Cases for Criminal Law Review

A. Impossible Crime See Art. 4, par. 2, RPC 1. People vs. Balmores, G.R. No. L-1896, February 16, 1950 Facts: Balmores attempted to cash in a sweepstakes ticket that was obviously falsified (the ticket was split into , and the winning ticket number written in ink at the bottom left part of the halved ticket). He presented his falsified ticket to a PCSO booth.The PCSO employee manning the booth saw that the ticket was obviously falsified, and had Balmores arrested.Balmores waived the right to counsel, and pleaded guilty to the crime of attempted estafa. On appeal, Balmores contended (1) that the facts and (2) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him on a plea of guilty because, being illiterate, he was not assisted by counsel. Issue: Did Balmores commit an impossible crime? Held: It may be that appellant was either reckless or foolish in believing that a falsification as patent as that which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but the recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code. Xxx Judging from the appearance of the falsified ticket in question, we are not prepared to say that it would have been impossible for the appellant to consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was presented for the payment had not exercised due care. The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing sweepstakes ticket could cause no harm to anyone and would not constitute a crime were it not for the attempt to cash the ticket so altered as a prize-winning number. So in the ultimate analysis appellant's real offense was the attempt to commit estafa (punishable with eleven days of arresto menor); but technically and legally he has to suffer for the serious crime of falsification of a government obligation. 2. Intod vs. CA, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992 Facts: Intod, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, were tasked by Aniceto Dumalangan to kill Bernardina Palangpangan due to a land dispute between the two. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Page 1 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Issue: Is Intods contention correct? Held: Yes. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the
Page 2 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies. Legal impossibility - occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category. Factual impossibility - occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. The case of Intod vs CA belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. 3. Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009 Facts: Gemma Jacinto along with Anita Valencia and Jacqueline Capitle were charged and convicted of qualified theft for unlawfully taking a postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. They were entrapped receiving marked money, which she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check. Issue: Whether a worthless check can be the object of theft Held: In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty. Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner
Page 3 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check. There can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain. B. Stages of Execution Art 6. RPC 1. Stages of development a. Preparatory acts, when punishable b. Acts of execution 2. Elements of attempted felony a. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts (1) People vs. Lamahang, G.R. No. L43530, August 3, 1935 Facts: Aurelio Lamahang was caught opening with an iron bar a wall of a store
Page 4 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

of cheap goods in Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke one board and was unfastening another when a patrolling police caught him. Owners of the store were sleeping inside store as it was early dawn. Lamahang was convicted of attempt of robbery Issue: Whether the crime is attempted robbery. Held: No. The crime committed is attempted trespass to dwelling. For the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to: (1) establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; and (2) prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. In case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact established
Page 5 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

and stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.

b. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony (1) U.S. vs. Eduave, G.R. No. L-12155, February 2, 1917 Facts: Eduave was incensed at the victim for the reason that she had charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped her and with being the cause of her pregnancy. Using a deadly weapon, Eduave inflicted a blow directed toward a vital part of the body. Eduave stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed, and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up he declared that he had killed the complainant. Issue: Is the crime attempted or frustrated murder? Held: The crime cannot be attempted murder. To be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform.
Page 6 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance. To put it in another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed. On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control. The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act
Page 7 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control that period between the point where he begins and the points where he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated. That the case before us is frustrated is clear. c. The offenders act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance (1) People vs. Lizada, G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003 Facts: Fredie Lizada was accused of raping his step daughter Analia Orilloso in four instances in their house in Tondo, Manila. Physical examination showed no extragenital physical injuries. Hymen intact. Lizada was charged and convicted of 4 counts of qualified rape. On appeal, Lizada argued that the prosecution failed to adduce the requisite quantum of evidence that he raped the private complainant precisely on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998. Issue: Whether the questioned acts constituted consummated rape. Held: No, the acts constituted attempted rape only.
Page 8 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accusedappellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused-appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of attempted rape.58 In a case of similar factual backdrop as this case, we held: "Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the appellant can only be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced the commission of rape by removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and lying on top of her. However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of the victim's brother. d. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to a cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance (1) Velasco vs. People, G.R. No. 166479, February 28, 2006 Facts: Velasco was charged with attempted murder before the RTC of Dagupan City. While denying that he committed the crime, Velasco argued, on
Page 9 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

appeal, that if ever he committed a crime, he merely committed attempted homicide. He maintains there was no sudden firing because the victim testified he was observing the alleged gunman for a period of ten seconds before the latter finally drew his .45 caliber pistol and fired at him. After the first shot, the victim was able to run away. Issue: Is Velascos contention tenable? Held: No. The crime is attempted murder. Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform all acts of execution as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own desistance, petitioner committed an attempted felony. Petitioner already commenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill by shooting private complainant seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. Private complainant sustained a wound on the left arm that is not sufficient to cause his death. The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death.

3. Elements of frustrated felony a. The offender performs all the acts of execution b. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence (1) U.S. vs. Eduave, supra. (2) People vs. Pagal, G.R. Nos. 112620-21, May 14, 1997 Facts: Accused Noli Pagal and Adolfo "Boy" Lamqui were convicted of the crimes of murder and attempted murder
Page 10 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

of Jose Rebujio and Paquito Medrano, respectively. During trial, Medrano took the stand and positively identified the assailants, corroborating the statement of the late Rebujio. He knew the assailants well because Pagal is his nephew, and he, Rebujio and the Pagals have been partners in the business of buying and selling cattle since their childhood.

Issue: Whether the lower court was correct in finding the accused guilty of murder and attempted murder. Held: The Court agrees with the trial court that for the death of Rebujio, accused-appellants are guilty of murder. The allegations of treachery, evident premeditation, and craft charged in the information were duly proved by the prosecution and never refuted by the defense. The court a quo also correctly convicted them for attempted murder of Paquito Medrano, instead of frustrated murder as charged in the information, because the injuries sustained by Medrano were merely superficial and not capable of causing his death even without timely medical intervention. No mortal wound having been inflicted upon the victim, the offenders failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony. They are, therefore, guilty only of attempted murder

(3) Ingles vs. CA, G.R. No. 117161, March 3, 1997 Facts: Petitioner was convicted of attempted homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, for the stabbing of a certain Celso
Page 11 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

Barreno. Petitioner admitted the stabbing but claimed he acted in selfdefense. According to him, it was Barreno who first tried to stab him after an altercation over a parcel of coconut land. Going by Barreno's account, petitioner was the aggressor from the start. He denied having any special interest in the land of petitioner's wife which supposedly sparked the argument between them. He also disowned the knife and insisted that petitioner had it on his person all along before stabbing him Issue: Is the lower court correct in finding the accused guilty of attempted homicide only? Held: No. The Court disagreed with the RTC. "A felony is . . . . frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Undoubtedly, no further act was needed to complete the fact of stabbing, not once but twice. Prosecution witness Dr. Tapales testified that without timely medical attention, one of the wounds could have led to severe blood loss which could have killed Barreno. If the inevitable result, which is the death of the victim, did not materialize, it was not because he was able to elude his
Page 12 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

attacker, but because he was treated in the hospital on time. The Court also observed that the trial and appellate courts ignored the treachery that so glaringly attended the commission of the felony. It is not disputed that Barreno was stabbed on the back by petitioner. The only variance lies in the statement of the former that the attack was sudden, which we accepted at its face value, and in the latter's averment that it was done in a fit of uncontrollable rage, which we found rather contrived. When a person is unexpectedly attacked from behind, depriving him of any opportunity to defend himself, undeniably, there is alevosia. Since treachery was not, however, alleged in the information, it did not qualify the felony to murder but may, nevertheless, be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the proper penalty. Petitioner should, therefore, have been found guilty as charged of the crime of frustrated homicide. (4) People vs. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990 Facts: Ceilito, was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar. The defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime. On appeal, the Orita argued that there is no crime of frustrated rape. Issue: Is there a crime of frustrated rape?
Page 13 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

Held: There is no such thing as frustrated rape. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape: Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. xxx xxx xxx Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman (Black's Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition, p. 193). On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides: Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce
Page 14 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply to the crime of rape. Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line of cases, We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender
Page 15 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed. c. But the felony is not produced d. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator (1) People vs. Tinampay, G.R. Nos. 8065860, March 23 1992 Facts: On 18 December 1983, the accused attacked Maximo, Segundo, and Florencio Hinacay which resulted in the death of Maximo and the serious physical injuries to Segundo. The accused were found guilty of murder and frustrated murder. On appeal, Held: In a crime of murder, or an attempt or frustration thereof, the offender must have the intent or the actual design to kill which must be manifested by external acts. For the injury sustained by Segundo Hinacay, the appellants committed frustrated murder as they performed all the acts of execution that produce the felony as a consequence but the felony is not thereby produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. In the present case, timely medical attention was the independent cause that prevented Segundo's death. For the injury sustained by Florencio Hinacay, the appellants committed attempted murder as there was already a commencement of the criminal act by overt acts but not all acts of execution
Page 16 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

were performed as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than the appellants' own desistance. In the present case, the appellants already commenced their attack on Florencio but Florencio managed to get away from them. 4. Consummated felony a. U.S. vs. Adiao, G.R. No. L-13785, October 8, 1918 Facts: Tomas Adiao, a customs inspector, abstracted a leather belt valued at P0.80, from the baggage of a Japanese named T. Murakami, and secreted the belt in his desk in the Custom House, where it was found by other customs employees. The defendant was charged in the Municipal Court of the city of Manila with the crime of theft. He was found guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated theft. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and again he was found guilty of the crime of frustrated theft, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Issue: Was it frustrated theft? Held: Based on the facts, the Court is of the opinion that the crime cannot properly be classified as frustrated, as this word is defined in article 3 of the Penal Code, but that since the offender performed all of the acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment crime of theft. The fact that the defendant was under observation during the entire transaction and that he was unable to get the merchandise out of the Custom House, is not decisive; all the elements of the completed crime of theft are present. b. U.S. vs. Berry, G.R. No. L-2273, December 4, 1905 Facts: Attorney Francis J. Berry and Paul G. Carriere were charged by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas with the crime of estafa. It was alleged in the complaint that the defendants, on
Page 17 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

or about the 11th day of June, 1904, fraudulently secured the signature of one Cornelio Finohermoso to a certain deed whereby the latter conveyed to Berry his title to a tract of land in Calulihan, municipality of Pitogo, containing 1,000 coconut trees, said land being bounded on the north by the land of Ramon Atienza; on the south by that of Joaquin Martinez; on the east by a forest belonging to the municipality of Pitogo, and on the west by the sea. The price stipulated was 1,000 pesos. Finohermoso was induced to believe that the instrument was not a conveyance of his property but a mere mortgage thereon. Issue: What is the offense committed? Held: The record sufficiently shows that this was one of consummated estafa. It was proved at the trial that Finohermoso, while in confinement and anxious to obtain his liberty, was induced through fraud and deceit to sign what was represented to him to be a mortgage deed of his land, for the purpose of securing the payment of a fee of 100 pesos to the lawyer who was to arrange the matter of his bail. It developed, however, that the instrument was an absolute conveyance of the land, in consideration of 1,000 pesos to the attorney who, through the interpreter, Carriere, had agreed to defend him. Under paragraph 7, article 535 of the Penal Code, he who through deceit shall defraud another by inducing him to sign a document, is guilty of estafa. According to the settled jurisprudence of our courts, the essential elements of the crime of estafa are: (1) the deceit employed to defraud another, and (2) the injury or damage caused thereby. Both elements must be present in order to convict of any of the various species of fraud defined and punished by the Penal Code. It is evident that deceit was employed by the defendant. The injury caused to Finohermoso is likewise manifest. By the fraudulent execution of the document, Finohermoso involuntarily parted with his title to a piece of land valued at more than 3,000 pesos in payment of services which were worth only
Page 18 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

100 pesos. Cornelio Finohermoso never would have signed the document marked "Exhibit A" had he been aware of the fact that he thereby conveyed for the sum of 1,000 pesos his title to a piece of land which, according to his own statement, was worth more than 3,000 pesos. He stated to the interpreter, Carriere, that as soon as he should obtain his liberty he would try to get 100 pesos to redeem the land. By virtue of the deed thus fraudulently executed the title to the property was unduly conveyed to the defendant, who did not even pay the arbitrary price fixed therein nor render, perhaps, any services to Finohermoso, to the prejudice of the latter.

c. People vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-31770, December 5, 1929 Facts: Hernandez was convicted of arson and sentenced to eight years and one day presidio mayor, with the accessaries of law, and the costs. On February 3, 1929, Miguel Dayrit, the offended party, was living with his children in his house situated in the barrio of Duque, municipality of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga. At a little past midnight on that date, and after Miguel Dayrit had retired, he noticed that the thatched roof of his house was on fire. He got up to fetch some water with which to extinguish the fire, when, looking out of the window, he saw the appellant beside the house, carrying a stick (Exhibit A). Miguel Dayrit shouted for help, and started to put out the fire, which he succeeded in doing, after a small part of the roof had burned. In answer to his cries for help, Artemio Tanglao repaired to the place and saw the defendant running away. Issue: What is the crime committed by Hernandez? Held: The crime is arson. The appellant did in fact, set fire to the roof of the house, and said house was in fact partially burned. With this, the crime of arson was consummated, notwithstanding the fact that the fire was afterwards extinguished, for, once the fire has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson does not depend upon the extent of the damage cause. This court has so held in the cases of United
Page 19 of 20

Cases for Criminal Law Review

States vs. Go Foo Suy and Go Jancho (25 Phil. 187) and United States vs. Po Chengco (23 Phil. 487). d. People vs. Orita, supra.

Page 20 of 20