Constructing a European Frontier

Nature, militarization and ethics of which border?

An essay by Moritz Hessler. September 9, 2011

Almost all the hard questions of our time converge on the status of borders; of boundaries, distinctions, discriminations, inclusions, exclusions, beginnings, endings, limitations and exceptions, and on their authorization by subjects who are always susceptible to inclusion or exclusion by the borders they are persuaded to authorize.1 Until the era of colonization, fixed borders, as we know them today, were alien to Africans. Limitations of kingdoms and chiefdoms were rather fluid and permeable. With the partitioning of Africa on the Berlin conference 1884-52 the colonial masters not only enforced the Western model of a nation state to their colonies, they also introduced modern concepts of citizenship and identity. These missions of bringing modernity to Africa are today considered to have enormously contributed to Africas poor situation and problems in the 20th century. For a long time, dynamics of globalization seemed to only work against the mother continent. Its former masters managed to transform colonial ways of exploitation into more subtle methods of political and economic cooperation. Facilitated by the relative geographical proximity the former European masters became the major political and economic partner for many African countries. Yet, illustrated as a flow, social and economic capital predominantly streamed to Europe, rather than to circulate as it would be expected in a cooperation. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the nation state's capacity for social integration is losing ground. We move toward 'postnational membership. The global economy is breaking up ties of solidarity and is widening the gap between winners and losers of modernization within the nation state. European

1 2

(Walker, 2006, p. 57) Cf. (Thomson, 2004)

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Why does Europe need a border? | Constructing a European Frontier

Integration is going to open up a new gap between the mobile lite of people moving toward a European identity and the less mobile people sticking to national solidarity.3 While promoting the process of European integration the continent of the former colonial masters began to construct an image of an open-minded, social, and diverse community. Unlike other world regions Europe appeared to successfully refine concepts of citizenship from being closely connected to the nation state to framing a new, broader construct. The European idea seemed to move towards the universal concept of Global Citizenship. Whereas most global perceptions of citizenry had, stemming from Western Enlightenment, always been connected to the structural and organizational limits of the nation state, supranational bodies like the Bretton Woods organizations strived to establish the pseudomodern concept of cosmopolitanism4 - combining Athenian Republicanism and Roman Liberalism5. The importance of one of the major achievements of globalization, physical and psychological mobility, is highlighted by Lerner, who states that above all, the success in obtaining Global Citizenship is to be measured in each individuals approach in extending its empathic capacity.6 Mobility therein facilitates the amalgamation of several identities into an individual version of Global Citizenship. Our multiple identities allow us each to connect not just to one place or culture or region or religion but to multiple facets of our world. [...] As individual we will find the maximum outlet for our creative energies and income-earning potential when we are part of global networks, at work and at play.7 Unfortunately, as any other citizenship, also the Global one seems to be somehow exclusive. Whereas employees of transnational corporations or supranational institutions are conceded the membership in a Global Citizenry, less elitist and sophisticated migrants are mostly excluded. Migrants would mostly move in a unidirectional flow from South to North and thus not qualify for broader concepts. The arguments of vernacular cosmopolitanism8, which addresses the conflict between traditional and cosmopolitan sets of values as well as of rights and duties, would support this categorization. Considering the fact that citizenship is not a membership to a club, but rather a right of existential belonging based on rights and duties of the Greek Republicanism and the Roman Liberalism, it would be interesting to examine from a global perspective in how far Global Citizenship reproduces colonial categorizations in terms of excluding outsiders as an inferior class without rights. Yet, I will rather focus on the dynamic character of the border as crucial regulator within the migrationdevelopment mantra, facilitating social, physical and intellectual mobility in a more or less selective manner. It is assumed that mobility will benefit development in so called developing countries. Yet, many analysts neglect the prerequisite of the freedom of movement to human capital and skills transfer such as

3 4 5 6 7 8

(Mnch, 2001, p. 1)

It can be called pseudo-modern because a few Greeks, specifically stated by Diogenes of Sinope 412 B.C., already regarded themselves as citizens of the world. Cf. (Hadas, 1943, p. 108) Cf. (Schrader, 2006, p. 221) Cf. (Lerner, 1958, pp. 47-54) (Sachs, 2008, p. 336) Cf. (Werbner, 2006)

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Why does Europe need a border? | Constructing a European Frontier

brain gain and social and financial remittances. As Glick Schiller and Faist point out, only temporary and circular migration, based on real mobility, will stimulate development.9 Yet, real mobility is increasingly constrained by the militarization of borders between the core and the periphery of a dependencia theory world. Despite the global North is in urgent need of specific labor forces it increasingly becomes protectionist against immigration. Officially justified by the defense of the welfare state there are myriad reasons of which the denial of global responsibilities is the most protruding. Summarized as the migration-development nexus10 and represented by among others the politics of fear and migration management, the South-North migration flow is featured as a threatening, unidirectional and neverending stream jeopardizing the socio-political status quo in the North. Neglecting the character of migration as balancing elements of a biased global economy completing the circular flow of cooperation the US and EU countries constantly fortifying their external frontiers against migration. Endorsed by the terrorist attacks of and after 9/11 the ultimate solution in protecting its citizens against the potential threat of every migrant seems to only be the militarization of the borders of the global North. What is the analytical basis to come to such a conclusion? What are the motivations for Europe in general and Germany in particular to erect and strengthen borders where in in what way? How does the European external border compare to the US-Mexican one?

Why does Europe need a border? Border controls must in particular respond to the challenges of an efficient fight against criminal networks, of trustworthy action against terrorist risks and of creating mutual confidence between those Member States which have abandoned border controls at their internal frontiers. (Commission of the European Communities, 2001) Based on the foundation of Modernism with its core element, the nation state, there was no evidence that globalization could produce anything else than increasingly radicalizing, exclusive identities. Global Citizenship, although aimed at becoming a broader idea, only reproduced these concepts with a different understanding of locality. As Maalouf elaborates in his book In the Name of Identity11 the border is a crucial instrument of building identities and thus to carve out the institutionalized form of identities: citizenship. The establishment and rootage of a common identity in the modern terminology requires a clear distinction between We and Them. A specific region with specific borders ensures a clear delineation in order to exclude Them and to construct an including We. But different to conventional and global citizenship it is difficult to apply such rhetorics to the European integration process. European citizenship aims at rather providing an umbrella for the whole diversity of different identities and citizenships in Europe than melting Europes diversity into one ideal. So, how do We exclude Them

Cf. (Glick Schiller & Faist, 2010, p. 10) Cf. (Glick Schiller & Faist, 2010, p. 6) Cf. (Maalouf, 2000)

10 11

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without knowing who exactly belongs to Us? Where and how can we draw a border in order to intelligently filtering illegal Them? The core values of the EU, manifested in Article 2 of its Treaty and adopted by its border agency Frontex, libertas, securitas, justitia, demonstrate the complexity of policing in the framework of allegedly antithetical ideas like freedom and security. The full implementation of Schengen as borderless area of freedom, security and justice had furthermore disaggregated the control over the movement of subjects from the territory of member states.12 Whereas and because internal borders at the shores of the nation states had been abolished the union identified a need to not only strengthen its external borders, but also to maintain control over the pan-European movement of irregular elements. As such [...] border controls [became] more and more differentiated, detached from the territorial logic and more targeted at specific groups.13 Similarly to the US example the EU strived and strives at erecting a smart border. In contrast to the US, this construction of the perfect wall is less the physical build-up of a barrier than a targeted and temporary militarization of certain districts at the external border as well as an internal securitization. Only an effective border mechanism would facilitate and increase freedom and security to EU citizens. The intelligent filter has to separate regular and wanted elements from the irregular, average, and potentially dangerous migrant.14 According to this ideal Europe is currently engaged in upgrading its borders in such way as to efficiently perform class categorization by sharpening the distinction between legal and illegal. The unanswered question remains: what is illegal immigration into the EU? How can a new and in many areas undefined construct as the EU maintain its control to broadcast a definition of who is an insider and who is an outsider? Can the strengthening and militarization of the border be explained by events like 9/11 and the Madrid bombings, or is it rather the next logical step in European integration?

Securitization & the War on Terror Apparently, events such as 9/11 led to changes in the vocabulary of policy makers and induced European politicians to concede increasing power to decreasingly controlled supranational agencies.15 But did 9/11 induce Europeans to implement a strategy of securitization of migration, as we would find it in the US and UK?16 Following the instinctive assumption that insecurity must come from outside also the EU institutions emphasized on highlighting links between terrorism, security, migration, and borders. Yet, the rationale to strengthen its borders arises rather from a motivation to mitigate risk than from an urgency to deal with an existential threat due to which security is invoked to legitimize contentious

12 13 14 15 16

Cf. (Vaughan-Williams, 2008, p. 63) (Jorry, 2007, p. 1) Cf. (Heyman, 2011) Cf. (Monroy, Europas Borderline, 2010) Cf. (Neal, 2009, p. 332)

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Why does Europe need a border? | Constructing a European Frontier

legislation, policies or practices that would otherwise not have been deemed legitimate.17 Migration is a potential threat, which requires trustworthy action in terms of solidarity to construct a notion of European identity and build a delineated Europe. In contrast to the definition that [s]ecuritization constitutes political unity by means of placing it in an existentially hostile environment and asserting an obligation to free it from threat18 rhetorics of exceptional means quickly faded after 2001 in favor of the business-as-usual agenda of the European integration process. Furthermore it can be questioned whether the still technocratic EU would be capable of transmitting common politics of fear. Europe is not a single polity. Migration as an immediate threat may cause a deeper concern in Italy than in Norway. If a debate about migration as a threat was held this happened either on the national level or in the highest political echelons of the EU, but not as a European public discourse so far. Neal emphasizes that the representations and perceptions of securitization politics may vary hugely according to the varying historical and social experiences of the different national audiences involved.19 Apart from the politics of fear the very structure of the union makes it very unlikely to decide on the exception and transcend the own legislative framework. Freedom and justice as two of the tree pillars of the European ideational set of values can be understood as derivative to the French Revolutions motto Libert, galit, fraternit and highlights the importance of predictability, consensus, and legitimacy within the union. Its major strength, but also by many identified as major weakness, is its bureaucracy and technocracy. Following this image the EU agreed on a cooperative action plan for the War on Terror. Biometric identifiers, information sharing, integrated border security, and effective risk analysis should impede terrorist movements by maximizing the capacities of existing border systems to monitor and counter movement of suspected terrorist.20 Combined with other mechanisms it puts all migrants under the general suspicion of being first a potential terrorist. This xenophobic, territorialistic politic was further supported by the critical economic state after the global economic downturn. In times of rising unemployment and lacking liquidity the popular suspicion against foreigners threatening the own existence by illegitimately profiting of the welfare state encourages nationalist image of migrants as smugglers, drug dealers, criminals, terrorists, representing the bad and disorderly Other. All boundary-crossing elements are potentially powerful and / or dangerous.21 It is difficult though to clearly attribute the nationalist-isolationist vision of a restored past and stable social, cultural, economic present to European joint action. Rather, as recently to be watched with the Danish example,22 the sacred nation state as clearly delimited territory prevails as dominant arena for such visions. As such, securitization and politics of fear are ruled out as decisive motives to explain why Europe is so keen to strengthen its borders. Rather than a state of exceptionalism through a terrorist threat,
17 18 19 20 21 22

Cf. Securitization Theory (Wver, 1995; Huysmans, 1995; Neal, 2009, pp. 335-338) (Huysmans, 1995, p. 50) Cf. (Neal, 2009, p. 337) Cf. (Vaughan-Williams, 2008, p. 66) Cf. (Heyman, 2011) Denmark officially communicated its will to leave the Schengen area.

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Where are the borders for which Europe? | Constructing a European Frontier

which would require immediate action, the union proclaims the risks of irregular migration as the major issue for the freedom, security, and justice within.

Europeanization Deducing from this evidence, the intended and realized strengthening of the border as limiting element for in- as well as outsiders can be considered to mainly aim at further evolving a notion of an European identity. As the relapses to national thinking in times of crises and Deleuze and Guattari highlight, the creation and development of any territory strongly depends on its borders, which mark inclusion and exclusion.23 The EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism once more focuses on emphasizing We and Them by stating: threat posed by terrorism to our society. Acts of terrorism are attacks against the values on which the Union is founded.24 It can be questioned whether such nationalist rhetorics benefit the formation of a much broader union. Should the border really be the essential idea of the EU, interlinking it with the core values of freedom security, and justice? Given demographic issues and the EUs key competency of managing diversity, wouldnt maybe new approaches of overarching, cooperative and inclusive politics provide a more efficient, and multilaterally beneficial solution?

Where are the borders for which Europe? In both law and practice the border for the movement of persons to and within Europe is no longer consistent with the edges of the physical territory of the member states. (Guild, 2005, p. 1) The interesting aspect is that the EU attempts to preserve nationalist rhetorics of border security applied to a broader geographic region, which is subject to a dynamic process of continuous integration and transformation. Considering internal and external realms and borders it can rightly be asked where and what is the border or, following Heyman, who are the deserving EU insiders and the serving Other outsiders?25 As Balibar states, borders are being multiplied and reduced in their localization, [] thinned out and doubled, [] no longer the shores of politics but [] the space of the political itself.26 The border becomes the facilitator for the advancement of Europeanization and European integration. A joint border against the Other represents the least common denominator in a diverse and heterogeneous union. Consequently, the localization of the border becomes more complex and its definition more generalized. For Guild the border is a place where control takes place on the movement of subjects into or within the EU.27 The complexity of migration and points of entry into the territory as well as the differentiated issue of citizenship and irregularity involve a more elaborated type of border, consisting of
23 24 25 26 27

Cf. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 353) (Vaughan-Williams, 2008, p. 69) Cf. (Heyman, 2011) Cf. (Balibar, 1998, p. 220) Cf. (Guild, 2005)

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Where are the borders for which Europe? | Constructing a European Frontier

internal and external borders. Furthermore, as the next chapter will show, border mechanisms adopt military and industrial methods as well as they offshore guarding beyond the physical borderline. European pre-border surveillance and border performances hundreds of miles away from Europe allow the critical question of how Europe defines its territory and borders and in how far the universal ideas of freedom and security are prudently balanced in a responsible way. How, for example, does pre-border surveillance and performances conform to the universal right of freedom of movement, which Europe put for itself amongst the key pillars of the union? Does only European citizenship grant the access to mobility, security and prosperity inside and outside of Europe? It is striking that new European borders are not only erected to intercept migration flows from Africa and Asia, but to actually construct a placeless border around a EU-citizen We. Europe equals European citizenship. Every other element, from the external or internal world, must be filtered by parameters of usefulness28. The issue becomes problematic when this rather overarching and extremely exclusive idea of European citizenship lays a claim to a certain territory the geographical area of the EU member states. With this claim it manifests a two-class society within the union, instead of preserving a diverse potpourri of differentiated citizenships of several layers: there is only the We, and those who We selected to be granted with a more or less temporary resident permit - such as the BlueCard for high skilled labor or the attraction of seasonal petty labor through bilateral agreements and informal attraction of certain migrant groups.29 The European integration project of building one citizenship and identity, unifying, countering terrorism as part of ensuring security, as well as most important raising solidarity seems to justify surveillance and border practices at and beyond the shores of as well as within the EU. The next chapter will illustrate the degree of polarization the integrated EU border security deploys. In the aftermath of 9/11 border security has increasingly focused on risk and the surveillance of non-EU-citizens as well as other practices that involved EU-citizens as objects and agents of surveillance. Sharpened the strategy could be described as good subjects are constantly on the look-out for suspicious or risky subjects. Citizen-detectives as integral part of the internal border are trained to reproduce the central dynamics of the war on terror.30 Frontex as central frontier agency accedes the official role to promote a pan-European model of integrated border security based on three tiers:31 1. Exchange of information and cooperation on issues relating to immigration and repatriation 2. Border and customs control focusing on surveillance, border checks and risk analysis 3. Cooperation between border guards, customs and police in non EU-states

28 29 30 31

Except citizens of partners from the ideological global West.

Compared to care labor in Canada. Different to other developed societies Europe isnt that much in need of petty labor since it is still able to recruit regular and cheap labor from its own, mostly Eastern territory. Cf. (Vaughan-Williams, 2008, p. 64) Cf. (Frontex, 2011)

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Which border mechanisms? | Constructing a European Frontier

Which border mechanisms? Representative for an increasing migratory flow from Africa to Europe, between January and September 2006 averagely 100-400 Africans arrived everyday at the Canary Islands, one of the migration hot-spot at Europes border. Since border security has undergone an evolution from nationally focused systems underlying the sovereignty of each state to operational cooperation at the external borders32 the first and immediate EU response was the deployment of Frontex personnel on-shore. Yet, the medium and longterm strategy was to prevent migration offshore and on the African shores. A complex border architecture of internal - consisting of mainly airport and citizen surveillance - and external borders - as such as the external East and Balkans land frontiers, the Southern sea frontier and ports, as well as the air surveillance comprising the space, airports, and extra-territorial intelligence. The identified need to increase cooperation, coordination, convergence, and consistency between border practitioners in the EU-Member States (Neal, 2009, p. 341) induced the union to establish Frontex as a centralized and relatively independent agency. The aim of disconnecting it from the immediate control of the political federation was to overcome bureaucracy, polity fragmentation, as well as diverging interest and risk perception. And even though the founders were out of legal issues hesitant to call it a European Border police and emphasized that the new organization was thought to support but dont replace national authorities it can be speculated that the disembodiment should also enable the supranational, and hardly intergovernmental, body to take use of extraordinary means outside of the arena of bureaucratic European decision-making.

The external border control risk and prevention beyond The aim of border control is to help to combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings and to prevent any threat tot he Member States internal security, public policy, public health and international relations. (Schengen Border Code (6)) Frontex, derived from frontires extrieures, was established in May 2005 as external border agency for the EU. Under its doctrine libertas, securitas, justitia it is controlled by two EU-commission officials and the heads of national border guard services. As discussed, its installation and hence the militarization of European external borders is less motivated by securitization impellent than by the continuation of the integration process and the principle of free internal movement.33 To ensure security and justice while abolishing internal borders in order to provide free internal movement a strengthening of the external borders is inevitable. Thus, Frontex is established not on the basis of securitization remits, exceptional politics and urgency, but in response to the disintegration of a common EU response to migration, security and borders. Several other dynamics, such as the increasing presence of far-right parties in an

32 33

(Frontex, 2011) Cf. (Neal, 2009, p. 344; Frontex, 2011)

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Which border mechanisms? | Constructing a European Frontier

increasing number of countries and the public debates about failed integration, prove this statement. The only logical answer to failed integration for European politicians seems to be a latching of the external borders.34 A joint border mechanism is aimed at reducing the potential decisionism, arbitrariness, and disparity of Member State border practices in order to avoid weak border parts hampering the effectiveness of the external EU borders. Frontex, the framework for this joint mechanism, was established to I) analyze the risk of vulnerabilities at the external border, II) help remedy these vulnerabilities through cooperative operation and consultancy, as well as to III) help upon specific emergency calls of member states. In close cooperation with other institutions and intelligence agencies such as Europol the new European border regime is capable to access comprehensive intelligence databases as well as civic and military resources and equipment.35 An example for the integrated border security strategy would be the new border surveillance system Eurosur which will become operative as joint decentral intelligence and communication system and integral military installation from 2013 onwards.

Figure 1: Budget Development, (Frontex, 2011, p. 22)

As stated the organizational structure of Frontex is divided in six units, comprising I) risk analysis, II) coordination of operative sea, land, air, and III) repatriation cooperation, IV) protection of the external borders, V) border guard training and VI) cooperative research and development. Without a duty to inform member states the agency, merging intelligence and police remits, still operates in a legally grey area. The retreat of the political discourses about security and risk from the public to a centralized and for many intangible body represent the general trend of Europeanization - transferring discourse away from the public, and sometimes emotional, discourses of the political game into the rather technocratic and complex spheres of EU institutions.36 The two most important tasks of Frontex can thus be summarized as undertaking risk analysis and providing a cooperational platform by connecting all relevant political,
34 35 36

And for the Danish even of the internal borders, tackling Schengen. Cf. (Monroy, Militarisierung des Mittelmeers, 2011, p. 3) Cf. (Huysmans, 1995, p. 82)

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Which border mechanisms? | Constructing a European Frontier

military, intelligence and police bodies. Yet, even though it is often stated that Frontex isnt in dispose of operational assets and with few executive power, only accompanying a coordinative function,37 its power already six years after its establishment is greater than most would suppose. Pushed forward by mainly Germany and Spain the Member States agreed in 2010 to guarantee an anytime available toolbox of resources and operational assets, including military armament and intelligence instruments, as quasi Frontex-own capacities. With extended risk analyses and comprehensive intelligence and information networks Frontex aims at changing the logics of border guarding: instead of responding to security threats the goal is to anticipate and manage risks.38 Close cooperation of all partners via the interface Frontex is intended to transform border mechanisms from intercepting threats as they arrive at the border to assessing risks likely to emerge in the future. The installation of an efficient European intelligence and information database will improve the sharing of information related to border surveillance at tactical, operational and strategic level and will explore synergies on risk analysis and surveillance data in common areas of interest concerning different types of threats.39 By the agency regularly updated and distributed migration risk scenarios, relying on information from all organizations and databases40, are thought to facilitate all Member States to efficiently develop cooperative and anticipatory border strategies. Yet, such an anticipatory strategy would be inefficient wouldnt the border mechanism include more comprehensive defense and surveillance instruments. Especially the integration of Mauretania, Senegal, Capverde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Morocco, and Tunisia into the migration defense and systems led to public protest. The collaboration with African despots and the outsourcing of its border operations to African partners mostly involves serious human rights issues, as such as outsourced borders also mean outsourced responsibility to act in compliance with the human rights charter. Yet, the image of the perfect wall and the militarization of the EU external border doesnt become complete until the full integration of satellite surveillance, surveillance sensors, drones and radar, as well as of NATO capacities. The satellitebased EU system Global Monitoring of Environment and Security can be referred to as example for the automation and militarization of the border. With one of many functionalities it automatically detects nonregistered ships leaving the African cost and informs naval border patrols.41 Even though the definition of the perfect wall is far from being clear-cut, the European architecture seems to strive to become the role model for the efficient filtering mechanism. A filter, which decides based on mostly automated and standardized criteria would further pervert the heritage of the ancient pillars of the European culture and society, speaking of ideas such as the Greek cosmopolitanism. Instead, it would further subjugate a whole society to economic processes, arguing with an optimization of the efficiency in filtering, acknowledging the commodification of labor, as well as applying just-in-time ideas to human resources.

37 38 39 40 41

Cf. (Streck, 2007, pp. 1-2) Cf. (Neal, 2009, p. 349) (Frontex, 2011, p. 14)

Such as the register for deported individuals, a joint visa database with North African partners, air surveillance information from North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea area. Cf. (Monroy, Militarisierung des Mittelmeers, 2011, p. 3)

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Which border mechanisms? | Constructing a European Frontier

As shown in figure 2, return cooperation consumes the second largest amount of the Frontex budget. Officially, Frontex proudly highlights the professionalization of repatriation, represented by Italys detention camps in Lampedusa, offering a capacity of up to 11.000 people per site. In an almost industrial processing onsite screening centers identify the migrants origin, routes, and collaborators before they are repatriated with a ratio of 100%, as Frontex emphasizes. Yet, it is almost cynical to speak of repatriation, since, due to the organizational or structural lack of the proper patria, migrants are often sent anywhere to Africa. The most important goals seem to be the displacement out of spheres of European responsibility. Following this issue I was surprised to find a study The Ethics of Border Security in the download section of the official Frontex website. Yet, I was quickly again disenchanted: as most other research papers, the study mainly dealt with internal issues. Rather than discussing the militarization of the European border from a more comprehensive perspective, the study conducted by the University of Birmingham discussed moral issues of its border guards. As first comprehensive collection of existent codes of conduct for border guards it tries to discuss and balance ethical and moral aspects with legal and obliged codes of conduct. Due to Frontex dubious legal implementation and missing cooperational agreements many officers serving abroad are uncertain about their executive rights and duties. What can Frontex border guards do when theyve intercepted irregular immigrants? This not only touches issues of national sovereignty but also international agreements, as the already several times mentioned human rights charter, but also the agreement of maritime salvage. Hence, it is an important item on the agenda of Frontex to cooperate with international organizations such as the UNHCR.42

Figure 2: Final Operation Budget Distribution, (Frontex, 2011, p. 24)

42

Cf. (Frontex, 2011, p. 13; Streck, 2007, p. 3)

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Which border mechanisms? | Constructing a European Frontier

To support the European idea and deal with the disparities between different external border parts the fifth and sixth units of Frontex play a particular role in harmonizing the European border regime as well as in developing a core curriculum for official border guards with a certain reproducing effect on the European identity. The common curriculum and best practices are thought to replace state judgments based on self-interest or populism by rule of law and common procedures.43 The urgency for such common approaches, as with the need to accelerate the development of a true European identity, is best illustrated by the example of Denmark. Pushed forward by the ultra-right-winged party it currently aims at re-establishing its intra-European border to defend East-European labor immigration. It would yet be interesting to research the impact of such pan-European training- and research-facilities on first the identities of the border guards and second on the broader European identity. How does the militarization of the external border with all involved dynamics facilitate, and constrain, the European and any other identity. Resuming to The Ethics of Border Security44 it would be important to examine the suspenseful triangle of supranational ideas and rules, individual ethics, and national codes of conduct and laws. And finally, considering Schengen: what would the perfect wall mean to the European, and actually also universal basic to freedom of movement? Doesnt the EU risk a reproduction of exclusionary rhetorics on the national level, like we would find it in many Member States at the moment?

Internal borderwork: beyond Inside / Outside The main shifts in the post-9/11 era certainly happened in the domain of security practices. Surveillance, categorization, and broad-based approaches replaced conventional mechanisms. The forerunners of these new strategies were the directly by terror affected countries of the US and UK. But endorsed by the economic downturn and infiltrated by Anglophone media the generalized suspicion against migrants and foreigners began to grow also in continental Europe. European surveillance became not only a practice at, but as an essential element beyond and within the external borders. Especially two concepts, 1) surveillance by Frontex in North Africa and 2) EU citizens as objects and agents of surveillance, demonstrate the critical state of Europeanization through the forced and militarized construction of a frontier. It appears like Europe would consciously and paradoxically transgress the core values of its image, on which it intends to erect the European identity. How can freedom, security, and justice be guaranteed if they are all ignored in border practicing, internally and externally, on a daily basis? How does a state of general suspicion, monitoring and categorizing, helps the image of Europe as a continent, which gains most from its diversity? In his critique of these new strategies Vaughan-Williams especially emphasizes on the UK concept of the citizen detective, in which literally everyone becomes a border guard.45 The concept emerged with the battle against terrorism, which would require the mobilization of all We against Them, of the good and
43 44 45

Cf. (Neal, 2009, p. 348) Cf. (Centre for the Study of Global Ethics at the University of Birmingham, 2010) Cf. (Vaughan-Williams, 2008, p. 68)

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Assessing these mechanisms | Constructing a European Frontier

decent polis against the potentially evil intruder46. Citizenship becomes closely connected with surveillance as bordering practice among suspicious populations in order to strengthen domestic freedom, security, and justice. Clearly communicated politics of fear are aimed at erecting internal borders of surveillance not only in civic spaces but deeply penetrating the private spheres47. Besides many other issues, this polarization and generalized and objectless suspicion directly catalyzes a broadbased process of racialization48. Without a clear definition of what to look for everybody becomes suspicious especially stereotyped communities. Internal and external security measures even increase insecurity and fears and lead to a profiling and monitoring of everyone. The only winners may be populist nationalist interest groups. Yet, how does this British concept affect the more moderate politics of the other EU Member States? How does it affect the external European border? Circumscribed briefly, objectless suspicion, which provides a virtual mandate to heighten racialized ways of looking and judging in the name of national identity, is increasingly reflected by European top-down surveillance akin to Frontex-commissioned planes flying over African territory. The process of Europeanization with its integral element of distinguishing We from Them as well as the construction of a European border imply similar trends in broader Europe. Even though different in its nature, the rhetoric to protect Europe from immigrants can be compared to that of the War on terror. Fear, suspicion, and internal class hierarchies and fractions along racial prejudices unfold a society of uncertainty. Even citizenship doesnt explain who deserves, and doesnt deserve, to belong to We. The categorization between legal and illegal not only at external border evokes the question for whom in the Schengen area the construction of the perfect wall implies a plus of freedom, security and justice. As Vaughan-Williams punctuates theres a fine line between a citizen-detective as informant and vigilant. Vigilant approaches may appear alluring, even consequent, to offer people the assurance that an established system of order will prevail. It may even be officially or informally legitimated by the stat, as the neo-vigilantist civilian border patrols in the US or the British, state-encouraged vigilantist surveillance49. Yet, if everyone were the police and the upholder of social order, by which law and which authority would he be controlled and accounted? Where would the boundary between intimacy and surveillance be? And who protects the weakest elements of the state against dangerous populist, nationalist, and racialist dynamics?

Assessing these mechanisms Surprisingly, it is the economic and geographical heart of Europe, Germany, which is pushing forward the construction of a European border, which goes, as elaborated, far beyond being a pure external one.
46 47

Cf. (Vaughan-Williams, 2008, p. 70)

48 49

Internal surveillance of Them on areas such as finance, mobility, river, storage, neighborhood with the rhetoric of Terrorists need to live somewhere, etc. The most striking example would be an individual community safety channel by BBC, which enables citizens to monitor their neighborhood by broadcasting public CCTV cameras. Cf. (Vaughan-Williams, 2008, p. 74) Cf. (Vaughan-Williams, 2008, pp. 75-76)

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Assessing these mechanisms | Constructing a European Frontier

Why Germany which isnt even at the geographical fringes of the federation? The German Foreign Minister Schuble, emphasizing on the migration threat, argued, that [c]itizens expect an effective protection of Europes external borders. Only jointly and solidly we can fight illegal migration.50 Interestingly it isnt clear whether he talks about the respective national citizens or a broader European idea. Yet, if he meant the latter one the conservatism in the approaches to this new idea would be disappointing. Why has a European citizenship to be built on the same fundaments like a national one with concepts stemming from times of pan-European wars? Why is fighting inevitable to build a nation? The ignorance to search for new models implies a fight of symptoms instead of causes and indispensably leads to another unsustainable negative feedback loop. Yet, the border construction once more demonstrates how little a nation the European federation is. For German security policy it is crucial to intercept migrant flows already in transit countries of North Africa and at the fringes of the union. In combination with the Dublin II agreement, which institutionalized that immigrants can only apply for asylum in the EU state of entry, Frontex is the next step to transforming all countries between the external borders and Germany into a massive buffer and filter respectively. More than other countries in the union it optimizes its outsourcing of responsibilities and displaces any issue about basic human rights like the asylum right to its partner countries. Mechanisms to redirect asylum seekers to all EU states dont exist so far.51 The establishment of Frontex can be considered as a way to both pretend solidarity and cooperation to its remote partners as well as strengthen the Dublin II incentive for transit countries at the shores of the EU to intercept illegal migration flows to the core of the union. Instead of prudently regulating migration it is actively combatted. Remuneration and Dublin II agreements52 incentive it for transit countries on both sides of the external border to intercept migration flows. Especially the outsourcing of legal and human rights issues arising from migration is to be seen critical. As above, one should always ask about the universal ideas of freedom and democracy53, represented for example by Article 13 of the Human Rights charter, the right to freedom of movement. How does the claimed patronage over these core values comply with the remunerated outsourcing of bordering practices to African despots? International agreements and basic rights such as asylum rights and sea rescue are de-facto abrogated at the fringes of the EU. By displacing the borders in extralegal and unregulated areas outside of the national, and in the case of the sea borders even any legal system54 and control, migration defense becomes an issue of political rather than public debates. The main question often is, where to redirect illegal immigrants, which had been intercepted at or before the external borders. Even with Frontex, which became the coordinative body for repatriation, it isnt clear who is in charge of returning illegal immigrant where. Does the external frontier, whose mechanisms return
50 51 52 53 54

(Streck, 2007, p. 2) Cf. (German Foreign Policy, 2011) Otherwise migrants can always be returned tot he country where they first entered the EU. Cf. (Afrique-Europe Interact, 2011) International agreements appear to be neglectable.

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Assessing these mechanisms | Constructing a European Frontier

desperate intruders to countries in which civil war is raging, really suits to the ethical fundament of a European citizenship? Will the concentration on internal perspectives and the instrumentalization and commoditization of the migrant help the building of a European nation in an increasingly globalized world? How does Europe deals with human rights of asylum and mobility, but foremost with also any right of its citizens, if anybody is considered to be a potential terrorist? And leaving Europe, how will its image change? Longer and more dangerous migration routes as well as the militarization of the border inevitably cause more casualties55; the internal radicalization will decrease the attractiveness to badly needed highskilled labor from all around the world. The perfect mall may emerge as imperfect in the end, because it neglects the concurrence of several dynamics of globalization. The implications for the demographically weak European union would be devastating. With regarding migration as a flowing threat of cultural, physical, and intellectual flooding as well as a threat to the own identity, Europe betrays its patronage over democracy. You cannot transmit and foster democracy without conceding the basic rights of exit and voice to anybody. But the EU seems to neglect that, as with the migration flow, theres a reciprocate relationship between all societal and democratic elements - not only flowing one direction. The transmission of democratic values and the build-up of a European citizenship are mutually dependent and require the interaction not only with internal partners. Migration has not to be a one-way mobility track as long as links are strengthened and mobility facilitated. Simplified, and following the development mantra, the abolishment of any border would be the most intelligent filter. Overcoming the dualistic perspective of risk and threat vs. the exploitation of Africa in terms of brain drain56 a cooperative approach to increase the provision of permanent mobility from and to sending and receiving countries would restore a natural cyclical flow of labor and resources in theory. Yet, such logic remains to be unrealistic as long as a deep gap divides the world in the rich and powerful global North, its semi-periphery including the emerging countries, as well as the Rest. As long as these global disparities exist an appropriate kind of border has to be found. It can be questioned whether Europe is developing a possible solution. With Rapid Border Intervention Teams RABIT and the strengthening of national borders57 as part of a broader European frontier Frontex returns to security discourse beyond pure risk analysis and prevention. This implicates the question whether the EU has the capacities to decide on the exception, to act in a consensual and non-legitimate response operation to an existential threat if migration really is such a threat. Personal data collection and increased interrogation of even regular migrants as well as the fact that security architectures and militarized foreign policy develop faster than controlling political institutions damages Europes image and the core values of freedom, security and justice. It has to be asked at which cost Europe is willed to fight terrorism and to defend its still to be established identity58. Instead of internalizing recommendation 118

55 56 57 58

Cf. (Streck, 2007, p. 2) Induced by official and informal attraction of the most capable labor. With pan-European border controls in e.g. ports the Schengen agreement is tackled. Among others, use of technology at which cost: moral cost, risk of error, legal grey area?

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A new kind of border? | Constructing a European Frontier

of the Updated Schengen Catalogue, to take all necessary measures to prevent the unauthorized crossing oft he border, it should rather be acknowledged that even illegal entrants have fundamental rights. Instead of institutionalizing more populist doctrines rules are needed for transferring people from a point of interception to a point where their claims to enter can be processed in an orderly and fair way.59

A new kind of border? Finally, the interesting question is whether Europe is able to construct a new, fairer kind of border, which meets the demands of both the 21st century society as well as the effects of globalization. All evidences lead to the need to answer this question with no. European anticipatory strategies are not more than the professionalization of security. Rather than occupying a moment of exceptionalism the security state becomes normalized, represented by state exceptionalism (RABIT) and a centralized intelligence-led risk management agency merging diverse policy areas - such as border control, asylum and anti-terror-, technologies, and professionals with different specializations. The closing of land, sea, and air borders with RABITs may lead to temporary accomplishments such as an overall decrease of 43.7% in the number of irregular migrants intercepted at the Greek-Turkish land border in November in comparison to October 2010.60 Yet, as with other systems, more regulation does unlikely lead to normalization. The imbalances will further grow on both sides of the border and will mutually cause reactionary and militarized actions. An integrated border security in an effectively analyzed War on Terror might catalyze terror. The changing nature and increasing complexity of Europes border is not much different to the USMexican one. As in the American example practices of surveillance serve as form of bordering; activities are aimed at contributing to the (re)production of Europe as an area of freedom, security and justice by excluding illegal subjects. Yet, with the construction of a border, which is not anymore at the border, and a new idea of the inside-outside framing it has to be asked for whom this area is constructed? Can such a sealed-off nation, the cradle of modern values in the historic line of Athenian Republicanism and Roman Liberalism and revived by Renaissance and the French and Industrial Revolutions, still provide freedom, justice and social mobility?

59 60

Cf. (Centre for the Study of Global Ethics at the University of Birmingham, 2010, p. 24) Cf. (Frontex, 2010)

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Sources | Constructing a European Frontier

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