ARANETA vs.

GATMAITAN FACTS: This is a case involving San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, being part of the National Waters of the Philippines and is considered to be the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of Bicol Region. Some trawl operators from different nearby places migrated to this area for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. Upon the presentation and recommendation of the Municipal Mayors league, the provincial governor and other concerned civil organizations, the President issued E.O. 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, which was subsequently amended by E.O. 66 granting the allowance of trawl fishing during typhoon season. However, E.O. 80 was also issued later, reviving E.O. 22 in so far as to absolutely prohibit the use of fishing trawls. A group of otter trawls operators filed a complaint with CFI with prayer to issue a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order, being null and void, as it allegedly constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President. The Government, through the Solicitor General, asserted that the President is empowered by law to issue the enactments in question, specifically under Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Law). But petitioners contended that such act do not expressly delegate to the President the power to declare a closed area for fishing purposes. The CFI ruled that the President has no power to prohibit the use of trawls in fishing and that this will entail legislation, which inherently belong to the Congress.

ISSUES: (a) Whether or not the President had the authority to issue the executive orders in question as such would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative powers. (b) Whether or not the power to declare a closed area for fishing purposes had not been delegated to the President under the Fisheries Act.

HELD: For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small and immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Law), to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete the supply of sea food, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Orders absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. Above all, it may be seen that in so far as the protection of fish fry or fish egg is concerned, the Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. Also, the use of trawls for fishing was evidently causing wanton destruction of the marine life of San Miguel Bay as it discriminately caught fry and immature fishes and other marine resources as well as destroying fish foods and corrals, which is of public interest. Therefore, the act of the President is in accordance with a legislative power validly and duly delegated. The law provides that All executive functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under the Executive Departments subject to the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines in matters of general policy. The Departments are established for the proper distribution of the work of the Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that each branch of the administration may have a chief responsibility for its direction and policy. One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which by law is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines. Moreover, "executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective Department", and there can be no doubt that the promulgation of the questioned Executive Orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who was and is called upon to enforce said executive Orders.

TIO vs VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

FACTS: Petitioner, herein, is a videogram operator who challenged the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1987, an act creating the Videogram Regulatory Board, for allegedly being harsh, oppressive and in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of due process in so far as it imposed a tax of 30% of the gross receipts and that such decree contains an undue delegation of legislative power to the extent that it vested in said board the power to solicit or to enlist the support of other governmental agencies (in this case, the support of the Local Government in the collection of tax payable) to enforce its broad powers in regulating the video industry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed decree unduly delegated legislative power and authority to the Board.

HELD: The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties would not be without adequate remedy in law. Furthermore, only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is, as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.

U.S. vs ANG TANG HO FACTS: Plaintiff accused defendant of violation of Act No. 2868, entitled An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose. Lower court charged Ho guilty of voluntary, illegal, and criminal sale of one ganta of rice at a price greater than that fixed by E.O. No. 53 of the Governor-General pursuant to the authority granted under the said act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2868 is a validly delegated legislative power to the Governor-General.

HELD: Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of rice at a price in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void. A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. Instead it left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice. By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction. Necessarily, all legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of such power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power (to enact law, in essence), which is unconstitutional and void.

YNOT vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Petitioner, herein, challenged the constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A, which prohibited the transporting of carabao and carabeef from one province to another and that in violation thereof, authorized its confiscation and forfeiture by the government and its disposal by distributing to charitable and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. Ynots 6 carabaos, while being transported in a pump boat, were confiscated by the police in Iloilo for violation of the above measure. He then filed for its recovery but RTC and IAC sustained the confiscation. Petitioner claimed unconstitutionality insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabaos or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries and that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner the right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. The original measure was issued for the reason that, the then present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs. The questioned E.O. was issued in the exercise of President Marcos legislative authority under Amendment 6 of the 1973 Constitution, which provided that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned measure contained an invalid delegation of legislative powers.

HELD: The court marked the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. In relation to the Presidents legislative authority under Amendment 6 of 1973, as there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of such extraordinary power, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For the foregoing reasons, Executive Order No. 626-A was declared unconstitutional.

PELAEZ vs AUDITOR GENERAL

FACTS: In 1964, the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued various Executive Orders, creating thirty-three (33) municipalities. Soon after, petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted a special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, provides that barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon a petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, has the power to create new municipalities, a function essentially legislative in nature. HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.

CRUZ vs. YOUNGBERG

FACTS: Petitioner filed an action for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injuction in the CFI against respondent Director of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which prohibited the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries. The Act in question reads as follows:
SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitute an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers.

HELD: The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. On the appelants argument that Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the Tariff Law, it should noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of cattle and it does not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of the Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law.

GREGO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and BASCO

FACTS: Private respondent Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative nd complaint sometime in 18981. He subsequently ran thrice, won and assumed office as Councilor in the 2 District of Manila, which victory did not remain unchallenged by opponents. As against him, petitioner, claiming to be registered voter of said District, filed with rd the COMELEC a petition for disqualification in 1995 during his 3 term. Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running far any elective position since he had been "removed from office as a result of an administrative case" pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (the Code), which took effect on January 1, 1992. Private respondent, on the other hand, avers that such provision of law may not be validly applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity, as this would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder and retroactive legislation impairs vested rights. Moreover, petitioner cited Section 25, Rule 5 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedures, which provides: Sec. 5. Effect of petition if unresolved before completion of canvass. . . . (H)is proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning number of votes in such election. Thus, he contended that Bascos proclamation, while the case is still pending consideration of the COMELEC, is void ab initio. After the parties' respective memoranda had been filed, the COMELEC's resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification, ruling that "the administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme Court on respondent Basco on October 1981 was wiped away and condoned by the electorate which elected him" and that on account of Basco's proclamation on May 17, 1995, as the sixth duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila, "the petition would no longer be viable." Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC en banc in its assailed resolution. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 25, Rule 5 of COMELEC Rules of Procedures mandates the suspension of winning candidates proclamation pending unresolved petitions.

HELD: It is to be noted that COMELEC Rules of Procedures was issued pursuant to R.A. 6646, which states in section 6 thereof that:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis supplied).

This provision, however, does not support petitioner's contention that the COMELEC, or more properly speaking, the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word "may" indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion. What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion granted to the COMELEC, the question of whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised whimsically and capriciously. The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality. The COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different conclusion from the Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. However, section 25, rule 5 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure, being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override, but instead remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case.

PEOPLE vs. MACEREN FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. Private respondents were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, which prohibited electro fishing in all fresh water fisheries in the Philippine. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz. Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal. Hence, the appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440. The municipal court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. CFI, however, assumed electro fishing is punishable under said law. As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 was issued within the power delegated by the Fisheries Law.

HELD: Supreme Court upheld municipal courts judgment. It opined that Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary and the Commissioner are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. Nowhere is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law". Such regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers and such powers when exercised in conformity with law have the force of law. As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.

BAUTISTA vs. JUINIO FACTS: Letter of Instruction No. 869 involving a valid energy conservation measure was issued as a response to the protracted oil crisis is put in issue in this prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. The use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and holidays was banned from [12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day after the holiday. While other motor vehicles of other classifications are exempted. Respondents Minister of PWTC and then Commissioner of LTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the specified vehicles found violating such LOI. Petitioner alleged among others, that the memorandum circular is unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power. On the answer required of respondent, it denied that there was an undue delegation of legislative power, reference being made to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. There was also a procedural objection raised, namely, that what is sought amounts at most to an advisory opinion rather than an adjudication of a case or controversy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 39, as implementing the above LOI is rendered unconstitutional by the principle of non-delegation of legislative powers.

HELD: To the extent that a Letter of Instruction may be viewed as an exercise of the decree-making power of the President, then such an argument is futile. If, however, viewed as a compliance with the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, as a consequence of which subordinate executive officials may in turn issue implementing rules and regulations, then the objection would properly be considered as an ultra vires allegation. The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. Of course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. 'The mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed.' On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.' It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative." It was alleged in the Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza that Letter of Instruction 869 and Memorandum Circular No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. It contains a specific provision as to 38 penalties. Thus: "For violation of any provisions of this Act or regulations promulgated pursuant hereto, not hereinbefore specifically punished, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed." Memorandum Circular No. 39 cannot be held to be ultra vires as long as the fine imposed is not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos. As to suspension of registration, the Code, insofar as applicable, provides: "Whenever it shall appear from the records of the Commission that during any twelve-month period more than three warnings for violations of this Act have been given to the owner of a motor vehicle, or that the said owner has been convicted by a competent court more than once for violation of such laws, the Commissioner may, in his discretion, suspend the certificate of registration for a period not exceeding ninety days and, thereupon, shall require the immediate surrender of the number plates * * *." It follows that while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of Memorandum Circular No. 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law. WHEREFORE, the petition was dismissed.

LUZON POLYMERS CORPORATION vs CLAVE

FACTS: Petitioner questioned the administrative grant of an emergency allowance of fifty pesos to the employees of a corporation with a capital stock of one million pesos, which has its origin in P.D. 390 granting said allowance to government employees. President Marcos issued LOI 174 implementing same policy under said decree in the private sector. Pursuant thereto, the Department of labor issued an Interpretative Bulletin explaining the meaning and scope of application of LOI 174. Subsequently, the President issued P.D. 525 making mandatory the payment of the emergency allowance. The Secretary of Labor also promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing P.D. 525, which provided for the brackets of the authorized capital stocks or total assets requirement with the corresponding mandated emergency allowance. Petitioners contention included: (a) in issuing the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525, particularly paragraph 7 thereof, the then Secretary of Labor exceeded his rule-making power inasmuch as said paragraph substantially altered and contradicted the provisions of P.D. No. 525; (b) the Secretary of Labors order of February 21, 1978 requiring petitioner to pay the deficiency of the emergency allowance it had paid its employees, is contrary to Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 525 providing that the Department of Labor shall not entertain any complaint under said decree against employers who have complied with LOI No. 174; and (c) the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave is contrary to law as it upholds the illegal exercise of law-making powers by the Secretary of Labor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor sufficiently conform with the standards of the law is seeks to implement.

HELD: While said administrative interpretation of LOI No. 174 is at best merely advisory for it is only the courts which have the power to determine what LOI No. 174 really means, it is significant to note that said Sec. 5 of the Interpretative Bulletin was adopted in P.D. No. 525. As aforequoted, Sec. 1 of said decree states that an emergency allowance of thirty pesos shall be given to employees of corporations with a capitalization of more than 100 thousand pesos but does not exceed 1 million pesos. What seems to have muddled the matter are the provisions of Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525. Under that section, petitioner appears to have been covered by the fifty-peso bracket for it states that a monthly emergency allowance of fifty pesos is required where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is P1 million or more. It should be observed that this provision not only injects a new determinative factor, i.e., the total assets of the employer, but also provides a choice for the deter-minative factor: whichever is higher between the employers authorized capital stock and its total assets. An examination of the issuances of the Department of Labor, however, reveals that said option is more apparent than real. In its Interpretative Bulletin aforementioned, the Department uses as a basis for granting the emergency allowance the authorized capital stock, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings. The phrase authorized capital stock clearly refers to employers which are incorporated by law and therefore have au-thorized capital stocks to speak of. Total assets as a determina-tive factor should only refer to other undertakings. Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations, therefore, introduced a matter which is not germane to the provisions of P.D. No. 525 by considering total assets as a criterion. Moreover, it further complicated the law by the addition of the phrase whichever is applicable and higher. In practice, the exercise of the option expressed in such phrase may lead to absurd situations. As demonstrated in this case, that which is higher, meaning petitioners total assets, may not also be applicable because petitioner is not an undertaking within the purview of the Interpretative Bulletin and the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525. Consequently, Sec. 7 of the said Rules has not conformed with the standards that P.D. No. 525 prescribes. Having been based on an erroneous decision of the Office of the President, it is further rendered obnoxious by the principle that an administrative agency like the Department of Labor cannot amend the law it seeks to implement.

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METROPOLITAN TRAFFIC COMMAND vs GONONG

FACTS: Private respondent David, a lawyer who claimed that the rear license plate of his car was removed by the petitioner while the vehicle was parked on Escolta, filed an original complaint. He questioned the petitioner's act on the ground not only that the car was not illegally parked but, more importantly, that there was no ordinance or law authorizing such removal. He asked that the practice be permanently enjoined and that in the meantime a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued. Respondent Judge Gonong granted the writ of preliminary injunction and held that the LOI 43, which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it "to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended as in the case at bar. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways." At any rate, he said, PD 1605 had repealed the LOI. Moreover, MTC had not been able to point to any MMC rule or regulation or to any city ordinance to justify the questioned act.

ISSUE: Whether or not the removal by traffic enforcers of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles authorized by LOI 43. Whether or not LOI 43 is repealed by P.D. 1605.

HELD: The Court held that LOI 43 is valid but may be applied only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the public streets due to some involuntary cause and not those that have been intentionally parked in violation of the traffic laws. The challenged decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in so far as it enjoins confiscation of the private respondent's license plate for alleged deliberate illegal parking, which is subject to a different penalty. The petitioner stresses that under the decree, "the powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation over such violations and punishment thereof are (hereby) transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission," and one of such laws is LOI 43. The penalties prescribed by the LOI are therefore deemed incorporated in PD 1605 as additional to the other penalties therein specified. A careful reading of the decree will show that removal and confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle is not among the specified penalties. Moreover, although the Metropolitan Manila Commission is authorized by the decree to "otherwise discipline" and "impose higher penalties" on traffic violators, whatever sanctions it may impose must be "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed." It would appear that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense. A violation imports an intentional breach or disregard of a rule, as where a driver leaves his vehicle in a no-parking area against a known and usually visible prohibition. Contrary to the common impression, LOI 43 does not punish illegal parking per se but parking of stalled vehicles, i.e., those that involuntarily stop on the road due to some unexpected trouble such as engine defect, lack of gasoline, punctured tires, or other similar cause. The vehicle is deemed illegally parked because it obstructs the flow of traffic, but only because it has stalled. LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles "that stall on the streets and highways' and not those that are intentionally parked in a public place in violation of a traffic law or regulation. In the case of the private respondent, it is not alleged or shown that his vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic. The charge against him is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no parking area (although this is disputed by him). The act, if true, is a traffic violation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD 1605, which does not include removal and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle among the imposable penalties.

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PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs TORRES FACTS: A petition for prohibition with TRO was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers. Department Order No. 16 was issued as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong in 1991. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. Pursuant to the DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, then followed by the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 37, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic helpers for Hong Kong. The petition was filed for the following reasons: (1) that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; (2) that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and (3) that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned circulars are ultra-vires. HELD: SC ruled that there is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition, however, issued judgment granting the writ of prohibition and suspended the implementation of challenged circulars pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land. The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents. The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power. To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons". The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:
. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries.

They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest. The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private employment agencies are hereby "temporarily suspended effective July 1, 1991." The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only. The justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the unscrupulous practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.

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PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision and a Resolution (filing within the 2-year reglementary period) of the Court Of Tax Appeals which denied the claims of the petitioner for tax refund and tax credits. Antecedent factual circumstances:
Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00. The taxes due were settled by applying PBCom's tax credit memos. Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered losses so that when it filed its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year. But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986. On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985. Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69. Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). CTA issued judgment denying the request of petitioner for a tax refund or credit on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period provided for by law and that petitioner's claim for refund was likewise denied on the assumption that it was automatically credited by PBCom against its tax payment in the succeeding year.

Petitioner justify its position on the basis of its reliance, in good faith, on the formal assurances of BIR in RMC No. 7-85 providing that the prescriptive period for the refund/tax credit of excess quarterly income tax payments is not two years but ten (10) and so that it cannot be prejudiced by the subsequent BIR rejection, applied retroactivity, of its assurances in RMC No. 7-85. ISSUE: Whether or not RMC 7-85 is a valid delegation of BIRs rule-making authority. HELD: The court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the CA, finding that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, the relaxation of revenue regulations by RMC 7-85 is not warranted as it disregards the two-year prescriptive period set by law. Basic is the principle that "taxes are the lifeblood of the nation." The primary purpose is to generate funds for the State to finance the needs of the citizenry and to advance the common weal. Due process of law under the Constitution does not require judicial proceedings in tax cases. This must necessarily be so because it is upon taxation that the government chiefly relies to obtain the means to carry on its operations and it is of utmost importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection of taxes levied should be summary and interfered with as little as possible. From the same perspective, claims for refund or tax credit should be exercised within the time fixed by law because the BIR being an administrative body enforced to collect taxes, its functions should not be unduly delayed or hampered by incidental matters. The NIRC provides that, in any case, no such suit or proceedings shall begun after the expiration of two years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment; Provided however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied). The rule states that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or credit with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, within two (2) years after payment of tax, before any suit in CTA is commenced. The two-year prescriptive period provided, should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return and final payment of the tax for the year. When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of the NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress. It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws), which are issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement.

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PHILIPPINE INTER-ISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Private Respondent United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. (UHPAP) secured enforcement of E. O. No. 1088, which fixes the rates of pilotage service. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), a government agency that regulates pilotage opposed and sought to block said enforcement, instead they promulgated their own orders, which in the beginning fixed lower rates of pilotage (Memorandum Circular No. 43-86) and later left the matter to self-determination by parties to a pilotage contract (Administrative Order No. 02-88) . Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 857, PPA has the power "to supervise, control, regulate . . . such services as are necessary in the ports vested in, or belonging to the Authority" and to "control, regulate and supervise pilotage and the conduct of pilots in any Port District." It also has the power "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees. . . for the services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District." PPA refused to enforce the executive order on the ground that it had been drawn hastily and without prior consultation: that its enforcement would create disorder in the ports as the operators and owners of the maritime vessels had expressed opposition to its implementation; and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was exorbitant and detrimental to port operations. It warned harbor pilots of disciplinary sanctions should they charge rates in accordance with E.O. No. 1088. Furthermore it contended that, E.O. No. 1088 was merely an administrative issuance of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and, as such, it could be superseded by an order of the PPA. They argue that to consider E.O. No. 1088 a statute would be to deprive the PPA of its power under its charter to fix pilotage rates.

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 1088 is a valid legislation.

HELD: The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. The growing complexity of modern society, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations and the increased difficulty of administering the laws made the creation of administrative agencies and the delegation to them of legislative power necessary. There is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise of administrative power, that if President Marcos had power to revise the rates previously fixed by the PPA through the issuance of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA could in turn revise those fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did in A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract. The orders previously issued by the PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised by law, as the President did by E.O. No. 1088. It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Nor is there any doubt of the power of the then President to fix rates. On February 3, 1986, when he issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. No. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it through the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the President did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees . . . for the services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District." It is worthy to note that E.O. No. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees. The reason is because E.O. No. 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports."

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LEGASPI vs MINISTER OF FINANCE

FACTS:
Valentino Legaspi, a incumbent member of the Interim Batasan Pambansa then, filed a petition praying that P.D. 1840 granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes, be declared unconstitutional alleging among others: that said decree was issued by President Marcos under his supposed legislative powers granted under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution approved in 1976, that said amendment is now rendered inoperable, deleted and/or repealed by the constitutional amendments of 1981 (after lifting the Martial Law), and that decree have been passed without the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa as mandated by the amended 1981 Constitution. Amendment No. 6 is quoted as follows: Whenever in the Judgment of the President, there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land. Generally taken, the 1976 amendments are amendments to the transitory provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution is reproduced or unaffected by the 1981 amendments.
Whether or not P.D. 1840 is likewise invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa.

HELD:
The insistence of petitioner that Amendment No. 6 has been repealed by the 1981 amendments springs from another point of view. It is fundamentally based on analysis and ratiocination related to the language and tenor thereof. However, the Constitution is not merely a literal document to be always read according to the plain and ordinary signification of its words. Beneath and beyond the literal terms of the Charter, like a mine of incalculably immense treasures, are elements and factors radiating from political and economic developments of the situation prevailing at the time of the inclusion of any particular provision thereof or amendment thereto. It is only from the light of the implications of such elements and factors that the real essence and significance of the words of the constitutional provision under scrutiny can be properly and adequately seen and comprehended. It was because of the total dislike of Martial law by the public that the concept embodied in Amendment No. 6 was born. The problem was what may be needed for national survival or the restoration of normalcy in the face of a crisis or an emergency should be reconciled with the popular mentality and attitude of the people against martial law. The Constitution has four built-in measures to cope with crises and emergencies. To reiterate, they are: (a) emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan; (b) call of the armed forces; (c) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (d) martial law. Of these four, the people dislike martial law most and would, if possible, do away with it in the Constitution. And the President who first conceived of what is now Amendment No. 6 knew this. Thus, Our understanding of the development of events and attitudes that led to the adoption of Amendment No. 6 is that in addition to the four measures authorized in the body of the charter, this amendment is supposed to be a fifth one purportedly designed to make it practically unnecessary to proclaim martial law, except in instances of actual surface warfare or rebellious activities or very sophisticated subversive actions that cannot be adequately met without martial law itself. Very evidently, the purpose of Amendment No. 6 is that the Philippines be henceforth spared of martial law unless manifest extreme situations should ever demand it. To recapitulate, the amendments of October 1976 were deliberately designed against martial law and to make the proclamation of martial law remotest, but nevertheless enable the government to meet emergencies effectively, they conceived the idea of granting to the President (Prime Minister) the power endowed to him by Amendment No. 6. At this juncture, it must be emphatically made clear that explicitly the power that Amendment No. 6 vests upon the "President (Prime Minister)" are to be exercised only on two specified occasions, namely, (1) "when in (his judgment) a grave emergency exists or there is a threat or imminence thereof" and (2) "whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly (now regular Batasang Pambansa) fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action." The power is to "issue necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction which shall form part of the law of the land." As the tenor of the amendment readily imparts, such power may be exercised even when the Batasan is in session. Obviously, therefore, it is a power that is in the nature of the other Powers which the Constitution directly confers upon the President or allows to be delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and emergencies. Presidential Decree 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.

15

BITO-ONON vs. HON. JUDGE FERNANDEZ and QUEJANO FACTS: Petitioner, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. Private respondent, on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both petitioner and respondent were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Petitioner was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting respondent to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him subsequently. Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, he then filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction claiming that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and directors. In his motion to dismiss, petitioner claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the DILG in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga's internal organization. RTC denied motion to dismiss on the ground that the Secretary of the DILG is vested with the power "to establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units." It added that DILG Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his rule-making power as provided for under Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code. Consequently, the RTC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for review filed by private respondent. Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was denied prompting the petitioner to file petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of injunction seeking the reversal of the order of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance by the DILG Secretary, as to the questioned provision in memorandum circular no. 97-193, is within its authority. Whether or not the Presidents general supervision extend to the Liga ng mga Barangay, which is not agovernment unit.

HELD: Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to the power of general supervision of the President over all local government units which was delegated to the DILG Secretary by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267. The President's power of general supervision over local government units is conferred upon him by no less than the Constitution and by law. The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." This is distinguished from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter." The Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether a local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. He cannot interfere with local governments provided that the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority (Taule vs. Santos). Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. Officers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The provisions of the Local Government Code primarily govern the ligas. However, their respective constitution and by-laws shall govern all other matters affecting the internal organization of the liga not otherwise provided for in the Local Government Code provided that the constitution and by-laws shall be suppletory and shall always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws. In conclusion, it was ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. In authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.

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DE JESUS vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FACTS: The LWUA Employees Association for Progress (LEAP), through its Chairman, Leonardo C. Cruz, filed with the CSC a complaint against Cabili and De Vera, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and Administrator, respectively, of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) for alleged violation of RA 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The complaint stemmed from the alleged failure or refusal of Cabili and De Vera to give due course or respond to the Memorandum of LEAP requesting investigation on the allegation of columnist Catapusan in the Beatwatch column of the Manila Bulletin that Water Districts are milking cows of certain LWUA officials. LEAP likewise questioned the propriety and legality of the act of LWUA Deputy Administrator De Jesus in collecting/receiving per diems, RATA, discretionary fund, and other extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses from the Olongapo City Water District where he was designated as member of the board of directors, aside from what he was already receiving from his present position. LWUA Administrator claimed, inter alia, that under the LWUA Charter (PD 198 as amended), LWUA is vested with corporate authority to take over the policy-making and management functions of defaulting water districts in order to protect its financial investment. It likewise authorizes LWUA to appoint any of its personnel to sit in the board of directors of a water district that has availed financial assistance from LWUA, and any such personnel so appointed is entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to a regular director. The CSC dismissed the charge for violation of RA 6713 against LWUA Chairman and Administrator. The CSC however ruled that it is illegal for any LWUA officer or employee who sits as a member of the board of directors of a water district to receive and collect any additional, double or indirect compensation from said water district except per diems pursuant PD 198, as amended. The CSC based its ruling on Section 8, Article IX (B) of the 1987 Constitution. LWUA Chairman Cabili and Administrator De Vera moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 95-4073, contending that the CSC erroneously and short-sightedly interpreted the provision of the Constitution relative to additional, double or indirect compensation. ISSUE: Whether or not CSC had the plenary jurisdiction to construe any provision of PD 198, on matters pertaining to compensation and other benefits of water district directors. HELD: Relying on Marilao Water Consumers Association v. Intermediate Appellate Court, petitioners contend that it is the LWUA, not the CSC, that has the power to issue rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law under which water districts operate and function. The court disagree. In the cited case, it has been held that proceedings for the dissolution of water districts should be lodged with the regular courts. In reaching this conclusion, it thus discussed the functions and powers of the LWUA as follows: "The LWUA does not appear to have any adjudicatory functions. It is, as already pointed out, primarily a specialized lending institution for the promotion, development and financing of local water utilities, with power to prescribe minimum standards and regulations regarding maintenance, operation, personnel training, accounting and fiscal practices for local water utilities, to furnish technical assistance and personnel training programs therefor; monitor and evaluate local water standards; and effect systems integration, joint investment and operations, district annexation and deannexation whenever economically warranted. The LWUA has quasi-judicial power only as regards rates or charges fixed by water districts, which it may review to establish compliance with the provisions of PD 198 x x x." They also alleged that the CSC usurped the functions of the LWUA in exercising, motu proprio, plenary jurisdiction to construe Section 13 of PD 198. For the Court to sustain them would be to allow the board of an administrative agency, by merely issuing a resolution, to derogate the broad and extensive powers granted by the Constitution to a constitutional commission like the CSC. Parenthetically, the task of safeguarding the proper use of government funds rests primarily with the Commission on Audit (COA). In De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, this Court ruled that it was the COA that had the power to determine the legality and regularity of the grant of allowances and benefits to LWUA-designated members of the boards of water districts. Mandated by the Constitution to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and -controlled corporations with original charters, the COA is vested with "the authority to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds." In Civil Service Commission v. Pobre, however, the Court recognized an instance in which the COA had concurrent jurisdiction with the CSC. The Court ruled as follows: "The COA, the CSC and the Commission on Elections are equally pre-eminent in their respective spheres. Neither one may claim dominance over the others. In case of conflicting rulings, it is the Judiciary which interprets the meaning of the law and ascertains which view shall prevail." The present case involves the acts of LWUA officials who are concurrently designated as members of the boards of directors of water districts. This Court has consistently ruled that water districts are government-owned and -controlled corporations with original charters, since they have been created pursuant to PD 198. Hence, they are under the jurisdiction of the CSC. Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows: "SEC. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. "SEC. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs." Section 3 is deemed to include the power to "promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions. It must be pointed out that the present controversy originated from an administrative case filed with the CSC for violations of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713). Necessarily, it was incumbent on the CSC to construe, in relation to that case pending before it, the provisions of PD 198. Settled is the rule that when a law confers jurisdiction, all the incidental powers necessary for its effective 20 exercise are included in the conferment.

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NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY vs PAREDES FACTS: Rayos alleged that David (then President of Liga Chapter in Caloocan City and Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter) committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997. Before the controversy could be resolved, DILG Secretary filed an urgent motion invoking the Presidents power of general supervision over all local government units and among others, sought relief that the DILG, pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office. David opposed DILGs request as it allegedly constitutes an undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, and the Liga. Respondent RTC judge Paredes ruled that the authority of the DILG to exercise general supervisory jurisdiction over local government units, including the different leagues created under the Local Government Code (RA 7160) finds basis in A.O. 267, which provides a broad premise for the supervisory power of DILG, and that what the petitioner may viewed as interference is rather a necessary and desirable corollary to the exercise of supervision. Subsequently, DILG issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, directing local government officials not to recognize David as Liga President, and Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 providing supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay. This was followed by the issuance of a Certificate of Appointment in favor of respondent Rayos as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Caloocan City. To support the petition, petitioners argue that under Administrative Order No. 267, the power of general supervision of the President over local government units does not apply to the Liga and its various chapters precisely because the Liga is , not a local government unit. Citing Section 507 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160) which provides that the Liga shall be governed by its own Constitution and By-laws, petitioners claim that the questioned order divested the then incumbent officers and directors of the Liga of their right to their respective offices without due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Liga is legally susceptible to DILG supervision and/or control. HELD: SC ruled that the DILG Memorandum Circulars were viod for being unconstitutional and ultra-vires. It was already ruled in Bito-onon vs Fernandez that the Presidents power of general supervision, as exercised therein by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident, whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays, which are in turn represented therein by their respective punong barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors, city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development. However, the acts of issuing the DILG Memorandum Circulars went beyond the sphere of general supervision and constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the liga, but more importantly, of the barangay as an institution. What the DILG wielded was the power of control, which even the President does not have. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILGs authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them. In this particular case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the elections to determine if they committed any violation of the Ligas Constitution and By-laws and its implementing rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG should have ordered the Liga to conduct another election in accordance with the Ligas own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers. Supervision may be defined as "overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

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CARPIO vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" as the consolidated version of House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463, in accordance with the Constitution, Article XVI, Section 6: The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which stall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. Petitioner, however, as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar sworn to defend the Constitution, filed the petition seeking this Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer for temporary restraining order. He respectfully advances the view that RA 6975 emasculated the National Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the National Police Commission and the PNP were placed.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6975 is unconstitutional.

HELD: It is a fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department." Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety 24 agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government. Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the Act in question adequately provides for administration and control at the commission level.

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