Annual Report - TCHRD - 2004

Human Rights Situation in Tibet
Annual Report 2004
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Old Tibetan man holding a copy of UDHR as sun cover on Human Rights Day in Dharamsala
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Table of Content
Executive Foreword Recommendations Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Development Right to Education
5 8 11 15 53
Civil and Political Rights

Civil Liberties Right to Information Freedom of Religion
67 71 95 115
Appendices
Appendix1 Appendix2 Appendix3 Appendix4 Appendix5 : : : : :
132 132 138 139 141 144
Map of Tibet
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Tibe Report Human Rights Stituation in Tibe t: Annual R eport 2004
Foreword Executive Foreword
Executive Foreword
Human Rights are rights that all persons hold by virtue of being human. Thus, they are not dependent upon the permission of the State, and they cannot be withdrawn by the State. Human rights are entitled to every person and are rights that everyone should recognize. They are guaranteed in the international human rights laws and standards. This is not the case for Tibetans in Tibet. Basic fundamental freedoms laid down in Chinas constitution and its various domestic laws have their limits. Overstepping those limits has serious consequences such as jail term or worse. Tibetans in Tibet have no liberty and freedom. Right now the people are very free, but free to experience unhealthy habits and unemployment by the environment they are in. The Tibetans are free to pursue any kind of economic activity. It is hard to ignore the lucrative money-making opportunities that Tibetans have come to see in the larger cities. However, it is also true that, with abundance of cash flow in Lhasa and the urban areas of Tibet, large number of Tibetans are getting caught up in unhealthy habits such as smoking, drinking, gambling, drugs and karaoke bars. Tibetans and non-Han Chinese are associated with barbarism and a threat to Chinas territorial integrity. Tibetans in their own home country have become victims of deep-seated prejudice. A carefully chiseled policy of denial of basic fundamental rights, freedoms and justice over a period of 45 years has led to a cultural genocide in Tibet. Human rights monitoring and protection has become an unusual challenge to the de facto impunity enjoyed by the Chinese government system. Questioning government policies could have serious consequences. Acquiring accurate information from the so-called ethnic minority regions of Tibet and Xinjang has become extremely difficult due to the secretive nature of operations and total lack of transparency. One of the most serious concerns of all is, Chinas indiscriminate use of the death penalty. Despite amendments to the Criminal Procedural Law in 1996, the continuous denial of the presumption of innocence and the right to own legal representation - many innocent people are cheated of fair trials. In addition, constant interference by government authorities in legal proceedings cast huge doubt on the independence of the judiciary. Similarly, Chinas (mis) use of the war on terror to clamp down on dissent has lead to grave human rights violations. The governments use of the term state secrets as reason not to reveal information makes it more difficult to protect human rights. A case in point is Trulku Tenzin Delek.1
TCHRD Press Release- 27/Oct/2004, www.tchrd.org
Tibe Report Human Rights Situation in Tibe t: Annual R eport 2004
Chinas White Paper, Progress in Chinas Human Rights Causes released on 30 March 2004 during the 60th session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR) in Geneva was no coincidence. Beijings newfound diplomatic shrewdness of this nature is not new to the international community. The hastily released White Paper seemed more of a retaliation to the US Resolution on Chinas human rights record at the UNHCHR than a genuine statement of facts. In the end the White Paper was criticized more for its rhetoric by human rights groups.2 Similarly, Chinas 6th White Paper on Tibet: Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet, released on 23 May 2004, echoed the same rhetoric with nothing new to offer. If the paper was a response to the Dalai Lamas proposal for Genuine Autonomy in Tibet, the Tibetan government-in-exile responded with the white paper cannot hide the true sad state of affairs of Tibet. Beijing hosted the visit of the Dalai Lamas representatives to China and Tibet for the third time in September 2004 - appearing to give a notion of an ongoing negotiation between the Tibetans and Chinese government. However, it also continues to restrict the Dalai Lamas international movements. After many years of prolonged holdup with pressure from Beijing, Moscow finally allowed the Dalai Lama to visit the country in November 2004. Japans announcement to allow the Tibetan leader to visit its country in April 2005 drew sharp protest from the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Human rights situation in Tibet did not improve in 2004. There was no let-up on many unpopular measures of control that went to describe the anxious nature of the political atmosphere. The resumption of the Strike Hard Campaign,3 the renewed emphasis on the Patriotic re-education campaign4 and the establishment of a re-education-through-labour camp in Ngari County in the Tibet Autonomous Region to check refugee flow5, are clear indications of continued suppression of the Tibetan people. As per TCHRD record by the end of December 2004, there continues to be at least 150 known political prisoners in the various prisons in Tibet.6 The government of Chinas announcement of the promulgation of Religious Affairs Provisions on November 30, 2004 of all religious groups in China from March 1, 20057 is a matter of serious apprehension for all Tibetans in Tibet. The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) sees this regulation as yet another measure of control put in place by the atheist regime. The regulation designed to keep-up with rapid socio-economic development when implemented, will see the ultimate closure of many local monasteries in Tibet. Religion is a way of life for all Tibetans and restrictions of this nature will deprive the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Chinese constitution. Tibetans still continue to be arrested for expressing their allegiance to the Dalai Lama as their spiritual and temporal head. Chinas atheist leadership distrusts all whose loyalties might be split, especially those for whom religion is of higher calling.
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TCHRD Press Release - 6/April/2004, www.tchrd.org TCHRD Press Release - 8/Nov/2004, www.tchrd.org 4 TCHRD Press Release- 8/Nov/2004, www.tchrd.org 5 TCHRD Press Release- 26/July/2004, www.tchrd.org 6 TCHRD, Human Rights Situation in Tibet: 2004, Annual Report, www.tchrd.org 7 Peoples Daily: 19 December, 2004
The Chinese Communist Partys overriding aim is social order. Its greatest fear is unrest. Religious and racial tensions are highest. The ethnic clashes in November 2004 between Hui Muslims and Han Chinese villages in Henan Province that left at least seven people dead, adds to the already explosive mixture of economic and social grievance. They are stark reminders of potential chaos and fragmentation underlying Chinas unstoppable economic rise. Conflicts of such nature cannot be ruled out in Tibet considering the discriminative character of Tibetans in all spheres of life. With the rapid explosion of economic growth, change in China is inevitable albeit Chinese characteristics. In March 2004, in a historic move, the word human rights, a taboo in China for many years, was incorporated into the Chinese constitution. The state official media hailed it as the first time ever. However, the two words fell short of any explanation leaving much room interpretation. It yet again questions Chinas sincerity in its efforts towards a more open and democratic society. As China grows more assertive about its position in the world, it is important that the world is conscious of the fact that China maybe a developing country, but is also a very determined one. It is still a regime that tolerates no opposition, deals brutally with dissent. It is one of the very few countries in the world today where there are no competitive elections, where saying the wrong thing can lead to life under house arrest or worse. It is rising quietly and gently but whether this rise will bring about change for the better is an open question. Governments around the world have an obligation to ensure that the rising giant rises with respect for human rights and democracy. This can only be possible through concerted efforts by world leaders.
Recommendations
To the government of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
Civil and Political Rights:

Civil Liberties:
Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights signed on 5 October 1998, and its two Optional Protocols; Incorporate in its domestic law a definition of torture that fully complies with the definition contained in the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT); Ensure the prompt, thorough effective and impartial investigation of all allegations of torture; Abolish all forms of administrative detention, in accordance with the relevant international standards; Provide a definition in Chinas Criminal Law for the expression endangering state security; Consider a moratorium on all executions of Tibet political prisoners; Revoke the death sentence on Trulku Tenzin Delek. Conduct a new and open retrial that permits Tenzin Delek access to independent legal representation. Allow freedom of movement of Tibetans wishing to leave or enter Tibet without restrictions of any sort; Grant the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to selfdetermination of the Tibetan people, so that Tibetans can freely choose their leaders and express their thoughts without fear of arrest or persecution.
Freedom of Religion
Review the role of Democratic Management Committee (DMC) and the use of patriotic re-education campaign in religious institutions; Release Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the XI Panchen Lama of Tibet, whose whereabouts are unknown since May 1995; Withdraw the compulsory education of books on political ideologies in monasteries and nunneries; Stop the persecution of religious figures through arrests, sentencing and restrictions; Respect Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR);
Recommendation
Right to Information:
Stop limiting the right to freedom of information; Allow for the free and unlimited access to radio, TV and the internet and all other sources of information; Undertake a review of the domestic legal system with a view to bringing it into line with international standards governing the right to freedom of opinion and expression; Take concrete legislative and administrative steps towards the implementation of the principle sanctioned by Article 35 of the Constitution (freedom of the press); Review the legal provisions of the Chinese Criminal Law and the Law of the State Secrets that is used to infringe upon the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and information; Make legal provisions for a number of mechanisms to address the problem of a culture of secrecy within the government; Provide a definition of state secrets in the domestic laws dealing with the right to access to information;
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:

Development
Respect the principles set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), particularly the right to self determination of the Tibetan people; Engage the Tibetan people in the development processes and ensure that their needs are taken into account in the management of natural resources; Encourage sustainable small-scale local projects that directly fulfill the basic needs of farmers and nomads in the Western Regions; Use the ICESCR instruments as a reference for discussing and addressing poverty issues; Stop the population transfer policy into Tibet; Stop the sinicization of the Tibetan people through economic, social and cultural policies;
Right to Education
Take steps in order to ensure that the 9-year compulsory education is free of charge for all Tibetan children; Take concrete measures in order to make schools available in sufficient quantity in the most remote areas of Tibet; Ensure that Tibetan children are guaranteed full opportunities to learn and study in their mother tongue as well as the opportunity to develop knowledge about their own culture; Carry out a thorough review of history textbooks with a view to eliminating any biased presentation of the history of Tibet;
To International Agencies and Governments:

Put the issue of human rights as a necessary pre-condition for all bilateral or multilateral talks with the Chinese government; Put pressure on China for concrete results on the ground with regard to the implementation of human rights treaties; Call upon China to release Gedhun Choekyi Nyima and all other political prisoners in Tibet; Demand that China take concrete steps towards the abolition of the death penalty; Urge China to allow free movement of the Tibetan people within or outside Tibet, especially of the exile returnees without fear of persecution or arrest; Urge China to engage in meaningful and constructive dialogue with the representatives of the Tibetan people; Urge China to involve the Tibetan people on all development projects in Tibet.
To Multinational Businesses and Corporations:

Ensure the Tibetan peoples participation in all stages of development projects; Undertake comprehensive social and environmental studies and impact assessments; Provide sustainable development initiatives that bring desired community benefits; Any project in Tibet must respect the sentiments and values of the Tibetan people.
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

China has always considered Economic, Social and Cultural Rights more important than Civil and Political Rights. This is clear, as China has chosen to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) but not the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Through its ratification of the ICESCR, China has an obligation to adhere to the principles set forth in the ICESCR. Article 1 (1) of the ICESCR states:
The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status.
In 2003, the Chinese government on ESC rights stated:
Adhering to the principle of putting people first, the Chinese government made new efforts to promote the all-round development of the urban and rural areas, regions, economy and society, and to enhance the peoples economic, social and cultural rights.1
Despite the Chinese governments claim of adhering to these principles, TCHRD has made certain observations that go contrary to the statements above, from research and information gathered from Tibet. TCHRD firmly believes that the focus of the impact of the Covenant must be on the ground and on how far individuals and groups like the Tibetans are able to enjoy the rights guaranteed in the Covenant or have the freedom to express their opinions without fear of reprisals. Denial of economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to receive education in ones own mother tongue, as well as policies and projects that involve forced evictions, often affect large sections of the population. Human rights cannot be fully realized unless and until people whose rights are at stake, not only become aware of those rights, but are empowered to seek, claim and defend them. It further recognizes that the call for action in defense of economic, social and cultural rights is more likely to be heeded when the individuals or people concerned can strike a chord between the denial of their rights and their deprived existence, and then to establish a link back to the ultimate legally binding duty of the government to respect, protect and fulfil those rights.
(www.china.org.cn/e-white/20040330)
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The Chinese governmental policies in Tibet claimed to be for the benefit of the local Tibetan population. On the contrary, there are serious concerns with regard to the protection of Tibetans as a people. Although development is happening and bringing some results, the underlying political significance attached to economic growth and progress of Tibet, prevents the benefits of development from trickling down to the Tibetan people. Furthermore, international governments and multinational companies in a rush to invest in the developmental projects in Tibet are largely failing to consider the needs and interests of the local Tibetan population. This has considerably contributed to the decline in the growth of the Tibetans standard of living. The following chapters on Development and the Right to Education2 will elucidate some of the violations of fundmental rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), of which China is a party to.
State of Education: A human Rights Perspective- Special Report by TCHRD, www.tchrd.org
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A nomad mother and son 2004 14
Development
Development
Introduction
The United Nations (UN) has defined the right to development as a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights law. It views development as a process in which fulfillment of civil and political rights and the freedom to participate in both the decision making processes and the enjoyment of the fruits of development in all spheres. Right to Development (RTD)1 places the human being at the center of development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has defined development as a comprehensive process directed towards the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms The Right to Development belongs fundamentally to all peoples, and originates in their right to selfdetermination. Article 1.2 of the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD) guarantees the full realization of the right of peoples to self-determination2, which includes the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources based on the principles of equity, justice, meaningful participation. In a 1986 speech to the UN General Assembly, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian has said, the two covenants International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)) have played a positive role in realising the purposes and principles of the UN Charter concerning respect for human rights. The Chinese government has consistently supported these purposes and principles.3 Both these covenants stipulate the right to self-determination. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has ratified, or acceded to 21 international human rights conventions including the ICESCR most of which reaffirm the Right to Development. China has not yet ratified the ICCPR signed in 1999. However, it has yet to adequately live up to its commitments under the agreements it has ratified, specifically the ICESCR, the Convention on the Rights of Child, and the Convention Against Torture. Following the Vienna Declaration, the right to development has been reinforced at the International Population and Development in Cairo (principle 3 of the Cairo Programme of Action), the World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (Article 213 of the Beijing Platform of Action), and the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg.
Right to Development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized 2 Self-determination means that peoples must enjoy the right to participate in the design and implementation of a genuine sustainable development policies 3 Human Rights in China, Beijing Review, 4 November 1991, p.43
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The PRC has emphasised the right to live and develop as the most urgent demand of the Chinese people.4 China also considers the right to subsistence as the most important of all human rights, without which other rights are out of the question.5 The provision of basic subsistence for all Chinese is considered the greatest achievement of the Chinese Communist revolution, the fundamental condition for which was the preservation of national independence and state sovereignty and the freedom from imperialist subjugation.6 Only when exploitation is eradicated, production boosted, and people are free from hunger and coldness, can primary rights to existence and development be obtained.7 The Third Work Forum on Tibet held in 1994 put forward key strategic policies on accelerating Tibets development and safeguarding social stability. Hence, the forum is considered as the starting point and a new milestone for Tibets development. Chinas Constitution and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of 1984 provides for Tibets autonomy in areas of politics, economy, religion, culture, economic undertakings, natural resources, education and others. Chinas White Paper on Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet released by the Information Office of the State Council on 23 May 2004 has said, In the past 40 years, the Tibet Autonomous Region has fully exercised autonomy in economic and social development in accordance with the law, and formulated and implemented Tenth Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development in light of Tibets reality. It has independently arranged its economic and social development projects, and has thus guaranteed the rapid and healthy progress of Tibets modernisation drive and the development of Tibets society and economy in line with the basic interests of the Tibetan people The ordinary people in Tibet are the direct beneficiaries of all the support, aid and policies. The recurrent theme in Beijings discourse on Tibet has been its developmental and beneficial role in Tibet. Often, the Chinese government has attempted to negate criticism of its human rights record by asserting that the Tibetan people have benefited as a result of the development policies implemented by Beijing authorities. Through its policies and propaganda, constitutional guarantees and international legal provisions to which it has committed, Beijing claims to accelerate economic and social development and to ensure equal right to development for its citizens. However, TCHRD research, corroborated by refugee testimonies and other research materials on Tibet, confirms a pattern of the violation of the right to development of the Tibetan people. While China claims to prioritise economic rights for its people, it has failed to employ rights-based and need-based approach to development in Tibet. The violation of Tibetans right to development occurs in the context of a calculated failure to apply real autonomy in the region where effective Tibetan participation is denied and policy-making power at all levels are not devolved. Secondly, Chinas economic and development policy in Tibet is laden with stability concerns. Thirdly, Beijing has opted for a top-down-approach with regard to its development
Human Rights Progress in China, PRC State Council Information Office, Beijing, Dec. 1995, translated in FBIS-CHI-96112 5 Human Rights in China, 8 6 Ibid. 9 7 Ibid, 12
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Development
policy and implementation mechanism. Fourthly, instead of being the main beneficiaries of Chinas development, the majority of Tibetans have remained marginalized and discriminated against in all spheres of life. China is bound by Agenda 21 to provide rights to minority in terms of involving in policy and strategic decisions. The section 20.46 of Chinas Agenda 21 has said, Mechanisms should be set up to allow minority nationalities, and minority nationality districts to participate at State or local levels in the process of formulating policies and strategies concerning sustainable development, as well as their implementation.8 Similarly, section 20.50 states that the right to autonomy of the minority nationalities to manage their land and other natural resources should be protected by law. National minority citizens should be given a greater role in policy-making concerning economic development, environmental protection, and natural resource utilization in their respective regions. However, in reality, the situation is different as the central authorities in Beijing make all the decisions and formulate all the strategies without taking into account participation and an assessment of the local inhabitants. The Western Development Strategy (WDS) launched in June 1999 pledges more effort to develop western parts of the country. The key projects include building the Qinghai-Tibet railway; transmitting electricity and natural gas from western areas to the east; protecting natural forests, grasslands and rivers; promoting elementary, occupational and higher education; fostering specialized farming; setting up mining bases; building tourist facilities with local characteristics; improving infrastructure in large cities; and expanding the wide-band digital transmission network.9 Beijing uses economic growth and development as an antidote to Tibetan nationalism. Its economic policies are fueled by an underlying agenda to further dilute the Tibetan population and to intensify the process of sinicisation in Tibet. Chinas Fourth Tibet Work Forum held in June 2001 and the Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2005) of TAR endorses top down approach to development in Tibet. Despite provisos and avowals of real autonomy in Tibet, the Beijing government formulates economic policy for Tibet, which in the end is devoid of meaningful participation by Tibetans. The amended Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of February 2001 ensures that the development of Ethnic Autonomous Regions (such as TAR) will be carried out under the unified plans of the central authorities in accordance with market demand. Through all its economic policies and provisions, China continues to seek to integrate Tibet into the rest of China by increased migration of the importation of people, ideals and models from China. The developmental role of the Chinese Government in Tibetan regions violates many of its international legal commitments. Tibetans have found themselves pauperized by the regional development strategies antagonistic to many of the needs of the region. Furthermore, the broad principles of the current economic strategy, intensified under the 1999 Western Development Strategy perpetuate many of the structural features that have led most Tibetans into their current poverty trap. Of additional concern is the fact that
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Available at www.acca21.cn/indexe12.html Breakthroughs planned for Nations Western Development, Peoples Daily Online, www.english.peopledaily.com.cn
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the Chinese government is seeking out foreign aid and investment to support various elements of its current strategies.10 In contrast to official reports of rapid economic growth and improved subsistence and development rights, the actual condition of Tibetans tells a different story. By any measure Tibetans are poor, with low Human Development Index levels, with evidence of systematic exclusion, deprivation and discrimination in all areas of life. Large-scale development in Tibet, more specifically the Western Development Strategy has rarely benefited local Tibetans. Money spent on Western Development generally has supported non-Tibetan businesses and Han Chinese immigrants or builds unproductive infrastructure and aids in resource extraction. New highways, dams, mineshafts, and wellheads funnel natural resources out of Tibet and bring tens of thousands of non-Tibetans in to work on such projects, leaving a legacy of environmental harm and social dislocation that falls most heavily on its inhabitants.11 It is the human development of the Tibetan people that is most needed, rather than the development of resources. As the so-called economic growth circumvents majority of the Tibetans, the growth is concentrated on the state sector or on hard infrastructures such as trade, transport, services, and government and communist party administration. The productive sectors like agriculture, mining and industry, are stagnant or growing much slower than the economy in general. Therefore, since over 80 percent of the Tibetan population is nomads and farmers they have been marginalized from the economic growth. This has resulted in inequalities between urban and rural population and in the urban areas between Han immigrants and Tibetan population. After 20 years of central government efforts that include generous state subsidies, the TAR has continued to remain Chinas poorest administrative unit.12 Systematic discrimination in the spheres of employment, health, housing, education and political representation continues to restrict Tibetan involvement and participation in the development of their own country. The discrimination and population influx of Han Chinese has denigrated and marginalised the status of Tibetans. The real situation in Tibet, in terms of socio-economic conditions and eradication of poverty, has been diluted through exaggerated claims of economic development and falsified figures of prosperity. Gyaltsen Norbu, the former TAR Chairman, said in 1997, We should do away with this unhealthy trends in boasting and exaggeration and hiding the truth from the higher levels in the work of aiding the poor.13 Hence, the governments denial, censorship and falsification of facts violate peoples right to know (Ch: zhiqing quang) and further impedes in presenting the actual situation to the world.
Andrew Fischer, Poverty by Design: Economics of Discrimination, Canada Tibet Committee [CTC], August 2002 The Milarepa Foundation and Project Underground, Raiding the Treasure House: Oil and Mineral Extraction in Chinas Colonisation of Tibet, www.milarepa.org 12 June Teufel Dreyer, Economic Development in Tibet under the Peoples Republic of China, Journal of Contemporary China (2003), 12 (36), August, 411? 30 13 Text of Report on the work of the government by Gyaltsen Norbu, Chairman of the TAR, delivered at the Sixth Regional Peoples Congress on 15 May 1997 published by the regional newspaper from Tibet Xizang Ribao, source Xizang Ribao, Lhasa, in Chinese, 29 March 1997, pp1.2
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Development
Therefore, the development policies in Tibet has failed to benefit the Tibetans and this failure has originated from several areas: economics are viewed and used as political control; contradiction between official provisions and actual implementation; the use of a top-down development approach; urbanoriented rapid growth strategies resulting in income inequality; population transfer programs causing marginalisation and discrimination of the Tibetan population; denial of meaningful local participation, disregard of local interests in the development process and exaggeration of the actual situation through questionable figures.
Development: Policies and Practicalities

The process of development and the right to development is wound up with freedom. Development is conceptualised as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.14 This conception of development is particularly powerful in the case of Tibet, where non-participation of Tibetans in the processes of development and their lack of basic freedom has led to inertia in the state of development in Tibet and a disintegration in the Tibetan peoples quality of life. Chinas White Paper on Regional Autonomy has advocated that the central government has exercised full autonomy in economic and social development. Under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Declaration on the Rights of People Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, states are duty bound to protect the rights of ethnic minorities in their political, economic, cultural, religious, educational and social life.15 The United Nations General Assembly has stated that in order to achieve social development, governments will make a renewed commitment to effective, transparent and accountable governance and democratic institutions that are responsive to the needs of people and enable them to take an active part in decision-making about priorities, policies and strategies.16 Two models of development in Tibet were discussed in the 1980s. One model of economic development advocated that Tibetans should be trained and encouraged to take leading roles in the TAR market economy and modernization process. The rapid development would be tempered somewhat, but the citizens of the minority autonomous area would be the primary beneficiaries and active participants of economic growth. In the other model, rapid development in Tibet would be emphasised with the door being open to all Chinese without restraints. Subsequently, Han Chinese with experience in rapid growth and economic reforms would play the leading role in economic development, particularly in the early period. The debate over these alternatives was settled in the mid-1980s when China opted for the second model.
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Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1999 Statement by Mr. Sita, Advisor of the Chinese delegation, on Item 14 at the 59th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 14 April 2003, Geneva 16 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the whole of the twenty-fourth special session of the General Assembly UN Doc. A/ S-24/8/Rev.1
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At Chinas Third Work Forum on Tibet held in 1994, a paradigmatic shift in Chinas development policy on Tibet took place when stronger emphasis was laid on security control through economic development. The social determinist strand in Chinese Marxism held a viewpoint that people who have evolved to a higher economic plane would no longer be tempted by irredentist notions.17 The former TAR Party Secretary of Tibet, Mr. Chen Kuyian, said that through economic development, people would become rich and give up their purpose of splitting the country.18 The report of the Fourth Tibet Work Forum of June 2001 also averred that economic development could not take place without stability. In 1980, the then general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Yaobang, visited Tibet. He acknowledged that the Chinese rule in Tibet had done more harm than good. He advocated the empowerment of the Tibetans through handing back most of the decision-making power to the Tibetans and the reduction of Chinese cadres. Unfortunately it was not long before Beijing reverted to its old development pattern on Tibet. Beijings logic is that since Tibet lacks quality human resources, it is the prerogative of the Chinese to help Tibetans develop and progress. China continues bringing in skilled Chinese personnel or pioneers to Tibet, to help in the development of Tibets economy.19 A series of economic reforms were introduced to facilitate the migration of Han populations willing to seek their fortunes in the TAR. These included simplified legal procedures for Han entrepreneurs, more flexible work arrangements for Han professionals, and the declaration of Lhasa as a special economic zone.20 The result has been a huge influx of non-Tibetan migrant labourers and business people. At this time, the majority of residents in Lhasa are Han Chinese and other towns are moving in that direction. China has talked about encouraging Tibetan participation, devolving policy-making power, and the importance of real autonomy, but in practice Tibetans are totally neglected. Tibetans have no role to play in the market economy of Tibet, which is practically under direct control and command of the PRC. Since the launch of the Western Development Strategy in 1999, China extracted Tibets natural resources for their own needs and channeled coal, oil, natural gas and other mineral resources into its industries in the eastern coastal region. The biggest benefit seemed to go to Chinese migrants living in the region and not the local residents leaving the chasm between rich and poor wider than ever, according to an article of USA Today dated 19 September 2003.21
Robert Barnett, Chen Kuyian and Marketisation of Policy Chen Kuiyian, Requirements and Hopes for the Third Working Meeting on Tibet, 28 June 1994, Xizang de Jiaobu, 1999, pp.194, 196-197 19 The Situation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Tibet, Written Statement submitted by the Federation of Associations for Defence and Promotion of Human Rights, an NGO in consultative status, Economic and Social Council, General E/CN.4/2003/NGO/50, 28 February 2003, Commission on Human Rights, Fifty ninth session, Item 10 of the provisional agenda. 20 Arthur N. Holcombe, The Impacts of Economic Reform and Opening Up Policies on Local Ethnic Population Living Standards in China: The Case of Tibet, August 2001 21 The Right to Development, written statement submitted by the Transnational Radical Party, a non-governmental organization in general consultative status, 2 February 2004, Commission on Human Rights, Sixtieth Session, Item 7 of the provisional agenda
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Development
The Chinese authorities have chosen the easiest and the most destructive path towards the development of Tibet, which basically means a huge investment in the administrative section, while supporting and maintaining a large population of Chinese settlers, who feed on state subsidies and support. In return, Tibets natural resources from timber, oil and gas, minerals and power are transferred to supply Chinese industries outside Tibet thus making the authorities and Chinese industries as the main beneficiaries of Tibetans resources. From the human security perspective, the developmental discourse and policies shift its emphasis on nationalistic goals to meeting basic needs of people. A condition of existence must be created where human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of ones community is realised. However, due to strong security interests of Beijing in the TAR, it is clear the Tibetan development policies reflect the concerns of the central authorities, as opposed to meeting the development needs of the Tibetan people. Chinas development model and logic is based on Chinese experiences and conditions, assumes the presence of common processes and features throughout the country. 22 Implicitly this model ignores the possibility that differences in Tibets social and natural conditions can be of value in determining the model and nature of development.
Western Development Strategy

The western region of China comprises 10 autonomous regions and provinces and one municipality including Tibet. In June 1999, Chinas former President Jiang Zemin officially launched the Western Development Strategy [Ch; xibu da kaifa] in which the government intended to reduce the disparities between coastal and interior regions in China23, and spur the overall development of Chinas western regions in an ecologically sustainable manner. There are five major components in this strategy infrastructure construction, environmental protection and improvement, adjustment of the industrial structure, promotion of science, technology and education and further economic reform and open door policy. The launch of the WDS has in some ways coincided with the success of East Timors struggle for selfdetermination and NATOs intervention in Kosovo. Mr. Jiang Zemin, emphasized the close relation between the WDS and national unity and social stability of Tibet. A Chinese economist, Hu Angang, echoed similar concerns, The worst case scenario - and what were trying to avoid - is China fragmenting like Yugoslavia. Already, regional [economic] disparity is equal to - or worse than - what we saw in Yugoslavia before it split. Therefore, it is apparent that the WDS has an underlying political agenda to maintain stability as well as to further integrate the restive regions of the west into China.
Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR), Environment and Development in Tibet; A Crucial Issue , 2003 23 The Western Development Strategy is reportedly launched to combat widening gap between the eastern coastal and inner western provinces
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In practice, the combined forces of polity and economy has raised the level of urban wealth in Tibet, and consequently increased the urban/rural poverty gap. Moreover, it gave little impetus to economic production or to the primary or secondary sectors, while at the same time diverted economic control towards the increasing population of Chinese immigrants in the area. Robert Barnett, a Tibet scholar and a Lecturer in Modern Studies at Columbia University in New York, called this economic policy as using the methods of the command economy to engineer socio-political results. The two most politically restive regions in Chinas west Tibet and Xinjiang are also the most distant from Beijing. It has become essential for China to stabilize these regions and to increase control. The effects of globalisation combined with strategic and military concerns have acted as additional impetus. Beijing believes that economic development and improved transportation can solve nationality problems and will help consolidate control. Under the umbrella of achieving stability, the authorities violate many fundamental human rights and freedom of the Tibetan people. Chinas economic revolution, which has transformed the far east of this massive country, is now moving west with international capital and technology on a scale never before seen in these isolated regions. The object is Tibets natural resources the flecks of gold locked in the dried-up seabeds; the deposits of copper, zinc, and other minerals; and the rich fields of natural gas and oil. China is pursuing these resources to fulfill its own national development goals, goals not shared by the people of Tibet.24 Thus, economic profit from the western region is another propelling factor behind the launch of WDS. The role of western regions is essentially as a resource provider to facilitate development in the central and eastern regions by transferring natural resources from west to east. The WDS is described as a leap over model of development for Tibet, whereby the Beijing government will provide special assistance to overcome the regions backwardness.25 The target looks difficult to achieve as investments in local agriculture and livestock, as well as soft infrastructure including health, education, employment and local participation have been given the least priority. Little of the development largesse is trickling down to the 80 percent of Tibetans living in rural areas. WDS is rather focused on investment in hard infrastructure such as highways, railways, pipelines, mineral extraction, dams, power stations and irrigation facilities. The benefits of the WDS have not been accessible to the large majority of ethnic rural Tibetans. Rather, they have been oriented more towards urban sector and have become a source of additional employment resulting in income disparities between Chinese migrants and local Tibetans. It is crucial that the development of any kind should prioritise capacity building of Tibetans. Chinas population transfer policy under the banner of development further exacerbates the marginalisation of Tibetans and has the potential to ultimately erode the essence of Tibetan culture and identity. Lama Dorjee, a 38-year-old farmer from Bugod Village, Gonjo County, Chamdo Prefecture reported to TCHRD about impacts that highway construction has in his native area. Lama Dorjee said,
The Milarepa Fund and Project Underground, Raiding the Treasure House: Oil and Mineral Extraction in China s Colonization of Tibet, www.milarepa.org 25 Initial Reports on Fourth Work Forum, Tibet Information Network (TIN) News Update, 27 July 2001
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In April 2004, the Chinese authorities started to broaden the road in my area into a highway, approximately 120 km in length. The highway project has made the farmers anxious, as it requires covering the farmland of many farmers. Many farmers lost their land to the highway project. Yet most of the farmers are frightened to raise their concerns to the authorities. The 400 odd farming families in the area have sustained themselves for many generations by growing grain, mustard, beans, potatoes etc in their fields. The objective behind building the highway is to transport timber. There are lots of trees in Sa-ngan Med area in Gonjo County. By building the highway, the Chinese can easily transport the timber. The Chinese have already cut thirty percent of the trees in the past and when the highway becomes functional, they can easily transport the rest. 26
Chinas WDS faces significant dual challenges of policy-making and policy implementation. This can be seen, first in decision-making tensions inside the political centre involving political elites and intrabureaucratic negotiations over the WDS; and second, in central-local political tensions over WDS policy implementation. Cumulatively, the tensions hinder the effectiveness, consistency and coherence of this latest regional development initiative in China. Since the formal initiation of the WDS in 1999, the government has attempted to institutionalise the decision-making, policy review, administration, and program/project evaluation processes for the WDS by establishing a three level27 core decision-making structure, which consists of three main levels.28 The core level formulates policies and strategies of the WDS without consulting the Tibetans of their needs and aspirations. The most important and necessary precondition for successful WDS in Tibet is the active participation of Tibetans themselves. At present Tibetan people are not free to speak their minds, and usual methods of consultation, surveys and appraisal will not work reliably in Tibetan areas as long as Tibetans feel the omnipresence of state power which makes them afraid to speak their minds.29 Where freedom of expression is restricted as in Tibet, Tibetans have neither a say nor a part in policy decisions affecting their development and economic rights. A former aid worker reported to Tibet Information Network (TIN), a London-based human rights monitoring agency, that Chinas development policy could have been dropped out of the sky. The worker said, This policy is just the latest in a series of centrally generated initiatives, and as usual, local input was zero.30 In this context, top-down policies based on a political rather than developmental agenda have tended to exclude the local inhabitants of western regions from participation in the shaping of their environment and in the development of their economy. The WDS has so far failed to deliver appropriate and much needed development to the Tibetans.
Farmers anxious over Highway Project, TCHRD Human Rights Update, at http;//www.tchrd.org/hrupdate/2004/ hr200407.htm#anxious 27 The Office of the Western Region Development Leading Group is at the base of this core structure. At the next level is the Western Region Development Leading Group. At the highest level are the Party elite of Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongju and Wen Jiabao 28 Gregory T Chin, The Politics of Chinas Western Development Initiative in Chinas West Region Development; Domestic Strategies and Global Implications, edited by Ding Lu d William A.W. Neilson 29 ibid. 30 Chinas Great Leap West, at www.tibetinfo.com
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Population Transfer: Impacts

Population transfer is defined as the movement of people as a consequence of political and/or economic processes in which the State government or State-authorised agencies participate. Population transfer has been condemned as prima facie unlawful and violative of a number of rights affirmed in human rights and humanitarian law for both transferred and receiving population.31 Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provided that the occupying powers shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. The UN Special Rapporteur on Population Transfer has stated in their reports that population transfer constitutes a violation of basic principles of conventional and customary international human rights laws. While the principles of international law concerning population transfers address the rights of the subject group of transfers, it has also been clarified that population transfers cannot be used as a policy which threatens the identity, culture and livelihood of a minority group living in an area in which the transfers are purported to be made. According to Chinas 2000 population census, China has a population of 1.26 billion in 31 provinces and municipalities and autonomous regions. About 38.9 of Chinas population is in the eastern region, and 28.1% in the west region (including Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjian). The provincial population ranges from 92.56 million in Henan Province, 90.79 million in Shangdong Province, and 86.42 million in Guangdong province to 5.18 million in Qianghai province and 2.62 million in Tibet. Chinas policy and practice of populating Tibet with people of non-Tibetan origin is the most serious threat facing Tibet. The Dalai Lama, the Tibets leader in exile, has stated in an interview with the International Commission of Jurist on 3 December 1996 in Dharamsala, The most serious threat to the survival of Tibets culture and national identity is presently Chinas population transfer program, which is reducing the Tibetans into an insignificant minority in their own land at an alarming rate. The Chinese government has consistently rejected allegations that it is practicing a policy of population transfer into Tibet. Yet Chinese policy statements and other evidence confirm that the increasing influx of Chinese into Tibetan areas has resulted from government policies and programmes to transfer Chinese, particularly cadres and professionals, and ordinary Chinese. Over the past decade and particularly after 1992, state policies of administrative, economic and infrastructural measures have facilitated and further encouraged the migration of Chinese, including less skilled workers and petty workers, to Tibet.32 The Third Work Forum in 1994 officially confirmed the population transfer policy. Gyaltsen Norbu, the then Chairman of the TAR, reiterated the policy when he called to get qualified personnel to Tibet through various channels and transfer a certain number of skilled workers here.33 The Fourth Tibet Work Forum of June 2001 formed 10,000 cadres into work groups for agricultural and pastoral
31
UN Sub-Commission resolution 1990/17; 1991/28; 1992/28, 1993/34. See also Meindersma, Legal Issues surrounding Population Transfers in Conflict Situations, Netherlands Institute Law Rev., Vol XLI, 1994, 31-84 32 International Commission of Jurist , Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, December 1997, p.119 33 Address of 15 May 1995, Xizang Raibao, 8 June 1995, SWB FE/2363 S2/1-16, 24 July 1995
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areas to rectify and improve grass-roots party organizations.34 In June 2002, Chinas official news agency Xinhua reported that new policies had been adopted to send more government cadres, soldiers, and skilled people to Tibet and other western regions in order to support development. Over the years, China has tried to lure Chinese migrants to western regions including Tibet by offering them incentives and job opportunities, higher wages and retirement pensions, relaxed family planning regulations along with various income supplements and financial incentives. The state relaxation of hukou (household) registration system and the increase in massive infrastructure projects in the Tibetan region has increased the influx of Chinese settlers. Many Tibetans have blamed the unrestricted flow of non-Tibetan migrant labour for the lack or loss of job opportunities. Experts like Goldstein, Arthur Holcombe cite Chinas present development policies as responsible for influx of Chinese immigrant. China has also been accused of hiding the actual number of Chinese in Tibet by not requiring many of the Chinese floating population to register and throughdeliberate misinformation and the withholding of information.35 Ignoring the unregistered floating population and the PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) presence, variously estimated at between 100,000 and 300,000, none of who are counted in census statistics, Chinese officials proclaimed that the population of the TAR was well over 90% Tibetan.36 The population transfers have had great impacts on development process for ethnic Tibetans. The policy is viewed as being central to the governments integration of the Tibetan economy into the Chinese economy. The Tibetans have been deprived of and discriminated against in their access to land, food and employment thereby threatening their livelihood. Tibetans are becoming a minority in their own land, excluded from effective participation and have not benefited from the so-called development. Chinese-sponsored infrastructure projects have mainly been directed to encourage Chinese settlement, fulfil military objectives and to expedite resource extraction. There are fundamental impacts of the population transfer policy. First, Tibets ecology in no way can support such a huge influx of population, especially if this population chooses to live the consumptive lifestyle characteristic of Chinese cities. No calculation has ever been made as to how many human beings the plateau can sustain without degradation and overload. Secondly, the practical realities of Chinese development also means that the Tibetan people will not only become a minority in their own land, but a marginalized, excluded, repressed, and unrepresented minority. Thirdly, threatening Tibets environment threatens the health and well being of the 85% of Asia that gets its waters from the Tibetan plateau.37
June Teufel Dreyer, Economic Development in Tibet under the Peoples Republic of China, Journal of Contemporary China (2003), 12 (36), August 411?30 35 According to a cadre in the Ministry of Public Security in charge of household registration. Renmin Ribao, SWB FE/ 1332 B2/6, 18 March 1992. Chinese officials have stated that most Chinese seen in Tibet are part of the floating population. Xinhua, 22 July 1995, SWB FE/2365 G/7 26 July 1995 36 Cited in (no author), An influx deemed good for Tibets economic development? Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 February 1998, p.29 37 DIIR, Environment and Development in Tibet: A Crucial Issue, 2003
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The completion of the railway project from Qinghai to Tibet will further increase migration of Chinese settlers into Tibet. The Environment and Development Desk [EDD] of the Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR) has expressed concern in its report entitled Environment and Development in Tibet: A Crucial Issue about the tremendous population pressures in Lhasa and its adjacent areas with the arrival of railroad. The same report provides information on the prediction made by the TAR authorities about the expansion of Lhasa City from the current 53 sq.km to 272 sq. km in the next 15 years. This indicates Beijings plan to relocate an even larger number of immigrants from China. In a latest attempt to expedite development of Tibet, China joined hands with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to train thousands of senior professions for the countrys impoverished western region. During the 2002-2004 period, the two sides will conduct investigations, hold seminars and initiate 57 training courses to train a total of 1,050 people at home and 345 others abroad. The program will also invite a total of 29 overseas experts.38 Bringing in permanent-brand personnel is very important, while developing talents of a migratory bird type is also a good strategy.39 It is true that many of those who migrate to the western regions including Tibetan areas, are not high quality professionals. These migrants are traders, farmers, cadres and administrators who are in direct competition with Tibetans for economic opportunity, and in many cases they do win out. Tibet is a politically sensitive region where occurrence of peaceful pro-independence demonstrations is quite common causing stability concerns for the Beijing authorities. Therefore, in order to enforce control mechanisms, the migrants consisting of soldiers and paramilitary police serve as operators of an elaborate state apparatus of control and punishment. As the Chinese authorities assume control over the economy, the Chinese language has become the language of commerce and administration. The Tibetan language has become a minority language and is even secondary in the education system. Education, an integral instrument in the preservation of culture, actually discriminates against the local population. Discriminatory practices resulting from massive population transfer challenge and sidelining of Tibetan language challenge not only the employment opportunities but also the Tibetan cultural autonomy.
Railway Project: Implications

In 1994, Beijings leaders discussed a project linking Lhasa City the heart of Tibet with the rest of China by rail. During Chinas Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), route surveys and feasibility studies on railway to Lhasa were conducted. The Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) allocated budget for construction of a railway line between Gormo to Lhasa.40 The Plan also underlined three other important
China, UNDP to train professionals for Western Regions Accelerated Personnel Training Vital to Western Development, Peoples Daily, June 07, 2000, http:// english.peopledaily.com.cn/200006/07/eng20000607_42446.html 40 Environment and Development Desk (EDD) of DIIR, Chinas Railway Project: Where will it take Tibet?
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projects along with the railway project: west-to-east gas transfer, west-to-east power transmission and south-to-east water diversion. Chinas Ninth Five-Year Plan earmarked a budget to undertake a series of studies on the feasibility of this project, Number One Survey and Design Institute of Chinas Ministry of Railways were instructed to prepare a blueprint for a Gormo-Nagchu-Lhasa Route and a Lanzhou-Nagchu-Lhasa Route, and Number Two Survey and Design Institute for a Chengdu-Nagchu-Lhasa Route and a Dali-NyintriLhasa Route.41 In February 2001, the Central authorities in Beijing reviewed the plans for four optional routes and gave top priority to the Gormo-Nagchu-Lhasa Railway. About 485 miles of the line run more than 14,765 feet above sea level, and 342 miles of track traverse permanently frozen earth. Addressing the Western Forum in Chengdu on 22 October 2000, Sun Yonfu, Chinas Vice Minister of Railways, said that China would build a railway to Lhasa to promote the economic development of the Tibet Autonomous Region and to strengthen national defense.42 The general pattern of Chinas railway development shows that Beijing has paid relatively little attention to economic considerations; national defense and security have been its chief concerns.43 Official statements have stressed the need for a railway to consolidate national defense and to unite nationalities. It is also feared that the railway will allow rapid deployment of troops in the event of military threats across the border as well as to suppress unrest in the region. The Beijing government says the railroad will reduce the cost of transportation to Tibet from six cents to less than two and a half cents per kilometer/ton, which will help speed up Tibets economic development, generating nearly $500 million in direct and indirect income, subsequently inducing businesses to set up shop, while bringing about 900,000 tourists to Tibet each year. All along the highway from Golmud to Lhasa, work on the railroad is forging ahead, as billboards proclaim the importance of the project with slogans like: Build the Qinghai-Tibet railway, create prosperity for people of all nationalities. 44 The projects are officially designed to enhance national defence and domestic stability and to further integrate the Tibetan economy with mainstream China. The construction will place great pressure on local resources, and when completed, will undoubtedly damage the fragile Tibetan ecosystem with erosion, silting and pollution. Cheap and reliable transportation will also mean large-scale Han migration into central Tibet, further endangering the cultural identity of Tibet.45 Tibets railway will accelerate exploitation of natural resource through cheaper and easier transportation of raw materials from the Tibet Plateau to China. The environment experts have predicted that railway will impact the many endemic wildlife species like Tibetan antelope and wild yak, long-term damage to the vegetation in the region, and further affect the migratory pattern of wildlife in the reserves. The
ibid South China Morning Post, 23 October 2000 43 Alan P. Liu, Communication and National Integration in Communist China, cited by Leung Chi-Keung (University of HongKong), China Railway Patters and National Goals, The university of Chicago, Department of Geography, Research Paper No. 95, 1980, p.155 44 Erling Hoh, Bridging Beijing to Tibet with each new track, Washington Times, 19 November 2004 45 Robert Bedeski, Western China: Human Security and National Security in Chinas West Region Development: Domestic Strategies and Global Implications edited by Ding Lu and William A. W. Neilson, 2004
42 41
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population influx through railway will increase poaching and pollution in the region and also widen the economic gap between China and Tibet. According to a report on Qinghai-Tibet Railway by the International Campaign for Tibet, the budgeted cost of the railroad is more than three times the amount the Chinese government has spent on health care and education in Tibet during the past 50 years. The population transfer of Han immigrants into Qinghai is a result of railroading in Tibetan . Thousands of unemployed Chinese have flooded Tibet depriving Tibetans of their jobs and diluting their tradition and culture. Dr. Robert Barnett, a Tibet scholar, said, In public, Tibetans will not voice any criticism, But in private, they will tell you that this is the end of Tibet. Tibetans face discrimination and marginalisation in the employment sector on the railway line. Chinese immigrants take up major proportion of employment opportunities on the excuse that Tibetans lack proper skills and technical know-how. The prevalence of corruption and lack of awareness of workers rights in Tibet further worsens the employment situation. The following incident gives a clear picture of the actual scenario:
A group of about 30 migrant laborers from Qinghai said the railway construction company pays their boss 2,000 yuan (about $245) per month per worker. The boss, a Hui Muslim also from Qinghai, takes half leaving each worker with 1,000 yuan for a month of backbreaking toil. With five months of work per years, the boss stands to pocket 150,000 yuan ($18,315), and the workers return home with about 5,000 yuan ($610) Asked about the absence of Tibetan railroad workers in Amdo, the boss replied: The railway company does not like to employ Tibetan workers. The Tibetans think the land belongs to them, and that they should decide how fast to work.46
In Zazique Village about 60 miles north of Lhasa, 18 families earn their livelihoods by herding about 1,000 yaks and 1,500 sheep. The railroad will run through their valley, and the herders will have to bring the animals to summer pastures in the mountains through a small tunnel under the tracks.
We dont know whether or not the animals will refuse to pass through the tunnel, said the village head. We are not opposed to this project, but it is creating big losses for us. The radios said that we would be able to make $30 a day working on the railroad, said a housewife in the village. We were very happy, and thought that we could make some money. But only five or six people got work, and they were paid only $9 to $12 per day. It is unfair but we dont know where to complain.47
Other analysts point to the military implications of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway saying it could be used to deploy tactical nuclear weapons. In June 2001, Janes Intelligence Digest reported that the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) considers it necessary to build up a network of roads and mule tracks to bring military hardware and troops to the forward areas of the disputed border with India. Writes
46 47
Erling Hoh, Bridging Beijing to Tibet with each new track, Washington Times, 19 November 2004 Erling Hoh, Bridging Beijing to Tibet with each new track, Washington Times, 19 November 2004
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defence analysts William Triplett, With even a single line, the PLA could move about 12 infantry divisions to central Tibet in 30 days to meet up with their pre-positioned equipment.48 A Chinese journalist, Lin Gu, in a BBC article titled Letter: Modernising Tibet dated 22 December 2004 spent a month in Tibets capital, Lhasa. When Tibetan residents were interviewed about the impact of railways, they expressed concerns about greater influx of outsiders that could threaten jobs and public security. One Tibetan commented: What Ive gained is a much broader vision, but what Ive lost is my own cultural tradition. If you ask me to be your guide in Lhasa, I can only give you a brief surface introduction, but I can never go deeper.
State of Ecology: Obliteration

Principle 23 of the Rio Declaration, the final document of the Earth Summit,49 states, The environment and natural resources of people under oppression, domination and occupation, shall be protected.50 The Declaration also emphasises participation of citizens in the decision making process at all levels and access to information about environmental issues in their communities.51 The principle of environment justice as originally conceived states that regardless of race and culture, people should enjoy the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards.52Environmental diplomacy is a chosen vehicle to enhance Beijings standing in the international community as a respected world power and a member of World Trade Organisation (WTO). In practice, China lacks in environmental protection, legislation, and policy enforcement. Development with blatant disregard for environmental protection has escalated especially in Tibet.53 It is officially claimed that while developing the poor areas, the Chinese government pays close attention to the protection of the ecological environment. At a conference held in Bangkok in February 2002, Prof. Li Bingiong of the Department of Agricultural Economics, China Agricultural University in Beijing, said, Poverty reduction by reliance on science and technology has helped to change the previous way of production by indiscriminate means at the expense of the ecology in poor areas.54 In the case of Tibet, the ecological and cultural conditions have been brushed aside in a very autocratic, top down approach. The Western Development Strategy of the Chinese authorities also serves as a mean toward nation building and strengthening its presence along the western border provinces. Though the ecological problems that will arise as a result of large scale developments, like the railway and
48 49
Erling Hoh For Tibetans, railroad brings doom, Washington Times, 26 November 2004 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992 50 UN Doc.A/CONF.151/5,3. 51 Principle 10, ibid. 52 R. Jaheil, Globalization and the violation of environmental justice, 22 February 2003 53 DIIR, Chinas Current Policy on Tibet, 29 September 2000 54 Prof. Li Bingjiong, The Progress of Poverty Alleviation in China; Experience, Problems and Implications for the Asia
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highway constructions, and energy and resource extractions are officially accepted, there are no specific measures and mechanisms designed to address these problems apart from the huge billboards and advertisement in the media extolling the importance and need of environmental protection. Massive and rapid urbanization - along with many development projects like big mining sectors, large hydropower stations, and huge infrastructure maintenance - has caused severe environmental degradation and displacement of Tibetans and wildlife. Ecological crises such as water pollution, deforestation, extinction of rare endemic species, soil erosion, climate change, dumping of nuclear materials and wastes and unrestricted mining threaten not only Tibet, but every downstream and neighbouring region.55
Resettlement and Displacement: Dispossession

According to the Deputy Director of the Office of the Leading Group under the State Council for Development of the Western Region, Li Zibhin, by May 2004, 920,000 ha of cultivated land were returned to forest and grassland in addition to another 680,000 ha of newly grown vegetation.56 A Xinhua article dated 21 November 2004 titled Afforestation helps reduce sandstorm in Tibet, the authorities declared that number of sandstorm days in Lhasa drop to 5.2 days in 2004 from 53.8 days in the early 1950s due to afforestation projects. Li Zibin reiterated that the policy of returning reclaimed farmland to forest will remain unchanged in the years ahead.57 In reality, Tibetans farmers and nomads are either resettled or forced to stop farming or herding activities as part of afforestation and conversion program. This has had devastating effects on the livelihood of the Tibetan nomads and herders. Among the 2.3 million Tibetan populations, 1.9 million are in agricultural and pastoral regions and 80 percent of the economic output of the whole region comes from agriculture and animal husbandry.58 As part of the conversion projects, Tibetan farmers and nomads are either resettled or forced to stop farming or herding activities. Tibetans look upon this policy as a threat to their traditional livelihood and nomadic lifestyle on which they have subsisted for generations together. An affected nomad has described the scenario as a fish being flung out of water.59 Other resettled Tibetans have complained of poor farming soil, social problems and soil erosion.60 The traditional skills and local knowledge of the inhabitants in the preservation of grassland are not respected. Such measures will ultimately destroy a viable and vital part of traditional Tibetan nomadic culture.
Pacific, Department of Agricultural Economics, China Agricultural University, Beijing, 100094, P.R.of China, Bangkok, February 2002 55 DIIR, Chinas Current Policy on Tibet, 29 September 2000 56 " GDP Growth Tops 8.5 Percent in Western Region in First Half, Peoples Daily Online, http;//english.peopledaily.com.cn 57 Land-Forest Conversion Continues in West, China Daily 58 Yang Chungtang, Effectively safeguard, guide, and bring into play the peoples enthusiasm; deepen implementation of the guidelines of the Third Forum on Work in Tibet from the Tibet news paper xizang Ribao, Lhasa, 21 April 1995 59 "Environmental drive threatens nomadic culture, TCHRD Press Release, 21 August 2003 60 Nomads and farmers resettled in environment protection drive in Chamdo and Sichuan, TIN News Update, at http;// www.tibetinfor.net/news-updates/2003/2907.htm
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Chinese government claims to have instituted new regulations and policies in the 1980s, policies that the government has praised as being a model for resettlement in developing countries. In reality the provisions for people displaced by ecological and water projects generally remain severely inadequate. An investigation done by Wu Ming, a Chinese sociologist, contradicts official claims. In his experience and research on the impacts of dam and reservoir resettlement programs in China, he found serious problems in relocation process. These include official cover up of inadequacies and failures in resettlement programs, falsification of figures on their progress, misuse of resettlement funds, systematic discrimination against rural residents in the allocation of resettlement resources, and a lack of proper efforts to inform, let alone consult with population relocated.61 Forcible resettlements of Tibetan nomads and farmers have occurred in the recent years. TIN reported that nearly 1,000 families were moved out from Jomda, Markham and Gonjo counties in Chamdo Prefecture to keep the forest intact.62 In December 2001, 60 families in Gonjo County, Chamdo Prefecture were resettled in Nyingtri (Kongpo) Prefecture in TAR.63 A 38-year-old farmer from Bugod Village, Gonjo County in Chamdo Prefecture reported to TCHRD:
The Chinese authorities in the past had ordered the resettlement of about 2,400 families from Jangsum, Langmed, Khori, Shiri, Motsa and Jamsam Villages in Gonjo County to Kongpo. Upon eviction from their ancestral land, the authorities then cut the trees and the timber was transported in trucks. The authorities on the contrary said that the Tibetans in Gonjo County were being resettled as many of the villages fall on the banks of Drichu River.64
The States reform policies and the mismanagement by the authorities are responsible for the present ecological degradation on the Tibetan plateau.65 The resettled Tibetan nomads and farmers are unjustly targeted for destruction of the grassland and forests to which their ancestral way of life contributed only marginally. So far, Tibetans have neither been consulted, nor was their input and knowledge sought in the implementation of these reforestation projects.
Mining and Resource: Extraction

China calls Tibet Xizang meaning treasure house of the west. There are more than 126 identified minerals in Tibet with significant deposits of uranium, chromite, boron, lithium, borax, and iron. Further reserves of sorundum, vanadium, titanium, magnesite, sulpher, mica, cesium, rubidium, arsenic, graphite, lepidolite and potash are some of the largest in both Tibet and China. Also, there are globally significant
61 62
Human Rights in China, Major Problems Found in Three Gorges Dam Resettlement Program, 1 March 1998. ibid. 63 Environmental drive threatens nomadic culture, TCHRD Press Release, 21 August 2003 64 http;//www.tchrd.org/hrupdate/2004/hr200407.htm#anxious 65 The Situation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Tibet, Written Statement submitted by the Federation of Associations for Defence and Promotion of Human Rights, an NGO in consultative status, Economic and Social Council, General E/CN.4/2003/NGO/50, 28 February 2003, Commission on Human Rights, Fifty ninth session, Item 10 of the provisional agenda.
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reserves of copper, gold, silver, zinc, oil and gas as well as other minerals on the plateau. Most of the resources are concentrated in Tsaidam Basin, Nagchu, Golok, Chamdo, Chang Thang, Kardze and Lhoka. The valuable reserves are distributed throughout Tibets three traditional provinces.66 Chinas Constitution asserts the state ownership of all natural resources. Between 1979 and 1999, China passed 16 environmental laws, covering a range of issues including marine pollution, forest cover, and energy efficiency.67 Chen Kuyian, former Party Secretary of TAR, said at Tibet Regional Economic Work Forum held in Lhasa on 17 December 1999, that the tapping of potential mineral resources to develop superior industries in Tibet is one of the main strategic policy decisions on the great development of Tibet. Chinas Tenth Five Year Plan and the 2020 Project outlines further exploitation of Tibets resources, and also envisage massive state investment in the transport and urban infrastructure needed to effectively access and convey these resources. China, with the assistance of international energy companies, is constructing an extensive gas pipeline from the Tsaidam Basin in Amdo to Shanghai, along with other similar infrastructure projects, which will only speed up the removal of Tibets natural resources. The present railway project from Gormo to Lhasa, once completed, will play a major role in facilitating exploitation of minerals and oil from the remote parts of Tibet.68 In recent years, the expansion of Chinese markets in the international arena has increased the growth of the mining industry in Tibet, with unprecedented investments from multinational companies and assistance from international aid agencies.69 Each new resource discovery and new investment in extraction, whether Chinese, foreign, or both, places considerable additional pressures on Tibets natural resources. The completion of Gormo-Lhasa Railway will increase extraction of minerals and other natural resources and promote Chinese migration. In China, minings are state-owned, making state both the profit earner and environmental regulator. This conflict of interest has produced rampant corruption and negligence of the legitimate concerns of the workers and local communities near the mining areas. The acceleration of mineral extraction has created unprecedented environmental and social problems in Tibet. The biggest profit from extraction of natural resources like coal, oil, natural gas and other mineral resources from Tibet goes to Beijing. Unfortunately, the development projects and mining activities are implemented without consulting Tibetans or assessing the impact on the environment, or the impact on Tibetan health and livelihood. Tibetans have no meaningful participation in the decision-making processes and implementation of the stated policies.
66 67
EDD of DIIR, Tibet 2000: Environment and Development Issues, 2000 The Milarepa Fund, Raiding the Treasure House: Oil and Mineral Extraction in Chinas Colonization of Tibet, www.milarepa.org 68 The Milarepa Fund, Raiding the Treasure House: Oil and Mineral Extraction in Chinas Colonization of Tibet, www.milarepa.org 69 EDD of the DIIR, Tibet 2000: Development and Environment Issues, 2000
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Furthermore, Tibetans have been arbitrarily arrested, detained, tortured and imprisoned for exercising freedom of expression and opinions.
In July 2004, officials from the Nagchu Mining Department visited Sari Village, Yongnak Township, Sog County, TAR, to mine the area. The resident Tibetans protested against mining activity, and heated exchanges took place between the resident and the officials. A month later,, officials from Sog County Administration accompanied by PSB officers arrived at the village to investigate the matter. The officers identified Thartok, Dejor and Tsering Dawa as key leaders of the protest. They were arrested on 4 September 2004, and subsequently detained at Nagchu Prefecture Detention Centre. In the aftermath of the arrest, a group of local Tibetans appealed to the authorities for the release of the Tibetan detainees explaining that their protest was based solely on environmental concern. However, the authorities dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the protest had political motivations. The family members of the three arrestees are reported to be anxious that they will get lengthy imprisonment.70
In the mining enterprises, local participation and employment are minimal. There are reports of local inhabitants being subjected to forced labour. The use of forced labour on Tibetans is in contravention of International Labour Organisations Conventions number 2971 and number 10572. A testimony received by TCHRD on 21 October 2004, states that when the Chinese need hand, the Tibetans are obliged to go which otherwise results in a fine of 50 yuan. The extensive mining activities have led to degradation of pastures, deforestation and pollution, affecting the health and livelihood of local inhabitants. Deaths, injuries, and human and animal birth deformities in nearby mining processing are some of the direct effects of the state of mining in Tibet. 73 The use of cyanide and mercury in the extraction and processing of some of the minerals in Tibet, especially gold and the generation of toxic wastes and dust particularly in open cast mining have been identified as the causes of loss of vision, hair, skin ulceration, respiratory problems and destruction of nervous systems and bone structures.74 A recent escapee in his testimony to TCHRD on 21 October 2004 said,
Tibetans have made constant appeal to stop mining because of its harmful effects on the growth of flora and fauna and on the health of the whole community. However, the authority threatened the people by warning that they hold legal authorized permission for mining and any challenge from the masses would be met with severity.
70 71
http://www.tchrd.org/hrupdate/2004/hr200409.htm#arrested Convention 29 describes forced labour as work extracted from persons under the menace of penalty and for which the individuals have not offered voluntarily. 72 Convention 105 is concerned with the banning of forced labour as a means of political coercion or as punishment for political views, as a method of mobilizing and using labour for purposes of economic development or as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination. 73 International Campaign for Tibet, 1993 74 Free Tibet Campaign, 1997
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Grassland: Degradation
Open grassland accounts for more than 60 percent of the landmass of Tibet. The degradation of the grasslands is the most pervasive environmental impact of the era of Chinese control of Tibet, and the impact, which most threatens the sustainability of Tibetan civilisation.75 It affects the local livelihood as well as the climatic pattern of China and the world. The findings of the UNDP, Asian Development Bank, World Bank and others have attributed the grassland degradation to the development policies of Chinese government. Based on an analysis of satellite images, the Chinese Academy of Science estimates that in the early 1990s some 375 million hectares nearly 40 percent of the country were affected by erosion. The main and immediate victims are the farmers who are forced to cultivate the poorer quality areas. An estimated 331 million hectares roughly a third of Chinas area is at risk of desertification. The Ministry of Agriculture estimates that about 34 per cent of all grasslands in China are moderately to severely degraded and about 90 percent are degraded to some degree. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the most fundamental underlying cause has been poor governmental development policies.76 The Grassland Law of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) came into effect in 1985. It is aimed at enhancing property of local economies of national autonomous areas (Article 1), while article 4 of the same law affirms the state ownership of the grassland. At the heart of these policies is a belief that traditional migratory grazing systems do not protect the land. This is despite the recognition by international land experts, including the World Bank, that Tibetans traditional tenure systems are the most sustainable and efficient use of the land. Under the Grassland Law, the nomads and farmers are allocated fixed portions of land based on their location high mountain villages are allocated the high land while low-lying villages are given low land. Moreover, farmers and nomads are expected to carry out fencing at their own cost. The PRC justifies sedentarisation and compulsory fencing as necessary to protect lands from overgrazing and also to increase productivity. However, these policies have affected the pasture quality by reducing mobility and flexibility of rangeland management, increased pasture degradation, reducing yield which forces many many families into malnutrition and poverty. The haphazard policy of sedentarisation has also resulted in familial disputes. From the Chinese government perspective, nomadic overgrazing and excessive stocking are blamed for the crises. China proposes to deal with the nomads not only by criminal law but also by imposing charges for the use of state property as an incentive to constrain over-utilisation. In reality, the imposition of a land use tax on top of all other taxes leveled on nomads, will only drive them to squeeze more from
Chen Shan, Inner Asian Grassland Degradation and Plant Transformation, 111, in Humprey ed, Culture and Environment in Inner Asia, Vol. 1. 76 World Bank, China; Air, Land and Water; environmental priorities for a new millenium, 2001, 11-24 <http;// wbln0018.worldbank.org/EAP?eap.nsf/Attachments/China>
75
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land they can never own. All these official assessment of the situation and subsequent policy implementation shows how out of touch with reality the central planners are, but central planning in China is still under the command in even the remote areas of Tibet.77
Chinas Human Development in Tibet

The concept of human development is explained on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)78, both as a process of widening peoples choices and the level of their achieved well-being. The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the average achievement of a country in basic human capabilities. The HDI indicates whether people lead a strong and healthy life, are educated and knowledgeable and enjoy a decent standard of living.79 In 1997, the Chinese Government issued its National Report on Sustainable Development, which made it clear that the Chinese government defined sustainable development as that level of development that would support booming Chinas growth rates. The report states: In Chinas Agenda 21, rapid economic development is regarded as indispensable for poverty eradication, enhancement of peoples livelihood, and strengthening of overall national strength.80 In his essay entitled Development as Freedom, the renowned economist Amartya Sen, has required development to be free from major sources of unfreedom like poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states. He refutes the the lee thesis which claimed authoritarian politics actually helping economic growth.
Poverty of Development
The Human Development Report 1997 identified three indicators of the Human Poverty Index (HPI) as survival, knowledge and a decent standard of living.81 Amei Zhang in an article on Poverty Alleviation in China; Commitment, Policies and Expenditures in 1993 defined poverty82 as income poverty and human poverty.83 The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has defined poverty as a human condition characterised by the sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources,
77
Speaking for Tibet; A Shadow Report submitted to the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development WSSD, August 2002 78 http:www.undp.org/undp/hdro/anatools.htm 79 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite of three basic components of human development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge is measured by a combination of adult literacy (two-thirds weight) and means years of schooling (one-third weight). Standard of living is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP per capital adjusted for the local cost of living (purchasing power party, or PPP) 80 www.acca21.org.cn/nreport.html 81 http://www.undp.org/undp/hdro/anatools.htm 82 Income Poverty is defined as the lack of necessities for material well being, which can be measured by incidence of poverty. Human Poverty means the denial of choices and opportunities for a tolerable life in non-income aspects such as deprivation in years of life, health, knowledge and housing, the lack of participation and lack of personal security.
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capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. The TAR Government launched its first poverty alleviation program in 1994. Its stated aim was to abolish absolute poverty among 275,000 poor people living in 18 nationally and regionally designated poor counties, whose average family per capita annual income was less than 500 RMB.84 Under Chinas 10th Five Year Development Plan (2000-2005), poverty alleviation efforts worth 6.46 billion RMB ($782 million) would cover all 75 counties in Tibet (having expanded from the initial 18 counties). The Western Development Strategy was stated as an effort to eradicate poverty and to lessen the income gap between eastern and western regions of China. The Chinese government officially issued the Outline for Poverty Alleviation and Development of Chinas Rural Areas (2001-2010) setting out the objectives, tasks, guiding ideology, policies and principles for work for the coming ten years. In Chinas White Paper on Regional Ethnic Autonomy, the Chinese government describes the progress in Tibet as leaps and bounds. The White Paper has mentioned that from 1965 to 2003, the Gross National Product (GNP) of Tibet increased from 327 million yuan to 18.459 billion yuan, and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capital rose from 241 yuan to 6,874 yuan. In yet another White Paper entitled Human Rights Cause in 2003, the PRC government claimed to have improved the peoples rights to subsistence and development with the rise in the general standards of the people. At the Global World Conference on Scaling Poverty Reduction held in Shanghai on May 26-27 200485, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, said that China has managed to shake off poverty by effective poverty alleviation through development. In the same breath, he said that the country has 29 million people unable to make ends meet, and to eliminate poverty will be an ardous task for it. The Premier acknowledged that most of the poverty stricken Chinese live in the countryside, and that poverty stricken farmers are therefore, the main beneficiaries of the poverty alleviation program. China has claimed that agriculture and modern livestock gained the new ground. The pace of transforming and reorganisng the traditional industries have picked up its speed.86 Chinas western region realized a GDP increase of 8.5 percent last year, and 8.7 percent in the first half of this year, marking a good start for the countrys strategic development of the west.87 Official figures place the number of TAR residents who live below poverty line at only 70,000 out of a total population of 2.6 million and falling steadily.88 The official rural surveys, as measured by the
http://www.undp.org/undp/hdro/oc27.htm Arthur N. Holcombe, The Impacts of Economic Reform and Opening Up polices on Local Ethnic Population Living Standards in China: The case of Tibet, August 2001 85 The conference was organized jointly by the World Bank and the Chinese Government 86 Refer Beijings Magazine on Human Rights, Vol. 4, No. 5, September 2004 87 GDP Growth Tops 8.5 Percent in Western Region in First Half, Peoples Daily Online, http;//english.peopledaily.com.cn 88 June Teufel Dreyer, Economic Development in Tibet under the Peoples Republic of China, Journal of Contemporary China, 2003, 12 (36), August 411?30
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absolute and benefit poverty89, found poverty in the TAR falling up to 1999, but rising sharply in Qinghai in 2000.90 A study on urban poverty in China by economist at the London School of Economics, Athar Hussain indicated that urban poverty rates in the TAR were actually the third highest of China in 1998, at around 11 percent of the official urban population.91 The poorest areas the western provinces are characterised by high human poverty.92 Therefore, the development pattern in Tibet happens where increase in poverty and inequality occurs along with huge investments under the WDS. The area of cultivated land in the TAR is only slightly larger than that of the city-province of Beijing, only 0.28 percent of the total national cultivated land, despite the fact that the TAR constitutes almost 13 percent of the total national area.93 Agriculture has traditionally been the foundation of the Tibetan economy. Pastoral nomadism (Tib:drokpa), grain farming (Tib:shingpa) and semi-nomadism (Tib: samadrok) are the three major forms of occupation in Tibet. Farmers are mainly concentrated in the valleys while pastoral and semi nomads are found on plateaus and mountains. Wang Lixiong, a Chinese scholar, who spent 15 years collecting data in various areas of Tibet, argues that modernisation and development has failed in Tibet as it was imposed from the top with no consideration to local interest and local culture. He said the road building in Tibet is aimed at creation of a stabilising group [wending jituan] of Han; administrators and soldiers and has little relevance for the lives of great majority of Tibetans, who live in small, dispersed communities in the high plateaus. Independent research and refugee testimonies have confirmed that the so-called economic growth in Tibet takes place in the state sector or in urban areas, thus having little or no effects on the Tibetan population. It was found that the government spending on education, health and agriculture in the TAR is less whereas priority is given to governments large, cost-intensive projects that do not raise the local income. The governments subsidy to Tibet has increased the GDP, but not the actual living standard of the population and their income. An article entitled Deciphering Economic Growth in the Tibet Autonomous Region released by TIN dated 8 April 2003 corroborates the above facts. The article says, that economic growth in Tibet is fuelled by central government spending and is overwhelmingly concentrated in the state-sector. It reinforces the fact that economic growth is a means and not an end of development. There is no automatic link between high GNP growth and progress in human development.
89
Two lines are officially used to define poverty in the PRC absolute line and benefit line. The absolute line is the minimum per person income required for a human to survive and subsist. The benefit line captures the extreme poverty that is significantly below even an absolute threshold and therefore potentially indicates severe malnutrition or other forms of extreme destitution. 90 "The rich gets richer, and the poor? Rural Poverty and inequality in Tibet indications from recent official surveys, TIN News Update, 31 May 2003 91 A Hussain, Urban Poverty in China Measurement, Patterns and Policies, in Focus Programme on Socio-Economic Security, ILO, Geneva http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/ses/index.htm 92 Amei Zhang, Poverty Alleviation in China: Commitment, Policies and Expenditures, 1993 93 The rich get richer, and the poor? Rural poverty and inequality in Tibet indications from recent official surveys, TIN News Update, 31 May 2003
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Thus, Chinese policy is creating two economies and two societies in Tibet: the urban, wealthy Chinese economy, and the rural poor, undercapitalized Tibetan economy. Also the gap between the official discourse of development and the lives of the people is often blurred by the use of impressive facts and figures. Thus, any development that has taken place in Tibet, rather than benefiting the Tibetan people has actually occurred at their cost resulting in a violation of their socio-economic rights, or more specifically their right to development.94 Experts have opined the failure of developmental policies on the Tibetan population. Pierre Antoinne Donnet states, From the point of view of economic performance, after forty years of Chinese Marxism, Tibets situation looks disastrous from any angle.95 Garbielle Laffitte, a Tibet expert, argues that despite large inputs of development funds from Beijing, Tibet would rank at the very bottom of the UNs list of nations (if it were a nation), along with countries like Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Mozambique.96 Another expert says that Even a cursory glance at the Statistical Yearbook of China will confirm that the TAR ranks last on virtually every indicator: total revenue, taxes remitted, per capita income, literacy, and even life expectancy at birth.97 Until the middle of the 1980s, China was following an agriculture-driven strategy development. Since the mid-80s, its development strategy has distinctly been oriented towards export-led industralisation.98 It is also said that this paradigmatic shift in Chinas development strategy has affected the progress in poverty reduction. In its plan to eradicate poverty in Tibet, China has focused heavily on income generation in certain areas of Tibet. This is done with the hope that a rise in income statistics taken out of the context of poverty indicators, will show that the poverty has been eradicated. Hence, the development that occurs is large scale and often out of step with the traditional economy and large communities. In contrast to rural household incomes, urban household incomes in the TAR have consistently been above the Chinese national average. The urban population consists mostly of the Han Chinese immigrants and is comprised of a far fewer Tibetans. Hence, it only reinforces the fact that economic growth and development has helped the urban economy where the Han immigrants are in the majority and not the Tibetan population.
Andrew Fischer, Poverty by Design: Economics of Discrimination, Canada Tibet Committee Pierre Antoine Dunnet, Tibet: Survival in Question, London Zed Books 1994, p.139. See also Ronald Schwatrz The Reform Revisited: The implications of Chinese economic policy and the future of Rural producers in Tibet, in Development, Society and Environment in Tibet, ed. Graham Clarke (Graz, Austria :Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 1995) 96 Gabrielle Laffitee, Tibet as a Developing Society, Paper presented to the Future of Tibet Colloqium, Canberra, Australia, 2 September 1995, p.4 97 June Teufel Dreyer, Economic Development in Tibet under the Peoples Republic of China, Journal of Contemporary China (2003), 12 (36), August, 411?30 98 Amei Zhang, Poverty Alleviation in China: Commitment, Policies and Expenditures, 1993
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Livelihood: Discriminatory
The right to livelihood is the fundamental rights of people to fulfilling, dignified work or other sources of subsistence, including access to land and productive resources, and to basic labour protection. The right to livelihood is explicitly stated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and encompasses such rights as the right of a person not be deprived of his own means of subsistence (article 1(2)); the right to work (article 6 (1); the right to fair and equal remuneration (article 7); and above all, the right to an adequate standard of living including adequate food (article 11). The first article of the ICESCR guarantees the right of all peoples to self- determination and the right to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Chinese law also provides for safeguarding the right to livelihood. Article 13 of the Chinese Constitution provides that the state protects the right of the citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property. In contrast to the provisions on paper, Chinas effort to provide protection at the implementation level has been extremely lacking. The PRC fails to recognize the right of Tibetans to self-determination and their right to freely pursue economic, social and cultural development. Secondly, the state-imposed development policies have not involved local participation and have not considered local concerns. Thirdly, the population transfer program has had immense impact on the livelihoods of Tibetans in terms of marginalisation, discrimination and denial of opportunities at both rural and urban level. China publishes many statistics on the number of schools and hospitals, but they conceal the actual experiences of pupils and patients. Statistics on the number of buildings and employees in these institutions tell us nothing about the quality of services provided, the cost to users, or the qualifications of those providing the services. When one looks more closely at quality, qualifications, budgets and the crucial question of who pays, a very different picture emerges.99 . It is clear that the economic development in Tibet cannot be judged by looking only at official statistics of GNP and GDP growth or some other indicators of overall economic expression.
Rural Livelihood
Over 80 percent of Tibetans sustain their living in agriculture and nomadic pastoralism. Crops such as barley, wheat, peas, and rapeseed are cultivated, while nomads herd yaks, sheep and goats.100 Since large concentration of population in Tibet is engaged in labour intensive agriculture, it is concerning that the large-scale developments in Tibet have not benefited the Tibetans and their livelihood. It can be attributed to both policy failure and denial of local participation in policy-making decisions.
99
100
Speaking for Tibet; A Shadow Report at the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development, August 2002 Right to Livelihood in TCHRD Annual Report on Human Rights Situation in Tibet, 2001
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An American anthropologist, Melvyn Goldstein, and other international social scientists have written that the Tibetan traditional livestock management system was a time-tested model, sophisticated, and developed enough to ensure viable and sustainable management of marginal pastures. The New Rangeland Management (NRM)101 doctrine states that the nomads know better than urban elites how to maintain both productivity and permanence in lands that cannot be intensively used without great damage. But in China NRM is unknown, thus honouring of nomadic knowledge is unheard of, with respect for customary custodianship of the rangelands unheeded.102 There were reports of official ruling by local authorities in certain regions of Tibet where limits were imposed on the number of livestock each family can have. Where families fail to adhere to official limits, fines are exacted. The official justification given for the ruling was that large livestock results in overgrazing of the land. However, this hampers the traditional nomadic culture and impedes the main source of livelihood for rural population. The nomadic way of life is an essential part of Tibetan identity. The governments policy of forced sedentarisation of nomads not only denies a large sector of the Tibetan community their livelihood but also threatens Tibets environment through the opening up of lands for mining. Beijing claims in its official publications like Chinas Tibet 2004 Facts and Figures that people in Tibet enjoy a preferential policy with local tax rate three percentage points lower than elsewhere around the country. Besides, the government has claimed to have exempted farmers and herders from any fees and taxes with free medical care. Tibetan farmers and nomads refute such claims when they spoke of heavy taxes. Taxes have been levied on their crop yield, number of animals, animal products, number of family members, as well as water, grass, and building taxes. Chinas taxation policy is known for is its arbitrary nature, as well as by its conspicuous absence of transparency and accountability or provision for appeal against harsh and unfair taxes. No official statistics are available which gives us detailed figures or breakdown for taxes collected at the county level or below. It seems that the decentralisation of tax has given greater powers to the local authorities but it is not clear how much tax the local authorities levies and how much is remitted to the central authorities. The effects of sedentarisation, livestock limitation, and arbitrary taxation policy, on the Tibetan land and livelihood are evidenced by refugee testimonies received by TCHRD. Dhondup, a nomad from Golog County in Qinghai Province, reported to TCHRD:
Nomadic life has been a prominent way of life and people have been sustained on the nomad life over many generations in Golog. At present the nomads in Golog are facing lots of hardship in their livelihood. In 2003, the Chinese authorities set up a new Supervision Division in Golog region to supervise the grassland of the nomadic region. The Division formulated two new rules, which was announced across
101
The NRM doctrine recognizes what the worlds nomads have always known: that these indigenous cultures have cared for the rangelands, while making full productive use of the land, for a very long time. 102 Speaking for Tibet; A Shadow Report submitted at the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development, August 2002
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various counties in the region. The first rule stipulates that each member of the family is entitled to own only five livestock and those having more than five will be fined 500 yuan each for every additional livestock. The second rule emphasised that it is compulsory for every family to fence the land allocated to them. The new policy affects the poor families a lot as they cannot afford to fence the entire land due to high cost. Every 1000-meter length of fence cost 7,400 Chinese Yuan. The ruling is unjustified as it affects the Tibetan farmers and nomads. In addition the Chinese government has imposed a minimum tax of 1500 yuan inclusive of grass, land and water tax from each family. The head of the Agriculture Division had warned that if a person fails to pay the tax, the person would be held in the local peoples court and the fine would be doubled every year on non-payment. As a result, almost all the families are facing severe livelihood problem and sell off their livestock to clear the tax burden. Golog these days is reeling under heavy water and fodder scarcity to feed livestock. Families grazing their livestock in other farms land were charged 10 Chinese Yuan for a horse, 5 Yuan for a cattle and 3 yuan for a sheep on a daily basis. In order to meet the family daily expenses due to continued problem faced by the nomadic families, I started collecting Yartsa Gunbhu (a medicinal plant) and others to earn additional income for the family during summer season. But we were told to pay tax amounting to 1500 Yuan to the Township and County authorities from our hard earned income. Unable to bear the constant repression and the negative policies that uproot the very existence of nomadic culture and subsistence, I escaped into exile.103
Heavy taxation, fencing and sedentarisation of nomads enforced in the nomadic regions under Qinghai Province have put many families in debt. Sonam Tsering, a 25-year-old nomad from Qinghai Province, reported to TCHRD;
Prior to 2003, we had to give two to three sheep annually as meat tax to the local authorities and also paid 1500 Yuan in cash. All the nomadic families make sure to pay their tax on time as it is doubled the next year if one fails to do so. In 2003, the authorities distributed grassland to all the families and instructed us to fence the grassland. We were allotted five Mu (approx 67 sq mts) of land for our livestock. My family borrowed 2000 Yuan from others to buy the barbed wire. The grassland allotted to us is cleared very fast by our livestock and our animals were getting weaker. Often two or three sheep die due to lack of food. To make the matter worse, we also have to pay 2000-3000 Yuan as tax to the local authorities. This tax is inclusive of meat, wealth and grassland taxes.
Just as taxation in Tibet is discretionary, it looks as if the livestock limitation policy across Tibet is enforced at the discretion of local authorities. This raises the issue of transparency and accountability, as government ruling is not applied uniformly. While some regions enforce a ceiling of five livestock per family member, the restriction in some regions is three. This is corroborated by Ngawang Palden, a 19year-old nomad from Marong Village, Rusho Township, Jyekundo County, Qinghai Province, who reported to TCHRD,
103
Chinese authorities make nomadic life miserable at http://www.tchrd.org/hrupdate/2004/hr200407.html#miserable
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Livelihood of families in the nomadic region of Marong Village is based on rearing livestock. However, in August 2003, the local authorities introduced the limits on the number of livestock that a family can own. This has put us in a difficult situation and was a matter of great concern to the nomadic families. My family owned more than 80 domestic animals and now as a result of the new rule, my family can keep only 18 animals. The remaining 62 animals were sold to different Chinese slaughterhouses.104
The combined impacts of erosion, fencing, sedentarisation, debt, poverty, taxation, soil loss, and exclusion and absence of basic human services threaten the very survival of the nomadic way of life.105 The formulation of all these policies occurs in Beijing, with little involvement of the Tibetans whose lives are affected by them. The result is an increasingly dissatisfied Tibetan rural sector largely untouched by massive Chinese investment in Tibet; discrimination against Tibetans in the market economy; the loss of livelihoods in both rural and urban economies and the potential for massive environmental devastation.
Urban Livelihood
The Tibetan population in the urban areas of TAR constitutes a little over 15-20 percent. While Tibets rural sector suffers, Tibetans in the urban areas face increasing unemployment, marginalisation and discrimination in all spheres of life. The dominant use of Chinese in business and the government bars the Tibetans from accessing equal opportunities alongside the Chinese migrants. The Peoples Republic of China is bound itself to recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work including fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, safe and healthy working conditions, and reasonable limitation of working hours plus paid holidays. The Chinese Constitution declares that citizens of the PRC have the right as well as the duty to work and that all citizens be treated equally. Nevertheless, Tibetans have to compete with Chinese migrants who enjoy preferential treatment. The use of household registration system (Ch: hukou] and flexible work arrangements for Han Chinese professionals coming from China have restricted rural Tibetans from seeking and accessing fully the opportunities available in urban areas. Additionally, urban oriented growth relying on economic reform and opening up has led to growing income disparities between urban and rural as well as between Han immigrants and Tibetan residents. The influx of Han immigrants to the Tibetan plateau has resulted in lower priority for Tibetan skills training and capacity building. Tibetans have been excluded from the most skilled and semi-skilled job opportunities that offer higher wages and the possibility to rise above the poverty line. Rather, they have been relegated to the least skilled and lowest paid work. The labour market issue raises the point access to and control over urban economic growth that discrimination in Tibet is to a large extent played out in the access to and control over the urban growth poles of the economy.
104 105
http:www.tchrd.org/hrupdate/2004/hr200408.htm DIIR, Environment and Development in Tibet; A Crucial Issue, 2003
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Tibetans are given lower wages than their Chinese counterparts and are sometimes subjected to humiliating treatments. Kunsang Tenphel, a 19-year-old farmer from Chamdo Prefecture reported to TCHRD,
At the age of ten, my father and I found a manual work at a building construction site. Each of us earned a paltry sum of 25 yuan a day for working from dawn to dusk. We were even forced to wash dirty clothes of the Chinese workers and were beaten up with bamboo stick if not washed properly. We argued with the building owner over wage differences in comparison with our Chinese counterpart for performing the same job where Chinese worker earns 60 yuan a day.
Education policy in Tibet is predominated by the use of Chinese language at both the official and commercial level. Many of the businesses and enterprises in Tibet are Chinese and state controlled, and thus implicit preference for Chinese labourers is often shown. Clearly, discrimination in language and education hampers full participation of Tibetans in the economy outside the traditional activities. These are in violation of principles of equity and non-discrimination in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to which China has committed through ratification. A number of Tibetan women from rural areas working as prostitutes has increased considerably in TAR. The rise in prostitution is a direct result of unemployment and poverty as well as existing development projects that have widened income disparities between rural and urban areas. The ill effects of prostitution in terms of increasing HIV and other sexually transmitted disease are well known. It is reported that in some areas of Tibet, the level of employment is only as high as 40%. Despite huge claims of having developed Tibet through Western Development Strategy and other development projects, the Tibetans have hardly enjoyed the fruits of development. Tibetans have neither the economic resources nor the education to compete for new jobs and positions that the WDS has created.
Healthcare System: Ineffective

The World Health Organisation (WHO) has defined health as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. Health is the basis for job productivity, the capacity to learn in school and the capability to grow intellectually, physically and emotionally. In economic terms, health and education are the two cornerstones of human capital.106 The right to a reasonable standard of health is articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). While Chinas Constitution does not explicitly guarantee the right to health, it recognizes the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living, including continuous improvement of living conditions,107
107
Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
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and the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.108 Chinas amended Regional National Autonomy of 2001, states that organs of self-government of national autonomous areas shall make independent decisions on developing local medical and health services and on advancing modern and traditional medicine (Article 40] The Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen sees health as an integral part of the development agenda. He says that the deprivation of health is bad even for the economy because peoples productivity depends on their level of nutrition and health. Poor health and disease are both a cause and a consequence of poverty. Chinas White Paper on Regional Ethnic Autonomy said that medical and healthcare conditions have improved remarkably with the increase in the number of health and medical institutions.109 The Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2005) also includes setting up of medical and public health networks at the county and township level, and forging a system that combines preventive medicine with health insurance. In 2002, Beijing announced its plan to provide basic health care to 900 million rural residents by 2010 as part of the global fulfillment of the health for all policy of the WHO. Yet behind this facade of doing something for Tibetans, grim health and human rights realities is a common theme in most of the refugee testimonies. The provision of healthcare within Tibet is found to vary widely between regions. The system generally operates on several levels of prefecture, county, township and village Different regulations are found to be in force in each county, indicating a high degree of localized policies. Despite injections of funds and high claims, Tibetan refugees escaping to India testify that the bulk of funds allocated to Tibets health sector are channelised towards developing hard infrastructure. Recent escapees identify cost and quality of treatment, the distant locations of facilities, and racial discrimination as the key problems in healthcare system in Tibet. Although much progress has been made in primary healthcare, it remains out of reach for the majority of Tibetans. Contrary to Chinese claims that healthcare is free in farming and pastoral areas, prohibitive fees continue to compromise the Tibetans health. This is augmented by discriminatory treatment, general lack of adequate facilities and lack of public health education among Tibetans. Healthcare facilities are concentrated in urban areas, and have not been fully extended to the more isolated rural areas where the majority of Tibetans reside. Many of Tibets problems such as the shortage of appropriately skilled personnel, are similar to those in other poor rural areas of China. The poor state of health of Tibetans and Chinese households living below the poverty line is inextricably linked to an inadequate diet, lack of basic facilities and sanitation, resulting in malnutrition, stunting, rickets, anaemia, gastro-intestinal problems diarrhoea, parasites, chronic
108 109
Article 12 (b) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Chinas White Paper on Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet by Information Office of the State Council of the People\s Republic Of China, 21 May 2004
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Development
respiratory infection and Iodine Deficiency. A primary reason for this may be that the laws China has enacted relating to healthcare fail to specify measures relating to the implementation of the right to health.110 Within Tibet, diseases such as Tuberculosis (TB), Kashin-Beck disease, leprosy and hepatitis are alarmingly common. One source estimated that in some areas in Tibet, TB levels are as high as 20 percent and it remains endemic with rates high above those in China111 Iodine deficiency disorders are prevalent, and Tibet has the worlds highest rates of Kashin-Beck disease- upto 80% in some regions.112 Hepatitis B prevalence is as high as 15% in Lhasa.113 Although HIV/Aids has not made an official appearance in the TAR, this situation will probably change since there is a large mobile population from neighbouring areas. Completion of the Qinghai to Lhasa rail link could also affect the rates of HIV and other infectious diseases in the TAR.114 Other common ailments on the plateau include chest conditions, diarrheal diseases, stomach disorders, rickets, goiter, eye infections and complaints of the heart, lungs and liver. The prevalence of these treatable and preventable diseases indicates that Chinas health care systems, or education campaigns do not effectively extend beyond the urban centres.115 The latest report on maternal mortality in Tibet documents the high maternal death rate is due to inadequate healthcare. The standard of healthcare quality in Tibet is one step below the rest of China, said Bonds and Rosenbloom [based in Austin, Texas, are the latest to join a cluster of health workers in Tibet] in an instant message interview from Lhasa, Tibet.116 The Health Bureau of the TAR says that on average 325 women in Tibet die for every 100,000 live births. The Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund, Cambridge, Massachusett, puts the maternal mortality rate at 500 per 100,000 live births.117 Arlen Samen118, founder of H.E.A.R.T, said, In mainland China, most women have one child. They are not living in the middle of nowhere without help and education. Hospitals are available; there are more doctors and facilities and they probably go to the doctor early. All of which means that depending on which set of statistics are trusted, Tibetan women are six to ten times more likely to die in childbirth than Chinese women. Their infants are up to three times less likely to survive. Because the great majority of births in Tibet occur at home to women who receive little or no prenatal care, none of us
110 111
Delivery and Deficiency; Health and Health care in Tibet, TIN, pp. 55-56 Health policy challenges in the Tibet Autonomous Region, US Embassy Beijing, December 2000 report [http// www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sand/tib-health.htm 112 ibid. 113 ibid. 114 Sonal Singh, Tears from the land of snow; Health and Human Rights in Tibet, 22 November 2004, www.phayul.com 115 TCHRD, Annual Report on Human Rights Situation in Tibet, 2001 116 Juhie Bhatia US Team takes Aim at Tibets Maternal Death Rate, Womens e News, Tuesday, 21 September 2004. Bonds and Rosenbloom, with Circle of Health International, based in Austin, Texas, are the latest to join a cluster of health workers in the region. 117 ibid. 118 An obstetric Nurse at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City
45
really have any idea about how many maternal or newborn deaths occur that are never registered, said Dr. Micheal Varner, a professor of maternal-fetal medicine at the University of Utah who is also medical director of H.E.A.R.T. The number of health workers in the TAR might seem impressive- almost 11,000 health workers and more than 3,000 barefoot doctors people with 3-6 months basic health training.119 However, the hospitals lack proper infrastructure and equipment. In fact, one in five city hospitals has no facilities for simple surgery and there is only one CT scanner in all Tibet.120 Where facilities do exist, hospitals may charge from 1000 yuan in rural areas to 3000 yuan at urban hospitals as a security deposit121- many months salary for Tibetans. The challenge to the health and human rights of Tibetan people is exacerbated by the absence of reliable health data separate from the official sources and few NGOs in Tibet. Medicins Sans Frontieres, a health NGO in Tibet, withdrew from the region at the end of 2002, after deciding that their organisation could not improve Tibetans health while infrastructure was so inadequate. According to reports by Tibet Daily on 7 June 2004, the first Aids case in TAR was identified in 1994. Since then eleven cases have been recorded.122Aids affect mostly the poorest regions of the world and Tibet is an impoverished land. In Tibet, the rise in prostitution and influx of the Han immigrants in Tibet are causes for grave concern in spreading the Aids. The rural Tibetans are ignorant about the disease and many young Tibetan girls are lured into the sex trade in the urban areas for economic reasons. There is lack of Aids awareness educational programmes in addition to lack of HIV testing sites in Tibet. Yunnan Province is known to be the worst affected province in the whole of China followed by Sichuan Province. In both the provinces there is a large Tibetan population as the traditional Tibetan province of Kham has been incorporated in these two provinces. Tibetans outside the Tibet TAR are more likely to be affected due to geographical proximity to the two provinces.
WTO and Globalisation: Whose Benefit?

When China became a member of the World Trade Organisation [WTO] on 11 December 2001, it was promoted as a win-win and all-win event for China and the world. 123 Beijing authorities view the WTO accession primarily as a vehicle to further reform and to gain international respectability for China. WTO-driven legal reforms in China support an equitable distribution of benefits, involves underlying questions of political will, and international monitoring.
Delivery and Deficiency; Health and Healthcare in Tibet, TIN, London, November 2002 Health policy challenges in the Tibet Autonomous Region, US Embassy Beijing, December 2000 report http// www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sand/tib-health.htm 121 Tibet Justice Centre (TJC), A Generation in Peril; The lives of Tibetan children under Chinese rule , http//www.tibetjustice.org/reports/children/index.html 122 http;//www.tchrd.org/hrupdate/2004/hr200407.htm#Aids 123 Statement by H.E Vice Minister Long Yongtu at the 18th Session of the WTO Working Party on China, 17 September 2001, available at www.wto.org
120
119
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Development
Globalisation at heart is an ancient phenomenon. It is a process of trade and commerce, with the spread of cultural influences, and the dissemination of knowledge and understanding between nations and peoples. Whereas economic globalisation is commonly understood as a phenomenon where there is intensification of international trade and expansion of free trade in the world market. The role of international institutions like the WTO, IMF [International Monetary Fund], and the World Bank, have led to centralised global trade bureaucracy managing the world economy.124 Several scholars and international human rights organisations have expressed concerns that Chinas accession to the WTO with the ongoing process of globalisation could have negative implications on the Tibetan economy, livelihood and culture. In its White Paper on Poverty Reduction the PRC admits that labour and resource intensive industries, such as agriculture and herding, may be adversely affected after China enters the WTO. A senior economist with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is more precise: Theres no doubt the peasants will have it worse under the WTO.125 In addition to legal reforms aimed at economic reformation, WTO accession will reinforce Chinas long-standing emphasis on maintaining social stability while encouraging centralisation of political authority. In his 5 December 2001 speech, outlining political-legal work, Politburo Politics and Law Committee Chair Lu Gan underscored the Partys emphasis on using the legal system to protect against worker unrest and social instability in the wake of WTO accession.126 Various negative impacts of globalisation include abuse of workers rights, environmental degradation, privatisation of health and other social services, increased poverty, loss of autonomy, and others, but also their fundamental cultural and religious belief systems are under assault.127 Globalisation has been described as a machine that throws off enormous wealth and bounty while it also leaves behind great furrows of wreckage.128 Globalisation is said to enrich the rich and leave the poor poorer. In the case of Tibet, it is all the more worrisome because they do not have a say and part in policy-decisions affecting their lives. There is a potential for abuse of general human rights protection when the WTO-driven legal reform is bent on achieving social stability and central government control. This could have worse implications for the marginalised and politically restive groups like the Tibetan community. On the one hand, the Tibetans owing to their marginalised status cannot access all the economic opportunities available and on the other hand, they are the targets for political control due to the political sensitivity attached to the Tibetan case.
124
Tashi Tsering, Globalisation to Tibet, Paper published by the Himalayan Research Bulletin of the Geography Department of Portland State University 125 Quote from Yuan Gangmin, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 126 ibid. 127 Tenzin P. Atisha, Tibetan Approach to Ecology, Tibetan Government-in-exile, http;//www.Tibet.com/Eco/eco7.html 128 William Greider, One World, Ready or Not; The Manic of Global Capitalism, Simon and Schuster, 1997
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Chinas 2001 White Paper on Modernisation said the commodities from other parts of the country and the world are flowing into Tibet in a continuous stream to enrich both the urban and rural markets and the lives of the local people. After its entry into the WTO, Zeng Peiyan, minister in charge of the State Development Planning Commission, promised that China would, under multilateral and bilateral agreements, open its market wider, particularly in the western region. In addition, he said, China will also expand its experiments in business practices further to the west so as to attract more foreign capital.129 The experience of other countries that enter the WTO, or who are dealing with the economic effects of globalisation, is that groups who are already excluded from mainstream national markets become even further marginalized.130 In this context, the flow and flooding of commodities is unlikely to help the Tibetans, as they are already a marginalised community in their own land. Given the social inequalities that currently exist in Tibet, and the PRCs discriminatory policy of refusing to allow Tibetans to participate in their own development, the WTO accession and its after-effects of cheap labour is likely to have a detrimental and impoverishing effect on Tibet. WTO membership will have an even greater impact on Tibets primary producers. WTO rules dictate that the Chinese government can no longer protect local produce by imposing high tariffs on foreign imports. Tariffs on many agricultural imports into China will be slashed, allowing in cheaper foods from vast and hi tech foreign farms which can produce far cheaper products than small Tibetan farms. Without such protection, market prices for important Tibetan produce such as barley, wheat, rapeseed and meat are likely to plunge. Experts predict that nomads will also have their markets adversely affected as they face increasing competition in their marketplaces.
Of the current WTO Agreements, the Agreement on Agriculture [AOA] could have the most direct impacts on Tibet as more than three quarters of all Tibetans are engaged in the agricultural sector, mostly practising pastoralism.131 AOA requires governments to reduce trade distortions, limit tariffs and subsidies and allow minimum market access to all countries involved in the WTO. Another important WTO agreement with major implications for Tibet is the Trade Related Intellectual Property [TRIP].132 Tibet has many different plants and herbs that are endemic to Tibet. With Chinas accession to WTO, there is a possibility that companies might claim patents for these plants and herbs. Chinas development method in Tibet also raises the issue of corporate social responsibility involving ethnic divisions between Tibetans and Chinese. The small-scale local projects would empower and enable the local Tibetans more than heavy infrastructure and industry.
Chinas Western Development makes good start, Peoples Daily online ICLT, Human Rights and the Long Term Viability of Tibets Economy, paper presented at PEC Peoples Summit, Vancouver, Canada, November 1997 131 J Charles, Livelihood Lost, Globalisation, WTO Accession and the Future of the Tibetan People, Free Tibet Campaign, http//www.freetibet.org/menu.htm 132 Tashi Tsering, Globalisation to Tibet, published in the Himalayan Research Bulletin of the Geography Department of Portland State University
130
129
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Development
Clearly, the companies who choose to invest in Tibet have a responsibility to help China catch up with the worlds best practices and to ensure that marginalized communities such as Tibetans are empowered and that their aspirations articulated properly. Thus, without taking the larger picture into consideration, the international involvement will only help Chinas long-term goal of assimilation, negatively impacting Tibetan lifestyles, livelihoods, culture and religion. For instance, according to information received by TCHRD, Carlsberg has signed a multi-million dollar deal with a Chinese company to make beer in Tibet. China Securities Journal reported that the new company, Tibet Lhasa Brewery, is a 50-50 partnership between Carlsberg International and Tibet Galaxy Science Technology Development. Beer is by far the popular alcoholic drink across Tibet. Overall consumption has risen dramatically in recent years with a 40 percent jump to 16.5 litres per head between 1997 and 2002. Foreign beer makers have begun aggressively pursuing the Tibetan market as barriers to trade the region have fallen.133 The large-scale production of beer will make it readily available, which could lead to a host of far reaching social ills and ill health for the Tibetans. Sadly, the indigenous population is being economically marginalized while Chinese companies and workers are snapping up contracts and jobs often because Chinese workers are more educated and skilled. Mure Dickie, the Beijing correspondent for The Financial Times, in a lengthy article on Tibet, said that despite government assurances, not a single Tibetan worker could be found at a major job site near Lhasa. [Financial Times, August 2, 2004]134
Conclusion
Chinas policies towards the Tibetan people reveal violations of Tibetans civil and political rights as well as its economic, social and cultural rights. Presently in Tibet, the social cost of Chinas economic policies are currently playing themselves out as the violation of the right to subsistence and development of the Tibetan people. The authoritarian governance, mismanagement and top-down development policies in Tibet have failed to deliver development to the Tibetan people and raise their living standards. The fundamental question for the TAR, and for policy makers at the central government level, is how best to spread the benefits of rapid growth and modernization to the relatively poor Tibetan populations, whose livelihoods depends on subsistence agriculture and nomadic livestock production.135 The development activities in the TAR should give greater priority to Tibetan capacity building, empowerment and participation. In the case of the Tibetan Plateau, two issues are particularly significant, the first being an appreciation for and an understanding of traditional relations between nature and economy. Secondly, China must
133
http;//www.tchrd.org/hrupdate/2004/hr200408 Ethical Corporation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Tibet, 22 September 2004 135 Arthur N. Holcombe, The Impacts of Economic Reforms and Opening up Polices on Local Ethnic Population Living Standards in China: The case of Tibet August 2001
134
49
understand the importance of achieving sustainable uses of land and natural resources, to ensure ecologically sustainable development. Unfortunately, China has neglected and undervalued the importance of traditional modes of exchange and production. At present, the current development methods based on disseminating the modern scientific knowledge to inform and uplift the rural masses, has not yet lifted the Tibetans out of poverty and food insecurity. Knowledge flows in one direction only downwards from those who are strong, educated and enlightened towards those who are weak, ignorant and in darkness.136 Economics like knowledge should not circulate only at the top levels, but should flow in one direction. The right to development is a rights based approach based on empowerment and participation (of the beneficiaries) in the decision making and execution process. Chinas exploitation of Tibets natural resources and so-called development of Tibetans through various projects without Tibetan participation and economic benefit is inconsistent with respect for the human right to development. Only when the people of Tibet enjoy genuine self-determination, can they truly enjoy the right to development.
136
Namgyal Chinas West Development Strategy and Rural Empowerment, in Chinas West Development Program: Domestic Strategies and Global Implications edited by Ding Lu and William A. W. Neilson, 2004
50
51
Novice monks of Kirti Monastic School holding the Chinese national flag on the Children Day, 1 June 2001
52
Right to Education
Right to Education
Introduction
The success of our education does not lie in the number of diplomas issued to graduates from universities, colleges, polytechnic schools, and secondary schools. It lies, in the final analysis, in whether our graduating students are opposed to or turn their hearts to the Dalai clique and in whether they are loyal to or do not care about our great motherland an the great socialist cause. This is the most salient and the most important criterion for assessing right and wrog, and the contributions and mistakes of our educational work in Tibet. To successfully solve the problem, we must improve political and ideological work in schools.1 Exactly 10 years have passed since Mr. Chen Kuiyuan, the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary, expressed so unequivocally his views and concerns over the ultimate goals of education in Tibet. His words exemplified the guidelines that for several decades have been characterizing education in Tibet: an ideology-driven education, which seeks to instill loyalty to China and the socialist cause. The provision of article 14 of the 1986 Compulsory Education Law, according to which teachers should be committed to the cause of socialist education, further reinforces the idea of a patriotic education that legitimizes the use of ideology in the teaching system. Against this background, it appears to be clear that education in the TAR is not directed to the free and full development of the Tibetan childrens personality, talents and mental and physical abilities. Instead, it becomes a tool that the central government can use to ensure political stability and ethnic unity within the region. In order to achieve these goals, education policies continue to target the young generations of Tibetans, undermining their identity through a biased representation of Tibetan history, a denial of their culture and traditions, and the relegation of Tibetan as a second-rate language. In this regard, over the last twelve months there has been no tangible evidence of positive measures taken by the Chinese government with a view to preserving Tibetan historic, cultural, linguistic identity through the educational system implemented in the TAR.
Acceptability of education
Article 4 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities states that
Chen Kuiyuan, Speech to Fifth TAR Conference on Education, 26 October 1994
53
States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, in order to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities existing within their territory. In practice, Tibetan students rarely receive any lessons on their culture or history. They are not allowed to honor any Tibetan holidays except for the Tibetan New Year, and are forced to celebrate Chinese holidays. They are also forbidden to wear Tibetan clothes at school.2 Moreover, Tibetan history continues to be subject to distorted representations in schools across Tibet. Such knowledge should be presented in a positive way in order to encourage tolerance and respect. Instead, bias in the presentation of Tibetan history results in low self-esteem within the Tibetan children and negative stereotypes towards them on the part of the Han Chinese community. It is reported that, because of such negative presentation of their history, Tibetan children are considered backwards and are frequently scolded by teachers and fellow-students.3. History textbooks play a major role in providing a biased representation of the history of Tibet. Chakjam Gyal, a student from Bokor village, located in the Tsolho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), stated: The school provides education from primary to higher secondary education. On my first year in the higher secondary school, we were introduced to a book entitled Chinese language in which a separate chapter on the Potala Palace was given. Fostering an everlasting friendship between Tibet and China was given as the prime reason behind its construction.4 In August 2004, a young monk near the Jhokhang temple in Lhasa, interviewed during a China-sponsored press trip of foreign journalists to Tibet, openly expressed his remorse for the lack of freedom of thought in Tibet and the compulsion to study a distorted version of the history of Tibet. He said: If someone from China says something about our history, and we know it is not true, because it is not what our scholars teach as the real history, but we cannot say so. We are not free to dispute. There is only one version of history allowed.5 The biased teaching of Tibetan history and the denial of Tibetan culture and traditions by the education system in Tibet represent a violation of the legal obligations that China has undertaken by ratifying the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In relation to article 13 (2) of the ICESCR, China has obligations to respect, protect and fulfill each of the essential features (availability, accessibility, acceptability, adaptability) of the right to education.6 Acceptability means
2 3
A Generation in Peril. The Lives of Tibetan children under Chinese rule, ICLT 2001 A Generation in Peril. The Lives of Tibetan children under Chinese rule, ICLT 2001 4 TCHRD Interview, 13 April 2004 5 A Report by Robert Marguand, The Christian Science Monitor, 25 August 2004. 6 Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, The right to education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10, Para. 50; 8 December 1999
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Right to Education
that the form and substance of education, including curricula and teaching methods, have to be acceptable to the students. China has clearly failed to fulfill the acceptability of education, as it has not taken positive measures to ensure that education is culturally appropriate for Tibetan children, further depriving them of a genuine knowledge of their history, culture and traditions.
Linguistic identity jeopardized

Chinas legislation authorizes the teaching of languages commonly used by specific or local ethnic groups.7 However, according to the law, this measure can be implemented only in schools - or other institutions of education - in which students of a minority ethnic group constitute the majority. This condition could open the door to a denial of the use of the Tibetan language in schools across the TAR, should Tibetan children become a minority within the school population, as a consequence of changes in the demographics of the region. Yet, even when Tibetan children represent the majority of the students in the schools, the teaching of Tibetan is marginalized to the advantage of the Chinese language. The case of the Shinga County secondary school exemplifies how the educational policies of the Chinese government have a negative impact on the use and the preservation of the Tibetan language in the TAR. The school was founded by the 11th Panchen Lama to promote and revive Tibetan language, and is attended only by Tibetan children. There were initially 70 teachers, out of which only 10 were Chinese. However, the school administration was gradually taken over by the Chinese authority, and, as a consequence, Chinese teachers began to replace Tibetan teachers. Tsering Kyi, a 19-year-old girl who studied at the Shingha County secondary school until July 2003, reported: Ever since then [the takeover by the Chinese authorities] the standard of Tibetan Language has been deteriorating. The class proceedings are now taken in Chinese language with only one hour of Tibetan class. The school administrators draw the attention of the students towards Chinese language, as they reckon that Chinese language will ensure them a career that would be otherwise difficult to pursue.8 Article 4 (3) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities declares: States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue.
7
8
See article 6 of the 1986 Compulsory Education Law and article 12 of the Education Law. TCHRD Interview, 17 May 2004
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In practice, as far as linguistic identity is concerned, China has not yet integrated the rights of the Tibetan minority in its education policies. Furthermore, instead of ensuring to the maximum of its available resources that the Tibetan linguistic identity is preserved, the Chinese government continues to turn a blind eye to a process that jeopardizes the very existence of Tibetan language, as this is progressively being replaced by Chinese as the sole language of education in school across the TAR. As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Ms. Katarina Tomaevski, has observed: An education that would affirm minority rights necessitates full recognition by the majority of the worth of minority languages and religions in all facets of life. Otherwise, education is seen as assimilationist and, hence, not compatible with Chinas human rights obligations.9 Moreover, if Chinas 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), which stressed the importance of recruiting teachers from China in order to develop education in Tibet,10 were to be fully implemented, the situation could further deteriorate as there would likely be an acceleration of the process of sinicization in the schools across Tibet. Professor Dungkar Lobsang Trinley, one of the leading cultural and intellectual figures of modern Tibet and recognized by the Chinese authorities as a national treasure, has said:
All hope in our future, all other developments, cultural identity, and protection of our heritage depends on this [Tibetan language]. Without educated people in all fields, able to express themselves in their own language, Tibetans are in danger of being assimilated. We have reached this point. 11
Accessibility of Education
In a press statement given on August 30th, 2004, the Executive Director of UNICEF, Ms. Carol Bellamy, expressed her concern over the fact that only 31% of children in Tibet have access to the compulsory nine years of education.12 Among the factors that could help explain such a low level of access to compulsory education among the children in the TAR is that there are undoubtly the financial obstacles that parents often have to face in order to secure basic education for their children.
Commission on Human Rights, 60th session, The right to education, Report submitted by the Special Rappoteur, Katarina Tomaevski, Addendum: Mission to China, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/45/Add.1, Para. 36; 21 November 2003 10 "China to invest 30 Billion Yuan in Basic Education, Xinhuanet, August 2001, http://www.edu.cn/20010904/ 3000223.shtml;According to the Chinese Ministry of Education, Educational departments in more developed eastern areas will be mobilized to help the central and western areas advance education by donating money and teaching instruments, and sending teaching staff to these areas through a rotation system. 11 Central Tibetan Administration, Educations policy of Intend , http://tibet.com, 19 March 2004 12 UNICEF goes west to help children, by Meng Yan, The China Daily, 3 September, 2004
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Right to Education
Article 10 of the 1986 Peoples Republic of Chinas Compulsory Education Law proclaims that the state shall not charge tuition for students receiving compulsory education. However, the realization of a compulsory education that is free to all in Tibet has not yet been achieved. As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Ms. Katarina Tomaevski, stated, compulsory education has not been made free in China.13 Although she did not specify whether she was including the TAR in her assessment on the freedom of compulsory education in China, the evidence collected by TCHRD suggests that Ms. Tomaevskis statement can certainly apply to the school system in the TAR. Over that last twelve months numerous interviews have been conducted by TCHRD with Tibetan refugees. The majority of their testimonies reveal that children across the TAR are often facing unaffordable school fees and other informal costs of education. Tenzin Nyima, a 14-year-old girl from Lhasa, studied for six months at a middle school in Lhasa before her parents withdrew her and sent her to India in search for better education. She told about her brief experience in the middle school: The tuition fees are two times higher than in primary school and the expenditures for books and stationery have to be sustained by the students themselves.14 Tsering Kyi, a 19-year-old girl who studied at the Shingha County secondary school until July 2003, reported: Students need to pay 270 Yuan twice a year as school fees; in addition they also have to pay for their food a sum which increases with the increment of their grade. Moreover, school management often resorts to collecting money from the students for miscellaneous expenses.15 School fees and other out-of-pocket costs that prevent families from sending their children to school represent a clear obstacle towards the realization of the accessibility of education. This is in contrast with Chinas legal obligations stemming from the ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which, at article 13 (2) declares that Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all and that Secondary education in its different forms, [...] shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education.16
13
Commission on Human Rights, 60th session, The right to education, Report submitted by the Special Rappoteur, Katarina Tomaevski, Addendum: Mission to China, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/45/Add.1, Par. 17; 21 November 2003 14 TCHRD Interview, 15 December 2004 15 TCHRD Interview, 17 May 2004 16 Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, The right to education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10, Para. 6; 8 December 1999
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Availability of Education
Another factor that may that may be contributing to the low levels of Tibetan children attending school is the complete lack of schools in some remote areas of the region. The problem affects mostly the rural areas, where children have to walk long distances or are forced to use other modes of transportation such as horses in order to reach their schools. Faced with this difficulty children often find it to difficult to make the journey to school, and, as a result, some of them eventually drop out and are left with no choice but to work in agriculture. Ngawang Lhamo, a 19-year-old girl from Samye Village, approximately 50 kilometers southeast of Lhasa, stated:
Children are denied of educational opportunities because there are no schools in their locality. As a result they take up farming. There are schools in the County but I have to travel three hours on a vehicle to reach the school from my place. So it is hard for students to attend school.17
Tenzin, an 18-year-old boy from Lhagoag Village in Chatren County, located in the Sichuan province, stated:
The children of my village and the neighbors have no access to schools. There are almost no students attending the County schools, as there are no adequate roads for vehicles. As a result, from generation to generation the children have been engaged in farming. The villagers have made appeals for the construction of a school, but so far the Chinese authorities have taken no steps in that direction.18
Kyzom, a 16-year-old girl living in the same village, stated:
Until recently, there was no school. As a result most of the people are illiterate. A few years back, under the initiative of the head of the village, parents were asked to send to school one child between 7-14 years old from each family. However, the students have to ride horse and it takes one day to reach the school. Moreover, the education standards of the teachers are poor and the schools infrastructure is wretched. The students gradually become demoralized and cause problems to their families.19
Under article 13 (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) China has a legal obligation to make education available to all. Thus, the Chinese governments failure to make schools available in sufficient quantity across Tibet is in contrast to its specific obligations to fulfill one of the essential features of the right to education.
17 18
TCHRD Interview, 13 December 2004 TCHRD Interview, 13 December 2004 19 TCHRD Interview, 13 December 2004
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Right to Education
Educational freedom: no choice but exile

As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Ms. Katarina Tomaevski, has pointed out: Chinas legislation defines education as a right as well as an obligation.20 The further specification of nine years of education as compulsory reinforces its definition as an obligation.21[...] Local authorities have often resorted to the law on compulsory education to force parents to enroll their children, and fines have been imposed [...] for their failure to do so.22 Parents have to send their children to school under the threat of legal enforcement, but they cannot choose education for their children.23 They face increasing difficulties in securing for their children an education that respects their culture, history and traditions and that help preserve the language diversity of the Tibetan people. Thus, they are often left with no option but to send their children across the Himalayas to Tibetan schools in India. Tsamchoe Lhamo, who reached the Tibetan Reception Center in Katmandu, Nepal, after fleeing Tibet on April 25th, 2004, stated: In June 2003, PSB officials of Shigatse Prefecture made an official announcement in 29 villages of the Dingri County to prevent families from sending their children to study in Tibetan schools in India and instead make it compulsory for families to send their children in Chinese administered schools. The authorities also warned that those parents who failed to send their children to study in the Chinese schools would even face a prison sentence. In Yuljong village, around 20 families were fined 1500 Yuan each for their inability to send their children to Chinese school. [...] Mrs. Passang, mother of three children, was fined 6000 Yuan for sending them to school in India.24 Against the principle set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, at article 13, proclaims that everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, the Chinese authorities impose upon Tibetans severe restrictions to their freedom of movement, making it nearly impossible for them to travel outside China to receive education in Tibetan schools in exile. Nevertheless, Tibetan children continue to risk their lives fleeing Tibet in search for an education that preserves their language, culture, history and traditions.
20
Article 46 of the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China states that citizens of the Peoples Republic of China have the right as well as the duty to receive education; Article 9 of the Education Law states that citizens of the Peoples Republic of China shall have the right and obligation to receive education and that all citizens, regardless of ethnic group, race, sex, occupation, property status or religious belief, shall enjoy equal opportunities for education according to law. 21 Article 5 of the 1986 Compulsory Education Law states that all children who have reached the age of six shall enroll in school and receive compulsory education for the prescribed number of years, regardless of sex, nationality or race. 22 Commission on Human Rights, 60th session, The Right to Education, Report submitted by the Special Rappoteur, Katarina Tomaevski, Addendum, Mission to China, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/45/Add.1, Para. 17; 21 November 2003. 23 Commission on Human Rights, 60th session, The Right to Education, Report submitted by the Special Rappoteur, Katarina Tomaevski, Addendum, Mission to China, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/45/Add.1, Para. 17; 21 November 2003. 24 TCHRD Interview, 25 April 2004
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Since the early 80s well over 7,000 children have risked everything to journey across the Himalayas in the hope that they will receive in exile the kind of education that they have been denied back home. Between January and August 2004, 2,416 new refugees have reached the Tibetan Reception Centre in Dharamsala. Of these refugees, children under the age of 13 constitute 20.98 %, while youth between the age of 14 and 25 constitute 40.23 %. Therefore, young Tibetan refugees account for 61.21 % of the total number of new escapees into India in eight months. In the month of September, 238 new Tibetan refugees arrived in Dharamsala. 81.93 % of whom were below the age of 25. The total number of Tibetan refugees who arrived at the Tibetan reception center from 1991 until June 2004 was 43,634, 59.74% of which were below the age of 25.
Conclusion
In 1996, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), in its concluding observations on the periodic report submitted by China, expressed concerns about reports that school attendance in minority areas, including the Tibet Autonomous Region, is lagging behind, that the quality of education is inferior and that insufficient efforts have been made to develop a bilingual education system which would include adequate teaching in Chinese. These shortcomings may disadvantage Tibetan and other minority pupils applying to secondary and higher level schools.25 Regrettably, the above remarks still accurately describe the situation of education in Tibet to date. It is unquestionable that over the last eight years the Chinese government has allocated considerable amount of resources aimed at improving the education system in Tibet. Increased budgetary expenditure on education for minority nationalities has been greatly emphasized by the Chinese government in its initial report submitted to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).26 However, no mention is made of any concrete measure adopted by the authorities with a view to integrating minority rights into their educational policies. Chinas report is clearly reflective of the governments one-dimensional approach to the realization of the right to education in Tibet. The Chinese government seems to fail to understand that spending on education, although necessary, is not sufficient to ensure that Tibetan children fully enjoy their right to receive an education that respects and preserves the Tibetan culture and identity.
25
Committee on the Rights of the Child, 12th Session, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: China; UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.56, Para. 19; 7 June 1996 26 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 34 th Session; Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Initial report submitted by the Peoples Republic of China; UN Doc E/1990/5/ Add.59, Par.a 218; 4 March 2004.
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Right to Education
Mr. Asbjrn Eide, Chairperson of the Working Group on Minorities of the United Nations SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, has written: The protection of minorities is intended to ensure that integration does not become unwanted assimilation or undermine the group identity of persons living on the territory of the State.27 Thus, as a minority nationality, Tibetans are entitled to a special safeguard under a human rights perspective. Tibetan culture, history and traditions require not only acceptance and tolerance of their own characteristics, but also a positive attitude on the part of the Chinese government. Protection of the Tibetan identity means that the China should abstain from policies that have the purpose or effect of assimilating the Tibetan minority into the dominant culture. In this regard, the Chinese governments educational policies are crucial. Denying Tibetans the possibility of learning their own language and of receiving instruction in their own language, or excluding from their education the transmission of knowledge about their own culture, history, tradition and language, is a clear violation of the obligation to protect their iden
27
Commentary to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, by Asbjrn Eide; UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/2, Para. 21, 2 April 2001.
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Interview with
Dawa Tashi
(Former Tibet University Student)
On June 9th 2003 officials of the Lhasa Public Security Bureau (PSB) dressed in civilian clothes entered the campus of the Tibet University in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). They searched the students dorm and found a number of political writings and a letter addressed to the United Nations. Five students were immediately arrested on grounds of splitting the motherland, undermining unity of nationalities and violating the constitution. They were detained in the TAR PSB Detention Centre. The five had clandestinely written political essays and formed a secret group called Tibetan Democractic Youth Group. Since the group was only involved in preparation for a political activity and had not carried out any public activity, four of its members were released after a month of detention and allowed to return to the University. However, a fifth student, Dawa Tashi, was suspected of being the ringleader and was kept in detention. He was eventually released on August 12th 2003. Upon his return to the University the Principal and the Head of the Tibetan Department accused Dawa of damaging the Universitys reputation and inciting other students against the government. A University assembly consisting of three thousand students and faculty members was called and Dawa was condemned for his splittist activities. As a result, Dawa was expelled from the university on August 25th 2003 with only one examination left to graduate. Therefore he decided to go into exile and reached Dharamsala in early 2004. In this brief interview with TCHRD, Dawa talks about his experience as a student in Tibet and discusses some issues dealing with the situation of education in Tibet at university level. He also expresses his thoughts as he looks back at life from exile. Q: Why did you decide to leave Tibet? A: After being labeled as a splittist and thrown out of university, it is hard to lead a normal life in Tibet. You are kept under constant watch by the authorities and your family comes under immense pressure. I lost hope and started feeling useless. Therefore, I made the decision to flee into exile. That way at least my family can be relieved from pressure. Besides, I thought maybe I could be of better use for the Tibetan cause from exile.
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Right to Education
Q: Do you think that you made the right decision to flee Tibet? A: I think so. Here in exile I am able to get information about international news and stories; this is not possible in Tibet. I am happy to learn and gain more knowledge. But I am very sad that I had to separate from the rest of my family members too. Q: Looking back, what do you think went wrong? Do you have any regrets? A: I have no regrets, although I regret that I did not have the opportunity to generate the activity we had planned. Q: What kind of impact do you think your activities, arrest and finally being thrown out of university would have on other Tibetan students in your university? A: The manner in which authorities handle cases like mine is very intimidating to anyone. I was called a splittist, named and shamed in front of 3000 students and teachers. I was rebuked for giving the university a bad name and kicked out of university for my actions. Other students were clearly told that if they got involved in such activities, they too would meet the same fate. In the past many times we were told of Lobsang Tenzin, who is serving a life sentence for his splittist activities, and warned that if we did what he had done, we too could be met with the same fate. So students naturally get scared. No one wants to get into trouble but I believe that those who feel the need to protest for the larger interest of our people will do so. Q: What is your understanding of human rights? Is there any awareness of human rights is in Tibet? A: Here we here mention the United Nations and human rights on radio and TV. Sometimes, we also hear some persons mentioning these terms in public places like teashops and restaurants. We dont know who they are. Generally, the local public is unaware of rights as such. People have no knowledge; they dont talk about human rights. People only know what official media is telling them. Thats all. Q: Now that you have been in exile for nearly a year in India and have seen Tibetans living here, what do you make of the difference in human freedom between here and Tibet? A: I can tell that the difference is like the sky and earth. When I arrived here, I had the privilege of watching the annual session of the Assembly of Tibetan Peoples Deputies (ATPD). The Deputies were raising issues and concerns of the public with the representatives of the government-in-exile freely, openly and without fear. You cannot do this in Tibet or China. There, during meetings your facial expression is taken note of. It is utmost important not seen to be disagreeing to the governments policies or questioning them. It is very dangerous if you do that.
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Q: As far as you know, do teachers and students in universities in Tibet have the possibility of freely expressing their thoughts? A: Generally speaking, teachers and students are free to express their opinions, as long as they do not talk about political issues, especially about independence for Tibet. Q: Can students freely associate within their universities to form students unions and other associations of the kind? A: Yes, students are allowed to form associations aimed at improving the students general welfare, but they cannot freely set up any kind of association that tries to advance a political cause. Q: Do students have a saying, individually or through their associations, in the matters concerning the universitys administration and policies? A: Students can voice their concerns over certain issues, for instance to push for the introduction of the Tibetan language as a teaching medium. However, I would not go that far as to say that students can exert a real and effective pressure upon the university administration. In fact, they cannot have an impact on the educational policies and cannot really change things within their university. Q: What is the level of political pressure, if there is any, exerted by the government authorities on the university administration? A: Generally, the university administration has a certain degree of autonomy in deciding matters concerning education within the institution. However, it has to strictly adhere to the regulations and guidelines set out by the Ministry of Education and cannot cross the line when it comes to implementing those regulations. Moreover, if very serious matters arise, the university administration generally has to report to Government officials. Q: How are subjects like politics and history taught in universities? A: If a teacher gives classes on the history of Tibet, he can only follow the official guidelines established for the teaching of history, and, most importantly, he must stick to what history textbooks say. There is no possibility for the teacher to go beyond what is in the textbooks. Q: Can students challenge the content of the textbooks and engage in a debate with the teacher? A: When I was taught the history of Tibet, students and teachers seemed to believe that what was said in the textbooks was correct, so there was no need for any debate. Students can challenge the official version of history presented, but they seem to be genuinely convinced of the veracity of the version presented to them.
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Right to Education
Q: Do students have the possibility to find textbooks presenting alternative version of history and politics in the university libraries? A: Books that do not deal with politics are usually available in libraries. However, as far as politics and history are concerned, only books whose publication has officially been authorized by the Government are made available to the public. Q: Is there any liberty to establish educational institutions at the university level? A: As far as I know, there are several private-funded initiatives to establish educational institutions, but not at the level of University. Q: Do you mean that there is no possibility of receiving a college education that differs substantially from that provided by the State? A: That is correct. In Tibet there is no trace of private academic institutions at the university level. All universities are established and run by the Government. Q: What are the basic requirements to get admitted into college? A: The basic requirement is the achievement of a national pre-established admission score, which is calculated on the basis of the marks that students receive when they complete high school. The admission score is the same all over China. However, in Tibet the admission threshold is set at a lower level. This provision has been designed to encourage students belonging to the Tibetan minority to enroll at universities. Q: Are university fees affordable? A: The annual tuition fee is around 3000 Yuan. Boarding is approximately 800 Yuan. Books and stationary can cost up to 150 Yuan. Q: Do you think that is affordable considering Tibets standards of living? A: I could not tell if that would be considered expensive for an average Tibetan. What I know is that in mainland China university fees are twice as expensive as in Tibet. I can also say with absolute certainty that for the average Tibetan family living in a rural area those fees would be almost prohibitive.
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Q: What do you think are the most negative aspects of the education in universities in Tibet? A: I think that the most negative aspect is that only a restricted number of subjects, like Tibetan history, culture and traditional medicine, continue to be taught in Tibetan. All the other subjects are not taught in Tibetan but only in Chinese. Students have absolutely no chance to receive teaching in Economics, Political Science, Law, etc. in their own language. Q: If the Chinese Government were not be in charge of education in Tibet, do you think that the situation of universities would be better? A: I would definitely say that the education system in Tibet would be better, mainly because all subjects would be thought in Tibetan. I think it would be more interesting and easier for students to learn. Moreover, students would have the opportunity to discuss political issues, something that is still being precluded to them. I also think that if China were not ruling Tibet there could be more Tibetan students studying in Universities across Tibet, as Chinese students are increasingly occupying seats that are meant for Tibetan students.
Dawa Tashi, was born 25 years ago in Nagartse County, Lhoka Prefecture, TAR. He studied in a village Elementary School from 1988 to 1991 and in Nagartse Government Primary School from 1991 to 1994. After completing Secondary School in 2000, he studied in the Tibetan Department at Tibet University in Lhasa until his expulsion in August 2003.
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Right to Education
67
Dalai Lama graffiti on a wall in Lhasa, June 2004
68
Alice Speller SFT-UK
Political Civil and Political Rights
Civil and Political Rights

China has chosen not to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which it signed on October 5, 1998 , claiming that in a developing country like China - economic, social and cultural rights of the people are more important than civil and political rights. Therefore, it ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). However, Beijing not having ratified the ICCPR does not mean that it is exempt from its obligation towards guaranteeing the constitutional rights of the people who live within its jurisdiction. China is also obliged to recognise and observe the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The Preamble of the UDHR clearly states:
Recognising that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights.
China continues to use all available diplomatic means to obstruct scrutiny of its human rights record. On the question of human rights, Beijing prefers bi-lateral dialogues to multi-lateral dialogues as it is able to put pressure on one country than many at a time. At the China-EU seminar on the ratification of the ICCPR in June 2004, Chinas representatives promised to take the responsible attitude to study the ICCPR and create the conditions for the early ratification of the covenant.1 However, Chinas promises contradict with what happens in practice. During 2004, there was huge suppression of the right to freedom of opinion and expression in the country. The persecution of the Tibetan writer, Woeser for her devotion to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan religion2 exemplifies the extent of control that is being exercised by the Chinese authorities on the freedom of expression. Similarly, the arrest and instant release of three outspoken Chinese intellectuals in December indicates the extraordinary campaign of criticism launched by Beijing in an effort to stifle intellectuals. In the year 2004, TCHRD recorded 21 known cases of arrests on charges of suspicion of activities that the government deems endangering state security, - activities that called for the freedom of Tibet or simply for expressing their allegiance to the Dalai Lama. The Centre
1 2
Xinhuanet, July 1, 2004 Essay - Tibet Facing Imperialism of Two Kinds: An Analysis of Woeser Incident, by Wang Lixiong
69
also received information of at least 20 arrests of Tibetans prior to 2004. As of December 2004, TCHRD record of known political prisoners is 145.3 Furthermore, the renewal of the strike hard campaign in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), and the intensity of emphasis on the continuation of the patriotic re-education campaign in monasteries and nunneries4 clearly indicate a tightening of control in Tibet. The announcement of the implementation of the Religious Affairs Provisions on November 30, 2004 of all religious groups in China from March 1, 2005 raises serious concerns for the Tibetan people. It is certain that religious institutions such as the monasteries, nunneries and religious schools will come under sever control. Many are likely to face ultimate closure, thus affecting the Tibetan peoples way of life. The following three chapters on Civil Liberties, Religious Freedom and the Right to Information explains in detail some of the grave human rights violations of civil and political rights that continue to occur in Tibet.
3 4
Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2004, www.tchrd.org TCHRD Press Release, November 8, 2004 www.tchrd.org
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Civil Liberties
Civil Liberties
Introduction
The Peoples Republic of China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on October 5th 1998. Although this was an important step towards the realization of civil and political rights in China, it must be regretted that to date China has not yet ratified the Covenant. On March 14th 2004, Chinas 10th National Peoples Congress adopted a constitutional amendment that included a general provision regarding human rights. Thus, article 33 (3) of the Chinese constitution now states: The State respects and preserves human rights. This amendment is welcomed as an important progress towards the advancement of human rights in China. However, as long as the general clause contained in article 33 (3) of the Constitution is not implemented through adequate legislative provisions and, most of all, a sound and well-functioning legal system and a truly independent judiciary, the overall human rights situation in China will not likely see a significant change. However, the human rights situation inside Tibet continues to deteriorate with no real improvement. The information from Tibet reveals a pattern of systematic violation of Tibetan civil and political rights. Article 35 and 36 of the Chinese Constitution guarantee the right to freedom of expression, association and religion. But these constitutional guarantees have failed to avert human rights violations from occurring in Tibet, as corroborated by testimonies of Tibetans who have arrived in exile. In fact, severe restrictions continue to be imposed on the freedom of assembly and association and on the freedom of opinion and expression. With regard to political rights, this year marked the release of some high profile political prisoners by Chinese authorities: Phuntsok Nyidron, the longest serving female political prisoner, was released from Drapchi prison after completing 17 years sentence; Ngawang Woeser and Ngawang Gyaltsen, monks of Drepung monastery who spearheaded the September demonstration of 1987, and Geshe Sonam Phuntsok was released from Chungdong prison No. 3 in Sichuan province. However, the release of some political prisoners and the decline in the number of detainees do not indicate an overall improvement in the human rights situation in Tibet. TCHRD has documented 146 known political prisoners still serving prison terms in the various Chinese prison networks across Tibet. Of which 55 Tibetans are serving more than 10 years of prison sentence and monks constituting 63 percent of the total prisoners. TCHRD believes that there are many more cases of unconfirmed arrests. According to Amnesty International, there are at least 145 known cases of political prisoners who are currently being held in Tibet for a variety of peaceful activities such as
71
advocating Tibetan independence and also for refusing to renounce their faith in His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The lack of independent access to prisoners and prisons made it difficult to ascertain the number of Tibetan political prisoner. In this respect, it must be noted that on June 16th 2004 the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Mr. Theo Van Boven, whose mission to China was scheduled to take place from the end of June 2004, announced that the visit was postponed until sometime later that year at the Governments request. The Government cited the need for additional time to prepare for the two-week visit as a reason for the postponement.1 Mr. Van Bovens predecessor, Sir Nigel Rodley, had tried unsuccessfully since 1996 to visit China. The information contained in this chapter is based on allegations of human rights violations reported to TCHRD by Tibetan refugees and other individuals during 2004. It is believed that those cases represent just a fraction of the actual number of abuses. Human rights violations remain too often unaccounted for, as international human rights monitors traditionally face obstacles in investigating violations of human rights in Tibet. Moreover, in some cases the information on arrests, detentions and prison sentences only comes to light years after the actual incident. Right to freedom of opinion and expression Article 19 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. Article 35 of the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China guarantees freedom of expression, publication, demonstration and assembly. It declares: Citizens of the Peoples Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration. Furthermore, the Chinese Constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief, the persons dignity and inviolability and freedom and privacy of correspondence.2 In practice, throughout 2004 the Tibetan peoples rights guaranteed by article 35 and 36 of the Constitution of the PRC were repeatedly violated. Various punitive and repressive measures were employed to censor independent reporters, writers and artists.
Special Rapporteur announces postponment of visit to China, 16 June 2004;http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/ news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/53B5D44CFD510A0BC1256F3C0034E7B6?OpenDocument 2 Article 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 of the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China.
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Civil Liberties
On September 22nd 2003 Dorjee Tsephel from Chabcha County in Tsolho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the Qinghai Province was arrested for composing a song in honor of the Dalai Lama. Qinghai Peoples court sentenced him to four years of imprisonment.3 On March 10th 2004, Namkha and Bagocha belonging to nomadic families from Tongde County in the Qinghai Province were arrested by Tongde County Public Security Bureau officials, who suspected that for their songs titled Amdo Phagod (Courageous Amdo Man) and Tsenpoe Phonya (Kings Messenger)5 contained implicit political messages. The authorities confiscated CDs bought by the locals and arrested the singer and the composer. They were released after two months of detention6. In a similar case, TCHRD received information on the arrest of Ghangshun, a Tibetan singer from Qinghai province in February 2004 for singing a song in praise of the Dalai Lama. To date, there is no information on his whereabouts.
Arbitrary arrest and detentions

Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile. Article 71 of Chinas Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) makes it mandatory for an arrest warrant to be presented at the time of arrest. Furthermore, article 59 states that The arrest of a criminal suspect or an accused shall be approved by the peoples procuratorates or decided by the peoples court. and article 64 of Criminal Procedure Law adds that when detaining a person, the public security organs shall present a detention warrant. The family of the detainee of the unit that the detainee works for shall be notified with the reason for detention. In practice, too often cases of arrests in Tibet are carried out without the presentation of an arrest warrant, the control of a judicial authority, and failing to communicate to the detainees family about his whereabouts. In September 2004, during its visit to the Peoples Republic of China, a delegation of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention headed by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Ms. Lela Zerrougui, had access to the Prison No. 1 of the Tibet Autonomous Region (Drapchi prison) and the Lhasa Detention Centre (Gutsa). However, the Working Group regretted that during its visit to Drapchi prison in Lhasa, it was informed that certain individuals on its list could not be interviewed due to an internal regulation. The visit to those detainees was particularly important to the Working Group given incidents that occurred in the aftermath of its 1997 visit. Upon learning this information, the Working Group decided to discontinue its visit to Drapchi prison.7
3 5
Tibet Times, 20 May 2004. The song titled Kings Messenger, begins: Dear youth of Tibet/Those who are left behind in Tibet should not remain timid./Raise your head with pride,/I am the messenger of the King 6 Tibetan Singer and lyricist released after two months detention, Human Rights Update, TCHRD May 2004. 7 Statement by Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Following visit to China, 4 October 2004,
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Over the past ten years, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has issued 39 opinions covering 208 cases of individuals who have claimed to be arbitrarily detained in China. The UN Working Group found that 180 of those 208 cases indeed contained, evidence of arbitrary detention. No conclusion could be drawn for the remaining 28 cases, either because the detainees had already been freed before the Working Groups investigation, or because of lack of information.8 The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary when it clearly cannot be justified on any legal basis such as ongoing detention beyond the sentence or the presence of an amnesty law. Detention is also considered arbitrary when the deprivation of liberty, is the result of the judgment or sentence for the exercise of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, detention is regarded as arbitrary when the complete or partial non-observance of the relevant international standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights relating to the right to a fair trail, is of such gravity as to confer on the deprivation of liberty, of whatever kind, an arbitrary character.9 By these definitions, the majority of arrests of Tibetan political prisoners can be defined as arbitrary as Chinese security forces routinely resort to arbitrary arrest and detention of Tibetans who hold peaceful demonstrations, display the Tibetan flag, distribute political leaflets, process photographs of the Dalai Lama and pray for him his health of well being. TCHRD received information this year that on October 22nd 2002 Tashi Topgyal, 50, from Ngamring County, Shigatse Prefecture, was arrested for pasting pro-independence posters two months earlier. The PSB officials discovered an autobiography of the Dalai Lama and two copies of the book Guidelines for the future Polity of Tibet. Those facts were followed by the arrest of Ngodup Dorjee, a bank staff member on suspicion of having connections with Tashi. It has been reported that in 2003 the Shigatse Peoples Intermediate Court sentenced him to six years of imprisonment that he continues to serve at Drapchi prison. On February 12th 2004, Choeden Rigzin, 25, a monk from Gaden monastery was arrested by Public Security Bureau (PSB) during a secret raid at the monastery. The PSB officials found a portrait of the Dalai Lama and further discovered a banned Tibetan national flag in his room. There has been no information on his whereabouts since then. Following Choedens arrest, the PSB detained two of Choedens friends, Tsuchung and Dhargay, on grounds of being involved in the alleged crime. The two monks were subsequently released and returned to the monastery. The officials later summoned all the monks and declared Choeden Rinzins possession of the Dalai Lamas portrait and the banned Tibetan national flag as crime. The officials also warned the gathering of around 500 monks not to participate in activities that split the motherland.10
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/DCE1B1DE1F7D56DBC1256F23002FFFFC?opendocument 8 The Dui Hua Foundation, Engaging China on Human Rights: John Kamn Remarks to the Brooking Institution, October 14 2004 9 UN Doc E/CN4/2000/ADD1 10 Monk arrested for Dalai Lama portrait and Tibetan National Flag , Human Rights Update, TCHRD March 2004
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Civil Liberties
On July 27th 2004, 60 people were arrested at a reception ceremony for a monk, Draksey Rinpoche, on his return to Chogri Monastery from Switzerland. The locals raised religious banners which included an image of a snow lion chasing an object resembling the banned Tibetan national flag. Most of those detained were released after spending several days in custody. There were reports of beating during their detention, which left the two men so severely injured that they could not walk.11 In September 2004 the Chinese authorities sentenced two monks and a layman to three-year jail terms, on suspicion that they were involved in pasting posters advocating Tibetan independence.12 On September 14th 2004, two brothers Nyima Tenzin, 20, and Sonam Nyima, 18, were arrested by the authorities of Sog County, Nagchu Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region(TAR) for protesting for independence and freedom in Tibet in front of the Sog County Government office.13 With regard to the above-mentioned cases of arbitrary detention, it must be noted that the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, following its visit to China, stressed the fact that to date no legislative measures have been taken by the government to ensure a clear-cut exception from criminal responsibility for those peacefully exercising their rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.14 Another element of concern is the Chinese authorities liberal interpretation of legislative provisions aimed at preserving state security and national unification, which contributes to the practice of arbitrary detentions and arrests. For example, article 103 of the Criminal Law of the Peoples Republic of China states: Whoever organizes, plots, or acts to split the country or undermine national unification, the ringleader, or the one whose crime is grave, is to be sentenced to life imprisonment or not less than ten years of fixedterm imprisonment; other active participants are to be sentenced to not less than three but not more than 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment; and other participants are to be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights. Whoever instigates to split the country and undermine national unification is to be sentenced to not more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights; ringleaders or those whose crimes are grave are to be sentenced to not less than five years of fixedterm imprisonment.
11 12
Ibid. Three Tibetans Jailed for Suspected Separatism Radio Free Asia (RFA), September 24, 2004 13 Brothers arrested for pro-independence protest. Human Rights Update TCHRD, October 2004. 14 Statement by Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Following visit to China, 4 October 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/DCE1B1DE1F7D56DBC1256F23002FFFFC?opendocument
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In this regard, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has reiterated its concerns over the fact that to date no definition for the term in criminal law endangering national security has been given, hence the application of criminal law provisions using this unduly broad notion may invariably give rise to arbitrariness.15
Prominent cases of arbitrary detention in Tibet17

Gedhun Choekyi Nyima Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the Dalai Lama recognized 11th Panchen Lama of Tibet, who will be 16 years old on 25 April 2005 has been missing from public view for 9 years in a row now. On May 17th 1995, the sixyear-old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, his parents and brother were taken to Nagchu Airport in Nagchu County, Nagchu Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region by a party of security police and have never been seen since then. The Peoples Republic of China has admitted to holding the Panchen Lama for his own safety. China Ambassador Wu Jian to UN in Geneva told that, He has been put under the protection of the government at the request of his parents.18 Many UN representatives, government delegations, NGOs and individuals worldwide have expressed concern over the Panchen Lamas continued detention at every given opportunity, and called for the Chinese authorities to allow access to the boy by an independent body acceptable to the Chinese government and Tibetans to verify his health and living conditions. The former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, also had requested access to the Panchen Lama. Beijing authorities have continued to deny access to the boy stating that he was well and growing up as any normal healthy child of his age. Trulku Tenzin Delek On April 7th 2002, Chinese authorities arrested Trulku Tenzin Delek, a prominent religious figure from Lithang County in Sichuan Province. Trulku was charged with alleged involvement in a series of bomb blast incidents that occurred in Kardze Tibet Autonomous Prefecture in 2001. On December 2nd 2002, the Kardze Intermediate Peoples Court convicted Trulku Tenzin Delek and his disciple Lobsang Dhondup and sentenced them to death. However, Trulku Tenzin Delek was granted a two-year suspension, while Lobsang Dhondup was executed on January 26th 2003. Trulku Tenzin Delek was known for his social welfare and environmental activities and professed allegiance to the Dalai Lama. It is
15
Statement by Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Following visit to China, 4 October 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/DCE1B1DE1F7D56DBC1256F23002FFFFC?opendocument 16 UN groups says China lags on human rights, Reuters, 4 October 2004 17 For more information on the list of known political prisoners in Tibet, see the Appendix. 18 http://:www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tibet/china/panchen.html
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believed that his rising popularity resulted in Chinese concerns that he might politically influence the local public opinion. The authorities refused to give information on the reasons of Trulku Tenzin Deleks arrest and the heavy sentencing, stating that the details of the case are a state secret. Almost two years have gone by, and Trulku Tenzin Delek continues to be in detention with his execution date set for January 25th 2005. Jigme Gyatso Jigme Gyatso, a former monk from Gaden monastery, is originally from Kersul district in Amdo. In 1985, he came to India and sought an audience with the Dalai Lama. Jigme stayed for a year in Drepung Gomang Monastery in South India and later returned to Tibet where he joined Gaden Monastery. On March 30th 1996, he was arrested on alleged charges of political activities and subsequently sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment.
Chadrel Rinpoche Chadrel Rinpoche is the former abbot of Tashi Lhunpo monastery, and Chairman of the Search Committee for the reincarnation of the 11th Panchen Lama. Chadrel Rinpoche and his assistant Champa Chungla disappeared from Chengdu Airport in Sichuan Province on May 14th 1995. On April 21st1997, the Shigatse Intermediate Peoples court sentenced Chadrel Rinpoche to six years of imprisonment. He was charged with plotting to split the country and leaking state secrets. He was accused of working for and assisting the Dalai Lama in the search for the 11th Panchen Lama. Although his sentence ended on May 13th 2001 following the completion of a six-year prison term, it is believed that he is now kept under house arrest. There is no additional information on his exact whereabouts in Shigatse, or on his state of health. Jampa Chungla Jampa Chungla, 56-year-old former assistant of Chadrel Rinpoche, was arrested in 1995 for his participation in the search committee of the 11th Panchen Lama. He was sentenced to a four- year prison term and to a two-year deprivation of political rights. He continues to be held in custody even after the completion of his original four-year prison term. Lobsang Tenzin Lobsang was arrested on March 11th 1988 for participating in a proindependence demonstration against the Chinese rule at the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa. He was accused of involvement in the death of a Peoples Army Police officer during the demonstration. On January 19th 1989, Lobsang Tenzin was sentenced to death with a two-year suspension. As a result of international
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pressure, Lobsang Tenzins sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in March 1991. Ngawang Pulchung Ngawang Phulchung has advocated for the Tibetan peoples human rights education. On September 27th1987, Ngawang Pulchung and 20 other monks of Drepung monastery staged a peaceful demonstration in central Lhasa demanding respect for human rights, including religious freedom and the right to self-determination for Tibetans. This protest was the first of a series of other important pro-independence demonstrations that were violently repressed by the authorities in the late eighties. In April 1989 Ngawang Pulchung and three other monks were arrested for forming a counter revolutionary group which had clandestinely produced political leaflets. Ngawang was denounced as the leader of the group and was sentenced to nineteen years in prison and to deprivation of political rights for five years. After 15 years he is currently serving his remaining sentence in Drapchi prison in Lhasa. Jamphel Jangchup Jamphel Jangchup is a monk from Drepung monastery and a member of the group of ten individuals who organized the famous September 27th 1987 demonstration in Lhasa. On March 8th 1989 he was arrested at Drepung monastery for printing copies of reactionary literature, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He was charged with being a principle member of a Counter revolutionary clique as well as spreading counter revolutionary propaganda and was detained in a Lhasa PSB Detention Center. On November 11th 1989, Lhasa Intermediate Peoples Court sentenced Jamphel Jangchup to nineteen years in prison with a deprivation of political rights for an additional five years. He was later transferred to Drapchi Prison on January 14th1990. His current state of health is believed to be extremely poor due to severe beatings and other acts of torture that he reportedly faced while in detention. Bangri Rinpoche Bangri Rinpoche established an orphanage school at his own expenses. In August 1999, he was arrested for his alleged involvement in attempting to explode a bomb in the Potala Square during the National Minority Games in Lhasa. The arrest of Bangri Rinpoche was followed by the authorities closure of Gyatso orphanage on October 17th1999. At the time of its closure there were 59 destitute n children between the ages of two months to twelve years old. 78
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In May 2001, Bangri Rinpoche was sentenced to death with a two-year suspension on charges of espionage and endangering state security by the Lhasa Municipality Intermediate Peoples Court. On May 29th 2001, he was shifted to Drapchi prison in the north of Lhasa City and was kept in solitary confinement for more than a year. In 2003 Bangri Rinpoches death sentence with a two-year suspension was commuted to life imprisonment. It has been reported that due to torture in prison, at present Bangri Rinpoche is unable to move his torso and lost much of his body weight. Moreover, Rinpoche has developed an ulcer and jaundice and his overall health condition is reported to have considerably deteriorated. Nyima Choedon Jigme Tenzin Nyima Rinpoche, wife of Bangri Rinpoche and co-director of the former Gyatso orphanage, was detained in August 1999 along with her husband and 21 other Gyatso orphanage staff members. The Lhasa Intermediate Peoples court sentenced Nyima Choedon to ten years due to her link with her husband. She received a initial sentence reduction of eighteen months in 2002 and a second sentence reduction of one year in 2003. She is due to be released in 2008.
Torture
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) ratified the CAT in 1988. The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT) defines torture as Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. Article 2 (1) of the Convention also states: Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. Moreover, article 11 of the CAT specifies that: Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment in the territory under its jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any cases of torture. Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires that all persons detained be treated with humanity and with respect for their inherent dignity. The Human Rights Committee
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has expressed the view that the rights set forth in article 10 constitute norms of general international law that are not subject to derogation.19 In this respect, article 38 of the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China states: The personal dignity of citizens of the Peoples Republic of China is inviolable. In practice, torture continues to be applied routinely and on a wide-scale in Tibet. Torture methods include electric shocks, pricking cigarettes on the face, hand and thumb cuffs, foot shackles, suspension from the ceiling, exposure to extreme temperature, long periods in solitary confinement, hooding, deprivation of food, water and sleep, forced labour and forced exercise drills. The Human Rights Committee determined that handcuffing, hooding, shaking and sleep deprivation used alone or in combination, violates the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.20 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture has said that the act of prolonged sleep deprivation amounts to torture21 and the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that prolonged solitary confinement might constitute a violation of the right to be free from torture.22 Prolonged incommunicado detentions, as well as acts of torture and ill treatment aimed at forcing confessions, are widespread. Testimonies of former political prisoners indicate that acts of torture are a recurring feature of interrogation methods. In this regard, it has been reported that, officers that rely on torture to break a case are not criticized but are cited for meritorious service and rewarded. 23 The right to habeas corpus and the right to have access to a lawyer and to the outside world are safeguards that ensure the humane treatment of detainees.24 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights found that prolonged incommunicado detention may facilitate the perpetration of torture and can in itself constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.25 Furthermore, article 15 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture provides a safeguard against the use of any statement that is extracted as a result of torture: such statements cannot be used as evidence in any proceedings, except against the person that is accused of torture. Chinas 2003 White Paper Progress in Chinas Human Rights Cause claimed significant progress in judicial guarantee for human rights and further stated: Public Security Organs have practiced strict enforcement of the law and emphasized law enforcement in the interest of the
19 20
UN Human Rights Committee, UN Doc CCPR/C/21Rev.1/Add.11, Para 13. UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.93, Para. 19, 21. 21 UN Doc E/Cn.4/1996/35/Add.1, Para 104 22 UN Human Rights Committee, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.93, Para. 20 23 2003 Human Rights Monitor Report pp.152 24 UN Doc A57/173, 2 July 2002 25 Commission on Human Rights resolution 38/1997, Para. 5
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public [] firmly dealt with violations of human rights involving the extortion of confessions by torture, the abuse of guns and police instruments and other coercive measures.
However, testimonies rendered to TCHRD by Tibetan former political prisoners shed light on the degree of physical and mental suffering inflicted on detainees and on the complete absence of measures taken by the authorities in order to redress human rights abuses. In April 2004, after completing their five-year prison sentence for participating in a peaceful demonstration against the Chinese authorities in Lhasa, Nyima and Nyidron reached Dharamsala and testified to TCHRD of torture and inhuman treatment inflicted upon them at Gutsa Detention center and later in Drapchi prison: Three of us were beaten, had boiling water splashed on our bodies, were lashed with belts and our bodies were pricked with cigarette butts. On reaching Drapchi prison, we were made to perform exercise drills and study prison rules and regulations. Nyima, a former nun of Phenpo Podo Nunnery in Phenpo Lhundup County, Lhasa Municipality, narrated her experience in Drapchi, Jamdron, a nun from Phenpo Gyara Nunnery and I were knocked down with an electric baton. We gained consciousness when the officers splashed water on us, and the beating continued until our body became numb. We were then placed in solitary confinement cell. A daily ration of a dumpling and a bowl of hot water was all that was given to us for the next one year and eight months while we were kept in solitary confinement.26 Damchoe Dolma, 29, a former political prisoner who protested against the Chinese authorities heavyhandedness in dealing with their Nunnery, was sentenced to six years of imprisonment in July 1995 along with seven other nuns of Shargon Nunnery in Jangkar Township, in Phenpo County. Lhasa Peoples Intermediate Court found all the nuns guilty of counter revolutionary propaganda. She spoke to TCHRD of the torture she under went in prison. While in Drapchi Prison, the policemen gathered all the nuns to teach them a song that had to be performed for the local leaders during their prison visit. However, all of us refused to learn the song. We were told that we would be punished if we refused to learn the song. We still refused. We were made to stand still in the sun from nine to five with an hour break at noon. That night, at around 11 p.m., some soldiers came into my room and took me to a room where I was interrogated. There were five of them. They kept asking me why I refused to learn the song. I did not reply. They then
26 Nuns undergo tremendous hardship for protesting against curtailment of religious rights, Human Rights Update, TCHRD, July 2004 and TCHRD Interview, June 2004
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beat me with an electric cattle prod all over my body until I fell unconscious. When I regain my consciousness, I was again asked if I was now willing to learn the song. When I replied negatively, they took the electric prod again and started to beat me on my heels, the shock of which again caused me to loose consciousness. When I regained my consciousness I found myself thrown onto my cell bathroom floor. I had wetted and excreted in my pants. I was unable to speak because my mouth was swollen. I found my face all bruised and cut. I was kept in that condition in the bathroom for seven days. I was later moved to solitary confinement cell with only one meal a day. The food was barely enough to keep me alive. The soldiers were careful to give me enough so that I wouldnt die. I was given a little rice for my meal along with a bowl of water. I stayed there for six months at the end of which I was sent back to my unit. We were subjected to political education classes and we were also forced to do laborious work such as knitting sweaters27
TCHRD has received reports that two Tibetan political prisoners, Rinzin Wangyal and Lobsang Tenzin, who are currently serving life sentences, are in critical health conditions. Rinzin Wangyal was arrested in 1996 and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1997. Due to continuous acts of torture over the years, his health condition has deteriorated it is reported that he cannot walk and eat without help. Lobsang Tenzin, a Tibet University student, was arrested in 1988 for participating in a pro-independence protest. His life sentence was reduced to 18 years of imprisonment in 1994. While in Drapchi prison, he underwent severe beatings which caused kidney malfunction and psychological disorders.28 Acts of torture are frequently inflicted upon Tibetan political prisoners not only for the purpose of extorting confessions, but also in an attempt to curb the detainees nationalist feelings and to serve as exemplary punishments aimed at deterring other Tibetans from challenging the Chinese governments policies. The majority of Tibetan prisoners arrested have suffered serious physical and mental abuses at the hands of either Public Security Bureau officers or prison guards. Even after their release from prison, many political prisoners need long-term medical attention, sometimes including physical and mental rehabilitation. However, those who cannot afford to pay medical expenses are forced to leave the hospital without having received adequate treatment. In some cases, the ordeal of political prisoners does not end with their release. In addition to their physical and psychological trauma, monks and nuns in particular find it difficult to return to their normal lives after being released, as they are constantly kept under surveillance and interrogated by the authorities. This often results in ostracism from their respective monasteries, which are afraid of drawing the attention and the interference of the authorities by taking back former political prisoners. Subsequently ousted by their own communities, those monks and nuns see their conditions further aggravated by the lack of employment opportunities.
27 Nunnery reconstruction leads to police confrontation: Damchoe Dolma testifies, Human Rights Update, TCHRD March 2004 and TCHRD Interview, March 2004. 28 Lobsang Tenzin and Rinzin Wangyal in critical condition., Human Rights Update, TCHRD, May 2004
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In October 1999, Geshe Sonam Phuntsok, popularly known as Kardze Geshe, was convicted on charges of leaving Tibet on illegal papers procured from Lhasa and for conducting a long life prayer ceremony for the Dalai Lama. In October 2004, he was released after the completion of a five-year prison sentence and was prohibited from giving religious discourse to his students. His movements continue to be restricted by the local authorities.29 Nyidron, a former political prisoner who suffered torture and eleven months in solitary confinement at Drapchi prison, told TCHRD: I was admitted to a hospital for a long duration but, before I could recover fully, my family had to pull me out as they couldnt afford the exorbitant medical expenses. Also, my nunnery had been instructed that I couldnt return to my religious studies and I also couldnt find a job. In 2002, I ran a small food stall in Lhasa but, after a month, three officers from the Lhasa City PSB ordered us to close the stall saying that it was a meeting point for reactionaries. It is very difficult for former political prisoners to find jobs in co-operatives or private businesses. The authorities wont issue registration certificates or other permits to former political prisoners who want to run small businesses. Its the end of a person in Tibet if he or she has any political incidents in their background. 30 On September 21st 2003 upon Namdol Lhamo, a member of the so-called 14 singing Nuns31 was released after completion of her 12 years sentence. She testified to TCHRD about her life outside prison: My parents passed away while serving my sentence in Drapchi prison. Life can be so difficult for former political prisoners to find respectable job in the society. I worked at a shop in Lhasa for one and half months with a monthly income of 50 Yuan. Many former political prisoners end up washing dishes in restaurants without job security and could be fired once the owner comes to know about their background. It is particularly difficult for monks and nuns to get readmitted into monasteries and nunneries after their release. The police would keep a constant watch on all movements.32 Namdol Lhamo suffered from mental instability after her release. She also had to sell her house before fleeing into exile. Gyaltsen Dolkar, another prominent member of the 14 singing nuns, who served a 12-year sentence for advocating for Tibets independence was released on March 21st 2004. She recounted to TCHRD her austere life after release:
China releases Geshe Sonam Phuntsok upon completion of prison term., Human Rights Update, TCHRD, October 2004. 30 Nuns undergo tremendous hardship for protesting against curtailment of religious rights., Human Rights Update, May 2004. 31 A group comprised of 14 nuns who clandestinely recorded songs on audiotape praising their homeland and the Dalai Lama in 1993. Their songs were smuggled out of Tibet and became the symbols of the spirit of Tibetan political prisoners languishing in various prisons across the plateau. 32 TCHRD Interview, 31 October 2004
29
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I was regularly summoned to the local public security bureau office where, officer made me sign a document stating my non participation in any future political activitiy. At the same time my health condition was serious and needed urgent medical attention. After a few days, I left to my hometown but found that my parents had passed away during my imprisonment. I returned back to Lhasa and earned my livelihood selling breads and noodles. Former political prisoners face great hardship after their release. Its very hard for them to find a proper job in the community. Furthermore, the Public Security Bureau often harasses them.33
Custodial deaths
The severity of torture systems employed by Chinese prison authorities is reflected by the number of deaths that occur inside detention centers or immediately after release from those facilities. According to the TCHRD database, the average age of custodial deaths occurred since 1987 among Tibetan political prisoners is 26. Article 22 (2) of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners stipulates that: Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialized institutions or to civil hospitals. However, officials seem to only act when the prisoner is in a near death situation, and by then it is often too late to save the persons life. TCHRD has received many reports from former political prisoners several reports of cases custodial deaths. Since 1987, TCHRD has documented 87 cases of deaths among Tibetan political prisoners as a direct result of torture. In the majority of these cases, the acts of torture and ill treatment, coupled with the authorities denial of timely and effective medical attention, resulted in a rapid deterioration of the physical conditions of the detainees. Deaths due to tortures and ill treatment have generally occurred either during detention or immediately after release. On January 15th 2004, Yeshi Gyatso, 65, died in his home after being released on medical parole from Lhasa Detention Centre. Yeshi was arrested in June 2003 on alleged charges of political activities and was subsequently sentenced to a six-year imprisonment term by Lhasa Intermediate Peoples Court.
Right to a fair trial

In Tibet, individuals accused of political crimes are often denied the right to a fair trial enshrined in articles 10 and 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Drapchi 14 Singing Nuns testify torture in Prison, Human Rights Update, TCHRD, November 2004 and TCHRD Interview, November 2004.
33
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Chinas legislation guarantees the citizens right to receive legal aid with the administrative statute Regulations on Legal Aid which was formulated and promulgated in 2003. In practice, detainees in China are often denied access to legal counsel until the prosecution has concluded the investigation and is ready to go to trial. By that time the accused has usually been detained for a long period of time without trial, varying from several months to over a year. Visits of detainees family members are only allowed once the courts verdict is given and the prisoner is transferred to the facility where he or she is to serve the sentence. Moreover, Chinas legal system does not provide sufficient safeguards against the use of evidence gathered through illegal means such as through the use of torture. An accurate examination of trial documents concerning the cases of political prisoners in China reveals that court verdicts often follow, almost verbatim, the text of the original indictment. Moreover, the appeal process fails to provide an adequate avenue for the review of criminal cases. In fact, Chinese authorities make it difficult for defendants to appeal a sentence before a higher court in Tibet, as there is a constant fear of reprisals against those who appeal on a suspects behalf, or against the suspect himself. The Chinese legal system does not recognize the principle of presumption of innocence enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this regard, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted that China has not yet amended the provision which stipulates that no one shall be considered guilty until convicted to clearly stipulate the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.34 On April 14th 2004 three fact-finding experts of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, issued a statement expressing their deep concern over the situation of Trulku Tenzin Delek making reference to serious procedural flaws during his closed trial. They particularly called attention to the violation of the right to a public trial; the violation of the right to chose his own lawyer, denial of the right to know and have the opportunity to examine the evidence presented against him in court and incommunicado detention and ill-treatment during the pre-trial period. Moreover, the United Nations experts expressed concern at the alleged lapses in respect for human rights during the trial proceedings and urged the authorities to grant Tenzin Delek Rinpoche a new trial ensuring respect for international norms and standards of due process.35
Independence of the judiciary

Article 126 of the Chinese Constitutions states that courts shall, in accordance with the law exercise judicial power independently and are not subject to interference by administrative organs, public organizations, or individuals. In practice, the judiciary is subject to policy guidance from both the government and the
34
Statement by Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Following visit to China, 4 October 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/DCE1B1DE1F7D56DBC1256F23002FFFFC?opendocument 35 United Nations Human Rights Experts express concern over situation of Tibetan monk, 15 April 2004, h t t p : / / w w w. u n o g . c h / u n o g / w e b s i t e / n e w s _ m e d i a . n s f / ( h t t p N e w s B y Ye a r _ e n ) / 2C97230C6CFC3ACEC1256F3A004DA9E5?OpenDocument
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Communist Party. At central and local level, the government and the Communist Party frequently interfere in the judicial systems proceedings. Under the Chinese judiciary system three bodies are in charge of enforcing the law: the procuracy36, the courts and the police forces. All of them operate under the close control of the Communist Party. The Chinese system is therefore in clear contrast with the United Nations Basic Principles on Independence of Judiciary, according to which
The Judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of the facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influence, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, from any quarter for any reason.37
The Chinese judiciary systems lack of independence is clearly displayed in cases involving political accusations. Courts at all levels are subject to close scrutiny and control by parallel and superior organs of the Communist Party known as politics and law committees. Furthermore, the Communist Party requires that, within each court, so-called adjudication committees, composed of the court president and other senior judicial cadres, not only screen all the most important or sensitive cases but also render a verdict before the trial. In Chinas legal press this procedure is openly referred to as verdict first, trial second. At the fourth meeting of the 8th Standing Committee of the Peoples Representative Congress of the TAR held on September 29th 2004, personnel changes in the TAR were announced38. Apart from a few changes within the Congress itself and the Peoples Government, most removal and replacements took place with the judiciary, affecting the Intermediary Courts and in particular the procuracy departments of all six prefectures of the TAR, except Lhasa, which has a special status. This new appointment reflects the current preference for Chinese over Tibetan cadres and illustrates Beijings present perception of regional autonomy as an exercise in integration rather than diversification. At the recent fourth meeting of the 8th Standing Committee of the Peoples Representative Congress of the TAR, held on September 29th 2004, personnel turnover was announced in the TAR39. Removals and replacements took place within the judiciary, affecting the Intermediary Courts and the procuracy departments of all six prefectures of the TAR, except Lhasa, which has a special status. Only two out of thirteen new cadres in the procuracy departments of the various TARs prefectures are Tibetans. Only one Tibetan out of five appointees has made it into the procuracy at the TAR level. Likewise, out of the seven new appointees to various Peoples Intermediate Courts, only one is Tibetan.
A Procuracy is a Chinese Judicial agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal cases. It also handles complaints against the police, prison officials and other branches of the administration. 37 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp50.htm 38 Tibet Information Network, 30th October 2004 39 Tibet Information Network TIN, Saturday October 30 2004
36
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THRD believes that the ethnic disparity in appointments at the judiciary level, coupled with Beijings policy aimed at appointing or transferring Chinese cadres from other provinces and various professional backgrounds to the TAR for a certain term, could progressively jeopardize the already precarious political autonomy of Tibet.
Death penalty
According to article 48 of the Chinese Criminal Law, all death sentences should be submitted to the Supreme Peoples Court for verification and approval. However, in 1980 the standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress of China decided to shift the authority to review and uphold death penalty sentences in cases of murder, robbery, rape, arson and other crimes that could severely jeopardize public security. This system, commonly known as xia fang (send down), was later reaffirmed through the Organic Law and the 1983 Notice and further sanctioned by the Supreme Court in 1997. As a result, the Chinese legal system faces a conflict between the Criminal Law and the laws and directives authorizing the xia fang. An amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law concerning the procedure for review of death sentences has been envisaged in the legislature plan of the 10th National Peoples Congress (NPC) on March 2004. As a result, the Supreme Court should be re-established as the ultimate body of appeal in capital cases, as article 48 of the Criminal Law requires. Article 212 (5) of the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law of the Peoples Republic of China states: Execution of death sentences shall be publicly announced. However, China continues to regard statistics on the death penalty as a state secret. Therefore, it remains impossible to know the number of people executed each year by the Chinese State. In the year 2003, according to some reports, more than five thousand people being were executed for various crimes40. China is a country that executes more people every year than the rest of the world combined. It must also be noted that the capital punishment, initially introduced for 32 crimes, has been gradually instituted for 73 different crimes.41
Anti-terrorism drills in Lhasa

The 3rd International Conference of Asian Political Parties held from the 3rd to the 5th of September 2004 in Beijing and gathered leaders and representatives of 81 political parties from 35 countries, including the Communist Party of China (CCP). The conference adopted the Beijing Declaration, which stated: Terrorism, splittism and extremism have already become plagues that do harm to human society. We strongly condemn and oppose all forms of terrorism. We advocate strengthening cooperation among sovereign countries and between regional organizations against terrorism, taking steps to
40 41
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1137608,00.htm http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1137608,00.htm
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eliminate the root cause of terrorism while giving full play to the role of the United Nations. Double standards should not be practiced and the fight against terrorism must not be linked with any particular ethnic group or religion.42
Under the banner of anti-terrorism the Chinese authorities have cracked down on Tibetan dissent and curbed heavily those they consider involved in splittist activities. The Chinese authorities concern over terrorism is reflected in continued anti-terrorism exercises in Tibets capital, Lhasa. The first daylong anti-terrorism drill Himalaya 03 was carried out by Chinese military on November 17th 2003. The second drill took place on September 12th 2004. The operations took place with Chinese troops practicing drills on rescuing hostages, handling bombs and biochemical attacks. The maneuvers, which lasted about three hours, also covered anti-hijacking, anti-explosion, anti-biochemical weapons and seizure of terrorists.43 A Chinese official said the drills were meant to keep armed forces ready for a crackdown on what he called separatists allied with the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. 44 The Chinese official news web portal Xinhua, quoted organizers as saying that The anti-terrorist maneuvers, in the context of increased acts around the world, were staged to check the regions response mechanism in case of terror attacks.45 Any anti-terror measures taken by China need to be conducted in full accordance with international law. TCHRD believes that labeling terrorists as those minorities who peacefully engage in cultural or religious activity or peacefully advocate for political independence or autonomy violates the Tibetans rights to freedom of opinion and expression, association and religion, as in accordance with international standards. There is, therefore, a clear need to review the legality of counter terrorist measures in the light of international human rights and humanitarian laws.
The Strike Hard Campaign

A further attempt to intensify the Chinese governments hard-line policies against those suspected of undermining Chinas unity was the re-launching of the Strike Hard campaign in Tibet. The campaign, conceived in 1983 to fight against crime and corruption in mainland China, was initially launched in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) in April 1996. However, in the TAR the campaign was carried out essentially with the purpose of thwarting the influence of the Dalai Lama and clamping down on Tibetan dissent. Under the Strike Hard campaign, all signs of reverence for the Dalai Lama including possessing his portraits, video and audiotapes, as well as making reference to the exiled leader and his government - have been curtailed. Also outlawed and tightly controlled is the possession of the Tibetan national flag, and any
42 43
http://www.icapp3.org.cn/2004-09/05/content_2809095.htm Xinhua News, 12 September 2004 44 Xinhua News, 12 September 2004 45 http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=6214118
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material with political connotations, all of which is viewed as an act that endangers state security or affects the stability and the unity of the motherland and must be punished accordingly. In the context of monastic communities, the possession of the above-mentioned items is monitored and sanctioned through frequent visits by work teams to major religious centers and institutions to conduct regular meetings aimed at politically re-educating and coercing monks and nuns to denounce the Dalai Lama. China has very recently stepped up its campaign to systematically Strike Hard on Tibetan political dissent and religious institutions. On October 19th 2004 the TAR main law enforcement bodies met for a week-long meeting in Lhasa and discussed the need to maintain social stability and to take appropriate measures against people suspected of undermining Chinese sovereignty and security. It was therefore decided to intensify the Strike Hard campaign in Lhasa during the last two months of they year 2004. The TAR Public Security Bureau (PSB) head, Mr. Yang Song, on October 20th 2004, said: social stability is not only an essential need of society, but also a very important political matter [] to strike hard and suppress the separatists. 46 Since its inception, the Strike Hard campaign has always had serious human rights implications for Tibetans. There have been numerous cases of arrests and detentions, torture and long-term imprisonment, for the mere expression of support for Tibetan independence and the Dalai Lama.
Re-education through labour camps

Another area that entails a deprivation of liberty is the use of the re-education through labor system, introduced by the Chinese government in 1957. In accordance with the Chinese Administrative Punishment Law, this system empowers the authorities to arbitrarily arrest and detain individuals without due process of law. A person can be sentenced by a local Public Security Bureau (PSB) or by the Reeducation through Labour Management Committee without any judicial control over the decision and without a right to appeal. Re-education through labor sentences range from six months to three years with a further one-year extension if the individual is viewed as having failed to reform. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has reiterated that that any form of deprivation of liberty - including re-education through labour - must be subject to judicial control.47 However, to date no real judicial control is exercised within the procedure to commit someone to reeducation through labour.48 In 2004, there was an increase in cases of re-education through labour camps of Tibetan political prisoners and Tibetans trying to flee Tibet or trying to return from their (delete) exile.
46 47
http://www.tibetinfor.com , 4 November, 2004 Statement by Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Following visit to China, 4 October 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/DCE1B1DE1F7D56DBC1256F23002FFFFC?opendocument 48 Statement by Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Following visit to China, 4 October 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/DCE1B1DE1F7D56DBC1256F23002FFFFC?opendocument
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Although it has been reported that the National Peoples Congress intends to put on its agenda the reconsideration of the current legal framework for re-education through labour49, it must be noted that in July 2004 a 40,000-square-foot new re-education camp became operational in Senge Township in the Ngari County. Eight million Yuan were allocated by the Development Department for the establishment of the camp, which can accommodate approximately two hundred inmates.50 The choice of location for the camp is significant, as it is located on the route followed by Tibetans fleeing Tibet and by those returning from India and Nepal.
Restricting freedom of movement

Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Everyone states that Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State and to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. In practice, China makes it difficult for Tibetans wanting to leave Tibet to acquire legal travel documents. Therefore, every year many Tibetans try to flee their homeland to seek freedom of religious practice in monasteries or to join educational institutions set up by the Tibetan government in exile in India without the right papers. On their journey across the Himalayan passes Tibetans not only face hunger, dehydration, injuries, snow-blindness, and frostbite while fleeing but also risk arrest at the numerous police checkpoints along the route. Moreover, arrest by Nepalese authorities and deportation back to the Chinese border leaves Tibetans extremely vulnerable. On September 11th 2004, the Nepalese security personnel arrested a group of 34 Tibetans, including six women and six children, who were trying to cross over to Nepal from Tibet. Dhondup Tsering, 22, Tashi Dhargay, 19, and Dhondup Namgyal, three monks from Dhargayling Monastery, started their journey on December 29th 2003 in order to seek an audience with the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala. Dhondup Tsering told TCHRD: Once we crossed into Nepal, a strong Nepalese army officer interrogated us in Tibetan and simultaneously kicked and beat us brutally. The army officer also frisked us thoroughly and took 1500 Yuan from me and 2900 from the others. We were subsequently detained in a toilet under strict surveillance with no food for the night. The next morning at around 11 am, the Nepalese army handed us over to the Chinese border security officials at Dram, at Nepal-Tibet border. All of us were interrogated individually by the Chinese officials and were subjected to severe beatings, despite the fact that
49
Statement by Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Following visit to China, 4 October 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/DCE1B1DE1F7D56DBC1256F23002FFFFC?opendocument 50 The Tibet Daily, 21 July 2004
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Civil Liberties
Tashi Dhargay was having ulcer and heart problems. We were kept in prison with no cot and electricity.
In November 2004 TCHRD received information that two minor girls from a group of fleeing Tibetans were assaulted and brutally gang-raped by a group of Nepalese dressed in police uniforms. The interviewee reported: We were five men and two girls, one aged 13 and the other 16, in our group. After crossing the Dram town (Nepal-Tibet border town), we reached the woods of Tatopani area. A group of eight men dressed in Nepali police uniform and armed with knives suddenly attacked us. The girls were stripped naked in front of us and the men raped both of them in turn. Some of the men raped the girls repeatedly. The other men laughed and urinated on the side when the girls were being raped. One man in our group was knocked down with a knife on the head when, out of desperation, he tried to fight the armed assailants. 51 Tenzin Nyima, 15, from Totse Village in the Nyingtri County was among the 18 Tibetans who were arrested during his first attempt to flee Tibet. He was imprisoned at Dilli Bazar jail in Katmandu by the Nepalese police and later deported to Tibet on May 31st 2003. He recounted his attempt to escape: We were threatened by pointing a gun at our heads and asked about our destination and the name of our group leader. We were also slapped and beaten with electric baton. I felt unconscious for more than one and a half hours after the police struck an electric baton on my back. He was detained near Dingri and imprisoned in Shigatse prison. I was later tied completely naked with a rope, and put upside down and ice-cold water was poured on my body. I was jailed for five months in Shigatse Prison and my relatives were able to secure my release after paying 3000 Chinese Yuan to the prison authorities. On his second attempt to escape into exile with 27 other Tibetans, he was detained by the Nepalese police and deported back to Tibet. While in detention in a small cell at Dram, a transit town at Nepal-Tibet border, five of us suffered severe nose bleeding and were kept without any medical attention for three weeks. After numerous appeals to Chinese officials for our release, I was finally given medical attention. The local police later shifted me to Shigatse prison where treatment of prisoners was slightly better and my parents were able to bribe the prison officials for my release. On his third attempt Nyima managed to escape into exile and reached Katmandu on May 2004. The year 2004 also witnessed several cases of Tibetans returning from their exile in India having been arbitrarily detained by the Chinese authorities, and sometimes being forced to pay bribes in order to secure their release. Tibetans returning from exile, especially highly respected Lamas, are regarded with suspicion by Chinese authorities for their allegiance to the Dalai Lama or for presumed involvement in political activities, which China labels as attempts of endangering State security. According to testimonies rendered to TCHRD, the
Minors raped enroute to exile , Human Rights Update, TCHRD November 2004 and TCHRD Interview, December 2004
51
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Chinese authorities also ordered the expulsion of monks and nuns returning from exile to their home monasteries in Tibet. Nevertheless, monks and nuns returning from monasteries in India are not the only Tibetans victims of persecution, as the Chinese authorities routinely target students returning to Tibet after completing their education abroad. Tibetans returning from India are often kept in custody by Chinese authorities in detention centers located at the Nepal-Tibet border. It is quite common for detainees to undergo interrogation sessions that can include beatings and other forms of physical punishment. TCHRD received information that two monks from Ragya Monastery, Gedun Rabgyal and Woeser Thaye, who had gone into exile and studied at Jadel Khangtsen, Sera Jhe Monastery in South India, while on their way back to Tibet were detained for four months before being handed over to the authorities of their respective places. They were both fined 4000 Yuan each by the Chinese authorities.52 In June 2004, Sherab and Tenzin Dadul, two Tibetan individuals who had studied at Jadel Khangtsen, Sera Jhe Monastery in South India, were detained along with two lay persons, Dhombuk and Monlam, at Dram prison at the Tibet-Nepal border while returning to Tibet. Currently there is no information on their whereabouts and well-being.53 TCHRD received information that in 2001 the Chinese authorities arrested four former monks from the Ragya Monastery in Machen, Kunchok Dhargay, Mathok Damchoe, Tsultrim Phuntsok and Sonam Gyatso while they were returning to their native place from India. The four were charged with having contacts with a secret organization called Freedom in Tibet and for distributing pictures of Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama. They were all sentenced to five to six years of imprisonment. TCHRD received confirmation of the news in 2004. Due to the difficulties in collecting timely information on human rights violations, in some cases reports of arrests and detentions reach TCHRD only after a prisoner has completed his/her sentence and escapes into exile.
52 53
Rise in arbitrary detention and fines for exile returnees , TCHRD Press Release, 12 August 2004 Tibet Times, 20 August 2004
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Civil Liberties
Conclusion
There is no doubt that over the past decade China has undergone a profound economic transformation. However, Chinas rapid economic development has not been accompanied by an increased awareness of its citizens civil and political rights. Du Zhongxing, member of the Chinese delegation to the 60th session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, stated: The realization of civil and political rights is a gradual process. No matter what method or model a country adopts in realizing human rights, the enjoyment of civil and political rights by individuals in that country cannot possibly exceed the level of its overall social development. [...] The realization of civil and political rights requires material support and capacity- building. It is closely linked to economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development. At present, there are some misunderstandings about civil and political rights. Some believe that the protection of these rights requires only political will and that no resources are needed. Yet in actual practice, it is not difficult to find out that protecting these rights does require resources. For example, resources are needed for human rights education, training of law enforcement personnel, provision of legal aid, elections at the grass-roots level, etc. To further promote the cause of human rights, the international community should give due regard to economic, social and cultural rights as well as the right to development. Greater technical support and assistance for the purpose of capacity-building should be provided to the vast number of developing countries which are economically under-developed and facing financial difficulties.54 This statement clearly reflects the Chinese governments misconception of the nature of civil and political rights. Chinese authorities consider economic development as a necessary pre-condition for the enjoyment of civil and political rights. However, according to a broadly accepted doctrine, civil and political rights serve to protect the individuals from excesses of the State. Therefore, individuals can enjoy those rights only as long as the State does not encroach upon their liberties. TCHRD believes that the promotion and the protection of certain fundamental rights, as the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to hold opinions without interference, the right of peaceful assembly, the right to freedom of association with others, the right to leave as well as to enter ones own country, does not require technical and material support and capacity-building, assistance and resources. While it is indisputable that human rights are interdependent and interrelated, TCHRD believes that the Chinese Governments view according to which the promotion and protection of the above-mentioned rights should depend on the degree of economic development of the society is totally unacceptable. The Chinese governments concern over bringing economic development to Tibet is overlooking that Tibetan people will not be fully developed until they are guaranteed opportunities of enjoying their most fundamental civil and political rights.
54
Statement by Adviser DU Zhongxing of the Chinese Delegation on Civil and Political Rights (Item11) at the 60th Session of the Commission on Human Rights (Geneva, April 1, 2004); http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/hy2004/t85174.htm
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Tower used for radio frequency jamming, July 2004
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Right to Information
Introduction
Individuals can claim their rights when they are aware of them. Such awareness can be achieved when information is widely made available, accessible and disseminated. The right to information therefore lays the foundations for several other fundamental rights: for example, it gives a meaning to the right to participate, which has been acknowledged as fundamental to the realization of the right to development.1 In 1946 the UN General Assembly in its very first session recognized that freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated and that freedom of information implies the right to gather, transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere without letters. As such it is an essential factor in any serious effort to promote the peace and the progress of the world.2 The right to information is enshrined in two fundamental documents of the International Bill of Human Rights. Both article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) include the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas as part of the right to freedom of expression. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression has repeatedly stated that the right to seek, receive and impart information is not merely a corollary of freedom of opinion and expression; it is a right in and of itself.3 Therefore, the right to information is an integral part of the broader right to freedom of opinion and expression. It helps specify the
Commission on Human Rights, 56 th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 18 January 2000; UN Doc E/CN.4/200/63, Para. 42. 2 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 59 (1), 1946; http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/ NR0/033/10/IMG/NR003310.pdf?OpenElement 3 Commission on Human Rights, 56 th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 18 January 2000; UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/63, Para. 42.
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content of the right to freedom of expression and better defines some of its constitutive elements. In fact, the right to information encompasses three interrelated dimensions: 1) The right to impart information; 2) The right to receive information; 3) The right to seek information. The right to impart information entails the existence of free and independent media and the availability of a pluralistic system of information. The right to receive information includes the possibility for all individuals to receive objective, complete and timely information. The right to seek information encompasses the possibility to access public records and documents as well as any other available source of information. Therefore, the enjoyment of the right to information is subordinated to the degree of commitment and cooperation of the State. On the one hand, the State should take positive action to ensure that an objective, complete and timely information reaches all segments of society without discrimination based on ethnicity, language, religion or gender. Moreover, the State should refrain from interfering in the free exchange and dissemination of information and from preventing individuals from accessing information that should be freely available to the public.
The right to impart information

Freedom of broadcasting
For the vast majority of people in Tibet, broadcasting, especially through the radio, is the primary source of information and news. It is therefore of paramount importance that this medium can operate independently and in the public interest. However, in Tibet the Chinese government still has a monopoly over broadcasting, with a ban on private broadcasters. This is in contrast with the spirit of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees the right to impart information and ideas through any media. In this regard, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression expressed the view that State monopolies over broadcasting can no longer be justified and that all States should put in place regulatory frameworks which provide for the licensing of both commercial and community broadcasters, including through terrestrial transmission systems.4
Commission on Human Rights, 58th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 30 January 2002; UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/75, Para. 81.
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Political Civil and Political Rights
The Special Rapporteur was also of the view that a key way to serve the public interest is by ensuring the availability of the widest possible range of information and ideas through broadcasting5 and that minorities have a right to access the airwaves. Public broadcasters should ensure that their programming serves all members of society and broadcasting authorities should take steps to ensure that minority groups have nondiscriminatory access to licenses.6 However, in Tibet, whether it is in televisions or radio, reporters have no other option but following and strictly complying with editorial guidelines issued by the authorities. In fact, the subjects to be covered and the angle of coverage of reporting are generally pre-decided in conformity with the governments views. In November 2004, a former Tibetan radio journalist, whose name cannot be disclosed, gave TCHRD a detailed account of how the governments policies affect the broadcasting sector in Tibet. He said: Every year the government imparts to journalists the directives on the issues that should be highlighted in the media. These directives should be circulated only within the media circles and must be kept secret. In the beginning of 2004, we were given four directives: firstly, journalists are not allowed to report on any event or news related to religion. Only the religious events sponsored by the government can be covered. Secondly, journalists are not allowed to report the activities of the international foundations and non-governmental organizations, operating in various areas of Tibet. This ban was actually introduced in 2001. Thirdly, the journalists cannot report on any protest or demonstration against the government. Lastly, there is a restricted scope for reporting on natural disasters and calamities. For example, when a number of animals die due to a heavy snowfall in winter times, even if a reporter covers the story, the report is not broadcasted instantly. The information will be partly used in a different context later on, once the authorities have started taking some action on the matter. The news will then be reported in a different context, saying that the Chinese Communist Party and the Government have done such and such thing as a relief measure for the natural calamity. But there will be no report on the number of animals killed and the scale of losses suffered by the nomads.7 Editorial freedom is further constrained by the presence of party members in the highest positions of the broadcasting department. They exercise a tight control over the content of the reports to be broadcasted, thus ensuring its compliance with the governments directives.
Commission on Human Rights, 58th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 30 January 2002; UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/75, Para. 81. 6 Commission on Human Rights, 58th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 30 January 2002; UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/75, Para. 82. 7 TCHRD Interview, 15 November 2004
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The procedure for the approval of reports to be broadcasted is lengthy, as they usually undergo checking and rechecking to for political acceptability. All reports have to go through three levels of editing. The head of the Tibetan news section passes on the story to the head of the Tibetan language department. He in turn passes it on to one of the deputy heads of the Tibetan radio and broadcast department. Once he gives his final decision, then the news can finally be broadcasted. If there is something politically incorrect, it is his responsibility. The senior editors are in most cases party members. They make sure that the stories are in conformity with the party policies. The proportion of party members in the various media offices is high. Party membership is also beneficial for promotion. 8 In this respect, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to freedom of opinion and expression noted that public broadcasters should serve the public, not the Government or the party in power. This implies protection against political interference, including through the appointment of an independent governing board and respect for editorial independence.9 Authorities control over broadcasting is not limited to the information contained in the reports. It also extends to the journalists, who always have to demonstrate how their work serves the cause of the to the government and the Party. The journalists are put under a lot of pressure to present policy in the most positive light the angle that reflects the party policies. Media workers are required to write annual reports on themselves. For example, I had to write about the anti-splittism issues that I covered. I had to explain how my reports complied with the office rules and the governments directives. I also had to list the places I visited to cover news stories.10
Right to inform versus state security

The use by the Chinese government of national security legislation to restrict and hinder the right to impart information in Tibet remains a grave concern. Heavy penalties are set forth in article 103 of the Chinese Criminal Law for those who organize, plot or carry out the scheme of splitting the State or undermining unity of the country and for whoever incites others to split the State or undermine unity of the country. Article 105 imposes heavy penalties on those who organize, plot or carry out the scheme of subverting the State power or overthrowing the socialist system and on whoever incites others by spreading rumors or slanders or any other means to subvert the State power or overthrow the socialist system.
8 9
TCHRD Interview, 15 November 2004 Commission on Human Rights, 58th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 30 January 2002;UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/75, Para. 83. 10 TCHRD Interview, 15 November 2004
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Nyima Tsering, a 65-year-old former monk from Gyantse County, Shigatse Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), was a teacher of Tibetan language and Buddhist ethics. In December 2002, Nyima was arrested by the Public Security Bureau (PSB) on alleged charges of distributing pro-independence literature and detained in the Gyantse County Detention Centre. In June 2003, after six months of detention, the Gyantse County Peoples Court sentenced him to five years of imprisonment for endangering state security. Nyima Tsering is currently serving his sentence in Drapchi prison in Lhasa.11 In February 2003 Lobsang Tenphel and another individual from Karze County were arrested in connection to the criminal case of Trulku Tenzin Delek and Lobsang Dhondup. The two individuals, both relatives of Trulku Tenzin Delek, were reportedly arrested for providing information on Trulku Tenzin Delek and Lobsang Dhondup.12 In September 2003 Lobsang Tenphen was found guilty of propagating information about Trulku Tenzin Delek and Lobsang Dhondup to the outside world and was sentenced to five years of imprisonment by the Karze Peoples Intermediate Court. He is currently detained in the Ngaba Prison in Sichuan Province.13 With regard to the restrictions to the right to impart information imposed by the State on the ground of national security, in October 1995 a group of experts in international law, national security and human rights adopted a set of principles known as the Johannesburg Principles. Principle 1.1 states: Any restriction on expression or information must be prescribed by law. The law must be accessible, unambiguous, drawn narrowly and with precision so as to enable individuals to foresee whether a particular action is unlawful.14 Furthermore, Principle 2 declares: A restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not legitimate unless its genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to protect a countrys existence or its territorial integrity against the use or threat of force, or its capacity to respond to the use or threat of force, whether from an external source, such as a military threat, or an internal source, such as incitement to violent overthrow of the Government. [...] In particular, a restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not legitimate if its genuine purpose or demonstrable effect is to protect interests unrelated to national security, including, for example, to protect a Government from embarrassment or exposure of wrongdoing, or to conceal information about the functioning of its public institutions, or to entrench a particular ideology, or to suppress industrial unrest.15
11
http://www.tchrd.org/hrupdate/2004/hr200401.html#profile http://www.tchrd.org/press/2003/pr20030313.html 13 http://www.tchrd.org/press/2003/pr20031013.html 14 Commission on Human Rights, 52nd session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 22 March 1996; UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/39, Annex. 15 Ibid.
12
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Monitoring phone calls and text messages

Chinese authorities have increasingly resorted to controlling phone calls made between Tibetans in and out of Tibet. The authorities are especially targeting monks and nuns making phone calls. In July 2004, Chinese authorities sent a directive to various departments of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) asking to intensify scrutiny of calls made by monks from monasteries in Tibet to India and vice versa.16 In August 2004, news received from Tibet indicated that the phone calls made by Tibetans in exile to their relatives in Tibet, particularly to monasteries, have come under tight control. Tibetans in Tibet have advised their relatives and friends in exile not to discuss any political matters during telephone conversation.17 A Tibetan individual, whose name cannot be disclosed, reported that PSB officers interrogated one of his relatives in Tibet for making phone calls to India. Since then they are seldom in touch.18 Moreover, according to the governments news agency Xinhua, Chinese authorities have also developed technologies aimed at controlling text messaging. 19 The system was allegedly designed to clean up pornographic, obscene and fraudulent phone messages that have infiltrated short messaging content. 20 However, the Paris-based group Reporters Without Borders said the surveillance also aims at keeping an eye on political dissent contained in mobile phones messages.21 The above-mentioned systems used by the Chinese authorities to monitor private conversation and information flows are in clear contrast with article 12 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which state, respectively, that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence and that everyone has the right [...] to hold opinions without interference. Moreover, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression pointed out that letters and conversations do fall within the scope of protection of article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).22
16
http://tchrd/press/2004/pr20040821.html http://tchrd/press/2004/pr20040821.html 18 TCHRD Interview, 23 December 2004 19 http://www.rfa.org/english/news/politics/2004/07/02/140051/ 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid 22 Commission on Human Rights, 51st session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 14 December 1994; UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/32, Para. 32.
17
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Banned publications
On April 9th 2000, a report broadcasted by the government-owned TV channel, Tibet TV, listed a number of publications that were banned by the authorities, as they could represent a threat to the countrys unity. Among the material falling under the authorities prohibition were the publishing, producing, printing, photocopying, distributing or propagating [...] reactionary propaganda materials from outside the border, especially publications, audio-video products and reactionary propaganda materials advocating Tibetan independence and undermining social stability and ethnic unity by the Dalai clique.23 The Chinese authorities continuously persecute Tibetan individuals not only for introducing into Tibet banned publications and audio-visual products regarding the Tibetan cause, but also for the mere possession of religious educational material containing teachings of the Dalai Lama. On December 21st 2004, Phuntsok Tsering, a 24-year-old monk from Dhargyelig Monastery in Mangpo Township, Lhatse County, Shigatse Prefecture, was arrested for possessing a teaching book of the Dalai Lama. As for January 5th 2005, he was detained in the Shigatse Prefecture Detention Centre.24 On April 11th 2003 Kunchok Choephel Labrang and Jigme Jamtruk, two monks from Labrang Tashikyil Monastery, situated in the Sangchu County, Gansu Province, were arrested following a raid of the local PSB which lead to the discovery in the monks rooms of booklets containing speeches of the Dalai Lama. The whereabouts of Kunchok Choephel Labrang, in his late thirties, is unknown. The other monk, Jigme Jamtruk, was released on bail after thirteen days of detention.25 On September 9th 2001, Jampel Gyatso, a 35-year-old monk from Phu Village, located in the TAR Lhatse County, was listening to audio teachings of the Dalai Lama in his room in Sera Monastery when officers of the PSB broke in seized the audio tapes. He was then taken to Lhasa PSB for interrogation and subsequently transferred to Gutsa Detention Centre in the north of Lhasa. During his three months of detention, Jampel was severely and repeatedly beaten. The Lhasa Intermediate Peoples Court found Jampel guilty of anti-government propaganda and sentenced him to two years of imprisonment and deprivation of political rights for one year. Jampel served his sentence in the Drapchi Prison, where he was also forced to follow political education sessions. He was released on 8 August 8th 2003 upon completion of the prison term.26 In November 2000, Samten, a 38-year-old monk who had escaped into exile in 1992 and studied in Drepung Monastery in South India, returned to Tibet to meet his relatives and took along 18 videocassettes about Tibet and 150 portraits of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for distribution in his native town. On December 11th 2000, officers of the Lhasa PSB broke into his residence and arrested him for possessing the above-mentioned material. He was subsequently taken into custody
23 24
http://www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/ TCHRD Interview, 31 December 2004; www.tchrd/press/2005/pr20050104.html 25 http://www.tchrd.org/news/2003/nb20030501.html 26 http://www.tchrd.org/hrupdate/2004/hr200407.html#teachings
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at a local police station and subjected to repeated acts of torture and ill treatment. Samten was then detained at TAR PSB Detention Centre in Lhasa and a month later was transferred to the Trisam camp located 10 Kms west of Lhasa to undergo re-education through labour. On 11 December 11th 2003, Samten was released after completing his three-year prison term. However, he had to report to the local PSB every week and sign a declaration stating that he would refrain from taking part in any political activities.27 In addition to the ban on what Beijing labels as reactionary propaganda materials, the Chinese authorities routinely resort to censorship of writers who make positive reference to the Dalai Lama, thus deviating from the governments stance, which requires to denounce him. In October 2004, when the Chinese Governments United Front Work Department and Publications Bureau determined that Tibetan Journal, a book on Tibets history, personalities and customs written by a prominent Tibetan writer, Woeser, contained political errors, as it praised the exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama. As a result, the book was banned by the Guangdong Provincial Publishing Bureau and the director of the books publishing company and the books editor were subjected to investigation. Moreover, Woeser lost her job, and her former work unit, the governmentaffiliated Tibetan Cultural Association, evicted her from her home and terminated her health and retirement benefits. She was also prohibited from applying for a passport to leave the country and her work unit, the Tibetan Cultural Association, organized a special committee to carry out thought correction on her. 28 With regard to government censorship practices, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression made it clear that special care has to be taken to ensure that writers, poets, journalists and editors are not intimidated or prevented from expressing their views in their writings through censorship or other covert methods [...].29
The right to be informed

Information monopoly
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression made it clear that one of the best guarantees of respect for the rights to freedom of expression and information lies in the existence of independent media, electronic and print, in which ownership is diversified and there is a maximum of self-regulation and a minimum of State interference.30
27
http://www.tchrd.org/hrupdate/2004/hr200406.html#incarcerated Tibetan Writer Persecuted for Praising Dalai Lama, Human Rights in China, 27 October 2004; http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision%5fid=18341&item%5fid=18338 29 Commission on Human Rights, 54th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 29 January 1999; UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/64, Para. 13. 30 Commission on Human Rights, 54th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 28 January 1998; UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/40, Para. 17.
28
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However, in Tibet the Chinese government exercises a substantial monopoly over information and its distribution. In addition to the complete control over radio and TV broadcasting, the government extends its reach to the press, which is considered as the Chinese Communist Partys (CCP) mouthpiece. For example, the CCP committees are responsible for appointing government representatives at the head of newspapers. The newspapers that are not directly run by a CCP organ are subjected to the Party control and influence through the partys propaganda department. The Press and Publication Administration, which is responsible for the day to day control of newspapers at the local level, is subservient to the decisions of the Partys propaganda department. The leading TAR newspaper, the Tibet Daily, official paper of the TAR Party Committee, stated its purpose as follows: The Tibet Daily is the mouthpiece of the Party Committee, government and the people of Tibet, and an important mass propaganda tool in our region. Under the leadership of the TAR Party Committee, we resolutely support correct guidance of public opinion, strive to spread Party lines, guiding principles and policies, and bring into play our role of building bridges and links closely connecting the Party and government with the people, always single mindedly sticking to our responsibility to the Party, country and the broad masses, striving to bring the principles and policies of the Party and the government before the masses in a prompt, accurate and broad ranging manner [...]. 31 This declaration of objectives is in evident contrast with two fundamental principles that, if promoted and respected, contribute greatly to enhance the right to receive objective, complete and timely information: first of all, State-owned media have a responsibility to report on all aspects of national life and to provide access to a diversity of viewpoints; secondly, State-owned media must not be used as a communication or propaganda organ for one political party or as an advocate for the Government to the exclusion of all other parties and groups.32
Language barriers
The Chinese language is widely used in the media across Tibet. As a result, Tibetans who cannot speak Chinese are disadvantaged and marginalized in receiving essential information. A former teacher from Chabcha Township in Qinghai told TCHRD:
31
http://www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/nu030500.htm Commission on Human Rights, 54th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 29 January 1999; UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/64, Para. 16.
32
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The Qinghai TV channel broadcasts its programs in Chinese for 24 hours a day. However, there is a 90-minute window of programs in Tibetan every day between 5 and 6.30 p.m., with the 15minute news program beginning at 5 p.m. The timing for the news is not good, as people are normally working at 5 p.m. The news in Chinese is at 7 p.m., when everybody is sitting at home. It must also be said that the news in Tibetan is broadcasted one day later the transmission of the same news in Chinese. Since 1995, many Tibetans, including heads of villages, have repeatedly appealed to the Qinghai provincial authorities to increase the duration of the Tibetan programs, but so far the authorities have turned a blind eye to their request.33 Moreover, the production of programs in Tibetan language is by and large neglected in the media across Tibet. In fact, between 80 and 90 percent of the programs broadcasted on Quinghai TV during the daily 90-minute window in Tibetan language, is simply a translation from the original Chinese version. In this respect, a former Tibetan journalist confirmed to TCHRD:
Another disadvantage is that there are no high Tibetan officials in the Qinghai Television Department. The authorities who sanction the news are Chinese and do not understand Tibetan. There is no provision to broadcast Tibetan news directly. The news has to be translated and broadcasted first into Chinese. Then, once permission is given, it is translated again in Tibetan and broadcasted the next day.34
Information embargo
The U.S.-based Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA), and the India-based Voice of Tibet (VOT) are the three main stations broadcasting in Tibetan language to Tibet. China has always looked at this overseas external broadcasts as a serious threat to its monopoly of information and as interference into its internal affairs. As a result, the Chinese authorities have resorted to different methods to prevent Tibetans from listening to programs broadcasted from abroad. The authorities have tried to jam broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA), by airing Chinese programs on the same frequency.35 In Kardze Prefecture they have distributed radios with fixed bandwidth. Kunsang, a 22-year-old student living in Kardze Prefecture, told TCHRD: In our village, the authorities told us that old radios would be replaced with better ones. Many people in our village gladly accepted the offer and replaced their old radios with the new ones distributed by the authorities. But when we switch on the new radios, we could not listen to Radio Free Asia and Voice of America anymore.36
33 34
TCHRD Interview, 13 September 2004 TCHRD Interview, 15 November 2004 35 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27768.htm 36 TCHRD Interview, 25 April 2004
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Civil Liberties
In Pemba County, Chamdo Prefecture, Chinese authorities have installed towers to block the broadcasts. Dorjee, a Tibetan nomad from Pemba County, Chamdo Prefecture, told TCHRD: In 2002, the County officials installed huge towers in our County. Since then we have not been able to listen to Voice of America. Many people in our town blame the tower installed by the authorities.37 TCHRD received evidence that similar towers have been installed Peding, an area located southeast of Lhasa and in Ngaba County, Tsolo Prefecture, Qinghai.
Turning a blind eye to AIDS

China faces an AIDS epidemic that has already affected vast areas of the country. According to Yang Zhengquan, executive vice president of the China Foundation for Human Rights Development (CFHRD), cases of AIDS have been reported in all of the countrys 31 provinces.38 The United Nations figures put the number of people living with HIV/AIDS in China at between 800,000 and 1.5 million; the figure could jump to 10 million by 2010 if current trends continue.39 The early phases of the Chinese epidemic resemble those already seen in other Asian countries, where infection has spread from high-risk to low-risk populations.40 Although the Chinese population is believed to be in the early stages of an HIV/AIDS epidemic, concerns are great that the HIV infection may soon spread to the rural population. 41 As a result, there are concerns that HIV/AIDS may spread across rural areas, including Tibet. Moreover, the increasing number of Han Chinese migrating into Tibet from neighboring provinces could accelerate the spread of HIV/AIDS across the plateau. Without a vaccine or a cure, the main hope in curbing the epidemic resides in widespread availability and accessibility of information and education are essential to effective prevention and treatment efforts.42 In 2002, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNAIDS undertook a revision of guideline 6 on access to prevention, treatment, care and support.
37 38
TCHRD Interview, 03 October 2004 Xinhua News Agency, 17 April 2004 39 Analysis: Bias fuels AIDS crisis in China, by Kathleen Hwang, United Press International, 3 September 2003 40 Modeling the Course of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in China: An Application of a Bio-Behavioral Macrosimulation Model of the Spread of HIV/AIDS, M. Giovanna Merli, Sara Hertog, Department of Sociology and Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin, Madison 41 Modeling the Course of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in China: An Application of a Bio-Behavioral Macrosimulation Model of the Spread of HIV/AIDS, M. Giovanna Merli, Sara Hertog, Department of Sociology and Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin, Madison 42 Commission on Human Rights, 59th session; The Right to freedom of opinion and expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo; 30 December 2002; UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/67, Para. 38.
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Revised guideline 6 and guideline 9 highlight the importance of information and education programmes for the purposes of prevention, and places them in a human rights context. Revised guideline 6 reads as follows43: States should enact legislation to provide for the regulation of HIV-related [] information, so as to ensure widespread availability of qualitative prevention measures and services, [and] adequate HIV prevention and care information []. States should also take measures necessary to ensure [...] the availability and accessibility of quality goods, services and information for HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, care and support [...].44 Guideline 9 reads as follows:
States should promote the wide and ongoing distribution of creative education, training and media programmes explicitly designed to change attitudes of discrimination and stigmatization associated with HIV/AIDS to understanding and acceptance.45
However, the Chinese government has so far failed to take any significant measure aimed at making information on transmission and prevention of AIDS widely available and accessible to the public. Yang Zhengquan, executive vice president of the China Foundation for Human Rights Development (CFHRD), pointed out that the news coverage on AIDS is still limited and superficial.46 Tashi, a local businessman in Lhasa who takes frequent trips between Lhasa and nearby rural areas, told TCHRD in 2004: In Lhasa people celebrate the World AIDS day. Most people are generally aware of AIDS and other disease in Lhasa. However, in rural and remote areas awareness is very poor. Nobody in the villages know about AIDS.47 Dorjee, a former resident of Tsolo, in the Qinghai Province, confirmed to TCHRD: People in villages do not know about the AIDS disease. I dont know if there are such cases in Tsolo Prefecture. Not only in villages, but also in bigger towns people dont know about AIDS. There is no dissemination of information of any type on health issues including AIDS. I only heard about this disease on television when I reached Lhasa. It was reported that a woman died of AIDS. For the first time in my life, through television programs in Lhasa, I heard how this disease spreads.48
43
Commission on Human Rights, 59th session; The Right to freedom of opinion and expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo; 30 December 2002; UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/67, Para. 39 44 Ibid. 45 Commission on Human Rights, 59th session; The Right to freedom of opinion and expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo; 30 December 2002; UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/67, Para. 40 46 Xinhua News Agency, 17 April 200447 TCHRD Interview, 16 November 2004 48 TCHRD Interview, 15 November 2004
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The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to freedom of opinion and expression reiterated its view that the effective exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to seek, receive and impart information, is of the utmost importance for ensuring effective education and information campaigns to prevent HIV/AIDS.49 Over the last years, several countries have conceived and implemented a number of good practices among policies and programs with respect to access to information for the purposes of education on, and prevention of HIV infection. These good practices included the dissemination of information on HIV/AIDS, including on transmission modes and prevention means, through publication of brochures, books, information material and leaflets; the production and dissemination of awareness campaigns targeted at specific vulnerable groups, through, in particular, radio and television programs, advertisements, video-clips, songs, theatre, exhibitions, comics, etc.; the inclusion of HIV/AIDS-related programs in the curricula of schools; the setting-up of hotlines and individual counseling systems; the development of web sites providing information on HIV/AIDS; the facilitation of access to condoms, including through their distribution during information campaigns, in schools, medical centres.50 In regards to such good practices, it is regrettable that the Chinese government has to date remained inactive in designing and putting into practice programs that would facilitate the dissemination of information on the prevention, transmission and treatment of the HIV infection.
Manipulation of facts and figures

Another recurring feature of the Chinese administration in Tibet is the authorities tendency to manipulate statistics that should be of significant public interest. Figures seem to be in most of the cases unreliable, as they do not necessarily reflect the actual situation, but are the result of the authorities attempt to present numbers that coincide to the highest extent possible with pre-defined statistical targets. In this respect, a former Tibetan township official in Sog County told TCHRD:
When the figures reported by the local officials are discussed in meetings, numbers are usually set at a level that makes everyone happy. Local officials try to cover their backs, producing figures that will not have their superiors running after them.51
In addition to the manipulation of statistics, the Chinese authorities regularly resort to distorting facts in order to present a biased and unrealistic official picture of the socio-economic conditions
49
Commission on Human Rights, 59th session; The Right to freedom of opinion and expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo; 30 December 2002; UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/67, Para. 41 50 Commission on Human Rights, 59th session; The Right to freedom of opinion and expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo; 30 December 2002; UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/67, Para. 42 51 TCHRD Interview, 10 December 2004
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of the Tibetan people. This practice is widespread among the lowest hierarchical levels of the administration, whose only concern seems to be to please the higher authorities. As a result, the real socio-economic conditions of Tibetans remain hidden to the top officials, making it extremely difficult to design and implement policies that can address the numerous problems affecting Tibetans. The testimony of a Tibetan individual arrived in Dharamsala from the Tsolo Prefecture exemplifies the local officials tendency to present an optimistic outlook of otherwise poor conditions during inspections carried out in villages by higher authorities. He told TCHRD:
In 2000, a very high dignitary from Beijing came to inspect the economic conditions in our area. He was the Vice Chairman of the Peoples National Congress. As usual, his visit was announced much in advance, like the visits of other high authorities. The local authorities arranged a big gala to the villagers on that day; villagers enjoyed good foods and games on that day, before the eyes of the visiting dignitary. Then the local authorities guided the dignitary to inspect three households in our village, which were actually chosen beforehand. These households were the most well off households in our entire village. The owners told the visiting dignitary that the villagers enjoy a very high living standard owing to the gratitude of Communist Party and hard work of the local authorities. In practice, in our village only 2-3 percent households have living conditions like the three households. Around 60 percent are middle-income households and all the others are extremely poor. The authorities never showed these to the visiting dignitary. Almost all the inspections are conducted in such manners. The local authorities fool common people in this manner.52
Tashi, a businessman from Lhasa, confirmed to TCHRD:
The officials at the local level resort to under or over reporting of facts to the higher authorities, as they are afraid of reprisals from higher officials: this phenomenon has become of public domain. During the 2004 Tibetan New Years celebrations, one of the dramas staged by Tibetan artists showed how village officials misled county officials. The story is about a very poor family in a village. However, when the local officials hear about a visit by County and higher officials then they immediately change the basic outlook of the poor family. On the inspection day, tea and food are placed in the house and clothes are distributed to show that the family is in good condition.53
52 53
TCHRD Interview, 11 October 2004 TCHRD Interview, 16 November 2004
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Right to seek information

Government control and censorship of the Internet
Internet is a unique communication medium due to its global, decentralized, interactive and, not least, infrastructure-independent nature which allows it to transcend national barriers.54 It provides the public and individuals with access to information sources and enables everyone to participate actively in the communication process.55 Moreover, the global reach and relative ease of use of the Internet make it a unique and highly effective tool for the promotion of human rights, enabling an unprecedented audience previously unfamiliar with human rights education to gain access to valuable information. It can be used to disseminate positive information and materials, research and facts about immigration and minorities which can in turn support action against racism and discrimination, raise awareness, promote understanding and increase tolerance.56 Commenting on the importance of Internet, Chinas former President Jiang Zemin publicly declared that the mix of traditional economy with information technology would drive Chinas economic development in the twenty-first century.57 However, as Internet is also perceived by Beijing as a key instrument in terms of freely receiving, exchanging and disseminating political information and ideas, the Chinese authorities have increasingly placed greater attention on its control and regulation. According to the official news agency Xinhua, the government purchased approximately USD 1 Million in software to carry out comprehensive long-term monitoring of computers in Internet cafs across China.58 Regulation of the Internet has also reached Tibet, particularly Lhasa and other major towns. The Chinese authorities have imposed a new surveillance system that requires users who want to access the Internet from cyber cafs to present a valid identification document in order to receive an individual registration number and password and to purchase an Internet Browsing Registration Card issued by the Internet Security branch. As a result, the Internet monitoring system allows the authorities to easily track every users e-mail exchange with the outside world and the websites visited. The Internet Security branch of the Lhasa Public Security Bureau has carried out interrogations of several Tibetans who had visited banned websites or exchanged e-mails dealing with sensitive political issues.59 Previously, PSB officers used to install tracking software in cyber cafs and regularly collect information on the websites visited. However, this system could not allow them to know the exact individual who might have visited sensitive websites included in the
54
Commission on Human Rights, 56th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 18 January 2000; UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/63, Para. 55. 55 Commission on Human Rights, 58th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 30 January 2002; UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/75, Para. 95. 56 Commission on Human Rights, 58th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 30 January 2002; UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/75, Para. 68. 57 http://frassle.rura.org/Directory/index?cat=7558 58 http://www.xinhuanet.org, 21 April 2004 59 http://www.savetibet.org/News/News.cfm?ID=2466&C=7
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governments black list. With the new system in place every bit of information exchanged can be accurately monitored and traced to a well-identified individual.60 Chinese authorities have used filtering systems that prevented users from accessing websites containing information that Beijing regarded as politically sensitive. The software allowed the authorities to screen out websites containing words or expressions relating, for example, to Tibetan Independence, Dalai Lama, Tibetan Government-in-Exile, Human Rights.61 A survey by Harvard Law School researchers between May and November 2002 revealed that the Chinese government prevented users from viewing several websites making reference to the Tibetan cause.62 However, as Internet monitoring systems are proving relatively ineffective and increasingly expensive, Chinese authorities are putting pressure on Internet corporations to comply with the Chinese governments policies. In their competition to conquer the Chinese market, Internet business corporations are censoring their search engine tools. The popular Internet portal Yahoo! agreed to change search engine to facilitate censorship.63 The widely used search engine Google decided to launch a news service that excludes publications disliked by the Chinese government.64 The USbased firm Cisco Systems has sold several thousand routers to enable the Chinese authorities to build an online spying system that identifies subversive keywords in messages. The system also enables the authorities to know who has looked at banned websites or sent dangerous e-mails.65 With regard to the freedom to disseminate and receive information through the Internet, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) made it clear that all mechanisms for filtering or blocking content are not acceptable. Any means of censorship that are unacceptable within the classic media must not be used for online media. New forms of censorship must not be developed.66
Access to information
The United Nation Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression made it clear that the right to access to information held by the Government must be the rule rather than the exception.67 However, this statement does not seem to apply to the situation of Tibet, where the access to information is severely hampered by the State legislation on state secrets. The scope of what constitutes state secrets in China is not restricted to matters of national security, but covers in practice any information that has not been officially vetted prior to disclosure or publication.68
60 61 62
http://www.savetibet.org/News/News.cfm?ID=2466&C=7 Ibid. http://www.tchrd.org/hrupdate/2004/hr200404.html#surveillance 63 http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=11031 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 OSCE Amsterdam Recommendations, 14 June 2003, Freedom of the Media and the Internet; http://www.osce.org/ documents/rfm/2003/06/215_en.pdf 67 Commission on Human Rights, 54th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 28 January 1998; UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/40, Para. 12. 68 http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/article?revision%5fid=17389&item%5fid=17388
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Article 398 of the Chinese Criminal Law imposes heavy penalties on both State and non-State personnel who intentionally or negligently reveal state secrets. Moreover, State secrets laws prohibit the publication of formally classified matters, as well as information that is already publicly available if the intended recipient is a foreign or overseas individual or organization. Under these laws, administrative agencies have almost unrestricted power to determine whether information will be classified as a state secret, making the scope of classified information in China extremely large and infinitely expandable.69 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression emphasized that everyone has the right to seek, receive and impart information and that this imposes a positive obligation on States to ensure access to information, particularly with regard to information held by Government in all types of storage and retrieval systems - including film, microfiche, electronic capacities, video and photographs -.70 However, Tibetans have no means of requesting access to government-held information, and there are no administrative or judicial procedures through which agencies can be ordered to disclose information under their possession or control. At the lower echelons of government, state secrets are commonly invoked by local officials attempting to conceal specific wrongdoings from the attention of higher authorities, or in evading responsibility for incidents that have taken place in their jurisdiction.71 This practice is in evident contrast with the observations made by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and information, according to which refusal to disclose information may not be based on the aim to protect Governments from embarrassment or the exposure of wrongdoing; a complete list of the legitimate aims which may justify non disclosure should be provided in the law and exceptions should be narrowly drawn so as to avoid including material which does not harm the legitimate interest.72 The Chinese governments failure of ensuring access to information is particularly evident and a matter of grave concern in Tibet with regard to the authorities denial of disclosing any information concerning arrest, detention, trial and sentencing of Tibetan political prisoners. In this respect, the case of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche clearly exemplifies the numerous violations of fundamental human rights, including the right to access to information, carried out by the Chinese authorities in the name of state security. On April 14th 2004 three fact-finding experts of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, including the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression,
69
http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/article?revision%5fid=17389&item%5fid=17388 Commission on Human Rights, 54th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 29 January 1999; UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/64, Para. 12. 71 http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/article?revision%5fid=17389&item%5fid=17388 72 Commission on Human Rights, 56th session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 18 January 2000; UN Doc E/CN.4/200/63, Para. 44.
70
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Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2004 issued a statement expressing their deep concern over the situation of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, sentenced to death on December 2nd 2002, after a trial that allegedly fell short of international norms and standards. His sentence was suspended until December 2nd 2004 and he remains in detention. Tenzin Delek Rinpoche was accused of causing explosions and inciting the separation of the state, charges he has always denied. His co-accused, Lobsang Dhondup, was executed on 26 January 2003. Numerous and credible reports have referred to serious procedural flaws during Tenzin Delek Rinpoches closed trial, in particular: violation of the right to a public trial; violation of the right to chose his own lawyer; denial of the right to know and have the opportunity to examine the evidence presented against him in court; as well as incommunicado detention and illtreatment during the pre-trial period. Moreover, the three United Nations experts expressed concern at the alleged lapses in respect for human rights during the trial proceedings and urged the authorities to grant Tenzin Delek Rinpoche a new trial ensuring respect for international norms and standards of due process.73
Conclusion
In contemporary society, because of the social and political role of information, the right of everyone to receive information and ideas has to be carefully protected.74 Moreover, the right to seek or have access to information is one of the most essential elements of freedom of speech and expression.75 In December 2003, Xudong Wang, the Chinese Minister of Information Industry, represented Beijing at the United Nations-sponsored World Summit on Information Society held in Geneva. World leaders including over 40 Heads of state/government and Vice-Presidents declared their common desire and commitment [...] to build a people-centered, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create access, utilize and share information and promoting their sustainable development and improving their quality of life, premised on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.76 Regrettably, the Chinese legislation, including the Constitution, falls short of providing a legal framework for the development of a sound media system that is in line with international standards that govern not only the right of freedom of opinion and expression, but also the right to information.
73
United Nations Human Rights Experts express concern over situation of Tibetan monk, 15 April 2004, http://www.unog.ch/ unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/2C97230C6CFC3ACEC1256F3A004DA9E5?OpenDocument 74 Commission on Human Rights, 51st session; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain; 14 December 1994; UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/32, Para. 35. 75 Ibid. 76 http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/Geneva/official/dop.html
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Civil and Political Rights The Chinese government not only controls, directly or indirectly, through the Communist Partys cadres, radio, television and newspapers, but also precludes its citizens from receiving information from alternative sources, including foreign media. The authorities longa manus also extends to the Internet, thus making it difficult for Tibetans to freely exchange information with the outside world. Moreover, the widespread culture of secrecy among the Chinese administration and the recurrent appeal to the protection of State secrets on the part of the authorities to withhold from Tibetans information that should be rightly theirs, contributes to negatively impact on several aspects of the life of Tibetans. All the above-mentioned factors seriously hinder the development of an informed public opinion in Tibet, raising serious doubts about Beijings willingness to ensure that Tibetans enjoy the right to freedom of opinion and expression.
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Committee for the conferment of Geshe Lharampa degree, August 2004
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Religion Freedom of R eligion
Freedom of Religion
Introduction
The state of religious freedom in Tibet in the year 2004 continues to be of concern with religious repression affecting many levels of Buddhist life and practice. Despite the fact that, the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China promises freedom of religious beliefs for all people, where in reality Chinese authorities continue to violate religious freedom in Tibet. In recent years, ensuring stability and security are cited as major reasons by the Chinese authorities for justifying religious restrictions in Tibet. The tightening of religious freedom in Tibet is being carried out through the legal management of religious institutions, such as by the Democratic Management Committee (DMC)1 and the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB)2. As the Democratic Management Committees work teams3 are concentrating their patriotic re-education4 campaigns in major monasteries and nunneries, such as by prohibiting the display of the Dalai Lamas photo, inciting the closure of schools and monasteries that are suspected of teaching splittist ideology, along with constant interference by the DMC authorities in the administrative affairs of religious institutions. Subsequently, the activities of monks and nuns in larger institutions are strictly controlled and monitored.
Officials at all levels in Tibet are now being exhorted to strengthen control over monasteries and over the process of identifying reincarnations of important Buddhist monks and nuns. Crackdowns on prayer ceremonies for the Dalai Lama and important religious institutions in eastern Tibet in recent years have been described by some Tibetans as being like a second Cultural Revolution. 5
Particularly of great concern to the Chinese Party in recent years, has been the influence held over the people by important religious leaders which is seen as a threat, or a split loyalty to the Chinese State. However, Buddhism is the fabric of Tibetan identity, which the Party views as intrinsically linked to nationality and thus it is seen as a threat by the Chinese authorities over their rule in Tibet. As a result,
Democratic Management Committee (DMC) was set up by the Peoples Republic of China to manage affairs within Monasteries and nunneries inside Tibet. The DMC has been used to implement the Partys policies of with the use of the patriotic re-education campaign, which includes among other things; the requirement of all monks and nuns to study political texts and adhere to a proclamation of loyalty to the mother land, in hand with the denunciation of the Dalai Lama. 2 The Religious Affairs Bureau which shares responsibility for controlling monasteries with local governments and Party cells, in implementing new policies of control at the grassroots level, Cutting Off the Serpents Head; Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-1995; Tibet Information Network Human Rights Watch/Asia. P. 30. 3 Work teams under the democratic Management Committee, are responsible for monitoring and conducting the patriotic re-education campaigns in monasteries. The work teams are also required to report any monks or nuns who refuse to adhere to the patriotic re-education classes. DMC officials are also responsible for monitoring and reporting any activities within the monasteries that Party authorities might deem subversive. 4 Patriotic Re-education campaigns are meant to among other things, instruct monks and nuns in State ideologies and include such things as requiring monks and nuns to claim allegiance to the State, as well as denounce the Dalai Lama. 5 http://www.unpo.org/news , taken from the ICT Report, When the Sky Fell to Earth 2004
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religious leaders in Tibet continue to face persecution, official harassment and intimidation. This year was no exception, and witnessed the ongoing persecution of religious leaders in Tibet. For instance, the whereabouts, and well being of the11th Panchen Lama Gendun Choekyi Nyima still remain unknown after he and his parents disappeared in 1995. The fate of Trulku Tenzin Deleks death penalty is still uncertain; his execution is set for 26 Jan 2005. In the case of Chadrel Rinpoche, the former abbot of Tashi Lhunpo Monastery he completed his six years prison term in 2002, but is still being kept under house arrest by Chinese authorities. Also, Champa Chungla, the secretary of search committee for the 11th Panchen Lamas reincarnation continues to be held in detention by Chinese authorities despite the completion of his prison term on 16 May 2003. Ironically, on 26 September 2004, the Chinese appointed Panchen Lama, Gyaltsen Norbu made his third official visit to Tibet, and praised the Chinese leadership for protecting and ensuring religious freedom in Tibet. On a positive note, the Geshe Lharampa degree examination was officially resumed in August 2004, after a ban of fifteen years. The Geshe Lharampa degree is the highest level of erudition in Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and takes more than twenty years to master, and is equivalent to Doctorate Degree in the West. Unfortunately, the Geshe Lharampa exam was reinstated with an additional State prerequisite to study six books concerning political ideologies.
Democratic Management Committee (DMC)

In 1990 during the Standing Committee meeting of National Peoples Congress the former President Jiang Zemin, and the then Premier Li Peng proposed the legal management of religious affairs. In the spirit of such legal management, the Democratic Management Committee or (Tib: mang gtso bdag nyer uyon lhan khang) poses a serious challenge to freedom of religious beliefs in Tibet. As the DMC is meant to empower Chinese authorities legally to carry out inspection, vigilance, supervision, searches, raids and infiltration by tightly controlling all aspects of religious activities in monasteries and nunneries. Moreover, DMC policies have a disregard for the traditional Tibetan monastic system, and are a break in the convention of Tibetan culture. Thus the Democratic Management Committee is a further attempt to replace the functioning of traditional Tibetan Buddhism by a Chinese version of monastic administration and control. The cardinal principle of the DMC is the legal management of religious affairs, where monks and nuns are expected to display a level of allegiance to the Party in the form professing loyalty, and allegiance to the State. It was during the Third Work Forum on Tibet in 1994 that the relationship between the monastic institutions and pro-independence movements in Tibet were established. In an article appearing in the Tibet Daily (Chinese language version) 25 November 1994 the Partys view of the Dalai Lama is stated as the following:
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We must emphasize that we must look squarely at the reality that the Dalai clique is using religion for its splittist activities; we must expose the fact that the Dalai is using the mask of religion to cover up his political features; and we must firmly stop the Dalai clique from influencing lamas and nuns in Tibet in any way. The broad masses of people, lamas and nuns, no matter whether or not they are Party members or cadres, must politically draw a clear line of demarcation with the Dalai clique. 6 The exact origin and date of the development of the Democratic Management Committee are difficult to pinpoint. However, it was in 1994 as an outcome of the Third Tibet Work Forum held in Beijing, that the role of the democratic Management Committees implementation in Tibet continued to be given great importance.7 The resulting new emphasis led to a renewed vigor in DMC activities in Tibet from 1996 onwards. The DMC administration was set up in all temples, monasteries and nunneries so that monks and nuns can manage their own affairs under DMC guidelines while being over- seen by DMC representatives. DMC representatives could be officially endorsed monks and nuns or could be a State approved lay person. The DMC work team officials are responsible for distributing State documents and enforcing Government policies in the religious institutions. DMC officials pay special attention and vigilance to implementing their policies in larger religious institutions. In other words, DMC management and policies are an apparatus of Party control, in which the long-standing independence of religious institutions once enjoyed in Tibet is under threat. Through the official means of the Democratic Management Committee, affairs within religious institutions are being restricted and controlled in the areas: of ritual and esoteric practices, transmission of oral instructions, retreats, as well as studying and worshipping. It is through the DMC, that authorities in last ten years successfully carried out the implementation of political education classes, and the propagating of Party policies and ideologies in religious institutions wherein monks and nuns are required to study political books. The entire campaign of patriotic education which proliferated for the last ten years was in fact being carried out under the mechanisms of work teams in initial years and later by the DMC. These restrictions will inevitably lead to the erosion of the foundation of Buddhism in Tibet, thus placing a serious strain on Tibetan Buddhism. Furthermore, the Democratic Management Committee, in hand with patriotic re-education campaign, subsequently implemented in religious institutions are
6 Taken from a reference translated by; Tibet Information NetworkHuman Rights Watch/Asia, Cutting off the Serpent s Head; Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-1995", p 33. Translated from reproduced in A Golden Bridge on October 1, 1994, in the Tibet Daily (Chinese language version), November 25, 1994. 7 This demand in practice meant that work teams or management committees had to obtain from each monk or nun a written or oral declaration that they would not support the political position and claims of the Dalai Lama or his followers. The demand is worded in such a way that it criticizes the Dalai Lama personally but does not explicitly require Tibetans to oppose the Dalai Lama as an individual or as their religious leader; instead they are ordered to separate themselves from the clique, and it is specified that the separation related to politics rather than religious matters. Given the general tone of these instructions to Party cadres, which elsewhere include extensive attacks on the Dalai as an individual and as a religious figure, we can assume that this ambiguity was not an oversight. But a reflection of a sense of caution amongst Chinese propagandists about how far they can push their demands without triggering off major unrest The ambiguity leaves decisions about difficult policy implementation to be decided by cadres at the local level and thus leaves the senior leadership free to deny responsibility if things go wrong. It is also in effect an invitation to grassroots cadres to be more energetic in carrying out the spirit of the instructions than required by the instructions themselves. Cutting Off the Serpents Head; Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-1995; Tibet Information Network Human Rights Watch/Asia. P. 34.
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undoubtedly ideological attempts by the State in usurping the foundations of Tibetan Buddhism, in an attempt to supercede the ideologies of an atheist State into Buddhist practices.
Source Book of Current Chinese Documents on Religious Policy8 contains four documents on religious policy with a number of key questions and answers given by Chinese authorities. The documents contain rules for monks and nuns in monasteries, advocating Science and Technology and doing away with Superstitions, educating in Anti-Splittism and an education in Party Policy on Religion. The documents outline the ongoing religious repression in Tibet. The document also stressed the importance of the theoretical and ideological Marxist views in the context of modernizing Tibet. It is in this attempt for modernization, that the sensitivity towards the maintenance and preservation of Tibetan Buddhist heritage is being overlooked and in the process faces neglect and destruction. In short, the implications of such policies are that religious institutions are being operated to a certain degree under the authority of the State; in other words the Chinese State is working towards a shift in power from Tibetan religious leaders to the central authority of the Party.
Ironically as stated in Chinese published book Chinas Tibet, 2004, Facts and Figures: The policy of freedom of religious beliefs shall be carried out in Tibet. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be protected, and lamaseries shall be protected.9 Nevertheless, it is apparent that Religion is to serve the overall aims of the Party and state, deepening the tie between the Party and the masses and to safeguard the state security.10 Moreover, clearly mandating religion to serve the purpose of State means the Party is violating the freedom of peoples choice to separate religion from political obligation.
Patriotic Re-education Campaign

. It was during the Third Tibet Work Forum, convened in 1994, that Chinese leaders explicitly began to focus on the Dalai Lama and the so-called hostile separatist forces based abroad. The patriotic reeducation campaign was the outcome, resulting in the Partys new policies on religion, with the placing of new restrictions on religious institutions. The patriotic re-education campaign was then carried out by the Democratic Management Committee. The intensification of the patriotic re-education campaign was later stepped up in Tibet in 1996, which introduced as a new requirement a series of political texts into monastic studies, and also stressed allegiance to the State and the denunciation of the Dalai Lama. The patriotic re-education campaign was also meant to target and suppress any sign of political unrest in religious institutions, which the Chinese authorities seem to consider as a source of political dissidence.
8 9
Taken from a reference in the ICT report, When the Sky Fell To Earth, Page no. 81 released in 2004. Chinas Tibet 2004, Facts and Figures, New Star Publishers, page 68, line 9-11. 10 Taken from a reference in the ICT report, When The Sky Fell To Earth, (2004) page. 93
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Here, politically the issue of religion is a sensitive topic in Socialist China, given the fact that the communist ideology is based and founded on the principle of atheism. While attempting to understand Beijings view of the Dalai Lama one must also consider the complex political history of the violently suppressed pro-independence movements in Tibet during 1987, 1988, and 1989 which prompted a shift in Chinas religious policies in Tibet. Another factor that may have led to the compounding fears of political unrest among Chinese leaders was the unexpected outbreak in Beijing of the student-led protest in Tiananmen Square. The violent handling of the protest by the PRC brought about international shock and condemnation; subsequently prompting Chinas human rights abuses to the forefront of international attention. Around this time the Dalai Lama continued to gain growing support in the international community for the Tibetan cause. Not surprisingly, this complicated fabric of socio-political events have had a lasting bearing on the way Chinese leaders see loyalty of the Tibetans to the Dalai Lama, and how such loyalty threatens the legitimacy of Chinese rule of Tibet. Thus, under the directive of Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) and its smaller committee of DMC, work teams were established to carry out and conduct the patriotic re-education classes instituted in the religious institutions for monks and nuns, making them among other things, to write essays denouncing the Dalai Lama. This campaign also entails a five point requirement, including the acceptance of Tibet as an inalienable part of China, as well as attempts to cultivate the love of one mother country under the slogan Love Your Country Love Your Religion (Tib: rgayl khches ring lugs bsam bloi slob gso), recognizing the Chinese appointed Panchen Lama and finally, denouncing the Dalai Lama as a traitor/splittist. Under the patriotic re-education the authorities also imposed bans on admitting monks and nuns under the age of eighteen, saying that those individuals under the age-limit are too young to study in religious institutions. All other monks and nuns are required to register with the DMC officials, those who do not possess a registration card or stay permit, are expelled from the monasteries. Furthermore, the monasteries and nunneries have a required ceiling of monks and nuns who are allowed to legally stay and study at the monasteries. Moreover, monks and nuns who have not registered with the DMC and those who have resisted the re-education classes, are forced to leave the monasteries, or go into hiding when work teams visit their monasteries. In relation, under the banner of patriotic re-education campaign the Chinese authorities have also expelled large numbers of monks and nuns from religious institutions who refuse to adhere to the requirements of the patriotic re-education campaign. Official interference by work team officials an dlater under the DMC has also arisen in regards to monastic reconstruction efforts, as expressed by Dhamchoe Dolma11 a nun aged 29, who served six years in Drapchi Prison in (TAR), Dhamchoe testified to TCHRD about her activities in Tibet and atrocities she suffered in Prison. She was from the Changra Village, Lhundup County, Lhasa City. At the age of seventeen she was ordained as a nun at Shar Bumpa Nunnery in Phenpo County. The Shar
11
Source: TCHRD March Update 2004, page 4
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Bumpa nunnery was badly destroyed during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the local Tibetans tried to reconstruct the nunnery through donations within the town. Nuns participated in the reconstruction through manual labor, and collected donations for reconstruction. In March of 1993 a team of Lhundup County officials came to the reconstruction site when majority of the work was completed. The officials stopped the rest of reconstruction, created disturbance, and intimidated the nuns. They also issued fresh guidelines for the number of nuns allowed in the nunneries, calling for additional reductions in the number of nuns admitted to the nunnery. In the aftermath of the confrontation at the nunnery, work team officials from Lhasa City and Lhundup County later returned to the nunnery to conduct patriotic re-education classes, for one month. Clearly, this incident is a violation of the Chinese constitution, which claims freedom of religious belief and worship for all citizens in which is stated in Article 36, Chapter two that, Citizens of the Peoples Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.
The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state...
Here it is apparent that the continuing restrictions imposed on religious practice in Tibet contradicts the freedoms enshrined in the constitution, as well as ignores the provisions of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights (UDHR). As stated in Article 18 of the UDHR
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. Freedom to manifest ones religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
Furthermore, Article 18 of International Covenant of Economic Social Cultural and Religion (ICESCR) states, Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Despite international and Chinese law, it seems apparent that religion in Tibet is greatly restricted, particularly in areas deemed politically sensitive by the Chinese administration. 120
Anti-Dalai Lama Campaign

A point of contention for Beijing is what is seen as the issue of Tibetans split loyalty towards the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authority. The Chinese authorities intensified their official anti-Dalai Lama stand during the policies of Fourth Session of the Sixth Regional Peoples Congress held on 24 May 1996, where they stated that the Dalai Lama is the chief villain who must be publicly exposed and criticized...stripping away his cloak of being a religious leader. Moreover, the restrictions of religious freedom in Tibet are being implemented in a two-prong strategy. The first being to force Tibetans particularly monks and nuns, to adhere to a five point denunciation, wherein they must state that the Dalai Lama is a traitor and splittist, while also forcing them to agree to the historical unity of Tibet as having always been a part of China. Next, monks and nuns must recognize the Chinese appointed Panchen Lama; and finally they must declare their personal opposition to separatism. The Chinese authorities also banned all Tibetans from possessing the Dalai Lamas portraits/ photos, praying for his well being, invoking his name, observing his birth day celebrations or showing any expression of faith and loyalty to his historical stature. From a reference taken from an International Campaign for Tibet report, When the Sky Fell To Earth, Party members officially involved in the patriotic re-education campaign in the TAR in 1997 summed up their view of the Dalai Lama as this, what kind of person is the Dalai? The Dalai is the main leader of the splittists who conspire for Tibet Independence, a tool used by international anti-China forces to promote hostility, the chief inspiration for those causing unrest within Tibetan society, and all those who obstruct the re-establishment of discipline in the regulations of Buddhist [monasteries] in Tibet 12 Overall, it is apparent that a great challenge for Chinese leaders is winning the hearts and minds of Tibetan people in their favor. Since, the communist state runs on the absolute loyalty and allegiance to the State, it is natural that the stature of Dalai Lama in the hearts of Tibetan people is taken as a point of concern to the PRCs legitimacy over their rule in Tibet. Thus, one of the main concerns in Chinas battle over Tibet has been dealing with the spiritual authority of the Dalai Lama and his political stature in the world community. Clearly, this year religious repression under the banner of patriotic re-education continues to be very high.
Persecution
TCHRD has received information about the continuing anti-Dalai campaign in the Kardze region of Sichuan Province. According to testimony received by TCHRD, it appears the year 2004 was marked
12
Taken from a reference in the ICT report When The Sky Fell To Earth, Page no. 17 released in 2004
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by the continued enforcement of the anti-Dalai Lama campaign. Samten13, 38 from Ghechoe Village in Kardze Prefecture (TAR) states, In 1992, Chinese officials visited Kardze Monastery. The monks were called in for meetings thrice every month and were instructed to denounce the Dalai Clique while claiming allegiance with the State. The officials then restricted the number of monks allowed to stay in monastery to only 300. He further elucidates the special restrictions on the religious ceremonies and festivals particularly the annual Monlam (Prayer Festival) held at the monastery. Samten goes on to further explain how restrictions and the stifling of religious freedom in religious institutions has led to the flight of many monks who decide to live in exile in India in order to study freely. From 1992 to 2000, Samten studied Buddhist philosophy at Drepung Loseling monastery in south India. He returned to Tibet to meet his relatives after procuring a years leave from the monastery. He recounts For my journey back to Tibet, I took along 18 Tibet related video cassettes and 150 portraits of Dalai Lama for distribution in my native town. After few days stay at Lhasa, on 11 December 2000 he was arrested by eleven policemen and detained at the Lhasa PSB Detention Center. A month later he was sentenced to three years of reform through labor at Trisam Labor Camp, near Toeling County. On 11 December 2003, Samten was released after completing his term. He reached Dharamsala in May 2004. In November 2003, authorities in Kardze and Lithang County threatened the local populace with confiscation of their land if they failed to hand over portraits of the Dalai Lama displayed in their homes. Jampel Gyaltso14, 35 from Phu Village, Mangdu Township, Lhatse County in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). He became a monk at 18 at Mangkar Dharling monastery and joined Sera Monastery when he was 25 years of age. In 1998, Love Your County, Love Your Religion (patriotic-re-education campaign) campaign began in Sera monastery. We were forced to denounce the Dalai Lama, and there was a banning of the Dalai Lamas portraits. Five plain clothed policemen stationed in the monastery arrested Jampel on 9 September 2001 for listening to the audio teachings of Dalai Lama. The Lhasa Intermediate Peoples Court charged Jampel of Anti Government Propaganda and sentenced him to two years imprisonment, along with deprivation of political rights for one year. He was released on 8 August 2003, and arrived in India in April 2004. Further testimony received by TCHRD in November 2004 from a monk named Jigme Dorjee15 states,
Teams of officials consisted of three to seven work team personnel from the County Government Administration Office, and they frequented the monastery. They conducted political classes, demanding monks to denounce the Dalai Lama, making the monks pledge loyalty to the motherland and to accept that Tibet is a part of China. A certificate upon completion of the political classes is issued to monks
13 14
Source: TCHRD June Update 2004, page 2 Source: TCHRD July Update 2004, page 5 15 Source: TCHRD Kathmandu Interview 2004
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belonging to the monastery. Those monks who were not registered officially go into hiding or go home when work teams officials visit the monastery. The monks who are registered officially are not happy in the monastery, as they have to criticize the Dalai Lama against their will in order to receive the official endorsement certificate to remain in the monastery. They have no choice but to follow the official instructions or lose their stay in monastery or face detention if matters turned worse for them... the Chinese claim of religious freedom is totally false. I am a monk but it is a huge struggle for me to stay in the monastery and study peacefully.
Expulsion
The expulsion of monks and nuns who fail to either complete or follow the requirements of the political re-education campaign continues to date. According to testimony received by TCHRD, a monk named Jigme Namgyal16 went to Lhoka Samye Drakmar Monastery to undertake a meditation retreat. However, Chinese authorities stationed in the monastery would not allow him to meditate saying that he would need a permit letter in order to stay in retreat. He states, The monastic population decreases every year due to such strict regulations and political indoctrinations. I have strong concerns that Samye Drakmar monastery will perish in the near future as there is no religious freedom in the monastery. Additionally, Lodoe Nyima17 a monk from the Tashi Lhukpuk monastery testified to the Tibetan Reception Center (TRC) in Nepal. After the launch of patriotic re-education in 1994 and the increasing religious repression led to the destruction of the monastery and at present it housed only thirty monks compared to several hundred in the past. Lodoe explains, That the small number of monks at the monastery is not because of the unwillingness of the local people to become monks, but because of Chinas policy of imposing a limited ceiling on the number of monks in the monastery. Recently, a new directive was issued which says the monastery is not allowed to house any more than 35 monks. The PSB officials of Yuri County are keeping the monastery under a watchful eye. Many of the senior and learned monks were expelled from the monastery under the pretext that they were corrupting the minds of young novices. The officials are promoting atheism under the patriotic re-education campaign and senior monks are forced to admit non-allegiance to the Dalai Lama under threat of expulsion. The failure to fulfill the officials demand would result in eviction from the monastery and the imposing of a fine of 2000 Chinese Yuan. The work team inspects the monastery twice a month. Later I joined Drepung monastery on 5 December 1995 and studied there for more than five years. I was not able to put my best foot forward in Buddhist studies due to the lack of religious freedom. We have to live a life under constant panic and fear because of sudden raids conducted inside the monastery by the Local Bureau officials, while they also forced us to praise communist policies and denounce splittist activities.
16 17
Source: TCHRD Kathmandu Interview 2004 Source: TCHRD Kathmandu Interview 2004
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Dukarkyap18 a graduate student from the Nubchang (North-West) Nationalities University who reached Kathmandu Tibetan Reception Center in October 2004 testified to TCHRD that, During vacations, I visit my home town and give tuition to students at a rented house to earn some money. In 2003 when I was returning to my hometown, I met a western tourist who gave me a book Footprints of Spring containing a picture and a speech by the Dalai Lama. I wrote the speech on the blackboard of the class and explained it to the students. However, the next day around 3.pm, seven local officials dropped in and started searching my house. The officials found a small photograph of the Dalai Lama and asked where I got them from. Later I was taken to the PSB office and interrogated. However, my family secured my release with the help of an influential person. I was directed to stop the tuition classes.
A Ganden monk named Kunga19 who recently escaped to India reported to the Tibetan Reception Center in Kathmandu on 16 March 2004, that, On 12 February 2004, Chonden, 25, was detained by Chinese police. They found a portrait of the Dalai Lama in Chondens room during a sudden raid of Gaden Monastery. During a second raid of the monastery, police found a Tibetan flag in Chondens room. Immediately Chonden was arrested. Kunga further describes, later, five to six policemen came to the monastery and called all the monks for a meeting. However, the details of Chondens imprisonments and illegal possession of the Dalai Lamas portraits were pronounced. Then the officials threatened the rest of the monks with punishments if they were caught with any such materials in the future. The present whereabouts of Choden are unknown, but many believed he is being held in Gutsa Detention Centre.
Persecution of Religious Leaders

Legal management of Tibets religious institutions through the political education campaigns, implemented by Democratic Management Committee officials, are further attempts of the Peoples Republic of China at promoting allegiance to the State, as well as an opportunity to target expressions of loyalty and faith to the Dalai Lama. In relation, China has also targeted high religious Lamas, as officials feel threatened by the religious influence (which officials may be equating with political influence) they exert on the Tibetan people. Since communist ideology hinges on the support of the people in order to maintain the Partys political power, it is natural to argue that Chinese leaders feel uneasy by Tibetans displays of faith for the Dalai Lama as well as other high religious Lamas.
18 19
Source: TCHRD November Update 2004, page 4 Source: TCHRD Kathmandu Interview 2004
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As previously mentioned, the Third Work Forum on Tibet convened in 1994 in Beijing was a turning point as a report by the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) highlights new crackdowns on Buddhism in Tibet. It says
The Third Work Forum guidelines demonstrate a deep concern on the part of the Party over the continued popularity of Tibetan Buddhism intensified by the perceived relationship between religion and the pro-independence movement.
Li Dezhu, the Minister of Chinas State Ethnic Affairs Commission in his strategy paper writes20 Historically, the western region was a sensitive region for ethnic relations. The negative impacts of some ethnic relations problems left over by history cannot be eliminated in the short term, but still require long term effort. The religious influence of the western regions is far-reaching, and the intermingling of nationality and religious issues has increased the complexity of managing ethnic relations. Anti-separatist policies have thus been built into Chinas western development strategy in order to support Beijings objectives of national unity and stability. In this way, the perceived goal is to reduce the negative effects of religion on the regions development and stability. In order to implement the Partys directives and policies in Tibet the Chinese authorities consider it important to restrict and play down the influence of high religious Lamas among the Tibetan people.
Gendun Choekyi Nyima the 11th Panchen Lama

The continued detention of the Panchen Lama Gendun Choekyi Nyima (originally detained on the 17th May 1995, at the age of six) is yet another instance of severe Chinese intervention into Tibetan religious affairs. Additionally, the Panchen Lamas state of health, and whereabouts has been unknown for almost the past 10 years. China has officially refused to admit the States detention of the Panchen Lama; however on one occasion Chinese authorities stated that his parents requested the States protection for fear that Gendun Choekyi Nyima might be kidnapped, and thus he is being held in safe custody with his parents. Shortly after the Panchen Lamas disappearance, in an effort to discredit the Dalai Lamas recognition of the Gendun Choekyi Nyima as the 11th Panchen Lama, the Chinese leadership announced their own State appointed Panchen Lama, a boy named Gyaltsen Norbu as the 11th Panchen Lama. Historically, the Panchen Lamas and the Dalai Lamas have (since the 16th century) enjoyed a special Teacher Disciple relationship for many centuries. For example, the first Panchen Lama was the teacher of fifth Dalai Lama, and it was at this time that the Panchen Lama was given a the honorable title Panchen which means Great Scholar. As long as the real Panchen Lama Gendun Choekyi Nyima, is not given the due recognition and the religious authority he deserves, he will be deprived of proper and complete religious education and practices thereby affecting the transmission of lineage of the
20
ICT report WHEN SKY FELL TO EARTH
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Panchen Lama. In this context, the implications of the ongoing detention of the 11th Panchen Lama, is a supreme act of religious repression for political means, and poses to upset the functioning of traditional Tibetan Buddhism. Chadrel Rinpoche Chadrel Rinpoche, the former abbot of Tashi Lhunpo Monastery of Shigatse was arrested in May 1995, days after the recognition of Gendun Choekyi Nyima as the reincarnation of the 11th Panchen Lama was announced by the Dalai Lama. Chadrel Rinpoche was the chairperson of the search committee for the reincarnation of the 11th Panchen Lama. After a brief trial, he was sentenced to six years of imprisonment for what authorities called conspiring to split the country and disclosing state secrets. His only crime was that he had communicated with the Dalai Lama over the reincarnation issue before the announcement was made. Chadrel Rinpoche has already completed his prison term of six years, yet he was not allowed to return to his traditional Tashi Lhunpo monastery. So far there have been no reliable reports about his whereabouts and well being. He was supposed to have been released in January 2002, however he is currently being held under some kind of unofficial house arrest, at an undisclosed location. Chadrel Rinpoches case not only illustrates the violation of human rights but also a violation of the right to religious freedom. Chadrel Rinpoches case is yet another instance of the lack of freedom and independence in religious institutions under Chinese rule.
Jampa Chungla Jampa Chunglas case is similar to that of Chadrel Rinpoche, as he is being held in illegal detention even though he completed his prison term on 16 May 2003. He was the secretary of the Search Committee for the finding of the 11th Panchen Lama, and was a close aide to Chadrel Rinpoche. He was sentenced to four years of imprisonment, and was also charged with, leaking state secrets, and endangering state security. He is reportedly under house arrest upon completion of his prison term.
Geshe Sonam Phunstok On 25 October 1999, about 20 PSB officers arrested Geshe Sonam Phunstok, the popular Buddhist teacher and scholar from Dhargay Monastery Kardze TAP in Sichuan, from his hometown. They sentenced him to five years imprisonment on allegations of inciting splittist activities among the masses and for having conducted a long-life prayer ceremony for the Dalai Lama. Apparently, Geshe Sonam Phunstok had traveled to India on a document procured from Lhasa to seek an audience with the Dalai Lama. He was imprisoned in Chuandong No 3 Prison in Tazhu County, Sichuan This year Chinese authorities released Geshe Sonam Province upon the completion of his prison term on 24 October 2004. However, his movements and actions in the Kardze Region are restricted and monitored. He is currently said to be in poor health due to the maltreatment he suffered in Prison. Currently, Chinese authorities are also said to be monitoring his movements in the Kardze region. 126
Trulku Tenzin Delek Trulku Tenzin Delek is a prominent Tibetan Lama currently facing a death sentence with the suspension of two years. Trulku Tenzin Delek is an outspoken proponent for the preservation and propagation of Tibetan culture and religion, and holds a high level of respect within the Tibetan community; he was also an active force in the construction of several new monasteries, and an orphanage in Eastern Tibet. Perhaps because Chinese authorities feel threatened by the level of respect shown to Trulku Tenzin Delek by the Tibetan people, and also for his expressed allegiance to the Dalai Lama, he has faced persecution by the Chinese authorities. Trulku Tenzin Delek was arrested for his alleged involvement in a series of bomb blasts that occurred in Kardze and one in Chengdu City on 3 April 2002. Chinese authorities arrested Lobsang Dhondup, a disciple of Trulku Tenzin Delek, and linked Trulku to the bomb explosions. Trulku was arrested on 7 April 2002. At a closed trial held on 2 December 2002 at Kardze peoples Intermediate Court. Lobsang Dhondhup was sentenced to immediate death penalty and was executed on 26th January 2003, while Trulku Tenzin Delek was given a death sentence with a suspension of two years. The present state of Trulku Tenzin Deleks health and remains unknown. Nevertheless, the death sentence with two years reprieve ends on 25 January 2005, but so far there has been no additional developments in his case, despite immense pressure from the international community.
Exile Returnees Face Expulsion

Due to the falling standards of religious instructions in Tibet, many monks and nuns come to India to pursue religious studies. However, upon return to Tibet, DMC officials who suspect them of having ties with Dalai Clique, or the Tibetan Government in Exile expel many monks and nuns from their home monasteries. As evidence of this, Phunstok Gyaltso21, 33 from Tso Chang Village in Tsojang, Qinghai Province, testified to TCHRD After staying in the monastery for some years, I wished to pursue my monastic studies in a monastery in south India. On 20 December 1994, I arrived in south India and joined Gaden Monastery. For the next five years, I stayed in Ganden Monastery and studied the Buddhist scriptures. On 15 January 1999, I returned to Tibet. After Phunstok Gyalsto and his friends reached Tibet and rejoined their monastery they faced intimidation from the Democratic Management Committee authorities, which was followed by their expulsions. He explains,
21
Source: TCHRD Kathmandu Interview 2004
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On 14 October 1999, an official letter was sent to the monastery demanding the expulsion of monks who have returned from India. The letter also threatened the monastery administration with severe punishment if they failed to comply with the order. The letter was sent from the Religious Affairs Bureau, Public Security Bureau, and the United Work Front Department. As per the directives of the letter Phunstok Gyaltso himself was expelled along with the monks, Khenrap Gyaltso, 30, Lobsang Dhondup, 32, Gedun Rabgay31, Sonam Gyaltso, 32, Lobsang Anyen, 28, Sherab, 27, Sangay, 21 were all expelled. In another case monks were beaten for crossing the border to pursue an audience with the Dalai Lama. Dhondup 22, Tashi Dhargay 19 and Dhondup Namgyal were monks from the Dhargayling Monastery located in Lhatse County in Mangpo Township. They began their journey to India on 1 December 2003. Unfortunately, on 29 December 2003 Nepalese police arrested them and deported them back to Tibet. They received severe beatings from the police and were kept in Shigatse Detention Centre for 23 days in poor condition before being transferred to Lhasa. Instead of being allowed to return to their monasteries, the authorities in Lhasa ordered them to return to their respective homes. In recent years religious repression and restrictions have extended to isolated regions outside the TAR. For instance, even remote hermitage centers come under the official scrutiny. The following testimony from monk Jigme Namgyal22 shows religious repression in retreat centers. He became a monk at a young age and enrolled in Phunstok Norling Monastery and started his retreat when he was 24 years old. After many days of strenuous search he discovered a good retreat place at Samye Dragmar Monastery. The monasterys staff told him about the requirement of permit letter from the office of Tsethang Prefecture Peoples Religious Department to undertake any retreat. He applied for three years, but was only granted three months permission for retreat after many days of appeal. The continuing violation of religious rights in Tibet by the Chinese officials prompted Jigmes escape into exile. His aspiration to stay in retreat for a long period of time was made difficult and he was not able to tolerate the work teams constant harassment and the patriotic education in the Monastery. He reached Kathmandu on 14 April 2004. An additional testimony received from a nun named Jigme23 reported to TCHRD on 18 April 2004 that, In July 1998 a total of six officials, two officials from Tanang Township along with two Chinese appointed members for the monastery from Religious Department had a meeting from morning 8 am till 3 in the afternoon. Those monks with retreat permits were also called for the meeting. Those monks who possess permits but have not signed the pledges requiring denunciation of Dalai Lama were subsequently threatened with eviction from the Dragmar Kyetsang Monastery. Similarly
22 23
Source: TCHRD Kathmandu Interview 2004 Source: TCHRD Kathmandu Interview 2004
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Wyantsa Monastery was also threatened with demolition if any nun failed to put their signature on the statement. Later senior clergies urged the nuns to write a symbolic signature without due spirit in order to save the monastery from destruction. Another case of religious rights violations was reported from Phelpar Monastery. The monk Loden from Chamdo gave this testimony at Tibetan Refugee Reception Center in Kathmandu on 5 April 2004. In 2000 the officials of Phelbar County came to know about Lodens plans for the reconstruction work in Phelkar Monastery. In response the five officials of the town and administrators of the monastery had a meeting, where three conditions were set to ban reconstruction work. The three rules outlined for the reconstruction work were as follows, first if there is no prior government consent for reconstruction work to be done by the monastery then it is not allowed. Secondly, it was announced that there was to be a ceiling of monks allowed in the monastery and that the existing monks of the monastery should apply for a new permit issued by the Chinese Government that allows for monk to remain in the monastery. And finally, monks below the age of 18 are not permitted to stay in monastery and should return to their respective homes. Loden further explained At present there were around 95 monks with official permit and more than 300 novices around the age of 18 without official permit. Those 300 monks secretly attended the monastery, but have to return to their room when they came to know about the sudden visits of officials from the town and County PSB. On 11 June 2003, ten officials from the County PSB visited the monastery at the beginning of the summer retreat and the monks were called for a meeting. The officials ordered senior clergies not to allow more than the 95 registered monks and warned of fining them 2000 Yuan if they were to violate the directive. In addition, the display of the Dalai Lamas portrait in the central hall was banned and all the monks were ordered to sign the denunciation of the Dalai Lama. However, all of the monks in the monastery refused to sign, saying that they cannot accept, or fulfill every wish of the Chinese officials. Now the work teams of five to six members visit the monastery on a regular basis, once every two months. Shortly after the incident Loden fled to India, as he felt there would be a dim future of religious freedom in Tibet under such circumstances.
Politicization of Geshe Lharampa Degree

In Tibetan Buddhism there are four major sects or schools, among which the Gelukpa School is most prominent and has the largest following. Tibets greatest scholar saint Tsongapa founded this school in 1410 A.D. One of his prominent disciples was Gendun Drupa, who was posthumously recognized as the first Dalai Lama of Tibet. Gelukpa School produced a successive generation of imminent scholars based on their strict monastic rules and wide Buddhist literature. One of the most important traditions of the Gelukpa School is the institution of Geshe Lharampa exam. It comprises dialectical debates, or is best described as a test on Buddhist philosophy. The applicant who wishes to acquire this religious title must submit to strenuous testing on the five major cannons of 129
Tibetan Buddhism through debate in the presence of a large assembly of religious scholars. Hence, the title Geshe means a learned man or a scholar, and Lharampa means the most profound or the highest erudition. In Gelukpa Geshe Lharampa is the highest academic religious honor, and is considered the most important aspect of Gelukpa Tibetan Buddhism. The Geshe Lharampa examination was first banned in 1959 by the Chinese, who claimed it was a feudal practice. Then in 1986 after repeated appeals of the 10th Panchen Lama it was revived after a ban of 27 years. However after the popular pro-independence demonstration in 1988 it was again banned, since Chinese authorities felt there was a large number of monks and nuns participating in the demonstrations from Drepung, Sera and Ganden monasteries (the three largest Buddhist monasteries in Tibet). The Chinese officials announced the resumption of Geshe Lharampa for the second time after the ban of fifteen years in August 2004. Recently, China announced on 28 July 2004, on the Xinhua.net web-site that there would be a resumption of the twice-banned highest academic degree, the Gelugpa (Yellow Hat School) of Tibetan Buddhism. The exam was to be resumed; but with the condition that from now onwards the applicants for this Degree have to study six other books on political thought under the Love Your Country, Love Your Religion (Tib: rgayl khches ring lugs bsam bloi slob gso); which falls under the political re-education campaign. Furthermore, 77 members (chosen by the PRC) Committee for the Conferment of Degree for the highest Buddhist Studies were formed on 20 August 2004 to supervise the examination of the Degree. In the past, monks on the sole basis of their academic merit and scholarship earned this prestigious and highly symbolic aspect of Tibetan Buddhism. It is a very sacred thread of Gelukpa Buddhism. The examiners themselves were the source of erudition and mastery of Tibetan Buddhism. Unfortunately, the addition of political texts to be included in the Geshe Lharampa exam acts as a disruption to the essence of Tibetan religious tradition, particularly in the wake of pronounced display of loyalty to the State. This is a serious political intervention in the religious affairs of the Tibetan people. Thus, there are number of negative implications of the reinstatement of the Geshe Lharampa exam by Chinese authorities. The scholarship and qualification of those whom the Party has hand picked, act as supervisors in terms of administering the examination. Thus the actual level of scholarship of the exam, will likely lead to falling standards of achievement among the new generation in Tibet, who undertake and earn this degree. It is also a point of concern that this new pre-requisite to study political thought contributes to the deviation from the Buddhist learning, especially since applicants are now judged on this new modified curriculum which includes political education, apart from religious texts. In this respect there is an inherent contradiction in Chinas religious policy, as one of the professed objectives of Chinese authorities is to separate Religion from State, while in contrast the Party seems to be incorporating religion into the State, through the requirement of politics in a religious environment.
24
TCHRD August Update 2004, page 6
130
Appendices
A month after the revival of Geshe Lharampa Degree, Gendun Tsundue24, who recently arrived at the Tibetan Refugee Reception Center in Kathmandu on 24 July 2004, told TCHRD about the biased and unjust selection of candidates for the re-introduced Geshe Lharampa examination and the activities of Chinese authorities in Ganden Monastery. Gendun further explained: On 27 July 2004, the authorities selected six monks, two each from Drepung, Sera and Ganden monasteries to appear for the preliminary test in front of 16 judges. However the selection of six monks was not done on the basis of their academic merit but on the basis of their allegiance to the authorities directives. In the ultimate sense, the introduction of six books on political thought directly challenges and disrupts the traditional institution of the Geshe Lharampa exam prior to Chinese occupation. Moreover, in its revised version, the true culture, practice and ritual of the institution of Geshe Lharampa exam and degree faces an endemic threat to its very existence and the continuation of this overall important Buddhist scholarly tradition.
The Chinese-appointed Panchen Lama

On 15 September 2004, the U.S. State Department released its latest International Religious Freedom Report, which described the Government of Chinas respect of religion poor and level of repression high (the report also mentioned the11th Panchen Lama Gendun Choekyi Nyima who is currently being held in an unknown location by Chinese authorities). Shortly after the release of the U.S. State Department report, the Chinese -appointed Panchen Lama, Gyaltsen Norbu, made his third official visit to Tibet. He was quoted in an interview, which appeared in Xinhua news on 26 September 2004 saying that, The policy of allowing the freedom of worship is fully respected (in Tibet), and that makes me very happy. Apparently, the visit of the Chinese chosen Panchen Lama to Tibet was nothing short of a propaganda campaign and an attempt to counter the U.S. State Departments International Religious Freedom Reports criticisms of Chinas religious record. It seems the visit of was perhaps an attempt to seek approval and support for the Party amongst Tibetans as endorsing Gyaltsen Norbu as the real Panchen Lama. It appears that through this visit of Chinas chosen Panchen Lama, Beijing is trying to convey to the international community that there is a level of religious freedom and respect for human rights in Tibet.
Conclusion
In 2004 there has been no significant change in Chinas religious policies, with no major improvements in Chinas handling of religious rights in Tibet. As the Tibetan people continue to face varying, and sometimes fluctuating degrees of religious repression and persecution at the hands of the Chinese State. It would seem that religious persecution will remain unabated in Tibet as long as the Chinese government continues to view the Dalai Lama and expressions of Buddhist belief and practice as an inherent threat to the legitimacy of Chinese rule in Tibet.
131
APPENDIX 1
List of Known Political Prisoners
LAY NAM E SE X AG E AFFI LI ATI O N AR R EST PR I SO N TER M OR I GI N
TC H R D
STATUS
NAM E
01- 002 N/A F 47 Lhubhug Village 00/03/01 Drapchi 4 yrs Lhubhug, Lhasa Lhoka Gongkar 10 yrs Life sentence 3 yrs 15 yrs 14 yrs 15 yrs Drapchi Drapchi Gutsa Drapchi Ngaba Prison Drapchi Gutsa DC Moawan Xiling Chamdo Drapchi Xinduqio 4- Sep- 04 4- Sep- 04 4- Sep- 04 Farmer 17/10/02 00/00/99 Nakchu DC Nakchu DC Nakchu DC K arze DC Drapchi 20- May- 04 Chabcha DC Ex- PLA Driver 24 12/3/1989 2/10/2003 O ct- 00 Feb- 04 M M 6 Tashi Lhunpo Monastery Bank Employee 17/05/95 21/12/02 Drapchi Tawu DC Drapchi Golok DC Beijing ShigatseDC 5 yrs 13? 7 yrs 3 yrs 18 yrs 6 yrs 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr 3 yrs 7 yrs 4 yrs 16 yrs 7/5/1996 26- Aug- 99 00/07/02 00/00/97 K ardze Monastery Feb- 91 29/03/94 12- Feb- 04 00/04/01 Serwa Monastery Gaden Monastery K arze Monastery Rongpo Gonchen Monastery 7/4/1997 Tsampung Monastery 18/07/01 00/00/96 00/00/99 40 40 33 52 30 28 29 45 31 Bank Employee Gaden Monastery K ongpo Bangri Monastery Drepung Monastery 30 40 35 30 45 30 25 18 30 M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M Dawa Dhondup Jigme Tenzin Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Gyaltsen Unknown Unknown N/A Damam N/A N/A N/A Unknown Unknown N/A N/A Unknown Unknown N/A Unknown Unknown
DET
Anu
96- 007
DET
Atsag
99- 046
DET
Bangri Rinpoche
Nangchen County Phenpo, Lhasa Lhoka Region K ardze County Chamdo Pashoe Meldrogungkar County K arze Malho"TAP", Q inghai Tengchen County Nagchu Golok Township,K arze Sog County Sog County Sog County K arze County,Sichuan Amdo Q inghai Chabcha County Lhasa Tawu County Lhasa Amdo Golok Nagchu, Lhari Shigatse, Ngamring
02- 004
DET
Bhangdro
97- 117
DET
Bhuchung
91- 032
DET
Butuk
94- 077
DET
Chemi Dorjee
04- 001
DET
Choedhen Rinzin
01- 026
DET
Choenga
97- 069
DET?
Choephel
01- 015
DET
Damdul
132
96- 224
DET
Dawa Dorjee
99- 071
DET
Dawa Gyaltsen
04- 004
DET
Dawa Tsering
04- 005
DET
Dejor
04- 006
DET
Dhartso
02- 008
DET
Dorjee Phuntsok
99- 067
DET
Dorjee Sonam
04- 002
DET
Dorjee Tsephel
89- 141
DET?
Dradul
03- 005
DET
Drakpa
00- 77
DET
Drukgyal
04- 003
DET
Gangshun
95- 005
DET
Gedun Choekyi Nyima
02- 005
DET?
Gendun

TC H R D
STATUS
NAM E
94 - 163 Unknown M 18 Tawu Monatery 00/00/94 Sheduk kyang 12yrs K arze Gutsa 3 yrs 10 yrs Drapchi K ardze DC Ngaba Prison 8 yrs 3 yrs 12 yrs 18 yrs 15 yrs K arzeDC Powo Tramo Drapchi Drapchi Sangchu DC N/A Drapchi 00/03/01 8/5/2002 2000 Labrang Monastery Rabgya Monastery Gaden Monastery Drepung Monastery Nalanda Monastery 23 23 M M M 29 19 21 Drongsar Monastery K hangmar Monastery Gonsar Monastery N/A 11/4/2003 00/05/01 10/5/1996 00/07/02 5/3/1995 22/10/94 30/06/92 O ct- 00 1/7/1997 15- 04- 95 N/A Xiling Drapchi Sangchu DC Machen DC Drapchi Gutsa Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi Chamdo DC Drapchi 6yrs 11yrs 3 yrs 12 yrs 9 yrs 15 yrs 5 yrs 14 yrs 9 yrs 3 yrs 5 yrs 6 yrs 00/07/02 17/03/00 21- Aug- 04 Jun- 02 Village Head 17/10/02 29/03/94 17/03/89 30/03/96 11/4/2003 00/03/01 12/9/1997 Serwa Monastery Drepung Monastery Amdo Labrang Monastery Labrang Monastery Tsenyi Monastery Pangsa Monastery Tsenyi Monastery Drakar Tetsong Monastery Drepung Monastery Sog Tsedhen Monastery Tehor Chakru Monastery 40 40 29 30 34 39 30 27 40 38 30 30 32 24 36 23 27 28 M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M Unknown M M Sonam Dhondup M M M Unknown N/A Unknown Unknown Penpa Unknown Unknown Unknown N/A Unknown Unknown Yugyal N/A Uknown Uknown Unknown Unknown Unknown N/A Unknown
DET
Gonpo
02- 006
DET
Gonpo
Phenpo,Lhasa Sog.Sogrongmi K ardze County K ardze County K arze County.Sichuan Chamdo Jojugyabdo Toelung Dingga K anlho Sangchu Machu County Toema,Ngaba Meldrogungkar Tsenyi,Ngaba Chabcha County Lhasa Sangchu County Machen County MeldrogungkarDrangda Meldrogungkar,Lhasa Phenpo Lhundrup Phenpo Lhundrup Meldrogungkar Dashar Lhasa Chamdo Pashoe Damshung
00- 008
DET
Gyurmey
04- 008
DET
Jamga
02- 038
DET
Jampa Namgyal
02- 007
DET
Jampa Sangpo
94- 066
DET
Jampa Tashi
89- 157
DET
Jampel Jangchup
96- 259
DET
Jigme Gyatso
03- 002
DET?
Jigme Jamtruk
01- 008
DET?
Jinpa
133
97- 038
DET
K alsang Norbu
01- 005
DET?
K elsang
02- 029
DET
K elsang Dhondup
00- 073
DET
K unchok
03- 003
DET?
K unchok Choemphel
01- 032
DET
K unchok Dhargay
96- 165
DET
K unchok Dhondup
02- 010
DET
K unchok Sonam
95- 136
DET
Legshe Phuntsok
94- 157
DET?
Lhasang
92- 051
DET
Lhundrup Dorjee
00- 76
DET
Lobsang
97- 053
DET
Lobsang Dorjee
Appendices
95- 156
DET?
Lobsang Gelek

LAY N AM E SE X AG E AFFI LI ATI O N AR R EST PR I SO N TER M OR I GI N
TC H R D
STATUS
N AM E
94- 076 Pema Tsering M 23 Serwa Monastery 29/03/94 Drapchi 15 yrs 12 yrs 5 yrs Lhasa Chamdo Pashoe Chamdo Pashoe Lhoka Tsona Chamdo Pashoe Drigung Meldro 5 yrs 18 yrs 14yrs Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi 00/06/01 00/04/02 00/05/01 00- 01- 01 May- 01 Farmer Sog Tsendhen Monastery 40 M M M 22 27 24 Drakar Tetsong Monastery Gonsar Monastery Tibet University Jang Taglung Monastery 17/10/02 18/08/97 8/5/2002 00/10/94 13/01/94 22/02/95 Drapchi Yakraphug Machen DC Drapchi Drapchi K arze DC Disappear Xiling Drapchi Powo Tramo Drapchi 3 yrs 7.5yrs 9 yrs 8 yrs 12yrs 21yrs 9 yrs 4 yrs 7 yrs 5 yrs 6 yrs 3 yrs 3 yrs K ardze Lithang Lhasa Chamdo Pashoe Chamdo Pashoe Sog,Sogrongmi Drepung Lhasa K ardze 12 yrs 12yrs 6 yrs 15 yrs 15yrs Drapchui Drapchi Powo Tramo Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi N gapa Prison Powo Tramo Chamdo DC 7/5/1996 2000 Serwa Monastery 29/03/94 11/8/1995 1999 Serwa Monastery 29/03/04 7/5/1996 12/2/2003 19/03/88 11/8/1995 11/8/1995 17/01/93 00/00/97 Gaden Monastery Business TAR""University Drongsar Monastery 20 Drongsar Monastery Sog Drama Association Drepung Monastery N echung Buddhist School O thok Monastery Rabgya Monastery Telephone Department 33 23 28 29 0 35 25 35 21 Drongsar Monastery Gaden Monastery 27 32 27 19 25 31 23 38 22 M M M M M Lobsang Dawa N /A Unknown Unknown N /A Lobsang Tsegyal M Jampa Lodroe( Poloe) M M M M M M M M M M F N /A M M N gawang Gyalsey M M Unknown Unknown N /A N orbu Phuntsok Unknown N /A Bushow Choesang N /A Unknown Unknown N /A
DET
Lobsang Jinpa
Chamdo Jojugyabdo Phenpo Lhundrup
96- 067
DET
Lobsang K hetsun
00- 074
DET
Lobsang N amgyal
94- 087
DET
Lobsang Palden
95- 119
DET
Lobsang Sherab
99- 066
DET?
Lobsang Tashi
94- 079
DET
Lobsang Tendar
96- 157
DET
Lobsang Tenpa
03- 009
DET
Lobsang Tenphen
88- 052
DET
Lobsang Tenzin
95- 118
DET
Lobsang Tsering
95- 144
DET
Lobsang Tsultrim
134
93- 240
DET
Lodroe Gyatso
97- 095
DET
Lokud
01- 018
DET
Lonam
00- 006
DET
Luzi Tashi Phuntsok
01- 020
DET
Mathok Dhamchoe
Machen County,Golok,Q inghai Lhasa Tsalgungthang Lhasa Lubuk K arze County,Sichuan Sog Ya- N gashang Chabcha County Phenpo County Lhasa Damshung Toelung Dechen
01- 003
DET?
Migmar
01- 043
DET
Migmar Tsering
02- 019
DET
N agyal Choephel
97- 085
DET
N gawang Geyser
02- 027
DET
N gawang Dhondup
94- 065
DET
N gawang Dorjee
94- 096
DET?
N gawang Jungney
95- 219
DET
N gawang K alsang

TC H R D
STATUS
NAM E
89- 166 Anu M 34 Drepung Monastery 16/04/89 Drapchi 19 yrs 15 yrs 8 yrs 10 yrs Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi Sog DC? Gutsa Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi Trisam Drapchi 31- 05- 94 21- Dec- 04 7/2/1997 1/7/1997 00/02/01 1/8/1995 19/03/00 K hangmar Monastery 23 34 M M M 25 30 18 N/A Rabgya Monastery K arze Monastery 3- Jan 30/06/92 00/05/01 00/04/01 23- 12- 04 14- Sep- 04 Drapchi Nyari DC Drapchi Drapchi Bayang DC Powo Tramo Drapchi Ngaba DC Drapchi Machen DC Maowan K ardze DC Sog DC? 20 yrs life 12 yrs 13 yrs 5 7 yrs 14 yrs 8 yrs 3 yrs 5 yrs 15 yrs 12 yrs 17 yrs 3 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 14/09/91 Drepung Monastery Dechen Sanga K har Monastery 2/12/1994 Staff of School 30/08/99 14- Sep- 04 Drepung Monastery 00/07/02 6/12/2002 8/3/1989 7/5/1996 00/00/97 Busker 2- Jan 7/5/1996 Gaden Monastery Tashigang Monastery Dhargayling Monastery Gaden Monastery Serwa Monastery Goyar Monastery 48 27 35 Lhasa Cement Factory Sog TsendhenMonastery Teacher N/A Gaden Monastery 21 27 30 20 22 65 21 38 23 48 28 32 24 29 24 M M F M M Unknown M M M M Unknown M M M M M M M M M M M M Serpo Mingtse Gui N/A Tsering Bakdro Migmar Unknown Unknown N/A Unknown Rinwang Unknown Unknown N/A N/A Pasang Tsering Penpa Wangdu N/A N/A
DET
Ngawang Phulchung
Toelung Dechen Toelung Sangmo K yabo Lhasa Taktse Lhasa Sog County Lhasa Dhampa Gyangtse County Lhasa Meldro Gyalding Toelung Dechen Lhatse Shigatse Lhasa Drushi Chushul Nyethang Lhatse Shigatse Taktse Drushi Chamdo Pashoe Lingkha Bayang County Lhasa Sog Yognashang Marthang County MeldroDashar Machen County K arze Dartsedo County Sog County
91- 064
DET
Ngawang Tensang
94- 031
DET?
Ngawang Woebar
99- 043
DET
Nyima Chodon
04- 009
DET
Nyima Tenzin
02- 013
DET
Nyima Tsering
02- 025
DET
Nyima Tsering
89- 133
DET
Pasang
96- 146
DET
Pasang Tsegye
97- 118
DET
Passang Tsonyi
02- 027
DET
Phumlak
96- 155
DET
Phuntsok Dhondup
135
94- 092
DET?
Phuntsok Rigchok
04- 011
DET
Phuntsok Tsering
97- 063
DET
Phuntsok Wangdu
97- 055
DET
Rinzin Dhondup
01- 010
DET?
Rinzin Phuntsok
95- 100
DET
Rinzin Wangyal
00- 014
DET
Sey K hedrup
03- 010
DET
Shethar
92- 175
DET
Sonam Dorjee
01- 032
DET
Sonam Gyatso
01/027
DET
Sonam Ngodup
04- 021
DET
Sonam Phuntsok
Appendices
04- 010
DET
Sonam Nyidrup

LAY NAM E SEX AGE AFFI LI ATI ON AR R EST PR I SO N TER M OR I GI N
TC H R D
STATUS
NAM E
94- 064 N/A M 39 Kartsel Monastery 5/6/1994 Drapchi 8 yrs Meldrogungkar 7 yrs 6 yrs 12 yrs 6 yrs 6 yrs 10 yrs 5yrs 5 yrs 5 yrs Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi 15- 02- 95 18/07/01 18/08/93 27/12/96 26/10/99 18/07/01 N/A Tehor Chakru Monastery 45 M M 54 64 Hydro- Elec Power Station Lithang Monastery Serwa Monastery 6/7/1992 21- Aug- 04 00/03/00 7/4/2002 00/00/97 Drapchi Chamdo DC Drapchi Drapchi Karze DC Chamdo DC Drapchi Kardze DC Drapchi Chuandong Drapchi 7 yrs Death 16 yrs 8 yrs 13 yrs 12 yrs 8 yrs Life 9 yrs 8 yrs 6 yrs Life 15 yrs Drapchi Xinduqio Xiling Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi Dzogang Drapchi Mong Ngal 00/00/99 31/10/99 5/5/2001 Carpentar Aug- 02 9/3/2001 Gaden Monastery 7/5/1996 2/5/2000 2001 Kirti Monastery 00/01/99 00/07/95 00/00/97 9/5/1996 Dhargye Choeling Monastery Shabten Monastery Gaden Monastery Jang Taglung Monastery Tsampung Monastery 23 25 66 Phakmo Monastery Rating Monastery Rego Village Tsampung Monastery 42 Thenthok Monastery Reting Monastery Govt Employee 47 32 37 M 50 63 21 25 20 24 27 23 23 23 N/A M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M Unknown Unknown N/A Unknown Unknown Unknown Penpa Ka Pasang Unknown Pasang Gyatso Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown N/A Ah- Nga- Tashi Unknown M N/A M
DET
Sonam Tsering
99- 068
DET?
Sonam Wangchuk
Phenpo County,Lhasa Karze Ronbazon Village Machen County Shigatse, Ngamring Chamdo Palbar Meldro Drigung Chamdo Prefecture Amdo Golok Ngaba County Lhoka Dranang Nagchu Taktse Lamo Chawa Phenpo Lhundup Tengchen County Taktse Thangkar Phenpo Thang- go Kartse Rego Tengchen County Meldro Dashar Kardze County Sog Yognashang Lithang,Karze TAP Chamdo Pashoe
99- 026
DET
Sonam Yeshi
01- 045
DET
Tashi Gyatso
02- 023
DET
Tashi Topgyal
01- 035
DET
Tamdin
96- 139
DET
Tasang Norbu
00- 002
DET
Tenpa
01- 042
DET
Tenpa Dhargay
99- 001
DET?
Tenzin
95- 008
DET?
Tenzin
136
97- 006
DET
Tenzin Dorjee
96- 169
DET
Tenzin Gelek
95- 140
DET?
Tenzin Jigme
01- 014
DET
Tenzin Khedup
93- 247
DET
Tenzin Namdrak
96- 232
DET
Thinley Tsundue
99- 060
DET
Thupten Choenchoe
01- 016
DET
Thupten Thabkai
92- 052
DET
Thupten Yeshi
04- 007
DET
Topden
00- 015
DET
Trakru Yeshi
02- 018
DET
TrulkuTenzin Delek
97- 052
DET
Tsepal

TC H R D
STATUS
NAM E
02- 020 M 42 Farmer 17/10/02 KarzeDC 3 yrs 15 yrs 3 yrs 3yrs 8 yrs 6 yrs 5 yrs 12 yrs 5 yrs Drapchi Ngaba DC BarkhamDC 00/04/01 Oct- 00 Monk Sungrabling Monastery Gaden Monastery Sog Tsedhen Monastery Lhoka Rabmey Monastery Gaden Monastery 33 Khangmar Monastery 2- Jan 28/06/89 7/5/1996 17/03/00 2- Feb 10/5/1996 3- Jan N/A Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi Trisam Prison Drapchi Ngaba DC 9 yrs 8 yrs 5 yrs 5 yrs 5 yrs 4 yrs 11 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 3 yrs 12 yrs 12 yrs Drapchi KarzeDC Gutsa Drapchi Drapchi Drapchi Ngaba DC Machen DC 19/03/00 17/10/02 00/07/02 00/07/01 2000 Jun- 00 Khangmar Monastery 3- Jan 00/05/01 28/08/95 3- Jan 00/09/98 Rabgya Monastery N/A Khangmar Monastery N/A Karze Monastery N/A Farmer Drepung Monastery N/A 40 26 23 0 30 30 31 0 53 30 55 24 30 25 20 28 32 25 28 N/A M M M N/A M M M M M N/A M M M M M M M M M M M M Unknown N/A Unknown Unknown Unknown Pema Sandup Bhagdro Unknown Unknown Tenzin Norbu Unknown N/A N/A Unknown Unknown
DET
Tsering Dorjee
Karze County,Sichuan Sog Yaklashang Karze County,Sichuan Chushul County,Lhasa Amdo Amdo Kardze Marthang County Machen Counyt Chamdo Pashoe Marthang County Ngaba County Karze Dhamdo Lhasa Amdo,Golok Lhoka Gongkar MeldroGyama Trikhang Sog,Sogrongmi Lhoka Gongkar County Meldrogungkar Marthang County
00- 012
DET
Tsering Lhagon
02- 009
DET
Tsering Nyima
02- 017
DET
Tsering Wangdu
00- 018
DET
Tseten Gyatso
00- 79
DET
Tsewang
00- 80
DET
Tsewang Jigme
03- 012
DET
Tsokphel
01- 029
DET
Tsultrim Dhargay
95- 074
DET
Ugyen Tashi
03- 013
DET
Voesel
137
98- 038
DET?
Wotse
01- 004
DET
Yaepu
00- 78
DET
Yeshi Choedrak
02- 028
DET
Yeshi Dorjee
93- 148
DET
Yeshi Jinpa
96- 136
DET
Yeshi Rabgyal
00- 007
DET
Yeshi Tenzin
02- 026
DET
Yeshi Tsultrim
96- 170
DET
Yonten Gyalpo
03- 011
DET
Zoepa
Appendices
APPENDIX 2
List of Known Arrest in 2004
STATUS
NAM E
DET Unknown M 25 Gaden Monastery 12- Feb- 04 Gutsa DC Golok DC 4 yrs 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr Kardze DC Kardze DC Sog DC? 14- Sep- 04 Dhargayling Monastery 21- Dec- 04 10- Mar- 04 10- Mar- 04 30 23- Dec- 04 Sog DC? Nyari DC Thunde DC Thunde DC Kardze DC 3 months 3 months Feb- 04 28 20- May- 04 Chabcha DC 4- Sep- 04 4- Sep- 04 4- Sep- 04 Tehor Chakru Monastery Tehor Chakru Monastery 20 18 24 21- Aug- 04 21- Aug- 04 14- Sep- 04 Nakchu DC Nakchu DC Nakchu DC 40 40 33 M M M M M M M M M M M M M N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Unknown Unknown N/A N/A Unknown N/A Unknown Mingtse Gui
Choedhen Rinzin
Meldrogungkar County Amdo Golok Chabcha County Sog County Sog County Sog County Kardze County Kardze County Sog County Sog County Lhatse Shigatse Thunde County Thunde County Dartsedo County
DET
Gangshun
DET
Dorjee Tsephel
DET
Dejor
DET
Dawa Tsering
DET
Dhartso
138
DET
Topden
DET
Jamga
DET
Nyima Tenzin
DET
Sonam Nyidrup
DET
Phuntsok Tsering
Released
Namkha
Released
Bagocha
DET
Sonam Phuntsok
Appendices
APPENDIX: 3
LIST OF KNOWN PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTRES IN TIBET
Tibet Autonomous Region Prison (Drapchi Prison) is the largest prison in the TAR. Prisoners from the TAR area with a long prison term are incarcerated in this prison. It is believed to have been constructed in 1960, and is located in the north-east outskirts of Lhasa. It is directly administered by the TAR Law Enforcement Department. There are nine units, of which the 3rd and 5th units hold female and male political prisoners respectively. Eleven cells for solitary confinement were later constructed in 1990. The rest of the units are for non-political prisoners. Due to overcrowding, the southern gate of Drapchi Prison was reportedly demolished and expansion work commenced in April 1998. Prisoners are mainly assigned to work at the vegetable farm, constructing houses, tailoring, carpet weaving, mechanical repairs, and the rearing of pigs and chickens. TAR PSB Detention Centre (Sangyip Prison) is situated in the northern district of Lhasa City. It is believed to have been constructed in 1983 and prisoners have been held there since 1984. Those suspected of more serious political crimes, including organising protest or collecting politically sensitive information, are believed to be held here for interrogation, possibly under the supervision of the TAR PSB. Sangyip has the capacity to hold approximately 70 inmates in its three cellblocks. Each of the blocks has 12 cells. Any prisoners falling under the TAR jurisdiction is detained here. Prisoners with long- term sentences are transferred to other major prisons in TAR and others sentenced to shorter prison terms are detained in Sangyip itself. Lhasa City PSB Detention Centre (Gutsa Prison) is located three kilometres east of Lhasa near the Kyichu River. Gutsas main section holds prisoners who are under investigation or awaiting sentences. Most of its inmates have not been formally charged or given administrative sentences. Many prisoners are reportedly forced to do manual labour such as breaking rocks. While Gutsa is predominantly for prisoners who are awaiting sentence, approximately one percent of prisoners are believed to be held here after sentencing, generally for periods of up to one year. TAR re-education-through-labour centre (Trisam Prison) is under the jurisdiction of TAR Law Enforcement Department. Since this centre is situated 10 kilometres west of Lhasa near the Toelung County Bridge it is also referred to as Trisam Prison. Trisam was opened in or around February 1992 and has since received many of the political prisoners from Sangyip, Outridu and Gutsa. Trisam has three units: the first for male political prisoners, the second for male criminals and the third for women prisoners, both political and criminal. It acts as an administrative detention centre for juveniles and prisoners whose term does not exceed three years. Inmates are known to perform hard labour at Trisam. At least eight cells at Trisam are reportedly used for solitary confinement. Reports from Tibet indicate that there are around 600 prisoners. Powo Tramo is formerly referred to as the TAR No. 2 Prison. It is situated near the town of Tramo in Pome County, Nyingtri Prefecture (Ch: Linzhi), 500 kilometres east of Lhasa. It is run by the TAR authorities and is for prisoners who have been sentenced to 10 years or more. It is one of the largest prisons in the TAR with facilities for solitary confinement. Most prisoners here are subjected to hard labour such as felling trees and agriculture.
139
Lhasa Prison (formerly known as Outridu) may be the institution that the Chinese authorities described to the European Unions Traoika as Lhasa Municipal Prison during their visit in May 1998. Confinement cells used to punish prisoners measure six by three feet and do not have windows. Chinese authorities are reportedly expanding the capacity of Lhasa Prison by building several new blocks of cells. There are currently four cellblocks and approximately 500 criminal prisoners are reportedly held there. It acts as a part of the TAR Law Enforcement Department. Lhasa Prison holds detainees who have been formally sentenced to less than five years. Most of them are subjected to hard labour such as breaking rocks and working on the prisons vegetable farm. Tibetan Military Detention Centre is administered by the PLA and has existed since 1959. Around 1992 it moved to the Tsalgungthang area about 11 kilometres east of Lhasa. Some political prisoners are known to have been held there in 1999, but due to the expansion programme undertaken in other prisons it is uncertain whether more political detainees have subsequently been brought there. The centre now holds military prisoners. Prefecture Detention Centres (PCD) are located at the administrative headquarters of each prefecture. There are six regions in the TAR besides Lhasa Municipality: Shigatse, Nagchu, Ngari, Lhoka, Kongpo-Nyingtri and Chamdo. These have administrative detention centres and kanshuo suo (detention centres for prisoners who have not yet been sentenced). In addition, there are prisons at the county level, which are generally for prisoners who have not yet been sentenced. The Chinese authorities reported to the visiting EU delegation in 1998 that each region and a number of counties have a local detention centre. Zethang Reform-through-labour facility is a new facility (laojiao) which began functioning on 15 January 1998 with the first detainees being six Drayab monks. This reform through re-education complex is in Zethang village, 10 kilometres east of Chamdo. It is under the direct administration of the Law Enforcement Department in Chamdo Prefecture. The accused, who are given prison terms by the respective provinces (administrative sentences), are transferred to this new facility. There are 30 rooms in the compound, which can each accommodate six prisoners. The facility has 30 prison staff. Maowan Prison (Ch: Aba Jlan Yu), is located in Maowan Qiang Autonomous County in Ngaba TAP, Sichuan. This prison accommodates prisoners from Ngaba and Karze regions and is one of the largest prisons in Sichuan Province. Those who are sentenced long-term are incarcerated here, including political prisoners. There are detention centres and prisons in every county and prefecture in the Tibetan regions of Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan provinces. It is known that around 12 Tibetan political prisoners are incarcerated in Menyang and Xinduqio prisons in Sichuan.
140
Appendices
APPENDIX 4
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

The old Tibetan quarter and market area around the Jokhang temple in Lhasa. In Tibetan it literally means the middle circuit or central circumambulation BPFA Beijing Platform for Action Cadre (Tib: le che pa; Ch: gan bu)) Technically applies to staff of the Chinese government administration; also referred to those working on official projects or in state enterprises. CAT United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment CCP (Ch: Zhong Guo Gong Chan Dang) Chinese Communist Party; founded in July 1921. CEDAW United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women CERD United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Circumambulation A religious ritual circling clockwise around a holy place in order to accumulate merit County (Tib:dzong;Ch: Xian) The Middle level administrative unit equivalent to district CPL Criminal Procedure Law; the revised CPL came into effect on 1 January 1997. CPPCC Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Congress CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child Cultural Revolution (Tib: Rigs-nas gsar-brje): The campaign initiated in 1966 by Mao Zedong in order to regain control of the Communist Party by ordering the youth to bombard the headquarters(purge opponents within the Party) and to eradicate the four olds (old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits). The Chinese authorities now describe it as The Ten Bad Years, referring to the entire period from 1966-1976, although technically it lasted only about two years. In Tibet it is sometimes considered to have continued until 1979. Detention Centre (Tib: lta srung khang; Ch: kanshousuo) Place where prisoners are held without charge prior to sentencing. DMC (Tib: u- yon lhan khang; Ch: wei yuan hi) Democratic Management Committee; Administrative organs established in 1962 in religious institutions in Tibet and reconstructed under the 1996 patriotic re-education Campaign Drapchi Prison Officially known as Tibet Autonomous Region Prison. Endangering State Security Charge introduced in the revised CPL to replace counter-revolutionary Floating Population (Ch: liudong renkou) Used to refer to Chinese migrants who are unregistered permanent and temporary residents in Tibet. Geshe (Tib) Spiritual title and doctorate; monk or lama who has completed the highest course in metaphysics and other academic monastic studies in the Gelukpa School Guanxi (Ch) Literally, connection; colloquially a connection to officialdom to acquire preferential treatment. Gyama(Tib) Unit of measurement equivalent to 500 grams ICCPR United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICESCR United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICJ International Commission of Jurists IUD Intrauterine Device Barkhor
141
Khel (Tib)
The load that can be carried by a yak; equivalent to 28 gyama (14kg)
Khenpo (Tib)
Lama (Tib)
Literally abbot. In Nyingma and Kagyu tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, Khenpo is analogous to the Geshe degree.
The Tibetan term for a respected religious teacher, equivalent to the Sanskrit term guru. A lama is not necessarily a monk, although monasticism is preferred for all lamas in the Gelugpa School. Chinese politicians use the term incorrectly to refer to any monk. Lingkor (Tib) Circulation area the original boundaries of Lhasa City MNAAs Minority National Autonomous Areas Motsey (Tib) 10 motsey equal one yuan Mu (Tib) A measure of land equal to 67 square meters NC Rs Nepal Rupees NPC National Peoples Congress PAP Peoples Armed Police Patriotic Education A sub-campaign of strike hard under which the Chinese work teams are sent into Tibetan monasteries and nunneries to enforce Communist ideology. Potala Palace Official residence of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa PRC Peoples Republic of China Prefecture (Tib: Sa Khul; Ch: diqu) The administrative area below the level of province or region and above the level of a county. The TAR is divided into six prefectures. A Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Ch: Zang zu Zhizhizhou) is a prefecture outside the Tibetan Autonomous Region but still considered to include a predominantly Tibetan population. Procuracy (Tib: zhib chu; Ch: jian chayan) A Chinese judicial agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal cases. It also handles complaints against the police, prison officials and other branches of the administration. Prostrate Buddhist practice of lying face down before any sacred body PSB (Tib: schi de chus; Ch: Gong An Ju) Public Security Bureau, local level police force responsible for detaining and arresting suspects and for pre-trial custody. re-education A sub-campaign of Strike Hard under which Chinese work-teams have been sent into Tibetan monasteries and nunneries to enforce Communist ideology Re-education Indoctrination of Chinese Communist ideology and national unity; carried out extensively in religious institutions and labour camps in Tibet Rukhag (Tib) One small unit within a prison, village, school, or military etc. Saga Dawa The month of Buddhas Birth, Enlightenment and Death Sang (Tib) 10 sang makes a gyama Security: Charge introduced in the revised CPL to replace counter-revolutionary SEZ Special Economic Zone Splittism (Tib: Khadral ringlugs) Party term for the movement for Tibetan independence or any nationalist sentiments. Strike Hard (Tib: dungdek tsanen; Ch: yanda) A PRC campaign tarhetted at crushing corruption and crime. Within Tibet, Chinese authorities are aiming the campaign at splittists. Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture TAP (Tib: Bod rang skyong khul) There are 10 of these administrative areas (below the level of a province or region) created outside TAR by the Chinese authorities, located in northern and eastern Tibet (in the Tibetan provinces of Kham and Amdo). Tibetan Autonomous Region TAR (Tib: Bod rang kyong ljongs; Ch: Xizang Zizhiqu) Formally created by China in 1965, this area of central and western Tibet, covering the area of west of the Yangtse River and south of the Kunlun Mountains, is the only area recognised by China as being Tibet.
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Appendices
Thangka (Tib) Themto (Tib) TIN TJC
Painted religious scroll. (Ch: hu kou): Residence registration document; also used as a ration card Tibet Information Network; an independent monitoring group based in London Tibet Justice Centre previously called International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet (ICLT) Tsongkhul Detention Area Tsuglakhang (Tib) Central Cathedral TWA Tibetan Women Association UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights UNWGAD United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Work Team (Tib: las don ru khag; Ch: gongzuo dui) Specially formed units of government personnel sent to conduct patriotic re-education in an institution or locality WTN World Tibet Network Yartsa Gunbhu (Tib) A Tibetan medicinal plant (botanical name: cordyceps sinensis) Yuan (Ch) As of December 2004 8 Yuan is approximately USD 1
143
APPENDIX 5 Table Listing Relevant International Human Rights Instruments Signed and/or Ratified by the Peoples Republic of China
I ns t r ume nt
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
Signe d on
R a t ifie d on
I de a ls
Re c o gnis ing t ha t , in a c c o r d a nc e w it h t he Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights. Re c o gnis ing t ha t , in a c c o r d a nc e w it h t he Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights as well as his economic, social and cultural rights. C onsidering that all human beings are equal b e fo r e t he la w a nd a r e e nt it le d t o e q ua l protection of the law against any discrimination and against any incitement to discrimination. Recalling that d iscriminatio n against wo men violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms with me n, in the p o litic a l, s o c ia l, e c o no mic a nd c ultura l life o f the ir c o untrie s, ha mp e rs the gro wth o f the p ro sp erity o f so ciety and the f a mily a n d ma k e s mo r e d if f ic u lt t h e f u ll development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of humanity. Desiring to make more effective the struggle a ga inst to rture a nd o the r c rue l, inhuma n o r degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world. C o ns id e r ing tha t the C hild s ho uld b e fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the UN, and in particular in the sp irit o f p eace, d ignity, to lerance, freed o m, equality and solidarity.
27 October 1997
27 March 2001
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
5 October 1998
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)
29 December 1981
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
17 July 1980
4 November 1980
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
12 December 1986
4 October 1988
29 August 1990
2 March 1992
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Human Rights Situation in Tibet

Annual Report 2004

Civil and Political Rights

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