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AYALA INVESTMENTS VS CA GR NO. 118305, FEBRUARY 12, 1998 FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.

300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As an added security for the said loan, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing to the ABC. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo Ching, Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI. Citing as one of the grounds for the writ was the fraud defendants employed in incurring the obligations by representing themselves as having the financial capacity to pay the loan when in fact they did not have such capacity. On July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching. On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable. HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM. The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.

ISSUES: 1. 2. HELD 1. YES. In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines Do the 100,000 shares of stock in the name of Alfredo Ching belong to the conjugal partnership? Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liability?

solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitionerhusband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.

2. NO. For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership. In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband's act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

HELD: Yes. RTC should not have ignored that TCT No. 167907 is in the name of "Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco." Cleodualdo and Michele were married on June 12, 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. As such, their property relations are governed by the Civil Code on conjugal partnership of gains It is clear that both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership of the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners. The property should not have been levied and sold at execution sale Respondents' bare allegation that petitioners lived with Michele on the leased property is not sufficient to support the conclusion that the judgment debt against Michele and Matrai in the ejectment suit redounded to the benefit of the family of Michele and Cleodualdo and petitioners A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Considering that the foregoing circumstances are evidently not present in this case as the liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai. BUADO VS CA FACTS: On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus B uado (petitioners) filed a co mplaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite. Said action originated fro m Erlinda Nicols civil liability a rising fro m the criminal o ffense o f sland er filed against her b y petitioners. On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages. Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this Court. Finding Erlinda Nicols personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property o n executio n addressed to the Register of Deed s of Cavite. T wo (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to put up a sheriffs indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder. On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners. Almo st a year later on 2 February 1994, Ro mulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respo ndent, as plaintiff therein, alleged that the d efendants, no w petitio ners, connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent ave rred that there was no proper publicatio n and posting o f the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed that his property which was valued at P500,000.00 was o nly so ld at a very lo w price of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00.Petitioners motion for

FRANCISCO V. SPOUSES GONZALES (2008) FACTS: In their desire to manifest their genuine concern for their children, Cleodia and Ceamantha (P), Cleodualdo and Michele have voluntarily agreed to herein set forth their obligations, rights and responsibilities on matters relating to their children's support, custody, visitation, as well as to the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house and lot shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old with the following condition: Cleodualdo shall retain usufructuary rights over the property until he reaches the age of 65 years old, with the following rights and responsibilities Respondent ordered Matrai and Michele to vacate the premises leased to them and to pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bill, and attorney's fees Real property donated to Cleodia and Ceamantha were used as payment CA ruled that since Michele's obligation was not proven to be a personal debt, it must be inferred that it is conjugal and redounded to the benefit of the family, and hence, the property may be held answerable for it ISSUE(S): Whether or not the fact that the spouses waived their right of ownership in favor of their children is valid

reconsideration was denied on 23 August 2000. Hence, the instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: WON the wife's criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership WON the husband of the judgment debtor may file an independent action t o p r o t e c t t h e c o n j u g a l property subject to execution. HELD: There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of perso nal d ebts contracted b y the husband or the wife befo re or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property o f the debtor -sp ouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of co njugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. Hence, the filing o f a sep arate action b y respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case to Branch 21 for further proceedings. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES vs. SPOUSES CIPRIANO [G.R. NO. 143826. AUGUST 28, 2003.] FACTS: In 1960, Vicente Reyes married Ignacia Aguilar but they had been separated de facto in 1974. One of their conjugal properties is Lot No. 4349 B-2 and the apartment built thereon. The said lot was registered in the name of Spouses Vicente Reyes and Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes. Vicente Reyes filed a petition for administration and appointment of guardian with the MTC. In the said petition, he misrepresented that his wife, Ignacia, died on March 12, 1982 and that he and their minor children were her only heirs. The court appointed Vicente as guardian of their minor children and subsequently authorized Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia. On March 1, 1983, respondent Spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares bought Lot No. 4349-B-2 for P110,000. As a consequence of which, the certificate of title in the name of

Vicente and Ignacia Agilar-Reyes was cancelled and a new title was issued in the name of respondent-spoues. These circumstances were discovered by Ignacia sometime in 1984. Ignacia then sent a letter to respondent-spouses demanding the return of her share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia instituted a complaint for annulment of sale against respondent-spouses and Vicente was included as one of the defendants. In their answer, respondents claimed that they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because the same was duly approved by the court. After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 void with respect to the share of Ignacia. A motion for modification of the decision was filed by Ignacia praying that the sale be declared void in its entirety and that the respondents be ordered to reimburse the rentals collected on the apartments. The trial court granted the motion for modification. The appellate court reversed the decision of the ocurt a quo, ruling that, notwithstanding the absence of Iganacias consent to the sale, the same must be held valid in favor of respondentspouses because they were innocent purchasers for value.

ISSUES: 1. What is the status of the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent-spouses? 2. Were respondent-spouses purchasers in good faith? HELD: 1. VOIDABLE. Pursuant to the foregoing provisions (Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code), the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Indeed, in several cases the Court had ruled that such alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void. The better view, however, is to consider the transaction as merely voidable and not void. This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from the questioned transaction, seek its annulment. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Lot No. 4349-B-2, is a conjugal property having been purchased using the conjugal funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their marriage. It is beyond cavil therefore that the sale of said lot to respondent spouses without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia is voidable. 2. NO. The Court finds that respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith. A

purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.

In the instant case, there existed circumstances that should have placed respondent spouses on guard. The death certificate of Ignacia, shows that she died on March 22, 1982. The same death certificate, however, reveals that (1) it was issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lubao Pampanga on March 10, 1982; (2) the alleged death of Ignacia was reported to the Office of the Civil Registrar on March 4, 1982; and (3) her burial or cremation would be on March 8, 1982. These obvious flaws in the death certificate should have prompted respondents to investigate further, especially so that respondent Florentina Mijares admitted on cross-examination that she asked for the death certificate of Ignacia because she was suspicious that Ignacia was still alive

Art 173. The wife may during the marriage and w/in 10 years the transaction questioned, ask the court for the annulment of any contract of the husband w/c tends to defraud her or impair interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right she her heir, after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ,SR v MINGOA G.R. No. 146548 FACTS: Domingo Hernandez, Sr. was awarded a piece of real property in 1958 by the PHHC as part of the governments housing program at the time. Title over the said property was issued in 1966 in the name of Hernandez, Sr., after full payment for the property was received by the PHHC. Neither [petitioners] nor Hernandez, Sr., took possession of the said property. On the other hand, the [respondents] took possession of the said property in 1966 and are in actual and physical possession thereof up to the present ,and have made considerable improvements thereon, including a residential house where they presently reside. From 1966 (the time when the [respondents] were able to possess the property) to 1983 (the time when the[petitioners] had knowledge that the TCT in the name of Hernandez, Sr. had already been cancelled by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City) covers almost a span of 17 years; and from 1983 to 1995(the time when the Heirs filed the original action) is a period of another 12years. The Deed of Transfer of Rights, executed by Hernandez, Sr. in Camisuras favor, expressly states that the former, inconsideration of the amount of P6,500.00, transfers his rights over thesubject property to the latter. Notably, such deed was simultaneously executed with the SPA on February 14, 1963. Petitioners contend that the lack of consent on the part of Sergia Hernandez (the spouse) rendered the SPAs and the deed of sale fictitious, hence null and void in accordance with Article 1409 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the consent of the spouse is necessary for the validity of alienation of conjugal property? HELD: No. The consent of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. to the contract is undisp uted, thus, t h e sale of his share in the conjugal property was valid. W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to t h e s a l e i n v o l v i n g t h e i r c o n j u g a l property, the trial court found that it was lacking because said wifes signature on the SP A was falsified. Ho wever, Sergias lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her share invalid. It bears stressing that the subject matter herein involves co njugal property. Said p r o p e r t y w a s a w a r d e d t o D o m i n g o H e r n a n d e z , S r . i n 1 9 5 8 . T h e a s s a i l e d SPAs were executed in 1 963 and 1964. Title in the name of Domingo Hernandez, S r . c o v e r i n g t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y w a s issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the p r o p e r t y to Melanie Mingoa and the i s s u a n c e o f a n e w t i t l e i n h e r n a m e happened in 1978. Since all these events o c c u r r e d b e f o r e t h e F a m i l y C o d e t o o k effect in 1988, the

PELAYO VS. PEREZ G.R. No. 141323 FACTS: David Pelayo through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed a deed of sale and transferred to Melki Perez two parcel of agricultural lands. Loreza Pelayo and another one whose signature is eligible witnesses such execution of deed. Loreza signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses, as such, Perez application was denied. Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and should pages of the deed of sale but she refused. He then filed a complaint for specific performance against the Pelayo spouses. The spouses moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground for lack of marital consent as provided by art166 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale was null and viol for lack of marital consent. HELD: We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale. Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or implied. A wifes consent to the husbands disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval was indeed given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale. Under Art 173, in relation to Art166, both of the NCC, W/C was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract viol of initio but Merely violable. Said provisions of law provide: Art 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compass mentis or a spedthriff, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a lepresarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property not the conjugal property w/o the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.

provisions of the New Civil Code govern these transactions. We quote the applicable provisions, to wit: A r t . 1 6 5 . T h e h u s b a n d i s t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f t h e c o n j u g a l partnership.A r t . 1 6 6 . U n l e s s t h e w i f e h a s b e e n d e c l a r e d a n o n c o m p o s m e n t i s o r a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction o r is confined in a l e p r o s a r i u m , t h e husband cannot alienate or encumbera n y r e a l p r o p e r t y o f t h e c o n j u g a l partnership without the wifes consent. If s h e r e f u s e s u n r e a s o n a b l y t o g i v e h e r c o n s e n t , t h e c o u r t m a y c o m p e l h e r t o grant the same. x x x.A r t . 1 7 3 . T h e w i f e m a y , d u r i n g t h e marriage, and within ten year s fro m the transaction q uestioned, ask the co urts for the annulment of any contract of the h u s b a n d e n t e r e d i n t o w i t h o u t h e r consent, when such consent is required, o r a n y a c t o r c o n t r a c t o f t h e h u s b a n d which tends to defraud her or impair her i n t e r e s t i n t h e c o n j u g a l p a r t n e r s h i p property. Should the wife fail to exercise t h i s r i g h t , s h e o r h e r h e i r s , a f t e r t h e dissolution of the marriage, may demand t h e v a l u e o f p r o p e r t y f r a u d u l e n t l y alienated by the husband. A r t i c l e 1 7 3 o f t h e C i v i l C o d e p r o v i d e s that the disposition of conjugal property without the wife's consent is not void but merely voidable. Thus, the failure of Sergia Her nandez to f i l e w i t h t h e c o u r t s a n a c t i o n f o r annulment of the contract during the marriage and within ten (10) year s fro m t h e t r a n s a c t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y b a r r e d h e r from q uestioning the sale o f the subject property to third persons.

The error in petitioners contention is evident. They invoked Art. 1390, par. 2 which refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this case, private respondents consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. This being the case, said contracts properly fall within the ambit of Art. 124 of the Family Code which provides that: x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Hence, the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect. A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract is also void and inexistent. Both the Deed of Transfer of Rights and the amicable settlement are null and void, and cannot be ratified.

GUIANG V CA G.R. NO. 125172 (JUNE 26, 1998) FACTS: Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended Complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioners-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale involving the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void. On 1 March 1990, over the objection of private respondent and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses, one half of their conjugal property, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood. Four days after the sale, to cure whatever defect in Judie Corpuzs title over the lot transferred, Luzviminda Guiang, as vendee, executed another agreement over the property, this time with Manuela Callejo, a widow of the original registered owner (from whom the Corpuz couple originally bought the lot), who signed as vendor, with Judie Corpuz signing as witness to the sale. When Gilda Corpuz returned home, she found her children staying with other households and only one of their children was staying in their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She gathered her children together and stayed at their house. For that, the Guiang spouses filed a complaint against her for trespassing. [Subsequently, the parties thereat signed a document known as amicable settlement.] HELD:

JADER vs. CAMAISA FACTS: Through an advertisement, petitioner was interested in 2 properties in Makati and Taytay respectively, so she negotiated to purchase it from a real estate broker authorized by the respondent spouses After inspection of the properties and some documents, petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses Petitioner made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker The agreement made was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto and petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife's conformity and consent to the sale A contract to sell has been executed Petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker atEdilberto's office for the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the consideration Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses Norma filed a Motion for summary judgment

R TC rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife since said wife who refusedto give consent CA affirmed judgment of RTC ISSUE: Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written consent.

HELD: No The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner without the knowledge and consent of respondent. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. On December 20, 1995, Marcelino Dailo Died. In one of her visits to the subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo on the subject property as co-owner therof is valid as to his undivided share. Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, the same having redounded to the benefit of the family. RULING:

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK VS. DAILO FACTS: Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. However, the deed of Absolute Sale was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. As vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the this, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner.

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of court authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents consent. On second issue, petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. To finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.

Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

RAVINA V. VILLA ABRILLE (2009) FACTS: Mary Ann (R) and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children (R). spouses acquired a lot in Davao; Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name T hrough their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan, the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The house was finished in the early 1980s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex. 1991, Pedro got a mistress; Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to the petitioners (P). Pedro sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent 1991, while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment. When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. RTC ruled in favor of Mary Ann; CA affirmed RTC decision with modifications ISSUE(S): whether the property is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns consent. HELD: Sale was null and void Ruled in favor of Mary Ann There is no issue with regard to the lot which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the 2 nd land was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given 5 years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case. Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Anns written consent. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith. petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed.

FUENTES V ROCA FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-sq uare meter lot in Zambales fro m his mo ther. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who wo uld prepare the documents and requirements to co mp lete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php140,000 will be paid upon the remo val o f Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about t o c o m p l e t e s u c h t a s k s a n d c l a i m e d t h a t h e w e n t t o M a n i l a t o g e t t h e s i g n a t u r e o f R o s a r i o b u t notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property o n the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery. The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action has already prescribed.

On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has not prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Co njugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the prescriptive period.

ISSUE1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged; 2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses alreadyprescribed; and 3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annulthat sale. RULING 1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in thedocument giving consent and another document executed at the same time period. The SC noted thatthe CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document which stated consent wascompletely different from the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to explain why therewas such difference in the handwriting. 2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989,after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships alreadyestablished at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarcianowithout the consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is agiven fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that the action has alreadyprescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes spousessince it was them who should have assailed such contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. Onthe other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the other spouse does notprescribe since it is a void contract. 3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case toassail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the actionanymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void from thebeginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale.When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. Aslawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any personfrom its enjoyment and disposal.

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