John Michele Fanuzzi & Norah Bawn Fanuzzi Defendants, Pro se, in propria persona Post Office Box

999 Emigrant, Montana 59027 Telephone: (406) 589-1111 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MONTANA BILLINGS DIVISION BANK OF THE ROCKIES, N.A., Plaintiff, v. John Michele Fanuzzi, Norah Bawn Fanuzzi, Golden Ratio Woodworks, Inc., et al., Defendants. Case Number: CV-12-02-BLG-RFC-CS0 Notice of Opposition and REQUEST FOR HEARING __________________________ Removed from Montana 6th Judicial District Court for Park County Case Number: DV-2011-216

NOTICE OF OPPOSITION TO REMAND, REQUEST FOR HEARING and Brief in Support of Federal Removal Jurisdiction Come now the Defendants John Michele Fanuzzi and Norah Bawn Fanuzzi with this Notice of Opposition to Remand and Brief in Support of Federal Removal Jurisdiction. Defendants submit that they are victims of a general systemic failure in which the United States District Courts must take a special remedial role because the Federal judiciary itself has, by its own construction of the law, formed and shaped at least two major components of the current crisis. FACTUAL BACKGROUND No party should be allowed to profit from its own wrongdoing, especially when that wrongdoing includes a sophisticated pattern of lies, deceptions, and false inducements by a party, covered up and perpetuated by its attorneys. The officers of the Plaintiff Bank of the Rockies induced John & Norah Fanuzzi into refinancing their
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business secured by commercial property based on a series of false promises between 2006-2007. The officers and directors of Bank of the Rockies, especially Michael Grove and Michael Strang engaged in predatory lending, i.e. they induced Defendants heavily to leverage their substantial equity and multi-million-dollar business, secretively obtaining unfair and unnecessary collateral far in excess of the amounts necessary to cover the commercial loans which were promised but never extended, and thus fraudulently took effective control over all of the Defendants assets. The Bank of the Rockies, by unfair business practices and intentionally predatory lending, while inviting Defendant John Fanuzzi to serve on the Banks board of advisors and using Defendants and their employees to promote the Banks business and customer base, within two years effectively destroyed Defendants business, the now defunct Golden Ratio Woodworks corporation. Incredibly enough, the Bank acquired additional collateral without making additional loans, and finally (after destroying Defendants business) also sought to foreclose on Defendants home and business real estate, and then evict the Defendants. All of this was done with full knowledge that Defendant Norah Bawn Fanuzzi was a cognitively and physically disabled person of great neurological sensitivity. The eviction threat in particular caused especially great stress and injury to Defendant Norah Bawn Fanuzzi, whose delicate condition results from a combination of Multiple Sclerosis (MS), Lyme Disease, heart trouble, and radiation poisoning. Norah Bawn Fanuzzis condition is in fact so delicate that Defendant requests that this court appoint a Guardian or Attorney ad Litem for his wife and children, if this court intends not to permit him, even as husband and father, to represent his family since he is not a licensed attorney. Appointment of counsel for a disabled person in a case such as this is consistent with, if not required by, the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) of 1990, as amended in 2004, 2008, 2009.
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The Defendants recognize that the background story of their relationship with Bank of the Rockies does not by itself confer Federal Jurisdiction on this Court. However, the Bank of the Rockies ongoing pattern of lies and deception continues in the Brief and Affidavit submitted by Attorney Joel E. Guthals in support of remand, and a brief review of his prevarications on these points is necessary (See also Affidavit of John M. Fanuzzi, Exhibit A). FORMAL DEFECTS IN PLAINTIFFS BRIEF in support of REMAND Attorney Joel E. Guthals violated both rules Rule 7.1 (c)(1) and 7.1 (d) (2) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Montana. First, in violation of 7.1(c)(1), neither in his brief nor motion nor affidavit did Guthals state that other parties have been contacted and state whether any party objects to the motion1 [and, to be sure, Joel E. Guthals never in fact contacted or attempted to discuss his motion or anything else with John or Norah Fanuzzi]. Second, Guthals brief is 29 pages long, and almost certainly exceeds 6500 words in length, but Local Rule 7.1(d)(2) Length of Briefs requires, that (C) Any brief of 4000 words or more must include a Table of Contents, Table of Authorities, and Exhibit Index. Defendants freely admit that their own Opposition Brief exceeds 4000 words and possibly 6500. However, Attorney Joel E. Guthals did not include either of these Tables or the Index in his 29 page Brief (+ motion + proposed order). Since there no penalty provision for violation of this rule appears analogous to 7.1(c)(4), Defendants John & Norah Fanuzzi merely ask this court to forgive their own omission of a Table of Contents, Table of Authorities, and Exhibits Index in their own present Response

1 Rule 7.1(c)(4) states: Failure to comply with this Rule may result in summary denial of the
motion. Denial must be without prejudice on the first occasion and the filer must be given an opportunity to refile the motion.

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Brief.

In regard to Local Rule 7.14(c)(4), however, Defendants ask this Court In the Bankruptcy Court proceedings which Guthals mentions, John & Norah

summarily to deny the Plaintiffs Motion for FAILURE TO MEET & CONFER. Fanuzzi were indeed dismissed on the most formalistic of grounds, namely that they did not complete their required credit counseling course before, but only after, filing their Chapter 11 Petition. This dismissal was taken despite the fact that several Ninth Circuit cases state that failure to complete the credit counseling course before filing, if followed by a good faith completion afterwards, should not be grounds for dismissal. Defendants believe that it is only fair to hold the Bank, represented by counsel, at least to formalistic standards as exacting as those to which Guthals (on some issues) and the Bankruptcy Court, seeks to hold the Defendants whom the Bank cheated and defrauded (swindled by deceptive and predatory lending and other unfair business practices) out of millions of dollars of property. FALSE STATEMENTS IN PLAINTIFFS BRIEF in support of REMAND Plaintiff states (Motion at 3, 5) that the procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. 1446(b) have not been satisfied in that all of the defendants in the State Court Action have not signed the Notice of Removal or concurred within the Notice of Removal with 30 days of the service of the State Action. On Page 20 of 29 of the Brief in Support of Remand (Document 4, Filed in this case on 01/17/12), Guthals writes: As demonstrated by the summonses, returns of service, and defaults entered in the State Court Action, defendants Golden Ratio Woodworks, Inc., James Toll, and Mathew Crown were served with the summons, complaint, verification of complaint, and order setting trial. Service was accomplished on December 13, 2011. These additional defendants have not joined in the notice of removal. As affirmed in John Fanuzzis affidavit (Exhibit A), (1) James Toll moved out of the subject property in the summer of 2011 and Defendants have no idea where James
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Toll is living, (2) Mathew Crown was not actually served on December 13, and if the summonses and returns of service say otherwise, they are false and perjurious and should be disregarded or subject Joel E. Guthals and his client the Bank of the Rockies to sanctions, including denial of remand (even if it were otherwise warranted), (3) the corporate defendant Golden Ratio Woodworks, Inc., no longer exists as a corporate entity or legal person, and has no capacity or need to answer. John Fanuzzi allowed the corporate charter to lapse after Bank of the Rockies caused Golden Ratio Woodworks to cease operations in the first quarter of 2007, and the corporation has been suspended by the Montana Secretary of State and is now inactive. John Fanuzzi has assumed personal liability for all of Golden Ratios debts (in effect, voluntary dissolution of a corporation without bankruptcy effectively pierces the corporate veil from the inside, and Golden Ratio never declared bankruptcy). Thus, the failure of all Defendants to join in the notice of removal results from the disappearance of one (Toll), the non-existence of another (Golden Ratio), and the Plaintiffs failure actually to serve the third (Mathew Crown) who knows nothing of the complaint and has never received a copy, because Defendants certainly never gave him one, although he would probably concur in the removal if asked to do so. So the only two Defendants who both exist and were served have both unanimously answered and appeared and concurred in their removal. Plaintiffs evidence is false and Guthals should be sanctioned for offering false evidence. Similarly, both on page 24 of the Brief in Support of Remand and at 12-13 of his Affidavit, on pages 4-5 of Doc. 5, Joel E. Guthals incompetently swears under oath to hearsay from a non-party to this action, namely the (unnamed) Deputy Clerk of the State District Court. Curiously, Guthals includes this odd sequence of sentences: Mr. Fanuzzi did not deliver or ask to file a copy of a notice of removal to the State District Court on that day. Mr. Fanuzzi has never filed a copy of a notice of removal with the State District Court. At no time did
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anyone in the office of the Clerk of the State District Court tell Mr. Fanuzzi or anyone else that the Clerks office would not allow a filing of a notice of removal. What is so terribly curious about this statement is that Guthals apparently knows and knew in advance that Fanuzzi would say that a clerk or employee of the 6th District Clerks Office (Angela or Angie Heiser---spelling uncertain but idem sonans) did in fact tell Defendant John Fanuzzi that he could not file the Notice of Removal in the District Court, but gave him the name and address of Judge Cybulski (and this was the first time that Fanuzzi had heard of the substitution of judges). Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the letter which Defendant John Fanuzzi sent to Judge Cybulski, on January 7, 2012, after his visit to the Clerks office informing the State District Court of his removal, together with a true and correct copy of Judge Cybulskis response. Plaintiffs Document 5 in this case is an affidavit signed by Guthals under oath, and it was clearly Joel E. Guthals intent to deceive and mislead the court concerning the facts stated in 12-13 as noted above. Defendants suggest that Joel E. Guthals orchestrated the entire event with the District Clerk of the 6th Judicial District in Park County in order to attempt to discredit the Defendants. Finally, Joel E. Guthals includes, at pages 10-11 of Guthals brief on behalf of the Bank of the Rockies, and in 3 (page 2) of Plaintiffs Motion to Remand, Guthals addresses the question of diversity jurisdiction. These paragraphs are mere surplussage and irrelevant, because they suggest (falsely) that Defendants have asserted Diversity Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332 as a grounds for removal, when the Defendants have asserted no such thing. Joel Guthals review of Civil Rights Removal and Federal Preemption removal are so cursory as to be laughable---and Defendants demand a full evidentiary hearing to present evidence regarding their right to remove under these subjects, although, quite clearly, Bankruptcy Related to Jurisdiction alone is sufficient to sustain removal in this case.
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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS OF CONTRACT AND FRAUD The Federal Courts have formulated at least two judicially crafted policies which (by design or coincidence) have totally preempted and frozen the rights of those whose property is being subjected to foreclosure pursuant to four key statutes: 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10), 28 U.S.C. 1443, and 42 U.S.C. 1981-1982. Because judicially created federal law by construction and application of the U.S. Code constitutes Federal law just as much as any statutory scheme enacted by Congress, the Federal Courts have a preemptive obligation address, modify, reform, and remedy their doctrines which serve as obstacles to the fair and just resolution of the mortgage foreclosure crisis in these United States. Both of these judicially crafted programs similarly take broad statutory language and construe it narrowly, so narrowly that Congress apparent intention is defeated and nullified almost completely 2 . Likewise both of these broad comprehensive statutory schemes in Federal Securities Fraud and Civil Rights law have been construed so as to obliterate or nullify much valid state common and statutory law regarding contractual or commercial rights. The combined effect of the two statutory programs is the preemptive obliteration or elimination of the common law of fraud and the common and statutory laws of holder-in-due course and privity-of-contract in relationship to commercial credit transactions, including but not limited to mortgages. Where the substance of state law is merely a thin veneer, itself a fraudulent cover, for the true legal dynamics involved, it can fairly be said that Federal law occupies the field and therefore

Defendants John Michele and Norah Bawn Fanuzzi submit that, with some obvious and historically well-known exceptions, most members of Congress, in both the 19th and 20th centuries should be afforded at least a presumption of literacy, of knowing the meaning of the words they use and the Court should not rewrite these democratically enacted laws in such a way as to radically disadvantage the mass of the people on whose behalf Congress was acting.
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preempts State Law. The only question Defendants raise here is whether Montanas common and statutory law of commercial lending contracts still has any power in light of federal law and policy in favor of enforcement of securitized and pooled mortgages. PREEMPTION PRINCIPLES The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law. (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407; Jevne v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 935, 949, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 685, 111 P.3d 954.) There are four species of federal preemption: express, conflict, obstacle, and field. (See Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943, 955, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422.) First, express preemption arises when Congress define[s] explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law. Pre-emption fundamentally is a question of congressional intent, and when Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one. (English v. General Electric Co., supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 7879, 110 S.Ct. 2270.) Second, conflict preemption will be found when simultaneous compliance with both state and federal directives is impossible. (Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)) Third, obstacle preemption arises when under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. (Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 373, 120 S.Ct. 2288, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581.) Finally, field preemption, i.e., Congress' intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area, applies where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
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comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation. (Hillsborough County, at p. 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. (1947) 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447.) Defendants recognize that Courts may be reluctant to infer preemption, and it is the burden of the party claiming that Congress intended to preempt state law to prove it. If this Court cannot summarily deny Plaintiffs Motion for Remand as suggested above, Defendants demand the opportunity for a full-blown evidentiary hearing on removal based on their three grounds of (1) Preemption of State Mortgage Foreclosure and Eviction by Federal Securities & Civil Rights Laws, (2) Civil Rights Removal because of the racial bias in lack of civil rights protection for non-racial civil rights such as the rights to make and enforce contracts and to enforce the same in court articulated by 42 U.S.C. 1981-1982, and (3) Bankruptcy Related to Jurisdiction and Removal. The conflict between the Common Law principles of holder-in-due course and privity of contract, and related elements of the Montana (and other states) Commercial Codes are utterly and completely incompatible with the procedures of non-judicial foreclosures and expedited evictions, but these procedures are either demanded or required by Federal pressure to maintain the functioning of the securitized mortgage finance system which has become a key policy of the Federal government and Federal Reserve Banking system. Elements of all four types of preemption are present, except that it is the United States Supreme Court, rather than Congress, which has rendered the coexistence of state and federal policies and regimes of contract construction impossible. State law still at least nominally upholds the integrity of contractual principles such as privity of

Defendants John Michele Fanuzzi & Norah Bawn Fanuzzis Notice of Opposition & Request for Hearing January 31, 2012

contract and holder-in-due-course doctrine, but Federal Civil Rights and Federal Securities laws prevent or prohibit the enforcement of these doctrines. DEFENDANTS JOHN MICHELE & NORAH BAWN FANUZZI SPECIFICALLY DEMAND A FULL EVIDENTIARY HEARING at which they can present the evidence and legal arguments for full federal preemption of common law doctrines by the federally mandated exigencies of (1) the securities laws which exempt fraud in home mortgages from securities regulation on the one hand and (2) the civil rights laws which forbid use of the civil rights laws to challenge non-racebased constitutional violations of civil rights. There is simply NO WAY to enforce the common law of commercial contract in light of Federal Law as it now stands, and Federal policies which defend the rights and powers of banks and their servicers to foreclose. The combined effect of the EXEMPTIONS granted from Federal Civil Rights laws and Federal Securities laws is the abrogation of state common and statutory laws protective of contractual integrity in favor of the claim jumping lawless culture of lies and deceit concerning the ownership of securitized mortgages. The Supreme Court ruled in 1990 that in 1933-34 Congress had no general intention to legislate against real estate fraud and speculation in enacting the Federal securities laws, despite the fact that this was one of the leading cause of the Great Depression, and the Supreme Court accordingly exempted home mortgages and consumer loans from federal securities regulation. And likewise, before that, in 19661975, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress enacted certain Civil Rights laws in the broadest, racially neutral and colorblind language not to create real equality of rights to make and enforce contracts in the courts, but merely to create a petty litigation tool by which one race could compete with another. The Supreme Courts version of judicially crafted affirmative action has had the result dividing the American population against itself and rendering the most one of the most broadly worded civil
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rights statutes of the 1860s-70s (28 U.S.C. 1343 and 1443) all but completely meaningless and useless to all people of all races except in certain (now mostly extinguished) situations (based in part on racially suggestive but ambiguous language in 42 U.S.C. 1981-1982). It is now necessary to place and review the Defendants particular financial and legal problems in the current national historical context. A TSUNAMI OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE & EVICTION A wave of bank foreclosures and evictions has shaken the stability of the people of the United States of America from coast-to-coast in a manner without historical precedent. While certain urban areas may have suffered higher rates during the great depression of the 1930s, one source reports that the foreclosure rate peaked in 1933 at 1000 homes going into foreclosure every day, nationwide3. A separate source reports that in the last quarter of 2010 there were 800,000 foreclosures filed in the Fourth Quarter alone 4 . One not educated in higher mathematics, Boolean algebra or

3 http://homeguides.sfgate.com/historical-rate-mortgage-foreclosures-8868.html: Depression-Era Information A 2008 article by David C. Wheelock, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, cited annual reports issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board during the 1930s. These reports reveal that the foreclosure rate exceeded 1 percent from 1931 until 1935. At the worst point in the Depression-era economic crisis, in 1933, about 1,000 home loans were being placed in foreclosure by banks every day. (Website quoted as of on-line report available and consulted January 29, 2012). 4

http://www.housingwire.com/2011/01/12/foreclosures-reach-record-high-in-2010-realtytrac: Daren Blomquist, who edits the RealtyTrac monthly reports, said the record set in 2010 will not last for long. "We dont think weve peaked yet nationwide," Blomquist told HousingWire. "Were expecting the 2011 numbers to be slightly higher than 2010, and then start the downward trend toward 'normalcy' in 2012." Saccacio said foreclosure filings would have been higher in 2010 "had it not been for the fourth quarter drop in foreclosure activity triggered primarily by the continuing controversy surrounding foreclosure documentation and procedures that prompted many major lenders to temporarily halt some foreclosure proceedings." The final quarter of 2010 had the lowest total since the fourth quarter of 2008. Lenders filed slightly fewer than 800,000 foreclosure cases in the fourth quarter, down 8% from a year ago and down 14% from the previous period. In December, filings dropped 26% from a year ago and 2% from the previous month. Lenders ramped up repossessions, REO, for the month by 4%, led by a 71% monthly increase in

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statistics cannot easily calculate or articulate in meaningful terms what the difference between 1000 per day in 1933 and 800,000 per quarter in 2010 would be (although the 2010 figure appears to approach 10,000 per day), but one can fairly say that a disaster of tidal wave proportions grips this country by the throat and every class of society is equally affected except for the very richest of the richest, only perhaps the top half of the top 1% of the population can rest truly safe. Defendants John Michele & Norah Bawn Fanuzzi, faced with being swept away in this crisis, have removed the eviction case brought against them to the U.S. District Court in Billings on three independent but interrelated grounds (1) Federal Question 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1441 by preemption of state common & statutory law of contract formation and enforcement and property ownership by Federal securities laws, (2) civil rights removal 28 U.S.C. 1443, 1447(d) arising from the judicial construction and application of a comprehensive Federal statutory scheme for civil rights as mandating affirmative action bias in enforcement of equal civil rights to make and enforce contracts in the courts for the acquisition and maintenance of ownership of property, (3) related to bankruptcy jurisdiction of the Federal Courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1334 & 1452. First among these grounds is Defendants allegation to the Court that, as a matter of law and fact, federally approved and fostered securitization of mortgage has

Nevada to 3,022 repossessions. However, Nevada REO was still down 24% from a year ago. Overall, Nevada had the highest foreclosure rate for the fourth consecutive year. There, one in 11 homes received a filing in 2010 despite a 5% decrease in activity from 2009. Filings did ramp up 18% in December from the previous month and were up 14% from December 2009. Arizona followed with the second highest rate. One in 17 homes there received a filing. Florida, one in 18, was third. But Blomquist warned more foreclosures could be in store even for those markets that many believe are peaking now. "There are some states and metro areas where it appears the numbers may have technically peaked, areas of California like Stockton are good examples," Blomquist said, "but foreclosures are still pretty high in most of those areas and there is still risk that we could see some foreclosure aftershocks hitting those markets in 2011." (Website quoted as of on-line report available and consulted on January 29, 2012).

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totally occupied, i.e. pre-empted, the conceptual legal field formerly structured and governed by common and statutory doctrines of privity of contract, holder-in-due course doctrine, and actual party in interest standing with regard to debt collection. Defendants allege that at least since February 1990, an irrational and unconstitutional Federal judicial fiat acted to free the mortgage business from the constraints of state common and statutory law by permitting securitization of mortgage notes and rampant speculation in such pooled or derivative securities in a dark and foggy grey area between traditional norms of contractual integrity and coherence of title on the one hand and unregulated securities manipulations, not regulated by ANY norm of fraud (state or federal) whatsoever. The effect of securitized or pooled mortgages on the continued viability or operation of such concepts as Chain of Title and Property Title Recordation has been the subject of massive controversy and scholarship5. The combination of non-judicial foreclosure by sale followed by summary eviction proceedings renders the entire mortgage foreclosure process free of constitutional restrictions guaranteeing the integrity of contract, the stability of the common law, and the necessity of due process before stripping rights to liberty and property. Nationwide, the victims of this epidemic of foreclosure and eviction try to understand and calm the crisis caused by Supreme Court authorized and Congressionally tolerated (if not fostered) lawlessness in the interpretation and enforcement of notes whose ownership is in fact hopelessly blurred by securitized mortgage trading. The massive exchange of large series of mortgage notes and contracts among owners and services has caused imprecision, uncertainty, and vagueness of title and

See for example the work of Chrispher L. Peterson, e.g. Predatory Structured Finance, Cardozo Law Review 28:5, 2185-2284 (2007), attached as Exhibit A to this Notice of Opposition and Brief in Support of Federal Jurisdiction. Also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=929118.
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identity of contractual parties, leading to a situation bordering on common or communal ownership of all real property in the United States, at least as between major government sponsored bailed out banks and finance companies. One may reasonably speculate whether the present situation has in fact resulted from some governmental-cum-intellentsia-elite intent to perfect the mandate of the Communist Manifesto of February 1848, published 164 years ago as of this month, that Central banking utilize policies of loose and easy credit to effect the final abolition of private property in real estate. Defendants allege and submit that Federal Preemption (through Titles 12 & 15 of the United States Code) of all law defining and determining the ownership and assignment of rights to perfect interests arising from, pursuant to and dependent upon securitized mortgages. Federal judicially crafted policies regarding civil rights removal must be reformed in order to permit property owners to challenge the standing and right to perfect interests created by non-judicial foreclosure through summary judicial eviction proceedings, given the murky relationship between traditional common and statutory property and contract law stated above. Defendants thus submit that this United States District Court therefore has preemptive Federal Question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331, even though the outcome determinative Federal Law is disguised behind the veil of having completely displaced traditional common law as the determinant of State Commercial and Real Estate Financing law (again, primarily through U.S. Code Titles 12 and 15).

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IF MORTGAGE NOTES ARE NOT SECURITIES, THEN THERE IS NO SECURITY IN MORTGAGE NOTES (FOR ANY PARTY) Securitization of mortgage notes stands at the base, foundation, and root (and constitutes the direct and proximate and therefore legal cause) of the wild speculation and resultant transformation of mortgage contracts and property law which has taken place over the past twenty-five years. The United States Supreme Court, perhaps intentionally, perhaps unwittingly, released the process of securitization or pooling of mortgage notes from the boundaries of both the state common and statutory law of contract and property in the several United States in 1990 when it exempted both consumer loans and loans secured by real estate from securities regulation by the adoption of the Second Circuits6 judicially crafted list of exceptions7 to the plain statutory mandate defining security to include any note8.

Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-1138 (2nd Cir., June 9, 1976). In the case of Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64-66, 110 S.Ct. 945, 951 (February 21, 1990), the Supreme Court held (though Defendants ask this Court rationally to explain why, in light of the present crisis): [T]he Second Circuit's family resemblance approach begins with a presumption that any note with a term of more than nine months is a security. Recognizing that not all notes are securities, however, the Second Circuit has also devised a list of notes that it has decided are obviously not securities. Accordingly, *64 the family resemblance test permits an issuer to rebut the presumption that a note is a security if it can show that the note in question bear[s] a strong family resemblance to an item on the judicially crafted list of exceptions, or convinces the court to add a new instrument to the list. . . . . . . . . . [B]ecause the Securities Acts define security to include any note, we begin with a presumption that every note is a security. We nonetheless recognize that this presumption cannot be irrebuttable. . . . In an attempt to give more content to that dividing line, the Second Circuit has identified a list of instruments commonly denominated notes that nonetheless fall without the security category . . . . (types of notes that are not securities include the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a mortgage on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets, the note evidencing a character loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business (particularly if, as in the case of the customer of a broker, it is collateralized)); . . . (adding to list notes evidencing loans by commercial banks for current operations). We agree that the items identified by the Second Circuit are not properly viewed as securities. More guidance, though, is needed. It is impossible to make any meaningful inquiry into whether an instrument bears a resemblance to *66 one of the instruments identified by the Second Circuit without specifying what it is about those instruments that makes them non-securities. Moreover, as the Second Circuit itself has noted, its list is not graven in stone, and is therefore capable of expansion. Thus, some standards must be developed for determining when an item should be added to the list. An examination of the list itself makes clear what those standards should be. In creating its list, the Second Circuit was applying the same factors that this Court has held apply in deciding whether a
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Defendants submit that this exclusion subverted the true purpose Congress had in 1934 (to prohibit exactly the kind of wild speculation in credit and note based securities which clearly caused the Great Depression in the first place) and that this judicially crafted subversion constitutes a direct and proximate (and therefore legal) cause of the present mortgage foreclosure crisis. But for the Supreme Courts adoption of this judicially crafted list of exceptions to Congress statutory mandate that any note be included in the federal securities laws, the disruptions in the established common and statutory law of contract and property ownership with regard to mortgages as secured transactions would have remained intact and the present mortgage crisis could not have occurred. CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DENIGRATES ALL CITIZENS RIGHTS TO EQUAL ACCESS TO THE COURTS, TO MAKE & ENFORCE CONTRACTS, AND TO ACQUIRE & MAINTAIN OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY A second judicially crafted list of exceptions relates to the Supreme Courts application and enforcement of certain key civil rights statutes, all lacking less than a decade for being a century and a half old. These include 28 U.S.C. 1443 and 42

transaction involves a security. First, we examine the transaction to assess the motivations that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it. If the seller's purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is interested primarily **952 in the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument is likely to be a security. If the note is exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a minor asset or consumer good, to correct for the seller's cash-flow difficulties, or to advance some other commercial or consumer purpose, on the other hand, the note is less sensibly described as a security. SCOTUS Citations and Footnotes Omitted, italics and quotes as in Courts original text. 8 The term security means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a security; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited. 48 Stat. 884, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10).

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U.S.C. 1981-1982. The key question in civil rights is whether all citizens of the United States have equal rights to make and enforce contracts, to have access to the courts and offer evidence in court, and to acquire and maintain ownership in property. The role of the Federal Judiciary in limiting these rights has construed these statutes as matters of affirmative action, a series of race-based schemes which means that only non-whites, specifically African-Americans, are entitled to assert their civil rights to make and enforce contracts (etc.), as a matter of Federal law when state courts and statutory schemes systematically deny these rights. CASE PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL Defendant Norah Bawn Fanuzzi was served with Bank of the Rockies Complaint for Trespass and Unlawful Detainer on Tuesday, December 13, 2011. John Michele Fanuzzi appeared voluntarily in State Court with his wife on December 27, 2011, although he was never served. (See discussion above of other named Defendants, absent: Toll, no longer legally or financially extant: Golden Ration Woodworks, or just not served and not involved: Mathew Crown. Rule 6(b) of the Montana Rule of Civil Procedure allowed the Defendants 10 business days after service on Tuesday, December 13, 2011 (not counting the day of service, weekends, or Court holidays) to respond to this complaint. The ninth day so calculated fell on Tuesday December 27, 2011 because of the Christmas Holiday falling on Monday, December 26, 2011. On this day, the Defendants John Michele Fanuzzi and Norah Bawn Fanuzzi filed a Motion to pursuant to Montana Code 3-1804 to Substitute Judge, together with their Motion for Extension of Time to file an answer or responsive pleading. Montana Law does not appear to allow any discretion at all to deny a timely filed Motion to Substitute Judge pursuant to 3-1-804 of the Montana Code, but Judge Swandal boldly and blatantly ignored this provision.

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Contrary to Joel E. Guthals representations to the Court, 6th District Court Judge W. Nels Swandall did NOT follow Montana Law, because he ruled on a pending motion and entered default against the Defendants AFTER being presented with Motion to Substitute Judge. This was both illegal and improper under Montana Law and highly prejudicial to the Defendantss rights to due process of law, and especially to Norah Bawn Fanuzzis rights as a disabled person. Motions to Extend Time to answer are normally and routinely granted, especially when filed before the expiration of the initial time period specified in a summons, and even when a Motion to Extend Time is denied, the Defendant is normally allowed actual NOTICE of the Denial and reasonable opportunity to comply with the Courts order to respond as a matter of elementary due process of law and fair play in the litigation game, but Judge W. Nels Swandal apparently did not see matters this way, or else he simply does not feel obliged to comply with the clear letter of the law, to wit: Under Montana law, the Defendants were entitled to demand one substitution of Judge. On December 28, 2011, acknowledging their Motion for an Extension of Time but denying it, while utterly ignoring the Defendants Motion to Substitute Judge in violation of Montana Law, Judge W. Nels Swandal entered a default judgment against the Defendants. Defendants submit that the rush to judgment in Judge Swandals court exemplifies the degree to which perfection of interest in non-judicially foreclosed property has assumed stature as THE PARAMOUNT value to be upheld in State Courts, in deference NOT to State Statutory or Common Law but to Federal Law and Policy in Favor of the enforcement of Securitized (Pooled) Mortgages and/or a national governmental policy in favor of the abolition of private property ownership by individuals. Whatever the exact cause of his conduct and haste in denying
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additional time and entering default against the Defendants without affording them a meaningful opportunity to respond, Judge Swandal by his actions taken on December 28, 2011 demonstrated that this is one of those rare cases where the Defendants cannot avail themselves of equal protection under the law, where in fact, Defendants rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant(s) to trial in the state court. Georgia v. Rachel; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303. Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 828, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 1812, 16 L.Ed.2d 944, 957 (1966). In fact, because Judge W. Nels Swandal seems determined to enter judgment against the Defendants without allowing a trial, and of ignoring his duty to step down when moved to be substituted pursuant to 3-1-804, the situation is even more grave. Defendants therefore submit Civil Rights Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1443(1) is appropriate. To perfect this removal Defendants contend and demand that Civil Rights Removal pursuant to this statute ought to be administered in a color-blind and race-neutral manner (in other words, according to the plain letter of the statute as enacted by Congress), and should not to be construed or administered as a judicial affirmative action program of benign (i.e. anti-majoritarian, minorities only) discrimination in light of Adarand Contractors v. Pena and related cases, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). As noted above, the fact that the Federal Judiciary has created a policy of affirmative action in the application and construction of the Civil Rights Removal Statutes does not mean it is any less of a comprehensive Federal statutory policy (as defined by Greenwood v. Peacock, quoted above) than if Congress itself had initiated and expressly framed this race-based scheme whether it be called benign or injurious in the extreme. WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE YIELDS UNJUST & DECEPTIVE APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE SOLE ADVANTAGE OF THE BANKS
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A procedural and substantive commonality creates a strong and interdependent relationship between the three prongs of removal here---all reject and require that this Court reject the well-pleaded complaint rule. The essence of John Michele & Norah Bawn Fanuzzis position here is that things are not as they seem. Superficially, a Complaint such as that of the Bank of the Rockies in this case, alleging that ostensibly state authorized non-judicial foreclosure proceedings should be routinely followed by summary quasi-judicial, nearly administrative eviction proceedings does not facially state any issue relating to Federal Law (except for the Bank of the Rockies unusually dependent reliance, noted above, in 31 on page 5 of 7 of the December 2, 2011, Complaint for Trespass & Unlawful Detainer, on the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts findings entered November 29, 2011). Defendants submit that as a matter of deep structure and real substance, however, non-judicial foreclosures dependent upon securitized notes are ONLY legitimate if a thorough analysis of the underlying Federal Banking and Securities statutes and regulations reveals that there are enough residual elements and factors comprising holder-in-due course and privity of contract that Bank of the Rockies can, despite having sold Defendants note into a securitized pool or bundle claim in any sense to preserve any real legal or equitable interest in the note sufficient to justify perfection of such interest through seizure. Civil Rights Removal law and jurisprudence constitutes an express and statutorily authorized exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Civil Rights Removal is always dependent upon the Defendants perspective, rather than the facial elements or superficial substance of the Plaintiffs complaint. The Supreme Court has counseled that [u]nder 1443(1), the vindication of the defendant's federal rights is left to the state courts except in the rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights
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will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court. Greenwood v. Peacock, supra. Defendants submit that the non-judicial foreclosure statutes and the summary eviction statutes of the State of Montana (given that the common and commercial codes of the state preempted directly by Federal Securities and Civil Rights laws) operate as such pervasive and explicit state laws (backed up, controlled, and determined by Federal laws, regulations and policies) which permit one to clearly predict that by their operation that th[e Defendants] rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court. The Federally secured, enumerated, USA v. Carolene Products Footnote 4 rights which non-judicial foreclosure followed by summary eviction denies are those provided (1) by Article I that there shall be no impairments of the [implicitly common law] obligations and rights of contract, (2) by Amendment I that there be no abridgement of the right of the people to petition for redress of grievances (incorporated to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment), (3) by Amendment IV that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, (4) by Amendment V that [n]o person.shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, (5) by Amendment VII that [i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law, (6) by Amendment IX that [t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people, (7) by Amendment X that [t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor

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prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to . . . or to the people, and (8) by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection. Defendants exercise their right to remove to the United States District Court to assert these defenses to the banking and securities laws which by way of hidden, occult, and hermeneutic processes actually shape and control the operation and application of mortgage lending practice, even though such behind the scenes universally outcome-determinative control and manipulation is nowhere apparent on the face of Complaints such as that propounded here by Plaintiff the Bank of the Rockies. RELATED TO BANKRUPTCY REMOVAL PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 1334 & 1452 As noted above, Judge Ralph B. Kirscher of the United States Bankruptcy Court dismissed Defendants John Michele and Norah Bawn Fanuzzis Chapter 11 Petition upon the SOLE and entirely non-substantive grounds of failure to take the required course in credit counseling BEFORE filing their petition---even though the Fanuzzis took their credit counseling within a reasonable time afterwards. Judge Kirschers judgment of dismissal was without prejudice of any kind, and no barrier to John & Norah Fanuzzis refilling was included in the order, and accordingly, within 3 days, by Friday February 3, 2012, Defendants will have refiled a petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court. However, removal related to Bankruptcy was proper EVEN PRIOR to this refiling, because Judge Kirscher retained jurisdiction over the Defendants petition and specifically the eviction case. To wit, on November 29, 2011, Judge Ralph B. Kirscher of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana entered the following order:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED Bank of the Rockies, N.A.s Motion to Modify Stay filed on November 7, 2011, is GRANTED; the stay afforded by 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is modified to permit Bank of the Rockies, N.A., to pursue its non bankruptcy remedies against the Debtors and others, including unlawful detainer and Defendants John Michele Fanuzzi & Norah Bawn Fanuzzis Notice of Opposition & Request for Hearing January 31, 2012

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trespass, in order to obtain possession of the following real property: That part of the W1/2 of Section 4 and the SE 1/4 of Section 5, Township 6 South, Range 8 East, of the Principal Montana Meridian, in Park County, Montana, described as Lot 3 of Minor Subdivision Plat No. 149 on file in the office of the Clerk and Recorder of said County, under Document #239761. TOGETHER WITH all of the rights and privileges of Grantor in said Real Property, all existing erected or affixed buildings, improvements and fixtures, all easements, rights of way, all water rights and ditch rights (including stock and utilities with ditch or irrigation rights), all other rights, royalties and profits related to the Real Property, including without limitation all minerals, oil, gas, geothermal and similar matters, and all of the tenements, hereditaments, appurtenances and improvements, thereupon belonging or otherwise appertaining, or thereto incident, the rents, issues, and profits thereof. The Property is commonly known as 2892 Highway 89 South, Emigrant, MT 59027. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in pursuing its applicable nonbankruptcy law remedies, Bank shall not pursue a damage claim against Debtors, but instead shall file a proof of claim with this Court for any such damage claim upon adjudication of its proposed state court action for unlawful detainer/trespass. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order is effective immediately, not stayed for 14 days pursuant to F.R.B.P. 4001(a)(3). 11-61848-RBK; Doc#: 17; Filed: 11/29/11; Entered: 11/29/11; 10:47:14; Page 4-5 of 5 (bold emphasis added).

Thus, Joel E. Guthals has also misrepresented to the Court the nature of the dismissal of the Fanuzzi bankruptcy, because the U.S. Bankruptcy Court has retained partial jurisdiction over this case. Furthermore, in 31 of the Bank of the Rockies Complaint in this Montana 6th Judicial District, Plaintiff alleged (as a key element of its grounds for recovery) that U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Kirscher found that Defendants John Fanuzzi and Norah Fanuzzi are not the owners fo the Property and have no legal and equitable interests therein (Page 5 of 7 of Complaint filed December 2, 2011, served December 13, 2011). Thus, there was interdependence between the Bankruptcy Courts order and the Plaintiffs eviction case against the Defendants John Michele and Norah Bawn Fanuzzi.
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Accordingly this case is on its face expressly and plainly related to (a) case() under title 11 within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1334(b) and is therefore removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1334 & 1452 despite the subsequent dismissal of the Fanuzzis Chapter 11 Petition on entirely formalistic rather than real substantive grounds (without any bar to refilling in Bankruptcy Court).

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CONCLUSION & PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Defendants John Michele & Norah Bawn Fanuzzi respectfully remove the above-entitled and numbered cause from the 6th Montana Judicial District to the United States District Court for the District of Montana (either Billings or Butte Division, as the clerk may assign), so that they may be here allowed, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to file an answer and set aside the illegally oppressive orders and unfair decisions of Judge W. Nels Swandal, and to challenge the Federal Banking and Securities Law Determinative Preemption (by operatively total and pervasive command and control statutory and regulatory direction, if not by express alteration of Montana State Law on its face) of the Common and Statutory law of mortgage and real estate financing in Montana. Defendants have also removed to federal court so that they, as Defendants, be fairly allowed further to answer and counterclaim seek declaratory judgment and injunctions concerning the effective preemption of state law by Titles 12 and 15 of the United States Code, and in particular so that Defendants may contest (as a matter of Constitutional Law) the operation of Federal Banking and Securities Laws and regulations as the real the operati[ve, .] pervasive and explicit state or federal law that th[e]se [Defendants federally secured Constitutional] rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court (or in this case, by denying Defendant the right to trial in State Court). Defendants may also counterclaim as allowed by 28 U.S.C. 1367 supplemental jurisdiction to plead certain state law causes of action and claims they have against the Bank of the Rockies. Defendants hereby assert their Seventh Amendment right to a full common law jury determination of all facts, and accordingly demand a TRIAL-BY-JURY of all issues so triable both in regard to the Plaintiffs Bank of the Rockies Complaint and in regard to their answer and counterclaims for damages, declaratory judgment, and
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injunctive relief against the Plaintiff Bank of the Rockies, N.A.. Defendants ask that the United States Clerk of Court for the District of Montana take note of their case and refer it to a fair, impartial, and unbiased judge without any direct or indirect financial interests in mortgage backed securities or collateral backed obligations (derivative debt, bonds, or stocks) of any kind or description. Respectfully submitted, Tuesday, January 31, 2012 _________________________ John Michele Fanuzzi, pro se Tuesday, January 31, 2012 _________________________ Norah Bawn Fanuzzi, pro se

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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE I, John Michele Fanuzzi, am a Defendant in the above-entitled-and-numbered case. I am over the age of 18 and otherwise competent to make this Affidavit. I served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Notice of Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Remand and Brief in Support of Removal Jurisdiction to the United States District Court for the District of Montana (Billings Division) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1334, 1441, 1443 & 1452 on: Joel E. Guthals Attorney No. 589 Guthals, Hunnes, & Reuss, P.C. Post Office Box 1977 Billings, Montana 59103-1977 Via first class mail with return receipt requested and also via Facsimile to and by e-mail to: (406) 245-3074 jeguthals@ghrlawfirm.com Done and executed on this Tuesday, the 31st Day of January 2012 in ________, ______________ County, Montana.

______________________________ John Michele Fanuzzi, Defendant In propria persona

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NOTARYS JURAT: John Michele Fanuzzi appeared in person before me on this 31st day of January, 2012, and having been duly sworn by me to take his oath, he did then and there sign, execute, and swear to the above-and-foregoing facts at my regular place of business, being________________________, _________ County, Montana. _________________________ Notary Public, Montana Printed Name of Notary:_________________________ My Commission Expires:________________________

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Exhibit A: Affidavit of John Michele Fanuzzi

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Affidavit of John Michele Fanuzzi & Verification of Brief In Support of Federal Removal Jurisdiction 1. My name is John Michele Fanuzzi. I am the first named defendant in this removed case and husband of Norah Bawn Fanuzzi. I am over the age of 18, have never been diagnosed with any psychiatric or psychological disorder, nor convicted of any crime of moral turpitude. I write this affidavit from personal knowledge and will testify to the truth of all matters asserted herein in open court if called upon to do so. 2. My wife Norah Bawn Fanuzzi was the only person formally served with a copy of the complaint and summons on December 13, 2011. 3. My wife is partially handicapped and disabled due to diagnoses of Multiple Sclerosis, Lyme Disease, and nervous anxiety tension. She has also been hospitalized for cardiac irregularity and shown signs and symptoms of radiation poisoning. 4. Mike Grove of Bank of the Rockies, N.A., has at all times been aware of her condition. We were social as well as business acquaintances because I formerly served on the board of advisors of the Bank of the Rockies and served on that board when the transactions ultimately giving rise to the present lawsuit took place. 5. I have reviewed the above-and-foregoing Notice of Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Remand and Brief in Support of Federal Removal Jurisdiction and hereby verify that all the statements of fact and circumstance contained therein are true and correct, except when phrased as a matter of opinion, in which case these opinions are based upon my own reasonable information and believe after due diligence in researching the question or questions. 6. James Toll moved out of the property, subject of this litigation, last summer and I have no idea where he is living at the present time. 7. Mathew Crown moved out of his room but has been staying in the basement of the shop and was not present at the time of service, nor has he ever become involved or expressed any interest in becoming involved in the present litigation. 8. I allowed the corporate status of Golden Ration Woodworks to lapse, and have not renewed the corporate charter with the Montana Secretary of State since 2007. Golden Ratio Woodworks ceased to be a viable commercial enterprise in or about January 2007 and I have assumed all liabilities personally, in that the corporation
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never filed for bankruptcy protection or any other kind of receivership or formal dissolution. Golden Ratio Woodworks no longer has any officers, directors, or assets of any kind, nor any registered agent for service of process. 9. Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the letter my wife and I sent to the Honorable David James Cybulski on or about January 7, 2012, together with a copy of the Notice of Removal I had intended to file in Montana State Court in Park County. 10. A woman named Angie or Angela Heiser (I am not sure of the spelling) at the Park County Clerks office of and for the Montana Sixth Judicial District refused to accept the Notice of Removal I had prepared and signed for submission in State Court. Any statement to the contrary is prevarication. She expressly informed me that she could not and would not accept this Notice. She gave me a post-it note with Judge Cybulskis name and address, and said I had to send it to him. It was for that reason that I sent the Notice to Judge Cybulski. 11. My records (and the Exhibit Cover Sheet for Attachments to my Notice of Removal filed in the U.S. District Court) show that I intended to file the Complaint, Docket Report, and all motions and documents with which I had been served or had otherwise received as of the time of filing my Notice of Removal. Any documents omitted were left out inadvertently, completely by accident, and certainly not with any intent to deceive the Court as Joel E. Guthals has suggested on page 23 of his Brief in Support of Remand. 12. My wife is a disabled person and I do not believe that she can stand the stress either of forcible eviction or of representing herself in court. She is emotionally, neurologically, and physically sensitive. I fully am willing to represent her interests, and those of my children, as their next friend according to traditional common law court procedure wherein a husband may so represent his wife and minor children. 13. I am aware of U.S. Supreme Court precedent limiting my right, as a nonattorney, to represent my wife and children. Accordingly, I respectfully affirm and verify, in this affidavit, my request to the Court that a guardian or attorney ad litem should be appointed for my children and wife to assist me in defending our familys rights in this litigation. 14. I am a natural born citizen of the United States of America, a white Caucasian man, born in New Jersey.
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15. The Courts of Montana deny me equal access to the Courts on a similar footing as non-natural persons or legal entities such as the Bank of the Rockies, N.A.. I certainly do not have the same rights to make and enforce contracts, of equal access to the courts, and equal rights to offer and give testimony under current law or customs, practices, and policies of the Montana Courts having the force and effect of law, as the white citizens of the United States possessed at the time of the original adoption of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982. 16. Because I am white, 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982, and 28 U.S.C. 1443, do not give me equal rights to the use of these statutes and legal procedures on my own behalf, nor on behalf of my wife and children, who are also white Caucasians. 17. I have taken the credit counseling courses required for filing a Petition in Bankruptcy Court and I do not anticipate that my refiling of Bankruptcy Court this week can possibly be dismissed as quickly or for any of the same reasons as were given by Judge Kirscher in dismissing my original petition under Chapter 11 in January. Further affiant saith naught. Done and executed on this Tuesday, the 31st Day of January 2012 in ________, ______________ County, Montana.

______________________________ John Michele Fanuzzi, Defendant In propria persona

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NOTARYS JURAT: John Michele Fanuzzi appeared in person before me on this 31st day of January, 2012, and having been duly sworn by me to take his oath, he did then and there sign, execute, and swear to the above-and-foregoing affidavit and verification of statement of facts in his Brief in Support of Federal Removal Jurisdiction at my regular place of business, being________________________, _________ County, Montana. _________________________ Notary Public, Montana Printed Name of Notary:_________________________ My Commission Expires:________________________

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Defendants John Michele Fanuzzi & Norah Bawn Fanuzzis Notice of Opposition & Request for Hearing January 31, 2012

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Exhibit B: True and Correct Copy of Letter From Defendants John Michele & Norah Bawn Fanuzzi to the Honorable David James Cybulski, Montana District Judge

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