CHAPTIR THREE

(()lill)lc\itv.
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l " orrrr Ilrrrl prcvcnts us fr()ur l<nowingi the worlcl in its lLrll
I

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

l'lris vicw, whiclr parallels that of Greenberg in many ways, emerges writi rrgs'f vladimir Mayakovskg Sergei Eisenstein, Bertolr Brecht, l'rrvir I)iscator, Dziga vertov, and Aleksandr Rodchenko. However, whcrc cirecnberg's writi'g reflects a basic skepticism about the redempr iv. 1'r<lwer of mass culture, the poets, photographers, and filmmakers of t lrc 1-r.strevolutionary period share a more optimistic, and nuanced, persPcctivc. They establish a crr-rcial distinction between mass media, such ils nr:linstream cinema, advertisilrg, newspapers, and radio, arrd forms of lropul:rr culture or revolution ary artthat are generated by or for the workirg class. one of the chief effects of mass media is t. prornurgate rulingclass ideals under the guise of entertainment and disinterested journalr t lrc

CRTHOPIDICS AND AESTHETICS

"'rr*-., tion in the cultural and political ferment sur:rounding avant-garde art i' (iermany and Russia following the First v/orld war. The formalist ringr-ristic theories of viktor Shklovsky, Roman Jakobson, and osip Brik cxcrcised a significant influence on poets, filmmakers, and photogrnph.r, rluring this peri.d. In Shklovsky's writing we encounter the characteristic call to make art "difficult": to thicken a.d complicate its formal apl)c:rrrl.ce in or:der to focus the viewer's attention o. the materiality of l'rrrq.agc itself. This is necessary, shkrovsky believes, because our de-

forrns of understanding

in any attempt to represent an cxtcrnal reality, or even to inrrok. that reality as a shared fran.re of refercncc with the viewer. If art is to "communicate" anything, as Bersani ancl r)r-rt'it point out, it is the fail, ur:e of communication itself (or perhaps the identity of the artist as the o'e best qualified to diagnose trris failure). But what happens afrer our faith in conventional meaning has bee'r shaken? Do.s G work of art leave us to wander, skeptical and disor:iented, through the modern forest of signs, or can the assault on conventionar knowredge catalyze

entailed

poLrncs oF ,HOCK From clive Bell's attack on representationar "pseudo-art," to clement Greenberg's fear of kitsch, to Michael Fried,s condemnation of the salacious "theatricality" of minimalist sculpture, modern critics have displayed a singular hostility ro artworks that solicit the viewer's interaction in a direct or accessible manner. The purpose of avant-garde art, in this view, is to point to the inevitabre compromises
THE

fro.r Brecht's writing, encourage the to suspend disbelief irrcl prrssively absorb the (typically con, scrvative) values of the playwriglrt. l{cvoluti.nary theater, in contrasr,
rrr-rdience

isrn. stage piays, to Llse an exzrmple

a'd

new

ap;ency? \x/e

find one

to thi, q,r.r,

social and political world inhabited by the viewer. Moreover, the aesthetic is not defined as a (potentially) universal mode of experience but is differentiated relative to one's social position. The factory worker, for example, has a much greater stake in challenging the naturalness of the bourgeois worldview portrayed in the mass media than the wealthy banker whose contingent reality it represents. In contrast to the quietisrn and withdrirwal that we encounter among American painters in the postwar peri.d (Rothko, Newman, etc.), avant_ garde artists during the rgzos acivcly engage rhe viewer, freely employing technologies and mode s of presentati()r associated with mass meclia and entertainment (e.g., Brecht's use of sportirrg motifs, stock market prices, and news stories in his plays or Piscator's i'novative use of film projection techniques).2 Key to their work is the experience of "shock," which can be produced by something as si'rple as seeing a city street from a new perspective (as in Rodchenko's photographs) or as complex as Eisenstein's montage techniques. \fhere Bell, Greenberg, and Fried describe

litical life. Mass rnedia are conden'rnccl, not lrccrruse thcy sig,nal thc 6:r<] taste (or limited leisure time) of the w.rking class, but bccr.rrrsc thcy sr,rp, press working-class consciousness of the operations of s'cial powcr. In this view the capacity for aesthetic discrimination is not an encl in itself but is linked to a more expansive critical capacity focused .n rhe br.ader

leads viewers to actively question thc rncanings rctrrrcscrrtcd onstage ancl to extend that critical attitr,rcle fo rhc valrrcs tlrcy cncorrntcr in ciaily po,

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of shock becomes the catalytic agent for a "heightened presence

wlrat is startling."3 And for N7alter Be'jamin, as David must be "snatched from the false context of the his'bjects t'rical continuum" so that we "confront them with surprise and shock.,,4 Here aesthetic shock or dislocation counteracts the false realitv c.nveyed by dominant cultural forms.5 Although it operates in a somatic or [''odily regisrer. its effecrs are nor purery physicar. Rather. the experience lirisby n<ltes,
o?

il l)r()(('ss olr"rtlit'lt:ttiorr" irr which tlrc sl'rcctirtor is "rro longt.r rrll6wccl tr strbrrrit t. lrr cxpcricrcc urcritically" s, tl-rat..what is..atural, rnust
hrrvc tlrc

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througlr clialogr-rc cxtcncled over time. But a commitment to dialogue, ncl nri-lttcrr how self-reflexive, signals the reliance of these projects on some conlmon system of meaning within which the various participants can speak, listen, and respond. And this in turn brings us back to the longestablished resistance in the modern and postmodern avant-garde to any concept of shared discourse. It is necessary, then, before elaborating my model of a dialogical aesthetic, to explore this resistance more fully. I focus here on the work of Jean-FranEois Lyotard, who provides one of the most thoughtful contemporary expressions of the avant-garde critique of discursive meaning.
LYoTARD AND THE

framework through which the viewer can comprehend the underlying connection between events or conditions (the inverse ratio between corporate layoffs and stock values, for exampre) that would have previously
been less comprehensible. Despite these obvious differences, the.. n.. "lso important similarities between this view and the perspective of Greenberg or Fried. In each case the aesthetic is defined n, i-ro.diate (prediscursive) somatic experience (a shock or epiphany) "r, that is only subse, quently "made sense of " in terms of an existing discursive system (the hierarchy of great art for Greenberg or Fried; ihe political analysis of capitalism for Benjamin). In each case emancipatory aesthetic knowredge is equated with that which is prior to or beyond shared discourse. Moreover, both of these perspectives appeal to an immed iacy, a simultaneity

aesthetic shock not by abandoning ourselves to the preasuies of ontic dislocation but by renewing, and expanding, our efforts to grasp the com_ plexity of the surrounding world. "Alienation, " as Brecht writes, ,.necis essary to all understanding. " 7 Thus the experience of shock (which is necessary to overcome the anesthetichaze of modern life) is followed by a reconsolidation of the subject around a heightened capacity to perceive the hidden operations of political power. It provides a new discursive

as Benjamin contends.6 N7e meet the epistemological challenge posed by

mind,,'

suBLlME For Lyotard, discursive systems of meaning, embodied in the realist tradition in the visual arts' are irrevocably compromised by their association with a conventional reason, which negates or ignores experiences that cannot be ar:ticulated through a fixed set of conventions. How can the academic painter, steepcd in the static traditions of neoclassicism, ever hope to capture the ephemeral effects of light and space so eloquently revealed in a canvas by Monet? Lyotard will turn to the concept of the sublime in order to elaborate his opposition to realist discourse. In Enlightenment thought the sublime experience is differentiated from the beautiful by virtue of its overwhelming (and potentially life-threatening) power. The sublime exceeds our capacity to measure, categorize, or understand, and, importantly, it reduces us to mute awe (it silences our ability to communicate). For I(ant the sublime is specifically associated with the experience of nature (ocean storms, deep canyons' vast waterfalls, etc.). Lyotard links the sublime in the eighteenth century with the gradual erosion of the ideal of an aesthetic "common sense," embodied in a set of rules for addressir-rg a discursively integrated community of listeners.

ofexperience (cf. Fried's "presentness"), as opposed to an aesthetic experience defined by duration (although Brecht's work clearly complicates this description). In this sense Greenberg's and Be'jamin's descripiions of the viewer's response to avant-garde art mark two ends of a continuum within modernism.8
As I have already suggested, the dialogical projects of v/ochenKlausur, I-acy, and others build on this tradition through their interest in

lcrgirrg fixed identities and perceptions of difference. At the same time, tlrcy c.nceive of the relationship between the viewer and the work of art 11.itc differently; not simply as an instantaneous, prediscursive flash

chal-

of

According to Lyotard the sublirne rnarks the initial expression of a fundamentally new view of the function of the artist and the effect of the artwork on the viewer. Specifically, thc sr,rblirnc replaces a rhetorical aesthetic based on shared discourse with an aesthetic based on somatic shock. The shock of the sublime is not the precursor to a heightened capacity for critical differentiation; rather, it is in and of itself valuable. For Lyotard this experience forces us to recognize the lirnits of our cognitive knowledge and exercises a chastening effect on the arrogant and totalizing drive of reason.e In contrast to Schiller's classic formulation of the aesthetic as a mode of experience that can restore ontological wholeness

DIATOGICAL AESTHET CS

DIALOG CAL AESTHETICS

i n re srity to a hurnanity torn a sun cler by the forces of modernity, Ly,r:u'tl rrclvocates "ontological dislocation" as a therapeutic antidote to a
.

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(l

r('ntcrccl and dominative Cartesian iclcntity. l0 l,y.tard offers an i'rportant rearticr-r[ati" fornralist, avant-garde rrrt. The task of advanced art is not simply trl'freveal the limitations of conventional r:epresentational systems (throLrgh tlre poetic torsion of lingr-ristic or visual material, as in futurism, cubisnr, ctc.) br,rt something far rrrore ambitious. It will represent the "r-rnpresentablc." It becomes the one site in our culture at which the "excess," thart which is beyond disc()urse or untranslatable into discursive form, is given refr-rge: an enclave in which the differend, to use Lyotard's rerrr, can be preserved and cr-rltivated.ll Lyotard's use of the concept of the subli'-re, however, elides tl're obvious differences between a raging cataract or bottomless chasm ilnd a painting in a museum. The sublime experience produced by an overwhelming force of nature is unproblernatically shifted ro olrr experience of a specific fabricated object that challenges our preconceptions about works of art in general. But the most powerful expressions of the sublime in eighteenth-century thought :rre associated with experiences in which we perceive the possibility of physical danger and c.me face to face with our own mortality. (Kant and Burke both note thar one's proximity to the sublime catalyst must be precisely calibrated; if you step too close to the edge of the Grand canyon, sublime awe simply beco'res terror. ) rvhile I rnay have spent a few tedior-rs afternoons in art galleries over the years, I have yet to encolrnter a work of art that threatened n1y very
existence.

I believe that Lyotard, in his concern to guard against the dominativc powers of unbridled reason, unfairly clismisses :lll forn'rs of disctrrsivc interaction. He c:rn conccivc of comnrunicrrtion only as an "agonistic" contest: "to speak is to fight."tu For Lyotarcl spccch can function only in one of two ways: as a form of intersr-rbjectivc conflict rrncl potential negation or as an aesthetically playful (and esscntially solitary) clomination of language itself, a kind of forr-nalist man iprrla tion of lingir istic or literary form for its own sake. The general nlcssrrgc irrrplicit in thc writings of Lyotard (as well as figures such as Clillcs l)clctrzc) is thrrt rrt thc core of our identity as conscious, volitional subjccfs witlr tlrt'crrpacity frlr cliscursive interaction is an intensely fearrfLrl, rrralcvolcnt, arrd clcfcnsive force, which can be held in check only by thc litcrally sclflcss, uondiscr-rrsive powers of the body. Whenever we engrrljc in cliscur:sivc inter:rctior-rs, speech acts, or other forms of cornmunicirtion, this Darth Vaderesque dark side threatens to come to the fore, schcrning to rnaxinrize its own evil self-interest through the conceptual rregation :rnd assimilation of the clther. Art, for Lyotard, is e serniotic zero-sunr game: thc artist "wins" when the viewer is deprived of as much of the framework of shared discourse
as possible and left epistemologically bereft. But Lyotard takes for granted the kind of relationship between viewer and artwork that is implied by both "realism" and "experimentation": a relationship in which
the viewer consumes an experience produced a priori by the artist. The only parameter open to question is the precise ch:rractcr of this encounter (easy vs. disruptive). There is no recognition that it might be possible to redefine the relationship between artist and viewel that is implied in both of these approaches and to anchor discourse not in some fixed representational order but in a process of open-ended diarlogical interaction that is itself the "worl<" of art. I have thus far identified two general modes within the broader tendency toward antidiscursivity in modern art and art theory. (It must be noted that there is significant movernent between these two positions, often by the same artist.) The first is a modality of indifference (epitornizcd by Fried's "authentic" work of art, or by Rothko's or Newman's patier.rt anticipation of the viewer-yet-to-be who is sufficiently evolved to rrppreciate his work). The second is a modality of engagement and theatricrrlity (as in the work of Brecht, Vertov, or Rodchenko). lVhereas I{otlrl<o or Ncwman considers the perceptions of actually existing vicwt'r's ,rs l,rrrcly irrclevant to his work, the tl.reatrical appro:rch proclrrccs its ,,rvrr liirrtl ol'rrcsrrtion. Spccificrlly, tlris wrlrl< is pronc to whrtt I'vt'rlc' s, rilr,,l .ls ;rn "or-llropt'tli.'" rrt'sllrctic, irr tlrlrt it cottt't'ivt's ol lltt' r'it'r,vct'

Ly.tard has difficulty providing a persuasive accolrnr of the actual effects that "sublime" works of art have on a viewer. Moreover, he overl.oks the extent to which we are already prepared to perceive anomalous .b jects by the institutional frame of the museum or gallery. \fle ofren confront anomalor-rs objects in daily life, but they do not necessarily precipitate a full-blown ontological crisis. How, then, do we cross the lir-re frrrrrr sinrple confusion to a consciousness-altering encounter withthe diff

t'rcrttl? Fr-rr:ther, in the history of the avant-garde, the "unpresentablc"

rrl'vrrys, incvitably, becomes the presentable-that which dislocates ancl r('iects treclition becomes tradition in turn. For Lyotar:d, as f<lr (irccrr

lrt'rg, rtrt is caLrelrt in an eternal treadmill of (forrral) inn<lvirti.,rr rrptl ,rssirrrilrrtiorr. Morcovcr, to thc crtcnt that r-rlr appropr.irrtivc consciorrsrrt.ss Itt'tls .tt tlillt'rcrrcc, thc avrttrf-srrt'rlt' worl< of rrrt crrtls up srrpplvirrri tlris rcr'\' tt rrtlt rrtr, (t.rrrlrorlit'rl irr tlrt'tlisr.our-sc ol rrr-l lrislor.),), rvitlr its irriti.rl lriss'rr ()l r'( \i\riur(( ;urtl ils ('\/('nrlr:rl tonsrrrrlrrrorr .rs lr.ilir.tl srt lt
.

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all around."la This belief that the viewer suffers fr.m an epistemorogical lack that will be corrected by the artist brirgs the orthopedic aesthetic inro surprisirrg proximiry ro rhe rheroric of rrdverrisirrg, which O;;",,r;; access to a more prestigious or enlightcnecr "l;;;;, s,ciar identity
of consuming the work itself. \fle are thus rcft with eirher conremp, io. at . viewer ("The ar:tist deserves to be belligcrcnt ro the r-najority,,,as David Smith writes) or an evangerical su;re .i,>rity trraf c.nceives
these artists seek to activelyprodr,ce hi..r

theatrical and indifferent m.des I outlined above. ,.It is our function as a.rtists, " according to Gottlieb, Rothko, and Newma' irr rqa3, ro _nt. the spectator see the world our way, not his way.,,13 And Albert Gleizes and Jean Metzinger, in Du Cubisme (r9rz), acknowledge that the ,.ultimate end" of art is to ..address rhe masses,,, but only ..;;.;;;;;_"r., to dominate, to direct, and not in order to be understood. . . . The artist who abstains from any concessions, who does not explain t_ri_r"f who tells nothing, builds up an internal srrength "rra whose radiance shines

thc lrapless modern subject. And second, there is the assumption that the arrist is uniquely suited to both recognize this defect and ,;;6 it. It is interesting to note that this rhetoric can cross the division between the

.t',.ur iltlt(.rt'lrllt, ll.rwt.tl sillr;t.t.t rvlr,,:;,, 1)r.l((.1)ltr.tl :rIP.rr:llUs t.(.(llilt.(.s (()tt(.(tt{)l. lll(,t-(.:u.(. lw() r.t,l:rtt.tl rtssun)l)liorrs lrt,rt.. l,,ir.st is tlrt. lrt.licl llr:tt llrt'vit,wt'r-'s r.()ll,tttvc,1. 1.'i511.;111;lrgiclrl ()ric'tilti()'t. thc w,rltl rs s,rrrrt'lrrw cle fcctivc.'r-lris capturc, o lr,,.ia truth: we are surr.rrrrclccl 6y lrr''.('rroric c.lfural systerxs (in the mass media, jour'alism, .t.. jt[.,"t lrt'rrvily biased by political ideologies. At "r" the same time, this .rthopedic preserves the idea that the artist is a superior being, abre to 'r'icrrati.n ll('rlctr:lte rhc veils of mystification that otherwise confuse and disoricrrt

r,vt.tlt'lirrt.:rs tlillt'rt'nl :rrrtl irrrplicitly thlt':rtcrtirrtr t() ()trr owrt static st'll' itrrrrgt'. Art crtrt irrrlectl challcrrgc olrr pcrceptiotls tlf diffcrcrrcc, llttt, lrs I Ir,rvt' strl3gcsrecl, this challenge can aiso entail the paradoxical negation

,rf thc vicwer irs a unique individual. Further, as a framework within which to underst:rnd dialogical art practices this avant-garde tradition hrrs sorne significant liabilities. First, it promulgates a relatively reducr ive rrrodel of discursive interaction bcsed on a neoromentic opposiriorr between mind arnd bodS reason and desire, and somatic and cognitive experience. Second, it restricts the definition of aesthetic experience to moments of immediate, visceral insight. And third, it is based on the essentially solitary interaction between a viewer and a physical object, providing no way to comprehend the creative dimension of communal or collective processes. Is it indeed possible to conceive of an emancipatory model of dialogical interaction? And is there a way to understand this dialogue as a form of aesthetic cxperience? I will begin to answer this question in the second p:rrf of this chapter.

DIALOGICAL PRACTICIS

in the requisite act of consumption. Rarher tr'rln wirit for the ideal viewer,

if they engage

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r.rcr

thr'r-rgh,t.."p..i.rr..
of the viewer

AESTHETIC 'l lrt' cortcr'pt oi acsthctic cxperience developed by early modern philosophcrs sttclt ,ts liattrllgrtrtcrl, l(atlt, irnd \Wolff is defined in terms of a p<ltcntirrl corrrrrrrrrtic:rbility thrtt is tl()t necessarily related to works of art pcr sc. Iior hrtttt rtrt :tcstllctic cxpcricnce is as likely to be triggered by a seashcll or rt gt'rrtttirttrr rls it is [y a Rembrandt. It is Hegel, as Anthony Clascartli poitrts ()trt, wh() tt:rrrows the definition of the aesthetic to "a specilic clrtss ol obiccts thilt are regarded
THE SpECtFIC:TY OF THE

as a subject-to-be-transformed 1f<rr .r ,rr.,rc rcccrlt exalnpre, consider Richard Serra's definition of his w.rk rrs trrc creatio, of ,,behavioral space").1t In neither case is the ar:tist c()rfcrt t() cngage with the viewer a' he or she acrually is. here antl rr,w. rhr.t,rrrh , ,:.;;;r., ;;;.,lfrL.rr_ tive interaction. I have outlined the gradual cons<>ricrati'. i. rnoder' a'd postmodern art theory of a general consensus trrat thc w'rk .f art must qr.rtro,, rundermine shared discursive cor.rvcrrri,rs. This rr", pr.".a"r.d ," durable because the dynarnic it rirrgcrs crrtinues 'roder to operate in our curtllre' as we impose reductive stere()typcs or pe.pre ."p.ri.rrces

as culturally fashioned objects."l6 [Jr'rt hrtw, prcciscly, flrc we to differentiate these objects from objects in trrrfLtrc. ()r cvcrl lrorn other objects fabricated by human beings but not rrcccptetl rls "rtrt" ? The answer provided by modern art theory, as I have suggcstctl, hrts lrcct.t to consistently

define the aesthetic through its dif{erencc fnrrrr tlontinant cultural forms, leading r-rs to Lyotard and the aesthetics oi thc dil'le.rend.But how can indeterminateness, or resistance t1l fixity ancl clcfirrition, become a "definition" or a determinant condition of art? From one perspective we can understarrtl thc wrlrk of art only as the

"r.J

that

product of a given cultural and historical cotltext (modernism) and a specific discursive system that construct the catcllory of "art" as a repclsitory for values (creative labor, noninstrurner-rtality, nondiscursive forrns

DIALOGICAL AESIHETICS

D ALOGICAL AESTHETICS

.f crrpitrrlist labor or as a I.vcly addition to my penthouse decor has everytlri.g to do with rhe co'fext in which I am viewing it and my own kn.wlc-dgc of art history. At thc same time, the work of art is presented as ar-r object that rejects continge ncy and frllstrates the grasp of discursive systems of kr-rowleclge through its relentless formal self-transformation. Thus formal meaning, which is i^ the first instance contingent and context dependent, becomes in the second instance the emblem of an immanent, autonomous (and ahistorical) drive toward flux and differentiation.
irs ir protest against the dehumanizing effects

rclati.nship to specific cultural moments, institr-rtionirl frames, and prec.tli'g artworks. Thus whether I "recclgnize" a Barnett Newman canvas
irr

,,1 lirr.rvlcclge, ctc.) actively suppressed within the drminant culture. 'llrt'rc is .othing inhere^r in a given work of art that allows it to play tlris r,le; rather, par:ticular formal arrargcments tirke on meaning only

STEPHEiV WILLATS AND THE AUDIENCE AS RATI]NALE

A pre-requisite for an art work that narriicsrs

rr

coLlnter-collsciousne ss is that t]re scparlrtiorr wlticlt exrsted between the artist and thc:rrrclicrrcc is closttl,

t;

that they become rxLltllally engrrgccl, to lhr, l.xrint rvlrt'r-t the :rudience become the rationrtlc irr both Iht' rrr,rliirrg :rnd leception of the worl<.
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The challenge that the aesthetic poses to fixed categorical systerns and instrumentalizing modes of thought is irnportant. At the same time, as I l.rave argued above, the te'dency to locate this principle of indeterminirteness solely in the physical condition or form of the work of art prevents us from grasping a* irnportant aspect of performative, collaborative art practice. An alternirtive appr.ach would require us to locate the moment clf indeternrinereness, of opcn-ended and liberatory possibility, not in the perpetually changing form of the artwork qua object, but in the very process of communication that the artwork catalyzes. This requires two important shifts. First, we need a more nuanced accou't of c.mmunicative experience: one capable of differenriating between en abstract' objectifying mode of discourse that is insensitive to the specific iclentities of speaking subjects (the kind targeted by figures such as Ly.t'rrcl) and a dialogical exchange based on reciprocal openness. This disti'ction, between what Jirrgen Habermas terms an "instrumental" and rr "cornmunicative" rationality, is typically collapsed in moclen-r and post, m.dern art theory. The second important shift requires that we understard the work of arr as a process of comrnu'icative exchange rather thrr' rr physical object. In this description visual art the c.r"pp.,rn.h., cliti.rr .f theater. But while the works of \fochenl(lausur, Lacy, ar-rcl oth('rs rrre pcrfornrative to the extent that they see the identity of the artisr rrrttl thc perticiprrnt as producecl thr.ugh situaticlnal encorntcrs, thcy art, ll()t srll)stllllilblc into thc trlclitions of theater, to thc cxtcnt thrrt fIcst,tlclrt'rttl .rr {lrt'corrccl-rt of tlrc "pcrfonncr" as thc crPr-cssivt. l.t.rrs.l tlrt. ivrttl<. I wrll rry lo tttltkt'tlris rlistirrctiorr sorrrt.wlrrrl tlt,:rrt,r.tlr.our,,lr srrrr. ',1)t t ilit , rrurrlrlt s.

London-based Stepherr willats is onc of sevcral influential artists in Europe and the Unitecl Statcs wlro used the movernent away from the ob;ect initiated by corrccptualism ro develop a collabor:ative, dialogical art practice in the r96os and r97os. over the past three decades willats has produced a number of extended projects with the residents of public housing estates or tower blocks in England, Germany, Finland, and elsewhere in Europe. In many cases he returns to these projects and sites over a period of several years. rwillats is particularly concerned with the social ilnd somatic experience of livir-rg in public housing (especially in isoiated high-rise buildi*gs) and with identifyi'g and facilit:rtirrg rn.des of resistance and critical consciousness among the resiclcr.rts of these cstrtes. He seeks to challenge what he calls thc "Ncw ltcality" pr.'rrleirtcd by the bureaucratic planning aplraratus tl.rat clcvclol'rcd irr Ilritairr cluring thc postwar period.17 One of Willats's nrrin gorrls is to rrckrrowlcdge and

honor a process of autonomous clccisi.rr nral<irs rr'cl scli-re{lection among communities that are typically trcatccl by the state and privare sector as a kind of inert raw material t'be variously processed and regr-rlated, both spatially, in the archirecure of state,subsidized housing, and ideologically, through the mechanisms of c.nsur'er society. As he writes, "My practice is about representing the potential self-organizing richness of people within a reductive culture of objects and possessions. In a society which reduces people I''r worki'g to celebrate their richness and conrplexity. I see this as a kind of cultural struggle."18 In his projects willats shifts the focus of art from the phenomenological experience of t lrc creator frrbricating an exemplary physical object to the phenomenol.gica I cxperience of his co-participants in the spaces and routines of their tlrrili' livcs. willrrts has p'stLrlatecl a concept of "sociaily interactive" cultr-rre that rt'rlt'lirrt'srtrt irttcrrrrsof tlrccliscrrrsiverclationshipthatitestablisherswith lltt u,t t. Irt tltis r'otttr'\( c()r)v('nti()rrlrl lrrt is rrrrclcrstoocl lrs :r proct'ss ol'
"'it li

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Prior exruricDcr, ilelisls e$ ta bl i$ hed

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${l'$hl{{irt fr}s;emq etlc{l onp!ree{fen$.

FrcuRE 16. Stephen lfiliats, Sociallv Interactive Model of Art practice,, (c. ry7o). Courtesy of the artist.

..A

rtcuRE 17. Stephen'Willats, "Convenrional Relationship of :rn Artwork between Artist and Audience" (c. t97ol. (lourrcsy of tlrc artist.

able to excrcise some autonomy from, or resistance to, the bleaL and repressive cr vironments of the housing estate. This concern with spatial polirr., nrd

blocks themselves. A .:--on strategy in Wiilats's collaborative projects involves .. the identification of specific sites at which his co-participants are

tion and feedback (figs. r6 and ry). Both \x/illats and his coilaborators are able to rransform their consciousness of the world through diarogical encounter that is mediated by the production " of imageTtext pieces, often in the form of signboards rocated in the housir.g .Jr",. or'ro*.,

challenged by the viewer's response thro,rgh

der the guidance of presuppositio's about a potentiar viewer that are never fully tested. (cf. Jack Burnham's description of Hans Haacke,s "real-rime" relationship to rhe viewer.) There r. trttte or no way for the viewer's responses to the work in the gallery to be communicatid to the artist so that he or she might modify future works (except through the professionalized surrogate of art criticisrn). rJfiilats argues for a form of aesthetic exchange in which the artisr's own presuppositions are potentially
a

object production that occurs in isolation from the actuar viewer and un-

process of direct collabora-

identity is evident in a number of works he produced in the r 9 8os, includingPat Pwrdy and the Glue Sniffers' Camp (r98r-82), which examined the "reterritorialization" of a wasteland near the Avondale estate in rWest London; The Kids Are in the Streets (r98r-82), abour a skateboard park located near a municipal housing esrate outside Brixton; and Are You Good Enough for the Cba Cha Cha? ft982), creared with the members of a punk music club in London.le \X/illats uses the process of collaborative interaction with the esrate residents to help them distance themselves from immersion in the life-world of the estate and to reflect back critically on the network of visible and invisible forces that pattern that

world. The aesthetic distance, or "defamiliarization," typically achieved

in a modernist painting through the rnanipulation of represenrational conventions is created here through collaborative production itself. Key to this is what'\)fillats calls the question: an initial interrogative statement developed with a given group of participants that is used to provide a framework for critical reflection: for example (inThe People of Charuille Lane), "\7hat do you think are the everyday pressures on family life created by moving into a house on this estate?" By trying to describe their life experience to Willats (and to themselves and other residents),

f
DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

sented by Gadamer and, later, Habern-rirs), wl.rich terrds to underestimate

the extent to which these same exchirngcs irrc constrairred by forms of social domination. It is possible to rcconcilc thcse two allalyses, according to Kogler, if we replace the corrvcntionel "irrtcrprctcr/outsicler" ilnd "agent/insider" relationship in thc social scicrrct's witlr rr clialogical r:rpprochement between the theolist rrrrrl tlrt' sitrrrrtt'cl agcnt. 'l'hcsc cxchanges would combine the f hcorist's corrrrrrrlrrrl of " rrrctlroclologicrl :rnd conceptual tools" with thc subjcct's own conrplcr scli-rrnrle rstrtrrclirrg t<r challenge both the "hiclclcn synrlrolic ilssunrl)ti()ns" that clclirrc thc sr-rl.r

ject's context and the lirnitations of abstract thcorizatiorr. 'fl'rc rcsrrlt would be a "dialogicill cr()ss-rcc()nsfruction" or "reciprocerl clucidltion" of a given social contcxt. "While the theorist helps the agent to get a clearer understandin g <>f hotu power works," according to Kogler, "the agent helps the theorist to recognize which structural constraints count
ds power."21

FTGURE 18. Stephen \7illats, Fr<tm One Generation to Another (r992-.111, Mrirkisches Viertel, Berlin, pl.rotographic prints, acrylic paint, and l-etraset text on paper and card, r z6 x 7 6.5 cm. Courtesy of the artrst.

by bringing it into discursive form via statements, images, and so on, the rcsidents establish a distance from this experience and situate it within

world in which reflexive examination is more easily facilitated (tig. r tl).20 Ilarrs Herbert I(cigler's The Power of Dialogue: Criticdl HerrncncuIirs tf'tcr Cadarner and Foucault GCSg) provides a usefr-rl tl.reorcrical rc s()urcc for trnclcrstrrncling Willats's approach. I(ogler cxplorcs thc rrrctlrotlolosicrrl inrPassc thrrt cxists bctwccn thc worl< oi Michcl liorrcrrull, ivlritlr plivilt'rit's thc philosophcr/tlrcorist rrs tlrt'orrly:rgt'rrl crrp:rlrlt'ol .ur "urrtlrslollttl irrsilllrt" irrlo tlrt'(st'r'rrrilrqly irrrpl:rt:rlrlt.) t.llt.rls ol porr,,t'r ()r \r)(i.rl irrltr:rtli,rr, llrt'tr':rtlitrorr ol tlilit;rl lrr.r'rrrr.rrr.1lit., (rt.prt. 'rrrtl
a parallel

I(cigler's analysis tends to understate the extent to which the theorisr is also a socially and politic:rlly situated agent, but it demonstrates the irnportance of a process of triangulation among multiple perspectives in recovering the "truth" of power relationships in a given context. Thus, while the projects of Willats still run the risk of prornulgating an orthopedic relationship to the participants (who need the artist/tl-rcorist to reveal the hidden symbolic assumptiorls of their life-worlcl), this perception is seen less as a gift (made possible by the superior critical facr,rltics of the artist) than as the procluct of a collirboratively generirted ir-rsight. In dialogical practice the artist, whosc pcrccl-rtious rrr:c informed by his or her own training, past projccts,:rncl livccl cxperience, cornes into a given site or cornmunity characterized by its own unique constellation clf social and economic forces, personalities, and traditions. In the excl-rirng;e that follows, both the artist and his or her collaborators will have their existing perceptions challenged; the artist rnay well recognize relationships or connections that the community members have become inrrrccl to, while the collaborators will also challenge the artist's preconccptions about the community itself and about his or her own function :r\ iln ilrtist. What emerges is a new set of insights. genercted et the inrcrscctior.r of both perspectives and catalyzed through the collaborarive Ir-,,.lrr. tiorr oI a given project. Anothcr inrportant component of Willats's approach concerns the signilicrrrrcc that cstr'rtc residents assign to physical objects in their immedi:rlt t'rrvir'orrncnt. Agrrilt, rrs witl.r the spirti:rl practices I have cliscussccl, hc
st t'l<s

to itlt'ntily points of rcsisteucc in thc rclrttiortshil-rs that rt'sitlcrrts

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

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FlcURt 20. Stephen'Willats, BrentfordTouers (ry861, display panel, photographic prints, acrylic paint, ink on card, 59 x 84 cm. Courtesy of the artist.

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19. Stephen rX/illats,

artlSt.

stablish with these objects.

'Willats

is interested in the ways in which

reople "curate" their living spaces, assigning value to objects in oppoition to a market system that links the consumption of specific consumer ;oocls to a priori models of identity (i.e., owning a sports car symbolizes \X/illats worked with rr perirrr virility). Thus in Brentf ord Towers ( t S 8 S )

attempted in various ways to mark out the space as a reflection of their own identities, and the concrete monotony of the surrour-rding environment (figs. r9 and zo).22 ln Priudte Icons (r gtl 3,), \X/illats collaborated with a young man who created a refuge in his apartment through the collection and creative transfor:mation of religious icons.23 And in Pat Purdy and the Glue Sniffers' Camp he documented abandoned objects that had been put to use at wasteland camps near a housing estate. Like the "question" that helps to catalyze self-reflection in \Tillats's other projects, the temporary abstraction of these objects from the gestalt of their surrounding spatial context triggers interactions among residents and with V/illats, facilitating a critical consciousness of the function they perform within a broader ecology of material and ideological signs.
W OCH EN K L ALiSUR AND CONCRET E NT ERV ENT tOrv Dialogical exchange plays iln even more central role in the works of the Austrian group \TochenKlrrr,rsur, part of a younger generation of practitioners concerned with comt

to map the interiors of their own apartments, identifying obccts thirt held a personal significance, which they then related to scenes rr thc outsidc world that they regularly viewed through their wir.rdows. 'lrcsc worl<s typically involve a montage technique thirt c<lrrtbittcs porrrrits ol'thc incliviclurrl (posccl in collab<lrati<>n with Willats), strltcrrrerrts rrl<t'rr llorrt irttcrvicws ("I rlorr't warrt t() hc ottc of flrc lrrcclt'ss tttrtsst's"), rn,l irnrrgt's tllilt ('()ntlrtst tlrt' privrrtc irtlt'riors, in wlrit lt tltt' lt'sitlt'rtts lt;tvt'
csiclents

rnunicrrtive interaction in nonart settings. As their name suggests (roughly trrrnslirtccl, it nrcans "weeks of closure" as well as seclusion), their pro jects ,rrt'tlt'lirrt'tl irr tcrrns of rr sct time franre during which they first describe

f
DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

.r sl)(,cific problem and then bring together the resources necessary

to fa-

t ilitrrte its resolution through a concentrated series of actions. Founding nrcnrl)cr \Tolfgang Zinggl defines their practice in terms of what he calls

.,c()ncrete interventions" in the field of social policy. As opposed to ear-

licr forms of activist art, which often sougl.rt tg "change everything but wotlnd up changing nothing," in Zinggl's words, Wochenl(lausur's practice is to identify specific problems, resolvable through the achievement
of clearly defined and concrete goals.2a

what 'WochenKlausur's proiects can be generally divided between and "advocacy-based" works' Colmight be termed "collaborative" laborative projects involve the generation of new institutional and spatial arrangements in consultation with specific groups, communities, and individuals. Examples would include their Interuetttion in Community Deuelopment of rg97, in which\rochenl(lausur staged a sefies of conversations with the residents of Ottensheim, a small town outsideLinz, concerning their visions for their community. The result was the formation of three interest groups (IGs); one was devoted to the needs of
the town's older residents, one to the town's youth, and one to the general development of the town's historic center. The Youth IG constructed

rlcuRE

21.

\(ochenl(lausu4 Interuention in a Schoctl, Urriversity of Applied

Art, Vienna, Austria (November r995 through January r996). Courtesy of

\rVochenl(laus ur.

with donations from local firms, along with a youth The Town Center IG developed a proposal to stage a weekly center. market, and the Elder IG established regulaf meetings between students at the local Polytechnic and older residents to compile oral histories and encourage intergenerational relationships. The result of all of these activities was the creation of a set of proposals to the Ottensheim town council for expanding future community involvement i1 democratic clecisign-making processes in the town. A "Pro-Ottensheim" political party emerged out of this project and is now the third-largest party on
a skateboard ramp

ented to the front of the room, with a series of rounded desks grouped in concentric rings around the blacl<board (fig. zr). They also created a cushioned "sitting corner" for the stlrdents irrrcl iutprove d the lighting system in the room. Due to the resist:rnce ()f thc cclucafion:rl bureau-

thc town council.

\rVochenKlausur's Interuention in d Scbool (tgSS-g6) involved a similer process of consultation and action organized around the collective

cracy to this kind of individualized reconstructiolt tlf classroom space' Wochenl(lausur was forced to locatc fr-rnding irnd sponsorship outside the school. The second area of Wochenl(lausllr's practice involves working through existing political and administrative systems to change conditions for a given group (typically a group that occupies a disempowered

rcthinking of the spaces of everyday life. Here \Tochenl(lausur workecl

with rhe students in a Viennese secondary school, asking them to proclf their classrooms, desks, cl.rairs, 1-rosc thcir own vision for the redesign ,rntl so on. "Pupils have no lobby," as \TochenKlausur notes. "They also Ilrvt,rrlrnost tr<t influence on the design of the classroom spilcc irl which witlr r lre y spclttl nrrllty ycltrs of thcir lives."25 Through e xtcllsivc rlrcctilrgs
\iTochcnl(lattsrtr clcvt'ltt1'rt'tl rl ttt'w tlrt, sr'lr66l's tw('lvc-ycilr-olcl strrrlcnts, st.;rlrnli rl t'llnll('nl('nt lrol tht' clltss tltat t'c1-tlrtct'tl tllt' t'xistittl', st':tts, ',t i

position relative to dominant cultural or political institutions). These projects tend to be less collaborative in terms of the perceived beneficiaries and instead are developed on behalf of this constituency through a ne twork of official representatives.In Interuention to Aid Drug-Addicted 'ilfttmen (which I discuss in the introduction), dialogue about pragn.ratic r'('sp()nses to the drug problem in Zurich amon!l policy makers and others was corrstrained by the fear that their statements would be taken out of (()ntcxt ,rrrtl usecl :rgainst them politically. It was necessary for Wochenlr. l:rusrrr t() crclrtc r cliscursive space that was to sollle extent insulated

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

lr.rrr this r:hetorical effect, in which key participants in the debate over
,lr rru policy could converse. The organization of the "boat colloquies," rv lr ich cve ntually included the secreraries of the nla jor Swiss political partics, the police cornmissioner, for-rr .f tl-re eight city cou'cilors, several

c()rporate managers, and the chief eclitors of thc city's rnajor newspapers rrs well as sex workers and activists, involvecl sonre clcgree of creativity rrs well. Thus \X/ochenl(1ar-rsur askcd tlre of Zwtch if he would 'r:ryor p:rrticipate, telling him that the leacler of the Socialist Party had already volunteered but would participate or-rly if the nray.r wirs involved. After
securing his agreement, they rhen mer with the hcacl of the Socialist party and reversed the story. Tl-re final r:esult was temporary government support, through the Zurich Social Department, f<:tr a pensionhousing fifreen women (it was eventually given permanent fundir-rg).

\TochenKl:rustr's Interuention in d De[tortation Detention Facility ftc;96) focused on conditior-rs ar the Salzburg Police Detention Cenrer, in which immigrar-rts awaiting deportation (but not legally under arrest)
were warehoused. Because of conditions therc, as rWocher-rKlausur notes,

the center was "worse than any prison." Inmates were routinely denied access to information abor-rt tl.reir rights as detainees; living conditions in ternrs of food, shower access, ancl laundry were primitive; and inmates weren't allowed teievisions, radios, or evcn books, even though they were kcpt in the facility for up to six monrhs. As they did in Zurich, \TochenI(lausur createcl a working group of representatives from the media, local churches, the Interior Ministry, and varior-rs relief organizations to deveiop a professional consensus around possible changes in the detention facilities. This consensus was then used to overcorne the facility dircctor's initial resistancc to the idea of allowing the cletainees access to social services. \)flith funding from the Pr<ltestant Refugce Service, wochenl(lausur was able to assign caseworkers fo each refugee a'd to

l will retur' to i'r the f.il.wirg chapter). However, \TochenKlausur appears to be cognizant .f this pr.,lrl",,, ancl fairly real_ istic about the strategic necessity,f thcst's()rrs ()f rcrrrri<l.ships. wolfgang Zrnggl contrasts their pragnrrrtic, locrrlly rcsp6rrsivr, .ppr,ro.h ,o rh. more grandiose (but less practicar) r'hct.r-ir. .f fis.rcs r,,.r, Joseph Beuyr, who sought norhing lcss llr;rrr tlr,. 1,,11q,,.,,,.,,,..1 ", 1,,, ,,,lrl,,,iolr,rf art and life' This strategic scrrsibility e xl('n(ls ro rlrt'ir-rrrrirrrtk,r.wrrrcl the prestige value .f art itself: "'r'ht'c.rtt.xt ,r .rr.( ,llt.rs .rrlv.rrrt.rr_lcs whcn acticln involves circrttlvcntirtg s.cirrl ,rncl brrr-t',rucr:rtic hierar.clrics arcl quickly mclbilizing peoplc irt 1'r.siti.rrs .f p.litical, aclrnilistrativc ()r ure* dia responsibility t' acc.,tplish c()rcrcto rrerrslrres. A' irvitati.' ir.'.r an art institution proviclcs w'crrcrKlausr-rr with an irfrastructurar frame work and cultural capitrrr, whilc the exhibitio'space serves as a studio from which tl.re interve'tio'is concructed.,,At th. same time, the real_ ism that allows .*ochenl(lausur ro so effectively respond r.r rp..ii. prot,_ lems can also tend ro foreclose a porirical vision that could linr< trrese concrete solutions to a broader emancipatory movement among those who have been strategicalry disempo*"r.d. rtri. "t,r.r... ', ;l]"rh: -.r. striking given the tradition of autonom ous (Autonomen) porttical nrgar-iizing in Austria and Germany (the Hafenstrasse occupatio'r in Ham_ burg, for exarnple).27 conversely, one'rigr'rt arguc th,lt trre vision of wochenKlausur's interventi.'s lies in the *,,rr.i,rg 1",.radig.r .r meth.dology that they have evolved, whicr-r car p.rcnriaily ir" ."pri."r".l rry other groups working in other: contexrs.
tives (a problem
In response to those wh. wo'lc{ cqratc trrcir-pr.aericc with social w'rk or activisrn, zinggl is insistent that it bc clcfirccl i, t.rrrs of art. ,,Locarized between social work and p.ritics, bcrwcer rncdiil work and manag;ement, " as Zinggl writes, "intervcntior.rs are n'nethe ress
based on ideas
I

provide them with better living conditions and access to legal services. They created dayrooms for detainee recreati()n, collecting "games, books, newsp:lpers, fitness equipment, a table soccer unit, a television and radios," rrs wcll as a card telephone with subsidized access.26 lJoth the collabor:irtive and the advocacy-based projecrs of Wochenl(lausur involve an intensive pr()cess of dialogue aud discussion to c'lcterr nrirrc tlrc eppropriate fon.n for a given intervention. Tlrere is potentielly s0rrrt' Pr'oblcril with aclvocacy projects that benefit clisen'r1-rowcrcd poPrr, l;rlrorrs (tlt'tainccs. pr()stitutcs, e'tc.) evc.n rrs thcy tal<c arlr,;rrrt:riic of tlrrrt tlrs, nrpo\n,t'r't'rl stlrlus to sl-rt'ltli lor tltt'rn tlrourilr lr plr,rl:rrrr ol rrolr l'o\'(lllilr(il1:rl or.r',:ilriz;tliorr (N(i())trllcr ts;ln(1 1,,()\,(.r nnr(il1 r(l)r(\(.nl.l

trrti.rr :rrtl
tr
,

boundaries. }flochenr(rausur,s statements, "outside of-the narrow thinkrng of the curture of specialization and outside of the hierarchies we pr.rr.d int' when we are crn"r. Ployed irr an instit'tion, a sociar orga.ization, or a poriticar party.,,A secrncl and related characteristic, as I have arrerrdy suggest"d. is th. r"c'ilitatiri. of uniqr-re forms of discursive interacti'' (as in the Zurich boat trilrs)' "'fhis type of art," zinggrwrites, "does not need the Iar:tist asl pr..Plrt't .r' pricst. . . . Instead, it irrises fr-om intersubjective communilets us think in uncomrnon ways," according to one

fr:or'the discor:rse of art." These ideas would incrude, first, the capacity to thi'k critic:rliy and crearivery acr:rss disciplinary .Art

t;l
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l

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DIALOGICAL AESIHETICS

DIALOGICAL AESTHET CS

i03

L/srE/v//vc I wanr to discuss one:rdclitional set ol rlialogical projects, by the Singapore-born, Cokrglre-based, artist Iay I'..1r. I(oh's early activist work in cennany was fclcused cln health car:e rrrrcl scientific research. He helped esrablish onc of the first pr-rblic inter'.tAY KoH AND THE ART oF ('st srolrps in Cologne to protest against the clirngcrs of genetic engineering ((iologne is a center for genetic research) arcl worl<ecl on the development a patient information system that allowccl hcalth service Llsers to rrronitcrr and evaluate the performance of doctors. l.n tL)c)2- I(oh founded an or:sanizational entity called arting that serves irs tl.re basis for a range of different activities: symposia, artist and critic exchanges especiaily focused on Asia, exhibitions, demonstrations, arrcl so on. "The idea," as l(oh wrote, "was to create a platform where I, together with my colleirgues, could use the medir-rrn of contemporary art to intervene in various social processes and structures."2e In r997 Kc>h founded a smaller group, the Interr-rational Foundation for Intermedia Arts (IF'lMA), which mobilizes ad hoc affiliations of artists, activists, and writers in Ger:many

ol

ir a c'mplex set .f exchanges of Asia are usccl b.tlr as cLrltural or stylistic resources (Japonisme and Chinoiserie in the cishtccrrrl-r rrncl nineteenth centuries) and as testing sites for thc nrost rrclverrcccl tcclrniclues f6r thc regulation of labor (frorn the tast luclia (ionrparry r. l lewlet packard).r2 Koh's awirreness of this conflictccl history hrrs contributecl to his skepricism about the current fascinati.n with Asierr culfrrral cxcl.range in the U.S. r,rnd European art worlcls. For I(oh this intcrcst, although ofter.r well intended, is highly problcnratic, rrs ir crrrrics with it ccrt:rin neocokrnial rnechanisms of both cxoticizrrtiou ancl honrogcrrization. Morcover, it is often characterized by an inaclvcrtently patronizinij irttitude on the part .f western organizers, clue to tl'rc discrepancy i' ec'nornic resourccs :rvailable to arts organizations in the \fest versus those in Asia, and Southeast Asia in particular. Koh draws a parallel berween the role of power-

ir which the countries

For centuries the rwest has bee^ engagcd

ful institutions like the Inrernarional Monet:rry Fund in representing \(/estern economic inrerests in Asia (under the guise of a benevolent globalisrn) ancl the role of the powerful curatorial/critical system of the .westem art

and Asia for the creation of specific projects.l0 Genopoly (r99o) was one of the first "intermedia" pr:ojects I(oh cleveloped with arting. It involved a series of performances, lectlues, and exhibits designed to raise ptrblic consciousness about the dangers of 5;enetic research (especially of experiments under way irr Cologne to implant human genes in animal
"receptors " ).

worlcl in representing European ancl Americ:rn cultural interests. He has written criticirlly about what he calls "the scale," the "universrrl ancl iclcrrl"

Genoytoly would set rhe pattern for a number of subsequent arting projects. It was based on the creation of collaborative alliances between various activist and arts organizations in Cologne and elsewhere (from the Biirger: Beobachten Perunien to the South and Meso-American Indi:rn Rigl-rts Center). This crucial networking componenr was combined with the interdisciplirary focus of the project, which featured lecrures, performances, exhibited artworks, publicatiorrs, a Web site, and so ou. Llnderlying many of arting's projects is the recognition that complex social and political issues, like those raised by generic research, cannot be ,rclccluately addressed simply by fabricating physical objects (sculprures, Prrirrtings, and so on) but require polyvalent responses thaf opcrate orr rrrrrltiplc lcvels of public intcraction. other projects have incluclc cl Aus<.cit tlcr l)t'ntokrallc, or "Time-Out in Democracy" (,q9; ), rvhich fcatrrrccl cr lrilrits, pLrblic works atrcl rrctions, anci a lecturc scrics clcvclol-rctl in lcsporrsc

(and implicitly Western) standirrd er-nployecl by currrfors, rrrtists, rlrrl crif ics from the United Statcs irncl F,urope thrrf trerlts rr.rr-wcsfcnr art as littlc more than a s!copy" or rcflection of tcnclcrrcics rrrrrl rrrtribrrt('s thrrt arc il seen as originally or more fu lly clcvcloPcrl irr Wcsrcr-n cLrltrrrrr I Precticcs.

irotcntial rlarrscls of neseti.,rr irlcl r.1riimplicit in discr-rrsivc infcractiorr. At thc sryllc tilrer, r.atIer tl-ran reject a communicative aesthetic oLrt of l.rancl, hc rrttcrrpts to produce
ver:sality

I(oh

is clearly cognizatrt of thc

to llrt'tllrrstic

t ts," itt ( it lltt:ttty by

in l<illings ancl rrttacl<s ort t\trsl,'ittdt,r, or-"Iolt.irln l'tst rt qr'()ttlls lollor'virrg lt'urrilit:rliorr. lr.olr lrr-r,rrr,,lrt 1o1,,1 1111 1 (l()z('nsol lulisls, vvlt,,,l,'v,.l,rlrtrl |r'r'1,'ll.ut(r.s,toll.rr,,,.,,, lrsl.tl l,tltott,,, .ur(l ()llt, r tr,,,r 1., rt flt.. tirrri , r ilr,.tllt ,rr (,r.r rr,rrr r.r'rropllrylrl.q_il
irrcr"crrsc

of his cerrtral concerns has been the facilitation of :rn ongoir-rg diakrgr_re ilrrong Asian artists, historians, and critics. "Cultural imperialism does not depend on arms or technological superiority but consists of attacl<s fr.r'n the intellectual side and fhe constant reinforcement of prejudices,,' l(.lr hirs writter.r. 'A lot of Asian people reinforce this way of thinking. 'Ihcy are educated in the wesr, blindly believi.g in its total superioriry rvlrilc th.se :rt home follow the same blind faith."3a I(.h's ongoing Ne/rt'rrk I'r.jacl involves a series of initiatives developed with artists and :il ls qf()ul)s in Barrgladesh, Myanmar, Hong l(ong, Thailand, and Tibet. 'l lrt st' irrclrrtlc c.llrrborative sponsored exhibitions, exchanges of artists
.rrrtl lvlitt'r's lrt'lwt't'rr, for e xirnrplc, Cierr-nany ancl Myannrar or Thailencl,

rnodes of inter:lcticln and erchange that can minimize these darrgers. One

.rrr,l llrt'ot-t',:tttiz:tliott ol corrft'r't'nccs rlcvotecl to thc rlefirrifion of rrrr irrtlt pt tttlt rrl Ast.ut rrlts pr';rtlitt.. l.,1lr lr:rs tl-:rvt lt'tl t.rl11sir,,t.ly, lrliltlirrri :r

(zooz) has led to the fcl'lation of a new artists' communiry, the Ayeyarwady Ar:t Assembly, and the creation of an independent art center in Myanmar. Many of the culturai exchanges orchesrrared by or o' behalf of \flestern institutions ignore the specificity and complerity of local art and cultural production, as well as the political irnplications of the power differer-rtials between developed and strategically underdeveloped counrries, through an appeal to art as a "universal language" that rrllows people frorn radically different culrures :,rncl bi,rckgrounds (e.g., the United States and Myanmar or Indo'esia) to icleutify s()lrle colrllnon gro'nd for interaction. For l(oh these exchanges havc t' begi' with a frank ack^owledgment of existing differe'ces.'fhey rrLrst alsil i'volve a sensitivity ,n the part of practitioners and organizcrs essociatccl with dominirnt, \restern fine arts institutions to thc ways in which cxch:rnge is constrained and struct'red by the specific c'ltural arrl p.litical context of a given colrntry, region, or site and by tl.re broatlcr political :rnd economic interrelationships between their respectivc corrrrtrit.s. The problem of this aestheric "ivc'saliry 'vas usefully illustrated in the controversy that accornpanicd a Iriglrly pLrblicized cxhibition, "Tomorrow ls Another Day," by thc IJ.S.-basccl rrrtist Rirkrit Tiravanija at cologne's I(olnischer I(u'stvcrc'irr ir rlrt' rvirrc' of r.)96-97. Tiravanija is widely viewed as an iconoclastic rrrrsiclc' wlr. cl'rallenges not only art world conventions but also fixecl rr.ti.ns .f identity. (He was born in Buenos Aires a'd lived rn Bangl<.1< ,rrrl (.lrrrada before relocating to the U'ited States.) His installatiors rrrurssrcss clivisions between the public and the private through rhe crcrrti.rr .f "parallel spaces" i' which he assembles temporary caf6s, clirirrg r()()'sr rr'd playhouses in galleries and mLlseurns. It should he nofecl, h.wcvc'r, th:rt Tiravanija is also a highly successful and sought-:rfter artist who wrlrks and teaches in New york, the very epicenter of \Testerrr cult'ral privilege. Tiravanija has been in-

nr'l\\'r,rl' ol torrrrttlr()n''.lnrorrli l\si.rrr,uli:,1:, ul .rrr r.llrlr l l(,l)r,,r,r,l, .rrr ilr',lrllrlr,,n,tl.ttt.l,lir.tttrti,..tll,.til.tlir,.l,,tlr,.r,,t,,11ilil,.iltl,.t(.\l ((.(rlnoillt( ,r, rvt ll :rs rrt('ll('etu:rl) irr Asilrrr :rrt :rrrtl cultur-(' :ln)()ng llrr.o;-rt,rrrr rrrtl Atttt llt:trt N( i()s, sftrtc rlecncics, critics, ancl clcalcls. I(olr lrrrs lrct'rr prrr tit rrlrrrly c()rtce rttocl to supp()rt thc enrergencc ()f an inclcpcrrclcnt critical ;rl)Prrrrrtus irr Southcast Asia that can offer an alternative to thc wi.1ys in whiclr art is valued and evaluared i' the r7est. Tb this end he clevelopecl 'l'bt Other Critic (r997-99), an exchange program with critics ancl :lrtists from Bangkol<, Myanmar, irnd Dhaka University in Bangladesh. lris colLabordtion, Networking and Res<turce-sbaring project i' Myan-

l. l.t t l(:ll('lris "prrrrrllcl sl):lc('s" irr uallcrics lrncl rrrtrscrrrrrs thr.orrglrl"rrroPt',rrrtl tlrr' Urritcrl Statcs, whcrc tl'rey are celebrated:rs cr-nbocli rrrt'rrts of rlrt's powcr to transcend institutional and cultural bouldi,rr:ies rrrrtl ro crcrrte a Lltopiilll space of free and open exchange (of food, convt'rsrrtion, etc.).
vtlt'tl

,ul

'rar

of t 996, as Tiravanija was reconstructing his New york rl[)irrtnlent in the Kolnischer ](unstverein as an "open space" for cookirrg, eating, and "communal celebration," the cologne police were in the process of breaking up and driving our a settlement of homeless people near the gallery, under pressure from a local business group called city Marketing that was concerned about the threat the homeless would pose to tourism and gentrification in the area.35 while cologne's liberal press lauded the show as a rnodcl of "intcrcultural exchange," a number of loca1 artists and activists for-rncl tl-re juxtaposition of Tiravanija's magnanirnous spatial gesture (albeit one in which :rclnrissior.r was carefully monitored by a stern Hausnrcistet-) aurl thc brrrtrrlity of (brrsiness-rllotivated) police attacks on the homelcss dccply pr.oblc.rrratic. cologne-based art activist stef:1n ltocrncr proclucccl e viclco critiquc of the erhibition (also titled Tttmorrow ls Antibcr 1)ay) thrrt incluclcd the following dialogue: "They act as if they are bcirrg s() scr)cr()'s i.'r:rkir-rg this room available when they are really doing rrothire at all. Ir is a meaningless statement. At the same time they are n.r:rking this grard gesture fifty homeless people are being ordered to clear out their carlp ancl go. . . . [I]t fits perfectly with the rhetoric of globalism, with its empry platitudes and its commitment to image over real change. "-t6 l(oh's protest took the forrn of the following nlessage (in Thai), written on the front
tl'rc winter

lr

door of the gallery: "N

Sawi,rsdee

Tiravanija cannot be blanrccl f'r thc rttrrcks on the h.'reless comm'niry near the gallery (or for l:rb'r c.rcliti.rs ir Thailand), his project suggests the challenges facecl by artisrs who clainr a cledication to clialogue but ignore the (political, s.cial, ancl culrrrral) c.rrrcxr in which that clialogue is situated. F'or Koh the work of art is not sir.ply a physicirl .bject but a specific social process: the catalyzation of dialoguc, tlrc excl.range of ideas, and the collective generation of new aesthetic paracligurs. Thc concept of discursive exchange as an antidote to the violence of ec.nomic exchange is elaborated rnthe ExchangingThought (rc195-96) project thar Koh
developed in chiang Mai, Thailand, in collaborarion

younger brother," in Thail. Vrur Proccss arrt sounds good, but what about the 'process' in your lThail s.cicty? Thc women and poverty?"37 V/hile

Khrap, Nong Chail [..Greetings,

with r'embers of

illi

lrlAl I'r,tr At Al ',I |l llI

n Al rr,lr

I ,,Iit

Il

al.

,r:$l$: '&i$!.

fl s

r$;

wltrtl sltt't:rlls "lltt'rtsstllivt'lrrrtlitrorr ol srtyirrg" tlrlt lrrrs tlorrrirratccl wt'stt'r'rr Plril.s.Plry rrrrrl arr. "we havc little fanrilirrrity with what it il)L'iilrs t0 listcrr," liiurrrrra writes, because "we are... imbued with ir lrg,cc.tric cultr.rrc in which the bearers of the word are predominately inv.lvcd i. speaking, molding, informing."3e It was this instrumentalizirg arspect clf language that modern art attempted to circumvent through its witl-rdr:awal into .pacity and inscrutability. But Fiumara refuses to surrender the concept of dialogue entirely; instead, she argues that we must begin to acknowledge the long-sr-rppressed role of listening as a creative

practice. For Koh an art practice that privileges dialogue and communication cannot be based on the serial imposition of a fixed formal or spatial mo-

FrcuRt 2.2. Jay Koh, E.T. (ExchangingThought), at pak Tuk Kong Market (November r 99 5 -January r A), Chiang lia;'social 99 f nrrJ Culture Festival, Chiang Mai, Thailand."Cou.t.ry of "rt"ll "tio',lri KohJay

tries, including Germany, Finlar-rd, Iran, Brazil, Turkey, and Eritrea, among others, to the market and offeri'g to exchange them for other objects brought for rrade by Iocer residents (fig. zz).lccording to the Exchanging Thought catalog, these transactions ..cross cultural and professional differences on the basis ofrespect and equality in a process where the spectator becomes a participant." objects play a central role here as both symbols for and ernbodimenrs of a kini orequitabre material dialogue intended to chalrenge the instrumentalizing logic of the art market.38 To understand Koh's work it is necessary to shift from a concept of art based on self-expression to one based on the ethics of communicative exchange. The act of establishing networks among Asian artists, wrirers, and activists across national boundaries is an i'tegral part ofhis artis_ tic practice, constituting a lcind of "aesthetics of listening.,' The Italian ;rhilosopher Gemma corradi Fiumara, in her book The other side of Language, notes the etymological origins of the Greek term /ogos in lagcin: to lie with, to gather in, or ro receive. She juxtaposes thil with

the group Bon Fai. ExcbangingThougbt was held in several different public markets in chiang Mai over a rwo-month period and involved bringing objects and works produced by artists from seventeen coun-

Tiravanija's "cafes" and "lounges"). Rather, it must begin with an attempt to understand as thoroughly as possible the specific conditions and nuances of a given site. only then can one devise the most effective and responsive forn-ral manifestirti.n, gesture, or event. For Tiravanija this would have involved taking the time to lear:n what was happening in the neighborhood ar.urc{ the gallery in which his work was installed or considering the symbolisu'r of stati'r-ring a guard at the entrance of an exhibit based on ideals of openness rrncl accessibility. well before the enunciative act of art making, the rrra'ripr-rlatior-r rr.cl .ccupation of space and material, there must be a periocl .f operness, of nonaction, of learning and of listening. For Koh it is eve. more important that \Testern artists and institutions, for whom the "assertive tradition of saying" comes so naturally, also learn to begin by listening.
(as in

tif

AESTHETICS AND ALTERITY

A DtALoctcAL AESTHET|7 \x/illats, wochenKlausur, and

their artistic practice through the facilitation of dialogue and exchange. But what kind of dialogue is this, and what exactly makes it aesthetic? I(ant contends that in aesthetic experience our "cognitive powers are in
free play. "a0 \(/hen we are no longer required to perform the onerous labor of testing each perception against an existing conceptual repertoire, we experience a unique liberatory pleasure. Further, in the very act of

I(oh all define

enjoying the unconstrained and harmonious operation of our mental faculties we recognize their implicit universality; we realize that everyone must experience the world through the same basic cognitive process. Here is the foundation of aesthetic "common sense": literallv a sense of the

oll

DIALOGICAL AESTHITICS

DIALOGIC,AL AESTHETICS

-()nuronness of cognition itself. This knowledge is produced at two sites: hc viewer and the object. As viewers we achieve universality by purgrrg ourselves of the (prototypically bourgeois) self-interest that is charrcteristic of our "normal" cognitive relationship to things like used cars, :avioli, and potential employers (i.e., what can this object/person do for ne? Is it a threat? Can I eat it? Can I sell it?). To perceive objects aesthetically we must rise above our specific identities as subjects (our desires lr "interests") and see things from a point of view that is universal. But what remains of the subject once self-interest is subtracted or suppressed? Ihe aesthetic subject functions for Kant as a kind of transcendent cipher: rhe lineaments of a subject, awaiting the specific content of a singular human being. A similar fate awaits the object of aesthetic contemplation. Here we :xperience aesthetic perception by abstracting from the specific condirions of the object qua object to the object as representation, or Darsteltung.This image acts as a kind of catalyst. seming in motion our cognilive operations without the practical considerations that are forced upon us by objects in the real world. It is our reflective "apperception" of these operations that allows us to intuit the existence of a ground for communication (and potential unity) with other human beings. Kant's ac:ount of the aesthetic contains a radical promise: the calculating and defensive individual has the capacity to become more open and receptive, to view the world not as a resource to be exploited but as an opportunity for experimentation and self-transformation. But this promise can be fulfilled only by robbing the object of aesthetic contemplation of its specificity and its ability to speak to us in turn. How might the position of the viewer and the object be handled differently in the context of a dialogical model of aesthetic experience? Is it possible to practice this sort of attirude in our relationships with people rather than representations?

(including figures such as Lyotard) to hypostatize langue as the essence of discourse at the expense of any detailed cor-rsicleration of actual human dialogue.al A related set of questions circr,rlates around the ways in which identity is formed and transformed tlrror-rgh ()ur encounters with other subjects. Given these concerns, I consider thc writirrg of thc (lerr-nan theorist Jiirgen Habermas to be an important res()urcc for tlrc cleveloprnent of a dialogical aesthetic.a2 Habermas's work or.r thc rclationslrip between human identity and communicative interaction is particr-rlarrly significant. He differentiates "discursive" forms of cornmunication, in which material and social differentials (of power, resources, and authority) are bracketed and speakers rely solely on the cornpelling force of superior argument, from more instrumental or hierarchical forms of communication
(e.g., those found in advertising, business negotiations, religious sermons,

EfHlCS There are two interrelated areas in which the definition of a dialogical aesthetic must be pursued: an investigation of speech acts and dialogue and an investigation of intersubjective ethics and identity formation. First it is necessary to shift from thinking about discourse primarily in terms of langue, as a fixed, hierarchical systcur of a priori meaning, to an understanding of discourse as parole rrrrcl clirrlogr-re. The bri'rcl<eting of the speech act by the Swiss lirrguist F'crrlirrancl clc Saussurc rrs rru unsr.ritable lre:'r for thc clrrborrrti<lrr <lf "sci('nlific" or tltcorcticrrl l<nowlcrlgc lccl to rl tcn(lency ()n tlrc prtrt of tlrosc stlrrr'tru'rrlisl rurtl poslstrrrctrrlrrlisl thinl<t'rs wlro wrolt'rrrrtlt'r lris irrllrrcrrc'r,
tlABERMA,S AND DTSCOURSE

and so on). These self-reflexive (albeit time-consuming) forms of interaction are intended, not to result in universally binding decisions, but simply to create a provisional understanding (the necessary precondition for decision making) among the members of a given community when normal social or political consensus breaks down. Thus their legitimacy is based, not on the universality of the knowledge produced through discursive interaction, but on the perceived universality of the process of human communication itself. Habermas seeks to preserve the Kantian subject's ability to transcend self-interest while at rl.re same time avoiding the tendency, also evident in I(ant, of abstracting ethical judgment from the specific social and material contexr within which human interaction occurs. For I(ant ethical judgment is legitimated by an ostensibly inherent sense of "duty" that is hard-wired into the human consciousness. In a discursive scenario, on the other hand, "maxims of conduct," :rs Mark \Tarren writes, "relate to individual needs, interests and situati onal commitments- "43 The encounters theorized by Habermas take place in the context of what he famously defined as a "public sphere." Participants in a public sphere must adhere to certain performative rules that insulate this discrrrsive space from the coercion and inequality that constrain human comrnunication in normal daily life. Thus, according to Habermas, "every srrbjcct with the competence to speak is allowed to take part in discourse," "cvcryorlc is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever," "everyone is lrllowccl to introduce any assertion whatsoeverr" and "everyone is alIowcrl to cxprcss his or her attitudes, desires and needs."aa This egalil:u'ilrrr irrtt'r'ircliorr crrltivatcs i1 sclrsc of "s<lliclarity" anr{rrrg discursive c<>-

llln I o(,1( Al Al ',Illl

Il(

'

lrln I

r{,t( At At ,,lIl lt(

l),llli(il)iltlls, wll() ilt(',:rs:r r'('slrll, "irrtirrr,rlr'ly lirrlit.tl rrr:rrr rrrlt.r'srrlr;r.r tivt'ly slr:tlt'tl lortrr ttl lift'."lt Wlrilt' tlrcrc is rro lirrrururtt.r' tlrrrt llrt.st. rrr It't-;tctiotts will rcstrlt itt ir cottscltsus, wc n()nctlrclcss crrrlow tlrcrrr witlr rr
pr'ovisiottal rttrthority that inflr.renccs us towrtrcl rnuturrl unclcrstarrrlirrg irrrcl lt'corrciliation. Further, the very act of participating in tlrese cxchangcs rrrrrl<cs Lls better arble to engage in discursive encounters and decisionnrrrking processes in the future.a6 In attempting to present our views to .thers, we are called upon to articulate them more systematically, to anticipate and internalize our interlocutor's responses. In this way we are led to see ourselves from the other's point of view and are thus, at least potentiallg able to be more critical and self-aware about our own opin-

'cfle sclf. Moreover, the consensus they reached on a response to the drug problc'r'r in zuich was intended, not as a universally applicabl.

irrg rr substantial collecrive knowledge of the subject at hand; at rhe least, llrcsc cxternal forces were considerably reduced by the demand for selfxive amenrion created by the ritual and isolation of the boat trip it-

wlrclr rlirrloguc wrrs vicwccl as ir c()lrtcst <lf wills. (cl. Ly.lrrrrl's rrr,clr'l ,l "agonistic" cr>mmunication.) But on the boat trips tlrt'y wcrc ablc t. speal<, and listen, not as deregates and representat ivt's chrr rgccl with defending a priori positions, but as individuals shar-

l):u liiun('nr) irr

i.ns. This self-critical awareness can lead, in turn, to a capacity to see our views, and our identities, as contingent and subject to creative transformation. \x/e might relate this dynamic of reflexive distancing to Stephen \Tillats's collaborations with housing estate residents, in which the act of producing a work about their own environment opens a space from which that environment can be critically perceived and potentially transformed. Habermas offers relatively few examples of actual discursive inreraction, except in his early workThe StructuralTransformation of the public Sphere (1962) and in his discussions of "new social movements" in the r97os.a7 \7hile I do not wanr to suggest that the dialogical projects I have outlined in this book illustrate Habermas's discourse theory, I do believe
that theory can provide one component of a larger analytic system. First, Habermas's concepr of an identity that is formed through social and discursive interaction can help us understand the position taken up by figures
like \Tillats or the members of \TochenKlausur. we typically view the artist as a heroic figure, actualizing his or her will through the transformation

thc drug crisis as a whole, but rather as a pragmatic response ro a very specific aspect of that problem-the homelessness experienced by pros_ titutes. In his book Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic Democracy (rggg), for I(en Hirschkop argues for the ongoing relevance of Bakhtin's work for contemporary politics, focusi'g .n his concept of a ,,redemptive inter, subjectivity."a8 Hirschkop's analysis bears crirectly on the *"y i'which \wochenKlausur was able to creafe a physicar and psychological .,frarne,, around the boat talks, setti.g them apart fr.m daily conversation and allowing the participants to view dial.gre 'ot as a t.<ll but as a process of self-transformation. This "ethical dimensi.n " of largu:rge Hirschkop , writes,
does not so much add depth to the space a'd time of language as reor.der our sense of what it means to participate in it. It is the dilerxion we blot out when we respond to language as "practically interested transrnission,',

,ol,riio'to

of nature or alchemically elevating the primitive, the degraded, and the vernacular into great art. Throughour. rhe locus of expressive meaning remains the radically auronomous figure of the individual artist. A dialogical aesthetic suggests a very different image of the artist, one defined (as I have already suggested with reference to Jay Koh), and of a willingness to accept a position of dependence and intersubjective vulnerability relative to the viewer or collaborator. Habermas's concept of an "ideal speech situation" captures an important, and related, aspect of these works, evident in I7ochenKlausur's "boat trips" on Lake Zurich. The collaborators in this project (the attorneys, councilors, activists, editors, and so on who embarked on these short journeys) were constantly called upon to speak in a definitive and contentious manner in a public space (the courtroom, the editorial page,

letting our immediate and individuar needs brind us to those questions which are most sharply posed by our intersubjective situation, our'eediness and ultimate vulnerability, the role of the future, and the recognition of others in determining the meaning of our actions.ae

in terms of openness, of listening

jects because it would fail to provide a sufficie.tly',objective" or universal standard of judgment. (It was feared that the bulk of society was, as yet' incapable of rational thought.) In large measlrre this was due to the fact that philosophers such as I(ant and Hurne were writing in the epistemological shadow of a declining, but stilr resonant, theorogicar worldview. As a resulr, the philosophical systems that hoped to compere with this perspective tended to simply replace one form of reassuringly

ity. Early modern philosophers rejected the idea of an aesthetic consensus achieved through actual dialogue or c.nsurtatio, with other human sub-

Habermas's concept of discursive interaction suggests that there are two key differences betwee. a dialogical and a conventional model of aesthetic experience. The first differe'rce concerns claims of universal-

lrln t {}(,t(

t At ,.|il

ltr

lr,urs(('n(l('nl ;trrllrolity ((iotl) witlr;rrrollrt.r.(rt.,rson,.\(,,r/.\//.\ (()ututuut.\, r'tt.). A tlr:rlogicrtl rrt.stltctic, lor its l'rirr.l, tlot's rrol t.lrrirrr to Pt.ovitlt., or lt'tlttit't', tlris l<irttl
ol-

.rr tlrc gcrrcration of a local c()nsensual l<nowlcclgc thrrt is only provisi.nally birrding and that is grounded instead at the Ievel of collective
in

trltivcrsalor olrjcctivc lourrtlrrtiorr. l{rrtlrcr, it is basccl

tcrrrction. Thus the insights rhat emerge from willats's collaborations with estate residents are not presented as enduring truths applicable to all people (as is the case in accounts of the transhistorical aesthetic power of Greek sculpture or the synesthesia evoked by the paintings of Kandinsky or Klee). The underlying assumption here is that it is possible to engage in communicative interaction across boundaries of difference without the legitimating framework of a universal discursive system because the necessary framework is established through the interaction itself. of course we must be realistic about the fallibility of discursive exchange. Like Habermas's "ideal speech situarion," the model of a dialogically produced identity I am elaborating is something that these projects tend toward or approximate, rather than reproduce. At the same time, it is necessary to believe that people are at least potentially capable of entering into discursive exchange without immediately succumbing to rhe snares of negation and self-interest. The second difference between a dialogical and a conventional model of the aesthetic concerns the specific relatio.ship between identity and discursive experience. In conventional aestl'retic experience, the subject is prepared to participate in dialogue tl-rrough an essentially individual and physical experience of "liking." It is o.ly rrftcr passing through the pr'cess of aesthetic perception that one's crrpacity for discursive interacrion is enhanced (i.e., one's sensory encounter with the work of art makes one more open-minded or receptive in future social inreracrions). In a dialogical aesthetic, on the other hand, subjectivity is formed througb discourse and intersubjective exchange itself. Discor-rrsc is simply a tool to be used 'r.r to communicate an a priori "content" with .ther already formed subjects but is itself intended to model subjectivity. This brings us to a complex point rcgrrrcling the specific way in which Habermas defines discursive interacri... Several possible criticisms of Habermas's model relate to the bracketi'rg of power differentials among speakers that is a precondition for participation in the public sphere. Habermas tends to underestimate the extent to which the competence necessary to participate in discourse is itself produced by forms of material and social power. Thus his account fails to explain how the ef-

It'r'ls.l tullru,rl ol sylrrb,lic capitrrl rulrol)g privilcgccl spcirl<crs, or.of lrt'gt'rrr,rric rr'clcls .f langr-ragc a'd rhetoric, can be prevented from birrsi.g rliscrursc. Further, he denies discursive legitimacy to forms of comrrrrilricatiOn (emotive, nonverbal, or gestural, etc.) that cannot be articulrrtccl in tcrms of a system of argument. A second criticism, which has l.'cc.r cleveloped from the point of view of psychoanalytic theory, involves I {rrbermas's assumption that we are, as discursive agents, capable of both identifying and representing our interests in a direct and unmediated
rrtanner.5o

sumes that as rational subjects we resp<lnci only to the "illocutionary force" of the better argument, or "good reas.rrs.".5 I But why should we necessarily respond to reason? \il/hat rnakes an argulnent..good"? rVith reference to what, or whose, standard, values, or interest is this superior strength or legitimacy determined? Further, what incentive do all these forceful speakers have to suspend their suasive campaigning in order to simply listen? How do we differentiate an assent won by rhetorical attrition from true understanding? This is why I consider Fiurnara's philosophy of listening to be important. A related concepr emerges in attempts to define a feminist model of epistemology. In their study Women's \Xlays of IGowing (ryg6), Mary Field Belenky and her co-authors identify what they rerm "connected knowing," a form of knowledge based, not on counterpoised arguments, but on a conversational m'de in which each i'terlocutor works to identify with the perspective of tl.re .thers. t2 This "procedural" form of knowl-

The most relevanr criticism of Habermas from the perspective of di, alogical art practice relares to his definition of the public sphere as a space of contending opinions and interests, in which the clash of forceful argumentation results in a final winning position that can "compel" the assent of the other parties. Habermas's discursive participants may have their opinions challenged, and even chirnged, b't they enter into, and depart from, discursive interaction as ontologically stable agents. He as-

two interrelated ele.rents. First, it is concerned with recognizing the social context from which others speak, iudge, and act. Rather than hold them accountable to sonrc ideal or generalized standard, it attempts to situate a given discursive statement in the specific material conditions of the speaker. This involves a recognition of the speaker's history (the events or conditions that preceded the speaker's involvement in a given discursive situation) and his or her position relative to modes of social, political, and cultural power both within the discursive situation and outside it (thereby acknowledging the operative
edge is defined by

DIAI OGICAI AFSTHFTICS

DIALOG CAL AESTHETICS

lt

lolcc of forrns of social domination th:rt are ostensibly bracl<eted-and lrt'rrcc disregarded-in the Habermasian public sphere). Thus a speal<er with a r"nastery of grammar, vocabulary, and rhctoric enhanced by a privilcge d education would communicate very differer-rtly from a speaker with()r-rt such advantages. This does not mean th:lt the insights of the less edrucated are any less valid, only that they n.ray require a different form of
listening. The second characteristic of connected knowilrg involves the redefi-

nition of discr-rrsive interaction in terms of elnpathetic identification. Rather than enter into communicative exchange with the goal of representing "self " through the advancement of already formed opinions and judgments, a connected knowledge is grounded in our capacity to identify with other people. It is through empathy that we can learn not simply to suppress self-interest through identification with some putatively universal perspective, or through the irresistible compulsion of logical argument, but literally to reclcllne self: to both knr>w and feel our connectedness with others. Again, the concept of listening is central to a con-

nected l<nowledge. In a follow-r-rp volume to Vlomen's'Way of Knowing (Knowl e d ge, D iffer ence dnd P ow er, r 9 9 6), Patrocinio Schweickart notes Habermas's tendency to "overvalue" argumentation as a form of knowledge production and his inability to rccognize that listening is as active, prodr-rctive, ar-rd complex as speaking: "ITlhere is no recognition of the necessity to give an account of listening as doing something. . . . [T]he listener is reduced in Haben-nas's theory to the minimal quasi-speaking role of agreeing or disagreeing, silently saying yes or no."53
EMPATHETTC /ivS/GHr tN LACY AND MANGLANO-O7ALLE

The ry99 killings in :r Littleton, Colorado, high school by two troubled teenagers occasioned an outpouring of vitriol against the young men and against a decadent or permissive culture that could have encouraged them to cornrlit this heinous act. \fhat was neglected in this response was the extent to wlrich the social er-rvironment of the high school itself, with its rigid hicrirrclries, casual violence, fear of difference, and vindictiveness, piayed rr rolc in their actions. Although economically and racially priviiegccl, tlrcsc younu men were also largely ostracized from the school's clr.rnrrniurI cultrrrc; thcy werc ror-rtinely beaten, forced to walk thc halls with tlorvrrc:rst cycs, ancl rttacl<cd as "faggots" by the school's ostcrrsibly rrn llorrlrlt'tl clitc.'l lris trcrlturcnt clocs rrot justifv thcir rrctiorrs, l)ut wc crur not lropt'1o urttlt'r-st;ttttl tlrt'rttt'rurittri ol tlrcst'rtcts (;trrtl ltorv lo I)r-('v('r1t

and objects. ("[Rlight from the beginni'g you rrave access ro rayers of d'n't exclude rh.sc wh'are less confident or proficie't in langr-rage.")'5a Ernpathetic insight can be pr:oduced alo'g il series of axes. The first occurs in tire r:app.rt between artists and their collab.rators, especially in those situations in which the artist is workirg across boundaries race, eth'icity, gender, sexuality, or class (in 'f Stephen \willats's projecrs, for exarnpre). These relationships can be quite difficult to neg.tiate equitably, as the artist .ften .perat.. n, or. .utsider, a position of perceived c'ltural authority. The second axis of 'ccupying cmpathetic insight occurs arxong the collaborirtors themselves (with or without the mediati'g figure of the artist). Dialogical projects can enh:rnce solidarity among individuals who arready ,hn.. n set of material
embedded mea'ings, and [you]

her work witlr no'r-F,nglish-speaki'rg str-rdents <:tn \xlest Meets East, describes the i'rportance of collaborative exche'ge frarnecl around images

initiatives and prison expansi'n in the United Str,rtes). \fe seem to have largely lost the capacity for empathy, for inragirg ourselves (or our circumstances) as differe't from who wc rlrcr (,r what tlrey ar:e). Tlris identification can never be co'rpletc-wc crrl rrcvcr clirir-r-r to fully inhabit the other's subject position; but wc carr irrrrgi.c it, arcr this imagination, this approxirnation, can r:rclically rrltcr orrr scnsc of who we are. It can become the basis for comtnunicatiotr ancl unclerstanding across differences of r:tce, sexuality, ethnicity, ancl so or-r. E*pathy is subject t' its .wr kirrcl of ethicar :rbuse-the arrogance of speaking for others-which I wiil examine in the next chapter. However, I also feel that a c.nccpt clf empathetic insight i. n ,r...rr,rry component of a dialogical aesthetic. Further, I would contend that the process of collaborative production that occurs in the works I am discussi'g (involving both verbal and bodily interaction) can help to generate this insight while at rhe sarle tirne allowing f.r a discursive e"change that can acknowledge, rather than exile, tlre nonverb:rl. Loraine Leeson, in

general public indifference ro the brur:rlizing impact of ,.law and orde r,,

ture indulges in an entirely punitive mc'tarity t.ward those wh, rrc defined as different (s.mething thar is everi more painfully eviclent in rhc

llr,rr rr',rrttcntt)r'rrillrotrl,rr'l.tt,,n,l...ll,,irr1',itstllttts.Alllooolltn()ur'(ul

c,rilntrnitics of viewers (often subsequent to the actu:rl procluctio, .l rr gi'cr Prrjcct). l)ial'gicirl w.rks can challcngc cr.'ri.rrrt rcr)r(,sr,rtrl (iotts ol :t rlivt'lt cottttttttltity:trrcl crclttc:.1 nr()r'c colrrplt,r rrntlt,r-stlrrrtlirli ,1, rurtl ( n)l):rrllv lor, tlr:rr tonrrrrurrir\, :un()n1,, ,t lr.r,:rtlt.r. p1lrli,. Ilr,.s,.

and cultural circumsrances (e.g., work with rrade unions by artists sr-rcl.r as Fred Lo'idier in clalifor.ia or carole concl6 and I(arl Bevericlge i. olnaclir). The final axis is produced between the collaborators a'd'thcr

llr,

l)ln I {,{,1(

Al

,, I

llt

t(

'

l)lAl r(,1( Al

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lt(

solitl,rlity ctt':ttiott, solitlrrr-rty t'rrlrlrrr.t.rrrt.rrt, ;urtl llrt. t'rrnlt'r'lrt'13t'rrorric-seltlorn cxist irr isolation. Arry givt'rr Projcct will ryPit:rIIy opcrrrtc irr rrrultiplc rcgisters. 'l'hc work of Slrzanne Lacy and T.E.A.M. (Teens + Educ:rtors + Artists + Mcclia) provides a useful example of collaboratively generated empathctic insight.The Roof Is on Fire (the project in oakland that I discussed in thc introduction) provided the students with a space from which to speak to each other and to a broader audience (whether the audience that actually attended the performance or the viewing public that saw coverage of the piece in the local and national media) that functioned as a rhetorical stand-in for a dominant culture that is far more comfortable telling young people of color what to think than it is with hearing what they have to say. The process of active, creative listening is evident both in Lacy's extensive discussions with the students in developing the project and in the attitude of openness encouraged in the viewer/overhearer by the work itself.55 This project generated empathetic understanding between Lacy and young people from quite different cultural backgrounds (and among the young people thernselves). At the same time, it provided a space for identification between the stlldents and the viewers of the work. An issue that repeatedly en"rerged dr-rring the rooftop dialogues in this project was the conflict between young people of color and the Oakland police. As a follow-up to the performance, [.acy organized a series of distlrrt
cussions between police and high school stuclcnts tl.rat extended over several weeks. Her goal was to create a *".rfc' cliscr-rrsive space (reminiscent of WochenKlausur's boat trips) in whiclr yoLmg people could speak honestly to the police about their fears ancl concerns and in which both po-

t ltttt(li()tls

ol "ltotttt', lrcrtlth rrrttl sitlcty, r'rlucatiorr arrcl cntploynrcnt, lceclcrship arrcl tltt:rlts."\(' 'l'hc "(lr-rlture in Action" exhibition organized by Sculpture Chicago tltrrirrg 1,2.12 and r993 featured a number of projects concerned with the gcncration of empathetic insight. Curated by Mary Jane Jacob, .,Culture ir Acti.n" was a landmark in the development of dialogically based art practice rn the United states, bringing broader public attention ro a.rrisrs and groups that had been working in this manner for a number of years.JT A "Culture in Action" project by Inigo Manglano-Ovalle in Chicago,s largely Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Central American \fest Town neighborhood relates directly to the modes of empathetic insight that I outlineil above. Manglano-Ovalle, who lives in \7est Town, began by proposing a project that would reclaim the neighborhood's social spaces from the threat of gang violence. Sereno/Tetulia tnvolved a system of outdoor
benches and streetlights intended to encourage the re-creation of the Latin American tradition of tetulia: rhe comrnunal gathering of neighbors on their porches and steps to socialize in the evenings. As Manglano-ovalle worked on this project, he came to realize that the influence of gang culture on the neighborhood had to be addressed more directly. The gangs were not simply a pathological excrescence on the West Town community. Rather, they performed a positive function, providing a sense of solidarity, collective identification, and respect for young people whose possibilities in life were severely restricted by racism, poverty, and spatial segregation. Unfortunately, these emotional rewards were won at the cost of a self-destructive and violent conflict between rival gangs, each seeking to define itself in opposition to the other. Manglano-Ovalle decicled to clcvelopr a project tlrat would encoLrrage empathetic identification betwccrr garrg nrcr.nbcrs ar-rcl neighborhoocl residents across both generational arrcl cultrrral b'urclarics. v7<rrking in collaboration with \wells High School, lrnrcrsor.r FIousc (ionrnrunity center, Erie Neighborhood House, and Clourrnr.rnity'l'clcvision Nctworl<, he proposed the formation of a video crllectivc witlr tlrc inrcrtion of bringing the members of different gangs together tlrrough rhe process of documenting and representing the \West Town corlnrunity. Hc hoped to lead the various gang factions to envision themselvcs as part of a larger communal entity. The collective was named Street l.evel Video (SLV), and their firstpro ject,Tele-Vecindario, involved inrerviewing residents of the neighborhood in order to develop an imaginative map of Xfest Town. Tapes were screened at Emerson House and were also shown on a Chi-

lice and young people could begin to iclcrrrify with each other as individuals rather than abstractions (the "gangst:..r" or the "cop"). According to Lacy, "The changes in body larrguirgc <>f the ten officers and fifteen youth who met weekly over two months nrarked a transition from stereotypes to dimensional personalities. I founcl rny own perceptions changing as I encountered police ir-r cars ancl younll pe ople in baggy jeans. lWere they one of my friends, someone I krrow?" This dialogue was followed up by No Blood/No Fowls, a "baskctball ganre as performance" berween Oakland Police and young people thirr combined video, interviews with players, dance, and a sound track to cxplore "how differences and conflicts can be examined without violerce." Lacy subsequently worked with the city of oakland to develop an c)aklir'd Youth Policy addressing issues

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

DIALOGiCAL AESTHETICS

119

crrllo cable access station. Tele-Vecindario evolved into a subsequent pr<rject called Cul de Sac, featuring a block party, a street parade, outcloor video installations in neighborhood front yards, murals, and a video rnemorial (Rest in Peace)with tapes devoted to victims of gang violence. A crucial component of Cwl de Sac was the process of negotiating among rival gangs in order to secure spaces to insrall television monitors and contacting neighborhood residents to provide the electricity to run them. This kind of collaborative and cooperative interaction was imporratrt in helping to create new forms of identification among gang members and the residents. The SLV collective continues to operate in Chicago (as Street Level Youth Media) with a wide and growing range of programs.5s This "afterlife," which was also evident in Lacy's work with youth policy in Oakland, is an important feature of dialogical proiects.
CONCLUSION: LEVINAS, BAKHTIN, AND PERFORMATIVE IDENTITY

The artists I have discussed above begin their work not with the desire to express or articulate an already formed creative vision but rather, as Fiumara has suggested, to listen. Their sense of artistic identity is sufficiently coherent to speak as well as listen, but it remains contingent upon the insights to be derived from their interaction with others and with otherness. They define themselves as artists through their ability to catalyze understanding, to mediate exchange, and to sustain an ongoing process of empathetic identification and critical analysis. I want to conclude by briefly discussing the broader philosophical implications of this approach, especially as they relate to issues that will emerge in my analysis of dialogical projects in the final chapter. In his study Alterity Politics: Ethics and Performatiue Swbiectiuity (tgg8), Jeffrey T. Nealon examines the constitution of subjectivity in

terms of communicative interaction, focusing on Mikhail Bakhtin's model of "dialogical" experience and Emmanuel Levinas's concept of "responsibility." In each case there is an insistence on preserving the "irreducible element in human contact" that resists co-optation by a more general or abstract conceptual power. Thus our capacity for ethical (and orre nright also say aesthetic) judgment derives not from the heady vantagc point of some transcendent subiectivity but from a given "dialogical sitr-ration in all its concrete historicity and individuality."se F'or [-cvinrrs rrncl llakl-rtirr <>ur willingness to interact in an cthical nrilrurcl'with othc'rs is rrot flrc rcsrrlt of sorlc lrbstrirct scnsc of cluty; r:rthcr, rtccorclirrg to Nt':rlon, "t'irclr ol tlrcrrr rrlgrrcs tlrrrt cfhics is cottstittttivt'ly lirrkt'tl ttr

corporeality, the direct experience of 'lived' tirre and place, and our affective and meaningful relationship with concrete others."60 Levinas describes intersubjective ethics in terms of the corrcrctc rcality of the other experienced through a "face to face" encounter.('l This "corporeal" interaction is central to a dialogical aesthetic. lt is cviclcrrt in works such as Mierle Laderman Ukeles's Touch Sanitatirm (19llo), arr cxrended performance in which the artist personally shool< hancls wirh, arrcl thanl<ed, more than 8,5oo sanitation worl<ers front thc Ncw Ylrl< (iity l)epartment of Sanitation. Her intentiolt wils to publicly acl<nowlcclge, tlrrough direct physical contact, the positivc valuc of worl< that is ofterr either ignored or disparaged as unclean.('2 Levinas and Bakhtin r>ffer alternatives to the violent mastery of conventional Cartesian identity while still preserving a framework that allows the subject to exercise solrre agency in the world. However, Nealon contends that Bakhtin's model is unable to entirely avoid the instrumentalizing tendencies of conventional reason. While Bakhtin describes a subjectivity that is formed through dialogical interaction, the ultimate goal of this interaction is the expansion of the authoring subject, for whom the other remains a mere vehicle. Bakhtin's subject, "like Odysseus," as Nealon observes, "returns home from erperience each time and finds itself changed and enriched, more open ro its own possibilities as it travels through different worlds of Otherness. . . . In the end, what is important is authoring my text: the story of my 'independence, internal freedom, unfinalizability and indeterminacy.''63 According to Levinas, in contrast, we should expect no ontological "payoff" from our encounter with the other. Rather than conceive of ethics as a set of behavioral guidelines to be followed by an already formed subject, Levinas views ethics itself as "first philosophy." For Levinas our very capacity to identify ourselves as subjects is a gift ro us from the other. As Nealon suggests, " [T]he ineluctable experience of the other is the foundir-rg of selfhood. . . . My ability to think, act, and resist [is] literally from and for the other."64 Levinas suggests a form of identity that can encounter otherness not as an opportunity for transcendence (the "imperialism of the ego," as he dcscribes it) but as a precondition for agency and subjectivity itself, leadirrg to a kind of "serial epiphany" that can result in "openness" to the otl'rcr rirther tl-ran defensiveness and fear.6s According to Nealon, it is Levirras's rrltnristic concern with "concrete" others that differentiates him lr'orrr llal<htiu, for whom, clialogics notwithstanding, the other still funcliorrs irs rr vt'lrrr'lc lor scll-rcrrlizrrtiorr.('r' But Ncalon overlooks a significirnt

lllr
I

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

DIALOGlCAL AESTHETICS

seem to focus on tt'rrsiOtt in l,evinas's account of the other' Levinas does "the cafess" rhc ruaterial specificity of the other. (Experiences such as .,face to face" encounter play a central role in his work.) I-evinas rtnd the reason' which fears that this specificity will be s:rcrificed by conventional seeks

to impose an a priori conceptLlal framework on the potentially as a mere reinfinite .o-ple*ity of the other. Hcrc thc "I" sees the other of self. But to irvoid Source' seel<ing in it a reflection, and cclnf]rrnatitln, is precluded from this sort ,rf .on..ptunl violence, thc Lcvinasiar-r sr:biect

assurnes that communicating with the other (the act of coultr.tt-tt.ticetion authority the other occupies a provisionally linite point of elocutionary any "krlowledge" of the other and receptivity) or, in fact, from having

or of otherness and alterity that concerns hinr. (lonsiclcred from another perspective, then, Levinas is n9 less guilty tllrrr llal<l.rtin 6f treating the other as an abstracticln. Moreover, thc othcr is tto lcss sr-rbject to the instrumentalizing desire of the self, which rccltrilcs tltt' of hcr ill ofder to establish its own identity as an ethical str[ricct. l.cvirres's problcmatic relationship to the material specificity ol'tht'olht'r-, lris "llistorictrl and genealogical deracination," as f-Llcc lrigrlrrry tlt'strilrt's it' is cvitlcrlt in his treatment of the feminine other, wlriclr lunc(i()ns rts ,t "1.rst'tttlo-rtrtitual\Wotttrttt is that which istic" foil for an ir-rtrinsically "ttrescttlittt"' strbicct. is subject to love (belovecl, <'tr dirtric) bttt ltot th:lt wlrich is capablt: of love in turn. The fen'rininc in l.cvirras, :ts Iligrlray writcs, "docs llot strrlld

atall(whichwould,again,requirefixingtheother'sidentitywithindeterminant conceptual or descriptive limits)' an amorThe other is less an interlocutor for Levinas than an intuition: which we can know nothing and phous and undifferentiated event about t.for. which the only forrn of "communication" we can risk is the mute for reciprocal gesture of submission. Language' as such, is less the basis .".hnng. between self anJother than a kind of "prayer" or supplicano answer.67 tion, in response to which the "I" can expect or enticipate

Infact,..reciprocity''itselfisanathema,asitcouldopenthedoortoan expect someinterested or calculating relationship in which we would it.68 Even the thing from the other in ,.t.rrr-, for our submission before ,.face to face,, encounter is defined by a necessary temporal disjunction relation," as between the self and the other (it is a "relation without with each Levinas writes), who ciln never be "contemporaneous" that Levinas other.('e It is particularly interesting to note the opposition "ethical" language. Rhetoric is disestablishes between "rhetorical" and manipulaparaged because it implies a form of persuasior-r (and hence at all (in tio,-,iof the other, whiie ethical language is not really language

for an other to be resl'rcctecl irr hcr lrurrtatt frccclotrt ,rncl httm,rtl iclcrrtity. The feminine othcr is lcft withottt hcr owtt spccific f:rce."72 These questiols 9f agcncy lcircl tg a relatecl issue. What is the status of the self and the sclf-other: relationship as ourlined by l.evinas? Is he describing the actual process through which we encounter difference or an ideal form of intersubiective experience tgward which we shor-rld strive? Or is this meant to be an account of the way in which we would "naturally" approach otherness were it not for the destructive oltological conditioning imposed on us by \X/estern tradition?7:r Does the "T" in f:rct require the presence of the other as a catalyst to achieve this form of ethical insight? Nealon speaks of encounters with thc other as "scri:rl

epiphanies." But wh:rt happens in those periorls bchucen ()tlr enc()ullters with otherness? Do we relapse ir-rt<t egoisn'r ancl c<thcrerrcc? or afe we simply awaiting a single self-transfortttins cucottttter with thc othcr that will catapult us, once and for all, intg rr rccggtliti1;rl gf thc "wgncler of the infinite"?7a Further, how can one tal<e up a position of responsibility to rhe other without some understancling of its social specificity? Simply stating that the "I" is defined by a pr:ior sense of obligation to the other
does not tell us what kinds of subiectivity or agency rnight be suhsecluently

to an unknown, the conventional sense) but an act of "saying" directed Levinas recapitulates a fear of disand unknowable, interlocutor.T0 Here now "rhetoric" course that has borne the name of kitsch, theater, and (while also echoing Barnett Newman's concept of art as "an address to thc r-tnl<uown"
dreadecl ptlsArry cliscursive exchange between self and other raises the n-right expcct s()lllc sibility tl.rat the self rnight rnake demands on the other,
)'71

mobilizcd on the basis of this responsibility.Ts FIow can we evaluate the

:rlltl itr 0rrtic.Prryofi,r|. 1-r"rr,,nr.l gain from thcir etrcotttltcr. As rr rcsttlt, (.()1lt-rl(lislilctilrt t<> ltis c6lcr-:rrr witl'r sllccitlcity, tlrc tttllt'l't:tlit's ott lltl ronitrlt

relative benefit or harm caused by our acti<lns on the other's behalf without some way in which to interact with, and learn from, it discursively? ln short, what would a Levinasian practice look like? This confusion is cxrrcerbatecl by the fact that Levinas provides few concrete examples of rhc l<irrcls of interactions he describes. 'l lrcr.c appcrrrs to be no possibility in Levinas's analysis that the en(()unt(,r'with othcrttcrss conlcl in fact lerrd the self away from tl.re blantlislyrrt.rrls

{ltt ollttt rts:t .rlrrrosl lrrt.lrrPlrl,sitlrl slil(US irr l.r'r,ittlts's rvl-itirl1". lt is ltss it istllt ttlt t ol llrt olltr'l ttlti(t sllrr.rlttl trr sl)il((':lll(l litrlt lll'ttr

ol rnrrstt'r'y anrl "cgo inrpcrialism" it't sttbsccltrent cllcoLltlters n,ltlr.r 1t()l(.(()1(t(.(('ilrlt'r'l6crtt6l'.'l'ltt'6tlrt; tttttsl t'ttlr.titt l-t;.l.cttrlrlly

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'

l,r'\'r,rrtl tlisrrrlsivt,r.t'rrr.lr,;rntl tlrt,st,ll rrrust lrt,tlt.rrit.rl llrt,rrst.()l lilrlluilll(. 'ttttl t'vt'tt lt'tttP.l'itl c()('\istctcc with thc ()tll..r,()w arrcl f'rcvcr. l. his ,rr rrr lysis ,l: tlrc crrr vcrrti.rrr l ()clysscar sr-rbjcct, Nealon clescribes

event?

rather than sacrificial, view of inrersubjectivity is essentiar to a drarogical aesthetic. Rather than seek indeterminateness ancr excess in an object that resists conceptual classification (as in the traditions of modern nrrd port-od.r. formalism) or in an epistemologically sequestered other (Levinas's otherbeyond-discourse), Bakhtin will locate ii ln the a- of dialog.r. itr.lf, the u'expected insights achieved via colraborative ", interactl' p.odrr.. new forms of subjectivity. As with Nealon's criticism of Bakhtin, the dialogical artist will find his or her identity "enriched,, or expanded through collaborative inreraction, but so, arguably, wiil his or her coilaborators. Is it possible ro conceive of this ontic payoff not as a singular possession to be won or lost at the expense of another but as a collectively realized

and the other' But Bakhtin argues that dialogical exchange can have precisely this reciprocal effect: that the result of a dialogical encounter i, to up.r, both participanrs to the "excess" that is made possible by the provisionar blurring of boundaries between self and other. This reciprocar,

itory of ontic richness and mystery, even as the self is abased before it). Excess thus takes the form of an ontological currency that can only be "spent" by an individual subject rather than shared between the self

prediscursive "excess" must be accumulated by a single ther the odyssean self or the other (which becomes, for

the total proscription of intersubjective e*change on the other. Nealon's analysis assumes a kind of zero-surn economy

tion between discourse and countercliscourse: an unforgiv_, irrrrru_ mentalization (defined by rhetoricar manipulatio') on th. 1.,. hand and
in which the

pi'clikc self at the expense of the other; the ,,I,, emerges from its encounter with alterity ontologically enriched, more compler, und more expansive, while the other is drained of its materiar specificity ,J;;;ro p"l. absrracrion. The only way to avoid this o.rr.o*. ""d is to eliminate discur_ sive interaction entirely. Flere again, we have the characteristic
opposi-

by which thc i.clctcrmi'ate "excess" of otherness (the infinite cornplexity ,f thc self that lies beyond discourse) always ,,accrues,,to the vam,

ir pr()cess

p"rti.ifnrrt, .i-

Levinas, a repos-

oll;rlrolrrlor.s t() t('nrporarily inhir[rit thc privilcgecl position of thc cxprt'ssivc cr'('1ll()r. llut wc also ncecl a way to understand how identity might r'lrrrrrgc ovcr tintc-r.rot through some instantaneous thunderclap of insig,lrt but throngh il more subtle, and no doubt imperfect, process of colIt'ctivcly gerrerated and cumulatively experienced transformation passing t h lougl.r phases of coherence, vulnerability, dissolution, and recoherence. 'l'his seems to me much closer to the spirit of the projects that I am discussir-rg here. If Levinas reminds us of the pervasive power of "egoicity" in our relationships to others, Bakhtin holds out the hope that this tenclcncy can be undone by something other than mute supplication. Ultimately it may not be possible to square the circle between Levinas and Bakhtin, between the dangers of domination and the demands of agency and sociality, and perhaps it is not necessary to do so. The constant trumping of ontological purity (the c{rive to rnove philosophy forward by devising more and more elaborate systems for defining a subject entirely purged of the capacity for ontological negation) faces the law of diminishing returns. While it is important ro locatc ethical rnodels for intersubjective experience, it is also necessary, at least for my investigation here, to bring these models into some strategic relationship to the quotidian practice of human interaction. It is in the nature of dialogical projects to be impure, to represent a practical negotiation (selfreflexive but nonetheless compromised) around issues of power, identity, and difference, even as they strive toward something more. In the remaining chapters I will exarnine these negotiations in greater detail, exploring the complex relationships that unfold within them between empathy and negation, domination and dialogue, and self and other.
t

Nealon's criticism of the nomadic odyssean subject is useful (I will develop a related analysis in chapter and in fact we can locare con4), crete examples of it in community-based practices in which the artist func, tions as a kind of tourist of the disempo*..ed, traveling from one site of poverty and oppression to the ,r."i nrrd allowing his"or her various

ltffi