple
an d meYpFs >ve n , ob, , , an d st eel SC, , , , ,
.hmdr f be combined wit h fur t her per fec.
t mn of body t ie.lr n and of movmg par t s
Combat with the Counterattacking Enemy
[Tr anslat ed at t he Command and Gcm al St aff School, Vr I, t
Leave w.r t b. K a. as, fr om a R.bsian ar t ,ele by L V,soLoost mvskl
,n K?17SWW7 %, c.wla 10 December 104!2.]
1. an ale. soat hwmt of St abng, o.c
t he endlms st eppe is dmwct ed by gulbes
snd r avme$. amf by a dr y river ch ar m cl.
Hem a r et r eat ing umt of Gwnwn t r oop.
managed t o chug t o t he localit y and m.
Canize a defense. T~cn~hes. dugout %, and
per manent IOZ and ear t h f., t dicat mns
had been PIePaIed ea!h m. To t hem t h,
Ger mans hur r iedly ajded ha, he,] w,, i,
ent anglen,et s and mme fields, and SC,
up heavy and hght mar h,e guns m t he
For t , ficat ,ons e,md,g along t he de.
ehvny. On t he for war d slope of a small
h]ll and m t he out sl:lr t s of an inhab,t et !
place t her e was a Iabyr mt h of t r enche,
All t hm t aken t oget her const it ut ed a hos
t ile cent er .f r es,st am?e whwh blocked
t he way of our at t acking umt s.
In t h)s ar ea t he Ger mr ms began m
concent r at e a power ful for ce m or der t o
br eak t hr ough t o t he sout hwest . As al.
ways, t hey began an mt ,esdied , em
naissance. The weat her did not pemut
t he enemy t o use air cr aft for t hk p,.
pose, so he oper at ed wit h t anks. Small
det achment s of veh,cles t r ammed t hen
for war d edge and at t empt ed t o penet r at e
t h e po,it ion of ou v t r oops , L1n der act io,,
of t h e am, at e fir e of an t it an k weapon ,
an d a t iller y, t h ey I oiled back m r e.
t , eat or cau gh t on fir e. it ft el a few days
~~gbefi~! , . cou t emt t ack, of t h e Fa s c,8t .
1 t he mm.mg t he r hyt hmmal 1WU of
t he mot ms was hear d t hi ouj?h a damp
ad heavy fag, The noise mcmased ad
dr ew nw.I W. It was not hhe t he s.1
ckt t el of t h r ee t o five h mt de r econ n a ,..
sancc t anhs, our combat out post r epoyt ed
t ho appr oach of t be Ger mans a?d opened
fir e. About fm.t y host dt . machmes cr ept
p out of t he mist . They wer e movmg
caut musl.y, as ,f feehnx t hem wav. m..
der ou,ly .HI!vhng up -over knolis ;0.
wed wit h t he fir st bght snow and ac,o.,
t he da, k shell holes, Beside t hem and b,.
hind t hem, scmcely dwt mgumhabk
loomed t he bdhouet t es of t he soldier s.
=Cut t he ,fant r y off fr om t he t ank. !,,
or der ed t he commander i r esponw m
t he r epo W. The execut ion of t hm or der
depended mainly on t he heavy mor t ar s,
dir ect ed by Lieut enant Emelyamkov.
Fmig under condit ions of limit ed vis.
ibd, t y r equnes car eful pr epar at ion Of
t he dat a befor ehand. The r ance of gul.
lie,, r avines, hoUows, and slopes is es
t ablished by shoot ing in dayhght . Cur .
t ains of fir e ar e also ahgned in zones. All
t be r ange elevat ions a~e wr it t en down.
An aiming point is chosen , t be lmmedl.
at e vicinit y of t he fir mz posmion. Wher e
t b,s wor k M done accur at ely and r aoidl?f,
t he count er at t acking e?er n y daeii not
achieve success. And so it was her e also.
,-The Ger mans ar e cr ossing t he t han.
nel,,> came t he r epor t t o Emily t znikov. He
or der ed t he opening of fir e an t he chan
nel. The mor t ar commander s swift ly
dr ew t heir not ebooks fr om t heir pocket s
or plane t ables and quickly r ead aloud
t he necessar y dat a. The gunner s set t heir
sight s accor dingly and ieveled t heir n
st r ument s on t he almmg point . Tbe
shells bur st in t he dr y r iver chaneL
Out m fr ont explosions r oar ed, and
t he damp fog began t o t ake on a IO.Y
mlm. Then came a new command. The
bar r els of t he mor t ar s r ose st ill h,gber .
This meant t hat t he enemy waa st all ad.
vancing, and fir e was being shift ed
near er , int o t be next zone. .Tbe r oar of
exnlos,ons became mor e dmt mct .
~he count er at t ack was beat en ofT. Five
host ile t anks wer e o fir e, t en wer e dlt .
abled. But t he Fasemt s did not st op at
t his. Despit e t heir lar ge losses, t hey
t hr ew t hemselve~ again and again at ,OW
p.smons. Each t ,m$ t anks and nmt or w.ed
,fant r y t ook par t m t be connt er at t ack~,
am-empained by ar t dler y and mor t al
fir e.
The enemys count er at t ack cont inued
all day and all night , and t he numbel
r ose t o more t han t en. Her e and t her e
t be t ier mans somet ,mes succeeded m
wedging t hemselves m, but t hey wer e ,m
medmt e]y t hr own back On. me, excmxl
by t he hat t l$, dld not Ket a moment s
sleep, and dld not eat m dr ink, whdc
beat ing off t be enemys at t acks.
Bt t o r epulse t he count er at t acks once
E not t o dest r oy a lar ge host ile for ce w.
t o depi-lve it of it s abdlt y t o act , e$P.
cmllv ,f t he enemv st all has t he abdlt y
t o r ~gr oup hm st r eingt h. It M essent ,al t i
at t ack, m move for war d, t o dr ive wedges
,t o t he combat fomnzt ios of t he foe,
t o br eak t hem UV. and t o smash t hem ,.
det ad. As soon & our command not ice,l
t hat t he Ger mans wer e sfficiet ly win,,
do\ vn by const ant cant er at t ackmg, t he
or der was given t o at t ack.
A r ifle r egiment br ought up t o t bc
bat t le fr om t he r ear dehver ed >t s blov
at t he cmemv at t he moment when one
of h,s nmer ius count mat t mks had been
beat en off. The r egiment demolished a
seines of Ger man st r ong point s and dug.
out s, br oke t hr ough t he bar bed w!re m
places, and advanced about 400 ,et w.
(440 yar d. ), penet r at ing t he fir st line of
for t ificat ions. Ymlent hand-t o-hand fight
ing br oke out in t he t r encbea and com
mnicat ion t r enches. Wlt b bayonet s,
hand gr enades, and pomt .bbmk fir e t he
Soviet war ner s clear ed t he way t o v,.
t or y.
When t he at t acker s appr oached t bc
second hne of Ger man fmt ificat ms, t he
enemy count er at t acked o~ce mor e. About
t wo dozen t anks bear ing at cmmt ic r ifle
men at op t hem ar mor , t oget her wit h a
84
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGEST
bat t alion. of ho~t ile infant r y, emer ged
fr om behind a h!ll t hr eat ening t he open
flank of OLIIr egnnent , Our ar t iller ymen
and sever al t anks came t . it s aid. Qu,ck
]Y St i,ft ins t belr combat for mat mn, t hey
hast ened t o move UD on t be flanl< of t he
ar mor ed for ce. Th6 Ger man count e r at .
t ack again col~apsed. Having Iobt ten
tanks, t he Fasc,st s scur r ied off behind
t be hill. Then t he enemys air cr aft aP
p=.r ed again, dr mmed homhs. WI,i fle\ v
off. Thm J ld not ,t br ~ak t he at t ack spnw
of OU1 t r oOPS. Th ey q.uickly I e. for med
and, advancing st(ep by st ep, t ow+ pos
.es, im of the new h..
A for ce of a u t oma t ,. r dkmen wa <
.et mt o t he br each at op fast t ank..
Lmut enr .m St m chenkov, t he leader of
t he fot ce, w., t o set ze a be,gbt smuat ed
In t he Ger man r ear . and, eonsohdat ing
hmmelf t her e, \ vas t o fir e on an mhahlt ed
place locat ed near by, which ser ved t be
c?, mans a. a concealed posmon for con.
cent r at mg t belr for ces. The success of
t he bat t le as a whole depended lar gely
on t he act ,ons of t his t ank.home for ce.
fhchar gig t he at omat ,c r , flemen o
t he hall, t he t anks penet r at ed far t her .
They scat t er ed a ne~v KTOUP of t he en
(my wh, ch was P, epar mg a count ,er
t hr u.t . Lieut enant St ar chenkov, bavlnz
killed p t o for t y Hlt ler it es, cot ir med t o
bold t he height and helped t he at t acking
mfat r y wit h his fir e, 1 t he aft er noun
t he bat t le shift ed t o t he ot si, r t . of t m
mhah, t ed place. [)u, umts entered the
hr eakt hr ougb one aft er anot her and
widened it . At t ack planes which bombed
t he Ger man for t ulcat ions suppor t ed
t helll.
Tbe Fascwt s st ill kept chngmg t o ever y
defensive t er r ain feat ur e. Her e and t hct z
hand-t o-hand fight ing flar ed UP, and
>ha:p fir e at shot a,. t mcm hIcdw out .
As alm I t he bexinning of t he act ion,
t he xem ndw t he cmmnad of Se,,
101 Lieut enant Emelyandmv dlst ingulsb.
ed t hemselves by shdt ul or gan, zat wn of
fi, e. 1 t he per md of t he most st hbom
r esist ance of t he enemy, t hey dest , OY<J ,
accor dmq t o st at ement s of t he umt -,
seven Ger man mach~ne g.., oe ar t ,l.
ler y and t hr ee mor t ar bat t emes, and ,hb
m=d near ly a Lat t ahon of F=,st ,
movnm m count er at t ack.
Towar d. evening our umt b cam., eJ
t he opposit e bank of t he dr y r over t han.
nel and t he mhabt ed place, and moved
ahead p t o one kdomet er (t hr ee-qua,
t er s of a mife). Tbe Ger man f., ce mblch
was ,t ended t o effect t he br eakt ht ough
was disper sed and par t ly wiped out ,
Attack on an Antitank Formation
[Fr om an ar t icle 1. De Panze8t, t,pw?. Tr anslat ed fr om Ger man
at t he Cm,,mand and Gener al
Kansas. ]
It was Whit sunday, l! May 1!)40, We
\ ,eYe alr eady appr oaching our days oh-
wt lve, t be Ym?mn mound Br ust hem t .
t he east of Sa,t T~od at 10:00 Al!.
Iiwbut a mmut es sleep, aft er bt eakmg
t hv t c.mt a..e of t be enemy, we had been
f,, ir led acr u~. t be A]ber t CaaI in t he
,,,qbt , aft er wh,cb me bad penet r at ed 4~
I,d<?mmels mt o t he enemys t er r it or y t o
mmd t he sot hwe.t , We had encount er ed
a few ha, r icades, abandoned eqmpment
.,<j bat t le.,vear y E?elgmn soldr ws but no
,eb~st ance wor t h ment lonmx so far . We
P:,d even capt ur ed a bmvy bat t er y wit h
... s all at t ached t o t he,, I,mber s. When
\ GC just a. much sur pnsed as t he Bel.
guns, hu, r ldly zot our t .nkb and ma
,bue zun~ int o posit ion, 40 men ,mmed]
!t efy st uck t hem hands mt o t he au. The
I,, KIz, oVel t be Denwr , r eady for blow
n% UP, had fallen mt oour possession un
,Ia,,, ai., d.
J ust as we r eached our final dr st i.a
t ,on for t he J ay we found a t ank wait
,WZ for s, h,dde I a elmp of br ush.
H br ought down t he r not omycle r ider wmh
III. point of t he column, and t he dr ive,
f t he commander s car as he sat beside
t he commander , t he disappear ed befor e
t be ant it ank cannon vnt h t he advance de
?.mhment bad a chance t o d,est r oy it .
\ Ymh vlght eous anger in t hem hear t s,
t be zmt it anh men sear ched t he count r y
fur it , bt t he t ank had made it s get a
<e est ablished our selves m a cir cular
f.nnat mn ar ound t he t wo villages of
!must her n and Or dingen, In t he cour se of
lhjs maneuver , a second bat t er y fell int o
.ur hands. Two t anks again advanced
St aff Scbocd, For t Leavenwor t h,
caut iously t owar d us, but dlsappr ?aed
for good at t he fus.t .ht ft om our r mt l
t ank cannon.
Suddenly a r adm oper at or sppear ed
\ vlt h an older fr om t be dm. i: cche\ v
(mys obJ ect l VP for t h e ~d~ll., det ach
men t : Hmwaerdc. ilu t con , e t h e maps
qam as we h u n t ed for Hogawde! We
figu r ed, t wa . cvt bel t ot h c. s ou t h or s ou t b
wes t of Sain t Tr en d. For a lon K ?Ime we
sear ched fm t he det achment s combat
post . We finally found ,t , but it was 4
Iolmnet ms sout hwest of Tu1+mont ont be
west s~d? of t he BUZ Get t et That made ,t
30 kdomet er s far t her ,t o eem> t ell,.
t m.y I a west er ly dnect ]on The officer s
looked at t he comma. de,. He k.e\ v \ vhat
t heir look meant , and said: c,WelL t hat
,. cpnt e a lit t le for one day. A scot
iE det achment in Saint T]ond bad just
bee fir ed o bv sniumb.
Our loss of sleep !~as t ellmz on us, hut
it made no differ ence. w? had t o go on
Ever y mmur e \ as impor t ant We Lnmv
t hat we must not gwe t he Bel!wms ar m
hleat hm~ spell, m t he f!nghsb awl
I%ch who \ ver e cmmg p ay t ,me t o
r mnfor ce t hem
So t her e was not hnw t o do hut g.t
r eady. Our commander gave t he or der s:
.lst Ant it ank Company in t be lead;
Wher ever t he enemy IS encount er ed, he
is t o be beat en.
Cour age IS half t be bat t le, but we ba!
t o be doubly wat chful now as we \ \ wukl
nat ur ally r un mt o st r onge, and >t r on gel
enemy, for ces. We had becom$acquai. t ed
wit h hls met hod of t ight mg since paswng
t he Meuse-Schelde canal: he would let
us come close t ? him, t hm at t ack us
on t he flank or m t he Iear as much as
posslhle.
We wer e not able t o go ar ound Saint
Tr end so we had t o go t hr ough it Half
+he cr ew in t he swn-t owing t ?cks ..- ...
wat ched t he houses on t be Ileft . t he t est .
t he houses o! t he r ight , r eady, w]t h t heir
r ifles in t hem hands. But emdently the
sight of t he int er minably .lang column
cauwd t hesnlper s t o Ioset he,r ner v.e. We
Icar ned fr om some of t he people of t he
vilbvm t hat Belgian and Fr ench sohiw-r .
had left ot over t hr ee hour s befor e. and
had cone m a vwst er lv di<ect ion. . well.
we would soon find oui!
W;C IIOWIYKA w,. first Our ha!?. com
Pa~Y, t he leading c~a>pa.y, bad J W
passed t hr ough Sat nt Tr end. Suddenly a
messenger c.at ne bJ ck t .1.h t he r eper k:
,bar r ,cadeat Ber g opZoom, St ones, t r ee
t r unkb, far m vebwles far med a bar r ier
acr osb t be whole r ight of way. But t he, e
was none of t be enemv t her e. So o we
went .
.4 kilomet er far t her o. on t he ?a.L
edm of Doimael, we found anot her bawl.
cade. Th,s t r me a copk of machme IWIIS
wer e pour ing t beij t ir e on us, and Ihe
,e~mt of r ,fles ,a, hemd, Bt we wor e
hamedfor t b!ssor t .f t hmr . Our ant it ank
me ,V?t aft er t hem ,wt h cannon and
r each, e guns. The Belg,am,ver et mt able
t o st and t his f., Imv+ The enemy mot m
;J cle t lmws hur r iedly cleat ed out , IMV.
,R US t o make a O,IWZ t hr oph t he
bar r ,cade.
Thm sa,ne t hing t ook place ever y kilo
mct m of t he J oIey e.cept t hat t he
]esmt a.ce gr adually became gr eat er , hut
under t be Ieadwsh,p of t be,r mm-wilt ed
cummandw t be t r oops of t be Ist Cmn.
pany bur led t he enemy back m magmfi
cent st vle fmm ba,,,eade t o har r ,w.de
Thu., <ve adva,md a st ep at a t mw.
Thr ough Or mmd, Gussenbove, Over &s
pens.d Ehxem,t he Belg]answer adr men
hack.
Now t hat we had cr ossed t be L,t t le
Get t e bullet s wer e hummmg in gr eat er
umber . past our ear s, cmn, ng fr om t he
mghhomg balls. But we d,d not st op for
t h,,, We S,mUly ass,gned a r nach,e g
or ant , t ank m.ncm t o t he t ask of hcddig
t he.efellowsdmvn. Th,. s,t at mn got less
plea,at aft er we mwsed Eh.ier n. Bul
iet s met e OW flyu ig all arod u % It
>ounded hke a s,var m of bees. Tbe enemy
made few h,t s, however , only a small
uumber of OUI men bem~ slight ly
wou n ded.
T,ue 10 t he mot t o of t he bat t aho:
..[~ast , da,,c ad hazd a, mm,,, t he men
of t bt Ist Company advanced boldly
t h, ouzh t he hummm~ bullet s and dr ove
t he near est machine Knner s back t owar d
Meer . Bt ilS we at t acked t he enemy at
t he r mlv, ay east ~f blew a mfemal d,
suddenly br oke out . The t owing muck
\ wt b t he advance det achment , whwh at .
t empt ed t o make a bold dash ahead, was
suddenly st r uck by seve, at ant zt ank
shells. In t be uncea.sIg dm of t be ma.
r h, ne guns, t her e VlaS hem-d t he r epeat ed
t ear of exploding shells of vamos cab.
be,, Our COmpanY suddenly found ,t
self m t he nndst of a r egular infer no.
Tbe 2d Company: whmh was follow
,g, vwt int o pomt mn at t he west en
t r ance of Ehxem m or der t o cat ch t he,,
hr eat b m t he nudst of t be fr ay and give
t he har d. pr essed Ist Company some r e.
hef. We wer e for ced t . go ar ound in a
br oad half cir cle m or der t o get t he guns
int o. posmmn, for t he enemy was now fir
,g fr om t he nor t h, west and mut h. It
was for t unat e for us t hat t be squadr on
of bicycle t r oops kept t he r ear c]ear , and
also. hy well dir ect ed machine-gun t ir e,
pr event ing t wo enemy bomber s fr om scor
ing bit s.
Our dr iver s in Elixem scar cely knew
wher e t o st at ion t heir vehicles for . bnl
let s wer e flat t ening t hemselves ever y
wher e against t he walls of t he houses.
Bullet s wer e even coming fr om isolat ed
houses and when, finally, shells began fly
85
MILITARY REVIEW
,*
in= at us fr om t he chur ch t ower t o mu
r ear , we t ur ned a t ank cannon ar ound
and set t led mat t er s for t hese wmmem.
OUI. AT mm fuinm, wer e now t inn~ mnt h
ever y gun at t hen dmposal at t he r ows
lble enemy, but his fir e. cont inually he
mme st r mvzer . The ar fio!, g hills wer e
mew lr w I?I e, stw,not hmg \ vas t o he swn
of t he enemy. W e wer e glad Mhen, once
I. a 10.c Nhale, we could cat r h .,xht of a
ffash of fir e-pr obably commg fr om an
AT m..<, i mdm t o have someihmr
t o am> at , It was lucky im us t hat n~Eht
w.. mmmz o. t he l,sht \ v:Mzet t ,n~ had.
and t hr B:lgmns .,> Ioniwt ,.ct e ah]? t o
mahe many hit s.
Ther e ex,,t c<l no doubt , aft er \ ve had
t h, ONn hacl. t he w>vmy out r wst . t o t he
ot her id? of t he LKt lr Get t e. t hat we
Those wer e cert ain ly t ense moment s.
But ,no,v t he t ir e of t he angr r ed enemy
hemhe heavwr .
/
Th e 2n d Compan y was able t o h old it s
<, , , n , ht how \ \ er e mat t e, s w,t h t he ls,t
Gm,pany IIp xh t -ad, cu t off by t h e ene
, , , > ,s fi, e ? 1.-0, -on ,, h t t le t , r n , n ow n ot a
n , ?, . , . x,l had ?Ot t hl(ld,
I1:ILNIZ h,, \ \ ay fr om house t o house
ar xl cr wp$nc t h, wwh t he dnch along t he
us as pmmd and unfor get t able meymies.
Alt hough t he news of t he sit uat ion of
t he Ist Company had passed fr om man
t o man m a t r lee and alt hough mat t ezs
.ver c not much bet t er wit h t he 2nd Com
pany, our infant r ymen advance, plat cmn
lmler s in t he fear !, quiet ly and in an .r
dei h and mat t el -of-fact way t owar d t he
halt . Thq men of t he 2~d Ant it ank Com
pany chanced t he powt mns of }hey guns
m ol,de t , t o co wr t he new ob Iect wes 9s
..indv a. if x were merely a practice
mrm.uver and not a mat t er of hfe and
,deat k! Oh, t he pr wdege of being able
t o PO Tut o t be field of bat t le wxb such
wldm, s! Hed Ger manv. t he land of
W lt h t he M Company u p ahead, t her e
occur r ed a Iwt of act ion chamct er zst ic of
wer e up w3.inst s u p.! i., enemy for ce.
which wer e de fen, h.c t hemwlbeb fr om
well-pi t -paI ed p.hit ion> u t he ht lk t o t he
Wet .
To but t mm ,xay t hr ough t his st one
\ *all w.* not a job for our small advance
det achment . We hzd t o t ind mme ot hm
solut zo for t lm pr oblem We weze now
st opped and we had t o see, as C.r man
s.ld,as, what we could do t o mas t m t h,.
s,t uat , on. The Ist Company was under
nr e fmm ever y s,de and t he 2nd Compmy
w.> ot in a nmr h bet t er fix Fw.t of all
w. v e, e . . But \ \hat s t hat com,nz out
Ikom among t he houses of hEeer ? That s
a t ank! Ther e-b anot ha <>, mm t her e:
and t be>e. .mot hm . . t hr ee, fou~, five
of t hem! Did t he enemy wanttoattack
M ?Theyesf .r ant nank men lu?hlc<l on e w]. We accon>pl,bhwl t hm m an old,
uP! At ]ast a t ar get ! F.wn t he nmves of
t !me t est ed Ger man manner wit h a shol t ,
t he h~o. 4 f?unnw. wew t aut t o t he h) cak-
\ , Eo, , , US ,as vau lt . We had t o d,,! e t he
ing point . I.,ke ih@ pant hel,, t hat a] mer i
,a.cals off of t he hdl ovw t hem on t he
animal, t he ant it ank man, t he gun.l?.yer , tmht , f,,,, \ \ h,ch t he.y w.1. pour ing
\ vat ched t cad> t spr ing, ,eady t o de-
Oankmc fir e Int o t he r ank, of t he ISI
.t r o.y, hehmd t he t elm.ofle SIzht . ,,Ant ,-
Con,pny, almost ,,, t o t be, r ,e, y back,.
t ank shells! The t hwd on t he r wht ! 800 Tbe .vnmmnd pwen t o t he Infant r y
n,,t .,, !<, It was t he vcme of t he w. com-
Comva. > amf t he ?mi .4nt ,t mL Company
mander at h], s,de. Qu,ckly, wit h bot h
n z, a. follows. ,,The Ifant vy Company;
hands, yet COOIY,he msn,plat ed t he con. .uppor t ed hy t he 2nd Ant ,t a,,k Cmn,,a,, y
t , .1s wh,.h hmught hm r apzd cannon t o wdl t ahe t he 1,)0 me, t hem ,, How .
bear on t he t aq?et . Finally t he command
\ vas gf,en; Fiye .1 Will f, The sbt -11wa~
on ms way! The fir st of t he t anks was hit
-and t he sr mnd! The ot he~s had alr eady
t ur t md, bt suddenly t he t hir d of t hem
t o heat .1OI e st r ongly m t he r lidst of t bc
\ vas st t uck,
had of bullet s and which wdl I am? w,t h
befm e a ser geant and a cadet capt mr i
we, e bemdt - h,m. Luck m wit h t he br ave.
By ct awlig, t hese t hr ee managed t o
hnng hack not only t he company com
mander bt t he onmmm~ssmed officer
out of t he enemy fir e,
When dar hne,s set t led dew, t he h,ll
was , o, hands and t he 1st Comgs,y.
had been br ought back \ vmhcmtt he low m
a smzle addmoal ma. Fmt aat elv fm
us, t he nnccmuw dar kness held 01 l-owes
much ICMV.I t han had been ant impat ed.
N mv t he infant r y cmnpay and t he 2nd
Ai,t ank Company,ver . also dr a> back
and ever yt hing was r emoved fr om t his
\ VS,p,S ne,t t o t he UPpel Res pQn , a mor e
favor abl.? t einam. We planned t o make a
deep t hr ust ,t o t be enemy>. t lak t he
next mouug, makmx t hm our point of
depmt um If we could not make it in a
fr ont al at t ack, per haps aar pr ise at t ack
m t be flank would do t he wor kt hat s
t he way our advance det achment wor ks!
For t he fir st t ime dmig t hk capaign,
we assmne or famcms cir cular defense
86
for mat ion20 kilomet er s ahead of t he
divisional secur it v in unknown. enwnv
t er wun.
WXt h t r oubled munt enaee t he t ir eless
r adio det achment mmt nmnder , Got ., an.
nounced t hat m spit e of s11 he mld do,
he had hem unable t o make cont act wit h
t he d]vmion for some t ime, Appar ent ly.
t he dist ance had become t oo gm.at , N c
simply had t o get a r epor t t hr ough t t he
division. Tbe admmist r at iv~ ofiicer had
t aken on Klmself t he command of t he be
r eaved 1st Company. Ther e was cdhmg
else t o do bt for t he Adjut ant t o make
h,s way hy nwht t hr ough t he enemys
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGEST
count r y t o t he bat t alions command post .
Sent inels wer e post ed. Dr iver s filled
t he,r gas t anks, and dur ing t he cour se of
t hm oper at ion, as a law st r aw, t be gas
t >uck ~bpped mt o a d,t ch and over t ur ned!
The vanmn commander s r eceived a few
shor t o, der s r ezar ding t he next day>s
ac-t ivit ies and t henr mdnigbt had al.
I eady pzsscd aft er 44 hour s of mar ch.
mg and conflict , aft er 44 hour s of t he
ar eat est t enswn, ever yone sank int o t he
deepest sleep. One M as if bur ned out at
sum a t ime. He M sust ained only by im
will and t he t hosht : you ar e a .Gemna
sold, et ,
Man-Management
[Ext r act ed fr om Lect ur e hy Lieut enant -Colod R. A. ?dansell,
O. B. E., Regal A rww Medzcal COVPS, Bvtt<s h Aw nu, Repr int ed fr om
Tke Jot,?ml of tit. R.wd A mng Medical COWS ( England) August
1942. ]
. .
Tbe fir st r eal ddt iclt y which t he sol.
dier meet s is t he whole differ ence whlcb
t her e m In behavior , values, sur r oundings,
almost ever yt hing, bet ween cwil and mili.
tat y hfe. In t r aimng t he r ecr uit m pr ace,
much t hogbt and t ime can he give t o
t hm; and ,t m handled by select ed officer s
and NCOS, Rut in war t her e cannot he so
much select lon, nor is t her e t ime t o spar e;
so we must I eahze, all t he mm e, t he
~t r am under wh,ch many of our men ar e
const ant ly l,vmg fr om t his point of view
alone. Pur ely o t he sa,t ar y s,de, t oo few
of us r eally consider , m our civilian hfe,
what a deal of t mhle we ar e saved hy
t hose wbo t hink and wor k for us. It is
ot unt d we fmd our selves m camp or
on act ive ser wce t hat we appr ecmt e t be
hlessmgs of a plug wblcb can he pulled or
of a dnst man who CZRSr egular ly. Adapt a
t ion t o t bib kind of life is unbelievably
ddficlt for some It IS a biological ,r ut h
t hat any hvir qg a,mmal wdl pesisb r apt dly
as t he r esult of t he accumulat mn of it s
o\ v r efuse unless ,t t akes act ,ve st eps
elt ber t o dispose of it s <wast e pr oduct s
.? t o r emove It self fr om t hem. The mor e
lowly for ms of lifet he veget ables~o
,,t suffer fr om t his dkabilit y; on t he
cont r ar y, t hey flour ish t he mor e as t he
, esult of it .
Ther e ,s a t ype of ment alit y which can
not only busy It self in t hese so essent ial
conser wmcy dut ies but also can even t ake
pr ule m t heir pr oper per for mance. Men
ar e t o be found wbo can make a hfe job
of t he br nmg of manur e and hke t be
husmess. If we can get such a man int o
our sanit ar y squad we can r est assur ed
t hat t he wor k wdl he well and t hor oughly
done. Ho~ever , t her e ar e equally many
nw, especially m our pr esent Ar my, t o
\ vhmn such employment may he a sour ce
of such ment al t r auma as t o leave not
only t he wor k ill-doneand we know
how danger ous t o ot her s t hat maY be
bt also t hemselves definit ely decr eased
m effwiency as member s of t he mdit ar y
machine. Ther e IS no need t o have r ound
pegs m squar e holes :f we wdl but t ake a
Izt t le t r ouble t o meamr e men UP.
The oe t hing which t he pr ivat e soldier
does not ba.ve and cannot haveunless
we Ewe ,t t o him is ( par adoxically
enouEh) pr wacy, even for a few mmut es,
m which t o lead h,s own p, ,.at e life.
Tbme is an wmr nms value fr om t h,s
point of wew m t he r ea,dmg w .mnt ing
mmm, t he quiet r oom of t he inst it ut e, t he
..t een w t he elb wher e a ma m st
and t hink t o hmw, or even just elf, st t ;
wher e he mm wr ~t e and r ead hu let t er s
t o and fr om his home, his wife, his chd
dm, his gui. imdent ally, d you k.w
who, and how many, t her e ar e in r ela
t ,o t o t he men under yol mmnedmt e
command .YOI. chddr en ? You ought t o.
And what t heir wm r ies ar e: God knows
we all have enough m t hese days; but
we, pel haps, can deal wit h our s and get
help in t hem mor e easdy t han t he pr wat e
sold,., c= unless we Or ,,]e, so ot
of our way t o help him, t o lear n h,s per
sonal hfe and t o bst en t o, and occakmally
advise, h,m m his t r oubles. Though we
may cd he able t o gwe any act we help,
It s amazmg-and we each know it our
selveswhat a r elief It is t o be able t o
get a wor r y off ones chest befor e some
cme t o whom we look UP and who wdl lis
t .m sympmhet wdly. Aft er .11, as a gen
er al r ule we ar e not asked t o make amy
wor ld. sbahmg decmions; for ms t he ht t le
wor r ws t hat gwe t he wor st t r ouble
lit t le t hings wh,ch, we, e we at home wkh
t he fmndy and face t o face wit h t hem,
would be br ushed aside wit h scar cely a
t hogbt but which, when wer e away,
pr ick and pr ick t dl t hey make a wound,
t he m Igin of which oft en we can bar ely
r emembe~ unt d we have t alked t he whole
t hing out wit h someone who will h.t en.
This sor t of t bmg was, I am t old, well
exemplified in our men wbo wer e br ougbt
back fr om Flander s br oken, at t he t ime,
wit h what in t he last war we r ashly ??dled
,%heU.shock. Essent ially at t he back of
most of t hese mens k?ouble t hel,e was a
wor r y, oft en so small and, when r evealed,
m ,t self so silly as t o be wit h difficult y
I ecognizable. m quiet er t imes as a r eal
wor r y at all. But , added t o ot her and
gr eat er st r esses, it became t he count er
par t of t he pr over bial st r aw on t he long-
suffer ing camel. Men wor r y over miss
mg just t hat let t er which was t o t ell t hem
whet her Ilt t le Dick did cat ch t he measles
fr om Nellie -&Xever st mnx in his chest ,
was Dick, Tbe pr oof of t hese t hings was
a r eeover y r at e u~expmt edi-y high in
compar ison wit h Dr evious simdar ex
per ience,
Talking about let t er s: bow long does
it t ake t o d]st mbt e let t er s in J our unit ?
Ever y ma kmms when t he post cor
uor al get s in wit h t he; but does t be
man who ,s wwt ing for unpor t ant e&s
and all news of h,. famdy IS impor t ant
m t hese days&ms he get hm iet t er wit h
t he pmmpt mude wit h whkb N. get our s
i t he Mess, or does lt t ake hour s t o r each
h,m t hr ough manp inquisit ive or ur n.
t er est ed hands? It IS a point wm-t b look.
mg mt o
In y.. umt ca a. ma say, as he en
t er s t he dmig hall, kBmwn st ew and
net . pudding must be Monday? Or ,
canver sr ly, because it is Monday does he
know t hat be ,S going t o hat e his din
ner bemuse ,t w,]} be br ow st ew ad
nce pudding? Wit h all t he difficult ies
wh,ch t her ear e m t hese days m t he mat .
t er of r at ions and t he ar r angement of
d,et sheet s, bot h fr om t he issue and t he
r eceipt point of view. isnt it just as easy
t o plan mm diet ar ies, so far as we can at
all, on an eight m t en day basis as on t he
cust omar y seven, so t hat a man cant t ell
wba.t day of t he week It may be hy what
he sees on h,s plat e, or vice ver sa? Mo
not ony has killed almost as much good
food as have cooks, and ?t IS wor t h while
t aking any t r ouble t o escape fr om ,t .
L,st m t o wave]]: ~
Dmaphne apar t , t ie soldler s chief
cal es ar e: fnst , hm per sonaf comfor t .
i.e., r egular r at mns, pr oger clot kig, good
ballet s and pr oper hosp,t al ar r angement s
(squar e meals and a squar e deal, in fact ):
and seccmdly h,s per sod safet yi e.,
t hat he shall he put mt o a f,gbt wt h as
xood a chance of vict or y and sur vival as
poss,ble. Guns and but t er , m ot her wor ds.
And it may he r emar ked t hat RmsLan
mor ale i t be la,t e war br oke t hr ough lack
of guns, Ger man lack of but t er .
Ther e ar e now, and t he peculiar condi. ,
t ios of moder n wa! make it neces
sar y t hat t her e should cont inue t o be,
many small, Isolat ed gar r isons scat
t er ed over t he count r yside wher e men
have t o r emain oft en on almost cont inu
ous hour s of dut y for long t our s at a
st r et ch. Dfany of t hese post s ar e locat ed
so far out in t he count r y t hat t her e M
lit t le posmbilit y of int er cour se wit h t he
wor ld at lar ge, even If t her e wer e t be
t ime or oppor t unit y for it . Our defense
and t he defense of our families depend
ver y gr eat ly on t h~ men in t hese pusi
- Wavell, G...,*I S1, Amh,bald Gener al. and
G..c,.t .hw
87
MILITARY REVfEW
t i.ms. Now people like YOU and 1 wit h a
r easonable de~r ee of educat mn, ar e able,
t o some ext ent at any r at e, t o r elieve
our s,wes of t he monot ony of such sit u
at ions we have t he abdlt y and t r aining
10 fmd r ecr eat mn i mm sur r oundings and
aven m our selves. But t he man of Ilt t le
m no edumt mn has not t hm abdny: he
has not even t he poswbd]t y, unless we
help hm~ Many of s may fmd ,t diff,
cuk t o appr eciat e t he out look of a m?in
Lecent ly r elieved fr om such a mt at io
whom one of h,s of fmer s met t he next
cv.nmg m t he t own. To a casual mquwy
a, t o how t hings went t be mm r ephed,
c,Gr and, SW, Ive been hav,g a good
~<mlkaloumt and I havent see a hladc of
t hat bleeding gr ass ,. 0,1 an ho,. And
xf you havent met befor e t he object mn
of t he slum chdd t o t he count r yt hat you
cant play hopscut ch m gr am . you cant
beg,n t o Yealt ze t he st r ain of t he t er r ible
r r mnot oy of t he.. place. o t h? uwf
cat ed t ownsman fve he, laughed at
t ime and again fo, t he swzgmt , on, but I
cont inue t o make it hwause I kno\ v it
ha, wor ked. t hat YOU cam mlwve t h,s
monot ony for t hcw men and t her efor e
,mpmve t hem fight ing efficwcy by t eacb
. ing t hem t he snnple a, t s of t he count ?y
wde-e~en t o bir d.wat ching ad t he ml-
Iect mn of wdd flcm em
A gr eat many of u, Z, e suffer ing, or
t hink we ar e sufft -r mg, fr om t he mo
n.t ony of t hizs at t he pr esent t une.
Tr aimng-t r ainmg. t r aining; move - mow
mot e; same mr t of t hing week aft er
week; ad o fight mx, which was what
we t hought we had been br ought ,nt o t he
Ar my for We ar e apt t o for get and if
we do so, how much mom do t he men
how long ,t r eally does t ake t o make a
soldier fit t o \ ~in a moder n war . And we
ar e ver y apt t o for get , also, t hat Hmler
once boast ed t hat ht . would defeat t he
Fr ench ar my by not at t acking h .hy
let t ing t r ut , so t o speak, m It s own
juice. Can we say t hat he did not do J ust
t hm t hix ? We must not go t hat \ vay
As a r ehef fr om t he monot ony of mew
t r aim.g, zames baw an mest inmhle
value, apar t .It oxet her fr om t he,, ,m.
PO, t a n .. m t he budding UP of a u n it s
.~lidar t t y; hut , of cour se, as many men
as possible mu>t play t hem and as
nt any officem, wit h t he me., as have not
r eached t he ~ear s \ vhen such exmt mns
ar e not r eally good for t hen cont inued
healt h Ther e m a t ime in hf. when nIS
far wiser t o wat ch such act ivit ies t h a n
t o &k. act ive par t in t h em. Eve at t h a t
t ime on e. can wat ch , cr micize, an d en
cou r age. It ,s r at h er sur pz ising how many
spor t s gr ounds oe m vimt ad see men
playmg, and playing har d, w,t hont ever
an officer even Iookmg on. You r e.hze
what a differ ence t he per sonal int er est of
an officer does make t o all of t he mens
act ivit ies. And hmv he does appr eciat e
t hat an officer should play games w$t h
him ? Ffes not a st er n cr it ic; he realiz es
justa.fuIly as d. You and 1 t hat ever y.
one ..not be fir st class, and t hat t he
mew fact t hat oe i. a of f,ccr does not
ot ecesaanly mean t ha,t oe M nbeat .
able w,t h hat or bsll. It is t he shar ing
of t hlg~ w,t h some oe t o whom he looks
up t hat be values. And, t hough it may
sound ?t r ange, ,t M t he fact t hat an
officer can ad does shar e t hings wit h his
me which does keep h,m, m t he, r eyes
espemdly, ahovt . t hem as someone t o
whom t hey look p and t o whom t hey
mt ,e t o look UP e~ m t he d,r est
emer gency. I vent ur e t o suggest t hat it
,. ,!,s+. t hm ab, bt y t o shar e our mens
r ecr wt , ons and p!easur es equally wit h
t he~~ t r mls ad t mbk+-a codit io
,, hich bas always, mor e or less, been a
ha~l~ p., t of Bnt ,sh soldt er ,ng, and is
r :,t her pechar t o t t wh,ch has acc
ount ed for t he buccess, bot h m vwt or y
and defeat , of Bnt ,sh ar m,, Let US not
for get t he t r ials aif t r oble~ while we,r e
t hmkmg of games. 1 have seen a b.t t abo.
on t he mar ch w,t h t he me ,n t he,, pla,
bat t le dr ess and full eqmpr nent and t hem
off,, ?,, wear ing wa,t er pr c, ofs ad over .
coat s; t r ue lt \ vas a t msembly damp, cold
day; but t hat is o r eason why an~ officer
shobl adver t ise t o h,s me and t o t he
WO,M at lar ge t hat he ,s less able or pw-
Pm ml t ,, endur e such mmor dmcom for t s
t han t hey ar e,
Ever yone knows t he value of sleep and
t he ,mpm t ance which M at t ached t o
.%,~bt s m h~d.,, Wh en nl~ll have had t o
n,t s. some cm all of t he sleep-t ime due t o
t hem it should he under st ood t hat \ ve ar e
r ,zht , ,nsmlmg t hat some, at least , of
t hat 1.s, should he made p t o t hem
f, on, t h, pO,t f view of E,lllg t he,,
hod,es ad m,ds r est in which t o make
sood, t o gr mv, and t o r epair br eakdown.
ht t h,s t zme of vest , t he hour s of deep,
,. t he one por t ,. of t he soldwr >s daily
l!fe which he has r eally p:wat ely, all
alone, t o h ms elf, and t hat sleep has an
added ad specml value fr om t hat point
f V,...
.,)Ia.,naaEelnet ,, is, aft er all, i t he
ma> a mat t er of det ads; and what it
r eally beds down t o ,s get t ,z t he best
h cm r an out of your mm hy doing t he
best y. poss,bly can for t hem i cdl .,..
cunlwances,
1 t he c-o, se of c,,nver w.t ,o w,t h SD
olilcm r emt ly, he t old me t hat he had
ot imd me Kr e.at differ ence bet ween thk
walad t he last ; and he ,vo,, o h,s bat .
t le dr ess t he ev,dence t hat he had ser ved
\ \,t h dist mct io bot h in t he r anks and
as an of f,.,, ,n t hat unfor t unat e d,s
t m h.nce and so mixht be held t o he just i
fied i compar ing ,t \ vit h t bls m t he mat .
t er , q.est mn. He said t hat in t he last
war t he gr eat majomt y of t he ot lker s n.
der \ vhcm, he ser ved and whom he met
wer e leader s; wher eas mm most seemed
t o him t o be dr iver s. I suggest t hat
t h ou gh a d, iver goes, nor mally, heh,nd
t hose whom he set s in movement , when
it comes t o t he r ed t r ial and t he bad
spot , t he dr wer of men is apt t o Zet a
shot in t he hack and t he leader , t hough he
be , fr ont . t o he car r ied t hmgh helI ad
hack ngm wit h t he job safely dome. I
have bee asked whet her t he pr esent sys
t em of r ecr uit ment conscr ipt ion as
against vohmt eer ing~oesn,t call for t he
dr iver r at her t han t he leader t ype of
officer . Honest ly, I fad t o see why. No
mer e acct dent of bir t hor br eeding-]et
.1.. any man-made law, can alt er t he
fact t hat a n,an,a a man for as t hat ,
which is oe of t he mmt impor t ant of
t hose t hm~s for which we ar e OW fight
ing. Does t he fact t hat a man% act ions ar e
gover ned, m t his r espect , hy t he law of
t he land r at her t han being left t o hm
own fr ee-will make him any less of a h
ma bang or less deser ving of being
t r eat ed as such; or fr t hei-, less hke]y
t o r espond t o such t r eat ment ?
As a br oad gener al st at ement , if y.
st udy hist or yr md hmgr apt iit -s as t he
most int er est ,g and possibly t he hast
\ vay of doing t hisye wdl come t o t he
conclusm t hat t he oe char act er ist ic
wh,ch ,s common t o all gr eat leader s, t c,
all r eally good sold,er s, has been not a
kno\ vledge of t act ics, not a skill in st r at
eEY, not even an abilit y t o deal wmh poli
t lclans, but simply an mt enw der .
st anding ad an mt inmt e knowledge of
t he pmvat e sold~ei-. J ohn Buchan+ has
pt t his spr enwly well in wr it ing of
J uha Byng.
CCTher eW have hem few command
er s who ,,er e mom r apt u,o,ly ador ed
by t hem men, ad xt was because of his
mch nder st andmg of humanit y, what
m Scot land IS called iner bness, and
not because of any gemal skmkess, for
he kept a t ight r ein o dlsciplie
he t alked t o ever y r mm as if he wer e z
blood r elat ion.,,
It M t he r esult of t hm t hat we see i
t hat magmfwet r et or t of Welhgt r m at
Wat er loo. That bat t le, yo W,II r emem.
her . went badly for t he Br it mh and t heir
alhes, so badly t hat t he spect at ing diplo
mat s who gat her ed md t be supr eme
st aff expr essed, i plain t er ms, t heir co
v,ct io t hzt ~t was hixh t mw t hat what
could st all be saved of men and mat er ial
should be wit hal mwn befor e it was ut
t er ly smashed. They r eceived t he blunt
Iep]y, My ar my and 1 know each Ot he,
exact ly, gent lemen. The me will do for
me what t hey will do for no one elwa>t $
And Welhngt o r ode down int o t he fight
inx squar es. Tr ue, if you like, t hat WeI1
mgt on spoke few fair wor ds t o or of his
soldier s; be may have bkickguar ded t hem
t o t heir faces, and beh~d t heir backs, in
hm or der s and m h,s dispat ches; but be
did msmt , befor e all t hings else, t hat t hey
f Bch ar ,, .3.a h ,,.Maw, 2f&f,.the. Door. Hod.
de, a n d Stouzhtm , Lt d.. 1940.
$ Hc,cr , Gmr s et t e A* I.dci-%m A mm. . Wm.
H.i.ems ., Lt d. , 1637,
88
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGEST
had what we have already called their
guns and butter.
Listen again to Wavell. >
tThe relationship hetuw+n a gemrd
and his t r oops is ver y much like t hat
bet ween a r ider and his hor se. The
hor se must be cont r olled and dwzir dined
and yet encour aged; he should, accor d
ing t o an old hunt ing maxim, be car ed
for in t he st able as if he wer e wor t h
five hundr ed pounds and r idden in t he
f~eld as if he wer e not wor t h half a
m oym. Ad t he home knows not only
by b,s own comfor t whet her he m be
mZ r ,ddm well m- badly bt be knows
if bis r ider is bold or fr ight ened, de
t er mined or hesit at ing.
Again:
t he SWXSS of a leader is t he degr ee
t o whmh he makes himself dispensable
and t eaches his dismples t o do wit hout
hnn and fend for t benmelves.$
And list en t o t hat wr it ev of t he last
war quot ed by Wavell:
CA man does not flee because he is
fight lg i an r mght eos came, be
does not at t ack because bis cause is
just ; he flees because he IS t he weaker ,
he conquer s because he is t be st r onger
or because his leader has made him
feel t he st r onger .
When you get back t o your umt s and
st ar t t alking of t h,s sor t of t hing you
\ v,ll muse t hose who will t ell you blunt ly
t hat yonve for got t en t hat t her e m a war
on; t hat whale we have st all so much t r ain.
,g t o do t her e M no t une fm- t hese high
falut in ,deasand, anyway, t hat t his is
1941 not 1914, This war is differ ent ,
I am t ir ed of bear ing t hat last phr ase
heeause so few of t hose who use n r eall?
under st and why and in what r espect t his
IS differ ent fr om all ot her war s m which
we have bee engaged. We, and ot her
peoples have been UP against wor ld
ccmquer or s and would-he-wor ld conquer .
mm befor e; and w.cb of t hem has in
vent ed,, some new weapon whlcb, when
we look at it , m bt some ew met hod of
mnploymg, ar ming, or moving t be old
weapons men. Alexander , wlt b t be
Macedonia phalanx; Caesar , \ vit h his le
gmns; Genghls Khan and Tamer lane, wlt b
$ Wedrnvood, The Rt. Hon. .1. C In a B B.C.
Rmndc,me on A,,,l 19, 1941
t heir use of amazingly mobile speed and
mass t er r or izat i ont his Panzer game
has hem played befor e: Napoleon
t her es not hing r eally new about it aIl;
we can se.+ t be pr inciples of F)eld Ser vice
Regulat ions clear ly car r wd out down t he
ages by t he successful ones. And t his m-
Iand has been invaded befor e,. t ime ad
again, and has sur vived-even gained
f, on> t hose m-deals. But what is d]ffer
et i our exper ience, at any r at e, ,s t hat
we ar e now facin~ an opponent whose
int ent ion is, and he has expr essed it
plainly, t be obht m.t ion of t he Br it ish
i w-no less. Tot al obl~t er at i on, save for
suc h few of our womenfolk as d,splay
suffmient ly mar ked Ifor dlc chal act er is
t lCS t o be wozt hy t o be used as br ood
mar es for cer t s., of his lower classes;
for t be mmaidw-men, women and chd
dr enslaught m- or st er ilizat ion and t he
sla-w labor camp. That is what we ar e up
against ad t hat is wher e t h,s war M d]f
fer mt fr om all ot her s t hat have gone be.
for e. What is going t o defeat t hat ? Ma
chines? Machines dont move t hemselves
or fight of t hemselves.
,<The man is t he fir st weapon of bat
t le; let us t hen st udy t he soldier in bat
t le, for it m be who br ings veaht y t o
,t Only st udy of t be past can give us
a sense of r eabt y, and show us how
t he soldier will fight in t be fut ur e.!]
The ccmmm pr ivat e soldwr .
Some people wdl t ell you t hat t his is
m Hygiene, which I am su~posed t o be
t eaching you, but some ot her and quit e
d, ffer ent t hing, ot my job at all. 1 would
r enud t hem t hat
c$Hygr +ne is t he st udy of man r at her
t han mat t er s. The st udy of t he develop
ment of t he soldler is mor e impor t ant
t han t he st udy of t be disposal of h,,
faeces.~
To us in t he Medical Ser vice of t he
Ar my, t he sound man, not t be sick. IS
t he Impor t ant one because, ht t le t hough
many r ealize lt or gme evr dence of so
doing at t imes, an ar my exist s t o go t o
war and not t o XO t o bosp, t al. Tbe pr e
vent ion of disease is t be lar ger pa, t of
our business and dut ies; but we must go
fur t her t han t hat t owar ds t he .<mamt en
ance and pr omot mn of healt h.
. .
IId Pm, Amksnt Quoted b, Wawll.
? Andersm, L,eutenat-Colmel 3 A . wh.
Prakaor of Mfhuw EI,aee, E.A. Med. COIL,
London 1924
.
We can go on, t oo, t o bet t er t hings t han
war ; we can t ake wit h us somet hing for
t he days t o come ma-management
t he ar t of get t infi t he besi out of t hose
placed and wor king under us by doing
t be best we can for t hem; not only m t be
lar ge mat t er s of sanit at ion and .envir on
met , housing, feedmx, clot hing, wor k,
and play: hut also, and oft en especially,
i t he small mat t ws t hat become so
lar gely Impor t ant i t he pr oduct ion of
peace and happiness. =FI.wdom fr om fear
is t he beginninx of w,sdmn.$ Make n.
m,st ake; t hk wdl be a har d bat t le if we
under t ake It .
,Tbe for ces of r mwt iqn, \ vbwh fought
DMI ael, in 1X75, will r afly t o cur t ail
bealt b act wmes m t he ft r e fcw SX.
act lr t he same r easont hat t he count r y
cannot affor d It . Those who be bewe, on,
t be ot her hand, t hat t he co,unt r y cann
ot affor d disease and deat h w,ll r e
qume t o ar m t hemselves wit h exact
knowledge of aD t he mam~old cod,
t icms of healt hy living in or der .t r a de-
ft -at t he campaign which wdl be
kmched aft er t he war t o di,ii~h t he
act mnt r +s of t he public healt h ser v
ices,~
Cant You t ake our hyg]ene of t he field
and t he bar r ack r oom, which we have
been t r ying t o t each you, on even int o
t he higher spher es of cwd .hfe, and r eahze
t hat our ,chai of infect mn sor ce
r out e-dest mat lon~can be ap-phed equal
lY t o t he social, ment al and, if you bke
t be wor d, p~ychological difficult ies of mm
fellowmen ? We ar e not just wast ing our
t ,w her e; we ca be lea, ning t be h,
est aM,s of peace t hr ough t he t r ials f
w.,
-T
When \ ve have become iwally conscm~s
t hzt no man can suffer alonet hat ever y
man,. suffer ings and pr nvmmns ar e pa, t
of t he body polit ic t hat t hey r eact cm and
1emam as sour ces af ifect mn of t he r e
nmider of b,s fellows; and when we have
per suaded our selves by bimple t r ial how
ess,ent ,ally eaey ,t m, fnwt t o mt er r pt
t be passage of an mfer t ion, t bm t o a,d
t he r ecover y of t be suffer er and t o plo
t ect t he st ,ll healt hy ~f only we wdl all
w., k t oget her , isnt t her e somet hing ver y
much bet t er t han anyt hing past which
we can put , and keep, in our view as t he
br ave new WO1Id which ye wdl r ebdd ?
89
354
Book Reviews
t h e bt a ff , , , s . an e\ B(mm,ced , <p, , , t e, of
t h e Xa zx w?n e . . <1 each I>as w,it wt ,
t h a t pmt ,m of t h e h au l< p, mt n , n mg t .
his s pwzdt y As J mu t u al J Ot I ~t M n ot
wh ich , s t ep by step, takes the .ead.r flom
t be qpr m~ of 1939, , , e. , t h e period im.
medmt e]y pwcwdmg the German inwmion
of Pola n d, p t o a n d ,n eIu d, n gt h e fn t dc
Gw,z act ion at St alin mad.
The ant her dr aws no mnelmcms,
I at her he let s t he r eader do t his fo,. h,n,.
elf, fr om t he mass of mat ewd gat her ed
md collect ed,
A, a compet ent st udy of t he for eign
pO),C,eS of OU1 Rus s ,an a~jy 2n ibe w a,
iw%ms t t h e AXIS, MI. Dalhn,s book repl e.
s en t . t , UIY wor t h \ +bde wa ,h g for all
t h ou gh t fu l pePt ,.
oI, ]y I eachible, it $, a vdu ablr mtzmate lBENTIFICATION
of Nazi-do,,lmakd Eu, op. made by ,,,,.
who we,? t hmmwhlv famdmv ,~mh lt t O
und.lst and w batltmeans t o liveunder
t he Naz, yokv.
Nt )Tfw OX CO}l BAT TRAINING
BY BRIGADIZR GENERAL Lour s R. ESTEVES,
U.S.A.
199 pages The Md,t aiy Ser vice
Puhh.hmz C. , Hai, mbu, g, Pa.
Fr om t he vat m.~ t ,iumne man al,,
pubhcat ,onb of t he Infant , y Sch. J and
Ar my CON e.pcmcfencc Co., ws Gcn,.1 al
Est t we, has COW,IIG<l a volume whmh
should pr ove highly usefnl t o officer s.
Pwt lcul.ally adapt +,{ as . ,Olil, e f ,
.t , uct iowal mat eIIaL t he book conwt s of
not es on s ubjects wh[ch C.IIIC up m the
dail.- lo.t ~c , , f t ?a m, n p of t >oop.. Th e
mat el t al H x\ .11 0, gan izcd an <! classified
an d 1eflect s t he dd,gent ,CSG,, ch an d
st uds \ vh,ch t he aut hm has put mt o ,t
SIJ }IEY RLISSIA, S IWREI(;X PIJ LICY
1939-1942
BY DAVID J I)ALLI N
452 pa+., Yale Un,v. t.rty Press,
rim. H..?

Th e open in g s en t en ce t o t he hooks in
~r oduct mn, quot wz 31I. \ Vmst n Chur ch.
ill m t hat <Russian POIW IS WI appeal m
a nwst e, y mvde an emgma . wlnh
up m one bent ence t he fwhn!xs wh t cb
for a Ion c t mw h aw t mu h led t h e FmP
h s h s pwt h ,n x <ou n t !ie.. FOI t he volicles
of t h e %v,et ~n mn t ow. , ds t be zes t of
wor ld have been at t , mt w indeed mos t
ememat ic and mccmmt ehenslhle to t h e
We% desmt e , eocat e~ assul ance~ fmm
Mw.cow ai t o t he,r u.equivocal at ur +.
Now v e ha~ e a clear and, wh~t I,
nmr c impor t ant , an object ive st udy of t hm
vast ly ]moor t ant quwmn hy, an aut hm
whose knowledge of t h e .u bde.t is PLO-
fou n d an d wh o cl! ew u pon an cn o, m. . .
b,bh oma ph y, bot h RubsIan an d n on . Ru s -
SIa, for t h e backgr ound of bm lfor ma
t ion. The r esult is a scholall y w.! k
Th e \ Vor ld,s .Miiit ar y Naval an d .$ir L, . i.
for ms , [~igia ad Flags.
, J oo Page. The MIIIt aFy Ser vice
PhhAmE Co Har r ,st ww. t %..
.
Tb,, , S a VWy wfl VOkJllltl , wh,ch
ar e compded t he nmst dat a pel tinenton
,Inlfor n,s and dmt %~ut sb,n~ imngn,a of
t he ma,ior co.t nes, Along w,t h It , t he
h adh ook ,clu des gen eral in fo, , n . t ir m,
ot h er t h a n m, h t a r y, . t h e con t r ,es
t h w>,.wl yes an d VF, y serviceable t ables of
fm ewn enu lvalent s of A,n e!,mm md,t amv
te! ma n u mb?, of t h e u r mc, Dal m;
lan gu ages .
W,t h A,ne,,ca fo, ms .e, v,g , fa,
flunx mmnet s of t he globe, t h,s handbook
,.,11 be ,velco,e t o AmIy p,, .O.I W1 a, a
) 11 uct ,~al ad t ,,,,dy gw,de.

SIBERIA
BY EMIL LENGYEL
J lli 1!:1s ,.s Ra n dom Rou w,
lx,; Yor k
&, o,,,
Em,] Le]vr yel. ,,bo ,s best know as a
wi ir e. on l n~emat i onal a,f f am I suc h
fII >t. pu h lwzt m.s as t h e XMC YO, k ra:.+
T, ,,!(s , con t ribu t es a valuable st udy on
t h,. ,,,, uo, vat r em.. He t akes t he
pekh el.
1 SAW THE FALL OF THE
PHILIPPINES
BY COLONELCAFWS P. ROMULO
323 pages Doubleday, Oman
Colonel Romulo, edzt or and r mblisher of
a lm.ge cha]n of Philiz
fwines iiewspapem,
semwd on Ger r ew.1 ,MzcA,t b,,s st aff
t hr .gbout t be L.. cmn .n a ,gn an d, be.
cau se t he J aps had a pr ice on bis bead,
was evacuat ed fr o> Bat azn t he night he
fm e lhe pwu n s la felt . This M Colonel
fbmmt os per sonal st or y of t he t r agic COD.
oest of his nat we islands. t old w,t h feel.
I & and wwd CO1O?wb, ch had pr eviously
won bxn a. 1941 Pubt zer Pwz.; It IS ab
sot bmg Imt not ver y conlfor t ~bk? r eading
The aecout bcwns wit h a .\ vt ft , e
vmw of COIO.I Rmnulos t r iu t hmch
t he m lent o t he eve of war , I{ mhkh he
cent , ast s nat ive feehng in ot he, ar ea.
\ v]t h t hat in t he Phdippmes. it deser ibm
t he c&w in .Manda bet wwen .l)ecembt w 8
an d t h e evacu at ion of t h e cit y, t h en s h] f t .
t o Bat aan and Cmr eg,dcw du! ing t be
s.r esw. It ckwas wit h a dr amat ic mmnt
of t he aut hor s mcae d, ine t he con.
defender s.
REPORTFROM TOKYO
fiY J OSEPH C. GREW
88 page. S,mon and Schust er ,
New Y., k
WHAT THE CITIZI?N SHOULD KNOV
A Bt lUT WARTIME MEDICINE
BY LIECTENAXT COLQXEL J OSEPH R. DAR
.NALL, .M. C. , ANO V. L COOPER
237 page. W. W. Nor ~n & CO ,
?$cVV Yor k, K. Y.
While t h,s wor k pvnnmily init iat es t he
mvdian mt o t he nmlt ilzt m.1 act ivit ies of
t he Medical DeIJZI tnw nt of t he Army anJ
t be count less moblems which t he Ar my
doct or is called upon t o handle, it M, ai
t be same t nne, a splendzd sour ce of in
fmmmt lon . t he subject also for nubt my
per sonnel ot he~ t han medical.
Of Palt lcldar lt er est t o t be nmlit ar y
leader ar e chavt ms deahns wit h r mht ar y
smt it at mn and hyziene. -,iht an. psy
chl at r y, communicable diseases, t he ve
ner eal pr oblem m wa, t ime. air medl.
t ine. and ot her subiect s -wh ;ch at s ome
t nne du r in g an office;5 service ma y awe
w,t hk his m. or gan izakicm.
90
Library Bulletin
BOOKSADDEDTO THE LIBRARY SINCEAPRIL 1943
ABEND. BALLET, - Pacilic Chart., 0, dest,ny m k,,,
BInBER, RAI.PI+ P. <Edtted by), The southwest Hlstorlcal Sin es . In dex
Bnmwmu, Rues.,,. Women In Battle Dress,
BOR:f:n~mJO:I&E WEVE~ C...,, A G, PmanyS, Most., p,,. III, ,,.,,
B,.,, TSODOII The M.antais Walt.
CRAP, JOHN R Second Lle.t.na.t>s Ha.db.. k,
Cur,.nt BlograPhy. Who>s News ad Why.
D,,, PALM. R. British in +he World fro,.
Federal ReP.ar4e,. SacOn.d SC.,,,, >.1, 181 F 2d
Fightlg o Gada[.ana,. 1943.
FLLWI, J.F.C M.mti G m+,... The Deci,lve Battle, of the U.S.A. Th,
military hmt.ry of the Umted states Lwtw.rn tim days of washmgmn . . .
Pemh,ng,
Glos,aw @f Abbwv! ations Used in the Br,ttsh Armed Force,. ,, >!?!...1 &
Non. OEe,d )
G..,. ,.., M , Voon.sn,, N .4. & SAIW,, T G.:ng to Off,.., Cand,da,e
Sohool. The gu,de LO mew ilk,, canal, dare school
HAM,,ow, TOMAS J. #, PPea,emer.t>, CII,,LI The Ihti<o ,wJ,nw ,. Spa,,
H, EsBE!3, Hmuwr S Subject Guide t . Reference Books
J!muow, KARL, Tho Commander and MM,,.,, S., . . . .
MACCWWAP, Jo,,., This Time F.. K.w,

M rLrTAP.Y RA,I.W A Simv,cz V S Army. - Railways .S Portugal, Spain &
Southern Fran...
MAW.,., N,,-I,01A8 Brltaw and Ireland.
MAr,ms, WILL,.,, & WSC,B, D,WJV Our Sol d,.,, Speak, q 775.~918
Mm.,,., F O Pa.a,.oow.
MY WJJ!MT, To. They Came 6, Friends.
N.>, Dmwwb,mm Unit.d S,,,.s Wars wi ,h the Barb.?, P.mve,, Vd IV
NiCOT;rlOnCES Blata French A handbook of .m.on Fmoch 1.. the fisbtuw
[) 1,,.. 1.., ,,. J s....,,, ser i i . P.ivate. 0. how ,. b a sold;.. i
t en easy lessons,
PM m,, R.,.<>,., & E,cAw,< Balcony Empire. F...],, It.ly at %.,
Politiaa[ Handbw. k of the World. 194.3
PT.m\ t, W,l .,,. hv c Map Inte,pretition with M,P A$JIlk attons.
R.> k.% QEw,. Dr.,, Rch.a,sal, The s,.,, of D,wP..
S, o,. OF F,,,). S,,,,,. The .%litical Economy of Total War Am
.,,., . $,,.,,,,.,
S,,,,:O,LWEL.AW H & T.,, ,, Gmlm?cm R United %.,,, S.,,., Sym.
S,!,,, E..,. H.,,, Char,., Carroll c. Car,olltom,
T..,, k Mllita,, E.gllsil-Ru,,,a. D,.ti.ana.y.
T,)L,,c,, us, f }rro D To I,Y.J Re.ovd
Directory of Periodicals
Included in t hu dlr eet or y ar e only t hos. per iodicals fr om which ar t icleb have
bwm sdect ed. Se? also .L,st of Pwiodt cals Indexed and Key t o Abbr eviat ions.
MILITARY AND NAVAL PERI ODI CALS
Pa,,, r., Pam
J.al t Forces C,,*A1,
GENERAL
Jo.,..) of the Un, ted 5...,,, Inst]tuuou
1...,1,, Jw.al 9,
E.(,lmml,
of Indm (G,,., Bntim Indu) v>
M ,1,,s,, h,,.., %!
F.q.l Enwwer. .TmJr.l ,Great Bnt.J,n) 92
Gen.aFaI Military
An co,.., 1, 1rdalld) 92
Defenm ,M.xm.) 92
0,......
Arms and Sewices
kmv <Irdn.nce 91
Am
Amwl.m,, , G mat B,,?.,) 91
N,..,,,,,I,
T..%,
D,. P,,n%.r,rww cGmmtmy 1 92
Reader,, D,w,,
A.I,LLEIW
S.!,.,.,, E.m,s P,,,, .
A?t,lie,mttsche Rundsthau ( Germany, 91 Sm me, Dm.,t
Navy and Marlcs
(km,, Art,lle,y Journal
Sc,.,,lh Am,,,...
F,dd Art[lle.y .loumd :; u s. A,, ser.,.,.
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles
This sect ion cat alogs t he ar t icles select ed fr om Lt br ar y per mdu=ds fr om Mar ch
15 t o Apr il 15. Per iodical. m t his cat alog m? ar r angr d alphahwic.11 y.
AEROPLANE [Great B.ltail
22 January 1943
RDmt+UWRANB Box.,... 3.,..,, rd..,] Nmola)
,, COA,T.4L co.mmw.,n
ARMY ORDNANCE
Ma,ch-AP.;l $943
TE;CAN,X:; GaoND Pow.,. L,,.,. General Leslw J
LENBLSASE Ma,., General C. M. Wemon
WIDN.4NCE m ACTION. Colonel Har oldJ . CmWa,
ART ILLERISTISCHE RUN DSCHAU lGerma.y:
January i943
WZTX A RSA.Y F,.m IIowmzmI BATTALION Bmww
CIG5STALIN LINE.
CAVALRY JOURNAL
March-April 1943
SOVXEI CAVALRY, 1918-1943. Colonel Gmeml O. 1.
Gomdov,ko>
RF.. C.. N.m
.4,. S[ ,.,,,, ,. T,. [sm.q
0,,QAN,2AT,0N cm A T.NI, /,?, Arw CMWm A. Band,k
W,i%,sR Ar, k,m ,,, S!,,,.. L,.,,, Capt.,. Shumdw
T, .8 Al.,,,, M.!,., B TrWyakov
5ALVMX ..+. S,,,,,, o, T.vk, ,. B,,,,= L,eut
C.lnd &. Afnskyk
Cm,,.., T,.,. ., Ant,-Commandos,
1 ND,>,.,,, Ass,,., .TIIA,h,w,
Tm:aN#.;onhl n ,,.,, 1 NSTP.UCTORS M al or (.,..1 S
COAST ARTI LI.ERY JOURNAL
Ma,ch.AIl,,i 194.3
&RMOn AWLCK .WD F,I!E EmEcT. (Mon.] Leon C
Den,, and 1,>,., Colonel Carl W. Holmmb
~~IT~DAu~LARDo~BmiaE, Lieu,. Cdemd Paul B. N .1s.
Me.,., Kmchko
91
MILITARY REVIEW
..
DEFEtiSA ,Msx,..l
Ma..h 7943
r, ,
T.DtFPrr ,,, km w rou,$him
,E, D,fw,, A,,. II(.I Man.,, , And,, i .,..,,,,.
ore,., ,,, I.AGB T... L,.,,.
IEl CmnbLUe d. la, Gmnde. V,,, da,i,% .,. i .,., . . .. .
C.,.,,., \ , G.,,, and h,.,., J (luam,r
T. (2...,.. W,,% MA,.,.
IL. Miq,a de Gu.rm d!. Almr,, !
John R 1...,11
n.,,.,. A..,.,, A,...,,
,I>d.,,u (. ,,. .4,, . . . . I
, L,,.., c.,,,,>,!
General
FIELD kRT8LLERY >OURNAL
AI@] 1943
THE N m T.+q!!m
Rmyrw,,o. L.+
Colonel ccmwd H 1,,,...
An,!,, sh, B,,. ,;,,,, ,., ,I,,w
AMERICAN FOREIGN
Ma,oh
SERVICE
9943
JOURNAL
T}y ~uwnm F (.(].,% !im,.t m,, ,.<>1,,.., J,,!,.
T,,>. LAW.,,. ,, ~EDFIAIA, !JomY LO, Nc>w.,,mm
19 Q L,wJt (_mIuI,adm Sam.., El ,., M m,,..
8.
RAb.:R;oOmmFljlE mm., 1<1. 1.>. $.... t J,.w, H
AMERtCAN LEGION MAGRZINE
TM! r i,,, . lc. . sr . Iw..!> C,04 Conrxl H 1 ...,
Mar.!, ?943
tNFANTRY .JOURNAL
k \ usTs.T !, T1,, c. M s,.s,
, ,s.,,
cam.,,, s,,,, ,.g pa b
AMERICAN MERcURY
AP.B1 1943
r,,, J,,,,, e., , ,$.,, AN A,,, R?,,D H,.,? J T,,>!,>,
COLLIERS
27 M.,ch ,943
JOURNAL OF THE
Fi,m,,.rrc.. l%)., CO,+. Furd
3 Aiirit 1943
UNITED sEflvlcE 1NSTITUTION OF tNDt.4
Great B,,..,. - Ind, a>
T!,, s,.,,,1.s-.,., ,.., L,, u! cW,m, , ,,
W,, A, ,!cI,,s,,!N.*,.E.
3 A,.,]
l ..
17 A..,l
1943
D,, -,
7943
F rank G.,..,,
LAST M.. 0,.
IV.! ,., L J
Husm,a L S,,
Israel,. 11
WME ls . . . . Pa,, 1 L!.!. C.1O6,1
Bay 1,,, ,, ,,,1 d ,. C..,] (,,..,
C.mmmndw Mac,.> Lw,s, and J.,M
.,! s,,.,
1. 7s3, .1, . ,. B,ucm ,3P T,,.,,,
I ..,1,,, Km.! t , 11!. ! .
> \ l.,., . , . . . =, l
0:,
HI: wkrn~,+:;:,:n$
24 Arm,l 1943
MW.RTS J MI,.J, H .,,,,, .,,(J
MARINE CORPS GAZETTE
Mam-AP r,? 7943
C05M0P0LITAN
lMDI. ,.! >, (,, >..,., ,Ti?,,, . .,; L,.,,,, ..,,, .,..,.,,
NAVAL 1NSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
APN I 1943
lrm 1,,,,,$, N A.!. r,,,. <,. s.. r,},,,.,? ( .,,,, ,,.
William D. Pui ., t.
92
Subject Index
LI ST OF PERI ODI CALS I NDEXED AND KEY TO ABBREVI ATI ONS
With the changein publication of the MWar# Reuiewfrom a qwmte?lgto a mmthlg basi s, Mai r I Arliclm and Foreign Militnrg Dzge8t8
will hezcejorth be listed in the Subject I ndtm oj the issue follow ing tiw ir publicat ion.
A O.d Army ilmlnanw
Art Rud Am,llm,,t,seho Rundsdmau ,Gmm. m,l
cav J... (%. r,lry Jour..,
GENERAL
CA Jo.. = (mat Art,ller, Journal
Am.F For Sew Am.,,,.. F.,,.,, S,r.ICeJurn.l
A Co, = An Cm.! ,, ,Iml. and,
Am,. Leg Aln.mcm Leg>. M .s..,..
Defesa De fensa , M ..>.)
Am., M.. - Am.,> . . . Mm?.,?
FA Jo, F,dd &m,llc,y .l.u~al
collie,,, cdl,..,.
l.f JO.. If!lt,, Journal
c., - C,mo.llca Jam January Jul x Jul,
Jo, USII = J.ril .1 the ;:;:! S?,,,,. 1s!,,,,.
.[ Ind,a cGmat Br!ta!
c., Hi, current !!,s,7, fell m+,..,, AW AWUM
MC G.. -. Mm,, C<,,LIS Gme, te
Fort e .= F,,., Me,, = Mer,h Sep Sept.mbc?
Harper>s - Harp..,. M.w.z,6 Arm = AIM,] OGt == October
M,! E.* M,l,, my EEI..P,
L,b L!b.rty Ma, 4.18> No -- NvmIbcT
N. 1s, Pro. Naval Ist]tte Prwedmm
Psmzer . D,, P.msFrlruPP. ,Gerrrmn>) LWC L,tc J June De. - Dm-lwr

AIR RAID WARNING SERVICE ARTILLERY
A
Bol~n~ The .cmn%-ryc ,,,.. !J.u, U\ ll (Id O.g. fzat,o. ,.6 Equipment
AFRICA
The.rn?Jown?Dt of .orma.tzilew. 1S= Mm. Artwl.
A>, mJPPmt m Tun,sm [C% Jo, Mm-APr 1943) Lmut,d .,,. d,f ,.s, , r A J.mIr M.,. AP, 19431
Sect,., M,l Re. Nay 194S1
The I.md,rzat Fedhala, Mrmmco, No>mnh., 8, 19,2
Th,e#o> mmt of mum .,t ,Ilwy. cF A Jour Am
Am., For S.,. h!., ,343,
AIR WARFARE
In the mud and blood of Tma@. ,,-.11,.,,, , ,
Tljelnm;~~ ?mP.sa and a,t,llw { Art Rund
&p, 1943)
Am summrt m Tumma ,Cav Jour Ms,. AP, 1943)
Th:8~w exPect, ., .,, m,d. {Am., Mm Agr
,), A[r.v. b.,tl.fldd ,SS, Eve Pm, 27 Mar
Rwnark, or, <.,,, .utlle,y fFA S, A?x 19431
,943)
W,,l.p,mmed c.rmmtmn bet.,? mfatry snd aFtll-
Surtns .Wm..s cL,f@ 12 Aw 19431 1,,, ( .%,, Ruml J. 1943)
Th,m .,, the ..,.,.1s Frwl.ndall (S,, E.e Past
. Battle c,f B,smmrk s.. a .,nd,mtmn of .,. defmmo
IU.S. Al? Serwcea APr 19431
Bmbiz The s,..I,I,s-P,, .,,t. (J, 11S11 0,,
20 m., 1943>
1942)
The rmmm, ,h.mdotn ,. subma,me <,arf.w (L,b
3 APr 1943)
Th. sac, .[ the fiEh, mE l%h. ,[7s May 19431
TII, s,,,, of Malt,, 1940-1982 <Rw Ens JCIUF
Ma, 19431
Smoke Eat,,,, 01 the .VY (S,,. DIE AW 1943)
SIJ,,IIg @Tenmv.s ,L,fe 12 40, lq4:+)
Org.nizato.. and Eq.lmnent
L S ,CLO.P , the Eh,nramk s,. ,1.,fe 22 Ma,
m a.,, ,..1.s, mmba, form. t!o. s [s,. Man
AM-1, S,.,>., M,l Rev M., 19%3]
Amfidd c..B,,..,Lo. d..,.w u), ,. .,s,. h, ,1, <R.,
EW Jo, - !&u 19431
M, ,UPDO,, m T..,,,. <C. S.. Mar. APr 194;)
ALASKA
Lrrt,, outpost Rat Eve Post 17 @ 1943)
Ch,n. .,, teak for<. , L,fe 12 APP 19481
7,s ,xped,,[n ,1.xf, 6 APr 194?,
Fowottm fro,. (Cdl,.r,e 27 Ma r IW?l
Hwh %ay $. Mas k. {Lib 3 Aw 194.11
,co.mstal command , ,Aem 22 Jan 1943)
M, McKmlm. <L,fe 22 Mar 19%31
. . . . . SL,,,,IZ c, ffens,m. ,L,fe 12 %W 19,8,
The CIJU.I battle of flghte, D1aes (L)b 27 Mat
AMMUNITION
CAVALRY
Rrmarhs . cows artlll<r, (FA Jo, AIM 19431
Omanlzatim and Eqir,nmt
,.hi. 8!, task f.,,. (1.;f. 12 Aim 1q43> ANIMALS C...,., ,mP1Ymm t of mmhmuzed ,monnamsanm
rh. s.,. of the 6EhmIE 19th (Cm MaY 194JI y:~yl [S?? !1., A,t,d. S..,,., M,l Rev !b%y
%dhk, f wd,w and mm .1 war rim 1Ss.. %1am
Artwk S..,*O., Md Be, May 19431
Trahlns T.c+ic,
Modem czvrdry o. t h. ?mtm. imnt ISee ,, F.ram
M,l,ta,, 11,.,s+s, S,<,!, Mtl R,. MaY 19431
AI, am. .&.,n,t rombat lorrn,,t,ns
Rod co.airy ,1-. Jur !,$a,-hw 194J)
Art,cl. SC et m. .MJ Rev May ,,,3, s a
SO[f;t$,ra.air), 1918-1943 ICP.V Jour - M=r-AIx
Am,!. OU, psc. ,s., s.. Post ,~oy?~gp
Bo,znj:g Th. mhmm,s.ty e uWIV ,).,
Trai. i n, Tact,..
For,.,,.. 1?.., troll>.,.. 27 Mar 1W81 ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE
The new ,ac,,cs , MC Gas Mzr-APr 19$31
n Ca. d?y ,,,.,,., %%3,. i W c., ? .IJ lwd)
D? f<.se iwwmt a]rmaft (D,f, s. AT.. 1,*. ?I
R.,.>.. km,T.,an,e hmnb?z c A.ro 22 J.. 19431
The S,W, f Malta, 1940-1942 R<>, F, JOUr
The ,P.w. of the figh,nw 19,b ,cm ,i,l~ay 1943!
Mar 1943) CHINA <ARMY OF)
22 Ma, U .;;4~;t my m the BBOWC!+ ma
Clwm m, ,,,k 1.,.,, ,L,k .{2 APr 19Idl
We bomb the U-R.., Pm. t%, Eve Post .27
Mar 19431
CIVILIAN DEFENSE
Loc.d ,(,<..,,, !,!m. ,,, <.., ! in C, F oh 19131
AIRDROMES
Lmnted ,,.. d, f,n,. <C 4 J., &far Aw 194?1
COAST ARTILLERY
ARMORED FORCES
AIR POWER 4r~90r,attwk -d fir. AT,.! (CA J*]w M.m-AIIr
Th~l,etng$mmt of armored mfan,r, of :,. armor+
M,,-AP, 1943> AAAs dual ml?. !CA Jmu
[See Man Artld. S,.,,, ml] 11.
A,, act,.. aw,st mmbal formw!ons ISm Ma,. May 19431
Art,.1. .%ct,m, M!l R.. May 19431
Ind,v, dual .sss1, t,.wmng. {Cm, J<,., M?,,.A,X, COMMANDOS
.\ ,, aPPmt m T.?,,. t Cab Jour M*r-Apr 19431
194s1 Cmm.,n d, and W.Z:,,S,3 [Jour US1l Ort
Battle of B,snmrdf see a v,dwat,an of .,, de f<.nw ,lrdn,nc, ,. ..,,.. ( A O,d Mar-AFo 1943)
19%2)
,11 S. A,, Ser%me, Arm 19431
Plan of msan,zat, or, for a nmd,rn mmhan,..d ym,
Germans tram ., AnthCmmandm.,, (C.. .lmur
The CO,,,,Z be,tle of !lzht., planes (Lab 27 Mar
1S., Fow>8 M>l,bary D,8wW, S,.,,, M,) Rev
Mar-AP, 19*?)
1943)
Mm 19481
The imwe, of a.,,,,.. on s.. IItwr , N?. In,,
S.,., v, Gmrnan tahs and armored ears ISW
P,.. Aim 19481
COMMAND, STAFF. AND LOGISTICS
., Fo,.wII M,htiI,y DIE-W. Swtmn. M,! R..
lnl~~a)md rmd blood of Tunis,. ( Call,,,, APr May 19481 A <omb>nvd w?..! stall {Jo!m 17S11 - OCt 1942)
The battle for Kemh lCA Jr Mar. AP, 1948, DemsMn and estmute of the a,,at,on (Defenm
Eues,sn Imw-mnw bombmz. I Aem 22 Jan 1943)
The batck. of El Alame$n {11 J., Al), 1q431 Mm 1943)
spr,ng .ffmm,.e 1Life 12 Am 1943)
The carnp.e,gn, , Rmm. (EA Jo., An, 1943, The d.vd.wmmt of combat i.,ell,wwe [See Ma>
U.1~4vjctory m the Bmma,ck ,... , L,k 22 .Mar The new ts,t,.a ,FA .Iu, A,, 1943) A,tide S?ctnon, hi?! Rev May 19431
0, AfweII battlefield. (Sat Eve Post - 27 Mar ThedHHwlt art of mmmd. lD.fmm Mar 19431
The dot ,,. of e d,vr,mn (AI [See Mm Article See
AIR RAIDS
R#*~$alrY. [C.. Jnur Mar-APr 1943) tmn, M $! Rev -- May 19481
Ty9:;)my expects an m m!d. @mer Mer API
SPwd and nu.neue,, [See ., ForwD M,l!tary DI- NwPr my ,Y lSee Ma!. Artmk Section, M!l Rev
ZSW. .%.,mr,, M ,1 Rev May 19431 May 1943]
93
MILITARY REVIEW
GREAT BRIT*IN ,r+mw orb
Th, battle .1 El Mama (lnf Jo., An, IW3,
.,c.zstal omlmlad ,, ,,4,,0 22 Jan ,94$,
The edumt,m of the nmhta,y . ...=,, (Roy Erq
JJur hf., 194.3)
Morale ,. v+, ,s,, ,.FO,WVI M,l,tti,y D,ze,t# s...
,,., ht ,l R.> May 1943]
The atam ..11 W. Cam bmk,.
sertlon, M,, w? M?,,,,,, s C
T~&~$$S~t,$Yfl,YR,:SeP Tor.agn M,ht.r, D,.
M.7 194?1
E
ECONOMICS
Th,.9,s~ r., ., ,L.,.,.. ,,,,..,,,, ,,,, ,,lg h,,,,
IN FANTRV
Command amd Stan
C.,..N of ,,, ,,.,,, ,. bat!]. ,s,,. .<ml pJ y
-F.,,.,*. M,,, L2,> r,,,,,,,. s,,,,.,,, v,, &. _
M,, 1!)43]
0.ga.lzat#on and E.q.ip.?.m
, ;,,T;;7 ,,..,, . . m ,,,,,,,
l b, I,ng JO.,
TIF:,::w w., ,,, a,m.,,d ,. f,,.,r, of ,. .,mm,,d
.
1S,, 11., ,1,,,.1. s,,,,., !.1,1 R.,
\
Ty,>:hh:iy, ply m 1,.,,, , .,,,..,
R, + ,,z M., 19*8,
M,., r.,,,.., b, .,,J., C ,,J, P,,.,,. , ,,,
c ~uF:cy,,T,y$3 ~ ,, t , , w ,p[ , ~,..,
Roy c.,
!ml.tr> d,% ,s, 15.. %1., Art,rl, S.0,., M,,
11. .- M,, 19*3 I
ttlgh ... u, ,,,,,s,. L,h
4 %,,, 19,J,
Wr:tl:pd .C,op.r., , ,.,.,, ,.fa ,,, ,,,~ .,.
( W Rnd J,. ,943,
T,?.,.,. Tact,.,
G
1?., ,1. t,ammE ,11 J,
GEOGRAPHY <M, L, TC. IW
P@ 19$31
( mmad .* ,1,. ,.,.,,, cml,pa, m baifl. !s.,
(11r9,y,r1.a ,,,, ,,,.6, Id !,,,,, 1,.. , p,,,, 2, \ ,,,, Im.>.. M,,, tmy D,,,, @,. ?,,.,, m,, M,l R..
\ T%y 19,3,
T),, ,,. ,..,,= ,F* Jo.,
APr 19431
P,.t ud. ,. ,,..,... R.z, b,,,,. ,{.,., [,=0 *L
., I, ,n,,,l l , b,.u, ,ra,., ng ..,,,,, Ns,,, i ,..k
22 \ f.,, ,9,s,
INTELLIGENCE (MILITARY,
IRELAND
Loul ,,..,,, , f,,,., ,.,,.,. ,,,. c., _ ,s1,, F,8
,! tRELAND on ,ARP.W Per,.
ilALY ARMY OF!
N.,, . m,nc,rn, ng 1 ,8,,. ,a,, k,. ,s., F ,., g. \,,, ,.
1w, IM{.,. M ,1 m. M., 19431 s mtm,
J
JAPAN <rlRMY OF,
rh. Jap,, no,. ,,,0 ,,,uzh :,..,,(. ,*,, ,) 1,!1.1. . ..!.,,,,
M ,1 lb !,[., 1943
JAPAN I NAVY OF!
TIm ,,r,t ,,., ., ,IW P.w,fi, .>,,, ,<,,, , M,. (;..
M... ,pF ,94,1)
Shi p 1,,,,,., ,. tic P.,,,,,, , Y!(; ,;,,. \ ,,m,, j,r ,,, ],
JOINT OPCRATtiONS
.1 c.r. b?ed ,m?ral ,!.I?, <J., L$S1l (J., ,s42)
JUNGLE
11s all m t)>, b.>,,k> IS<.,. M.,. A,,,?,,, s,,.,,,., ,,,,
R.. Way lv4~l
L
LABRADOR
Prelude to m,.,,. R,.) bullets ,1,,, lesson .,
.,s. mwh,b,ou, t ra,nmg enter. , N,. SW.,!+ M
M., 1942)
.M,l,ta,y w,mm,t (CA 30, Mw.AF, ,.%3,
GoVERNMENT (MI LITARV1
94
The ,I,W1OWIC,I, of mrp; wtillwy. (FA _ k,.,
APr 1943)
me wn~ioymenc or G3,D, .Ft,,,erJ (s,. M,,n *rt,c[e
S,.,,.., M d Rev May 194s,
Rmna,ka on COW, ?.,uW,Y. (FA Jo., AW 19431
Divi,b.
u
Th, a,t,vatiom of a drvmmn, [Se+ Mm .4rUde Sm.
t,., M,t R, May 1943!
The d,,t,e of , d,.,,,. C-,. [See Ma, Article Sec.
t,., M d Rev May 1943]
Mot., mv,nw. t by mgantc tranmmmatcm m the
l:~v. try d,v!mon. We Ma!. Article Section, Mil
May 1948)
Q?atlms a?ectuw the di.tsmn m .,!3..,,. e ..,,...
,s,, ,. F. X,,g M,utary Il,g=w sect<., M,i l+,,
May 1943)
LEADERSHIP
The a,tny wound forces. <A Ord Mar-AP, 19431
~$i$:;,v:: the front. 11.1 Jo, AW 194s,
1S,+ .,FCW,ED M,hta,y D,WSW SW.
,1., M,, i+. M., 1943,
LEND. LEASE
Lmd.lea,. , t ,d M.,. AP, ,WS}
.
L1&lSON
Theemp,oy,nent .,1 ..,,s .,t ,!,.,,. ISW M.,,) A,,,.,.
S(.r,,. M,, Rev May 1948,
M
MAIL
CC8cWsh,lI Ac,, 194S, !N8v 1 s, h,
MALTA
Th~lfiwo: Maim, 1340 .1942 ,Rw Enz Jo.,
MANEUVERS
WIwe yank 6izht8 wnk lLIb 24 APr 1943)
MN%
R..ord,ns mtellwme IA. ros F.b 1943)
MARINE CORPS
Th. i i ,,, yea, of ,Im Par,ht. ,,.,! .s,. (M- C,..
Mar. Ap, ,943)
MECHANIZATION
Ca:ma,l:v employment .[ mmhs!zed rocnamsance
,~a,, 1S.. h!., Arlrde Sect,.., .M,l Rev May
MEDICAL SE8V8rX
C.,=. dwaw (Roy l% Jo., Mar 1943)
HOSP1tSl dlxP. (Sat EVE PSt 3 AP, 1943)
Mediterranean THEATER
The bawl. of El Alwnam c70F J.w APr 19431
Ml LITARY SCHOOLS
Th&:a~t#l, .%wncam en>. [Sat E.. P,?,, 2
MOBILITY
MOV1 ES
Trmnrw ads. to .ml,ta,y m,tmmon ,s,, M,,
ArtIde Section, M,! Rev Map 194s)
N
!VAVAL WARFARE
An Am*ncan sub wad= Jaw.. (cm M.Y 19431
Battle of B,m,a,ck s,. a v,ndma,[o of ,$, defense
(US A,, S(v.,,oea - Am 1943)
The COm,mg ,howdc,wn ,. ,ub,n..,ne v ,a,fa,.. (Li b _
3 AL!, 1943$
READERS GUIDE AND sUBJECT INDEX
The. E%PendsblSS, keepotak,nstoll (Newwwk
.22 Mar 1943)
The fitalwmof the Pe.Ui,navalwar. (MCGW.
MaF-AI,, 1943)
J... S... A memorable .,,1 bat?!. (N.. 1s, %..
--AP, 194W
Tbl~,~tor,n mr today. (Nav In,t P,., AI),
Sh,olo,,,s,n the Pac,fie. ,.MCGIU -Mw.AP,1943,
The mdemms front [Cm His Mar 1948>
W~a2~ ,bmimmesa, edc,,w ,GoII,,.,,8 .@
NEW GUINEA
Trench %S,farv .,tlmut b,,,hfl,, y. [S(.(. OFO,,WI
M,l, twF Di .w, c,., S,,,> ... M,l R.. May ,94??)
NtGHT OPERATIONS
1.!, ,, wht cmnbat 1S,. ,,Fo,.,s. M,l,, my D,.
Wsts,, S,wm., M!l R.. May 19431
0
OBSTACLES
German mm-field, d how ,,, rmmim, ,iwm ,.
<.,.,., ,!.1,1 Ihw - AI,, 194?,
OFFENSIVE COMBAT
s., Tact,,, ( ,p.ra, m,
ORDNANCE
Ordnan,, ,. ,.,, IA {)rd -- !lar. AIM 1943)
1
PACIFIC
The,, F.xmdab!# he-non rakmEtll >Ne%,=.di
-22 U., 1947,
Th. fi,st,mmof U>. tw,fienava)tva, (MF G..
M.,. *D, 1923)
Last nmnll Wakel.land. cSat E>, PLIs, 3,10,17
.,p, 19,.31
<t, IPlos,-, tl,#Ps,,fic ,MC G,. M.mr-APr 1948)
SD7.E II,..., !L,{e 12 kpr 1943,
Lt~44g)ct.r> m tht B,mm..k m. ,L>fc 22 Mm
PARACHUTES
Fu,t ,,, n,t t , t h. ,nst?,t, (%111 .,LFw M., I!7431
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Thesac. ofkh?li8ht, ng IWh (Cm May 1943>
PHOTOGRAPH V
T.,, .?xPe&,,m ,1,1. 5 APT 1943)
PHYSICAL FITNESS
B3t?l<, t..mlz <lnr J.ur APT 1943)
P,elud, to ,.,, R,,.] bullms enforw 1?ss. at
,,rmy amph, bmus ,ramm.a mnmr. ,Ne. mvwk
22 Ma, 19,3,
POLAND <ARMY OF,
Fur,..t ht,s,le 8, Rud.I Talbska 1 Folmd 1S..
,Fo,e,LT M,l,tary Dw@# S,.,,.., >M 1 Rev
Ma, 194J]
PRODUCTION (WAR)
Remington Arm,. Ther!st, [th?frtma ,Fort?
APF 1943)
PSYCHOLOGY <MILITARY]
il,?Ja~a.?s:,re t.ush lS.PMaIXI hr?,.l~S@mn
%ld R,. Ma, 1s,31
l%~;:;wj for the fi~hww man, (1[ Jo., AIX
Q
QUARTERMASTER SERVICE
Food mamr ! ,be army (L, b 10 A,>, 1I$J,
M, McK,nl.y ,1.,1. 22 %1., 19$3,
Highway, Military Roads
H,~hwwtr, A1a,ka. ,L,b --3A ,19431
Them>!,tiry ro%dto A!aaka. ,~lEn, A,,,,,,)
Railways
G,rm,y,,, ulnembl,,pot ,SC, D,~ M.aY 1948)
RUSSIA
Th;9~:cmt of R.,,,, at,eg,h ,S,, D,g hlsy
RUSSIA <ARMY QF,
Arttllery m mmnba,m thest,e.m olSLai,ng?.d. ,S,,
.V%,FJKII M,l,ta,y LhzestJ, S,,,,., M,, l?.?.
May 1943]
The b&tLle[o, Kerch. ,cAJc,u, Ma,. AD, ,w&
Cs,m~I~W o the Sm.wt [,.., ,M,i h. A,,
SEA POWER
STATE GUARD
StaRt,vgnard t,a,nmz 1S.. MAI. ,%.t<dr S..?mn, kl.1
Ma, 1943!
SUPPLY
Not., on .),., warfare , th.l,., ., ,s.,
Main Art,cWSmt,w,, M>l R.. May 19431
0~g4ArICaII battlefield <Sat EVC Post 27 Ma.
SalvaWad auP Iyoft.ank, l battlr ,C.. J,
Mar-&Dr 1948 7
T~94.w o the sa)vwe fro, (J.., L,S1l n.,
5URPR15E
Takambuahm. ((... Jour MaPAPr 19431
T
TACTICS OPERATIONS
Defensive Combat
Th,~4~)PhWmmtOf ro,p, a,t,t! e,> ,F,%J<NI,
AP,
Offenswe Combat
A,. . . . . . . warat combat fammt> . K+ M.,
Art!ek S,,.tmn, M,l Rev May 19431
The battl, fw Kemh ,(-A Jo., Mar.,@ 1943)
Th, bz,,i. of El kk.me, r.. ,11 Jo, APT 1943)
TbecamLw,i~e,n Ruesta cFAJw- AIIC194V
T$ee~,PIwmvtof .mwsmhllw, iFAJour Am
special Warfare
Artillery >ncombat enthestrw& of Stal,nErad 1S.,
,,Fo,.,KD M,l,tmy D,wsti, Seek,,., Mtl Rev
May 1943
&
AN KS
1ERRAIN
T,mk am bu,h,., ,(%, J.u, \ far.,ip, 194.3}
1rRANSPORTATlON
u
JNITED STATES ARMY OF)
command and staff
N..,, say 1,, [S., M., 1,..1. Sect,., ?.3,1 R,,
u,, ,W7]
The,, .,,. the G,.,.,1, I%,!+ ,Sat E? P,,
10 APr 1943)
Ih.,?,ro, h,wm.ra,s - Fr,.&ndail ,s., E.. Pa,,
20 %1,, 1%4?1
school,
Thea.,ma,,m .1. d,,., L%. m, A,,, P,. S.,.
u., M,[ R, hf.> 19431
Prelude ,. ,,,,.. %.1 bdl ,t , eimr+$vkat
army alph,bmm ,,.,,.. ..,.,
22 %., 1943>
Tr,m,ng a>d, to m!l,ta,, mntru?tm 1S., Man
,i ,t , d, S,.,,.., M,l R,. hr., 1%%3)
T,.,., Iw rn,lx tar> ts,ru.t<>m <[-q, Jmir - Mar
AP, 194?1
S. F.PI,
Food mug!. m t h. arm, ,L,b Ill A, 194?1
TFa3nig T,.,,.,
Th. act,. atmm .[, d,. mon IS,. M:un lrlKl.Ser
,,, bill R.v - MtI, 19$31
I%, tm,,,=m,ndfwrm. x4(1Td Mw.A~S:34~,,
H~o,y b. h..lthy thagh ,h,bwe.ked
20 M.r194sl
1n~9y$,ual combat ,,,,.,.s (MC Gaz NiI,-APr
L.ader,hipat tbefrot I1ni J.r A@, 19431
Tra,,E ad, to 17uM.w m,tructm.. lSee Main
.ATt,.)eswt! .11, Mll n,. May 19431
Unarmed oR,..,. ,$nf Jo, -.40, 1943)
W;9b4.3yb t h. ~-Bat P@s ,S.t Eve Pm-Q 7M. T
VJh.rcyak %ht,wk bLIh 24 Aor 19431
iJNITED STATES (NAVY OF)
0rgan3z,tion end ELIdtmmnt
The.m,,cmft camwr. The backboeof serc-wa Iar
,.,, ,MC G,, M.,. AL! ,19431
The Exnendabl-.,ke eponmkr&tdi, [Newsweek
22 Mar 1943)
95
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WAKE ISLAND
Last man R I\ k. Id.,r,d <Sat EL. P.,, 3, 10, 17
Ml, 1.,,.4,
WARS
l - 1
I
WORLD W4R 11 (7939.
1
1- _.. . 2
A,, 1. Wpp.r, 7..,.).!. ,,... JO., ?.18, ,,>, 1,,<,
MILITARY REVIEW
.%,.,<. OQIO,l. (Sat Eve Pmt 17 Am 1948 I
The battle for Kemh. {CA Jo., Ma,-A,, 1943)
Battle .1 B,,nmrck .,. . vmdmatmm 01 arc defew
(U.S. A!, S,,,.- - AD, 1948,
The battle of El Alam.,m. (1.! Jour APr 1948)
The camDa,Es m Rwsm. ,FA Jou, .@ ,943)
Chum .,, t.,k force [Lrfe 12 APr 1943,
The CC,III,W ,hcm,dmv. m .ubmar,n, wart.,, ,L,b
3 AP, 1943)
The fir,, ,,s, of the Pac,fm ,m.n, war. {MC G,.
hisr-APr 1943)
Form, battle at Ruda T,lubska , Pol.nd 1S.. ,,~a;
,,,. M ,I,tary D,gew, s,.,,.., M!i R.,
,..,,
....
Hand,,n& fe,dmg sd care of ma, dam IS., Ma,.
4,,,.,. section, M,l Rev Ma, 1943]
In th~ mud s.d blood of Tun,ma ,Colherk -- 17
APT 19481
Th~~~@m#w .,? tough 1S,, Ma,. Art,.k S.,,, .,
May 194s!
Ja~roea : A mmnrable . ...1 battle. , N. 1.s,
A!J, 19431
l% ,.,KI,w a, Fedhalz, M......, Xwmbm 8, 1942
CA,!,., !7<>, se, Mar 19431
Last m,. OU W.1+ 1,1.nd (s., c., Post 3, ,0.17
@ 194.?)
Ih,, PW ,,.,,,s ,FA Jo, AD, 1943)
( 1, Afr,can battl,lwld ,S,( r.., Po,, 27 M,,
1..,
Sh:~4&es , the Pac)fic. [MO 0., M,,.&Dr
The meze of Malta, 194P $942 (Roy E,w Jour
Ma, 1948)
SPnnE 05en9!ea (L>te 12 Am 1948)
Tr<ch wmfaw v/,,hmm ti,ibility. [See .<Pore, .
M,Mary D>mats,, Sect,,, M,! Rev May 1943
f
T,, exwd,tmn. (L,fe -5 An, 1949)
The underseas f,., (Cur His - Mm 1943)
U.1:4ictmy t the B,mnamk wa. (Lie 22 Mar
WE6PON5
me army ground form, (A clrd Mar-am 194s1
The W- t.cum. lF.4 Jour Am 1943)
Ordnance m XWOn (A O,d MP.r-Aw 1948)
Red cavalry. (c., JO., Mar-ALw 1948)
Rsnn%tm A,IES The ,IW of the f.xemr,n. (Fmtum
APr 1943)
S,lf.P,WJelled 8. nmuma, fSee ,, Fo,ew, M,hta,y
Dwati, Sect,., M,] Rev ?&y 1943]
tilTHDRAwAL
Thl@@y)PIWmmt .1 w,,P, .,,,11..,. , FA Jo., A L,,
S;w&walm. 1918-1943 (C. JoUr M.,-Aw
Speed and I.,.,, [S,0 ,Fo,,,gn M,l,tary D,
P!QSLS,,SWW, M,l Rev May 19431
Tact,- f ,etreat,tw Gem!. its [SW ., Fc,r,iw,
M>l, td,y D, Bwt. S,.,,, M,l l?,. - May 194S]
96