Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974 PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners, vs. RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH XV, respondents.

Concepcion, Victorino, Sanchez and Associates for petitioners. Jose G. Ricardo for respondent Ricardo Cipriano.

ESGUERRA, J.:p In this petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the review and nullification of two orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the first, dated August 4, 1970 sustaining private respondent Ricardo Cipriano's motion to dismiss "on the authority of Republic Act 6126", and the second, dated October 16, 1970, denying the motion for reconsideration of the first order. The question before Us involves the retroactive application of the provisions of Republic Act 6126, otherwise known as the Rental Law. The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30, 1969, by plaintiffs, now petitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against private respondent Ricardo Cipriano for the latter's alleged failure to pay rentals. An adverse judgment having been rendered against said respondent, he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 338-M. In the said Court private respondent sought to amend his Answer filed in the Municipal Court on the grounds that (1) for lack of time he was not able to disclose to his former counsel all the material facts surrounding his case and, therefore, he was not able to fully determine his defenses; and (2) that prior to the hearing of the case in the lower court he wanted to cause the filing of an amended answer but was not able to do so for his alleged failure to contact his counsel. The motion to file amended answer was denied by the Court. The parties eventually submitted a stipulation of facts, the salient provisions of which read as follows: 1. The plaintiffs are the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendant since 1954; 2. The house of the defendant was built on the property with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff pursuant to an oral contract of lease; 3. Before 1969 the lease of the property was on year-to-year arrangement, rentals being then payable at or before the end of the year; 4. The following are the rates of rentals: (a) 1954 to 1957 P12.00 a year (b) 1968 to 1959 P13.20 a year (c) 1960 to 1961 P14.00 a year (d) 1962 P16.00 a year (e) 1963 to 1965 P24.70 a year (f) 1967 to 1968 P48.00 a year 5. Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis and rental was increased to P30.00 a month by the plaintiffs;

6. The defendant has remained in possession of the property up to the present; 7. Since January 1969 the defendant has not paid rental at the present monthly rate; 8. A formal notice to vacate, dated March 22, 1969, was sent by registered mail to, and received by, defendant. On July 7, 1970, Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order giving private respondent herein seven days within which to file his motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on July 13, 1970, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint, invoking the prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126, entitled "An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's Dwelling Is Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss but respondent Judge issued an order on August 4, 1970, which reads: On the Authority of Republic Act 6126, this Court hereby sustains the Motion for Dismissal filed by the defendant through counsel, dated July 13, 1970. A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied by respondent Judge. Hence this petition. Thrust upon Us, therefore, for resolution is the problem of whether Republic Act 6126 may be held applicable the case at bar. For convenience We reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in question: Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another's dwelling is located shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month. Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved June 17, 1970. It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered by the aforecited law. We rule otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, 1 while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected. Private respondent, however, puts forward the argument that there was no perfected contract covering the increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly payments of P30.00 effective January 1969, as he did not give his consent thereto. In his brief he alleges: Defendant (respondent) herein also begs to disagree with the contention of plaintiffs. We believe and respectfully submit that there would be no impairment of obligation of contract if Republic Act 6126 were to be applied to the present case. The alleged new contract of lease and subsequent increase in the amount of rental were not effected as of January 1969 with respect to the defendant. He did not accept the new rate of rental. The eloquent testimonies on record to show that defendant never accepted the new rate of rental imposed upon him by the plaintiffs were the pretrials on the case wherein defendant offered to accept the increase to the tone of 100%. Hence, the new contract of lease increasing the rental had never been agreed upon by both the plaintiffs and the defendant because the defendant never gave his consent to the new rate of rental. In effect, therefore, the alleged new contract of lease was not a contract at all since it did not have the consent of the other party, the defendant. Private respondent's contention is devoid of merit. There is nothing in the stipulation of facts to show that his consent to the increase in rentals and change in the manner of payment was essential to its validity. There was no more subsisting yearly contract of lease at a fixed amount. It had already expired when the increase and conversion into monthly payments took effect in January, 1969. The lessor was free to fix a higher amount than that previously paid by the lessee (private respondent herein) and if the latter did not agree to the increased amount, he could have vacated the premises and thus rendered himself free from liability. Respondent Cipriano, therefore, cannot invoke lack of consent on his part as basis for declaring the contract of lease ineffective. Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. 2 The law being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation", 3 it had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that "No lessor of a dwelling unit

or land ... shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act." Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was effective on March, 1970, up to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law, did not, by its express terms, purport to give a retroactive operation. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that "Expressium facit cessare tacitum" 4 and, therefore, no reasonable implication that the Legislature ever intended to give the law in question a retroactive effect may be accorded to the same. A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on House Bill 953 which became Republic Act No. 6126, as recorded its Congressional Records of March 5, 1970 reveals the sponsors of the Rental Law did not entertain for a moment that a retroactive operation would be given to this enactment. We quote pertinent portions of the discussion: Remarks of sponsor, Mr. Roces: Mr. Roces Mr. Speaker, the President is still observing the effect of the newly established floating rate. In the meantime we feel that, in line with the policy that those who have less in life should have more in law, apartment dwellers are entitled to protection. Therefore this bill proposes that the rentals paid today will not be increased in the next 18 months. and on pages 66 and 72 respectively of the same Congressional Record We likewise find the following: Mr. Gonzales Will the gentleman from Manila interpret for us the phrase "during the period of 6 months preceding the approval of this Act" in Section 2? 5 Mr. Roces. My interpretation is that the rent being paid during that period not before will be the one considered. Mr. Montano ... The term moratorium as utilized by the gentleman from Manila at the start of his sponsorship was applied not in its legal acceptance but generally. For purposes of the bill, the term is construed as suspension of increasing rents in the meantime that we have not yet determined the real value of the currency ... . Respondent's tenacious insistence On the retroactive operation of Republic Act 6126 represents a last ditch effort on his part to hold on to the premises while at the same time escaping the obligation to pay the increased rate. We can not countenance such a situation, for to permit the same to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity and causing injustice to the petitioner herein. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent in expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment, 6 Similarly, in the case of La Previsora Filipina, Mutual Building and Loan Association v. Felix Ledda , 66 Phil. 573, 577, this Court said: It is a principle generally recognized that civil laws have no retroactive effect unless it is otherwise provided therein (Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Santos, G.R. No. 43861). Act No. 4118 does not state that its provisions shall have retroactive effect, wherefore, it follows, as it is hereby declared, that it is not applicable to the contracts entered into by the parties, and, hence the trial court erred in granting possession to the petitioner. The petitioner contends that said law is applicable because when the property in question was sold at public auction said law was already in force. This contention is in our opinion untenable. The date which should be taken into account in order to determine the applicability of the law is the date when the contracts were entered into by the parties and not the date of the public sale, ... . Under the circumstances of this case, We, therefore, rule that Republic Act 6126 is not applicable to the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says. WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby nullified and set aside. The court a quo shall proceed with the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M (12285) on the merits in accordance with Republic Act 6031 if applicable, otherwise under the prevailing procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court. Costs against respondent.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila ENC BANC

G.R. No. 111651 November 28, 1996 OSMALIK S. BUSTAMANTE, PAULINO A. BANTAYAN, FERNANDO L. BUSTAMANTE, MARIO D. SUMONOD, and SABU J. LAMARAN, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH DIVISION, and EVERGREEN FARMS, INC. respondents. RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.: On 15 March 1996, the Court (First Division) promulgated a decision in this case, the dispositive part of which states: WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 3 May 1993 is modified in that its deletion of the award for backwages in favor of petitioners, is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 26 April 1991 is AFFIRMED with the modification that backwages shall be paid to petitioners from the time of their illegal dismissal on 25 June 1990 up to the date of their reinstatement. If reinstatement is no longer feasible, a one-month salary shall be paid the petitioners as ordered in the labor arbiter's decision, in addition to the adjudged backwages. Private respondent now moves to reconsider the decision on grounds that (a) petitioners are not entitled to recover backwages because they not actually dismissed but their probationary employment was not converted to permanent employment; and (b) assuming that petitioners are entitled to backwages, computation thereof should not start from cessation of work up to actual reinstatement, and that salary earned elsewhere (during the period of illegal dismissal) should be deducted from the award such backwages. There is no compelling reason to reconsider the decision of the Court (First Division) dated 15 March 1996. However, we here clarify the computation of backwages due an employee on account of his illegal dismissal from employment. This Court has, over the years, applied different methods in the computation of backwages. The first labor relations law governing the award of backwages was Republic Act No. 875, the Industrial Peace Act, approved on 17 June 1953. Sections 5 and 15 thereof provided thus: Sec. 5. Unfair Labor Practice Cases. (c) . . . If, after investigation, the Court shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice, then the Court shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice and take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act,

including (but not limited to) reinstatement of employees with or without back-pay and including rights of the employees prior to dismissal including seniority.
. . . (emphasis supplied) Sec. 15. Violation of Duty to Bargain Collectively. . . . Any employee whose work has stopped as a consequence of such lockout shall be entitled to back-pay. (emphasis supplied) In accordance with these provisions, backpay (the same as backwages) could be awarded where, in the opinion of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), such was necessary to effectuate the policies of the Industrial Peace

Act. 1 Only in one case was backpay a matter of right, that was, when an employer had declared a lockout without having first bargained collectively with his employees in accordance with the provisions of the Act. As the CIR was given wide discretion to grant or disallow payment of backpay (backwages) to an employee, it also had the implied power of mitigating (reducing) the backpay where backpay was allowed. 2 Thus, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the CIR increased or diminished the award of backpay, depending on several circumstances, among them, the good faith of the employer, 3 the employee's employment in other establishments during, the period of illegal dismissal, or the probability that the employee could have realized net earnings from outside employment if he had exercised due diligence to search for outside employment. 4 In labor cases decided during the effectivity of R.A. No. 875, this Court acknowledged and upheld the CIR's authority to deduct any amount from the employee's backwages, 5 including the discretion to reduce such award of backwages whatever earnings were obtained by the employee elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. 6 In the case of Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Sagilo-Itogon Workers' Union, 7 this Court restated the guidelines for determination of total backwages, thus:

First. To be deducted from the backwages accruing to each of the laborers to be reinstated is the total
amount of earnings obtained by him from other employment(s) from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement. Should the laborer decide that it is preferable not to return to work, the deduction should be made up to the time judgment becomes final. And these, for the reason that employees should not be permitted to enrich themselves at the expense of their employer. Besides, there is the "law's abhorrence for double compensation".

Second. Likewise, in mitigation of the damages that the dismissed respondents are entitled to, account

should be taken of whether in the exercise of due diligence respondents might have obtained income from suitable remunerative employment. We are prompted to give out this last reminder because it is really unjust that a discharged employee should, with folded arms, remain inactive in the expectation that a windfall would come to him. A contrary view would breed idleness; it is conducive to lack of initiative on the part of a laborer. Both bear the stamp of undesirability. From this ruling came the burden of disposing of an illegal dismissal case on its merits and of determining whether or not the computation of the award of backwages is correct. In order not to unduly delay the disposition of illegal dismissal cases, this Court found occasion in the case of Mercury Drug Co., Inc., et al. v. CIR, et al. 8 to rule that a fixed amount of backwages without further qualifications should be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee (hereinafter the Mercury Drug rule). This ruling was grounded upon considerations of expediency in the execution of the decision. Former Justice Claudio Teehankee approved of this formula expressing that such method of computation is a "realistic, reasonable and mutually beneficial solution" and "thus obviates the twin evils of idleness on the part of the employees and attrition and undue delay in satisfying the award on the part of the employer" 9 However, Justice Teehankee dissented from the majority view that the employee in said case should be awarded backwages only for a period of 1 year, 11 months and 15 day which represented the remainder of the prescriptive period after deducting the period corresponding to the delay incurred by the employee in filing the complaint for unfair labor practice and reinstatement. Justice Teehankee opined that: . . . an award of back wages equivalent to three years (where the case is not terminated sooner) should serve as the base figure for such awards without deduction, subject to deduction where there are mitigating circumstances in favor of the employer but subject to increase by way of exemplary damages where there are aggravating circumstances (e.g. oppression or dilatory appeals) on the employer's part.

10

The proposal on the three-year backwages was subsequently adopted in later cases, among them, Feati University Faculty Club (PAFLU) v. Feati University (No. L-31503, 15 August 1974, 58 SCRA 395), Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. CIR (No. L-34300, 22 November 1974, 61 SCRA 154), Danao Development Corporation v. NLRC (Nos. L-40706 and L-40707, 16 February 1978, 81 SCRA 487), Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation v. Lazaro (No. 63779, 27 October 1983, 125 SCRA 463), Philippine National Oil Company - Energy Development Corporation v. Leogardo (G.R. No. 58494, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA 26). Then came Presidential Decree No. 442 (the Labor Code of Philippines) which was signed into law on 1 May 1974 and which took effect on 1 November 1974. Its posture on the award of backwages, as amended, was expressed as follows. Art. 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is

unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his back wages computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his reinstatement. (emphasis supplied).
Under the abovequoted provision, it became mandatory to award backwages to illegally dismissed regular employees. The law specifically declared that the award of backwages was to be computed from the time compensation was withheld from the employee up to the time of his instatement. This notwithstanding, the rule generally applied by the Court under the

promulgation of the Mercury Drug case, 11 and during the effectivity of P.D. No. 442 was still the Mercury Drug rule. A survey of causes from 1974 until 1989, when the amendatory law to P.D. No. 442, namely, R.A. No. 6715 took effect, supports this conclusion. In the case of New Manila Candy Workers Union (Naconwa-Paflu) v. CIR (1978), 12 or after the Labor Code (P.D. No. 442) had taken effect, the court still followed the Mercury Drug rule to avoid the necessity of a hearing on earnings obtained elsewhere by the employee during the period of illegal dismissal. In an even later case (1987) 13 the Court declared that the general principle is that an employee is entitled to receive as backwages the amounts he may have received from the date of his dismissal up to the time of his reinstatement. However, in compliance with the jurisprudential policy of fixing the amount of backwages to a just and reasonable level, the award of backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, was nonetheless followed in said case. In a more direct approach to the rule on the award of backwages, this Court declared in the 1990 case of Medado v. Court of Appeals 14 that "any decision or order granting backwages in excess of three (3) years is null nad void as to the excess." In sum, during the effectivity of P.D. 442, the Court enforced the Mercury Drug rule and, in effect, qualified the provision under P.D. No. 442 by limiting the award of backwages to three (3) years. On March 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 took effect, amending the Labor Code. Article 279 thereof states in part : Art. 279 Security of Tenure. . . . An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of

allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation is witheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement . (emphasis supplied)

In accordance with the above provision, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to his full backwages from the time his

compensation was witheld from him (which, as a rule, is from the time of his illegal dismissal) up to the time of his actual reinstatement. It is true that this Court had ruled in the case of Pines City Educational Center vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 96779, 10
November 1993, 227 SCRA 655) that "in ascertaining the total amount of backwages payable to them (employees), we go back to the rule prior to the Mercury Drug rule that the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any, should be deducted therefrom." 15 The rationale for such ruling was that, the earnings derived elsewhere by the dismissed employee while litigating the legality of his dismissal, should be deducted from the full amount of backwages which the law grants him upon reinstatement, so as not to unduly or unjustly enrich the employee at the sense of the employer . The Court deems it appropriate, however, to reconsider such earlier on the computation of backwages as enunciated in said Pines City Educational Center case, by now holding that comformably with the evident legislative intent as expressed in Rep. Act No. 6715, above-quoted, backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, should not, as general rule, be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. The underlying reason of this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality (illegality) of his dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself and family, while his backwages have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee. The clear legislative intent of the amendment in Rep. Act No. 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the "deduction of earnings elsewhere" rule. Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind Rep. Act No. 6715 points to "full backwages" as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. 16 In other words, the provision handling for "full backwages" to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and free from ambiguity and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo est. 17 Therefore, in accordance with R.A. No. 6715, petitioners are entitled on their full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, from the time their actual compensation was withheld on them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. As to reinstatement of petitioners, this Court has already ruled that reinstatement is no longer feasible, because the company would be adjustly prejudiced by the continued employment of petitioners who at present are overage, a separation pay equal to one-month salary granted to them in the Labor Arbiter's decision was in order and, therefore, affirmed on the Court's decision of 15 March 1996. Furthermore, since reinstatement on this case is no longer feasible, the amount of backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination on 25 June 1990 up to the time of finality of this decision. 18 ACCORDINGLY, private respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, dated 10 April 1996, is DENIED. SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992 OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUALBAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. PascualBautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual ( Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following: (a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses; (b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit: Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista Manuel C. Pascual Jose C. Pascual Susana C. Pascual-Bautista Erlinda C. Pascual Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr. (c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit: Avelino Pascual Isoceles Pascual Loida Pascual-Martinez Virginia Pascual-Ner Nona Pascual-Fernando Octavio Pascual Geranaia Pascual-Dubert; (d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit: Olivia S. Pascual Hermes S. Pascual (e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by the following: Dominga M. Pascual Mamerta P. Fugoso Abraham S. Sarmiento, III Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay Eleuterio P. Sarmiento Domiga P. San Diego Nelia P. Marquez Silvestre M. Pascual Eleuterio M. Pascual (Rollo, pp. 46-47) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47). On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101). On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual ( Rollo, p. 102). On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit: This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112). On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights ( Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights ( Rollo, pp. 116-130). On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136). On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied. Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.). On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositive part of which reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38) Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42). Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course. The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418). Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419). On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them. The petition is devoid of merit. Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that: Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father. In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual. On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point. The Court held: Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]). Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]). Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious. Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative. It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-28396 December 29, 1967

AGRIPINO DEMAFILES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ANTIQUE, in its capacity as Board of Canvassers for the newly created Municipality of Sebaste of the Province of Antique, and BENITO B. GALIDO, respondents.

Salonga, Ordoez Sicat and Associates for respondent. Ramon Barrios for respondent Comelec. Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
CASTRO, J.: The new municipality of Sebaste1 in Antique province held its first election of officers in the general elections of November 14, 1967, with the petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty. On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised Election Code, to disregard, as "obviously manufactured", the election return from precinct 7 on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were registered (of whom 188 voted), when, according to a certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of October 30, 1997. At its session on the following day, November 22, the board, over the objection of one member, voted to reject the return from precinct 7 and then proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of Sebaste. On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting the board's action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two board members, Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escao, to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Acting on the protest, the COMELEC resolved on November 28, 1967: To annul the canvass and proclamation of the local officials of the new municipality of Sebaste, Antique, which was made by the Provincial Board of Antique; To constitute the Board of Canvassers by appointing the substitutes pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 167 (a) of the Revised Election Code, which shall canvass anew the results of the election for local offices of Sebaste, Antique, in accordance with the Instructions to Boards of Canvassers contained in the Resolution of the Commission No. RR544, particularly No. 5-K thereof, and thereafter to proclaim the winning candidates for local offices of said municipality. In turn, Galido asked for a reconsideration on the ground that the two members of the provincial board who were reelectionists were disqualified from sitting only when the board was acting as a provincial, but not as a municipal, board of canvassers and that the COMELEC resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation of officials was issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard. In its resolution of December 4, 1967 the respondent Commission reconsidered its previous order and held "that the canvass and proclamation already made of the local officials . . . stands". Failing to secure a reconsideration of this latter resolution, Demafiles filed the present petition for mandamus and certiorari to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC, to annull the proclamation of Galido, and to secure an order directing the COMELEC to appoint substitute members of the provincial board and to order a new canvass of the returns, including that from precinct 7. The three principal issues tendered for resolution in this case are: (1) whether the respondent board of canvassers was within the periphery of its power in rejecting the return from precinct 7 on the strength of an election registrar's certificate that a less number of voters than that shown in the return had registered; (2) whether the provincial board members, who were candidates for reelection, were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers; and (3) whether the Commission on Elections can order the board of canvassers to count a return from a given precinct.

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These issues, together with the arguments of the parties, will be discussed seriatim, but we must first proceed to dispose of the preliminary question raised by the respondent Galido, namely, that this case is moot because he had taken his oath and assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870. Obviously, the frame of reference is section 2 of the statute which reads: The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified [sic]. In our view, the last portion of the provision "and shall have qualified" is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does not warrant the respondent's reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their proclamation. It is quite probable that that is what the legislature meant. But here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from supplying.itc-alf "If there is no meaning in it," said the King in Alice in Wonderland, "that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any." Frankfurter, who himself was fond of quoting this passage, admonishes that "a judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration." 2 Accordingly, we have to go by the general rule that the term of office of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January following their election,3 and so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way affected the basic issues in this case, which we need not reach and resolve.

First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function that of compiling and adding the results they appear in the returns, transmitted to it. This is the teaching in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections :4 "the canvassers are to
be satisfied of the, genuineness of the returns namely, that the papers presented to them are not forged and spurious, that they are returns, and that they are signed by the proper officers. When so satisfied, . . . they may not reject any returns because of informalities in them or because of illegal and fraudulent practices in the elections." 5 Thus, they cannot pass upon the validity of an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came are illegal.6

But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the ground that it is "obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the statement therein that there were 195 registered voters, of whom 188 voted, the certificate of the local election registrar states that only 182 voters had registered on October 30, 1967. Lagumbay v. Commission on Elections7 is cited in support of this view. In Lagumbay the returns were palpably false as it was indeed statistically improbable that "all the eight candidates of one party garnered all the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same number, whereas all the eight candidates of the other party got precisely nothing.itc-alf" In other words, the aid of evidence aliunde was not needed, as "the fraud [being] so palpable from the return itself ( res ipsa loquitur the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facie value. On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing on its face from which the canvassers might conclude that it does not speak the truth. It is only when it is compared in the certificate of the election registrar that a discrepancy appears as to the number of registered voters. The return therefore is by no means "obviously manufactured" so as to justify its exclusion. This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more people than registered voters were allowed to vote in precinct 7. Perhaps that is true, although the petitioner claims that after October 30, 1967 eight more voters were allowed to register (making a total of 190, voters), and on the day of the election 5 voters erroneously assigned to precinct 6 were allowed to vote in precinct 7 because that was where they were really assigned. The point is simply that this question should be threshed out in an election contest.itc-alf Lagumbay itself explicitly says Of course we agree that fraud in the holding of the election should be handled and finally settled by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence is necessary. . . . Consequently, the canvass made and proclamation had should be annulled.8

Second, the canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the four members of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it, they being candidates for reelection. As this Court held in Salcedo v. Commission on Elections:9
And added reason for the nullification of the actuation of the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro is the fact that its members were disqualified to act it appearing that they were all candidates for reelection. This is clear from Section 28 of the Revised Election Code which provides that any member of the provincial board who is a candidate

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for an elective office shall be incompetent to act in said board in the performance of its duties in connection with the election. Branding the above statement as obiter dictum, the respondent Galido argues that reelectionist members of the provincial board are disqualified under section 28 only when the board acts as a provincial board of canvassers, to prevent them fro canvassing their own votes, and not when they sit as a municipal board of canvassers. With respect to the canvass and proclamation made the provincial board of Oriental Mindoro, three issues raised in Salcedo, in resolving which this Court held (1) that a provincial board cannot act as a municipal board of canvassers where a municipal council has been formed; (2) that provincial board members who are candidates for reelection are disqualified to sit in the board and (3) that a board of canvassers which excludes from canvass the return from a precinct acts "in contravention of law." At any rate the language of section 28 is all-inclusive Thus: Any member of a provincial board or of a municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on said body in the performance of the duties the of relative to said election . . . . The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a provincial board of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal canvassing body new municipalities, and so we make none, in line with the maxim ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.

Third, it is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC has the power to annul an illegal canvass and an illegal proclamation as

when they are based on incomplete returns, and order a new canvass to be made by counting the returns wrongfully excluded.10 If it has power to direct that certain copies of election returns be used in preference to other copies of the same returns,11 there is no reason why it cannot direct canvassing bodies to count all turns which are otherwise regular.itcalf Indeed, it is its duty to do so, failing which it may be compelled by mandamus. As earlier pointed out, it is the ministerial function a board of canvassers to count the results as they appeal in the returns which on their face do not reveal any irregularities or falsities. ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions dated December 4 and 8, 1967 of the Commission on Elections are set aside, and the canvass of returns made and the subsequent proclamation of the respondent Benito B. Galido are annulled. The respondent Commission on Elections is hereby directed. (1) to appoint new members of the board of canvassers in substitution of Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escao, and (2) immediately thereafter to order the board of canvassers as reconstituted to convene, canvass all votes including those appearing in the return from precinct 7, and, in accordance with the results of such canvass, proclaim the winning candidates. Costs against the private respondent Galido.

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DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997) Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. Issues: (1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution. Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executor, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Constitutional Law, People's Initiative, Political Law

FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: 1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

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ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative? HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 104528 January 18, 1996

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, ALFONSO MAGLAYA, ANGELINA MAGLAYA P. REYES, JORGE C. BERNARDINO, CORAZON DE LEON, VICTORIANO ACAYA, FLORENCIA CULTURA, MARIA CAMPOS, ERNESTO SARMIENTO SANTIAGO TAMONAN, APOLONIA TADIAQUE, SIMEON DE LEON, NATIVIDAD J. CRUZ, NATIVIDAD B. LORESCO, FELICIDAD GARCIA, ANA ANITA TAN, LUCAS SERVILLION, JOSE NARAWAL, represented by their duly authorized Attorney-in-Fact, CORAZON DE LEON AND SPOUSES LEOPOLDO AND CARMEN SEBASTIAN, respondents. RESOLUTION PANGANIBAN, J.: May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior purchasers on installment of individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree", is not applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957? This is the question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the Office of the President of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by the Executive Secretary, Franklin M. Drilon, "by authority of the President." Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. (represented by spouses Antonio and Susana Astudillo). Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed over said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in question. Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots. Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later consolidated), the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a decision rendered on October 28, 1988 ruled that PNB - without prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina Village, Inc. - may collect from private respondents only the "remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously entered into with" Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had already bought from said subdivision developer. On May 2, 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board affirmed this decision. On March 10, 1992, the Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with the HLURB. Hence, the present recourse to this Court. Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from judgments or final orders of the . . . Office of the President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . ." However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision three years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice. Petitioner bank raised the following issues: 1. The Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957 because said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976, while the subject mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975; and 2. Petitioner Bank is not privy to the contracts between private respondents and mortgagor-subdivision developer, hence, the Office of the President erred in ordering petitioner Bank to accept private respondents' remaining amortizations and issue the corresponding titles after payment thereof. Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent (as succinctly captured in the preamble quoted below) must be given effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieve:

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WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life; WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers

have reneged on their representations and, obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers; by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value;1 (Emphasis supplied).

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated

While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law - as an instrument of social justice - must favors the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is presumed to have conducted the usual "due diligence" checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection or other modes of investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the property offered as collateral. It could not have been unaware that the property had been built on by small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerless to discover the attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment being to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers." The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and condition it sought to remedy, must be enforced. Sutherland, in his well-known treatise on Statutory Construction (quoted with approval by this Court in an old case of consequence, Ongsiako vs. Gamboa 2 ), says: The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.3 Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly prospective application of the law. Little people who have toiled for years through blood and tears would be deprived of their homes through no fault of their own. As the Solicitor General, in his comment, argues: Verily, if P.D. 957 were to exclude from its coverage the aforecited mortgage contract, the vigorous regulation which P.D. 957 seeks to impose on unconscientious subdivision sellers will be translated into a feeble exercise of police power just because the iron hand of the State cannot particularly touch mortgage contracts badged with the fortunate accident of having been constituted prior to the enactment of P.D. 957. Indeed, it would be illogical in the extreme if P.D. 957 is to be given full force and effect and yet, the fraudulent practices and manipulations it seeks to curb in the first instance can nevertheless be liberally perpetrated precisely because P.D. 957 cannot be applied to existing antecedent mortgage contracts. The legislative intent could not have conceivably permitted a loophole which all along works to the prejudice of subdivision lot buyers (private respondents). 4 Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of P.D. 957, which themselves constitute strong arguments in favor of the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole. These are Sections 20, 2l and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect and will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957's enactment: Sec. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer or shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominiun plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority. Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. - In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the

effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium

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project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond
is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof. Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this Decree. Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. - No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for, the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor, of the owner or developer when the buyer, after, due notice to the owner or developer, desist from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at this option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied) As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment clause, we find the following statements of Justice Isagani Cruz enlightening and pertinent to the case at bench: Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract. Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as the agreement deals with a matter, affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the legislature as a postulate of the legal order. 5 This Court ruled along similar lines in Juarez vs. Court of Appeals6 : The petitioner complains that the retroactive application of the law would violate the impairment clause. The argument does not impress. The impairment clause is now no longer inviolate; in fact, there are many who now believe it, is an anachronism in the present-day society. It was quite useful before in protecting the integrity of private agreements from government meddling, but that was when such agreements did not affect the community in general. They were indeed purely private agreements then. Any interference with them at that time was really an unwarranted intrusion that could properly struck down. But things are different now. More and more, the interests of the public have become involved in what are supposed to be still private agreements, which have, as a result been removed from the protection of the impairment clause. These agreements have come within the embrace of the police power, that obtrusive protector of the public interest. It is a ubiquitous policeman indeed. As long as the contract affects the public welfare one way or another so as to require the interference of the State, then must the police power be asserted, and prevail, over the clause. The decision of the Court of Appeals in Breta and Hamor vs. Lao, et al.7 penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose A. R. Melo, now a respected member of this Court, is persuasive, the factual circumstances therein being of great similarity to the antecedent facts of the case at bench: Protection must be afforded small homeowners who toil and save if only to purchase on installment a tiny home lot they can call their own. The consuming dream of every Filipino is to be able to buy a lot, no matter how small, so that he may somehow build a house. It has, however, been seen of late that these honest, hard-living individuals are taken advantage of, with the delivery of titles delayed, the subdivision facilities, including the most essential such as water installations not completed, or worse yet, as in the instant case, after almost completing the payments for the property and after constructing a house, the buyer is suddenly confronted by the stark reality, contrived or otherwise, in which another person would now appear to be owner. xxx xxx xxx

We cannot over emphasize the fact that the BANK cannot barefacedly argue that simply because the title or titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrance or lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step to verify the over-reaching implications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure. The BANK could not have closed its eyes that it was dealing over a subdivision where there were already houses constructed. Did it not enter the mind of the responsible officers of the BANK that there may even be subdivision residents who have almost completed their installment payments? (id., pp. 7 & 9).

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By the foregoing citation, this Court, thus adopts by reference the foregoing as part of this Decision. The real estate mortgage in the above cited case, although constituted in 1975 and outside the beneficial aegis of P.D. 957, was struck down by the Court of Appeals which found in favor of subdivision lot buyers when the rights of the latter clashed with the mortgagee bank's right to foreclose the property. The Court of Appeals in that case upheld the decision of the trial court declaring the real estate mortgage as null and void. As to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner avers that, in view of the provisions of Article 1311 of the Civil Code, PNB, being a "total stranger to the land purchase agreement," cannot be made to take the developer's place. We disagree, P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid amortizations tendered by private respondents. Sec. 18. Mortgages. - No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the Authority, Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The

buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereof. (emphasis
supplied) Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is without prejudice to petitioner Bank's seeking relief against the subdivision developer. Finally, before closing this Resolution, we enjoin petitioner Bank to focus not only on the strictly legal issues involved in this case but also to take another look at the larger issues including social justice and the protection of human rights as enshrined in the Constitution; firstly, because legal issues are raised and decided not in a vacuum but within the context of existing social, economic and political conditions, law being merely a brick in the up- building of the social edifice; and secondly, petitioner, being THE state bank, is for all intents and purposes an instrument for the implementation of state policies so cherished in our fundamental law. These consideration are obviously far more weighty than the winning of any particular suit or the acquisition of any specific property. Thus, as the country strives to move ahead towards economic self-sufficiency and to achieve dreams of "NIC-hood" and social well-being for the majority of our countrymen, we hold that petitioner Bank, the premier bank in the country, which has in recent years made record earnings and acquired an enviable international stature, with branches and subsidiaries in key financial centers around the world, should be equally as happy with the disposition of this case as the private respondents, who were almost deprived and dispossessed of their very homes purchased through their hard work and with their meager savings. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby DENIED, petitioner having failed to show any REVERSIBLE ERROR or GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in the assailed decision. No costs. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-29755 January 31, 1969

DOMINGO N. SARCOS, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, petitioner, vs. HON. RECAREDO CASTILLO, as Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur, and THE HON. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, respondents.

Sisenando Villaluz, Jr. for respondents. Cristeto O. Cimagala for petitioner.

FERNANDO, J.: Is the power of preventive suspension of a municipal mayor against whom charges have been filed still vested in the provincial governor? That is the novel question presented in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Such an authority he did possess under the former law. 1 Then came the Decentralization Act of 1967, which took effect on September 12 of that year. 2 What before could not be denied apparently no longer holds true. The statutory provision now controlling yields a contrary impression. The question must thus be answered in the negative. We hold that such a power has been withheld from the provincial governor and may no longer be exercised by him. Petitioner Domingo N. Sarcos, the duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, running as an independent candidate but winning, nonetheless, in the November 14, 1967 election, was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by respondent Recaredo Castillo, the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. 3 The act constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in petitioner allegedly "[conniving] with certain private individuals to cut and fell [timber] and [selling] the [timber] or logs so cut or felled for their own use and benefit, within the communal forest reserve of the Municipality of Barobo, Province of Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the government; ...." 4 In the answer of respondent Castillo as well as the other respondent, the Provincial Board of Surigao del Sur, there was an admission of the fact that as set forth in the petition on October 4, 1968, such an administrative complaint for such an alleged offense was indeed filed by respondent Governor with respondent Provincial Board. What was sought to be stressed in the answer, however, was that as early as April 18, 1968, a charge under oath for abuse of official power in consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by the Municipal Council of Barobo, Surigao del Sur. He was then given the opportunity to answer and explain within 72 hours, in an order of respondent Governor date May 21, 1968. The explanation offered by petitioner contained the following: "These logs which I caused to be hauled sometime within the month of January, 1968, were the same logs cut and tumbled down by the persons abovementioned within the communal forests of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, and which were seized by the patrolmen of the undersigned. The said logs were sold in order to raise funds for the purchase of the police uniforms and arms." 5 It was on the basis of the above administrative complaint that respondent Governor, according to the petition, ordered the "immediate suspension [ofpetitioner] from his position as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur; the same Administrative Order ... [containing] the immediate designation of Vice-Mayor [Brigido L. Mercader] of the same town as Acting [Mayor]." 6 Such administrative order for the preventive suspension of petitioner was admitted by respondent Governor and sought to be justified thus: "[Considering] that the acts charged against and admitted by the petitioner 'affects his official integrity,' as such Municipal Mayor, by his having taken the law into his own hands; ..., there was an urgent necessity to order the immediate 'preventive suspension' of the petitioner, in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, of Republic Act No. 5185, otherwise known as the 'Decentralization Act of 1967'." 7 The decisive issue therefore, as set forth at the outset of this opinion, is whether or not respondent Provincial Governor is vested with power to order such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of 1967, more specifically Section 5 thereof. For if no such authority exists, then whatever be the alleged justification for preventive suspension cannot validate the action taken by theGovernor. To assert otherwise would be to negate the rule of law.

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What does Section 5 provide? It opens with the categorical declaration: "Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the suspension and removal of elective local officials shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of this section." After setting forth in the next paragraph the grounds for suspension and removal of elective local officials, namely, disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, dishonesty, oppression, and misconduct in office, it continues: "Written subscribed and sworn charges against any elective provincial and city official shall be preferred before the President of the Philippines; against any elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary of the provincial board concerned; and against any elective barrio official before the municipal or city mayor or the municipal or city secretary concerned." Then comes the portion specifically dealing with preventive suspension. This paragraph reads thus: "Within seven days after the charges are preferred, the President, Governor, or Mayor, as the case may be, or his duly authorized representative, as provided in the preceding paragraph, shall notify the respondent of such charges. The President, Provincial Board and City or Municipal Council, as the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or falsity of the charges within ten days after receipt of such notice: Provided, That no investigation shall commence or continue within ninety days immediately prior to an election. The preventive suspension of the respondent officer shall not extend beyond sixty days after the date of his suspension. At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended officer, shall be reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until their completion, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to the fault, neglect or request of the suspended officer, in which case, the time of delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension: Provided, however, That if the suspended officer shall have been found guilty as charged before the expiration of the thirty days, his suspension, in the case of municipal and barrio officials, may continue until the case is finally decided by the Provincial Board." Considering that Section 5 leaves no doubt as to this particular paragraph governing exclusively the suspension and removal of elective local officials, it must be apparent why, as previously stated, respondent Provincial Governor lacks the authority to order the preventive suspension of petitioner. 1. Under the former law then in force which stands repealed by virtue of the Decentralization Act, 8 the provincial governor, if the charge against a municipal official was one affecting his official integrity could order his preventive suspension. 9 At present, the law is anything but that. A reading of the pertinent paragraph above quoted makes manifest that it is the provincial board to which such a power has been granted under conditions therein specified. The statutory provision is worded differently. The principle, that the deliberate selection of language other than that used in an earlier act is indicative that a change in the law was intended, calls for application. 10 2. This conclusion has reinforcement from a fundamental postulate of constitutional law. Public officials possess powers, not rights. There must be, therefore, a grant of authority whether express or implied, to justify any action taken by them. In the absence thereof, what they do as public officials lacks validity and, if challenged, must be set aside. To paraphrase a leading American decision, 11 law is the only supreme power under constitutional government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its function is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives. Here, clearly, no such authority is vested in the provincial governor. Instead, the statutory scheme, complete on its face, would locate such power in the provincial board. There would be no support for the view, then, that the action taken by the provincial governor in issuing the order of preventive suspension in this case was in accordance with law. 3. Moreover, any other view would be to betray lack of fidelity to the purpose so manifest in the controlling legal provision. It is fundamental that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 decided in 1909, it has been our constant holding that the choice between conflicting theories falls on that which best accords with the letter of the law and with its purpose. The next year, in an equally leading decision, United States v. Toribio, 13 there was a caveat against a construction that would tend "to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator." Then came the admonition in Riera v. Palmaroli, 14 against an application so narrow "as to defeat the manifest purpose of the legislator." This was repeated in the latest case, Commissioner of Customs v. Caltex, 15 in almost identical language.1awphil.t So it is in the United States. 16 Thus, in an 1898 decision, the then Justice, later Chief Justice, White minimized reliance on the subtle signification of words and the niceties of verbal distinction stressing the fundamental rule of carrying out the purpose and objective of legislation. 17 As succinctly put by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone: "All statutes must be construed in the light of their purpose." 18 The same thought has been phrased differently. Thus: "The purpose of Congress is a dominant factor in determining meaning." 19 For, to paraphrase Frankfurter, legislative words are not inert but derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed. 20 The same jurist likewise had occasion to state: "Regard for [its] purposes should infuse the construction of the legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of government and not merely as a collection of English words." 21 In the sixth annual Benjamin Nathan Cardozo lecture

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delivered by him, entitled "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes", he developed the theme further: "The generating consideration is that legislation is more than composition. It is an active instrument of government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to be achieved. It is in this connection that Holmes said, 'words are flexible.' Again it was Holmes, the last judge to give quarter to loose thinking or vague yearning, who said that "the general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down." And it was Holmes who chided courts for being 'apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law where those words import a policy that goes beyond them.' Note, however, that he found the policy in 'those words'." 22 It may be noted parenthetically that earlier, the United States Supreme Court was partial more to the term "objective" or "policy" rather than "purpose." So it was in the first decision where this fundamental principle of construction was relied upon, the opinion coming from Chief Justice Marshall. Thus: "The two subjects were equally within the province of the legislature, equally demanded their attention, and were brought together to their view. If, then, the words making provision for each, fairly admit of an equally extensive interpretation,and of one of which will effect the object that seems to have been in contemplation, and which was certainly desirable, they ought to receive that interpretation." 23 So, too, with his successor, Chief Justice Taney. Thus: "This construction cannot be maintained. In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the whole law, and to its object and policy." 24 It should not escape attention that the above excerpt was quoted with approval by the present Chief Justice Warren as late as 1957. 25 What is the purpose of the Decentralization Act of 1967? It is set forth in its declaration of policy. 26 It is "to transform local governments gradually into effective instruments through which the people can in a most genuine fashion, govern themselves and work out their own destinies." 27 In consonance with such policy, its purpose is "to grant to local governments greater freedom and ampler means to respond to the needs of their people and promote their prosperity and happiness and to effect a more equitable and systematic distribution of governmental powers and resources." 28 It is undeniable therefore that municipalities, as much as cities and provinces, are by this act invested with "greater freedom and ampler means to respond to the needs of their people and promote their prosperity and happiness." It is implicit in our constitutional scheme that full autonomy be accorded the inhabitants of the local units to govern themselves. Their choice as to who should be theirpublic officials must be respected. Those elected must serve out their term. If they have to be removed at all it should be for cause in accordance with the procedure prescribed and by the specific officials of higher category entrusted with such responsibility. It is easily understandable why as held in a leading case, Lacson v. Roque, 29 "strict construction of law relating to suspension and removal is the universal rule." As was further emphasized by Justice Tuason who penned the opinion: "When dealing with elective posts, the necessity for restricted construction is greater." Deference to such a doctrine possessed of intrinsic merit calls for due care lest by inadvertence the power to suspend preventively is given to officials other than those specifically mentioned in the act. For any other view would result in a dilution of the avowed purpose to vest as great a degree of local autonomy as is possible to municipal corporations. That would be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster the policy of the act. 1awphil.t 4. Lastly, the construction here reached, as to the absence of power on the part of provincial governors to suspend preventively a municipal mayor is buttressed by the avoidance of undesirable consequences flowing from a different doctrine. Time and time again, it has been stressed that while democracy presupposes the right of the people to govern themselves in elections that call for political parties contending for supremacy, once the election is over the equally pressing and urgent concern for efficiency would necessitate that purely partisan considerations be ignored, and if not entirely possible, be restricted to a minimum. The present litigation gives rise to the suspicion that politics did intrude itself. Petitioner Municipal Mayor, an independent candidate, and thus of a different political persuasion, appeared to have been placed at a disadvantage. It would be a realistic assumption that there is the ever present temptation on the part of provincial governors, to utilize every opportunity to favor those belonging to his party. At times, it may even prove irresistible. It is desirable therefore that such opportunity be limited. The statutory provision then should be given such a construction that would be productive of such a result. That is what we do in this case. To paraphrase Justice Tuason, we test a doctrine by its consequences. It could be said, of course, that to deny such a power to a provincial governor but at the same time to affirm the existence thereof insofar as the provincial board is concerned would not advance the cause of decentralization any. In answer, it suffices to note that the Decentralization Act having so recognized such an authority in the provincial board, the judiciary must perforce recognize its existence. Until after the legislature decrees otherwise, the courts have no alternative but to accord deference to such declared congressional policy. It may also be stated that the provincial board being a collective body, the first, second and third class provinces being composed of the provincial governor, the vice-governor and three other members elected at large by the qualified electors of the province, and that in the fourth, fifth, sixth and

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seventh class provinces having in addition to the provincial governor and the vice-governor two other members likewise elected at large, 30 there is a safeguard against the temptation to utilize this power of preventive suspension for purely partisan ends. What one person may feel free to do, fully conscious as he is that the authority belongs to him alone, may not even be attempted when such an individual shares such power with others who could possibly hold dissenting views. At any rate, there is a brake, which it is hoped would suffice on most if not all occasions. Such a restraining influence is indeed needed for the undeniable facts of the contemporary political scene bear witness to efforts, at times disguised, at other times quite blatant, on the part of local officials to make use of their positions to gain partisan advantage. Harassment of those belonging to opposing factions or groups is not unknown. Unfortunately, no stigma seems to attach to what really amounts to a misuse of official power. The truism that a public office is a public trust, implicit in which is the recognition that public advantage and not private benefit should be the test of one's conduct, seems tohave been ignored all too often. The construction of any statute therefore, even assuming that it is tainted by ambiguity, which would reduce the opportunity of any public official to make use of his position for partisan ends, has much to recommend it. 5. We hold, therefore, that under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967, the power of preventive suspension is not lodged in the provincial governor. To rule otherwise would be at war with the plain purpose of the law and likewise fraught with consequences far from desirable. We close with this appropriate excerpt from an opinion of Justice Holmes rendered on circuit duty: "The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the changeof policy that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for the courts to say: We see what you are driving at but you have not said it, and therefore, we shall go on as before." 31 WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are granted, the preventive suspension of petitioner by respondent Castillo annulled and set aside with the result that his immediate reinstatement to his position as Municipal Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, is ordered, without prejudice to any further proceedings to be taken by respondent Provincial Board in connection with the charge of misconduct and dishonesty in office against petitioner, respondent Provincial Board being strictly enjoined in the disposition of such administrative complaint to act strictly in accordance with the applicable law. Without costs.

SUBJECT: AMENDMENTS DOMINGO SARCOS, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur petitioners vs HON.RECARELO CASTILLO,Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur & the Hon.Provincial Board of Surigao del Sur respondents FACTS: Sarcos, an independent candidate, won in the 14 November 1967 elections, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur. Castillo charged Sarcos with misconduct and dishonesty in office. Such act alleged constituted connivance with certain private individuals, to cut and fell timber and selling of the timber cut, for own use andbenefit, within the communal forest reserve of the municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public and the government. As early as 18 April 196 there was already a charge under oath for abuse of official power in consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by Municipal Council of Barobo. It was on the basis of this administrative complaint that the Castillo filed petition ordering the immediate suspension of Sarcos from position as Mayor saying that the acts committed by mayor Sarcos affects his official integrity, the petition was in accordance with theSec.5 of RA 5185- Decentralization Act of 1967. ISSUES: WON Provincial Governor is vested power to order preventive suspension of MayorSarcos under RA 5185 HELD / RATIONALE: No. Castillo as governor lacks authority to order the preventive suspension of the Petitioner, Sarcos. According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly the paragraph dealing with preventive suspension: "The President, Provincial Board and City or Municipality Council, as the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or falsity if the charges within 1- days after receipt of such notice." It was the former law Sec. 2188 of Rev. Adm. Code which gives power to the Governor to order preventive suspension, however, it was already repealed by the Decentralization Act of 1967. The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a cause for the order byGovernor of the preventive suspension of the Mayor, being an independent candidate thus of a different political persuasion. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are then granted. The preventive suspensionorder by Castillo is annulled and set aside. Mayor Sarcos to be reinstated to hisposition.*The Decentralization Act, to which the decision in this case is based, amended /repealed Sec. 2188, Rev. Adm. Code. The former law provides that the provincial gorvernor, if the charge against a munucupola official was municipal

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official was one affecting his official integrity, could order his preventive suspension. It was repealed by the RA NO. 5185 Sec. 5 which provides that now it is the provincial board which has been granted the power to order preventive suspension. Comendador vs. De Villa Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court. Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail. Cases on constitutional law (Philippine casebook series) A historical and juridical study of the Philippine Bill of rights Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.

Comendador vs. De Villa (as chief of staff of the AFP) Right to bail of Military Personnel Facts: The case involves 4 consolidated cases of the officers of the AFP who are facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d etat on December 1-9, 1989:

G.R. No. 93177-petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus- questioning the conduct of the pre-trial panel and the creation of General Court Martial (GMC No. 14)

G.R. No. 96948-certiorari against the ruling denying them the right to pre-emptory challenge(or that the Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof.)

G.R. No. 95020-certiorari- against the respondent judge on the ground that he has no jurisdiction of GCM No. 14and no authority to set aside its ruling of denying bail to private respondents

G.R. No. 97454 -certiorari- against the decision of RTC in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objection are also raised.

Charges against them include mutiny, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and various crimes in relation to murder

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The pre-trail investigation (PTI) panel issued several letters of notice to the petitioners for counter-affidavit and of the affidavits of their witnesses. All were moved to delay and the petitioners contend that there was no pre-trail investigation done In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail and it was denied by GMC No. 14. The RTC granted him provisional liberty but he was not released immediately, pending the final resolution of the appeal to be taken. Then the RTC ruled that the right to bail covers military men facing court-martial proceedings

Issues: Whether there was violation of due process Whether or not the military personnel are entitled to bail, thus, WON there was a violation of the right to bail Held:

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to be heard when they were asked to submit their counter-affidavits to the PTI. They cannot claim that they were denied due process. Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence."

"even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction."

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.

However, a right to speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military, where the right to bail does not exist. Solicitor Generals explanation of the exception: The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people.the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, Neither does it violate equal protection because the military is not similarly situated with others. Dispositive part of the case: As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No.93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners.

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Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered released. ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE. No costs.

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971 FACTS: In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable. ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half. Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Morales vs Subido

On January 22, 2012

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Political Law Journals vs Enrolled Bill

Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelors degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the

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designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads: Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with exemplary record. Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter. HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

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