Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998 SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.: This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution 1dated September 27, 1995 and the Decision 2 dated April 10, 1996 of the Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533, 4 and the Orders 5 dated August 29, 1994 6 and February 2, 1995 7 that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394. 8 The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in the questioned Decision 9, are as follows: On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . . On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah AlGazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice. When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members but did not succeed

because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDI (sic). In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah. One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes.

Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. 10 Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the international flights. 11 Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, 12 she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause. On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint 13 for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager. On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss 14 which raised the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case. On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) 15. Saudia filed a reply 16 thereto on March 3, 1994. On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint 17 wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as party defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint 18. The trial court issued an Order 19 dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia. From the Order of respondent Judge 20 denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration 21 of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition 22 (To Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration). In the Reply 23 filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if that ground is raised for the first time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order 24 dated February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIA's Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the assailed Order reads as follows: Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994, considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees, upon the basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing new of substance which might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to be reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of the defendant, is DENIED. SO ORDERED. 25 Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 26 with the Court of Appeals. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining Order 27 dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim. In another Resolution 28 promulgated on September 27, 1995, now assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIA's Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit: The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED, after considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it appearing that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled thereto (Unciano Paramedical College, et. Al.,v. Court of Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993, Second Division). SO ORDERED. On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant Petition 29 for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995. However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the Decision 30dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the

petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal. On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order 31dated April 30, 1996, given due course by this Court. After both parties submitted their Memoranda, 32 the instant case is now deemed submitted for decision. Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues: I The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this case involves what is known in private international law as a "conflicts problem". Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts done by another sovereign state which is abhorred. II Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of leave of court is now moot and academic when this Honorable Court required the respondents to comment on petitioner's April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be construed with liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof. III Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 entitled "Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al." and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day reglementary period as provided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 has not yet become final and executory and this Honorable Court can take cognizance of this case. 33 From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues emerge for our resolution: I. WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS

JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED "MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES". II. WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN. Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset. It maintains that private respondent's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule. 34 On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 35 and 21 36 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law. 37 Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the interplay of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia. As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint 38 dated June 23, 1994: 2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporation doing business in the Philippines. It may be served with summons and other court processes at Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.). Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114 Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila. xxx xxx xxx 6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila. 7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiors reauested her to see MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah. 8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to

board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sigh a document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila. 9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manger, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her. 10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take that flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders. 11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing, and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. 12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff sought the help of the Philippines Embassy in Jeddah. The latter helped her pursue an appeal from the decision of the court. To pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights of defendant SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served the international flights. 39 Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a "conflicts" case. A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. 40 The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. 41 The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile,

or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. 42 In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise. We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction 43 confronts the court a quo. After a careful study of the private respondent's Amended Complaint, 44 and the Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code. On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals, 45 this Court held that: The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes. Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent's assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum. Based on the allegations 46 in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction 47 we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.48 Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:

Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction: xxx xxx xxx (8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours) xxx xxx xxx And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate: Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. [Now Regional Trial Court] (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. 49 Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her. Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.

Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions 50 praying for the dismissal of Morada's Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction. As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.: 51 We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside from disputing the lower court's jurisdiction over defendant's person, prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action has prescribed. By interposing such second ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of which it prayed the court to resolve controversy in its favor. For the court to validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latter's person, who, being the proponent of the affirmative defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its special appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that; When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. 52 Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court has jurisdiction over the case and that its exercise thereof, justified. As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. 53

Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two important values should be stressed. 54 Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule." 55 The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law. 56 Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative fact. 57 An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. 58 Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable law. 59 These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the following: (1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin; (2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation; (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved; (4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts; (5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised; (6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis; (7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori the law of the forum is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given

case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and (8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment. 60(Emphasis ours.) After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the "handing over" or "turning over" of the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner's purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner's authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven. Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort. Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability 61 have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. 62 As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, 63 raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly established. Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the most interest in the problem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's insistence that "[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter." 64 As aptly said by private respondent, she has "no obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21" of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. 65 And as correctly held by the respondent appellate court, "considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is". 66 Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the trial court's denial of defendant's (herein petitioner's) motion to dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available, and expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the vindication of the country's system of law and justice in a transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try and adjudge the case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging the results of the case in any manner whatsoever. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-9318394 entitled "Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Annex "A", PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, p. 36. 2 Annex "A", SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION, April 30, 1996; rollo, pp. 88-102. 3 Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas, and concurred in by Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial and Associate Justice Pacita Caizares-Nye. 4 Entitled "Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Hon. Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and Milagros P. Morada". 5 Issued by respondent Judge Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. 6 Annex "B", PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, pp. 37-39. 7 Annex "B", PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, p. 40. 8 Entitled "Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines". 9 Supra, note 2. 10 Decision, pp. 2-4; see rollo, pp. 89-91. 11 Private respondent's Comment; rollo, p. 50. 12 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 13 Dated November 19, 1993, and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-18394, Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. 14 Dated January 14, 1994. 15 Dated February 4, 1994. 16 Reply dated March 1, 1994. 17 Records, pp. 65-84. 18 Rollo, p. 65.

19 Supra, note 6. 20 Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz. 21 Dated September 19, 1994. 22 Records, pp. 108-116. 23 Records, pp. 117-128. 24 Supra, note 7. 25 Ibid. 26 Dated February 18, 1995; see supra, note 4. 27 Supra, note 7. 28 Records, p. 180. 29 Rollo, pp. 1-44. 30 Supra, note 2. 31 Rollo, pp. 80-86. 32 Memorandum for Petitioner dated October 9, 1996, rollo, pp. 149-180; and Memorandum for Private Respondent, October 30, 1996, rollo, pp. 182-210. 33 Rollo, pp. 157-159. All caps in the original. 34 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 14, rollo, p. 162. 35 Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. 36 Art 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages. 37 Memorandum for Private Respondent, p. 9, rollo, p. 190. 38 Records, pp. 65-71. 39 Supra, note 17, pp. 65-68.

40 Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 edition, p. 3. 41 Ibid., citing Cheshire and North, Private International Law, p. 5 by P.M. North and J.J. Faucett (Butterworths; London, 1992). 42 Ibid. 43 Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws, sixth edition (1984), p. 24, citing Leflar, The Law of Conflict of Laws, pp. 5-6. 44 Supra, note 17. 45 83 SCRA 237, 247. 46 Supra, note at 17, at p. 6. Morada prays that judgment be rendered against Saudia, ordering it to pay: (1) not less than P250,000.00 as actual damages; (2) P4 million in moral damages; (3) P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and (4) P500,000.00 in attorney's fees. 47 Baguioro v. Barrios, 77 Phil. 120. 48 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is defined as the authority of a court to hear and decide cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. (Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 487) 49 Supra, note 37, p. 58, citing Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 350 U.S. 501, 67 Sup. Ct. 839 (1947). 50 Omnibus Motion to Dismiss dated January 14, 1994; Reply (to Plaintiff's Opposition) dated February 19, 1994; Comment (to Plaintiffs Motion to Admit Amended Complaint dated June 23, 1994) dated July 20, 1993; Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint dated June 23, 1994 under date August 11, 1994; and Motion for Reconsideration dated September 19, 1994. 51 18 SCRA 207, 213-214. 52 64 SCRA 23, 31. 53 Coquia and Pangalangan. Conflict of Laws, 1995 edition p. 65, citing Von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 Cornell L. Rev. 927 (1975). 54 Ibid. 55 Supra, note 40 at p. 94, citing Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflict of Laws, p. 50.

56 Ibid. 57 Supra, note 37, at p. 136; cf. Mussbaum, Principle of Private International Law, p. 173; and Rabel,The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study, pp. 51-52. 58 Supra, note 37, p. 137. 59 Ibid. 60 Supra, note 37, at pp. 138-139. 61 Includes the (1) German rule of elective concurrence; (2) "State of the most significant relationship" rule (the Second Restatement of 1969); (3) State interest analysis; and (4) Caver's Principle of Preference. 62 Supra, note 37, p. 396. 63 Supra, note 59, p. 79, citing Ruben v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 305, 113 N.E. 2d 424, 431. 64 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 22; rollo, p. 170. 65 Memorandum for Private Respondent, pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 202-203. 66 CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 97. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants. Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al. Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al. J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company. Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.: This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t The facts of the case are as follows: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies. On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1 After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes. Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law. In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters but this Court resolved to deny the motion.
2

San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence. Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500. EN BANC [G. R. No. 2935. March 23, 1909.]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GEORGE I. FRANK,Defendant-Appellant. DECISION JOHNSON, J.: Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of September, 1905. the Defendantappealed. On the 12th day of October, 1905, the Appellant filed his printed bill of exceptions with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 5th day of December, 1905, the Appellant filed his brief with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 19th day of January, 1906, the Attorney-General filed his brief in said cause. Nothing further was done in said cause until on about the 30th day of January, 1909, when the respective parties were requested by this court to prosecute the appeal under penalty of having the same dismissed for failure so to do; whereupon the Appellant, by petition, had the cause placed upon the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d day of February, 1909. The facts from the record appear to be as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, in the United States, the Defendant, through a representative of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, entered into a contract for a period of two years with the Plaintiff, by which the Defendant was to receive a salary of 1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel. Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the Defendant, he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary paid during such period.

Third. The Defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th day of April, 1903, and was paid half-salary from the date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands. Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the Defendant left the service of the Plaintiffand refused to make a further compliance with the terms of the contract. Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the Plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover from the Defendant the sum of 269. 23 dollars, which amount the Plaintiff claimed had been paid to the Defendant as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the period consumed in travel. Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract. To the complaint of the Plaintiff the Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his special defense that the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law. To the special defense of the Defendant the Plaintiff filed a demurrer, which demurrer the court sustained. Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court rendered a judgment against the Defendant and in favor of the Plaintifffor the sum of 265. 90 dollars. The lower court found that at the time the Defendant quit the service of the Plaintiff there was due him from the said Plaintiff the sum of 3. 33 dollars, leaving a balance due the Plaintiff in the sum of 265. 90 dollars. From this judgment theDefendant appealed and made the following assignments of error: chanrobles virtualawlibrary 1. 2. The court erred in sustaining Plaintiffs demurrer to Defendants special defenses. The court erred in rendering judgment against the Defendant on the facts.

With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right which the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the Defendant. The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. The Plaintiff [the Defendant] claims that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed. It is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is admitted that at the time and place of the making of the contract in

question the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined b the law of the place where the contract is made. (Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) cralaw Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought. (Idem.) cralaw The Defendants claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult a the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the Plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year later, is not tenable. Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of error are, therefore. First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way affected the terms of the contract in question; and Second. The Plaintiff [Defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract was made, he cannot plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced. We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second assignment of error. For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson and Willard, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994 BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. Nos. 104911-14 December 5, 1994

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and/or ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994 ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, ROMEO PATAG, RIZALINO REYES, IGNACIO DE VERA, SOLOMON B. REYES, JOSE M. ABAN, EMIGDIO N. ABARQUEZ, ANTONIO ACUPAN, ROMEO ACUPAN, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRE, WILFREDO D. ALIGADO, MARTIN AMISTAD, JR., ROLANDO B. AMUL, AMORSOLO ANADING, ANTONIO T. ANGLO, VICENTE ARLITA, HERBERT AYO, SILVERIO BALATAZO, ALFREDO BALOBO, FALCONERO BANAAG, RAMON BARBOSA, FELIX BARCENA, FERNANDO BAS, MARIO BATACLAN, ROBERTO S. BATICA, ENRICO BELEN, ARISTEO BICOL, LARRY C. BICOL, PETRONILLO BISCOCHO, FELIX M. BOBIER, DIONISIO BOBONGO, BAYANI S. BRACAMANTE, PABLITO BUSTILLO, GUILLERMO CABEZAS, BIENVENIDO CADALIN, RODOLFO CAGATAN, AMANTE CAILAO, IRENEO CANDOR, JOSE CASTILLO, MANUEL CASTILLO, REMAR CASTROJERES, REYNALDO CAYAS, ROMEO CECILIO, TEODULO CREUS, BAYANI DAYRIT, RICARDO DAYRIT, ERNESTO T. DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, ONOFRE DE RAMA, IGNACIO DE VERA, MODESTO DIZON, REYNALDO DIZON, ANTONIO S. DOMINGUEZ, GILBERT EBRADA, RICARDO EBRADA, ANTONIO EJERCITO, JR., EDUARTE ERIDAO, ELADIO ESCOTOTO, JOHN ESGUERRA, EDUARDO ESPIRITU, ERNESTO ESPIRITU, RODOLFO ESPIRITU, NESTOR M. ESTEVA, BENJAMIN ESTRADA, VALERIO EVANGELISTA, OLIGARIO FRANCISCO, JESUS GABAWAN, ROLANDO GARCIA, ANGEL GUDA, PACITO HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO HILARIO, HENRY L. JACOB, HONESTO JARDINIANO, ANTONIO JOCSON, GERARDO LACSAMANA, EFREN U. LIRIO LORETO LONTOC, ISRAEL LORENZO, ALEJANDRO LORINO, JOSE MABALAY, HERMIE MARANAN, LEOVIGILDO MARCIAL, NOEL MARTINEZ, DANTE MATREO, LUCIANO MELENDEZ, RENATO MELO, FRANCIS MEDIODIA, JOSE C. MILANES, RAYMUNDO C. MILAY, CRESENCIANO MIRANDA, ILDEFONSO C. MOLINA, ARMANDO B. MONDEJAR RESURRECCION D. NAZARENO, JUAN OLINDO, FRANCISCO R. OLIVARES, PEDRO ORBISTA, JR., RICARDO ORDONEZ, ERNIE PANCHO, JOSE PANCHO, GORGONIO P. PARALA, MODESTO PINPIN, JUANITO PAREA, ROMEO I. PATAG, FRANCISCO PINPIN, LEONARDO POBLETE, JAIME POLLOS, DOMINGO PONDALIS, EUGENIO RAMIREZ, LUCIEN M. RESPALL, GAUDENCIO RETANAN, JR., TOMAS B. RETENER, ALVIN C. REYES, RIZALINO REYES, SOLOMON B. REYES, VIRGILIO G. RICAZA, RODELIO RIETA, JR., BENITO RIVERA, JR., BERNARDO J. ROBILLOS, PABLO A. ROBLES, JOSE ROBLEZA, QUIRINO RONQUILLO,

AVELINO M. ROQUE, MENANDRO L. SABINO, PEDRO SALGATAR, EDGARDO SALONGA, NUMERIANO SAN MATEO, FELIZARDO DE LOS SANTOS, JR., GABRIEL SANTOS, JUANITO SANTOS, PAQUITO SOLANTE, CONRADO A. SOLIS, JR., RODOLFO SULTAN, ISAIAS TALACTAC, WILLIAM TARUC, MENANDRO TEMPROSA, BIENVENIDO S. TOLENTINO, BENEDICTO TORRES, MAXIMIANO TORRES, FRANCISCO G. TRIAS, SERGIO A. URSOLINO, ROGELIO VALDEZ, LEGORIO E. VERGARA, DELFIN VICTORIA, GILBERT VICTORIA, HERNANE VICTORIANO, FRANCISCO VILLAFLORES, DOMINGO VILLAHERMOSA, ROLANDO VILLALOBOS, ANTONIO VILLAUZ, DANILO VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO VILLANUEVA, ANGEL VILLARBA, JUANITO VILLARINO, FRANCISCO ZARA, ROGELIO AALAGOS, NICANOR B. ABAD, ANDRES ABANES, REYNALDO ABANES, EDUARDO ABANTE, JOSE ABARRO, JOSEFINO ABARRO, CELSO S. ABELANIO, HERMINIO ABELLA, MIGUEL ABESTANO, RODRIGO G. ABUBO, JOSE B. ABUSTAN, DANTE ACERES, REYNALDO S. ACOJIDO, LEOWILIN ACTA, EUGENIO C. ACUEZA, EDUARDO ACUPAN, REYNALDO ACUPAN, SOLANO ACUPAN, MANUEL P. ADANA, FLORENTINO R. AGNE, QUITERIO R. AGUDO, MANUEL P. AGUINALDO, DANTE AGUIRRE, HERMINIO AGUIRRE, GONZALO ALBERTO, JR., CONRADO ALCANTARA, LAMBERTO Q. ALCANTARA, MARIANITO J. ALCANTARA, BENCIO ALDOVER, EULALIO V. ALEJANDRO, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRO, EDUARDO L. ALEJANDRO, MAXIMINO ALEJANDRO, ALBERTO ALMENAR, ARNALDO ALONZO, AMADO ALORIA, CAMILO ALVAREZ, MANUEL C. ALVAREZ, BENJAMIN R. AMBROCIO, CARLOS AMORES, BERNARD P. ANCHETA, TIMOTEO O. ANCHETA, JEOFREY ANI, ELINO P. ANTILLON, ARMANDRO B. ANTIPONO, LARRY T. ANTONIO, ANTONIO APILADO, ARTURO P. APILADO, FRANCISCO APOLINARIO, BARTOLOME M. AQUINO, ISIDRO AQUINO, PASTOR AQUINO, ROSENDO M. AQUINO, ROBERTO ARANGORIN, BENJAMIN O. ARATEA, ARTURO V. ARAULLO, PRUDENCIO ARAULLO, ALEXANDER ARCAIRA, FRANCISCO ARCIAGA, JOSE AREVALO, JUANTO AREVALO, RAMON AREVALO, RODOLFO AREVALO, EULALIO ARGUELLES, WILFREDO P. ARICA, JOSE M. ADESILLO, ANTONIO ASUNCION, ARTEMIO M. ASUNCION, EDGARDO ASUNCION, REXY M. ASUNCION, VICENTE AURELIO, ANGEL AUSTRIA, RICARDO P. AVERILLA, JR., VIRGILIO AVILA, BARTOLOME AXALAN, ALFREDO BABILONIA, FELIMON BACAL, JOSE L. BACANI, ROMULO R. BALBIERAN, VICENTE BALBIERAN, RODOLFO BALITBIT, TEODORO Y. BALOBO, DANILO O. BARBA, BERNARDO BARRO, JUAN A. BASILAN, CEFERINO BATITIS, VIVENCIO C. BAUAN, GAUDENCIO S. BAUTISTA, LEONARDO BAUTISTA, JOSE D. BAUTISTA, ROSTICO BAUTISTA, RUPERTO B. BAUTISTA, TEODORO S. BAUTISTA, VIRGILIO BAUTISTA, JESUS R. BAYA, WINIEFREDO BAYACAL, WINIEFREDO BEBIT, BEN G. BELIR, ERIC B. BELTRAN, EMELIANO BENALES, JR., RAUL BENITEZ, PERFECTO BENSAN, IRENEO BERGONIO, ISABELO BERMUDEZ, ROLANDO I. BERMUDEZ, DANILO BERON, BENJAMIN BERSAMIN, ANGELITO BICOL, ANSELMO BICOL, CELESTINO BICOL, JR., FRANCISCO BICOL, ROGELIO BICOL, ROMULO L. BICOL, ROGELIO BILLIONES, TEOFILO N. BITO, FERNANDO BLANCO, AUGUSTO BONDOC, DOMINGO BONDOC, PEPE S. BOOC, JAMES R. BORJA, WILFREDO BRACEROS, ANGELES C. BRECINO, EURECLYDON G. BRIONES,

AMADO BRUGE, PABLITO BUDILLO, ARCHIMEDES BUENAVENTURA, BASILIO BUENAVENTURA, GUILLERMO BUENCONSEJO, ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE, VIRGILIO BUTIONG, JR., HONESTO P. CABALLA, DELFIN CABALLERO, BENEDICTO CABANIGAN, MOISES CABATAY, HERMANELI CABRERA, PEDRO CAGATAN, JOVEN C. CAGAYAT, ROGELIO L. CALAGOS, REYNALDO V. CALDEJON, OSCAR C. CALDERON, NESTOR D. CALLEJA, RENATO R. CALMA, NELSON T. CAMACHO, SANTOS T. CAMACHO, ROBERTO CAMANA, FLORANTE C. CAMANAG EDGARDO M. CANDA, SEVERINO CANTOS, EPIFANIO A. CAPONPON, ELIAS D. CARILLO, JR., ARMANDO CARREON, MENANDRO M. CASTAEDA, BENIGNO A. CASTILLO, CORNELIO L. CASTILLO, JOSEPH B. CASTILLO, ANSELMO CASTILLO, JOAQUIN CASTILLO, PABLO L. CASTILLO, ROMEO P. CASTILLO, SESINANDO CATIBOG, DANILO CASTRO, PRUDENCIO A. CASTRO, RAMO CASTRO, JR., ROMEO A. DE CASTRO, JAIME B. CATLI, DURANA D. CEFERINO, RODOLFO B. CELIS, HERMINIGILDO CEREZO, VICTORIANO CELESTINO, BENJAMIN CHAN, ANTONIO C. CHUA, VIVENCIO B. CIABAL, RODRIGO CLARETE, AUGUSTO COLOMA, TURIANO CONCEPCION, TERESITO CONSTANTINO, ARMANDO CORALES, RENATO C. CORCUERA, APOLINAR CORONADO, ABELARDO CORONEL, FELIX CORONEL, JR., LEONARDO CORPUZ, JESUS M. CORRALES, CESAR CORTEMPRATO, FRANCISCO O. CORVERA, FRANCISCO COSTALES, SR., CELEDONIO CREDITO, ALBERTO A. CREUS, ANACLETO V. CRUZ, DOMINGO DELA CRUZ, AMELIANO DELA CRUZ, JR., PANCHITO CRUZ, REYNALDO B. DELA CRUZ, ROBERTO P. CRUZ, TEODORO S. CRUZ, ZOSIMO DELA CRUZ, DIONISIO A. CUARESMA, FELIMON CUIZON, FERMIN DAGONDON, RICHARD DAGUINSIN, CRISANTO A. DATAY, NICASIO DANTINGUINOO, JOSE DATOON, EDUARDO DAVID, ENRICO T. DAVID, FAVIO DAVID, VICTORIANO S. DAVID, EDGARDO N. DAYACAP, JOSELITO T. DELOSO, CELERINO DE GUZMAN, ROMULO DE GUZMAN, LIBERATO DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE LEON, JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN, NAPOLEON S. DE LUNA, RICARDO DE RAMA, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, ALBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA CRUZ, LEONARDO DELOS REYES, ERNESTO F. DIATA, EDUARDO A. DIAZ, FELIX DIAZ, MELCHOR DIAZ, NICANOR S. DIAZ, GERARDO C. DIGA, CLEMENTE DIMATULAC, ROLANDO DIONISIO, PHILIPP G. DISMAYA, BENJAMIN DOCTOLERO, ALBERTO STO. DOMINGO, BENJAMIN E. DOZA, BENJAMIN DUPA, DANILO C. DURAN, GREGORIO D. DURAN, RENATO A. EDUARTE, GODOFREDO E. EISMA, ARDON B. ELLO, UBED B. ELLO, JOSEFINO ENANO, REYNALDO ENCARNACION, EDGARDO ENGUANCIO, ELIAS EQUIPANO, FELIZARDO ESCARMOSA, MIGUEL ESCARMOSA, ARMANDO ESCOBAR, ROMEO T. ESCUYOS, ANGELITO ESPIRITU, EDUARDO S. ESPIRITU, REYNALDO ESPIRITU, ROLANDO ESPIRITU, JULIAN ESPREGANTE, IGMIDIO ESTANISLAO, ERNESTO M. ESTEBAN, MELANIO R. ESTRO, ERNESTO M. ESTEVA, CONRADO ESTUAR, CLYDE ESTUYE, ELISEO FAJARDO, PORFIRIO FALQUEZA, WILFREDO P. FAUSTINO, EMILIO E. FERNANDEZ, ARTEMIO FERRER, MISAEL M. FIGURACION, ARMANDO F. FLORES, BENJAMIN FLORES, EDGARDO C. FLORES, BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO, MANUEL S. FRANCISCO, ROLANDO FRANCISCO, VALERIANO FRANCISCO, RODOLFO GABAWAN, ESMERALDO GAHUTAN, CESAR C. GALANG, SANTIAGO N. GALOSO, GABRIEL

GAMBOA, BERNARDO GANDAMON, JUAN GANZON, ANDRES GARCIA, JR., ARMANDO M. GARCIA, EUGENIO GARCIA, MARCELO L. GARCIA, PATRICIO L. GARCIA, JR., PONCIANO G. GARCIA, PONCIANO G. GARCIA, JR., RAFAEL P. GARCIA, ROBERTO S. GARCIA, OSIAS G. GAROFIL, RAYMUNDO C. GARON, ROLANDO G. GATELA, AVELINO GAYETA, RAYMUNDO GERON, PLACIDO GONZALES, RUPERTO H. GONZALES, ROGELIO D. GUANIO, MARTIN V. GUERRERO, JR., ALEXIS GUNO, RICARDO L. GUNO, FRANCISCO GUPIT, DENNIS J. GUTIERREZ, IGNACIO B. GUTIERREZ, ANGELITO DE GUZMAN, JR., CESAR H. HABANA, RAUL G. HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO HERNANDEZ, JOVENIANO D. HILADO, JUSTO HILAPO, ROSTITO HINAHON, FELICISIMO HINGADA, EDUARDO HIPOLITO, RAUL L. IGNACIO, MANUEL L. ILAGAN, RENATO L. ILAGAN, CONRADO A. INSIONG, GRACIANO G. ISLA, ARNEL L. JACOB, OSCAR J. JAPITENGA, CIRILO HICBAN, MAXIMIANO HONRADES, GENEROSO IGNACIO, FELIPE ILAGAN, EXPEDITO N. JACOB, MARIO JASMIN, BIENVENIDO JAVIER, ROMEO M. JAVIER, PRIMO DE JESUS, REYNALDO DE JESUS, CARLOS A. JIMENEZ, DANILO E. JIMENEZ, PEDRO C. JOAQUIN, FELIPE W. JOCSON, FELINO M. JOCSON, PEDRO N. JOCSON, VALENTINO S. JOCSON, PEDRO B. JOLOYA, ESTEBAN P. JOSE, JR., RAUL JOSE, RICARDO SAN JOSE, GERTRUDO KABIGTING, EDUARDO S. KOLIMLIM, SR., LAURO J. LABAY, EMMANUEL C. LABELLA, EDGARDO B. LACERONA, JOSE B. LACSON, MARIO J. LADINES, RUFINO LAGAC, RODRIGO LAGANAPAN, EFREN M. LAMADRID, GUADENCIO LATANAN, VIRGILIO LATAYAN, EMILIANO LATOJA, WENCESLAO LAUREL, ALFREDO LAXAMANA, DANIEL R. LAZARO, ANTONIO C. LEANO, ARTURO S. LEGASPI, BENITO DE LEMOS, JR., PEDRO G. DE LEON, MANOLITO C. LILOC, GERARDO LIMUACO, ERNESTO S. LISING, RENATO LISING, WILFREDO S. LISING, CRISPULO LONTOC, PEDRO M. LOPERA, ROGELIO LOPERA, CARLITO M. LOPEZ, CLODY LOPEZ, GARLITO LOPEZ, GEORGE F. LOPEZ, VIRGILIO M. LOPEZ, BERNARDITO G. LOREJA, DOMINGO B. LORICO, DOMINGO LOYOLA, DANTE LUAGE, ANTONIO M. LUALHATI, EMMANUEL LUALHATI, JR., LEONIDEZ C. LUALHATI, SEBASTIAN LUALHATI, FRANCISCO LUBAT, ARMANDO LUCERO, JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN, THOMAS VICENTE O. LUNA, NOLI MACALADLAD, ALFREDO MACALINO, RICARDO MACALINO, ARTURO V. MACARAIG, ERNESTO V. MACARAIG, RODOLFO V. MACARAIG, BENJAMIN MACATANGAY, HERMOGENES MACATANGAY, RODEL MACATANGAY, ROMULO MACATANGAY, OSIAS Q. MADLANGBAYAN, NICOLAS P. MADRID, EDELBERTO G. MAGAT, EFREN C. MAGBANUA, BENJAMIN MAGBUHAT, ALFREDO C. MAGCALENG, ANTONIO MAGNAYE, ALFONSO MAGPANTAY, RICARDO C. MAGPANTAY, SIMEON M. MAGPANTAY, ARMANDO M. MAGSINO, MACARIO S. MAGSINO, ANTONIO MAGTIBAY, VICTOR V. MAGTIBAY, GERONIMO MAHILUM, MANUEL MALONZO, RICARDO MAMADIS, RODOLFO MANA, BERNARDO A. MANALILI, MANUEL MANALILI, ANGELO MANALO, AGUILES L. MANALO, LEOPOLDO MANGAHAS, BAYANI MANIGBAS, ROLANDO C. MANIMTIM, DANIEL MANONSON, ERNESTO F. MANUEL, EDUARDO MANZANO, RICARDO N. MAPA, RAMON MAPILE, ROBERTO C. MARANA, NEMESIO MARASIGAN, WENCESLAO MARASIGAN, LEONARDO MARCELO, HENRY F. MARIANO, JOEL MARIDABLE, SANTOS E.

MARINO, NARCISO A. MARQUEZ, RICARDO MARTINEZ, DIEGO MASICAMPO, AURELIO MATABERDE, RENATO MATILLA, VICTORIANO MATILLA, VIRGILIO MEDEL, LOLITO M. MELECIO, BENIGNO MELENDEZ, RENER J. MEMIJE, REYNALDO F. MEMIJE, RODEL MEMIJE, AVELINO MENDOZA, JR., CLARO MENDOZA, TIMOTEO MENDOZA, GREGORIO MERCADO, ERNANI DELA MERCED, RICARDO MERCENA, NEMESIO METRELLO, RODEL MEMIJE, GASPAR MINIMO, BENJAMIN MIRANDA, FELIXBERTO D. MISA, CLAUDIO A. MODESTO, JR., OSCAR MONDEDO, GENEROSO MONTON, RENATO MORADA, RICARDO MORADA, RODOLFO MORADA, ROLANDO M. MORALES, FEDERICO M. MORENO, VICTORINO A. MORTEL, JR., ESPIRITU A. MUNOZ, IGNACIO MUNOZ, ILDEFONSO MUNOZ, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ERNESTO NAPALAN, MARCELO A. NARCIZO, REYNALDO NATALIA, FERNANDO C. NAVARETTE, PACIFICO D. NAVARRO, FLORANTE NAZARENO, RIZAL B. NAZARIO, JOSUE NEGRITE, ALFREDO NEPUMUCENO, HERBERT G. NG, FLORENCIO NICOLAS, ERNESTO C. NINON, AVELINO NUQUI, NEMESIO D. OBA, DANILO OCAMPO, EDGARDO OCAMPO, RODRIGO E. OCAMPO, ANTONIO B. OCCIANO, REYNALDO P. OCSON, BENJAMIN ODESA, ANGEL OLASO, FRANCISCO OLIGARIO, ZOSIMO OLIMBO, BENJAMIN V. ORALLO, ROMEO S. ORIGINES, DANILO R. ORTANEZ, WILFREDO OSIAS, VIRGILIO PA-A, DAVID PAALAN, JESUS N. PACHECO, ALFONSO L. PADILLA, DANILO PAGSANJAN, NUMERIANO PAGSISIHAN, RICARDO T. PAGUIO, EMILIO PAKINGAN, LEANDRO PALABRICA, QUINCIANO PALO, JOSE PAMATIAN, GONZALO PAN, PORFIRIO PAN, BIENVENIDO PANGAN, ERNESTO PANGAN, FRANCISCO V. PASIA, EDILBERTO PASIMIO, JR., JOSE V. PASION, ANGELITO M. PENA, DIONISIO PENDRAS, HERMINIO PERALTA, REYNALDO M. PERALTA, ANTONIO PEREZ, ANTOLIANO E. PEREZ, JUAN PEREZ, LEON PEREZ, ROMEO E. PEREZ, ROMULO PEREZ, WILLIAM PEREZ, FERNANDO G. PERINO, FLORENTINO DEL PILAR, DELMAR F. PINEDA, SALVADOR PINEDA, ELIZALDE PINPIN, WILFREDO PINPIN, ARTURO POBLETE, DOMINADOR R. PRIELA, BUENAVENTURA PRUDENTE, CARMELITO PRUDENTE, DANTE PUEYO, REYNALDO Q. PUEYO, RODOLFO O. PULIDO, ALEJANDRO PUNIO, FEDERICO QUIMAN, ALFREDO L. QUINTO, ROMEO QUINTOS, EDUARDO W. RACABO, RICARDO C. DE RAMA, RICARDO L. DE RAMA, ROLANDO DE RAMA, FERNANDO A. RAMIREZ, LITO S. RAMIREZ, RICARDO G. RAMIREZ, RODOLFO V. RAMIREZ, ALBERTO RAMOS, ANSELMO C. RAMOS, TOBIAS RAMOS, WILLARFREDO RAYMUNDO, REYNALDO RAQUEDAN, MANUEL F. RAVELAS, WILFREDO D. RAYMUNDO, ERNESTO E. RECOLASO, ALBERTO REDAZA, ARTHUR REJUSO, TORIBIO M. RELLAMA, JAIME RELLOSA, EUGENIO A. REMOQUILLO, GERARDO RENTOZA, REDENTOR C. REY, ALFREDO S. REYES, AMABLE S. REYES, BENEDICTO R. REYES, GREGORIO B. REYES, JOSE A. REYES, JOSE C. REYES, ROMULO M. REYES, SERGIO REYES, ERNESTO F. RICO, FERNANDO M. RICO, EMMANUEL RIETA, RICARDO RIETA, LEO B. ROBLES, RUBEN ROBLES, RODOLFO ROBLEZA, RODRIGO ROBLEZA, EDUARDO ROCABO, ANTONIO R. RODRIGUEZ, BERNARDO RODRIGUEZ, ELIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ALMONTE ROMEO, ELIAS RONQUILLO, ELISE RONQUILLO, LUIS VAL B. RONQUILLO, REYNOSO P. RONQUILLO, RODOLFO RONQUILLO, ANGEL ROSALES, RAMON ROSALES,

ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, TEODORICO DEL ROSARIO, VIRGILIO L. ROSARIO, CARLITO SALVADOR, JOSE SAMPARADA, ERNESTO SAN PEDRO, ADRIANO V. SANCHA, GERONIMO M. SANCHA, ARTEMIO B. SANCHEZ, NICASIO SANCHEZ, APOLONIO P. SANTIAGO, JOSELITO S. SANTIAGO, SERGIO SANTIAGO, EDILBERTO C. SANTOS, EFREN S. SANTOS, RENATO D. SANTOS, MIGUEL SAPUYOT, ALEX S. SERQUINA, DOMINADOR P. SERRA, ROMEO SIDRO, AMADO M. SILANG, FAUSTINO D. SILANG, RODOLFO B. DE SILOS, ANICETO G. SILVA, EDGARDO M. SILVA, ROLANDO C. SILVERTO, ARTHUR B. SIMBAHON, DOMINGO SOLANO, JOSELITO C. SOLANTE, CARLITO SOLIS, CONRADO SOLIS, III, EDGARDO SOLIS, ERNESTO SOLIS, ISAGANI M. SOLIS, EDUARDO L. SOTTO, ERNESTO G. STA. MARIA, VICENTE G. STELLA, FELIMON SUPANG, PETER TANGUINOO, MAXIMINO TALIBSAO, FELICISMO P. TALUSIK, FERMIN TARUC, JR., LEVY S. TEMPLO, RODOLFO S. TIAMSON, LEONILO TIPOSO, ARNEL TOLENTINO, MARIO M. TOLENTINO, FELIPE TORRALBA, JOVITO V. TORRES, LEONARDO DE TORRES, GAVINO U. TUAZON, AUGUSTO B. TUNGUIA, FRANCISCO UMALI, SIMPLICIO UNIDA, WILFREDO V. UNTALAN, ANTONIO VALDERAMA, RAMON VALDERAMA, NILO VALENCIANO, EDGARDO C. VASQUEZ, ELPIDIO VELASQUEZ, NESTOR DE VERA, WILFREDO D. VERA, BIENVENIDO VERGARA, ALFREDO VERGARA, RAMON R. VERZOSA, FELICITO P. VICMUNDO, ALFREDO VICTORIANO, TEOFILO P. VIDALLO, SABINO N. VIERNEZ, JESUS J. VILLA, JOVEN VILLABLANCO, EDGARDO G. VILLAFLORES, CEFERINO VILLAGERA, ALEX VILLAHERMOZA, DANILO A. VILLANUEVA, ELITO VILLANUEVA, LEONARDO M. VILLANUEVA, MANUEL R. VILLANUEVA, NEPTHALI VILLAR, JOSE V. VILLAREAL, FELICISIMO VILLARINO, RAFAEL VILLAROMAN, CARLOS VILLENA, FERDINAND VIVO, ROBERTO YABUT, VICENTE YNGENTE, AND ORO C. ZUNIGA,respondents. Gerardo A. Del Mundo and Associates for petitioners. Romulo, Mabanta, Sayoc, Buenaventura, De los Angeles Law Offices for BRII/AIBC. Florante M. De Castro for private respondents in 105029-32.

QUIASON, J.: The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's Administrator, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court: (1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460; (2) to render a new decision: (i) declaring private respondents as in default; (ii) declaring the said

labor cases as a class suit; (iii) ordering Asia International Builders Corporation (AIBC) and Brown and Root International Inc. (BRII) to pay the claims of the 1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv) declaring Atty. Florante M. de Castro guilty of forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA Case No. L-86-05-460; and (3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288). The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al., v. Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court: (1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799 and L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines instead of the ten-year prescriptive period under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (ii) denied the "three-hour daily average" formula in the computation of petitioners' overtime pay; and (2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220). The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International Builders Corporation, et. al., v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al." was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court: (1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims of 149 claimants; and (2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar as it denied the motions for reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59; 61-230). The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified the decision of POEA in four labor cases: (1) awarded monetary benefits only to 149 claimants and (2) directed Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive evidence on the claims dismissed by the POEA for lack of substantial evidence or proof of employment. Consolidation of Cases G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the Third Division while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the Second Division. In the Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the Second Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R. Nos. 10491114, Rollo, p. 895).

In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division granted the motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the consolidation of said cases with G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32, which were assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-30, Rollo, pp. 369-377, 426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14 with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 1109; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562). I On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case No. L-84-06-555). The claimants were represented by Atty. Gerardo del Mundo. BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals. The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 13-14). At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to file its answer. On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and BRII, ordered the claimants to file a bill of particulars within ten days from receipt of the order and the movants to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the bill of particulars. The POEA Administrator also scheduled a pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984. On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their "Compliance and Manifestation." On July 23, 1984, AIBC filed a "Motion to Strike Out of the Records", the "Complaint" and the "Compliance and Manifestation." On July 25, 1984, the claimants filed their "Rejoinder and Comments," averring, among other matters, the failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers and to attend the pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984. The claimants alleged that AIBC and BRII had waived their right to present evidence and had defaulted by failing to file their answers and to attend the pre-trial conference.

On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion to Strike Out of the Records" filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out in the order. On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to comply with the Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA Administrator direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers, after which the case should be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed another complaint for the same money claims and benefits in behalf of several claimants, some of whom were also claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779). On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the Order dated October 2, 1984 and an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day, AIBC asked for time to file its comment on the "Compliance" and "Urgent Manifestation" of claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a second motion for extension of time to file the comment. On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that its motion for extension of time was granted. On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to file their answers. On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment" praying, among other reliefs, that claimants should be ordered to amend their complaint. On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the order. On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the reversal of the said order of the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed the appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and praying that AIBC and BRII be declared in default. On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an "Amended Complaint and/or Position Paper" dated March 24, 1985, adding new demands: namely, the payment of overtime pay, extra night work pay, annual leave differential pay, leave indemnity pay, retirement and savings benefits and their share of forfeitures (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the POEA Administrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the amended complaint (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 20). On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for Summary Judgment." On the same day, the POEA issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers to the "Amended Complaint," otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present evidence and the case would be resolved on the basis of complainant's evidence.

On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as Improper Class Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended Complaint dated March 24, 1985." Claimants opposed the motions. On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his directive to AIBC and BRII to file their answers in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC, together with a petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction. On September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA Administrator from hearing the labor cases and suspended the period for the filing of the answers of AIBC and BRII. On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator to include additional claimants in the case and to investigate alleged wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC and their respective lawyers. On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a complaint (POEA Case No. L85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII with the POEA, demanding monetary claims similar to those subject of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same month, Solomon Reyes also filed his own complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-779) against AIBC and BRII. On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates asked for the substitution of the original counsel of record and the cancellation of the special powers of attorney given the original counsel. On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of the claim to enforce attorney's lien. On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money claims (POEA Case No. 86-05460) in behalf of 11 claimants including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case No. 8406-555. On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed on February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII. In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA Administrator, it is not amiss to mention that two cases were filed in the Supreme Court by the claimants, namely G.R. No. 72132 on September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case No. 2858 on March 18, 1986. On May 13, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a resolution in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the POEA Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the motions and oppositions filed in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460 and to decide the labor cases with deliberate dispatch. AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489), questioning the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to answer the amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution dated November 9,

1987, we dismissed the petition by informing AIBC that all its technical objections may properly be resolved in the hearings before the POEA. Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was filed on September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18 co-claimants against the POEA Administrator and several NLRC Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to the Secretary of Labor and Employment with a request for the early disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. The second was filed on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and Rolando R. Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII for violation of labor and social legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos, Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of violations of labor laws. On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution dated December 12, 1986. On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its motion for suspension of the period for filing an answer or motion for extension of time to file the same until the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the order of the NLRC dismissing the two appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRC en banc denied the motion for reconsideration. At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On June 24, 1987 claimants filed their "Urgent Motion to Strike Out Answer," alleging that the answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their "Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply with the POEA Order of June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their position paper. On March 4, 1988, claimants filed their "Ex-Parte Motion to Expunge from the Records" the position paper of AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time. On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro filed their memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their Supplemental Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed its "Reply to Complainant's Memorandum." On October 26, 1988, claimants submitted their "Ex-Parte Manifestational Motion and Counter-Supplemental Motion," together with 446 individual contracts of employments and service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a "Consolidated Reply." On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision in POEA Case No. L-8406-555 and the other consolidated cases, which awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal" from the decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC also filed its motion for reconsideration and/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of Appeal" filed earlier on February 6, 1989 by another counsel for AIBC.

On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal," praying for the dismissal of the appeal of AIBC and BRII. On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their "Supplement to Complainants' Appeal Memorandum," together with their "newly discovered evidence" consisting of payroll records. On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their "Manifestation," stating among other matters that there were only 728 named claimants. On April 20, 1989, the claimants filed their "Counter-Manifestation," alleging that there were 1,767 of them. On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for Execution" of the Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the grounds that BRII had failed to appeal on time and AIBC had not posted the supersedeas bond in the amount of $824,652.44. On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve the labor cases. On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their "Manifestational Motion," praying that all the 1,767 claimants be awarded their monetary claims for failure of private respondents to file their answers within the reglamentary period required by law. On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the POEA in these consolidated cases is modified to the extent and in accordance with the following dispositions: 1. The claims of the 94 complainants identified and listed in Annex "A" hereof are dismissed for having prescribed; 2. Respondents AIBC and Brown & Root are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the 149 complainants, identified and listed in Annex "B" hereof, the peso equivalent, at the time of payment, of the total amount in US dollars indicated opposite their respective names; 3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19 complainants classified and listed in Annex "C" hereof, who appear to have worked elsewhere than in Bahrain are hereby set aside. 4. All claims other than those indicated in Annex "B", including those for overtime work and favorably granted by the POEA, are hereby dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in support thereof or are beyond the competence of this Commission to pass upon.

In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of its powers and authority under Article 218(c) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, hereby directs Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco of this Commission to summon parties, conduct hearings and receive evidence, as expeditiously as possible, and thereafter submit a written report to this Commission (First Division) of the proceedings taken, regarding the claims of the following: (a) complainants identified and listed in Annex "D" attached and made an integral part of this Resolution, whose claims were dismissed by the POEA for lack of proof of employment in Bahrain (these complainants numbering 683, are listed in pages 13 to 23 of the decision of POEA, subject of the appeals) and, (b) complainants identified and listed in Annex "E" attached and made an integral part of this Resolution, whose awards decreed by the POEA, to Our mind, are not supported by substantial evidence" (G.R. No. 104776; Rollo, pp. 113-115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 85-87; G.R. Nos. 105029-31, pp. 120-122). On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12 co-claimants, who were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 120741-44). The petition was dismissed in a resolution dated January 27, 1992. Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991 Resolution of the NLRC were filed. The first, by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo; the second, by the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro; and the third, by AIBC and BRII. In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the motions for reconsideration. Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776), the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro (G.R. Nos. 104911-14) and by AIBC and BRII (G.R. Nos. 105029-32). II Compromise Agreements Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and AIBC and BRII have submitted, from time to time, compromise agreements for our approval and jointly moved for the dismissal of their respective petitions insofar as the claimants-parties to the compromise agreements were concerned (See Annex A for list of claimants who signed quitclaims). Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a compromise agreement and the corresponding motions for the approval of the agreements were filed by the parties and approved by the Court:

1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio Abarquez and 47 co-claimants dated September 2, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 470-615); 2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Bienvenido Cadalin and 82 co-petitioners dated September 3, 1992 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 364-507); 3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Jose M. Aban and 36 co-claimants dated September 17, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 10502932, Rollo, pp. 613-722; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 518-626; G.R. Nos. 10491114, Rollo, pp. 407-516); 4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Antonio T. Anglo and 17 co-claimants dated October 14, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 650-713; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 530-590); 5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dionisio Bobongo and 6 co-claimants dated January 15, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 813-836; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 629-652); 6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Valerio A. Evangelista and 4 co-claimants dated March 10, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829); 7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimants Palconeri Banaag and 5 co-claimants dated March 17, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1657-1703; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 655-675); 8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Benjamin Ambrosio and 15 other co-claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 17731814); 9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Valerio Evangelista and 3 coclaimants dated May 10, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829); 10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Quiterio R. Agudo and 36 co-claimants dated June 14, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 974-1190; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 748-864; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 10661183); 11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Arnaldo J. Alonzo and 19 co-claimants dated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1173-1235; G.R.

Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1193-1256; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 896959); 12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Ricardo C. Dayrit and 2 co-claimants dated September 7, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1243-1254; G.R. Nos. 104911-14,Rollo, pp. 972-984); 13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dante C. Aceres and 37 co-claimants dated September 8, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1257-1375; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1280-1397); 14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Vivencio V. Abella and 27 coclaimants dated January 10, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, Vol. II); 15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Domingo B. Solano and six coclaimants dated August 25, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32; G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14). III The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows: We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over the more than fifty volumes now comprising the records of these cases. From the records, it appears that the complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at various projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia. Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the Philippine Government, all the individual complainants signed standard overseas employment contracts (Records, Vols. 25-32. Hereafter, reference to the records would be sparingly made, considering their chaotic arrangement) with AIBC before their departure from the Philippines. These overseas employment contracts invariably contained the following relevant terms and conditions. PART B (1) Employment Position Classification : (Code) :

(2) Company Employment Status : (3) Date of Employment to Commence on : (4) Basic Working Hours Per Week : (5) Basic Working Hours Per Month : (6) Basic Hourly Rate : (7) Overtime Rate Per Hour : (8) Projected Period of Service (Subject to C(1) of this [sic]) : Months and/or Job Completion xxx xxx xxx 3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate as set out in Part B of this Document. b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer, and Employer may, at his sole option, change or adjust such hours as maybe deemed necessary from time to time. 4. TERMINATION a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this agreement, the Employer may, at his sole discretion, terminate employee's service with cause, under this agreement at any time. If the Employer terminates the services of the Employee under this Agreement because of the completion or termination, or suspension of the work on which the Employee's services were being utilized, or because of a reduction in force due to a decrease in scope of such work, or by change in the type of construction of such work. The Employer will be responsible for his return transportation to his country of origin. Normally on the most expeditious air route, economy class accommodation. xxx xxx xxx 10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory completion of contract, employee shall be entitled to 12-days vacation leave with pay. This shall be computed at the basic wage rate. Fractions of a year's service will be computed on a pro-rata basis. b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the employee for every year of service for non-work connected injuries or illness. If the employee failed to avail of such

leave benefits, the same shall be forfeited at the end of the year in which said sick leave is granted. 11. BONUS A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be accrued and payable only upon satisfactory completion of this contract. 12. OFFDAY PAY The seventh day of the week shall be observed as a day of rest with 8 hours regular pay. If work is performed on this day, all hours work shall be paid at the premium rate. However, this offday pay provision is applicable only when the laws of the Host Country require payments for rest day. In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were deployed, His Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law for the Private Sector (Records, Vol. 18). This decree took effect on August 16, 1976. Some of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows (italics supplied only for emphasis): Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-five per centum thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum of fifty per centum thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to being from seven o'clock in the evening until seven o'clock in the morning. . . . Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay. . . . an employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work on his weekly day of rest if circumstances so require and in respect of which an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him. . . . Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage. Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year's continuous service with his employer shall be entitled to leave on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.

A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his service in that year. Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other party thirty days' prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days' notice in respect of other workers. The party terminating a contract without giving the required notice shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof. Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days' wages for each year of the first three years of service and of one month's wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service completed within a year. All the individual complainants-appellants have already been repatriated to the Philippines at the time of the filing of these cases (R.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 59-65). IV The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were: First: Whether or not complainants are entitled to the benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain; (a) Whether or not the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits. (b) Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree (allegedly prescribing a more favorable treatment of alien employees) bars complainants from enjoying its benefits. Second: Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain is applicable in these cases, whether or not complainants' claim for the benefits provided therein have prescribed. Third: Whether or not the instant cases qualify as a class suit.

Fourth: Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision that is the subject of these appeals, conformed with the requirements of due process; (a) Whether or not the respondent-appellant was denied its right to due process; (b) Whether or not the admission of evidence by the POEA after these cases were submitted for decision was valid; (c) Whether or not the POEA acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root International, Inc.; (d) Whether or not the judgment awards are supported by substantial evidence; (e) Whether or not the awards based on the averages and formula presented by the complainants-appellants are supported by substantial evidence; (f) Whether or not the POEA awarded sums beyond what the complainants-appellants prayed for; and, if so, whether or not these awards are valid. Fifth: Whether or not the POEA erred in holding respondents AIBC and Brown & Root jointly are severally liable for the judgment awards despite the alleged finding that the former was the employer of the complainants; (a) Whether or not the POEA has acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root; (b) Whether or not the undisputed fact that AIBC was a licensed construction contractor precludes a finding that Brown & Root is liable for complainants claims. Sixth: Whether or not the POEA Administrator's failure to hold respondents in default constitutes a reversible error. Seventh: Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in dismissing the following claims: a. Unexpired portion of contract; b. Interest earnings of Travel and Reserve Fund; c. Retirement and Savings Plan benefits;

d. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay; e. Area Differential Pay; f. Accrued interests on all the unpaid benefits; g. Salary differential pay; h. Wage differential pay; i. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to SSS; j. Refund of withholding tax not remitted to BIR; k. Fringe benefits under B & R's "A Summary of Employee Benefits" (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint); l. Moral and exemplary damages; m. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of the judgment award; n. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and the accreditation of B & R issued by POEA; o. Penalty for violations of Article 34 (prohibited practices), not excluding reportorial requirements thereof. Eighth: Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in not dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 on the ground of multiplicity of suits (G.R. Nos. 10491114, Rollo, pp. 25-29, 51-55). Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain's Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample discretion to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure. NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the Amiri Decree No. 23, being more favorable and beneficial to the workers, should form part of the overseas employment contract of the complainants. NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to the claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked elsewhere. On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants was three years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines,

and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976. On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the labor cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the simple reason that not all the complainants worked in Bahrain and therefore, the subject matter of the action, the claims arising from the Bahrain law, is not of common or general interest to all the complainants. On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the cardinal rules of administrative due process: namely, (1) the failure of the POEA Administrator to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII; (2) some findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) some of the evidence upon which the decision was based were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII during the hearing. On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA Administrator that BRII and AIBC are solidarily liable for the claims of the complainants and held that BRII was the actual employer of the complainants, or at the very least, the indirect employer, with AIBC as the labor contractor. NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the POEA Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its local agent. On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was correct in denying the Motion to Declare AIBC in default. On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not based on the Amiri Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled: (1) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the claims for refund of the SSS premiums and refund of withholding taxes and the claimants should file their claims for said refund with the appropriate government agencies; (2) the claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to the claims which are not based on the overseas employment contracts nor the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976; (3) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over claims for moral and exemplary damages and nonetheless, the basis for granting said damages was not established; (4) that the claims for salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contract may be allowed if filed within the three-year prescriptive period; (5) that the allegation that complainants were prematurely repatriated prior to the expiration of their overseas contract was not established; and

(6) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the complaint for the suspension or cancellation of the AIBC's recruitment license and the cancellation of the accreditation of BRII. NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 should have been dismissed on the ground that the claimants in said case were also claimants in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460, the POEA just resolved the corresponding claims in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In other words, the POEA did not pass upon the same claims twice. V G.R. No. 104776 Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on the following grounds: (1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their right to a speedy disposition of their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The POEA Administrator allowed private respondents to file their answers in two years (on June 19, 1987) after the filing of the original complaint (on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard of its own rules, affirmed the action of the POEA Administrator; (2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default and should have rendered summary judgment on the basis of the pleadings and evidence submitted by claimants; (3) the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in not holding that the labor cases filed by AIBC and BRII cannot be considered a class suit; (4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is ten years; and (5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have dismissed POEA Case No. L-86-05-460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de Castro (Rollo, pp. 31-40). AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776, argued: (1) that they were not responsible for the delay in the disposition of the labor cases, considering the great difficulty of getting all the records of the more than 1,500 claimants, the piece-meal filing of the complaints and the addition of hundreds of new claimants by petitioners; (2) that considering the number of complaints and claimants, it was impossible to prepare the answers within the ten-day period provided in the NLRC Rules, that when the motion to declare AIBC in default was filed on July 19, 1987, said party had already filed its answer, and that considering the staggering amount of the

claims (more than US$50,000,000.00) and the complicated issues raised by the parties, the ten-day rule to answer was not fair and reasonable; (3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRC's finding that there was no common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy which was the applicability of the Amiri Decree No. 23. Likewise, the nature of the claims varied, some being based on salaries pertaining to the unexpired portion of the contracts while others being for pure money claims. Each claimant demanded separate claims peculiar only to himself and depending upon the particular circumstances obtaining in his case; (4) that the prescriptive period for filing the claims is that prescribed by Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (three years) and not the one prescribed by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (ten years); and (5) that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA Case No. L-8605-460 should be dismissed, this being a private quarrel between the two labor lawyers (Rollo, pp. 292-305). Attorney's Lien On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to strike out the joint manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII dated September 2 and 11, 1992, claiming that all the claimants who entered into the compromise agreements subject of said manifestations and motions were his clients and that Atty. Florante M. de Castro had no right to represent them in said agreements. He also claimed that the claimants were paid less than the award given them by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro collected additional attorney's fees on top of the 25% which he was entitled to receive; and that the consent of the claimants to the compromise agreements and quitclaims were procured by fraud (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810). In the Resolution dated November 23, 1992, the Court denied the motion to strike out the Joint Manifestations and Motions dated September 2 and 11, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-609). On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien," alleging that the claimants who entered into compromise agreements with AIBC and BRII with the assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all signed a retainer agreement with his law firm (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535). Contempt of Court On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del Mundo to cite Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of court and for violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The said lawyers allegedly misled this Court, by making it appear that the claimants who entered into the compromise agreements were represented by Atty. De Castro, when in fact they were represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).

On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges against Atty. De Castro for unethical practices and moved for the voiding of the quitclaims submitted by some of the claimants. G.R. Nos. 104911-14 The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for certiorari on the grounds that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) applied the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines; and (2) it denied the claimant's formula based on an average overtime pay of three hours a day (Rollo, pp. 18-22). The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself during the negotiation for an amicable settlement of their money claims in Bahrain as shown in the Memorandum dated April 16, 1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-22). BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in G.R. No. 104776 that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code of the Philippines, a special law, prevails over that provided in the Civil Code of the Philippines, a general law. As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the method of computing the overtime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed that they were not bound by what appeared therein, because such memorandum was proposed by a subordinate Bahrain official and there was no showing that it was approved by the Bahrain Minister of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the averaging method was discussed in the course of the negotiation for the amicable settlement of the dispute and any offer made by a party therein could not be used as an admission by him (Rollo, pp. 228-236). G.R. Nos. 105029-32 In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) enforced the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and not the terms of the employment contracts; (2) granted claims for holiday, overtime and leave indemnity pay and other benefits, on evidence admitted in contravention of petitioner's constitutional right to due process; and (3) ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for the 683 claimants whose claims had been dismissed for lack of proof by the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself. Lastly, they allege that assuming that the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 was applicable, NLRC erred when it did not apply the one-year prescription provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29-30). VI G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; G.R. Nos. 105029-32 All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although they disagreed as to the time that should be embraced within the prescriptive period.

To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years, applying Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. NLRC believed otherwise, fixing the prescriptive period at three years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14, invoking different grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that the prescriptive period applicable to the claims was three years, instead of ten years, as found by the POEA Administrator. The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the prescriptive period was one year as prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he deferred to the ruling of NLRC that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative law. The POEA Administrator held the view that: These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor Code) refer to those arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right as provided by the Labor Code. In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the rights of the workers as provided by the Labor Code, but the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain, which ipso factoamended the worker's contracts of employment. Respondents consciously failed to conform to these provisions which specifically provide for the increase of the worker's rate. It was only after June 30, 1983, four months after the brown builders brought a suit against B & R in Bahrain for this same claim, when respondent AIBC's contracts have undergone amendments in Bahrain for the new hires/renewals (Respondent's Exhibit 7). Hence, premises considered, the applicable law of prescription to this instant case is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides: Art. 1144. The following actions may be brought within ten years from the time the cause of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; Thus, herein money claims of the complainants against the respondents shall prescribe in ten years from August 16, 1976. Inasmuch as all claims were filed within the ten-year prescriptive period, no claim suffered the infirmity of being prescribed (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, 89-90). In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the prescriptive period is three years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the NLRC argued as follows:

The Labor Code provides that "all money claims arising from employer-employee relations . . . shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred" (Art. 291, Labor Code, as amended). This three-year prescriptive period shall be the one applied here and which should be reckoned from the date of repatriation of each individual complainant, considering the fact that the case is having (sic) filed in this country. We do not agree with the POEA Administrator that this three-year prescriptive period applies only to money claims specifically recoverable under the Philippine Labor Code. Article 291 gives no such indication. Likewise, We can not consider complainants' cause/s of action to have accrued from a violation of their employment contracts. There was no violation; the claims arise from the benefits of the law of the country where they worked. (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 90-91). Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as provided by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, NLRC opined that the applicability of said law was one of characterization, i.e., whether to characterize the foreign law on prescription or statute of limitation as "substantive" or "procedural." NLRC cited the decision in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955], where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code. In said case, the claims would have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not "specifically intended to be substantive," hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum should apply. The Court observed: . . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains, we think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose this test is the most satisfactory one. It does not lead American courts into the necessity of examining into the unfamiliar peculiarities and refinements of different foreign legal systems. . . The court further noted: xxx xxx xxx Applying that test here it appears to us that the libelant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against the particular rights which the libelant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives, viz: "The present Code regulates the relations between capital and labor, placing them on a basis of social justice, so that, without injuring any of the parties, there may be guaranteed for labor the necessary conditions for a normal life and to capital an equitable return to its investment." In pursuance of these objectives the Code gives laborers various rights against their employers. Article 623 establishes

the period of limitation for all such rights, except certain ones which are enumerated in Article 621. And there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Panamanian legislature gave special consideration to the impact of Article 623 upon the particular rights sought to be enforced here, as distinguished from the other rights to which that Article is also applicable. Were we confronted with the question of whether the limitation period of Article 621 (which carves out particular rights to be governed by a shorter limitation period) is to be regarded as "substantive" or "procedural" under the rule of "specifity" we might have a different case; but here on the surface of things we appear to be dealing with a "broad," and not a "specific," statute of limitations (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 92-94). Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which was applied by NLRC, refers only to claims "arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right as provided by the Labor Code." They assert that their claims are based on the violation of their employment contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and therefore the claims may be brought within ten years as provided by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rollo, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976). AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed under the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the Philippines a "borrowing law," which is Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the common-law conflicts rule (G.R. No. 104776,Rollo, pp. 45-46). First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law. Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides: A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract. (G.R. Nos. 10502931, Rollo, p. 226). As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]). A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing

that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on prescription of actions. However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines Islands. Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]). In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976. The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that: The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. (Sec. 10). The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18). In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law, the next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is three years, as provided by the Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines. The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides: The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment. NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent part provides: Money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred. xxx xxx xxx The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976) invoked by the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is inapplicable to the cases at bench (Rollo, p. 21). The said case involved the correct computation of overtime pay as provided in the collective bargaining agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law. As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not make any reference as to the computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and instead insisted that work computation provided in the collective bargaining agreements between the parties be observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern." Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended by R.A. No. 19933) provides: Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued otherwise such action shall be forever barred, . . . . The court further explained:

The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended) will apply, if the claim for differentials for overtime work is solely based on said law, and not on a collective bargaining agreement or any other contract. In the instant case, the claim for overtime compensation is not so much because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended but because the claim is demandable right of the employees, by reason of the above-mentioned collective bargaining agreement. Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period for filing "actions to enforce any cause of action under said law." On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing "money claims arising from employeremployee relations." The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the employer-employee relations, which is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the collective bargaining agreement. The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable under said Code, does not find support in the plain language of the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims "arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right," as provided by the Labor Code supported by the facial reading of the provision. VII G.R. No. 104776 A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776, claimants aver: (1) that while their complaints were filed on June 6, 1984 with POEA, the case was decided only on January 30, 1989, a clear denial of their right to a speedy disposition of the case; and (2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp. 31-35). Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded to the accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is

consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into consideration in determining whether or not the right to a "speedy disposition of cases" has been violated, thus: In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the administration of justice has violated the speedy disposition of cases. Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, (1991), we held: It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justified motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served with a copy of the amended complaint, claimants had been asking that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to file their answers within the ten-day period provided in Section 1, Rule III of Book VI of the Rules and Regulations of the POEA. At that time, there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRII to strike out of the records the amended complaint and the "Compliance" of claimants to the order of the POEA, requiring them to submit a bill of particulars. The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their final disposition in the administrative level after seven years from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the cases of complainants. The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767 claimants. Said complaint had undergone several amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985. The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were deployed in different areas, one group in and the other groups outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling more than US$65 million according to Atty. Del Mundo, included: 1. Unexpired portion of contract; 2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund; 3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;

4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay; 5. Area Differential pay; 6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits; 7. Salary differential pay; 8. Wage Differential pay; 9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to Social Security System; 10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to Bureau of Internal Revenue (B.I.R.); 11. Fringe Benefits under Brown & Root's "A Summary of Employees Benefits consisting of 43 pages (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint); 12. Moral and Exemplary Damages; 13. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of amounts; 14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and issued by the POEA; and 15. Penalty for violation of Article 34 (Prohibited practices) not excluding reportorial requirements thereof (NLRC Resolution, September 2, 1991, pp. 1819; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74). Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient definiteness and clarity of some facts, the claimants were ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC for a bill of particulars. When claimants filed their "Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike out the complaint from the records for failure of claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While the POEA Administrator denied the motion to strike out the complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correct the deficiencies" pointed out by AIBC. Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the complaint, the records of employment of the more than 1,700 claimants had to be retrieved from various countries in the Middle East. Some of the records dated as far back as 1975. The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA Administrator were interrupted several times by the various appeals, first to NLRC and then to the Supreme Court. Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases were filed against AIBC and BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA Cases Nos. L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaint was filed on May 29, 1986 (POEA Case No.

L-86-05-460). NLRC, in exasperation, noted that the exact number of claimants had never been completely established (Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991, G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the three new cases were consolidated with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in terminating the proceedings, thus: These cases could have been spared the long and arduous route towards resolution had the parties and their counsel been more interested in pursuing the truth and the merits of the claims rather than exhibiting a fanatical reliance on technicalities. Parties and counsel have made these cases a litigation of emotion. The intransigence of parties and counsel is remarkable. As late as last month, this Commission made a last and final attempt to bring the counsel of all the parties (this Commission issued a special order directing respondent Brown & Root's resident agent/s to appear) to come to a more conciliatory stance. Even this failed (Rollo, p. 58). The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay in the disposition of the cases, to the lament of NLRC, which complained: It is very evident from the records that the protagonists in these consolidated cases appear to be not only the individual complainants, on the one hand, and AIBC and Brown & Root, on the other hand. The two lawyers for the complainants, Atty. Gerardo Del Mundo and Atty. Florante De Castro, have yet to settle the right of representation, each one persistently claiming to appear in behalf of most of the complainants. As a result, there are two appeals by the complainants. Attempts by this Commission to resolve counsels' conflicting claims of their respective authority to represent the complainants prove futile. The bickerings by these two counsels are reflected in their pleadings. In the charges and countercharges of falsification of documents and signatures, and in the disbarment proceedings by one against the other. All these have, to a large extent, abetted in confounding the issues raised in these cases, jumble the presentation of evidence, and even derailed the prospects of an amicable settlement. It would not be far-fetched to imagine that both counsel, unwittingly, perhaps, painted a rainbow for the complainants, with the proverbial pot of gold at its end containing more than US$100 million, the aggregate of the claims in these cases. It is, likewise, not improbable that their misplaced zeal and exuberance caused them to throw all caution to the wind in the matter of elementary rules of procedure and evidence (Rollo, pp. 58-59). Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the listing of some of the complainants in both petitions filed by the two lawyers. As noted by NLRC, "the problem created by this situation is that if one of the two petitions is dismissed, then the parties and the public respondents would not know which claim of which petitioner was dismissed and which was not."

B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be consolidated in a "class suit" because "all the named complainants have similar money claims and similar rights sought irrespective of whether they worked in Bahrain, United Arab Emirates or in Abu Dhabi, Libya or in any part of the Middle East" (Rollo, pp. 35-38). A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12). While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain Law, many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia under different terms and conditions of employment. NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that inasmuch as the first requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to file their claims in a class suit. While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same (for employee's benefits), there is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other employees of defendants. The named claimants have a special or particular interest in specific benefits completely different from the benefits in which the other named claimants and those included as members of a "class" are claiming (Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473 [1913]). It appears that each claimant is only interested in collecting his own claims. A claimants has no concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. A principle basic to the concept of "class suit" is that plaintiffs brought on the record must fairly represent and protect the interests of the others (Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them under the Rules of Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6). The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are the exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of all indispensable parties. In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem arises when the decision is adverse to them, in which case the others who were impleaded by their self-appointed representatives, would surely claim denial of due process. C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA Administrator and NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De Castro guilty of "forum shopping, ambulance chasing activities,

falsification, duplicity and other unprofessional activities" and his appearances as counsel for some of the claimants as illegal (Rollo, pp. 38-40). The Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is intended to put a stop to the practice of some parties of filing multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues, with the result that the courts or agencies have to resolve the same issues. Said Rule, however, applies only to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled "Additional Requirements For Petitions Filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitioners and Complainants." The first sentence of the circular expressly states that said circular applies to an governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application of the anti-forum shopping rule to the lower courts and administrative agencies, said circular took effect only on April 1, 1994. POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for unethical conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and POEA have no jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical conduct of lawyers. Attorney's Lien The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated December 14, 1992 was filed by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his claim for attorney's fees for legal services rendered in favor of the claimants (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 841-844). A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the court or administrative agency which renders and executes the money judgment secured by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer shall cause written notice thereof to be delivered to his clients and to the adverse party (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37). The statement of the claim for the charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo should have been filed with the administrative agency that rendered and executed the judgment. Contempt of Court The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be filed in a separate and appropriate proceeding. G.R. No. 104911-14 Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not accepting their formula of "Three Hours Average Daily Overtime" in computing the overtime payments. They claim that it was BRII itself which proposed the formula during the negotiations for the settlement of their claims in Bahrain and therefore it is in estoppel to disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).

Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain dated April 16, 1983, which in pertinent part states: After the perusal of the memorandum of the Vice President and the Area Manager, Middle East, of Brown & Root Co. and the Summary of the compensation offered by the Company to the employees in respect of the difference of pay of the wages of the overtime and the difference of vacation leave and the perusal of the documents attached thereto i.e., minutes of the meetings between the Representative of the employees and the management of the Company, the complaint filed by the employees on 14/2/83 where they have claimed as hereinabove stated, sample of the Service Contract executed between one of the employees and the company through its agent in (sic)Philippines, Asia International Builders Corporation where it has been provided for 48 hours of work per week and an annual leave of 12 days and an overtime wage of 1 & 1/4 of the normal hourly wage. xxx xxx xxx The Company in its computation reached the following averages: A. 1. The average duration of the actual service of the employee is 35 months for the Philippino (sic) employees . . . . 2. The average wage per hour for the Philippino (sic) employee is US$2.69 . . . . 3. The average hours for the overtime is 3 hours plus in all public holidays and weekends. 4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of service as compensation for the difference of the wages of the overtime done for each Philippino (sic) employee . . . (Rollo, p.22). BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not prepared by them but by a subordinate official in the Bahrain Department of Labor; (2) that there was no showing that the Bahrain Minister of Labor had approved said memorandum; and (3) that the offer was made in the course of the negotiation for an amicable settlement of the claims and therefore it was not admissible in evidence to prove that anything is due to the claimants. While said document was presented to the POEA without observing the rule on presenting official documents of a foreign government as provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, it can be admitted in evidence in proceedings before an administrative body. The opposing parties have a copy of the said memorandum, and they could easily verify its authenticity and accuracy.

The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as contained in the memorandum is another matter. Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, an offer to settle a claim is not an admission that anything is due. Said Rule provides: Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of the record with unwanted evidence but a statement of public policy. There is great public interest in having the protagonists settle their differences amicable before these ripen into litigation. Every effort must be taken to encourage them to arrive at a settlement. The submission of offers and counter-offers in the negotiation table is a step in the right direction. But to bind a party to his offers, as what claimants would make this Court do, would defeat the salutary purpose of the Rule. G.R. Nos. 105029-32 A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that "where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment contract." It quoted with approval the observation of the POEA Administrator that ". . . in labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Rollo, pp. 90-94). AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically when it refused to enforce the overseas-employment contracts, which became the law of the parties. They contend that the principle that a law is deemed to be a part of a contract applies only to provisions of Philippine law in relation to contracts executed in the Philippines. The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable that those stipulated therein. It was stipulated in said contracts that: The Employee agrees that while in the employ of the Employer, he will not engage in any other business or occupation, nor seek employment with anyone other than the Employer; that he shall devote his entire time and attention and his best energies, and abilities to the performance of such duties as may be assigned to him by the Employer; that he shall at all times be subject to the direction and control of the Employer; and that the benefits provided to Employee hereunder are substituted for and in lieu of all other benefits provided by any applicable law, provided of course, that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation or custom, it being understood that should

applicable laws establish that fringe benefits, or other such benefits additional to the compensation herein agreed cannot be waived, Employee agrees that such compensation will be adjusted downward so that the total compensation hereunder, plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation herein agreed (Rollo, pp. 352-353). The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more felicitously. While a part thereof provides that the compensation to the employee may be "adjusted downward so that the total computation (thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation" therein agreed, another part of the same provision categorically states "that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and custom." Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257 [1979]). Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or leave it." The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power (Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. v. Songco, 25 SCRA 70 [1968]). Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed (Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a "system" to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d, 150-161). Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms." By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract (Anton, Private International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]). A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party

expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties' own choice of the applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their transaction (Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country. In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117 SCRA 486 (1982), the "Employment Agreement," between Norse Management Co. and the late husband of the private respondent, expressly provided that in the event of illness or injury to the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own misconduct, "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitation of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Worker's Insurance Act of registry of the vessel, whichever is greater." Since the laws of Singapore, the place of registry of the vessel in which the late husband of private respondent served at the time of his death, granted a better compensation package, we applied said foreign law in preference to the terms of the contract. The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by AIBC and BRII is inapposite to the facts of the cases at bench. The issue in that case was whether the amount of the death compensation of a Filipino seaman should be determined under the shipboard employment contract executed in the Philippines or the Hongkong law. Holding that the shipboard employment contract was controlling, the court differentiated said case from Norse Management Co. in that in the latter case there was an express stipulation in the employment contract that the foreign law would be applicable if it afforded greater compensation. B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their right to due process when said administrative agency granted Friday-pay differential, holiday-pay differential, annual-leave differential and leave indemnity pay to the claimants listed in Annex B of the Resolution. At first, NLRC reversed the resolution of the POEA Administrator granting these benefits on a finding that the POEA Administrator failed to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII, that some findings of fact of the POEA Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and that some of the evidence were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 35-36; 106-107). But instead of remanding the case to the POEA Administrator for a new hearing, which means further delay in the termination of the case, NLRC decided to pass upon the validity of the claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC and BRII complain of as being irregular and a "reversible error." They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence submitted on appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to have been "unilaterally submitted by the claimants and not disclosed to the adverse parties" (Rollo, pp. 37-39). NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were submitted to the POEA administrator by the claimants after the cases were deemed submitted for resolution and which were taken cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in resolving the cases. While AIBC and BRII had no opportunity to refute said evidence of the claimants before the POEA Administrator, they had all the opportunity to rebut said evidence and to present their

counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and BRII themselves were able to present before NLRC additional evidence which they failed to present before the POEA Administrator. Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is enjoined to "use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the basis of the evidence of both parties submitted before the POEA Administrator and NLRC, the latter considered that it was not expedient to remand the cases to the POEA Administrator for that would only prolong the already protracted legal controversies. Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for the reception of evidence, where the same can be readily determined from the uncontroverted facts on record (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 190 SCRA 653 [1990]; Pagdonsalan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 127 SCRA 463 [1984]). C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for 683 claimants listed in Annex D of the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 whose claims had been denied by the POEA Administrator "for lack of proof" and for 69 claimants listed in Annex E of the same Resolution, whose claims had been found by NLRC itself as not "supported by evidence" (Rollo, pp. 41-45). NLRC based its ruling on Article 218(c) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which empowers it "[to] conduct investigation for the determination of a question, matter or controversy, within its jurisdiction, . . . ." It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority under Article 218(c) to remand a case involving claims which had already been dismissed because such provision contemplates only situations where there is still a question or controversy to be resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42). A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the technical rules of procedure and evidence do not apply to the proceedings conducted by administrative agencies (First Asian Transport & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]). This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings before NLRC. Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of procedure and evidence in administrative proceedings, there are cardinal rules which must be observed by the hearing officers in order to comply with the due process requirements of the Constitution. These cardinal rules are collated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940). VIII

The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion. WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur. ANNEX A LIST OF CLAIMANTS WHO SIGNED QUITCLAIMS Bienvenido Cadalin Ardon Ello Antonio Acupan Josefino R. Enano Benjamin Alejandre Rolando E. Espiritu Wilfredo Aligada Patricio L. Garcia Jr. Robert Batica Felino M. Jocson Enrico Belen Eduardo S. Kolimlim Guillermo Cabeza Emmanuel C. Labella Rodolfo Cagatan Ernesto S. Lising Francisco De Guzman Edilberto G. Magat Ignacio De Vera Victoriano L. Matilla Ernesto De la Cruz Renato V. Morada Reynaldo Dizon Ildefonso C. Muoz Ricardo Ebrada Herbert G. Ng Antonio Ejercito Reynado Oczon Eduardo Espiritu Romeo Orial Ernesto Espiritu Ricardo Paguio Rodolfo Espiritu Emilio Pakingan Oligario Francisco Ernesto S. Pangan Antonio Jocson Albert L. Quinto Alejandro Olorino Romulo M. Reyes Efren Lirio Leonilo Tiposo Noel Martinez Manual P. Villanueva Francis Mediodia Arnaldo J. Alonzo Luciano Melendez Pastor M. Aquino Reymundo Milay Ramon Castro Jose Pancho Graciano Isla Modesto Pin Pin Renato Matilla Gaudencio Retana Ricardo B. Morada Rodelio Rieta, Jr. Pacifico D. Navarro Jose Robleza Eugenio A. Remonquillo Nemeriano San Mateo Felix Barcena Juanito Santos Eliseo Fajardo

Paquito Solanto Sergio S. Santiago Conrado Solis, Jr. Antonio R. Rodriquez Menandro Temprosa Luis Val B. Ronquillo Maximiano Torres Teodorico C. Del Rosario Francisco Trias Joselito C. Solante Delfin Victoria Ricardo C. Dayrit Gilbert Victoria Antonio P. Hilario Domingo Villahermosa Edgardo O. Salonga Rogelio Villanueva Dante C. Aceres Jose M. Aban Reynaldo S. Acojido Amorsolo S. Anading Esidro M. Aquino Alfredo S. Balogo Rosendo M. Aquino Ramon T. Barboza Rodolfo D. Arevalo Felix M. Bobier Rexy De Leon Ascuncion Jose H. Castillo Basilio Buenaventura Emmanuel H. Castillo Alexander Bustamante Remar R. Castrojerez Virgilio V. Butiong, Jr. Romeo O. Cecilio Delfin Caballero Bayani M. Dayrit Danilo M. Castro Felizardo S. Delos Santos Franscisco O. Corvera Nestor N. Estava Edgardo N. Dayacap Rolando M. Garcia Napoleon S. De Luna Angel D. Guda Benjamin E. Doza Henry L. Jacob Renato A. Eduarte Dante A. Matreo Clyde C. Estuye Renato S. Melo Buenaventura M. Francisco Resurrecion D. Nazareno Rogelio D. Guanio Jaime C. Pollos Arnel L. Jacob Domingo Pondales Renato S. Lising Eugenio Ramirez Wilfredo S. Lising Lucien M. Respall Rogelio S. Lopena Alvin C. Reyes Bernardito G. Loreja Rizalina R. Reyes Ignacio E. Muoz Quirino Ronquillo Romeo C. Quintos Avelino M. Roque Willafredo Dayrit Raymundo Pedro L. Salgatar Virgilio L. Rosario Rodolfo T. Sultan Joselito Santiago Benedicto E. Torres Ernesto G. Sta. Maria Sergio A. Ursolino Gavino U. Tuazon Rogelio R. Valdez Elito S. Villanueva Dionisio Bobongo Lamberto Q. Alcantara Crisenciano Miranda Arturo P. Apilado Ildefonso C. Molina Turiano V. Concepcion Gorgonio C. Parala Domingo V. Dela Cruz Virgilio Ricaza Eduardo R. Enguancho Palconeri D. Banaag Melanio R. Esteron

Bayani S. Bracamante Santiago N. Galoso Onofre De Rama Joveniano Hilado Jose C. Melanes Eduardo Hipolito Romeo I. Patag Romero M. Javier Valerio A. Evangelista Valentino S. Jocson Gilbert E. Ebrada Jose B. Lacson Juanito P. Villarino Armando M. Magsino Aristeo M. Bicol Avelino O. Nuqui Quiterio R. Agudo Delmar F. Pineda Marianito J. Alcantara Federico T. Quiman Jose Arevalo Alberto M. Redaza Ramon A. Arevalo Renosa Ronquillo Jesus Baya Rodolfo Ronquillo Guillermo Buenconsejo Antonio T. Valderama Teresito A. Constantino Ramon Valderama Eduardo A. Diaz Benigno N. Melendez Emigdio Abarquez Claudio A. Modesto Herbert Ayo Solomon Reyes Mario Bataclan Isaias Talactac Ricardo Ordonez William G. Taruc Bernardino Robillos Oscar C. Calderon Francisco Villaflores Pacifico P. Campano Angel Villarba Eulalio G. Arguelles Honesto Jardiniano Ben G. Belir Juan Y. Olindo Cornelio L. Castillo Hernani T. Victoriano Valeriano B. Francisco Ubed B. Ello, Sr. Jaime L. Relosa Ernesto V. Macaraig Alex Q. Villahermosa Espiritu A. Munoz, Sr. Vivencio V. Abello, Jr. Rodrigo E. Ocampo Renato C. Corcuera Rodolfo V. Ramirez Emiliano B. Dela Cruz, Jr. Ceferino Batitis Esteban B. Jose, Jr. Augusto R. Bondoc Ricardo B. Martinez Jaime C. Catli Bienvenido Vergara Gerardo B. Limuaco, Jr. Pedro G. Cagatan Macario S. Magsino Francisco Apolinario Domingo B. Solano Miguel Abestano Ricardo De Rama Prudencio Araullo Arturo V. Araullo Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989 HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, DEODATO RELOJ and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. Quiason, Makalintal, Barot & Torres for petitioner. Alejandro, Aranzaso & Associates for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated August 2, 1985, which reversed the order of the Regional Trial Court dated February 28,1985 denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by private respondents Jack Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj. A complaint for collection of a sum of money (pp. 49-52, Rollo) was filed by petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as petitioner BANK) against private respondents Jack Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-42850 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84. It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with, and was granted by, the Singapore branch of petitioner BANK an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of Singapore dollars 200,000.00 (which amount was subsequently increased to Singapore dollars 375,000.00) with interest at 3% over petitioner BANK prime rate, payable monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility; as a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by petitioner BANK to it through the aforesaid overdraft facility, on October 7, 1982, both private respondents and a certain Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee (p. 53, Rollo) in favor of petitioner BANK whereby private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft facility. The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that: This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee. ... (p. 33-A, Rollo). The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, petitioner BANK demanded payment of the obligation from private respondents, conformably with the provisions of the Joint and Several

Guarantee. Inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay, petitioner BANK filed the above-mentioned complaint. On December 14,1984, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss (pp 54-56, Rollo) which was opposed by petitioner BANK (pp. 58-62, Rollo). Acting on the motion, the trial court issued an order dated February 28, 1985 (pp, 64-65, Rollo), which read as follows: In a Motion to Dismiss filed on December 14, 1984, the defendants seek the dismissal of the complaint on two grounds, namely: 1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; and 2. That the court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. In the light of the Opposition thereto filed by plaintiff, the Court finds no merit in the motion. "On the first ground, defendants claim that by virtue of the provision in the Guarantee (the actionable document) which reads This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee, the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court finds and concludes otherwise. There is nothing in the Guarantee which says that the courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of the courts of other countries or nations. Also, it has long been established in law and jurisprudence that jurisdiction of courts is fixed by law; it cannot be conferred by the will, submission or consent of the parties. On the second ground, it is asserted that defendant Robert' , Sherman is not a citizen nor a resident of the Philippines. This argument holds no water. Jurisdiction over the persons of defendants is acquired by service of summons and copy of the complaint on them. There has been a valid service of summons on both defendants and in fact the same is admitted when said defendants filed a 'Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleading on December 5, 1984. WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. A motion for reconsideration of the said order was filed by private respondents which was, however, denied (p. 66,Rollo).

Private respondents then filed before the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order (pp. 39-48, Rollo). On August 2, 1985, the respondent Court rendered a decision (p. 37, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition with preliminary injuction is hereby GRANTED. The respondent Court is enjoined from taking further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for filing with the proper court of Singapore which is the proper forum. No costs. SO ORDERED. The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 38, Rollo), hence, the present petition. The main issue is whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit. The controversy stems from the interpretation of a provision in the Joint and Several Guarantee, to wit: (14) This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilites arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee. ... (p. 53A, Rollo) In rendering the decision in favor of private respondents, the Court of Appeals made, the following observations (pp. 35-36, Rollo): There are significant aspects of the case to which our attention is invited. The loan was obtained by Eastern Book Service PTE, Ltd., a company incorporated in Singapore. The loan was granted by theSingapore Branch of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. The Joint and Several Guarantee was also concluded in Singapore. The loan was in Singaporean dollars and the repayment thereof also in the same currency. The transaction, to say the least, took place in Singporean setting in which the law of that country is the measure by which that relationship of the parties will be governed. xxx xxx xxx Contrary to the position taken by respondents, the guarantee agreement compliance that any litigation will be before the courts of Singapore and that the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and determined in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. A closer examination of paragraph 14 of the Guarantee Agreement upon which the motion to dismiss is based, employs in clear and unmistakeable (sic) terms the word 'shall' which under statutory construction is mandatory.

Thus it was ruled that: ... the word 'shall' is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714).lwph1.t There is nothing more imperative and restrictive than what the agreement categorically commands that 'all rights, obligations, and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore.' While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates that the stipulation that "[t]his guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice (J. Salonga, Private International Law, 1981, p. 46). Indeed, as pointed-out by petitioner BANK at the outset, the instant case presents a very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be disinclined to litigate before a foreign tribunal, with more reason as a defendant. However, in this case, private respondents are Philippine residents (a fact which was not disputed by them) who would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign court and in the process incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience, than to have a Philippine court try and resolve the case. Private respondents' stance is hardly comprehensible, unless their ultimate intent is to evade, or at least delay, the payment of a just obligation. The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass private respondents. In the case of Polytrade Corporation vs. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 187, it was ruled: ... An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, 'The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila,' does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to

which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur. This ruling was reiterated in the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., et al., G.R. No. 57250, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 740, where the stipulation was "[i]n case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao City." We held: Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say that a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, Rules of Court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the parties. Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory with the permission of the latter's authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them (J. Salonga, Private International Law, 1981, pp. 37-38).lwph1.t As regards the issue on improper venue, petitioner BANK avers that the objection to improper venue has been waived. However, We agree with the ruling of the respondent Court that: While in the main, the motion to dismiss fails to categorically use with exactitude the words 'improper venue' it can be perceived from the general thrust and context of the motion that what is meant is improper venue, The use of the word 'jurisdiction' was merely an attempt to copy-cat the same word employed in the guarantee agreement but conveys the concept of venue. Brushing aside all technicalities, it would appear that jurisdiction was used loosely as to be synonymous with venue. It is in this spirit that this Court must view the motion to dismiss. ... (p. 35, Rollo). At any rate, this issue is now of no moment because We hold that venue here was properly laid for the same reasons discussed above. The respondent Court likewise ruled that (pp. 36-37, Rollo): ... In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it is not authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it may

still refuse to entertain the case by applying the principle of forum non conveniens. ... However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum non conveniensdepends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court (J. Salonga, Private International Law, 1981, p. 49).lwph1.t Thus, the respondent Court should not have relied on such principle. Although the Joint and Several Guarantee prepared by petitioner BANK is a contract of adhesion and that consequently, it cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to the stipulations of the contract, substantial bases exist for petitioner Bank's choice of forum, as discussed earlier. Lastly, private respondents allege that neither the petitioner based at Hongkong nor its Philippine branch is involved in the transaction sued upon. This is a vain attempt on their part to further thwart the proceedings below inasmuch as well-known is the rule that a defendant cannot plead any defense that has not been interposed in the court below. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the respondent Court is hereby REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED, with costs against private respondents. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Gri;o-Aquino, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913 CONSTANZA YAEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. GABRIEL FUSTER, defendant and appellant. O'Brien & DeWitt for plaintiff. Chicote & Miranda for defendant.

JOHNSON, J.: On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez were joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In February of 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the

Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired real and personal property. Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza Yaez came to Manila, where her husband was residing, and here lived with him in conjugal relations until the month of April, 1899. On the 4th day of that month and year they made an agreement, in a public document, by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases." (B. of E., p. 13.) In the same document, the husband undertook to send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid, Spain, from the month of June of the said year 1899. The husband complied with this obligation until August, 1899, after which time he ceased to make further payments. In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines, but the husband had absented himself therefrom in the early days of February of the same year. On the 11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by him in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and cohabited and by whom he had had two children. She prayed that she be granted a decree of divorce; that the court order the separation of the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, to date from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal society be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property had been determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to P12,959.90. The defendant denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila, as they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain, and he alleged that both of them were natives and subjects of Spain. He admitted that he was married to Constanza Yaez; he also admitted having executed the document of the 4th of April, 1899, in which he had undertaken to make an allowance for the support of his wife in Madrid, but he denied the other paragraphs of the complaint. As a special defense with regard to the allowance, he alleged: "That in or about the month of May, 1900, he wrote to his wife, the plaintiff, instructing her to return to Manila, with a view of joining her husband and being maintained by him in his own house; that the communication was ignored by the plaintiff, who against the will of the defendant, continued to live separately from him that from the year 1901, the defendant did not know her address; that since 1900, the plaintiff has lived in comfort and has known where her husband resided; that the plaintiff, during all of the time referred to, in addition to dispossing of valuable property belonging to her husband, possessed and still possesses property of her own, acquired by her, in greater amount than that owned by her husband; and that in any case the action has prescribed by operation of law."(B. of E., pp. 7 and 8.) As to the divorce, he admits that he had by the plaintiff two children that have died. He expressly denied the contents of paragraph 5 of the complaint, relating to the charge of adultery and also those of paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, concerning the possession of real and personal property of the conjugal partnership, the statement of their amount, and their qualification as being all conjugal property. As a special defense, he alleged that prior to the year 1899 he conferred powers of attorney upon the plaintiff to administer and collect property and credits pertaining to him to the value of about 200,000 pesos; that the plaintiff accepted and exercised the said power of attorney, attached the property and collected the credits without ever having

rendered any account of them. As a special preferred defense, he alleged that neither the trial court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, because, as to the allowance for support, since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila, or of any other place in the Philippine Islands, the agreement upon the subject was neither celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in the Philippine Islands; and as to the divorce, because the action therefore ought to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts. In conclusion, he prayed that the court find: That the court was without jurisdiction over the two causes of action; that even if it had jurisdiction, it could not order the payment of the sum claimed as arrears of alimony; that, after all, the action with regard to this cause of action has prescribed; and as to the prayer for a decree of divorce, the defendant should be acquitted, while on the other hand the plaintiff should be required to render to the defendant an accounting, supported by proofs, of her operations as his attorney and administratrix of his property in Spain. In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17, directed that the communal property be divided between the parties, with costs against the defendant, and in event that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be effected by commissioners according to law. Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with. These latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the partition to the court, who then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both parties appealed. I. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL. The first error assigned is the utter lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and of all other courts of the Islands to try the case, either with regard to the fulfillment of the contract to furnish alimony, or to decree a divorce or suspension of life in common between the spouses: lack of jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject matter of the litigation; and over the persons of the contending parties, because neither of the spouses was a resident of the Philippines on the date of the complaint. The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than that which he manifestly had in the Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the date of the complaint. On the contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the contrary, that during this not inconsiderable period, extending from the year 1892 until a month prior to the arrival of his wife in the Philippines in March, 1909, he had constantly resided in the said Islands, had kept open house, and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property which is now the object of the division of the conjugal society. It is also plainly shown, without proof to the contrary, that his wife resided in this city of Manila from the middle of 1896 until April, 1899, at which time she was permitted by him to change her residence. It is affirmed by the defendant in point five of his answer to the complaint, that in May, 1900, he sent a letter instructing the plaintiff to return to Manila to live with her husband and to be supported by him in his house, but that the plaintiff, against the will of the defendant, continued to live part from him. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also affirmed in the said answer, that during

all of the time referred to in the complaint, and especially since 1900, the plaintiff knew where her husband resided. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also very evident that the contract, by virtue of which he authorized his wife to move to Spain and residethere in such place as was agreeable to her, was executed in these Islands, "in the city of Manila on the 4th of April, 1889," as is to be seen in the heading of the document. (B. of E., p. 12.) Finally, at page 11 of his brief, he says that the record shows him to be a Spanish subject, inscribed in the consulate of his nation, and cities article 26 of the Civil Code, the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill. Granting these facts, there can be no doubt that the defendant, although a Spanish subject, was a resident of these Islands. Article 26 of the Civil Code that he cites itself provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country, where they may be considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents therein, shall be required, in order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to state that such is their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in the registry of Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married, and any children they may have." From this provision, which is the exclusive and irrefutable law governing the defendant, we are to conclude that the domicile of the defendant and the plaintiff is fully proven, irrespective of the Treaty of Paris. Without this supposition of having acquired his domicile and residence in these Islands, he could not have required his wife to return to live with him therein because this requirement could only be based on articles 58 of the Civil Code of Spain, according to which the wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish his residence, or on article 48 of chapter 5 of the Marriage Law in force in the Philippines, which imposes upon the wife the duty of obeying her husband, living in his company, or of following him to wherever he transfers his domicile or residence. And just because he was absent for a month before his wife returned to the Philippines, he cannot be understood to have surrendered his habitual domicile of more than seventeen years, without having established any other afterwards, and without making any declaration in legal form, before he absented himself, of it being his intention to change his domicile, while at the same time he retains here his house, real property and all manner of means of subsistence. Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure leaves to the election of the plaintiff the bringing of a personal action like the one at bar either in the place where the defendant may reside or be found, or in that where the plaintiff resides. The litigating spouses have gained not only domicile (domicilio) but also residence (vecindad) in Manila. In this litigation the defendant claims that, born as he says in Mallorca, in the Balearic Islands, he is not subject, in his marriage, to the rules governing conjugal property, that are in force in the territories of Spain that are governed by the common law of Castillo (as the Philippines in their day), because they are opposed to the Foral Law in force in the said Islands and which is respected by the Civil Code. Even if this defense could be sustained herein, paragraph 2 of article 15 of the said Civil Code would be applicable. It provides: "For the purposes of this article, residence (vecindad) will be acquired: By residence of ten years in common law provinces or territories, unless before the termination of that time he manifests his will to the contrary; or by a residence of two years, if the interested person declares this to be his will . . . In any case, the wife will follow the condition of her husband. . . ." On no occasion had the defendant manifested his will to the contrary, not even as he was leaving, after a residence of seventeen years, a month before the return of his wife to these Islands. On the contrary, when he inscribed himself in the Spanish consulate, he declared his intention of

continuing to reside in the Islands as a Spaniard and not as a Mallorquin, subject as such to the common law of Spain. In an endeavor to demonstrate the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands over the subject matter of the complaint that is to try an action for divorce between two Catholic Spaniards, he alleges in his appeal: That both litigants are Spanish subjects and that they contracted a Catholic marriage; that in accordance with article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (the same as that of these Islands) the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, "all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the AUTHORITY to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the person and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife, and, in our case, by the Spanish law by virtue of article 9 as above set out." (Brief, p. 12.) The appellant and defendant continues his argument, saying: That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code of Spain, "jurisdiction in actions for divorce and nullification of canonical marriages lies with ecclesiastical courts," while that of civil tribunals is limited to civil marriages; that this being so, the action for divorce brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, according to his own law of persons, because these courts ought to apply the Spanish law in accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil Cod of Spain, and this Spanish law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the ecclesiastical courts, in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands con subrogate itself. Says this appellant: "If a law of a foreign country were of rigorous application in a given case, a North American tribunal would have no jurisdiction upon an ecclesiastical court and therefore the North American tribunal in applying it would have to exercise a faculty which that law reserved to the ecclesiastical court." (Brief, pp. 13, 14, and 15.) Unless we take the question itself for granted, the foregoing reasoning cannot be upheld. The question is precisely whether the courts of the Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on appeal, and it is taken for granted that the power to decree it is one of the rights included in the personal statute, but appellant does not prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the personal statute of a foreigner carries with it, to whether he transfers his domicile, the authority established by the law of his nation to decree his divorce, which was what he had to demonstrate. The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the

tribunales of the state which have coercive means (property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures which, although he won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights because of the court's lack of means to enforce them." (Torres Campos, "Elementos de Derecho International Privado," p. 108.) "Justice," says the same professor, "is a principle superior to that of nations, and it should therefore be administered without taking into any account whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In order to foster their relations and develop their commerce, all civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their own people, but to those foreigners who contract within the country or outside of it juridical ties which in some manner effect their sovereignty. (Ibid, p. 107.) Might its courts, in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in its territory, apply the personal law of the parties, but abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from administering justice because the personal law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of the given case to some court that is not the territorial one of the nation? This has never yet been claimed in any of the theories regarding the conflict of laws arising out of questions of nationality and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial law in favor of private persons. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their nation.1awphi1.net It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme Court (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibaez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325). In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein. The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation. The second assignment of error is directed against the finding of the court that the defendant had committed adultery with a certain woman in this city from the year 1899 until 1909; the third was against the finding that the adultery was accompanied by public scandal and injured the dignity of his wife; and the fourth for having decreed the divorce, suspension of the married life, and the separation of the properties of the parties. The evidence relating to the foregoing not being sent up on appeal, we are unable to review it, so we accept the findings of the trial court. There is a point of law regarding the claim that the adultery, even though it were proven would not be a cause for divorce, because no public scandal resulted therefrom nor was there contempt

displayed for the wife. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) The facts must be accepted by this tribunal as they were found by the trial court, since the evidence cannot be reviewed; moreover, the appellee affirms the contrary and maintains that it is a proven fact, public and notorious, an assertion that the trial court must have found to be proven. (Appellee's brief, p. 5.) In law, it is not necessary that adultery, to be a cause for divorce, should be accompanied by public scandal and contempt for the wife. There is no law that requires this. Law 2, title 9, of the Fourth Partida does not require it. The fifth and sixth assignments of error are directed against the finding of the trial court that there exists conjugal property, a finding that the appellant maintains is without foundation, and that which holds that the property in the hands of the receiver (that sought to be divided) is conjugal property, a conclusion which the appellant claims to be contrary to the law which should be applied to the case and according to which, as alleged in the tenth assignment of error, the whole of the property should be adjudicated to the defendant as being exclusively his. Facts: The appellant affirms that he is a native of Mallorca in the Balearic Islands and that is also the condition of his wife, the plaintiff. Law: That although the rule of the Civil Code is that which legally governs conjugal property, yet at the same time it admits, as an exception, the laws, usages, and customs of the Foral Law, according to which, as applied in the Balearic Islands, the law of the family is that of the division of property and that of conjugal property is not known; so that the property pertains exclusively to the spouse who, by whatever title, has acquired it. In support of the facts, appellant cites pages 27 to 37 and 39 to 41 in the bill of exceptions; and of the law, the doctrinal authority of Manresa, Gutierrez, and Alcubilla. The citation from pages 39 to 41 of the bill of exceptions, the only pertinent one, is but an affidavit filed by the defendant in which, under oath, he himself testifies as to the Foral Law in the Balearic Islands. The adverse party says with regard to this: "This affidavit was never presented in proof, was never received by the trial judge, and cannot seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law of a foreign jurisdiction. Sections 300, 301 and 302 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now in force in these islands, indicate the method by which the law of a foreign country may be proved. We maintain that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was never submitted as proof, never received by the trial court, and which has never been subjected to any cross-examination, is not a means of proving a foreign law on which the defendant relies." (Brief, pp. 6 and 7.) Furthermore, on the supposition that the defendant could invoke the Foral Law as the law of his personal status in the matter of the regimen of his marriage, and that to allege this he be considered as authorized by article 15 of the Civil Code, we have said before, in dealing with his law of domicile, that paragraph 2 of this article 15 of the Civil Code would be entirely adverse to his claim, and if it be advanced that there is a similar Foral Law in the Philippines by virtue of paragraph 1 of the said article 15, it might be said, though there is not at present any need to say it, that it is not in force. The two findings attacked are in perfect accord with the law. All the property of the marriage, says article 1407 of the Civil Code, shall be considered as conjugal property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. No proof has been submitted to this effect.

As seventh assignment of error it is alleged that the court below erred in holding in the judgment that the plaintiff had brought to the marriage a dowry of 30,000 Spanish dollars. But the defendant himself adds that the court made no order or decree regarding the alleged dowry. On the other hand, the plaintiff, in her fourth assignment of errors, claimed that the court erred in not confirming the report of the commissioners which gave to the said plaintiff the sum of 30,000 Spanish dollars. It is unnecessary to say anything further. The eighth error consists in that the court below ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P56,010.17 Philippine currency, whereas the plaintiff had made no demand in her complaint with respect to this sum; that no arrears of payment are owing for alimony, even though payments had been stipulated in the contract, unless they are claimed by the person who had furnished the actual support, and that alimony is due only when it is necessary; so that, as the plaintiff has had no need of it for ten years, nor has she stated who has furnished it, there is no reason for awaring her the amount of the arrears for all that time; that as she has allowed ten years to elapse before claiming it, her action prescribed in 1904, that is to say, after five years. The plaintiff acknowledges that there is no petition or prayer in her complaint as to this cause of action, but she considers that in equity such an omission can be supplied. Paragraph 3 of section 89 (90) of the Code of Civil Procedure determines one of the requisites of the complaint: "A demand for the relief which the plaintiff claims." The section goes on to say: "If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded must be stated. If special relief, such as an order for the special restitution of property, etc., the ground of demanding such relief must be stated and the special relief prayed for. But there may be added to the statement of the specific relief demanded a general prayer for such further or other relief as shall be deemed equitable." In the complaint of the case at bar the provisions of paragraph 2 of the said section 89 [90] are complied with by setting forth in its paragraphs 4 and 5 the relation of the cause of action, that is, the contract of the 4th of April, 1899, by which the defendant obligated himself to send to the plaintiff in Spain a certain amount of money monthly, for her support, and the failure to comply with this obligation after the month of August, 1899. Paragraph 6, as a consequence of the promise established in 4 and 5, says as follows: "That the defendant Gabriel Fuster y Fuster actually owes the plaintiff the sum of 36,100 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 dollars, which, reduced at the present rate of exchange, amounts to the sum of P12,959.90, Philippine currency." (B. of E., p. 2.) In the case of default on the part of the defendant "the court shall proceed to hear the plaintiff and his witnesses and assess the damages or determine the other relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled, including the costs of the action, and render final judgment for the plaintiff to recover such sum or to receive such other relief as the pleadings and the facts warrant." The pleadings, not the prayer of the complaint. This court has recently decided that the pleadings, not the prayer, exactly, are the essential part of a complaint. It is not a question of alimony for the present, nor for the future, which constitutes the first cause of action, but of certain sums stipulated in a contract. This contract is a law for the contracting

parties, a law which rises superior to those general laws which regulate the nature of the subject matter of the contract (in the present case an entirely voluntary one) and which govern judicial action. An action arising out of a contract of this nature does not prescribe like all personal ones, but, by the provisions of article 1964 of the Civil Code, after fifteen years. But even though the provisions of article 1966 were applicable, by which an action to compel the fulfillment of an agreement to pay alimony prescribes in five years, yet by section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "when payment has been made upon any demand founded upon contract . . . an action may be brought . . . after such payment. . . ." And the parties admit that on the 18th of August, 1908, the plaintiff secured the payment of 6,365.68 pesetas by virtue of the contract of April 4, 1899. So that from August, 1908, until March, 1909, the date of the complaint, the said period of five years had not elapsed. The ninth assignment of error consists in that the court below erred in empowering the receiver to proceed to the separation of the property and in appointing commissioners to make the partition and distribution between the spouses, since the principal question in this action hinges upon the classification of the property; that it was erroneously classified as conjugal property, whereas all of it pertained to the husband alone and should be adjudicated to him for the reason that, as it reiterated in the tenth assignment of error, the conjugal partnership was not subject to the provisions of the law governing conjugal property, because such provision are totally foreign to the Foral Law of the Balearic Islands. The action of the trial court, by the terms of section 184 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was in accordance with law. The only question before this court is the partition of real property. All that referred to in the second decision appealed from, dated September 9, 1911, is urban real estate. Its classification as conjugal property is in accordance with law, as is shown in the foregoing reasoning, and that no consideration of the Foral Law enters into the question has also been demonstrated. II. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL. As the trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff only P5,010.17, the petitioner here prays that the judgment be reversed and that in its place this court order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff her claim of P12,959.90, plus the additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of P107.70 per month, dating from the 1st of August, 1909, until the date of payment, with legal interest upon the said P12,959.90 from the date of the filing of the complaint until the date of payment, and, furthermore, legal interest upon each of the monthly payments due after the filing of the complaint, and which will continue to become due until the close of this litigation. The trial court made the following findings: First, that the total amount of the alimony owing to the plaintiff amounted to 34,200 pesetas; second, that of this sum the plaintiff had collected in Madrid 6,365.68; third, that the remainder, that is, 27,834.32, was equivalent to $5,566.86 Mexican currency; fourth, that the Mexican peso was worth 90 centavos Philippine currency; fifth, that therefore the sum of $5,566.86 Mexican currency was equivalent to P5,010 Philippine

currency; and finally, as there was no evidence as to the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to be presumed that it was that current at the time and place where the agreement was made, which was Mexicanpesetas. In her appeal, the plaintiff contends that these findings are erroneous in that, firstly, the parties had admitted that the pesetas referred to in the contract of the 4th of April, 1899, were Spanish, and in view of this admission the court was not empowered to define them as being different from the kind admitted by the parties; secondly, if he were so empowered, his interpretation should be governed by the terms of the law. With regard to the first error, the plaintiff says that the statement is made in her complaint that the defendant had obligated himself to pay her a "monthly pension for her support of 300 Spanish pesetas, that is, 60 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency, amounts to P107.70;" that the defendant had admitted this in hi answer to the complaint, and that by his finding in a sense other than that accepted and not refuted in the answer of the defendant, the court violated the provisions of section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court has not incurred this error, because it does not appear that the defendant in his answer accepted the fact in the manner alleged in the complaint. The defendant said that he admitted having made the agreement referred to in paragraph 4 of the complaint, and that he stood upon its contents. The contents of the document to which he refers is of the following tenor: "Mr. Fuster binds and obligates himself to pay to his said wife the sum of 300 pesetas, monthly, payable de su cuenta in the city and capital of Madrid, for her support. . . ." He did not therefore admit the matter of the Spanish pesetas; that does not appear in the contents of the document the only thing he admitted in his answer. As to the second error, the court did not commit it in applying the rule contained in article 1287 of the Civil Code. "The usages or customs of the country shall be taken into consideration in interpreting ambiguity in contracts. . . ." If in the contract the word " pesetas," not being specific, was ambiguous, then it was in harmony with this precept to interpret it as being the peseta then in use or current when and where the agreement was made, Mexican being then the usual and current money in the Philippines. Furthermore, the phrase de su cuenta clearly means that it was not "Spanish pesetas" that the contracting parties had in mind, because if the agreement had been a specific one to pay 300 Spanish pesetas in Madrid, everyone would of course understand that the expense of following the fluctuations of change and of the differences in value between the money current in the country, and the Spanishpesetas, would have to be defrayed by the obligated party; whereas, if nothing more than pesetas was mentioned, it was necessary to decide which party should pay for the difference in value so that the 300 pesetas stipulated here should be 300 Spanish pesetas paid in Madrid. Against the reasons of the court below for his decision this court can offer no legal grounds. The rule of interpretation cited is the one applicable and it supports the reasoning of the decision appealed from. The appellant also alleges as error that the court did not adjudicate to her the 30,000 Spanish dollars which the commissioners proposed in their report. First she characterizes this sum of 30,000 dollars as the dowry of the wife delivered to the husband, then, later, as paraphernal property brought to the marriage.

According to the last instructions of the court to the commissioners, this amount of 30,000 dollars could not enter into the partition, and with reason. If, as was claimed, it was inherited by the plaintiff from her uncle, it really constitutes paraphernal property under article 1381. "Paraphernal property is that which the wife brings to the marriage without being included in the dowry and that she may acquire after the creation of the same without being added thereto." But it is a provision of article 1384 that "The wife shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may administer said property. In such case the husband is obliged to create a mortgage for the value of the personal property he may receive, or to secure said property, in the manner established for the dowry property." Not even was there offered in evidence the public deed of delivery, nor the equally public mortgage deed that is required by law. So that, therefore, the necessary proof of the obligation to return paraphernal property as here demanded does not exist.lawphil.net The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of September, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed. The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement of costs in this instance. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur. -oo0ooRepublic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913 CONSTANZA YAEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. GABRIEL FUSTER, defendant and appellant. O'Brien & DeWitt for plaintiff. Chicote & Miranda for defendant.

JOHNSON, J.: On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez were joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In February of 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired real and personal property. Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza Yaez came to Manila, where her husband was residing, and here lived with him in conjugal relations until the month of April, 1899. On the 4th day of that month and year they made an agreement, in a public document, by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to

Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases." (B. of E., p. 13.) In the same document, the husband undertook to send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid, Spain, from the month of June of the said year 1899. The husband complied with this obligation until August, 1899, after which time he ceased to make further payments. In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines, but the husband had absented himself therefrom in the early days of February of the same year. On the 11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by him in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and cohabited and by whom he had had two children. She prayed that she be granted a decree of divorce; that the court order the separation of the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, to date from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal society be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property had been determined, that onehalf thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to P12,959.90. The defendant denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila, as they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain, and he alleged that both of them were natives and subjects of Spain. He admitted that he was married to Constanza Yaez; he also admitted having executed the document of the 4th of April, 1899, in which he had undertaken to make an allowance for the support of his wife in Madrid, but he denied the other paragraphs of the complaint. As a special defense with regard to the allowance, he alleged: "That in or about the month of May, 1900, he wrote to his wife, the plaintiff, instructing her to return to Manila, with a view of joining her husband and being maintained by him in his own house; that the communication was ignored by the plaintiff, who against the will of the defendant, continued to live separately from him that from the year 1901, the defendant did not know her address; that since 1900, the plaintiff has lived in comfort and has known where her husband resided; that the plaintiff, during all of the time referred to, in addition to dispossing of valuable property belonging to her husband, possessed and still possesses property of her own, acquired by her, in greater amount than that owned by her husband; and that in any case the action has prescribed by operation of law."(B. of E., pp. 7 and 8.) As to the divorce, he admits that he had by the plaintiff two children that have died. He expressly denied the contents of paragraph 5 of the complaint, relating to the charge of adultery and also those of paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, concerning the possession of real and personal property of the conjugal partnership, the statement of their amount, and their qualification as being all conjugal property. As a special defense, he alleged that prior to the year 1899 he conferred powers of attorney upon the plaintiff to administer and collect property and credits pertaining to him to the value of about 200,000 pesos; that the plaintiff accepted and exercised the said power of attorney, attached the property and collected the credits without ever having rendered any account of them. As a special preferred defense, he alleged that neither the trial court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, because, as to the allowance for support, since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila, or of any other place in the Philippine Islands, the agreement upon the subject was neither celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in the Philippine Islands; and as to the divorce, because the action therefore ought to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts. In conclusion, he prayed that the court find: That the court was without jurisdiction over the two causes of action; that even if it had jurisdiction, it could not order the payment of the sum claimed as arrears of alimony; that, after all, the action with regard to this cause of action has prescribed; and as to the prayer for a decree of divorce, the defendant should be acquitted, while on the other hand the plaintiff should be required to render to the defendant an accounting, supported by proofs, of her operations as his attorney and administratrix of his property in Spain.

In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17, directed that the communal property be divided between the parties, with costs against the defendant, and in event that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be effected by commissioners according to law. Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with. These latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the partition to the court, who then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both parties appealed. I. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL. The first error assigned is the utter lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and of all other courts of the Islands to try the case, either with regard to the fulfillment of the contract to furnish alimony, or to decree a divorce or suspension of life in common between the spouses: lack of jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject matter of the litigation; and over the persons of the contending parties, because neither of the spouses was a resident of the Philippines on the date of the complaint. The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than that which he manifestly had in the Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the date of the complaint. On the contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the contrary, that during this not inconsiderable period, extending from the year 1892 until a month prior to the arrival of his wife in the Philippines in March, 1909, he had constantly resided in the said Islands, had kept open house, and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property which is now the object of the division of the conjugal society. It is also plainly shown, without proof to the contrary, that his wife resided in this city of Manila from the middle of 1896 until April, 1899, at which time she was permitted by him to change her residence. It is affirmed by the defendant in point five of his answer to the complaint, that in May, 1900, he sent a letter instructing the plaintiff to return to Manila to live with her husband and to be supported by him in his house, but that the plaintiff, against the will of the defendant, continued to live part from him. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also affirmed in the said answer, that during all of the time referred to in the complaint, and especially since 1900, the plaintiff knew where her husband resided. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also very evident that the contract, by virtue of which he authorized his wife to move to Spain and residethere in such place as was agreeable to her, was executed in these Islands, "in the city of Manila on the 4th of April, 1889," as is to be seen in the heading of the document. (B. of E., p. 12.) Finally, at page 11 of his brief, he says that the record shows him to be a Spanish subject, inscribed in the consulate of his nation, and cities article 26 of the Civil Code, the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill. Granting these facts, there can be no doubt that the defendant, although a Spanish subject, was a resident of these Islands. Article 26 of the Civil Code that he cites itself provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country, where they may be considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents therein, shall be required, in order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to state that such is their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in the registry of Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married, and any children they may have." From this provision, which is the exclusive and irrefutable law governing the defendant, we are to conclude that the domicile of the defendant and the plaintiff is fully proven, irrespective of the Treaty of Paris. Without this supposition of having acquired his domicile and residence in these Islands, he could not have required his wife to return to live with him therein because this requirement could only be based on articles 58 of the Civil Code of Spain, according to which the wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish his

residence, or on article 48 of chapter 5 of the Marriage Law in force in the Philippines, which imposes upon the wife the duty of obeying her husband, living in his company, or of following him to wherever he transfers his domicile or residence. And just because he was absent for a month before his wife returned to the Philippines, he cannot be understood to have surrendered his habitual domicile of more than seventeen years, without having established any other afterwards, and without making any declaration in legal form, before he absented himself, of it being his intention to change his domicile, while at the same time he retains here his house, real property and all manner of means of subsistence. Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure leaves to the election of the plaintiff the bringing of a personal action like the one at bar either in the place where the defendant may reside or be found, or in that where the plaintiff resides. The litigating spouses have gained not only domicile (domicilio) but also residence (vecindad) in Manila. In this litigation the defendant claims that, born as he says in Mallorca, in the Balearic Islands, he is not subject, in his marriage, to the rules governing conjugal property, that are in force in the territories of Spain that are governed by the common law of Castillo (as the Philippines in their day), because they are opposed to the Foral Law in force in the said Islands and which is respected by the Civil Code. Even if this defense could be sustained herein, paragraph 2 of article 15 of the said Civil Code would be applicable. It provides: "For the purposes of this article, residence (vecindad) will be acquired: By residence of ten years in common law provinces or territories, unless before the termination of that time he manifests his will to the contrary; or by a residence of two years, if the interested person declares this to be his will . . . In any case, the wife will follow the condition of her husband. . . ." On no occasion had the defendant manifested his will to the contrary, not even as he was leaving, after a residence of seventeen years, a month before the return of his wife to these Islands. On the contrary, when he inscribed himself in the Spanish consulate, he declared his intention of continuing to reside in the Islands as a Spaniard and not as a Mallorquin, subject as such to the common law of Spain. In an endeavor to demonstrate the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands over the subject matter of the complaint that is to try an action for divorce between two Catholic Spaniards, he alleges in his appeal: That both litigants are Spanish subjects and that they contracted a Catholic marriage; that in accordance with article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (the same as that of these Islands) the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, "all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the AUTHORITY to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the person and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife, and, in our case, by the Spanish law by virtue of article 9 as above set out." (Brief, p. 12.) The appellant and defendant continues his argument, saying: That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code of Spain, "jurisdiction in actions for divorce and nullification of canonical marriages lies with ecclesiastical courts," while that of civil tribunals is limited to civil marriages; that this being so, the action for divorce brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, according to his own law of persons, because these courts ought to apply the Spanish law in accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil Cod of Spain, and this Spanish law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the ecclesiastical courts, in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands con subrogate itself. Says this appellant: "If a law of a foreign country were of rigorous application in a given case, a North American tribunal would have no jurisdiction upon an ecclesiastical court and therefore the North American tribunal in applying it would have to exercise a faculty which that law reserved to the ecclesiastical court." (Brief, pp. 13, 14, and 15.)

Unless we take the question itself for granted, the foregoing reasoning cannot be upheld. The question is precisely whether the courts of the Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on appeal, and it is taken for granted that the power to decree it is one of the rights included in the personal statute, but appellant does not prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the personal statute of a foreigner carries with it, to whether he transfers his domicile, the authority established by the law of his nation to decree his divorce, which was what he had to demonstrate. The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of the state which have coercive means (property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures which, although he won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights because of the court's lack of means to enforce them." (Torres Campos, "Elementos de Derecho International Privado," p. 108.) "Justice," says the same professor, "is a principle superior to that of nations, and it should therefore be administered without taking into any account whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In order to foster their relations and develop their commerce, all civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their own people, but to those foreigners who contract within the country or outside of it juridical ties which in some manner effect their sovereignty. (Ibid, p. 107.) Might its courts, in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in its territory, apply the personal law of the parties, but abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from administering justice because the personal law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of the given case to some court that is not the territorial one of the nation? This has never yet been claimed in any of the theories regarding the conflict of laws arising out of questions of nationality and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial law in favor of private persons. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their nation.
1aw phi 1.net

It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme Court (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibaez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325). In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein. The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation. The second assignment of error is directed against the finding of the court that the defendant had committed adultery with a certain woman in this city from the year 1899 until 1909; the third was

against the finding that the adultery was accompanied by public scandal and injured the dignity of his wife; and the fourth for having decreed the divorce, suspension of the married life, and the separation of the properties of the parties. The evidence relating to the foregoing not being sent up on appeal, we are unable to review it, so we accept the findings of the trial court. There is a point of law regarding the claim that the adultery, even though it were proven would not be a cause for divorce, because no public scandal resulted therefrom nor was there contempt displayed for the wife. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) The facts must be accepted by this tribunal as they were found by the trial court, since the evidence cannot be reviewed; moreover, the appellee affirms the contrary and maintains that it is a proven fact, public and notorious, an assertion that the trial court must have found to be proven. (Appellee's brief, p. 5.) In law, it is not necessary that adultery, to be a cause for divorce, should be accompanied by public scandal and contempt for the wife. There is no law that requires this. Law 2, title 9, of the Fourth Partida does not require it. The fifth and sixth assignments of error are directed against the finding of the trial court that there exists conjugal property, a finding that the appellant maintains is without foundation, and that which holds that the property in the hands of the receiver (that sought to be divided) is conjugal property, a conclusion which the appellant claims to be contrary to the law which should be applied to the case and according to which, as alleged in the tenth assignment of error, the whole of the property should be adjudicated to the defendant as being exclusively his. Facts: The appellant affirms that he is a native of Mallorca in the Balearic Islands and that is also the condition of his wife, the plaintiff. Law: That although the rule of the Civil Code is that which legally governs conjugal property, yet at the same time it admits, as an exception, the laws, usages, and customs of the Foral Law, according to which, as applied in the Balearic Islands, the law of the family is that of the division of property and that of conjugal property is not known; so that the property pertains exclusively to the spouse who, by whatever title, has acquired it. In support of the facts, appellant cites pages 27 to 37 and 39 to 41 in the bill of exceptions; and of the law, the doctrinal authority of Manresa, Gutierrez, and Alcubilla. The citation from pages 39 to 41 of the bill of exceptions, the only pertinent one, is but an affidavit filed by the defendant in which, under oath, he himself testifies as to the Foral Law in the Balearic Islands. The adverse party says with regard to this: "This affidavit was never presented in proof, was never received by the trial judge, and cannot seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law of a foreign jurisdiction. Sections 300, 301 and 302 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now in force in these islands, indicate the method by which the law of a foreign country may be proved. We maintain that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was never submitted as proof, never received by the trial court, and which has never been subjected to any cross-examination, is not a means of proving a foreign law on which the defendant relies." (Brief, pp. 6 and 7.) Furthermore, on the supposition that the defendant could invoke the Foral Law as the law of his personal status in the matter of the regimen of his marriage, and that to allege this he be considered as authorized by article 15 of the Civil Code, we have said before, in dealing with his law of domicile, that paragraph 2 of this article 15 of the Civil Code would be entirely adverse to his claim, and if it be advanced that there is a similar Foral Law in the Philippines by virtue of paragraph 1 of the said article 15, it might be said, though there is not at present any need to say it, that it is not in force. The two findings attacked are in perfect accord with the law. All the property of the marriage, says article 1407 of the Civil Code, shall be considered as conjugal property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. No proof has been submitted to this effect.

As seventh assignment of error it is alleged that the court below erred in holding in the judgment that the plaintiff had brought to the marriage a dowry of 30,000 Spanish dollars. But the defendant himself adds that the court made no order or decree regarding the alleged dowry. On the other hand, the plaintiff, in her fourth assignment of errors, claimed that the court erred in not confirming the report of the commissioners which gave to the said plaintiff the sum of 30,000 Spanish dollars. It is unnecessary to say anything further. The eighth error consists in that the court below ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P56,010.17 Philippine currency, whereas the plaintiff had made no demand in her complaint with respect to this sum; that no arrears of payment are owing for alimony, even though payments had been stipulated in the contract, unless they are claimed by the person who had furnished the actual support, and that alimony is due only when it is necessary; so that, as the plaintiff has had no need of it for ten years, nor has she stated who has furnished it, there is no reason for awaring her the amount of the arrears for all that time; that as she has allowed ten years to elapse before claiming it, her action prescribed in 1904, that is to say, after five years. The plaintiff acknowledges that there is no petition or prayer in her complaint as to this cause of action, but she considers that in equity such an omission can be supplied. Paragraph 3 of section 89 (90) of the Code of Civil Procedure determines one of the requisites of the complaint: "A demand for the relief which the plaintiff claims." The section goes on to say: "If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded must be stated. If special relief, such as an order for the special restitution of property, etc., the ground of demanding such relief must be stated and the special relief prayed for. But there may be added to the statement of the specific relief demanded a general prayer for such further or other relief as shall be deemed equitable." In the complaint of the case at bar the provisions of paragraph 2 of the said section 89 [90] are complied with by setting forth in its paragraphs 4 and 5 the relation of the cause of action, that is, the contract of the 4th of April, 1899, by which the defendant obligated himself to send to the plaintiff in Spain a certain amount of money monthly, for her support, and the failure to comply with this obligation after the month of August, 1899. Paragraph 6, as a consequence of the promise established in 4 and 5, says as follows: "That the defendant Gabriel Fuster y Fuster actually owes the plaintiff the sum of 36,100 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 dollars, which, reduced at the present rate of exchange, amounts to the sum of P12,959.90, Philippine currency." (B. of E., p. 2.) In the case of default on the part of the defendant "the court shall proceed to hear the plaintiff and his witnesses and assess the damages or determine the other relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled, including the costs of the action, and render final judgment for the plaintiff to recover such sum or to receive such other relief as the pleadings and the facts warrant." The pleadings, not the prayer of the complaint. This court has recently decided that the pleadings, not the prayer, exactly, are the essential part of a complaint. It is not a question of alimony for the present, nor for the future, which constitutes the first cause of action, but of certain sums stipulated in a contract. This contract is a law for the contracting parties, a law which rises superior to those general laws which regulate the nature of the subject matter of the contract (in the present case an entirely voluntary one) and which govern judicial action. An action arising out of a contract of this nature does not prescribe like all personal ones, but, by the provisions of article 1964 of the Civil Code, after fifteen years. But even though the provisions of article 1966 were applicable, by which an action to compel the fulfillment of an agreement to pay

alimony prescribes in five years, yet by section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "when payment has been made upon any demand founded upon contract . . . an action may be brought . . . after such payment. . . ." And the parties admit that on the 18th of August, 1908, the plaintiff secured the payment of 6,365.68 pesetas by virtue of the contract of April 4, 1899. So that from August, 1908, until March, 1909, the date of the complaint, the said period of five years had not elapsed. The ninth assignment of error consists in that the court below erred in empowering the receiver to proceed to the separation of the property and in appointing commissioners to make the partition and distribution between the spouses, since the principal question in this action hinges upon the classification of the property; that it was erroneously classified as conjugal property, whereas all of it pertained to the husband alone and should be adjudicated to him for the reason that, as it reiterated in the tenth assignment of error, the conjugal partnership was not subject to the provisions of the law governing conjugal property, because such provision are totally foreign to the Foral Law of the Balearic Islands. The action of the trial court, by the terms of section 184 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was in accordance with law. The only question before this court is the partition of real property. All that referred to in the second decision appealed from, dated September 9, 1911, is urban real estate. Its classification as conjugal property is in accordance with law, as is shown in the foregoing reasoning, and that no consideration of the Foral Law enters into the question has also been demonstrated. II. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL. As the trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff only P5,010.17, the petitioner here prays that the judgment be reversed and that in its place this court order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff her claim of P12,959.90, plus the additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of P107.70 per month, dating from the 1st of August, 1909, until the date of payment, with legal interest upon the said P12,959.90 from the date of the filing of the complaint until the date of payment, and, furthermore, legal interest upon each of the monthly payments due after the filing of the complaint, and which will continue to become due until the close of this litigation. The trial court made the following findings: First, that the total amount of the alimony owing to the plaintiff amounted to 34,200 pesetas; second, that of this sum the plaintiff had collected in Madrid 6,365.68; third, that the remainder, that is, 27,834.32, was equivalent to $5,566.86 Mexican currency; fourth, that the Mexican peso was worth 90 centavos Philippine currency; fifth, that therefore the sum of $5,566.86 Mexican currency was equivalent to P5,010 Philippine currency; and finally, as there was no evidence as to the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to be presumed that it was that current at the time and place where the agreement was made, which was Mexicanpesetas. In her appeal, the plaintiff contends that these findings are erroneous in that, firstly, the parties had admitted that the pesetas referred to in the contract of the 4th of April, 1899, were Spanish, and in view of this admission the court was not empowered to define them as being different from the kind admitted by the parties; secondly, if he were so empowered, his interpretation should be governed by the terms of the law. With regard to the first error, the plaintiff says that the statement is made in her complaint that the defendant had obligated himself to pay her a "monthly pension for her support of 300 Spanish pesetas, that is, 60 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency, amounts to P107.70;" that the defendant had admitted this in hi answer to the complaint, and that by his finding in a sense other than that accepted and not refuted in the answer of the defendant, the court violated the provisions of section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The court has not incurred this error, because it does not appear that the defendant in his answer accepted the fact in the manner alleged in the complaint. The defendant said that he admitted having made the agreement referred to in paragraph 4 of the complaint, and that he stood upon its contents. The contents of the document to which he refers is of the following tenor: "Mr. Fuster binds and obligates himself to pay to his said wife the sum of 300 pesetas, monthly, payable de su cuenta in the city and capital of Madrid, for her support. . . ." He did not therefore admit the matter of the Spanish pesetas; that does not appear in the contents of the document the only thing he admitted in his answer. As to the second error, the court did not commit it in applying the rule contained in article 1287 of the Civil Code. "The usages or customs of the country shall be taken into consideration in interpreting ambiguity in contracts. . . ." If in the contract the word " pesetas," not being specific, was ambiguous, then it was in harmony with this precept to interpret it as being the peseta then in use or current when and where the agreement was made, Mexican being then the usual and current money in the Philippines. Furthermore, the phrase de su cuenta clearly means that it was not "Spanish pesetas" that the contracting parties had in mind, because if the agreement had been a specific one to pay 300 Spanish pesetas in Madrid, everyone would of course understand that the expense of following the fluctuations of change and of the differences in value between the money current in the country, and the Spanishpesetas, would have to be defrayed by the obligated party; whereas, if nothing more than pesetas was mentioned, it was necessary to decide which party should pay for the difference in value so that the 300 pesetas stipulated here should be 300 Spanish pesetas paid in Madrid. Against the reasons of the court below for his decision this court can offer no legal grounds. The rule of interpretation cited is the one applicable and it supports the reasoning of the decision appealed from. The appellant also alleges as error that the court did not adjudicate to her the 30,000 Spanish dollars which the commissioners proposed in their report. First she characterizes this sum of 30,000 dollars as the dowry of the wife delivered to the husband, then, later, as paraphernal property brought to the marriage. According to the last instructions of the court to the commissioners, this amount of 30,000 dollars could not enter into the partition, and with reason. If, as was claimed, it was inherited by the plaintiff from her uncle, it really constitutes paraphernal property under article 1381. "Paraphernal property is that which the wife brings to the marriage without being included in the dowry and that she may acquire after the creation of the same without being added thereto." But it is a provision of article 1384 that "The wife shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may administer said property. In such case the husband is obliged to create a mortgage for the value of the personal property he may receive, or to secure said property, in the manner established for the dowry property." Not even was there offered in evidence the public deed of delivery, nor the equally public mortgage deed that is required by law. So that, therefore, the necessary proof of the obligation to return paraphernal property as here demanded does not exist.
lawphil.net

The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of September, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed. The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement of costs in this instance. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.