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Mike Holmes President, AOC Australia Chapter


EW in Australia

Overview of Australian Defence Priorities How Australia Procures EW Who the EW Players are Current/Projected Defence Programs with EW components


What sort of Defence Force does Australia need? The changing nature of threat is fundamentally reshaping the global defence environment - Australia is NO exception

Population Explosion

Non-State Actors

Transnational Actors

Non-State Actors Axis of Evil Weapons Proliferation

Information Security

Failed States

Source: Corporate Market & Competitive Assessment


Communism in North Korea, Islamic separatism, nuclear war & failed states all pose potential threats in Asia & the sub-continent

Threat of China seeking to expand political & military authority Tension over Taiwan Straits

North Korea
Hard-line communism from Kim Jong Ils regime Tension around Korean Peninsula

Asia Pacific
Islamic separatism acting as incubator for terrorism poses threat eg The Philippines Internal strife & corruption in Myanmar Thailand in dispute with Myanmar over illegal immigration Piracy & narcotics pose key threats to Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar & The Philippines

Continued rivalry between Malaysia & Singapore Both view the other as being expansionist Singapore reliant on Malaysia for water supply

Sub Continent
Nuclear threat between India & Pakistan over Kashmir

Indonesia East Timor

Islamic separatism acting as incubator for terrorism Focus on border protection

Papua New Guinea

Instability over recent national elections increase in crime

Instability over independence Concerns over oil royalties

Key security priorities include East Timor & border protection -4-

Source: Corporate Market & Competitive Assessment; S&P Working Group

Australias means of dealing with a range of threats has varied over the years from self-reliance to dependence on great & powerful friends
Beazley Govt (late 1980s) - 87 Defence of Australia document promoted self-reliance - Drive for Australian industry to support this policy - ADF forces focused on defence of Air/Sea gap Shift of strategic alliance from Britain to WWII (1939-1945) US with Greater level of Australian Command ANZUS of troops contributing to British War effort & significant industry production Whitlam Govt. (1972-1975) - Potential ejection of US bases - Nixons Guam doctrine ends US interventionist policy - Debate for self reliance

Sept 11th - Support of War on Terror - Moves to integrate US / ADF Force Structure - Potential negative impact for AII

WWI (1914-1918) Australian troops contribute to Imperial Forces Boer War (1901) Australian troops contribute to Imperial Forces Federation Reliance on UK

Korea (1950-1953) Malaya (1958-1964) Vietnam (1964-1972)


- Australia drawn into conflict with US on back of Nixons Domino theory on march of communism - Australia responds to all the way with LBJ - Marked increase in buying US equipment vs UK
-5Source; S&P Working Group


The changing nature of threat means our current strategic policy of Self-reliance is under challenge to reflect new political priorities of regional stability, border protection, & anti-terror protection

Current military strategy - Self reliance:

A self-reliant defence strategy means: focusing on maintaining numbers & defence capabilities in support of military operations to defeat enemies in the Air/Sea Gap maintaining a balanced Force Structure maintaining a broad range of global supply need for interoperability developing a sustainable local industrial base to adapt, modify & support equipment

Potential future military strategy - Expeditionary Warfare:

A strategy focused on Expeditionary Warfare would mean:

reduction in numbers required to support operations ie would be operating as part of global force less balanced Force Structure rationalised supply base drive to become integrated as part of coalition force (increased commonality) ie same equipment as US which would be more expensive - therefore we procure less no role to adapt & modify

Force Structure implications of Self-reliant strategy

Force Structure Implications of Expeditionary Warfare strategy

Force Structure decisions have been made around securing a position in the Air / Sea gap This has led to Procurement decision priorities in Air & Naval

A new strategy focused on foreign deployments will have major Force Structure implications

Source: Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force; 2002 Weston Creek statement; -6S&P Working Group

How big is Defence in Australia?

Overall, total funding for Defence will increase in 02-03 to $14.3bn (excluding capital use charge of $5bn) Governments Defence 2000 White Paper committed to an average annual real growth of 3% p.a.over the next 10 years Bi-partisan acceptance that Defence Spending needs to be increased in absolute terms to fund a physically larger Australian Defence Force (ADF) the increasing number of operational deployments requisite equipment

Source: DoD Press release of 14.5.02 regarding salient Budget figures.


What we are doing with the money!

Readiness for deployments in Iraq

ADF deployment as part of multi-national force ADF deployment Future deployments as part of multi-national force

Remote potential for deployments against North Korea Remote potential for deployments in Taiwan



Leadership of INTERFET operation in East Timor (Australian led) Bougainville Truce & Peace Monitoring group

RAN leadership of Persian Gulf Taskforce - Deployment of Special Forces in Afghanistan - RAAF Cooperation with USAF in Globalhawk & B707 deployments to Afghanistan & Pakistan

UN sponsored Cambodian Mine Action Centre

Solomon Islands International Peace Monitoring Team

Increased RAN deployments in Northern border protection


Source: Defence 2000; S&P Working Group


Note: of nearly 3000 personnel deployed to East Timor approx 2,500 were Australian

Australia and the United States of America

Since 1951, the ANZUS treaty has been our most significant military alliance & has been at the heart of our security arrangements with the US - EW plays a key role The alliance has seen the Australian / US security relationship evolve around 3 key areas
Diplomacy Diplomacy ANZUS is the accepted vehicle ANZUS is the accepted vehicle through which the Australian // US through which the Australian US security relationship is fostered -security relationship is fostered has expanded over the years to has expanded over the years to include: include: -- AUSMIN (official Australian // US AUSMIN (official Australian US annual security dialogue vehicle) annual security dialogue vehicle) -- ADAC (AUSMIN Defence ADAC (AUSMIN Defence Acquisition Committee) -- vehicle Acquisition Committee) vehicle to buy direct through AUSMIN to buy direct through AUSMIN -- Liaison with US Commander-inLiaison with US Commander-inChief Pacific Forces Chief Pacific Forces Intelligence Intelligence Provision of strategic intelligence Provision of strategic intelligence via Joint US // Australian via Joint US Australian Intelligence facility (Pine Gap) Intelligence facility (Pine Gap) Use of specialised Australian Use of specialised Australian capabilities to gain regional capabilities to gain regional intelligence eg to USN intelligence eg to USN Provision of Signals Intelligence Provision of Signals Intelligence via Defence Signals Directorate via Defence Signals Directorate facilities (eg Geraldton & facilities (eg Geraldton & Shoalhaven) Shoalhaven) Partner to UK/USA Signals Partner to UK/USA Signals Intelligence agreement (NZ & Intelligence agreement (NZ & Canada are additional partners) Canada are additional partners) Military Military Australia & the US have supported Australia & the US have supported each others security objectives each others security objectives both in the region & globally both in the region & globally eg LTGEN Cosgrove given eg LTGEN Cosgrove given international recognition in leading international recognition in leading INTERFET force in East Timor INTERFET force in East Timor Military to Military Training & Military to Military Training & Exchange eg USN cooperation Exchange eg USN cooperation Integration of ADF assets into US Integration of ADF assets into US command structure command structure

Source: P. Keating speech at Labour party conference in WA; article in Financial Review of 12.7.02 written by T Walker, S&P Working Group


Defence spending in Australia is declining as a % of GDP which has been consistent with trends in the US & UK (Australia is <1% of global defence)

Defence spending as a % of GDP Defence spending as a % of GDP

7 6 5

% of GDP

4 3 2 1 0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Australia UK US

US shows slight increase post 11/9

Source: Shephard A, Trends in Australian Defence; 1999 Defence Annual Reports 1997/98 - 2001/02; S&P Working Group

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Each budget category has shown growth over the same period - except for Strategic Policy
Defence budget by budget category 1987-2003 (A$m) Defence budget by budget category 1987-2003 (A$m)

16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 1987- 1988- 1989- 1990- 1991- 1992- 1993- 1994- 1995- 1996- 1997- 1998- 1999- 2000- 2001- 200288 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 20 01 02 03 Defence Operations Navy Army Air Force Strategic Policy Intelligence

Source(s): Shephard A, Trends in Australian Defence, 1999, Defence Annual Reports 1997/98 - 2001/02; S&P Working Group

Note: Army, Navy, AF includes acquisition & logistics, Science& Technology, Personnel & Superannuation; Defence Ops includes ADF exercises & old Forces Exec; - 11 -

Australias procurement & approvals process begins well before acquisition involvement
Strategy Development Govt. Departmental Advice Departmental Secretaries eg DoD& Depart. of PM & Committee on National Cabinet, Attorney Generals Dept. Security (SCONS)

National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC-C)

Endorsed Whitepaper

Classified & Unclassified Military Response Options (MROs)

Capability Development Capability considered & agreed by Cabinet Capability reviewed by Defence Committee DCIC Secretariat Defence Capability Investment Committee (DCIC) Review Head of Capability System Military Response Options (MROs)

Prepares Cost Capability Schedule Summary (CCSS) Acquisition (DMO) Cabinet approves project PDS &/or ITR issued by Project Office Project Board evaluates RFT responses Writes Source Evaluation Responses (SERs) DCIC (USM) endorse SER

- Capability Development Statement - Capability Options Document Defence Exec. consider / endorse SER Cabinet Contract

Approval Signature

Source: ADF Procurement process flowchart; S&P Working Group

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Note: >50 individual steps in entire process

The EW Players

Defence - Operational Joint EW Operational Support Unit - Provides EW mission programming and OFP updates 7 SIG EW Regiment - Mostly land operations (SIGINT/COMINT) RANTEWSS - Navy tactical EW support Defence - Support/Procurement Defence Science & Technology Organisation Airborne Self-Protection System Project Office Industry (Prime Contractors) BAE SYSTEMS TENIX Industry (Sub-Contractors & Overseas Companies with low presence) Raytheon Australia Avalon Systems Advanced Systems/ADI Thales Clough Engineering NR CEA Technologies Micreo
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Airborne Early Warning and Control - Wedgetail

Under contract 4 x AEW&C aircraft (Boeing 737-700) EW consists of full EW self-protection suite, plus ESM Electronic Support Measures (ESM) Subsystem Elta ALR-2001A, a derivative of the RAAF AP-3C ESM Electronic Warfare Self Protection Subsystem Laser & missile warning sensors, traditional chaff & flare countermeasures, plus directed IR countermeasures EW Suite Control (EWSC) provided by enhancement of HIDAS EWSC from BAE SYSTEMS Avionics (Stanmore) All end-user programming done in-country OFP support in-country for EWSC - sensors/EA equipment OFP support by OEMs

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F/A-18 (Hornet) Upgrade

HUG has multiple phases - work to date includes mostly avionics upgrade and radar EW is in Phase 2.3, which is currently un-funded HUG 2.3 project office has now been formed and is considering EW options, these include CMDS, EA and RWR CMDS CMDS will be the ALE-47, provided via FMS Electronic Attack No publicly stated plan Radar Warning Receiver ALR-67(v)3 ALR-2002 ALR-67(v)2 Upgrade

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F-111 Interim EWSP

Project has provided the following: CMDS upgrade (ALE-40) Pod based EA (ELTA EL/L-8222) RWR Upgrade (ALR-62(v)6/7) Integrated control panel (TERMA ALQ-213) Project is now largely complete Project Echidna (Phase 3) will later add upgraded RWR (ALR-2002A) and Missile Warner

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C-130H EWSP Upgrade

Designed to provide a level of EWSP, though non-integrated EWSP fitted to 4 of the 12 C-130H Upgrade earlier Project Apollo modification Upgrade comprises: RWR (Elisra SPS-1000(v)5) CMDS (ALE-47) MWR (AAR-47) Project is largely complete

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Air-Air Refuelling Capability

AARC has reached Life of Type (B707) Actual numbers of aircraft will be determined by tenderers EWSP is understood to be a requirement, though no details of the capability requirement have been released Project is close to RFT release

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US-Aus Project Arrangement (PA-10) - Collaboration on Aircraft Survivability Equipment

Under PA-10 Australia has/will purchase from the US the following equipment: ALQ-211 SIRFC ALQ-212 SIIRCM VVR-1 Laser Detection System Data will also be exchanged on CM techniques and technologies Extensive laboratory and field work to be undertaken Local industry involvement in most tasks

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Project Echidna

Echidna seeks to provide a variety of EWSP improvements for a variety of ADF aircraft types Echidna Phase 1 has three stages: Stage 1 is the full scale development of the ALR-2002 RWR Stage 2 is the competitive Initial Design Activity of an integrated suite for Echidna aircraft (C-130J, S-70A, CH-47, F-111) Stage 3 is the provision of ballistic protection for S-70A Echidna Phase 1A is the development of an EO CM development & validation laboratory Echidna Phase 1B is the development of an RF CM development & validation laboratory Echidna Phase 2 is the acquisition of EWSP for S-70A & CH-47, plus support infrastructure Echidna Phase 3 is the acquisition of ALR-2002A and a MWR for the F-111

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Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter

In 2001 the ADF selected the Eurocopter Tiger to provide the ARH capability The aircraft is being acquired with the extant EWSP suite, comprising: RWR (TWE) LWR (TWE) MWR (AAR-60) CMDS (Saphir-M) A UDF/PFMG is being developed by Australian Industry

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Nulka Active Missile Decoy US-Aus Joint Program

Nulka is a hovering decoy, designed to defeat RF guided anti-ship missiles Has been acquired by both Navies Common round which carries the RF payload Launch method is divergent (US uses modified Super RBOC, Australia has dedicated launcher) RAN has 14 ships Nulka equipped USN has in excess of 120 planned

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Land Projects
Airborne Surveillance for Land Operations Known as JP129, the project will acquire an uninhabited airborne vehicle for surveillance Operations over land but also out to 20 nm offshore Near all weather operation in day or night Potential to carry EW payloads is not stated but is an expected growth Future Soldier Extensive project to equip the soldier Closely mirrors UK and US programs Potential for personal ESM Project Bunyip Will acquire additional SIGINT/COMINT assets for a variety of ADF platforms EA also sought Will take advantage of existing Defence networks to share information

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Naval Projects

FFG7 (Guided Missile Frigate) Upgrade ESM upgrade to Rafael Sea Pearl system Collins Class Submarine ESM upgraded to Condor CS3701 for 2 vessels Mine Hunter Coastal Fitted with Australian Prism ESM system and chaff launcher(Superbarricade) 6 vessels total Sea Hawk Upgrade Added ESM (AES-210), MWR (AAR-54) and CMDS (ALE-47) Seasprite Helo for ANZAC ship Same EW fit as Sea Hawk

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