INTHEHIGHCOURTOFHIMACHALPRADESH,SHIMLA

CWPNo.438of2011A a/wCWPNo.4716of2011E Reservedon:16.07.2012 Decidedon:30.08.2012

CWPNo.438of2011 1. Evangelical Fellowship of India, A Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, 805/92, Deepali Building, Nehru Place, New Delhi110 019, through Rev. Richard Howell, General Secretary. 2. ActNowForHarmonyAndDemocracy(ANHAD)aregisteredTrust having its office at 23, Canning Lane, New Delhi110 001, through ShabnamHashmi,ManagingTrustee. Petitioners. Versus State of Himachal Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Home Department,Shimla,HimachalPradesh. Respondent. ............................................................................................................................... CWPNo.4716of2011 Rev. Shamser Masih, son of Shri Jit Masih, earlier Presbyterincharge, ChristChurch,TheRidge,Shimla,presentlypostedasPresbyterincharge, ChurchofSt.Johninwilderness,Palampur,DistrictKangra,H.P. ...Petitioner. Versus 1. State of Himachal Pradesh, through Principal Secretary, Home Department,Shimla,H.P. 2. DistrictMagistrate,DistrictShimla,Shimla,H.P. 3. Shri Samuel Prakash, s/o Man Singh, resident of Christ Church Annexe,ChristChurch,TheRidge,Shimla,H.P.(deleted) 4. Mrs.MeenuPrakash,w/oShriSamuelPrakash,residentofChrist ChurchAnnexe,ChristChurch,TheRidge,Shimla,H.P. ...Respondents.

CivilWritPetitionsunderArticle226ofthe ConstitutionofIndia.
Coram TheHonbleMr.JusticeDeepakGupta,J. TheHon'bleMr.JusticeRajivSharma,J.
Whetherapprovedforreporting?1Yes.
1

Whether the reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes.

:2:
CWPNo.438of2011 Forthepetitioners: Mr.SudhirNandarajog,SeniorAdvocate,with M/s R.R. David, P.K. Singh, Aman Sood, TehminaArora,LoreignOvung,FebinMathew VargheseandDhirajPhilip,Advocates. Mr. R.K. Bawa, Advocate General, with Mr. Vivek Singh Thakur, Additional Advocate General,fortherespondent. Dr. Subramanian Swamy with Mr. Ajay Pal Jagga andMs.Madhu Sharma, Advocates, as intervener. Mr. T.S. Chauhan, Advocate, for applicant MahantRamMohanDass. Mr. B.C. Negi and Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocates, for applicantSanatan Dharam Sabha. Ms.AnuTuli,Advocate,forapplicantRamesh Chogar. ............................................................................................................................... CWPNo.4716of2011 Forthepetitioner: Fortherespondents: M/s Manoj V. George, B.D. Das, Alex Joseph andAmanSood,Advocates. Mr. R.K. Bawa, Advocate General, with Mr. Vivek Singh Thakur, Additional Advocate General,forrespondentsNo.1and2. Mr.DineshThakur,Advocate,forrespondent No.4. Dr. Subramanian Swamy with Mr. Ajay Pal Jagga andMs.Madhu Sharma, Advocates, as intervener.

Fortherespondents:

DeepakGupta,J.
CWPNo.438of2011 The petitioners, by means of this writ petition, have challenged the constitutional validity of the Himachal Pradesh FreedomofReligionAct,2006(hereinafterreferredtoastheHimachal PradeshAct)andhaveprayedthatthesaidAct,especiallySections2(a), 2(b),2(c),2(d),4,8oftheActandRules3,4,5and6oftheH.P.

:3: Freedom of Religion Rules framed under the Act are ultra vires the ConstitutionofIndiaandviolatetheprovisionsofArticles14,19(1),21 and25oftheConstitutionofIndia. 2. Wemaypointoutthatduringthecourseofthehearingof

thewritpetitions,alargenumberofapplicationswerefiledbyvarious individuals and bodies, such as, Dr. Subramanian Swamy, Mr. Vijay Kumar Sood, Shree Sanatan Dharam Sabha, Mr. Ajay Sood, Mahant RamMohanDass,ShriBrahminSabhaShimla,Mr.RameshChaujjar, ShriAshutosh,etc.Therefore,on30thApril,2012,wehadpermittedall these applicants to intervene, though they were not permitted to be arrayedasrespondents.Dr.SubramanianSwamy,evenatthetimeof finalarguments,prayedthathemaybearrayedasapartyrespondent. WehavepermittedtheapplicantstoassisttheCourt,butwedonotfeel thattheyarenecessarypartiestothepetitions. 3. Attheoutset,wemaystatethatalargenumberofissues

raisedinthispetitionstanddecidedandarenolonger resintegra in viewofthedecisionsoftheApexCourtrenderedin Rev.Stainislaus versusStateofMadhyaPradeshandothers,AIR1977SupremeCourt 908 and SatyaRanjanMajhiandanotherversusStateofOrissaand others,(2003)7SupremeCourtCases439. InStainislaus'scase, the Apex Court upheld the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Dharma SwatantrayaAdhiniyam,1968andtheOrissaFreedomofReligionAct, 1967.InSatyaRanjanMajhi'scase,theApexCourtwasdealingwitha petition wherein the provisions of Sections 2 and 7 of the Orissa FreedomofReligionAct,1967andRules4&5oftheOrissaFreedomof ReligionRules,1989,hadbeenchallenged.

:4: 4. In Stainislaus'scase,theApexCourtdealingwithArticle

25(1)oftheConstitutionofIndiaandespeciallytheword'propagate' heldasfollows:
15.Article25(1)oftheConstitutionreadsasfollows: 25 (1) Subject to public order, morality and healthandtotheotherprovisionsofthisPart,all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscienceandtherightfreelytoprofess,practise andpropagatereligion." 15A. Counsel for the appellant has argued that the right to 'propagate' one's religion means the right to convertapersontoone'sownreligion.Onthatbasis, counselhasarguedfurtherthattherighttoconverta person to one's own religion is a fundamental right guaranteedbyArticle25(1)oftheConstitution. 16. The expression 'propagate' has a number of meanings,including"tomultiplyspecimensof(aplant, animal, disease etc.) by any process of natural reproductionfromtheparentstock",butthatcannot, for obvious reasons, be the meaning for purposes of Article25(1)oftheConstitution.TheArticleguarantees a right of freedom of religion, and the expression 'propagate'cannotthereforebesaidtohavebeenused inabiologicalsense. 17.Theexpression'propagate'hasbeendefinedinthe Shorter Oxford Dictionary to mean "to spread from person to person, or from place to place, to disseminate,diffuse(astatement,belief,practise,etc.)". 18. According to the Century Dictionary (which is an EncyclopedicLexiconoftheEnglishLanguage)Vol.VI, 'propagate'meansasfollows: "Totransmitorspreadfrompersontopersonor from place to place; carry forward or onward; diffuse; extend; as to propagate a report; to propagatetheChristianreligion." 19.Wehavenodoubtthatitisinthissensethatthe word 'propagate' has been used in Article 25 (1), for what the Article grants is not the right to convert anotherpersontoone'sownreligion,buttotransmitor spreadone'sreligionbyanexpositionofitstents.Ithas to be remembered that Article 25 (1) guarantees "freedom of conscience" to every citizen, and not merelytothefollowersofoneparticularreligion,and that, inturn,postulates that there is nofundamental righttoconvertanotherpersontoone'sownreligion because if a person purposely undertakes the conversion of another person to his religion, as distinguishedfromhisefforttotransmitorspreadthe tenets of his religion, that would impinge on the "freedomofconscience"guaranteedtoallthecitizens ofthecountryalike.

:5:
20.ThemeaningofguaranteeunderArticle25ofthe ConstitutioncameupforconsiderationinthisCourtin Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay, (1954)SCR1055=(AIR1954SC388)anditwasheldas follows: "Thus, subject to the restrictions which this Articleimposes,everypersonhasafundamental right under our Constitution not merely to entertain such religious belief as may be approvedofbyhisjudgmentorconsciencebutto exhibithisbeliefandideasinsuchovertactsas are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion and further to propagate his religious views for the edificationofothers". This Court has given the correct meaning of the Articles,andwefindnojustificationfortheviewthatit grantsafundamentalrighttoconvertpersonstoone's ownreligion.Ithastobeappreciatedthatthefreedom ofreligionenshrinedintheArticleisnotguaranteedin respect of one religion only, but covers all religions alike,anditcanbeproperlyenjoyedbyapersonifhe exerciseshisrightinamannercommensuratewiththe like freedom of persons following the other religions. Whatisfreedomforone,isfreedomfortheother,in equal measure, and there can therefore, be no such thingasafundamentalrighttoconvertanypersonto one'sownreligion. 21. It has next been argued by counsel that the LegislaturesofMadhyaPradeshandOrissaStatesdid not have legislative competence to pass the Madhya Pradesh Act and the Orissa Act respectively, because their laws regulate 'religion' and fall under the ResiduaryEntry97,inListIoftheSeventhScheduleto theConstitution. 22.ItisnotincontroversythattheMadhyaPradeshAct provides for the prohibition of conversion from one religiontoanotherbyuseofforceorallurement,orby fraudulentmeans,andmattersincidentalthereto.The expressions "allurement" and "fraud" have been defined by the Act. Section 3 of the Act prohibits conversion by use of force or by allurement or by fraudulentmeansandSection4penalisessuchforcible conversion. Similarly, Section 3 of the Orissa Act prohibitsforcibleconversionbytheuseofforceorby inducementorbyanyfraudulentmeans,andSection4 penalisessuchforcibleconversion.TheActstherefore, clearlyprovideforthemaintenanceofpublicorderfor, if forcible conversion had not been prohibited, that wouldhavecreatedpublicdisorderintheStates. 23. The expression "Public order" is of a wide connotation.Itmusthavetheconnotationwhichitis meanttoprovideattheveryfirstEntryinListII.Ithas beenheldbythisCourtinRameshThapperv.TheState of Madras, (1950) SCR 594 = (AIR 1950 SC 124) that "public order" is an expression of wide connotation andsignifiesstateoftranquilitywhichprevailsamong themembersofapoliticalsocietyasaresultofinternal

:6:
regulations enforced by the Government which they haveestablished." 24. Reference may also be made to the decision in RamjilalModiv.StateofU.P.,(1957)SCR860=(AIR 1957SC620)wherethisCourthasheldthattherightof freedomofreligionguaranteedbyArticles25and26of the Constitution is expressly made subject to public order,moralityandhealth,andthat "itcannotbepredicatedthatfreedomofreligion can have no bearing whatever on the maintenanceofpublicorderorthatalawcreating anoffencerelatingtoreligioncannotunderany circumstancesbesaidtohavebeenenactedinthe interestsofpublicorder." It has been held that these two Articles in terms contemplate thatrestrictionsmay beimposedonthe rights guaranteed by them in the interests of public order.Referencemayaswellbemadetothedecisionin ArunGhoshv.StateofWestBengal,AIR1970SC1228= (1970CriLJ1136)whereithasbeenheldthatifathing disturbsthecurrentofthelifeofthecommunity,and doesnotmerelyaffectanindividual,itwouldamount todisturbanceofthepublicorder.Thus,ifanattemptis madetoraisecommunalpassions,e.g.,ontheground thatsomeonehasbeen"forcibly"convertedtoanother religion, it would, in all probability, give rise to an apprehensionofabreachofthepublicorder,affecting thecommunityatlarge.TheimpugnedActstherefore fall within the purview of Entry 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule as they are meant to avoid disturbances to the public order by prohibiting conversionfromonereligiontoanotherinamanner reprehensibletotheconscienceofthecommunity.The twoActsdonotprovidefortheregulationofreligion andwedonotfindanyjustificationfortheargument that they fall under Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule.

5.

Dr.SubramanianSwamyhasdrawnourattentiontothe

CollectedWorksofMahatmaGandhi,whereincertainquestionswere posedbyMahatmaGandhiandansweredbyhimself:
Would you preventmissionariescomingto India inordertobaptize? WhoamItopreventthem?IfIhadpowerandcould legislate,Ishouldcertainlystopallproselytizing.Itis thecauseofmuchavoidableconflictbetweenclasses andunnecessaryheartburningamongmissionaries. ButIshouldwelcomepeopleofanynationalityifthey cametoservehereforthesakeofservice. InHindu householdstheadventofamissionaryhasmeantthe disruption of the family coming in the wake of changeofdress,manners,language,foodanddrink.

:7:
Isitnottheoldconceptionyouarereferringto?No suchthingisnowassociatedwithproselytization. Theoutwardconditionhasperhapschangedbutthe inward mostly remains Vilification of Hindu religion, though subdued, is there. If there was a radical change in the missionaries' outlook, would Murdoch books be allowed to be sold in mission depots? Are those books prohibited by missionary societies? There is nothing but vilification of Hinduisminthosebooks.Youtalkoftheconception being no longer there. Only the other day a missionarydescendedonafamineareawithmoney in his pocket, distributed it among the famine stricken, converted them to his fold, took charge of theirtempleanddemolishedit. Thisisoutrageous. ThetemplecouldnotbelongtotheconvertedHindus, anditcouldnotbelongtotheChristianmissionary. But this friend goes and gets it demolished at the hands of the very men who only a little while ago believedthatGodwasthere.

6.

Hehasalsodrawnourattentiontotheissueraisedinthe

Constituent Assembly that conversion from one religion to another broughtaboutbycoercionorundueinfluenceshallnotberecognized bylaw.ThequestionwasansweredbytheHon'bleSardarVallabhbhai J.Patelinthefollowingterms:
TheCommitteediscussedthisandtherewereseveral othersuggestionsmadebytheHouseandtheclause was referred back to the Committee. After further consideration of this clause, which enunciates an obvious principle, the Committee came to the conclusionthatitisnotnecessarytoincludethisasa fundamentalright.Itisillegalunderthepresentlaw anditcanbeillegalatanytime.

7.

Relying upon the aforesaid observations, Dr.

Subramanian Swami contends that conversions are against Hindu philosophy and, therefore, should not be permitted. We are of the consideredviewthattheissuesraisedbyDr.SubramanianSwamyare more philosophical in nature. The question whether conversions shouldbepermittedornotisnotfortheCourttodecide.Wehaveto decide the present cases on the basis of the legal submissions. Conversionsinourcountryarepermissibleiftheconversionisbythe

:8: freewilloftheconvertee. Wearealsooftheopinionthateachand every citizen of this country has a right not only to follow his own beliefsbutalsohasarighttochangehisbeliefs. 8. AcomparativeanalysisoftheHimachalPradeshAct,the

MadhyaPradeshActandtheOrissaActshowsthatthedefinitionsof thewordsconversion,force,fraudandminorareidenticalinall thethreeActs. IntheMadhyaPradeshAct,theword'allurement'has beenusedtodescribeofferofanytemptationintheformofanygiftor gratification either in cash or kind or grant of any material benefit, either monetary or otherwise. In the Himachal Pradesh and Orissa Acts,insteadoftheword'allurement'theword'inducement'hasbeen defined,butthedefinitionisidentical. Inmostotheraspectsalso,all thethreeActsareidentical. 9. TheApexCourtinthecasereferredtoabovehasupheld

therighttopropagateareligion,butatthesametime,innouncertain termshasalsoheldthattherighttopropagateone'sownviewsdoes not give any person the right to convert anybody else except if the personconvertsofhisownfreewill. 10. Propagationcantakeplaceinmanymanners. Todayin

this electronic world we are flooded with religious channels on the electronicmedia.Therearemanygodmenfloatingalloverthecountry espousing different religions and beliefs. Nobody can stop their activitiesaslongastheyactwithintheboundsoflaw.Whatthemain provisionsoftheActdoistopreventconversionbyforce,fraudor inducement.TheseprovisionshavealreadybeenupheldbytheApex Court, though in the context of Madhya Pradesh and Orissa Acts.Therefore,thepetitionerscannotbepermittedtochallengethose

:9: provisions of the Act, which are identical to the provisions of the MadhyaPradeshandOrissaActs. 11. Thoughmanyissueshavebeenraisedbeforeus,weare

notevenentertainingthesameinviewofthepronouncementofthe Apex Court referred to above. We may, however, to be fair to the petitionersandMr.SudhirNandarajog,learnedseniorcounselforthe petitioners,makereferencetotheissuesraised. 12. It has been urged before us that the definition of the

wordsforce,fraudandinducementareveryvagueandliableto bemisused. Merelybecauseadefinitionisliabletobemisuseddoes not mean that the Act should be struck down. As and when the provisionsoftheActaremisused,theaffectedpartycanapproachthe Court for redressal. In any event, all these matters stand squarely coveredbythejudgmentinthecasesreferredtoaboveand,therefore, suchargumentscannotbepermittedtoberaisedbeforeus. 13. It has also been urged before us that Article 13 (2)

prohibits the Legislature from enacting any law which infringes the rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution which would includeArticle25oftheConstitutionofIndia. Ithasalsobeenurged before us that there are two proselytizing religions, i.e. Islam and ChristianitytospreadthewordofGodisaninherentpartofthese religions and, therefore, the State cannot put any restriction on this religiouspracticeofproselytization. Wecannotacceptthisargument becausetheApexCourtinnouncertaintermshasheldthatthoughthe right to propagate may be a fundamental right, but there is no fundamentalrighttoconvert.

:10: 14. Weareproudofourmulticulturalheritagewherepeople

belongingtoallreligions,thoughtsandbeliefshaveamalgamatedinto oursociety.Indiancultureissuchthatwehaveacceptedintoourfold believers and nonbelievers. Indian Society has not discriminated againstanyreligionorthought. Atthesametime,wecannotpermit religions,whichadvanceproselytizationandencourageconversions,to carryouttheseconversionsbyforce,fraudorinducement. 15. ChristianityenteredandflourishedinIndiarightfromthe

timewhenSt.ThomasAquinascametoIndiain52A.D. Jewsfound asyluminIndiabothinKochiinKeralaandintheNorthEasternparts of the country. Zoroastrians entered India at Navsari to escape persecutioninPersia. Today,though thenumberofJewsmayhave dwindled, Christians and Parsis have flourished and attained high officesinthecountry. Islamisnowthesecondlargestreligionofthe country. Though,bypeacefulpropagation,eachreligionmayexpand thenumberofitsfollowers,therehavetobelimitationsonthemanner inwhichconversionsarecarriedoutandnocivilizedsocietycanpermit conversionstobecarriedoutbyforce,fraudorinducement.The wordofGodcannotbespreadeitherthroughtheswordorbytheuseof moneypower. 16. Therighttopropagateone'sreligionmayentitleaperson

toextolthevirtuesofthereligionwhichhepropounds. He,however, hasnorighttodenigrateanyotherreligion,thoughtorbelief.Onemay promiseheaventothefollowersofone'sreligion,butonecannotsay thatdamnationwillfollowifthatpathisnotfollowed.Theessenceof secularism is tolerance and acceptance ofall religions. The right to propagatecanneverincludetherighttodenigrateanyotherthought,

:11: religionorbelief. Therefore,thoughtherighttopropagatemaybea fundamentalrightbuttherighttoconvert,asheldbytheApexCourt,is notafundamentalright. 17. Religionisamatteroffaithandbelief,butallreligionsdo

not believe in 'God'. Reference in this behalf may be made to the judgmentoftheApexCourtin TheCommissioner,HinduReligious Endowments,MadrasversusSriLakshmindraThirthaSwamiarofSri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282, wherein the Apex Court made the followingpertinentobservations:
Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individualsorcommunitiesanditisnotnecessarily theistic.TherearewellknownreligionsinIndialike BuddhismandJainismwhichdonotbelieveinGod or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess thatreligionasconducivetotheirspiritualwellbeing, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothingelsebutadoctrineorbelief. Areligionmay not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances,ceremoniesandmodesofworshipwhich areregardedasintegral partsof religion, andthese formsandobservancesmightextendeventomatters offoodanddress.

18.

In RatilalPanachandGandhiandothersversusStateof

Bombayandothers,AIR1954SC388,theApexCourtagainobserved asfollows:
It may be noted that 'religion' is not necessarily theisticandinfacttherearewellknownreligionsin India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believeintheexistenceof God orofanyIntelligent FirstCause.Areligionundoubtedlyhasitsbasisina systemofbeliefsanddoctrineswhichareregardedby those who profess that religion to be conducive to theirspiritualwellbeing,butitwouldnotbecorrect tosay,asseemstohavebeensuggestedbyoneofthe learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, that matters of religion are nothing but matters of religiousfaithandreligiousbelief. Areligionisnot merely an opinion, doctrine or belief. It has its outwardexpressioninactsaswell.

:12: 19. Therightoffreedomofopinion,therightoffreedomof

conscience by themselves include the extremely important right to disagree.Eveysocietyhasitsownrulesandoveraperiodoftimewhen people only stick to the age old rules and conventions, society degenerates. New thinkers are born when they disagree with well acceptednormsofsociety.Ifeverybodyfollowsthewelltroddenpath, nonewpathswillbecreated,nonewexplorationswillbedoneandno new vistas will be found. We are not dealing with vistas and explorationsinthematerialfield,butwearedealingwithhigherissues. Ifapersondoesnotaskquestionsanddoesnotraiseissuesquestioning ageoldsystems,nonewsystemswoulddevelopandthehorizonsofthe mind will not be expanded. Whether it be Budha, Mahavira, Jesus Christ, ProphetMohammad,GuruNanak Dev, MartinLuther,Kabir, RajaRamMohanRoyorSwamiDayanandSaraswati,newthoughtsand religiouspracticeswouldnothavebeenestablished,iftheyhadquietly submittedtotheviewsoftheirforefathersandhadnotquestionedthe existingreligiouspractices,beliefsandrituals. 20. In a secular country, every belief does not have to be

religious. Even atheists enjoy equal rights under our Constitution. Whether one is a believer, an agnostic or an atheist, one enjoys complete freedom of belief and conscience under our Constitution. There can be no impediments on the aforesaid rights except those permittedbytheConstitution.Thisrightoffreedomofconscienceand beliefalsoincludestheveryimportantrighttochangeone'sownbelief. Everypersonhasarighttoquestionthebeliefsofothersinacivilized manner without deriding or casting aspersions on the beliefs of the others.Everyhumanbeingalsohasarighttoquestionandchangehis

:13: ownbelief.However,thischangemustbeanactofhisownconscience anactwhichhascomefromwithinhimself,anactuninfluencedby force,fraudorinducement. Ifapersonchangeshisreligionor beliefofhisownvolitionthentheStatehasnoroletoplay. Onthe otherhand,ifpersonsaremadetochangetheirreligionduetoforce, fraudorinducement,thiswouldwrecktheverybasicframeworkof our society and lead India to total annihilation. No law can be permittedtobeinterpretedinsuchamannerthattheverybeingofour secularcountryisputatstake. 21. Therighttodissentisoneofthemostimportantrights

guaranteedbyourConstitution.Aslongasapersondoesnotbreakthe laworencouragestrife,hehasarighttodifferfromeveryothercitizen andpropagatewhathebelievesishisbelief. A.D.M.Jabalpurversus ShivakantShukla,(1976)2SCC521,isashiningexampleofadissent whichismuchmorevaluablethantheopinionofthemajority. 22. ComingtotheprovisionsoftheActandtheRules,which

arenotfoundintheMadhyaPradeshandOrissaActs,wemayreferto Section4oftheHimachalPradeshAct,whichreadsasfollows:
4.(1)Apersonintendingtoconvertfromonereligion toanothershallgivepriornoticeofatleastthirtydays totheDistrictMagistrateofthedistrictconcernedof hisintentiontodosoandtheDistrictMagistrateshall getthematterenquiredintoallbysuchagencyashe maydeemfit: Providedthatnonoticeshallberequiredifaperson revertsbacktohisoriginalreligion. (2) Any person who fails to give prior notice, as required under subsection (1), shall be punishable withfinewhichmayextendtoonethousandrupees.

23.

Section8oftheActempowerstheStatetoframerules,

whichhavetobeplacedbeforetheLegislative Assembly andweare concernedwithRules3,4,5and6,whichreadasfollows:

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3.Noticebeforeconversion(1)Anypersondomiciled intheState,intendingtoconverthisreligion,shallgive a notice to the District Magistrate of the District in which he is permanently resident, prior to such conversion,inFormA. (2) The District Magistrate shall cause all notices receivedundersubrule(1)ofrule3tobeenteredina Register of Notices and Complaints of conversion in FormB,andmaywithinfifteendaysfromthereceipt of said notice, get the matter enquired into by such agencyashemaydeemfitandrecordhisfindingsas regardstheparticularsofnoticegiven: Providedthatthepersongivingnoticeandanyother personlikelytobeprejudiciallyaffectedshallbegiven adequate opportunity to associate himself with any suchenquiry. 4.InquiriesinothercasesWhereonthebasisofany complain or any information laid before him, the DistrictMagistrateisoftheopinion,forreasonstobe recorded, (a)thatforceorinducementhavebeenusedorislikely tobeusedinanyconversionwithinthelocallimitsof hisjurisdiction;or (b)thataconversionhastakenplacewithoutnoticein contravention of the provisions of this Act, he may causeaninquirytobemadeinthematterandproceed inthemannerasprovidedinRule3. Everysuchcomplaintsoreceivedshallbeenteredinthe Register of Notices and Complaints of conversion in FormB. 5. Registration and Investigation of Case If after enquiryunderrule3orrule4,asthecasemaybe,the DistrictMagistraterecordsafindingthataconversion hastakenplaceorislikelytotakeplacethroughthe use of force or inducement or without the requisite notice,heshallentertheparticularsofthecaseinthe RegisterofForcedConversioninFormCandreferthe casealongwithallmaterialadducedduringthecourse oftheenquirytothePoliceStationinwhichtheperson isresidentorwheretheconversionisintendedordone forregistrationofacaseanditsinvestigation 6.SanctionforProsecutionIfafterinvestigatingthe matter,it appears thatan offenceunder Subsection (2)ofsection4orundersection5hasbeencommitted, the Investigation Officer shall place all relevant material before the authority empowered under Section 7 to grant prosecution sanction and such sanctionshallbegrantedorrefusedwithinaperiodof 7days,givingreasonsinwriting.

24.

Animportantissuewhichhasbeenraisedinthesecases

iswithregardtotherighttoprivacyofapersonwantingtochangehis

:15: beliefs.Section4oftheHimachalPradeshActlaysdownthataperson intendingtoconvertfromonereligiontoanothershouldgivenotice thirty days prior to his conversion to the District Magistrate of the District concerned, who shall get the matter enquired into by such agencyashemaydeemfit.TheprovisotoSection4(1)laysdownthat no notice shall be required if a person reverts back to his original religion.Incaseofviolationofsubsection(1)ofSection4,theperson, who fails to give notice, would be punishable with fine which may extendupto`onethousand. 25. Rule 3 providesthatany person domiciled inthe State,

intending to convert his religion, shall give notice to the District MagistrateoftheDistrictinwhichheispermanentlyresident,priorto such conversion, in FormA. Thereafter, the District Magistrate is requiredtocauseallnoticestobeenteredinaRegisterofNoticesand ComplaintsinFormBandwithinfifteendaysfromthereceiptofnotice maygetthematterenquiredintobysuchagencyashedeemsfitand record his findings as regards the particulars of notice given. The proviso lays down that the District Magistrate, before passing any order,mustgivenadequateopportunityintheenquirytotheperson giving notice and any other person who is likely to be prejudicially affected. 26. Rule5laysdownthatiftheDistrictMagistrateisofthe

opinionthattheconversionhastakenplaceorislikelytotakeplace throughuseofforceorinducementorwithoutrequisitenotice,heshall refer the case alongwith all material adduced in the course of the enquirytothepoliceforregistrationofacaseanditsinvestigation.The prosecutionsanctioncanbegivenbytheDistrictMagistrateorsuch

:16: authority authorized by him not below the rank of Sub Divisional Officer. 27. Inthiscase,themainissuewithwhichweareconcerned

is whether the fundamental rights of the person, who is converting (hereinafterreferredtoastheconvertee),arebeingadverselyaffected bySection4andRules3and5? 28. We may, at this stage itself, point out that neither the

MadhyaPradeshActnortheRulesmadethereunderprovidethatthe convertee should give notice before conversion. In the Madhya PradeshAct,itisthepersonwhoisconvertinganyotherpersonfrom onereligiousfaithtoanother,suchasareligiouspriest,whoisrequired to give notice of such conversion to the District Magistrate. Every conversionmaynotentailtheperformanceofaceremony. Trueitis, that in some religions, before initiation into the religion, some ceremonyhastobeperformed,butthisisnotapplicabletoallreligions. 29. UndertheOrissaAct,thereisalsonoprovisionforgiving

advance notice by the convertee. However, Rule 4 of the Orissa FreedomofReligionRules,whichwereenactedintheyear1999,reads asfollows:
Any person intending toconverthisreligion, shall give a declaration before a Magistrate, 1st Class, havingjurisdictionpriortosuchconversionthathe intendstoconverthisreligiononhisownwill.

30.

As per this rule, any person intending to convert his

religionisdirectedtogiveadeclarationbeforeaMagistrate1st Class priortosuchconversionthatheintendstoconverthisreligionofhis ownfreewill.Thereisnotimeperiodprescribed.Thenonfiling ofsuchdeclarationisnotanoffence.UnderRule8oftheOrissaRules,

:17: onlycontraventionofRules5and6isanoffence,butcontraventionof Rule4isnotanoffence. 31. Therefore, we find that the Himachal Pradesh Act has

gonemuchfurtherthantheMadhyaPradeshorOrissaActsasfarasthe convertee is concerned. We have earlier discussed that our Constitution ensures that no person living in India can be denied equalityunderthelaworthebenefitsofPartIIIoftheConstitutionof India and every person is entitled to his freedoms, which are guaranteedunderPartIIIoftheConstitutionofIndia. Theserights, whicharecommonlyknownasfundamentalrights,are,infact,human rights.Theserightsinhereineveryhumanbeingandineverycivilized society,wemustrespectsuchrights.Therighttoprivacyisoneofsuch rightsandhasbeenthesubjectmatterofinterpretationinanumberof cases. 32. InGovindversusStateofMadhyaPradeshandanother,

AIR1975SupremeCourt1378,theApexCourtafterdiscussingvarious articlesanddecisionsoftheCourts,bothfromIndiaandabroad,held asfollows:

22. There can be no doubt that privacydignity claims deservetobeexaminedwithcareandto be denied only when an important countervailing interestisshowntobesuperior.IftheCourtdoesnot findthataclaimedrightisentitledtoprotectionasa fundamentalprivacyright,alawinfringingitmust satisfy the compelling state interest test. Then the questionwouldbewhetherastateinterestisofsuch paramount importance as would justify an infringement of the right. Obviously, if the enforcementofmoralitywereheldtobeacompelling as well as a permissible state interest, the characterizationofaclaimedrightasafundamental privacyrightwouldbeoffarlesssignificance. The questionwhetherenforcementofmoralityisastate interest sufficient to justify the infringement of a fundamentalprivacyrightneednotbeconsideredfor the purpose of this case and therefore we refuse to enter the controversial thicket whether enforcement ofmoralityisafunctionofstate.

:18:
23. Individual autonomy, perhaps the central concern of any system of limited government, is protectedinpartunderourConstitutionbyexplicit constitutionalguarantees.Intheapplicationofthe Constitution our contemplation cannot only be of what has been but what may be. Time works changes and brings into existence new conditions. Subtlerandfarreachingmeansofinvadingprivacy willmakeitpossibletobeheardinthestreetwhatis whisperedinthecloset.Yet,toobroadadefinitionof privacyraisesseriousquestionsabouttheproprietyof judicialrelianceonarightthatisnotexplicitinthe Constitution. Ofcourse,privacyprimarilyconcerns the individual. It therefore relates to and overlaps withtheconceptofliberty.Themostseriousadvocate of privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of the right. Privacy interest in autonomy must also be placedinthecontextofotherrightsandvalues. 24.Anyrighttoprivacymustencompassandprotect the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing. Thiscatalogueapproachtothequestionis obviously not as instructive as it does not give analyticalpictureofthedistinctivecharacteristicsof therightofprivacy.Perhaps,theonlysuggestionthat can be offered as unifying principle underlying the concepthasbeentheassertionthataclaimedright mustbeafundamentalrightimplicitintheconcept oforderedliberty. 25.Rightsandfreedomsofcitizensaresetforthinthe Constitution in order to guarantee that the individual,hispersonalityandthosethingsstamped with his personality shall be free from official interference except where a reasonable basis for intrusion exists. Liberty against government a phrasecoinedbyProfessorCorwinexpressesthisidea forcefully. In this sense, many of the fundamental rightsofcitizenscanbedescribedascontributingto therighttoprivacy.

33.

InR.RajagopalaliasR.R.GopalandanotherversusState

ofTamilNaduandothers,AIR1995SupremeCourt264, examining theconceptofrighttoprivacy,theApexCourtheldasfollows:

24. We may now consider whether the State or its officialshavetheauthorityinlawtoimposeaprior restraintuponpublicationofmaterialdefamatoryof theStateoroftheofficials,asthecasemaybe? We think not. No law empowering them to do so is broughttoournotice.AsobservedinNewYorkTimes v. United States ((1971) 403 US 713), popularly known asthepentagon paperscase,anysystemof prior restraints of (freedom of) expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity andthatinsuchcases, theGovernmentcarriesaheavyburdenofshowing

:19:
justification for the imposition of such a restraint. Wemustaccordinglyholdthatnosuchpriorrestraint orprohibitionofpublicationcanbeimposedbythe respondents upon the proposed publication of the alleged autobiography of 'Auto Shankar' by the petitioners.ThiscannotbedoneeitherbytheStateor by its officials. In other words, neither the Government nor the officials who apprehend that theymaybedefamed,havetherighttoimposeaprior restraint upon the publication of the alleged autobiography of Auto Shankar. The remedy of public officials/public figures,if any, will ariseonly after the publication and will be governed by the principlesindicatedherein. 25.Wemustmakeitclearthatwedonotexpressany opinionabouttherightoftheStateoritsofficialsto prosecute the petitioners under Sections 499/500, I.P.C. This is for the reasons that even if they are entitledtodoso,thereisnolawunderwhichtheycan preventthepublicationofamaterialontheground that such material is likely to be defamatory for them.

34.

Ourattentionhasalsobeendrawntothejudgmentofthe

Delhi High Court in Pranav Kumar Mishra and another versus GovernmentofNCTofDelhiandanother,WP(C)No.748of2009, decidedon08.04.2009. Inthiscase,thepetitioners,bymeansofthe writ petition, had challenged the practice of posting the notice of intended marriage under the Special Marriages Act, 1954, at the residentialaddressofbothpartiestothemarriageasalsothroughthe StationHouseOfficerofthepolicestationconcernedforthepurposeof verificationofaddress.Thepetitioners,whowereofmarriageableage, prayed that they do not want that such notices be sent to their residences. 35. The Delhi High Court after considering the rival

contentions came to the conclusion that there is no requirement of postingofnoticetotheapplicants'addressesandheldthatthedispatch ofsuchnoticeswouldamounttobreachoftheirrighttoprivacyand heldasfollows:

:20:
8. It becomes clear on a textual reading of the relevant provisions of the Act and the information procuredfromthewebsiteoftheGovt.ofDelhithat no requirement of posting of notice to applicants' addressesorservicethroughtheSHO,orvisitbyhim is prescribed in either the Act or the website. The petitioner'sconcernsandapprehensionsarejustified. Absentanylegalcompulsionasisthepositionfor sending notices to residential addresses in case of solemnizationofthemarriage,intermsofSections4 and5,theirdispatchcanwellamounttobreachof therighttoprivacy,whicheveryindividualisentitled to (Ref Govind vs. State of MP, (1975) 2 SCC 148, R.Rajgopalvs.StateofT.N.(1994)6SCC632,District RegisrarandCollectorvs.CanaraBank(2005)1SCC 496. 9.ItistobekeptinmindthattheSpecialMarriage Actwasenactedtoenableaspecialformofmarriage foranyIndiannational,professingdifferentfaiths,or desiringacivilformofmarriage. Theunwarranted disclosure of matrimonial plans by two adults entitled to solemnize it may, in certain situations, jeopardizethemarriageitself.Incertaininstances,it mayevenendangerthelifeorlimbofoneattheother partyduetoparentalinterference.

Oneoftheconsiderations,whichweighedwiththeDelhiHighCourt wasthat,infact,thelifeandlimbofthepartiessolemnizingmarriage against the wishes of the parents would be endangered and the marriagewouldbejeopardized,ifsuchnoticesweresent. 36. The Apex Court in Ram Jethmalani and others versus

Union of India and others, (2011) 8 Supreme Court Cases 1, was dealingwithacasewherethepetitionerwantedthatthenamesofthose Indian citizens, who had stashed away huge amounts of illegally begottenmoneyinBanksinAbroadmaybepublished.TheApexCourt dealingwiththerighttoprivacyheldasfollows:
83.Righttoprivacyisanintegralpartofrighttolife. This is a cherished constitutional value, and it is importantthathumanbeingsbealloweddomainsof freedomthatarefreeofpublicscrutinyunlesstheyact in an unlawful manner. We understand and appreciatethefactthatthesituationwithrespectto unaccounted for monies is extremely grave. Nevertheless, as constitutional adjudicators we alwayshavetobemindfulofpreservingthesanctity ofconstitutionalvalues,andhastystepsthatderogate from fundamental rights, whether urged by Governmentsorprivatecitizens,howsoeverwell

:21:
meaning they may be, have to be necessarily very carefullyscrutinised.Thesolutionfortheproblemof abrogation of one zone of constitutional values cannotbethecreationofanotherzoneofabrogation ofconstitutionalvalues. ............................. 88. The revelation of details of bank accounts of individuals, without establishment of prima facie groundstoaccusethemofwrongdoing, wouldbea violation oftheirrightstoprivacy. Detailsofbank accountscanbeusedbythosewhowanttoharass,or otherwisecausedamage,toindividuals. Wecannot remain blind to such possibilities, and indeed experience reveals that public dissemination of banking details, or availability to unauthorised persons,hasledtoabuse.

37.

Apersonnotonlyhasarightofconscience,therightof

belief,therighttochangehisbelief,butalsohastherighttokeephis beliefssecret. Nodoubt,therighttoprivacyis,likeanyotherright, subjecttopublic order,morality and the largerinterestofthe State. Whenrightsofindividualsclashwiththelargerpublicgood,thenthe individual'srightmustgivewaytowhatisinthelargerpublicinterest. However, this does not mean that the majority interest is the larger publicinterest.Largerpublicinterestwouldmeantheintegrity,unity and sovereignty of the country, the maintenance of public law and order.Merelybecausethemajorityviewisdifferentdoesnotmeanthat theminorityviewmustbesilenced. 38. It has been strongly urged By Mr. R.K. Bawa, learned

AdvocateGeneral,onbehalfoftheStatethattherighttoprivacyisnot anindefeasibleright. Therecanbenoquarrelwiththisproposition. However,theStatemusthavematerialbeforeittoshowwhatarethe very compelling reasons which will justify its action of invading the righttoprivacyofanindividual. Aman'shomeishiscastleandno invasionintohishomeispermissibleunlessjustifiedonconstitutional grounds.Aman'smindistheimpregnablefortressinwhichhethinks andtherecanbenoinvasionofhisrightofthoughtunlessthepersonis

:22: expressingorpropagatinghisthoughtsinsuchamannerthatitwill causepublicdisorderoraffecttheunityorsovereigntyofthecountry. 39. Whyshouldanyhumanbeingbeaskedtodisclosewhatis

his religion? Why should a human being be asked to inform the authoritiesthatheischanginghisbelief? WhatrightdoestheState havetodirecttheconverteetogivenoticeinadvancetotheDistrict Magistrateaboutchanginghisrebelliousthought? 40. Aperson'sbelieforreligionissomethingverypersonalto

him. The State has no right to ask a person to disclose what is his personal belief. The only justification given is that public order requiresthatnoticebegiven. Weareoftheconsideredviewthat in caseofapersonchanginghisreligionandnoticebeingissuedtotheso called prejudicially affected parties, chances of the convertee being subjectedtophysicalandpsychologicaltorturecannotberuled out. TheremedyproposedbytheStatemayprovetobemoreharmfulthan theproblem. 41. In case such a notice is issued, then the unwarranted

disclosureofthe voluntary change ofbeliefby anadult may lead to communal clashes and may even endanger the life or limb of the convertee. We are not, in any manner, condoning or espousing conversions especially by force, fraud or inducement. Any conversion,whichtakeplacebyforce,fraudorinducement,must bedealtwithstrictlyinaccordancewithlawwhichwehaveheldtobe valid.Atthesametime,therighttoprivacyandtherighttochangethe beliefofacitizencannotbetakenawayunderthespeciouspleathat publicordermaybeaffected.Weareunabletocomprehendhowthe issuanceofanoticebyaconverteewillpreventconversionsbyfraud,

:23: forceorinducement. Infact,thismayopenaPandora'sboxand oncenoticeisissued,thismayleadtoconflictsbetweenrivalreligious outfitsandgroups.NomaterialhasbeenplacedonrecordbytheState toshowthattherehasbeenanyadverseeffectonpublicorderbyany conversionintheStatewhetherpriortooraftertheenactmentofthe Himachal Pradesh Act. In fact, till date only one case has been registeredunderthisAct. 42. Asobservedbyusabove,conversionsmaynotrequireany

ceremonyinsomereligionsandhowwilltheGovernmentdetermine when the thought process of a person has changed. A person who belongstoAreligionandwillinglywantstoconverttoBreligionwillnot changehisreligionovernight,exceptincaseofforcedconversionsor conversionswhichtakeplaceduetopaymentofcashorothermaterial gifts.Changeofreligion,whenitisofitsownvolition,willnormallybe alongdrawnoutprocess. Ifapersonofhisownvolitionchangeshis religion,thereisnowaythatonecanmeasureorfixthedateonwhich hehasceasedtobelongtoreligionAandconvertedtoreligionB.This hastobeanongoingprocessandtherefore,therecanbenonoticeof thirtydaysasrequiredundertheHimachalPradeshAct. 43. Furthermore, we are of the view that the proviso to

Section 4 is also discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the ConstitutionofIndia. Originalreligionhasnotbeendefinedinthe Himachal Act. According to Dr. Subramanian Swamy, the original religionisHindureligionalone. Wecannotacceptthissubmissionof his. The general consensus of opinion used was that the original religionwouldbethereligionoftheconverteebybirth,i.e.thereligion hewasborninto.

:24: 44. Wefailtounderstandtherationalewhyifapersonisto

revertbacktohisoriginalreligion,nonoticeisrequired.Itwasurged beforeusthatsincehewasborninhisreligionandknowshisreligion well,therefore,itwasthoughtthatwhilerevertingbacktohisoriginal religion, no notice be issued. This argument does not satisfy the parameters of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Supposing a personborninreligionAconvertstoreligionBattheageof20and wantstoconvertbacktoreligionAattheageof50,hehasspentmany moreyears,thattoomatureyears,beingafollowerofreligionB.Why shouldhenotberequiredtogivenotice? 45. Anotherquestionwhichistroublingusisifapersonborn

inreligionA,convertstoreligionB,thenconvertstoreligionCandthen toreligionD. IfheconvertsbacktoreligionBorC,heisrequiredto give notice, but if he converts back to religion A, then no notice is required.Thisalso,accordingtous,istotallyirrationalandviolativeof Article14oftheConstitutionofIndia. 46. Wealsofailtounderstandwhyaperson,whofailstogive

suchnotice,shouldberequiredtopayafine,whichmayextendupto ` 1,000/.WecanunderstandthefeelingsoftheStateinenactingthe law. We are also of the view that conversion by force, fraud or inducementshouldbedealtwithstrictlyandshouldbediscouraged. But, by and large, it is the poor and the downtrodden, who are convertedbyforce,fraudorinducement.ByenactingSection4 andmakingthenonissuanceofthenoticeacriminaloffence,theState has, in fact, made these poor and downtrodden people criminals, whereasthemainthrustoftheActshouldhavebeentodealstrictly

:25: with the persons who convert people by force, fraud or inducement. 47. WealsofoundmanyflawsintheRules. Rule3requires

thatanypersondomiciledintheStateintendingtoconvertmustgive notice to the District Magistrate of the District of which he is a permanentresident. Supposingapersonisapermanentresidentof DistrictShimla,whoisstayinginDelhi.HedecidestoconvertatDelhi. The conversion, if any, would take place at Delhi. The State of HimachalPradeshhasnojurisdictionovertheUnionTerritoryofDelhi. InDelhi,thereisnolawcorrespondingtotheH.P.FreedomofReligion Act.IfsuchconversionisnotillegalinDelhi,whyshouldsuchperson be required to give notice in Himachal Pradesh? How can such a personbevirtuallytreatedtobeacriminalwhentheactofconversion islegalatDelhi? ThereareotherflawsalsointheRulesinasmuchas theyaretotallyvagueanddonotspecifytheagency,throughwhichthe DistrictMagistrateshouldcarryouttheenquiry. But,sinceweareof theviewthatSection4itselfisultravirestheConstitutionofIndia,the corresponding rules must fall and we need not go into a detailed discussionofthoserules. CWPNo.4716of2011 48. AsfarasCWPNo.4716of2011isconcerned,oneofthe

issuesraisedisthattheprosecutionofthepetitioneristotallyillegal. Wefoundthattheprosecutionwasinitiatedmanyyearsback. More thanthreeyearshavebeenexpiredandthecriminalcaseisatthestage ofevidence. Therefore,withoutexpressinganyopiniononthemerits ofthecase,wedisposeofthewritpetitionwithadirectionthatthecase No.RBT50/3of2011/08shallstandtransferredtotheCourtofChief

:26: JudicialMagistrate,Shimla,whoisfurtherdirectedtoensurethatthe proceedingsinthiscasearecompletedlatestby31stDecember,2012. 49. Inviewoftheabovediscussion,weallowthepetitionstoa

limited extent and strike down Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2006 and Rule 3 of the Himachal Pradesh FreedomofReligionRules,2007asbeingviolativeofArticle14andultra virestheprovisionsoftheConstitutionofIndia.Rule5onlyinsofaras itrelatestoactionsrelatingtoSection4isalsoheldtobeultravires. However,allotherprovisionsoftheActandtheRulesareheldtobe legal and valid. Both the petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.Noorderastocosts.

(DeepakGupta) Judge (RajivSharma) Judge August30,2012 (rajni)