The Rise and Fall of Détente On The Korean Peninsula, 1970-1974

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974
Christian F. Ostermann / James F. Person, eds.
History and Public Policy Program Critical Oral History Conference Series

Christian F. Ostermann / James F. Person, eds.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20004-3027 www.wilsoncenter.org ISBN# 1-933549-71-8 Cover image: Korean Central Intelligence Agency Director Lee Hurak (right) greets North Korean Second VicePremier Pak Seongcheol (left) during a meeting in South Korea on October 13, 1972 2011 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Contents
Acknowledgements Preface Executive Summary Participants Chronology Opening Remarks Panel I: Inter-Korean Dialogue in the Era of Dtente Panel II: Inter-Korean Dialogue and U.S.-ROK Relations Panel III: Inter-Korean Dialogue
and the DPRKs Relations with Allied Countries
V VI VIII X XVIII 1 5 23 47
Panel IV: Inter-Korean Dialogue

and the Domestic Politics of the Two Koreas
77
Panel V: The Two Koreas and the United Nations Document Appendix Index
105 129 263
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, established by Congress in 1968 and headquartered in Washington, D.C., is a living national memorial to President Wilson. The Centers mission is to commemorate the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson by providing a link between the worlds of ideas and policy, while fostering research, study, discussion, and collaboration among a broad spectrum of individuals concerned with policy and scholarship in national and international affairs. Supported by public and private funds, the Center is a nonpartisan institution engaged in the study of national and world affairs. It establishes and maintains a neutral forum for free, open, and informed dialogue. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center. The Center is the publisher of The Wilson Quarterly and home of Woodrow Wilson Center Press, dialogue radio and television. For more information about the Centers activities and publications, please visit us on the web at www.wilsoncenter.org.
Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO
BOARD OF TRUSTEES Joseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair Sander R. Gerber, Vice Chair Public Members: Melody Barnes, designated appointee from within the Federal Government; Hon. James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress; Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary, U.S. Department of State; G. Wayne Clough, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Arne Duncan, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; David Ferriero, Archivist of the United States; James Leach, Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities; Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Private Citizen Members: Timothy Broas, John Casteen, Charles Cobb, Jr., Thelma Duggin, Carlos M. Gutierrez, Susan Hutchison, Barry S. Jackson
Acknowledgements
This transcript is the second in a series of critical oral history conferences jointly convened by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars North Korea International Documentation Project and the University of North Korean Studies. The conference was held on 1-2 July 2010 in Washington. The editors would like to thank the KOREA FOUNDATION, THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH KOREAN STUDIES, UNITED AIRLINES, and THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS for their generous financial support for both the conference and this publication. We would also like to thank the eyewitnesses to this history the veteran diplomatic and intelligence officials who traveled from Korea, Bulgaria, and all corners of the United States carrying a hefty 1,700-page collection of declassified archival documents. We are particularly grateful to the faculty and staff of the University of North Korean Studies, including Ambassador Jounyung Sun, Prof. Jongdae Shin, Prof. Kihljae Ryoo, Dean Oullette, and Heeseon Min for their support in organizing the conference and for collecting newly declassified South Korean documents from the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Seoul). We would also like to thank Bernd Schaefer and Eliza Gheorghe for sharing many (East) German and Romanian documents. For their efforts, the editors would also like to thank the staff of the History and Public Policy Program, including Kristina Terzieva and Piet Biersteker. Finally, for all of their hard work in assembling the massive collection of archival documents from around the world and in helping assemble this transcript and collection of documents, we would like to thank NKIDP interns Lauren Bae, Ria Chae, Hazel Han, Na Sil Heo, Wandi Hwang, Esther Im, Charles Kraus, Debbie Kye, Yong Kwon, Scott LaFoy, Robert Lauler, Chaeryung Lee, Taylor Sutton, and Will Treece.
Christian F. Ostermann James F. Person
Korea Foundation
V
Preface
With this publication, the Wilson Center presents the findings and transcripts of the international conference The Rise and Fall of Detente on the Korean Peninsula, 19701974, organized in July 2010 by the Centers History & Public Policy Program (North Korea International Documentation Project) and the University of North Korean Studies (Seoul). The conference is the second in an ongoing critical oral history conference on inter-Korean, U.S.-ROK, and DPRK-Socialist bloc relations during the Cold War. Begun in 2008 with support from the Korea Foundation (Seoul), the conference series brings together newly declassified documents, eyewitnesses, and scholars and engages them in discoveries and discussions of the white spots in our countries shared history. The 2010 conference examined the fundamental shift that began to emerge in the major power alignments in East Asia in 1970. With relations between the USSR and China declining over the previous decade to the point of military skirmishes along their shared 2,700 mile border, Chinese leaders understood that they could not withstand the sustained enmity of two global powers and cautiously sought to improve relations with Washington as the lesser of the two threats. By 1971, the two Koreas likewise began to lessen the tensions that had beset the peninsula ever since the Korean War (1950-1953) and began an unprecedented series of face-to-face negotiations. With the participation of veteran officials from the U.S., Korea and Europe who were part of these historic events, the conference explored the period beginning with the improvement of relations between the two Koreas that led to the historic North-South Joint Communiqu of July 4, 1972, through March 1974 when North Korea abandoned interKorean dialogue in order to seek a separate U.S.-DPRK treaty to replace the Korean War armistice. The conference also studied the reactions of the two Koreas to the SinoU.S. opening, the abduction of dissident-turned-president of the Republic of Korea, Kim Dae-Jung, the Korea question in the United Nations, and a host of other issues affecting inter-Korean, U.S.-Korean, and Sino-DPRK relations during this period.
VI
The conference was yet another co-production of an extraordinarily successful and close partnership between the Center and the University of North Korean Studies, one of Koreas leading academic institutions headed by President Park Jae-Kyu. We are tremendously grateful to President Park and his colleagues for their expertise, institutional support and cooperation. The conference would also not have been possible without the generous support of the Korea Foundation, led by President Kim Byung-kook. The transcript of the discussions will in itself be a unique historical source for scholars and the public in both Korea and the United States. Though the discussions focused on events dating back nearly four decades, their legacies confront American and Korean policymakers today. We hope that the proceedings will contribute to an informed dialogue on U.S.-Korean and inter-Korean relations, past and future. Jane Harman Director, President, and CEO Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
VII
Executive Summary
In July 2010, the Woodrow Wilson Centers History & Public Policy Program (North Korea International Documentation Project) and the University of North Korean Studies convened their second in a series of critical oral history conferences at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC. For the first and perhaps last time, a group of veteran diplomatic and intelligence officials from the Republic of Korea, the United States, and the former communist bloc, all active in Korean affairs in the early 1970s, assembled with a small group of scholars in an effort to provide context to, and fill gaps in the available documentary record. The Rise and Fall of Dtente on the Korean Peninsula, 1970-1974 is the result of that historic conference and features extended and probing discussions on the rise and demise of the inter-Korean dialogue, South Koreas changing relationship with the United States, and North Koreas position within the communist bloc during the era of dtente. The Rise and Fall of Dtente on the Korean Peninsula, 1970-1974 features the transcript of the conference discussions and a selection of primary source documents. The proceedings revealed the following findings: South Korean leaders were concerned that after the United States-China rapprochement in the early 1970s, Washington might also unilaterally seek rapprochement with North Korea. These concerns factored prominently into Seouls decision to engage Pyongyang directly. After determining that the prosperity gap between the two Koreas was widening, in South Koreas favor, President Park Chung Hee suggested holding discussions on a rota-
VIII
tional basis in Seoul and Pyongyang, to make the North Korean leadership aware of the Souths growing affluence; North Korean leader Kim Il Sung entered into dialogue with Seoul believing that South Korea was ripe for revolution, and that, much like North Vietnam, the North would ultimately prevail over the South; Korean Central Intelligence Agency Chief Lee Hurak played an influential role in the decision to strengthen presidential authority in South Korea under the Yushin system possibly more so than President Park Chung Hee. Twenty-two documents, obtained from archives in South Korea, Hungary, Romania, (East) Germany, Bulgaria, Albania, and the United States accompany the conference transcript and provide additional context and evidence on this period in inter-Korean, U.S.-Korean, and DPRK-Socialist bloc relations. Among the most noteworthy documents in the collection are newly obtained and translated conversation between Kim Il Sung and foreign heads of state, including Romanias Nicolae Ceauescu and Bulgarias Todor Zhivkov. In his 1971 conversation with Ceauescu, Kim Il Sung described his new policy of peaceful reunification, premised on the belief that South Korea was on the verge of revolution. In his 1973 conversation with Zhivkov, the North Korean leader expressed his frustrations with Chinese foreign and domestic policies.
IX
PARTICIPANTS
Participants
EYEWITNESSES
DANIEL A. ODONOHUE entered the U.S. Foreign Service in 1957 and spent much of his early career in Korean affairs. He was a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul from 1960 until 1964, handling both domestic and international issues including coordination with the United Nations Command.In the period 1964-66, Ambassador ODonohue was assigned to the Korea desk in the State Department Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. From 1972 until 1974, he was political counselor in the United States Embassy in Seoul, followed by two yearsas office director for Korean affairs in the State Department (1974-76). In 1968, Ambassador ODonohue was a member of the Vance party sent to Seoul immediately after the Pueblo/Blue House incidents. Ambassador ODonohues other assignments included Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and PacificAffairs (1981-83-dealing mainly with Southeast Asia);Ambassador to Burma (1983-87) and Thailand (1988-91), as well as principal deputy director of the State Department Policy Planning staff (1987-88). KIM DASOOL was the person at the South Korean Red Cross in charge of the
inter-Korean dialogues of the 1970s. He was the team supervisor when the NorthSouth Red Cross Conference first took place at Panmunjeom in September of 1971. When the North and South Korean Red Cross Conference was going back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang, he served as an overseer of the conference as a whole as the Head of the Office of the South-North Dialogue and the Inter-Korean Red Cross Conference Representative.
LEE DONGBOK is a former member of the Republic of Koreas National
Assembly (1996-2000) and a visiting professor at the College of Law and Political Science at Myongji University. Mr. Lee began his career as a political reporter
for The Hankook Ilbo (1958-1971), followed by a career of playing a key role in the formulation and execution of South Koreas policy toward North Korea and national unification in varying capacities. Dr. Lee served as a member of the North-South Red Cross Talks (1971-1972), spokesman for the North-South Coordinating Committee (1972-1982), Director-General for North-South Dialogue at the National Unification Board (1980-1982), Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (1991-1992) and Special Assistant to the Director of the National Security Planning Agency (1991-1993).Having participated in many of the past rounds of negotiations between the two Koreas as a key member of the Southern delegations, Mr. Lee was instrumental in producing a number of major inter-Korean agreements, including the North-South Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, and the North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange and Cooperation as well as the North-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, both of which went into effect as of February 19, 1992.
GEORGI MITOV is a retired Bulgarian foreign ministry officer with thirty years of diplomatic experience. During his tenure, Mr. Mitov occupied a number of positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His assignments abroad included missions to Pyongyang, Islamabad, Odessa, and Seoul. Mr. Mitov was appointed Third, and later Second Secretary at the Bulgarian Embassy in Pyongyang during 1966-1969 and 1973-1975 respectively, and in 1990 opened the Bulgarian Embassy in Seoul, serving as a Charge dAffaires. He holds a degree in history from Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang and has attended the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. B. DONOVAN PICARD is a partner with Picard Kentz & Rowe. His areas of
practice include International Trade and Investment, International Arbitration, Litigation and Dispute Resolution, and Public and Private International Law. After service in Vietnam (1967-69) and Japan (1969-71), Mr. Picard was assigned
XI
PARTICIPANTS
to cover Korea in the Department of States Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and began that assignment with several months assignment temporary duty assignment (TDY) in Seoul during the Pak/Kim Dae-jung election campaign. In 1972, Picard moved from INR to the Office of Korean Affairs, with particular responsibility for North Korea. He spent the summer of 1973 again on TDY in Seoul during the initial North-South Red Cross discussions and the U.N. General Assembly Korea debate. Mr. Picard has been in private practice since leaving the US Department of State.
WARD THOMPSON is a U.S. Marine Corp Vietnam veteran and holds de-
grees from Brown University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. His Foreign Service career specialty was the Nordic Countries, where he was political counselor at embassies in Helsinki and Copenhagen and consul general in Gothenburg. He also served at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul as political officer in 1972-75, following one year of Korean language training. He focused on ROK external relations, including the UN, on North-South contacts and on U.S. military concerns and, as a language officer, met with people throughout Korea to contribute to the Embassys understanding of domestic developments. This experience served him well in his later assignment as Director of the State Departments Office of Human Rights Policy.
SCHOLARS
GREGG A. BRAZINSKY is associate professor of history and international
affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Professor Brazinsky is pursuing research on various projects, including a study of SinoU.S. competition in the Third World. His publications include Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy (University of North Carolina Press, 2007). Brazinsky also serves as co-director of the George Washington University Cold War Group and as senior advisor to NKIDP.
XII
JAMES HERSHBERG is associate professor of history and international affairs at The George Washington Universitys Elliott School of International Affairs, and former director of the Cold War International History Project from 19911996. His expertise is in the international history of the Cold War, contemporary international relations, and nuclear history. Hershberg received the 1994 Stuart Bernath Prize from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. His work has appeared in the following publications: the Journal of Cold War Studies, Cold War History, Diplomatic History, the Journal of American History, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and the CWIHP Bulletin. Hershberg is the author of James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age. He holds a Ph.D. from Tufts University, an M.A. from Columbia, and a B.A. from Harvard. HONG SEUKRYULE is assistant professor in the history department at Sungshin
Womens University in Seoul, and an advisor for the Republic of Koreas Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Prof. Hong holds a Ph.D. in Korean History from Seoul National University, and has also spent time as a visiting researcher at the University of Maryland at College Park (1999-2000). He specializes in the modern history of Korea, and specifically, U.S.-ROK and inter-Korean relations during the Park Chung Hee administration. Prof. Hongs publications include The Unification Issue and Socio-political Tension in South Korea: 1953-1961(Seoul University Press. 2001), as well as Pueblo Incident in 1968 and U.S.-ROK-DPRK Triangular Relations, The Journal of Korean History (2001), and US-DPRK Relations in the early 1970s, The Korean Journal of International Relations (2004).
CHRISTINE KIM is an assistant professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service of Georgetown University, where she teaches courses on modern Korean and East Asian history. Her research focuses on the relationship between culture and politics in the formation of national identity. She is presently completing a manuscript about the significance of the Joseon (1392-1910) monarchy in twentieth century Korea entitled The King Is Dead, and has forthcoming articles in the Journal of Asian Studies and Collective Memory in Northeast Asia (PalgraveMacmillan). Her next project looks at cultural properties (munhwajae) as an attribute of Koreanness. Kim received her Ph.D. from Harvard in 2004.
XIII
PARTICIPANTS
KATHARINE H.S. MOON is Professor in the Department of Political
Science at Wellesley College. Moon is the author of Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations (Columbia University, 1997; Korean edition by Sam-in Publishing Co., 2002) and other publications on the U.S.-Korea alliance and social movements in Korea and Asia (e.g., democratization, womens movements, migrant workers, human rights). They are available in edited volumes and academic journals such as Asian Survey and The Journal of Asian Studies and Korean publications such as Changjak-gwa Bipyeong,and Dangdae Bipyeong. Currently, Moon is completing a book manuscript Protesting America, Pursuing Democracy: Korean Civil Society in Alliance Politics (forthcoming, GAIA/University of California Press).Moon received her Ph.D. from Princeton University, Department of Politics.
CHRISTIAN F. OSTERMANN is the director of European Studies and the History and Public Policy Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center, as well as director of the Centers North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) and Cold War International History Project (CWIHP). He is also co-editor, along with Christopher E. Goscha, of the recently published Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962 (2010). Before joining the Wilson Center in January 1997 as associate director of CWIHP, he worked as a research fellow at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and repository based at the George Washington University. He is a co-editor of Cold War History (London), and a Senior Research Fellow, National Security Archive (George Washington University). He also served as a lecturer in history and international affairs at the George Washington University and professorial lecturer at Georgetown University. He has been a consultant on several historical documentaries. Prior to coming to Washington, he studied in Bonn, Cologne and Hamburg and was a research fellow at the Commission for the History of Parliament and Political Parties, Bonn (Germany).
XIV
JAMES F. PERSON is coordinator of the Wilson Centers NKIDP and a pro-
gram associate with the Wilson Centers History and Public Policy Program. Person is currently completing a Ph.D. in history at the George Washington University, writing a dissertation on North Koreas relations with the Soviet Union and China from 1953-1967. His publications include We Need Help from Outside: The North Korean Opposition Movement of 1956 (CWIHP Working Paper No. 52) and New Evidence on North Korea in 1956 (CWIHP Bulletin 16).
RYOO KIL-JAE is an associate professor at the University of North Korean
Studies (UNKS) in South Korea, and a former Woodrow Wilson Center public policy scholar. He is currently studying the domestic politics and foreign relations of the DPRK from 1965-1974. Now he is a member of the Policy Advisory Committee to the senior secretary of the President, and to the Ministry of Unification of the ROK government. Professor Ryoo is also the chair of the Committee of North Korea and Unification, Korean Association of International Studies.
BERND SCHAEFER is a senior scholar with the Woodrow Wilson
International Centers Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and a former public policy scholar at that Center. He is completing a book East Asian Communism and the Superpowers, 1968-1976 for publication in the Centers Cold War Series with Stanford University Press. He was a Visiting Professor with the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, a Fellow at the Nobel Institute in Oslo, and a Research Fellow with the German Historical Institute in Washington D.C. and the Technical University of Dresden. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Halle in Germany and an MPA from the Harvard Kennedy School. His publications include North Korean Unification Policy, 1971-1975 (CWIHP, Washington D.C. 2010);); North Korean Adventurism and Chinas Long Shadow, 1966-1972 (CWIHP, Washington D.C. 2004); Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: Global and European Responses (Cambridge University Press, New York 2009; ed. with Carole Fink); and The East German State and the Catholic Church, 1945-1989 (Berghahn Books, New York 2010).
XV
PARTICIPANTS
SHIN JONG-DAE is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies,
Seoul and a former Woodrow Wilson Center public policy scholar. Prof. Shins current research focuses on North Koreas foreign relations and inter-Korean relations in the 1970s. His numerous publications include Principal Issues of South Korean Society and State Control (co-author) (Yonsei University, 2005); and Theory of Inter-Korean Relations (co-author) (Hanul, 2005).
WILLIAM STUECK received his Ph.D. in history from Brown University in 1977. He has written widely on U.S.-Korean relations and the early Cold War. Among his books are The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, 1995) and Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton, 2002). He is currently a distinguished research professor of history at the University of Georgia. SUN JOUNYUNG is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies,
Seoul, and is also currently the vice-president and CEO of the United Nations Association for the Republic of Korea. Ambassador Sun served as vice minister of foreign affairs and trade, deputy foreign minister for trade, and South Koreas ambassador to the United Nations, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia.
SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR. is a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. A specialist on international security affairs, he has published widely on U.S. strategy and transatlantic relations. He was a co-editor and a contributor to The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the Shaping of the New Europe (2006). His latest publication is with Sherrill B. Wells, Germanys Choice of Shared Sovereignty in the European Union in Richard Rosecrance, Ernest R. May, and Zara Steiner (eds.), History and Neorealism (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). WOO SEONG-JI is currently an associate professor at the College of
International Studies, Kyung Hee University. He worked as an assistant professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of
XVI
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea from March 2003 to February 2005. He also worked as a Research Fellow for the Center for International Studies, Seoul National University from August 2002 to August 2003. Dr. Woo received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, Bloomington. His English articles include The Park Chung Hee Administration amid Inter-Korean Reconciliation in the Dtente Period: Changes in the Threat Perception, Regime Characteristics, and the Distribution of Power (Korea Journal, Summer 2009), Triangle Research and Understanding Northeast Asian Politics (Asian Perspective, Summer 2003), South Koreas Search for a Unification Strategy (Orbis, Summer 2003), and Adversarial Engagement and Alliance Relations: Triangular Politics on the Korean Peninsula, 198894 (Issues & Studies, March 2001). His research interests are North Korean politics, inter-Korean relations and international relations theory. Currently his research focuses on the dynamics of inter-Korean reconciliation processes in the early 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s.
YAFENG XIA is an associate professor of history at Long Island University in
New York, a guest professor at the Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University in Shanghai, and Wilson Center Fellow. He is the author of Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-72 (2006). His articles have appeared in Journal of Cold War Studies, Diplomacy & Statecraft, The International History Review, The Chinese Historical Review, Diplomatic History, Cold War History, among others. He was a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2010.
XVII
Chronology
1970
9 15
July / The Nixon administration ofcially announces the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from the Republic of Korea.
August / ROK President Park Chung Hee proposes a new unication policy beginning with a discussion of humanitarian issues peaceful competition with North Korea in his Liberation Day Speech. December /ROK President Park Chung Hee appoints Lee Hurak as the Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).
19
1971
8-14 12
April / At the Fifth Session of the Fourth Supreme Peoples Assembly, DPRK Foreign Minister Heo Dam announces the DPRKs Eight Points on unication. August / Choe Duseon, president of the South Korean Red Cross,
proposes a meeting between North and South Korean representatives to discuss the reunication of divided families. August /The North Korean Red Cross accepts Choe Duseons proposal.
14
XVIII
20 20
September /The rst round of preliminary Red Cross negotiations began between North and South Korea.
November /Jeong Hongjin of the KCIA met with Korean Workers Party member Kim Deokhyeon, opening up a new line of communication between the governments of North and South Korea.
1972
10
January /Kim Il Sung proposes a peace treaty between North and South Korea.
10-22 2-5 21 4
March /A series of preliminary conferences are held in Panmunjeom between North and South Korean representatives to discuss high-level ofcial visits. May /KCIA Director Lee Hurak meets with Korean Workers Party member Kim Deokhyn in Seoul to discuss unication.
June /Kim Il Sung reveals to Washington Post correspondent Selig S. Harrison that he is willing to sign a peace treaty with South Korea.
July /The DPRK and ROK issues a Joint Communiqu, paving the way for the formation of the North-South Coordinating Committee cochaired by Kim Yeongju and Lee Hurak.
XIX
30 13
August / First Plenary Red Cross Talks involving representatives from North and South Korea open in Pyongyang.
September /Second Plenary Red Cross Talks involving representatives from North and South Korea open in Seoul. October /North and South Korean representatives attend the Third Plenary Red Cross Talks.
22-26 3
November /Lee Hurak meets with Kim Il Sung to discuss reunication and other issues. November /North and South Korean representatives attend the Fourth Plenary Red Cross Talks in Seoul. November /Meeting of the North-South Coordinating Committee opens in Seoul. December /A heavily rigged plebiscite approvs ROK President Park Chung Hees Yushin Constitution. December /A new constitution is ratied in North Korea, making Kim Il Sung President of the DPRK.
13
30 27 28
XX
1973
14-16 12-14 23 8
March /Second meeting of the North-South Coordinating Committee is held in Pyongyang. North Korea again proposes a peace treaty with South Korea, but South Korea rejects the proposal in favor of building trust between the Koreas. June /Third meeting of the North-South Coordinating Committee is held in Seoul.
June /ROK President Park Chung Hee announces the Seven-Point Declaration for Peace and Unication. DPRK President Kim Il Sung shortly announces his own Five-Point Policy for National Reunication. August /Opposition candidate Kim Dae-jung is abducted by the KCIA in Tokyo. August /North Korea suspends meetings of the North-South Coordinating Committee allegedly in response to Kim Dae-jungs kidnapping.
28 23 11
October /A DPRK gunboat and torpedo boat crosses the Northern Limit Line (NLL). By the end of 1973, DPRK vessels cross the NLL on forty-three different occasions.
December /Three DPRK torpedo boats attempt to intimidate United Nations Command (UNC) vessels escorting a routine supply ship to Baengnyeong Island near the NLL. DPRK vessels continue to intrude upon the Northwest Islands over the next several days.
XXI
WARD THOMPSON
Opening Remarks
by
Christian F. Ostermann and Ambassador Sun Jounyung
SUN: The Korean Peninsula has been a source of tension and instability since the Korean War began in 1950. The study of history and a re-examination of events on the Korean Peninsula, however, may help us to resolve some of the problems that Korea is facing today and even to establish peace between North and South Korea in the future. Today, the Wilson Center is hosting the second Critical Oral History Conference on the Korean Peninsula. I am very happy to say that many of the key officials directly involved in the formulation and execution of policies during the 1970s have assembled here today to offer their testimonies, to fill in some of the missing pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, and to provide greater clarity as to what happened during the era of inter-Korean dialogue and dtente. I am very grateful to the veterans for their participation in this conference. OSTERMANN: Thank you very much, Ambassador Sun. Several years ago, Ambassador Sun, if I recall correctly, argued that we should complement our focus on collecting, translating, and publishing documents on North Korea with oral history. The documents, of course, only tell you part of the story. In the case of Korea specifically, historical documents are limited in quantity. Even in the United States, where we have a greater number of materials available because of more liberal declassification polices, there are still gaps and white pages in the historical record. It is through oral history, through interviews, and through critical oral history, however, that we can begin to fill in those gaps in the historical record. Critical oral history is a particular form of oral history. Oral history is usually conducted by interview between one scholar and one veteran policymaker or eyewit-
OPENING REMARKS
This is very much a historical conference.

Its also a historic conference. It is highly unlikely that this group will come together ever again. So today we have a very unique opportunity to reconstruct history, history that will most likely be lost if its not captured here today,
ness. But for critical oral history conferences, we bring as many eyewitnesses from as many sides as possible together with expert scholars and documents. The focus of critical oral history is the eyewitness: the policy, intelligence, and diplomatic veterans from all sides of the event. Obviously we cant have North Korean eyewitnesses here today, but our dream is that someday we also will have them at the table. The eyewitnesses are of crucial importance to this exercise. Sometimes our eyewitnesses are afraid that they will be criticized if they attend these events because this is a critical oral history conference. That is not what critical means in this context. This exercise is not about criticizing anybody. Critical in this case means having documents available; critical in the sense that we hope to really try to get back to the events now several decades past, put ourselves back in the shoes of those who had to live through those times, who had to make policy decisions at the time, and to try to understand the events through their eyes, through their recollections. The documents are critical in that they will both stimulate memories among the eyewitnesses and also provide a check on recollections. This is a serious historical exercise. We will record and transcribe the discussion here and enlarge the historical record. And to make the transcript of this conference as valuable to future generations of historians as possible, it is important for the eyewitnesses to be as specific, as concrete as possible. The documents, I hope, will allow us to do just that. And finally, we also have our scholars, our experts, scattered around the table here. Unlike at a normal scholarly conference, the scholars dont take center stage. They are here largely to listen to the eyewitnesses and in-between pose some questions. The scholars, of course, know the gaps in the historical record and their questions will hopefully prompt, guide, and inspire us to talk about those gaps in the archival record. This is very much a historical conference. Its also a historic conference. It is highly unlikely that this group will come together ever again. So today we have a very unique opportunity to reconstruct history, history that will most likely be lost if its not captured here today, and so we very much appreciate your willingness to contribute to this event. Let me just also say that to the veterans, to the eyewitnesses here today, what we hope you will be able to do is to really go back in time to the early 1970s and forget what youve learned about the events between then and now. We hope for
a lively conversation between the scholars and the veterans. Ideally even between the veterans without much input from the scholars. We are interested in really recapturing what it felt like, what your views were at the time, what decisions and actions were taken, fully realizing that at the time your knowledge of the future, and even your view of what was happening then, was incomplete, was only one piece of a larger puzzle. We are not interested in a lot of prepared statements. Nobody here, not the scholars, not the eyewitnesses, we hope, will give long monologues. We really want to wrestle with a number of issues that have been so far unresolved in history. In order to focus our attention on some of these gaps, we will have two scholars at the beginning of each session. We call them provocateurs who will pose some of the questions that we would like to address during this conference. The eyewitnesses should not feel limited to just those questions, but any insightful information on the subject would be very helpful. Let me in closing thank and acknowledge a number of institutions and people who worked really hard to make this event happen. Let me first thank the Korea Foundation, which has long supported the North Korea International Documentation Project. Let me also acknowledge the support from the Wilson Centers leadership in the lead-up to this conference. Let me thank again our partners at the University of North Korean Studies for what has become a really wonderful friendship and partnership over the years. The fact that we all are coming together around this table today, I think, is due to the fact that we have really developed this amazing partnership with the University of North Korea Studies. Last but not least, let me thank my staff for the heroic effort in putting together this conference. At this end, first and foremost, James Person, who coordinates the North Korea International Documentation Project, but also Kristina Terzieva and Timothy McDonnell, and then a host of interns, including Scott LaFoy, Will Treece, Yong Kwon, and Wandi Huang. I would also like to thank Dean Oulett and Min Heeseon from the University of North Korean Studies. Thank you all for your efforts. Finally, Id like to thank the interpreters for the translations they will provide us over the next day and a half. Thank you.
AMBASSADOR DANIEL ODONOHUE
Panel I
Inter-Korean Dialogue in the Era of Dtente
Chair: Christian Ostermann Provocateurs: Bernd Schaefer, Hong Seukryule
During the first panel, we are supposed to talk about Inter-Korean Dialogue in the Era of Dtente. When we talk about the early 1970s, of course, the major global current was dtente: talks and negotiations between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and, on the other hand, after 1971, the rapprochement between the United States and China. The other major communist powers in Asia besides North Korea had a major impact on dtente. Obviously, the Vietnam War made the United States more conducive to talks with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was less interested in talking to the United States in order to avoid an escalation in Vietnam. And then, of course, China had a major impact on dtente for two reasons. First of all, China was perceived by the Soviet Union after 1969 increasingly as a major threat to Soviet interests, which made the Soviet Union more interested in talking to the U.S. and to contain China. China, which started a dialogue with the United States in 1971, also facilitated dtente in a certain way. Now in this global context, the two Korean states seem to be on the receiving end, and this is what we want to talk about. So I will try to lay out about five major issues we will want to talk about throughout the entire conference, but especially during this first panel. First, were the two Korean states, both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), more reactive when it came to dtente in the early 1970s? Did the Koreas react to outside currents, or were they proactive? Did the Koreas start some of these initiatives
SCHAEFER:
PANEL I: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE IN THE ERA OF DTENTE
ZHOU ENLAI AND RICHARD NIXON
on their own, independent of international events, or were they influenced by international events? The second major question deals with the inter-Korean talks. Were the actions both in South Korea and North Korea related to each other? Initiatives from both North and South Korea started more or less simultaneously in 1971, but the question is who started first. Did they react to each other or did they act more independently of each other? Were the initiatives from the Koreas related, or were they unrelated? The third interesting question is what motivated North and South Korea? Why were they interested in starting inter-Korean dialogue? Were they sincerely interested in Korean unification at that time? What were the motives of the North Korean side? What were the motives of the South Korean side? Was it mostly economic or was it mostly political, or were there maybe ulterior motives on both sides? The fourth question concerns the roles of the allies. Were the allies encouraging their respective Korean partner to engage in inter-Korean dialogue? Were they rather discouraging them? Were the allies skeptical or were they optimistic? Finally, I think it would be very helpful if all the eyewitnesses and speakers would try to address the role of China, because I think this is a crucial player throughout the entire period for two reasons. China, of course, was at that time the most important ally of North Korea. They were extremely close. But China also started rapprochement with the United States, which also had a major effect on South Korea. So the question would be whether the role of China, and particularly the rapprochement between the United States and China, had an impact on North Koreas decision to start to engage in inter-Korean dialogue and whether it had an impact also on South Koreas decision to actually conduct this dialogue. I think the role of China comes together during the Nixon visit to Beijing in 1972. The questions to the South Korean side of course would be: were you very concerned that the West would strike a deal with China behind the Koreas backs? With regard to North Korea, we know that a North Korean delegation was in Beijing during the Nixon visit and hoped to have a chance to talk to the U.S. If not, the North Koreans were interested in having China act as a mediator for North Korean interests and negotiate on North Koreas behalf. So the role of China, the impact of China, and the impact of rapprochement, I think, would
LEE DONGBOK
be something which I would like all of the eyewitnesses, whether from Korea, Bulgaria, or the United States, to address. Thank you.
HONG: Mr. Schaefer spoke rather broadly, so I would like to ask some more specific questions. First, when it comes to inter-Korean dialogue, were there any hardliners opposed to these talks? On August 12, 1972, the head of the Red Cross in South Korea, Mr. Choe Duseon, made a suggestion that there should be a meeting for the divided families in North and South Korea. This suggestion provided the impetus for dialogue between the two Koreas. Now, on August 6, six days prior to the announcement by the Red Cross, [Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency] Lee Hurak met with [U.S.] Ambassador Philip Habib and informed him that South Korea will not have dialogue with North Korea. Any type of contact with North Korea requires serious consideration from South Korea. At the meeting with the ambassador, Mr. Lee had told him that the Ministry of the Judiciary as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been consulted on the matter. But it is apparent that Mr. Lee had not consulted with the Ministry of Defense, because the Ministry of Defense was opposed to idea of talks. This was the understanding that the U.S. side had at the time. So my question is, during inter-Korean dialogue, what position or stance was taken by the leaders of the defense sector? My second question is what happened in North Korea? My understanding is that the North Korean military was also against the idea of dialogue. It appears from the documentation that Mr. Lee had spoken to Ambassador Habib, and that Ambassador Habib had indicated that there were hardliners as well as soft-liners in North Korea. Mr. Lees comments gave the impression that that Kim Il Sung was a soft-liner and was under pressure from the hardliners in the military. So my
question is directed to the eyewitnesses, Lee Dongbok and Kim Dasool? How did you feel about the situation in North Korea at the time? Another question I have is about the peace treaty. In March of 1974, North Korea suggested to the U.S. that there should be a peace treaty between the U.S. and North Korea. But the question remains, prior to that, was a peace treaty between South and North Korea ever discussed? Was a peace treaty supposed to be signed after the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the peninsula? We know that there was an official venue in which the suggestion for a peace treaty was made in March of 1971, during the second meeting between North and South Korea. Was a peace treaty ever suggested prior to that? How did the eyewitnesses feel about a peace treaty with North Korea? Did you ever hear that North Korea did indeed want a peace Treaty? What was the South Korean governments reaction to North Koreas suggestion for a peace treaty? We have veteran diplomats on the U.S. side as well, and what I would like to hear from them is how the U.S. reacted to the peace treaty offer by North Korea in the March of 1974? I will have the honor to respond first, and I will try to be as succinct as possible while responding to these questions. First, Mr. Schaefer, you asked whether the ROK and the DPRK were reactive or proactive at the time dialogue was initiated. I think my answer is that the ROK was more reactive whereas the DPRK was more proactive. Secondly, were inter-Korean talks interactive or unrelated? Was that your question? I think South Korea and North Korea had different objectives at the start of the dialogue in early 1970, so I assume that inter-Korean dialogue was unrelated.
LEE: STUECK: The question was whether the two Korean states reacted to each other. Or were they two different streets, one going on in South Korea and one in North Korea and then meeting at some point, or whether one was starting and the other responding. LEE:
Yes, I understand your question. The two Koreas were singing two different tunes and dancing to two different tunes at the same time, so they were rather
unrelated rather than interactive. South Korea had a different objective than the North, so the initiatives were more unrelated than interactive. The two Koreas had different motives. South Korea had concerns about security because of the turn of events in the international theater, including the process of dtente which had been launched by the United States, particularly after Richard Nixons Guam Doctrine. And the concern grew very conspicuously on the part of South Korea about what the security situation was going to be like as the U.S. dtente policy was taking shape. North Korea was more motivated by optimism because of what they saw in the context of the PRCs takeover of the mainland China, followed by the success of military operations in Indochina. The United States seemed to be losing. And while Kim Il Sung had come to power ahead of both China and North Vietnam, now China and Vietnam seemed to be moving faster than Korea. Kim felt rather restive because North Korea was lagging behind. At the same time, Kim was more optimistic because the United States was viewed as being on the losing end of things. Kim was upbeat and trying to take advantage of this situation for North Koreas benefit. Kim Il Sung thought that this dialogue [with the South] would help North Korea to pursue unification, while South Korea was concerned about security. That is how I viewed the situation. And you know, the fourth question, if I understand it correctly, I think that at that time, South Korea was more ill at ease working with allies, particularly with the United States. The United States was obviously trying to retreat from Asia. By contrast, North Korea was quite upbeat because of Chinas rise and also because of the situation in Indochina and what looked to be a victory for North Vietnam. So South Korea had more problems with its allies, at least when compared with North Korea. The role of China at that time was reserved and passive. For example, Kim Il Sung made a visit to China in April 1975 right in the wake of the fall of Phnom Penh to the [Cambodian] communist army. Kim Il Sung was very upbeat and tried to trumpet the Korean Peninsula as the area next in line for communist conquest. So Kim Il Sung made a very provocative remark at a dinner hosted by the Chinese State Council one day in April of 1975 in which he spoke about his preparedness to go to war if necessary and achieve unification. But the Chinese
South Korea was more ill at ease working

with allies, particularly with the United States. The United States was obviously trying to retreat from Asia. By contrast, North Korea was quite upbeat because of Chinas rise and also because of the situation in Indochina and what looked to be a victory for North Vietnam.
were very reluctant to allow that. The Chinese were obviously seen as trying to play down Kim Il Sungs plans. At that time, China was busier mending its relationship with the United States than it was sympathetic to Kim Il Sungs wishes. Related to Dr. Hongs points, I doubt if during the early 1970s, as South Korea began reaching out to North Korea for inter-Korean dialogue, there was any such schism between hardliners and soft-liners in the government. I think that was when President Parks control over all of the government was very secure and I dont think there was any room for that kind of a schism or differences to develop. And Lee Hurak was quite seriously taking things to the president, so much so that the president was able to prevail upon all sectors of the government, so much so that I dont believe there was that kind of a schism. I read in the documents of [Ambassador William J.] Porter having listened to what Lee Hurak had to tell him, but I think Lee Hurak was trying to, I mean he was, as I recall, he was handling his communication with the United States in such a way that he tried to make sure that he would secure maximum support from the United States. I remember him talking to Ambassador Porter and also [John H.] Richardson, who was the CIA station chief, and Lee Hurak was very careful in selecting his words and way of explaining things, but I dont think he was serious if he projected an image of the South Korean government in a state of division over how to handle North Korea. I really doubt that. And I doubt the MND [Ministry of National Defense] at the time was in a position to voice opposition to the South Korean government as it tried to open up dialogue. In the same vein, I have very strong doubts about whether North Korea was that much of a divided house. North Korea more so than South Korea because of the fact that North Korea was under the Partys control. And when you talk about Party control, it was the control exercised personally by the Great Leader, so I doubt if there was any room for any element in the military to hold that kind of a different view on South Korea. About the peace treaty, North Korea began talking about it long before 1973. It was terminology which began to surface at the extension of the Geneva Conference in 1954. North Korea at times talked about it in the context of a North-South peace treaty, but most other times North Korea kept on talking about it in the context of U.S.-North Korea peace treaty. When they spoke of the peace treaty,
10
however, it was not actually the peace treaty itself. They always tried to talk about preconditions leading to the peace treaty, so much so that we were unable to discuss the peace treaty because North Koreans were always coming up with preconditions. It was more the preconditions than the peace treaty itself that they [the North Koreans] insisted on talking about. So there was actually no way for us to talk about the peace treaty. That is very helpful. I would like to give Mr. Kim the opportunity to comment as well, but, Bill Stueck, you had an immediate follow-up question for Professor Lee.
SUN: STUECK: One of your comments really struck me and that was Kim Il Sungs visit to China in April of 1975. Did you know at the time that Kim Il Sung made this comment at a dinner and if so how did you know? I have been told by a Chinese scholar, who I trust totally, that he has seen a document from that trip on the Chinese side in which Kim Il Sung actually proposed to Mao Zedong and even solicited support for a North Korean attack on South Korea. Did you know this at the time and if not how did you find out? LEE:
KIM IL SUNG AND MAO ZEDONG
Somehow that portion of Kim Il Sungs remarks reached us almost immediately following his visit to China. I think it should have been through some third party context. And you are right, Kim Il Sung very specifically suggested that it was time for North Korea to pursue unification. But Zhou Enlai was very outspoken in trying to play him down, saying that this is something which you have to think very seriously about as long as the United States maintains its troops in South Korea. So China was very negative in contrast to Kim Il Sungs upbeat mood. Thank you, now weve already jumped ahead quite a bit. In this session Id really like us to think back to the beginnings of inter-Korean dialogue and set the stage for the events as they unfold.
OSTERMANN:
11
Kim Il Sung apologized for the January 21, 1968 incident.

This was the incident where the North Koreans actually attacked the Blue House, attempting to assassinate the president..
I will address the question from Professor Hong about hardliners first. First of all, I think there were hardliners and soft-liners in both North Korea and in South Korea. Now, the suggestion for the reunion of the divided families came during the Park regime. President Park had to think quite long and hard before he made the suggestion. I think the suggestion was made even in spite of the fact that he [Park] had enough knowledge to know that there would be hardliners who would be against such a proposal. Lets talk about the people who make up the divided families. When you look into the composition of these people, you can see that most of these people are people who have migrated or were otherwise refugees from North Korea, so they do have their roots in North Korea and they held a lot of passion and hatred towards North Korea. You could say that these people are actually the hardliners themselves. So in my humble opinion, I think it was that there had been long and hard thoughts going into the decision to first suggest a reunion of the divided families. I think the resistance coming from the hardliners was anticipated ahead of time and was watered down by Park. I also served in the Korean CIA and the biggest mission that we had at the time was to stop the infiltration of North Korean spies. Now, even within the KCIA we had different opinions. For example, I was personally in favor of dialogue. However, there were people who were serving in other sections, such as the Counter Intelligence Section. These people were hardliners and they were against the idea of having talks. I think its important for us to remember that the hardliners in South Korea did not exist only within the military, but they were also within the population, including the people who were refugees and migrants from North Korea. And of course there were hardliners in North Korea as well. Director Lee [Hurak] had visited Pyongyang in May of 1972 and at the time he had met with Kim Il Sung. During the meeting, Kim Il Sung apologized for the January 21, 1968 incident. This was the incident where the North Koreans actually attacked the Blue House, attempting to assassinate the president. Kim Il Sungs apology came with the explanation that there were certain leftist forces within North Korea who caused this incident to occur and that it was not his own intention. Of course, we didnt buy that at all. We didnt think that an attack on South Korea like that could have been carried out without the approval of Kim Il Sung. However, the very fact that he [Kim] was able to bring about this type of exD. KIM:
12
cuse shows that there was a certain conflict within North Korea, at least between those who were for a stronger military and those for a stronger economy. Now when President Park initiated the dialogue between South and North Korea, the first official mention of such was on August 15, 1970. There was a presidential declaration in which he stated that we will start a dialogue with North Korea beginning with humanitarian issues first. Prior to the declaration, there had been on-going talks, and I think that the president had decided that, in light of the hardliner position against talks, it would be better to start with humanitarian issues first.
OSTERMANN: Professor Kim has a question, but could you just for the record let
When the Korean government was trying to nd a theme for interKorean dialogue,
it was important no one could actually
us know when you served at the KCIA? Yes, I joined the KCIA when the KCIA was formed in 1961, and I served in it until 1979.
D. KIM: C. KIM:
refuse the proposed theme. It had to be something that the U.S. could not refuse,
Im wondering if I could ask you to elaborate on the humanitarian issue that was included in the 1970 declaration. You mentioned, for example, that the focus on divided families was specifically targeted to undermine the hardliner approach. Could you explain how exactly that occurred? Was the focus on divided families an attempt to perhaps win popular support? Was there a need to marshal up popular support for that initiative outside of the government? In addition, I would like to ask whether there were other issues which had been considered besides the divided families. You mentioned that indeed this was a very strategic issue on the part of Park for political reasons. Were there other issues that had been considered but ultimately fell out of favor?
that the hardliners within South Korea could not refuse, and that North Korea could not refuse either. So the theme was reunions for the divided families.
D. KIM: There are three reasons why the divided family talks came first in our Red Cross attempts. The first one is really because there were the domestic hardliners who did not want to hold any talks at all between the Koreas. This was one way of sidestepping the hardliner position. The second part would be the Nixon Doctrine and the rapprochement between the U.S. and China. Korea was concerned at the time that perhaps Korea would become isolated as the U.S. became closer to
13
South Koreas decision

to go forward with the offer for dialogue in 1971 had very much to do with a reduced condence in the United States as a result of the Paris truce talks.
China. I think this was actually the precise reason why the inter-Korean dialogue began, because South Korea wanted to show the U.S. that it was able to talk directly with North Korea. The third factor considered by Park was that, when South Korea suggested that inter-Korean dialogue take place, it was important that North Korea could not refuse. We felt that the theme that would be most suitable was the divided families. As dtente was being carried out through the Nixon Doctrine, it was important for Korea to find ways to ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula. Korea felt that once there was a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula, there would not be any such guarantee for peace. So it was important that Korea, on its own, find a way to have an assurance of security. So at the time when the Korean government was trying to find a theme for inter-Korean dialogue, it was important no one could actually refuse the proposed theme. It had to be something that the U.S. could not refuse, that the hardliners within South Korea could not refuse, and that North Korea could not refuse either. So the theme was reunions for the divided families. Thats how we decided on that. Thats how I believe that came about. This was not for popularity or popular reasons. That would be a mistaken understanding.
OSTERMANN: Thank you very much. Very helpful. Bill Stueck and Professor Lee
both have follow-up questions.

STUECK: First, I think I know the answer to both of these questions, but just for reassurance. Number one, would you say that Parks moving forward with the dialogue with North Korea was tactical in terms of his relationship with North Korea? That is to say, it was not based on any idea that reunification was going to occur soon. And secondly, did he assume that all American troops were likely to withdraw from South Korea, say from within the decade of the 1970s? LEE:
I think I should say that South Koreas decision to go forward with the offer for dialogue in 1971 had very much to do with a reduced confidence in the United States as a result of the Paris truce talks.1 On the basis of what had transpired in the Paris Peace Talks, South Korea began feeling very ill at ease about the security
14
commitment that the United States had to South Korea. Then there was President Nixons Guam Doctrine, followed by Dr. Kissingers secret visit to Beijing, and followed by President Nixons trip to China. Now, many officials in the South Korean government, as well as in the private sector, became very worried about the possibility of some kind of political deal between Washington and Beijing about Korea, struck across our shoulders. So what were we supposed to counter this with? That brought about the need for the South Koreans to think about opening up an independent sector in terms of dialogue with North Korea. And when the government began thinking about dialogue with North Korea, it was not actually the humanitarian talks through the Red Cross. It was more talks about the political context. And as these needs arose in the minds of people in the South Korean government, North Korea was also moving, you know, with some overtures of dialogue as early as November and December 1970. We began hearing about some North Korean elements based in Tokyo trying to approach South Koreans, among them Mr. Jang Giyeong, who used to be deputy prime minister and economic minister in President Parks government and a former publisher of the Hankook Ilbo, one of the leading newspapers in South Korea. In his capacity as an IOC [International Olympic Committee] member, Jang had chances to expose himself to North Koreans at the time of the Winter Olympics. In the winter of 1970, Jang Gihyeong came to the KCIA in Seoul and reported to Mr. Lee Hurak that he had been approached by North Koreans in Tokyo, suggesting that he accept Kim Il Sungs invitation to visit Pyongyang. Jang Gihyeong asked Director Lee Hurak what he was supposed to do, and people in Seoul began wondering about whether North Korea was really trying to find a conduit toward South Korea. In 1971, as Mr. Kim observed, people in South Korea, particularly within the KCIA, began measuring different options for dialogue, but in the context that there had to be as little political risk as possible. So they came up with this idea of humanitarian talks, believing that it was going to be the least politically risky whether it was accepted by the North Koreans or not. And then in June, in the summer of that year, Prince Norodom Sihanouk [of Cambodia] paid a visit to Pyongyang and Kim Il Sung hosted a mass rally to welcome him. At the rally, Kim Il Sung spoke very extensively about the new developments between Washington
15
In 1971 people in South Korea,

particularly within the KCIA, began measuring different options for dialogue, but in the context that there had to be as little political risk as possible. So they came up with this idea of humanitarian talks, believing that it was going to be the least politically risky.
and Beijing, in the context of viewing Washington as surrendering to Beijing. And at that time, Kim Il Sung inserted in his two-hour long speech that he was willing to sit down with all South Korean political parties and social organizations as well as individuals including the Democratic Republican Party, which was the ruling party of South Korea. North Korea had been limited to sitting down with the South Korean regime, but his mentioning of the Democratic Republican Party was picked up by us, people in South Korea, whereas in the case of South Korea most of the major overtures in North Korea were reserved for the president to be spoken in certain commemorative speeches like one on August 15.2 August 15 was approaching and because of Kim Il Sungs remark at that rally, South Korea felt the need to preempt because of the opinion that North Koreans might speak of something on the occasion of the August 15 commemoration, so South Korea chose August 12, three days prior to August 15 to ask the president of the Korean Red Cross, Choe Duseon to come up with the Red Cross proposal. So when South Korea proposed Red Cross talks, it was proposed as a stepping stone leading to political dialogue with North Korea, which was later followed-up by the North-South Korean Committee meetings. That is what I think I can tell you.
D. KIM:
When the U.S. policy in Asia changed from the Truman Doctrine to the Nixon Doctrine, there were certain changes that were perceived by Asia. The first thing that had occurred was when the U.S. had rapprochement with China and the U.S. actually severed its relationship with Taiwan. And then, with the beginning of Nixon Doctrine, there was a withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula, from the size of 60,000 strong to 40,000. So 20,000 troops had been withdrawn. And also, when it came to the Vietnam War, the termination talks, the talks were held with the Liberation Front of the Viet Cong. At the time, North Korea was attempting to bring about unification by force on the Korean Peninsula, and, in South Korea, North Korea had planted certain movements, including the Liberation Front, Liberation through Revolution, and Peoples Revolution groups. So these groups were trying to subvert South Korea by force. So what concerned the South Korean government the most at the time was that when North Korea had attempted to unify the Peninsula through the Liberal Revolution War, or through the Liberation Front, the Korean government was
16
concerned that these infiltrating groups could be recognized as legitimate, groups that could be an object for discussion or talks with the U.S. This was what concerned South Korea the most at the time; that these guerilla groups could be recognized potentially by the U.S. So the biggest concern, I would say, was when the U.S. entered into dtente with China, and eventually if the U.S. were to normalize its relationship with China, then it was a definite possibility that the U.S. government could also enter into dtente with North Korea and perhaps even normalize its relationship with North Korea. That was a concern. What I have told you, I can be sure of because I actually witnessed this discussion taking place between the staff and the president. This was during the time when I was serving as a desk officer at the KCIA. I had gone to the Blue House to make a report and I saw them, the staff and the president [Park Chung Hee], holding this talk. So from the Korean governments perspective, a continued preservation of the regime was very importantthat there is a direct communication route with North Korea, because by letting the Nixon Doctrine run wildly in Asia, it was actually hurting the chance of permanent peace, as the government saw it, on the Korean Peninsula. And so I second Mr. Lee Dongboks thoughts that the discussion held between the Red Cross was really for political and military resolutions to the issues that we were facing on the Korean Peninsula. This was a way for us to explore the possibility of having peace on the Korean Peninsula.
OSTERMANN:
Bill Stueck again and then Dr. Hong and Ryoo Kihljae, three questions all immediately on the issues that we just discussed. I am impressed by the level of mistrust in Seoul of the United States. My sense from my research on the American side is that in fact there was serious consideration given in the United States to a withdrawal of all American troops in the early 1970s, looking forward, not immediately, but gradually, down to a point where there were only American Air Forces in Korea, which of course included atomic weapons and enough American troops to guard the bases. Were you aware of that as a possibility and if so how did you perceive it?
STUECK:
17
Beginning in the 1960s, President Park

had his slogan Economy First, Unication Second, so the economy came rst in his regime. But once the Nixon Doctrine was announced, it was necessary that South Korea change its slogan and its approach.
LEE:
The fact that the United States, in the context of a variety of contingency planning, was conducting considerations of those troop withdrawal possibilities, that was something which was known to many people in the South. However, during that timeframe, the South Korean government was very outspoken and opposed to the reduction of 20,000 troops out of the 60,000 troops. I dont think they were going as far as thinking about the possibility to have seen the bulk of U.S. troops withdrawn from South Korea. But that leads to the crisis in the U.S.Korean relationship during the early years of the Carter administration, at which time President Carter was committed to the troop withdrawal which led to such a critical phase in the relationship between the two countries. But as early as the early 1970s, it was more in the context of what Mr. Kim observed, that in the Peace Talks, the Viet Cong was accepted by the United States as a legitimate counterpart in the negotiations. Although I had not considered this, I agree with Mr. Kims suggestion that inside the South Korean government there were concerns that such underground ghost parties, phantom parties, phantom organizations like the Unification Revolutionary Party or other underground groups, might be, in due course, accepted by the United States as potential counterparts in negotiations. So Mr. Kim is now suggesting that inside the South Korean government there was the kind of need perceived to prevent this from happening by way of a possible opening-up a dialogue between the two Koreas. Mr. Kim, I would like to ask you a few further questions. If I understand you correctly, you were saying that the North and South Korea dialogue had taken place because: one, South Korea was trying to prevent China and the United States from dictating the destiny of South Korea by their own choices or choosing, and second, this was one way for South Korea to preempt the U.S. from having direct contact with North Korea. Is that correct?
HONG:
I dont believe prevention was the purpose because, beginning in the 1960s, we had a five-year economic plan that went into effect, and the economic plans into the 1970s were very successful. So in the 1970s I would say that South Korea finally had reached a point where South Korea was on par with North Korea as far as economic standing was concerned. And in order for South Korea
D. KIM:
18
to actually achieve that status and come to that stage, it was vital that there was security and military protection coming from the U.S., so it was a precondition that there should be U.S. security provided in order for South Korea to be economically prosperous. If security was somehow shaky, then this would mean that South Korea had to find a way to survive on its own. If you recall, beginning in the 1960s, President Park had his slogan Economy First, Unification Second, so the economy came first in his regime. But once the Nixon Doctrine was announced, it was necessary that South Korea change its slogan and its approach. So the new approach, I would say in a sum, was that there would be first a dialogue and economic construction and then other things to come after that. So what the Nixon Doctrine brought to and required of Korea and Asia was that there had to be independence and self-survival, basically meaning that the U.S. was no longer willing to be the police of the world and that each country was on its own. So for Korea, we had to find a way to be self-dependent. So as to your question Professor Hong, its not that South Korea was trying to prevent the U.S. from having contact with North Korea, this was not something we were trying to do, although I admit it would have been good if that had occurred, but we knew that this would not have been possible either, so what we were trying to do was to have a channel of communication with North Korea where we could talk directly with one another. I hope that was sufficient.
RYOO: I would like Mr. Kim and Mr. Lee to confirm certain facts that actually seem to be a bit contradictory in their testimonies. Who really initiated the dialogue between the two Koreas? From Mr. Kims testimony, I understand that it was South Korea that initiated the dialogue and that this was part of a grand strategy, that the South Koreans had that first there should be economy and then there should be a unification and that strategy had somehow changed to a certain degree and that this was requiring an initiation of dialogue by South Korea. From Mr. Lees testimony, however, I hear that the initiation may have been coming from the other side, in that South Korea was more of a reactive force rather than a proactive force and that the talks were initiated from certain contacts that were made in Tokyo during the winter of 1970. And so what really happened? Who was responsible for initiating the dialogue?
PAK SEONGCEHOL AND LEE HURAK
19
KIM DALSOOL
LEE:
I will be very short. The initiatives at that time were from both sides for different reasons. North Korea had proactive reasons whereas South Korea had reactive reasons, so in a larger context the initiatives came from both sides almost at the same time. When we reduce it to a smaller context, when we confine it to the initiation of Red Cross talks, well theres no question that South Korea initiated it when Choe Duseon made the proposal, to which North Korea reacted over the radio several days later afterwards. However, when North Korea responded, it was not in the form of either accepting or rejecting this South Korean offer. North Korea produced its own offer and said that it was sending an emissary to Panmunjeom, at which time South Korea decided to send an emissary likewise to Panmunjeom and found that North Korea was not necessarily directly responding to Choe Duseons proposal. They produced their own proposal and they began meeting in Panmunjeom based on this different proposal. That is how the preliminary rounds of the Red Cross talks began taking place. good. Jim Hershberg, an immediate follow-up on that?
OSTERMANN: Very
HERSHBERG: Yes, just one very small clarification. If I understand you correctly, you were saying that the process was a purely Korean-Korean dynamic with no important external influence from third parties or mediators or anything of the like. LEE:
With no mediation at all. Well, it had international sort of coding in the context that both Koreas to a large extent were responding to the changes in the international surroundings. So that was the kind of international influence,
20
but I dont think there was any outside parties either intervening or offering any good offices.
HERSHBERG: Purely LEE:
I dont think its really

all that important as to who initiated the talks; was it the
context.
Purely inter-Korean context, yes.
OSTERMANN: Thank you very much. Dr. Kim, do you have anything else to add
on this particular issue?

D. KIM: Actually, for me I dont think its really all that important as to who initiated the talks; was it the South first or was it the North first? But what I can say is that both South and North felt a need that there had to be talks between the two. This was necessitated by what had happened outside of the Koreas. This was because the U.S. and China were entering into a rapprochement. It was felt that it would be necessary for South and North Korea to also somehow come to terms with one another. OSTERMANN:
South rst or was it the North rst? But what I can say is that both South and North felt a need that there had to be talks between the two.
Thank you very much. I think this was a very exciting and productive session. In the next session we will focus on the U.S. relationship with South Korea and I think our American colleagues will come into greater focus in that session. Obviously we will also hear later from Mr. Mitov on his view from Pyongyang and from Sofia. With that though let me thank all of you for a very good first start into this meeting, thanking in particular Mr. Kim and Dr. Lee for their contributions and patience with the probing by the scholars, but this is exactly what we like to do, give an opportunity to have a follow-up question and really have time to respond to some of these more subtle issues.
21
LEE DONGBOK
Panel II
Inter-Korean Dialogue and U.S.-ROK Relations
Chair: William Stueck Provocateurs: Gregg Brazinsky, Woo Seong-ji

BILL STUECK:
That first session was wonderful. Our provocateurs for this panel are Gregg Brazinsky and Woo Seong-ji. Let me encourage both of you to respond to the first session in outlining your questions.
BRAZINSKY: I want to pick up with something that was mentioned during the last session. Mr. Kim, I believe, had mentioned that he had heard a Blue House discussion between Park Chung Hee and some of his aides in which there had been expressed a concern that the United States was interested in normalizing relations with the DPRK on its own. I wonder if you could talk in a little bit more detail about this discussion and the concerns that existed at the time. When exactly did this discussion take place? And what exactly were you afraid would be the course of American policy? STUECK:
If you want to respond to that directly, wed be happy to have that.
D. KIM: As to the exact date when I was involved in this discussion, I do not recall. However, what I can tell you is that at the time the Director of the KCIA had been Kim Gyewon and I was serving as the Desk Officer for Asia. Director Lee Hurak came in after Kim Gyewon and the change took place around December 1970, so I think the meeting may have taken place around November 1970. Now, I had gone to the Blue House on this particular day because I had to give a briefing on
23
PANEL II: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE AND U.S.-ROK RELATIONS
President Park had asked the undersecretary repeatedly

about the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China and what would happen to South Korea after the normalization, because he wanted to know whether there was a possibility that the U.S. would sever its relationship with South Korea as a result of the normalization of relations with China.
Jochongryeon, which is the alliance of North Koreans in Japan, and I was waiting to give my briefing but the president and his aides were talking and talking and the discussion was taking a long time. So I ended up actually listening in on the discussion. At the time, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yun Seokheon, was giving a briefing to the president. After the briefing, President Park had asked the undersecretary repeatedly about the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China and what would happen to South Korea after the normalization, because he wanted to know whether there was a possibility that the U.S. would sever its relationship with South Korea as a result of the normalization of relations with China. At the time I recall Mr. Yun had to explain that the situation for Taiwan and that of South Korea were different. I was supposed to give my briefing but my briefing kept on getting delayed because the discussion was taking longer and longer. I would say the discussion had actually gone on for hours and the president was really concerned about the dtente taking place between the U.S. and China, and he was seriously considering the impact and possible consequences of such dtente.
BRAZINSKY: Im curious if I can ask the former American diplomats in the audi-
ence if they could talk about the context of American foreign policies surrounding this. What I find so interesting here is that hes talking about this early period, a meeting during this early period in 1970-1971. Kissinger I believe first makes his secret trip to China in the fall of 1971 and then Nixon visits Shanghai in February of 1972. But its interesting that theres this intense fear in South Korea about U.S.-DPRK normalization before the U.S. hadnt really done anything official with China. So Im curious if any of the participants on the American side might weigh in here a little bit in interactions with South Koreans. Were there any concerns expressed? About when did South Koreans start to express concerns or anxieties about the changing U.S. relationship with the Peoples Republic of China?
ODONOHUE: I think that as our Korean interlocutors mentioned originally, the basic things driving concerns as we saw them on the Korean side, were the Nixon Doctrine and China. What did it mean for Korea? From our perspective, the whole period was one of reassurance, although in that period we withdrew one
24
division. So I think that I would say from our perspective at that point in time there was no concrete basis for a concern that we were going to normalize relations with North Korea, but that was from our perspective, it is something that they would have been concerned about. Now theres something else going on that was peripheral to that, which was the unification and the UN, and also internationally, where there was increasing difficulty on the part of South Korea and ourselves in maintaining the isolation of North Korea. Other countries wanted to move there. We for our part, and I say we, the U.S. government entities, did feel that the South should be more flexible. Both of us wanted to get out of the UN debate, so that aspect had in it this question of international recognition of the North, but it was far more tactical rather than a substantive.
HERSHBERG:
Just for the American participants, Id be curious if you might comment even briefly on the question on the locus of generating U.S. policy. This is of course a very special period in U.S. foreign policy when we have Nixon and Kissinger operating in some cases behind the State Departments back. Is the general feeling that policy is really being generated out of the embassy in Seoul, or that the White House is operating behind its back to a substantial measure when it comes to policy towards Seoul?
ODONOHUE: In that context, the embassy played a larger role than most embassies. However, there were two aspects. One of course, the China aspect, in which at best we were only occasionally told what was going on. [Ambassador] Habib, more than most, would have been aware because of his relationship with Kissinger. And secondly, you had the whole military issue emanating from the Nixon Doctrine; that change was being driven, obviously, in Washington. Our job was not only to convey that, but to convey back the problems, weighing in on the kinds of things that would be considered. But very obviously, this was [the Department of] State and [the Department of] Defense setting the parameters.
Let me just comment from the standpoint of the position of a very junior officer in the Office of Korean Affairs in Washington during this period. The
PICARD:
25
The one thing that seems to be constant

was the very strong U.S. relationship with South Korea. That simply was not questioned. The question really on our minds was how do we reassure the South Korean government that these changes that were taking place could be helpful and not harmful to them.
one thing that seems to be constant was the very strong U.S. relationship with South Korea. That simply was not questioned. The question really on our minds was how do we reassure the South Korean government that these changes that were taking place could be helpful and not harmful to them and how this continuing strong relationship could best take its place in what was clearly an international scene that was shifting. So there was certainly no interestin fact there was a clear policy that there would not beany U.S.-North Korean direct talks, certainly none without South Korean approval and participation.
STUECK: Can we have our second provocateur? Dr. Woo. WOO:
My understanding is that, when the South and North Korean dialogues were taking place, unification was also on the agenda. If there were indeed talks regarding unification, were there certain methods or formulas that were suggested? And if so, by whom were they suggested? And if there were any discussions that had taken place, at what depth was the topic discussed? If there had been progress in these discussions, what was the progress? Additionally, I would like to know how much access to information from the unification talks the U.S. had. As the dialogue between the two Koreas progressed, was the speed of the progress too fast for the U.S., or perhaps was there a point when the U.S. felt that there was a loss of control? As to South Koreas initiative, when it came to talks with North Korea, there were some talks that perhaps South Korea was not as proactive and perhaps there was some prodding, maybe some encouragement from the U.S. before South Korea became more active. So if there was any type of persuading or encouragement provided by the U.S., what was it? I also have a question about the economic differences between South Korea and North Korea. When we look at the economies of South and North Korea during the early 1970s, we can see that the South Korean economy was on the rise and for North Korea, perhaps you could say it was on the decline. So as South Korea was experiencing a boom in its economy, I think its fair to say that the South Korean officials felt somewhat more confident in approaching North Korea and perhaps the reverse could be said of North Koreans. But what really took place? Was it a factor that helped us
26
when we approached North Korea, when the economy of South Korea was doing so much better? The following question is directed to Mr. Mitov. Mr. Mitov, if I may ask since you were in North Korea during that period when the economy of North Korea was facing more difficulties and was perhaps even in decline, did you hear from the North Korean officials or did you sense from their activities that perhaps they were a little bit nervous, maybe even quite concerned about what was taking place in North Korea as far as their economy was concerned? And the last question goes to the diplomats and officials who had worked in the U.S. Embassy. How did you feel about the differences between North and South Korea as far as the economy was concerned? Since the economies were developing at a different pace, was this a factor that was important enough for you to weigh or be thinking about?
LEE: Regarding whether at the time of the initial rounds of the North-South dia-
PAK SEONGCHEOL AND PARK CHUNG HEE
logue if there were serious discussions about the unification formula or unification per se, my reply is that there were no such serious discussions on unification per se, nor a unification formula because in the early 1970s, neither side had comprehensive unification policies. North Korea had kept on talking about a political negotiation conference in a variety of different expressions, but it was in 1980 at the time of the Sixth Party Congress where North Korea finally came up with the scheme for configuring a Korean Republic, which thereafter become North Koreas official unification formula. And South Korea responded to that unification formula at the time of the early years of President Chun Doo-hwans presidency, in February 1982. I was involved in the drafting of that unification formula personally, the unification formula on democratic unification through national reconciliation, something like that, so that was in 1982. So previous to these two developments, neither of the two Koreas had come up with any comprehensive unification policies, so there had been no room for the two sides to talk about unification per se. Instead, the North Koreans kept on being aggressive and proactive, talking about certain conditions for unification in the context of political negotiations and things like that, or certain conditions that North Korea imposed on South Korea allegedly for the purpose of creating condi-
27
I vividly remember that in his conversation with Director Lee Hurak

and other South Korean members of the North-South Korean Committee in early November 1972, Kim Il Sung spoke very proudly of North Koreas economic progress, to the point that he was talking about his refusal to accept a proposal from Nikita Khrushchev for North Korea to join COMECON.
tions favorable for unification. So in the early 1970s, this dialogue did not spend much time on unification per se. Secondly, the question about whether there was influence from the United States, whereas South Korea was relatively reluctant. I think as I understood it, the question was whether the United States was prodding South Korea to become more active in pursuing dialogue. I dont think that was the case. As Ambassador ODonohue observed, the United States at that time was more interested in avoiding diplomatic confrontations in the United Nations over the Korean question, things like that. But the United States was more busily engaged in the Chinese theater so much so that I dont think Washington was very interested in seeing the two Koreas talking between themselves. So it was very much an inter-Korean initiative rather than initiative having come from outside forces when the dialogue began in the early 1970s. Third, this is a very interesting question that you raised regarding the comparison of the national strengths of the two Koreas at the time when this dialogue began unfolding in the early 1970s. At that time, North Korea seriously believed that it was ahead of South Korea in terms of economic advancement. But North Korea had to realize the fact that South Koreas economy was actually ahead of North Koreas during the course of dialogue, as North Koreans came to South Korea and South Korean delegations went to North Korea. I vividly remember that in his conversation with Director Lee Hurak and other South Korean members of the North-South Korean Committee in early November 1972, Kim Il Sung spoke very proudly of North Koreas economic progress, to the point that he was talking about his refusal to accept a proposal from Nikita Khrushchev [Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1953-1964] for North Korea to join COMECON [the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance]. And Kim Il Sung told us that when Khrushchev made the proposal, he declined that proposal because there was such a discrepancy between the Soviet Union and North Korea in the context of economic capability and he was likening North Korea in terms of kindergarten as against the Soviet Union in a graduate university. So if he joined COMECON, then the discrepancy would expand and North Koreas participation in COMECON would leave North Korea with a lot of empty holes, where the Russians would be digging all the natural resources in exchange for finished
28
WARD THOMPSON
products that the Soviet Union would be providing North Korea. So he declined to Khrushchev, by saying that we are going to remain kindergarten kids and you may go and you may advance as graduate students. That is the way we will feel safe. That was what Kim Il Sung told us. And in exchange, Lee Hurak was talking about Ulsan Industrial Complex and Pohang Steel Mill, and Kim Il Sung was unable to understand what Lee Hurak was telling him, so he was asking Kim Il, who was alongside, what was this Mr. Lee saying. So Kim Il was providing some explanations so much so that in the course of this exchange of visits, North Korean visitors to South Korea were literally astounded in the context of economic development, so much so that when they were taken on an expressway and saw the traffic, they complained that South Koreans had amassed all the vehicles in order to impress them. So we told them that we did not have much trouble assembling all the cars, but we did have difficulty amassing all the buildings in Seoul. That was the joke that we cracked. And because of this observation of economic differences, that was one of the reasons why North Koreans began feeling negative about the continuation of the dialogue.
STUECK: LEE:
Do you have a date on cracking that joke? Ive heard that joke before.
We made that joke to the extent that it was picked up by the press and put into print by certain media.
ODONOHUE:
As Mr. Lee pointed out, the initiative was solely a South Korean one. In the period prior to that, the United States officials had an interest one in more flexibility because, as he notes, the UN question was becoming so difficult. Secondly, there was, you could say, a generalized feeling that everyone else is try-
29
North Korean visitors to South Korea

were literally astounded in the context of economic development, so much so that when they were taken on an expressway and saw the trafc, they complained that South Koreans had amassed all the vehicles in order to impress them. So we told them that we did not have much trouble assembling all the cars, but we did have difculty amassing all the buildings in Seoul.
ing dtente, so shouldnt the South Koreans look at it? Th is was very secondary the initiative on the part of the South was taken by President Park. Lee Hurak was his agent. Once the initial step was taken, they then were very careful to brief us. Lee Hurak would meet regularly, certainly within the context of any of the formal meetings, and brief the ambassador and others on the Red Cross talks. So we had a conscious South Korean effort to keep the Americans in step. From our perspective this fit everything else going on, and so we were very supportive. They really, particularly in that context, didnt need our advice. They were doing nothing that caused any problems in our relationship. The general American perspective was dtente should break out everywhere. In terms of unification we never saw that unification was a near-term possibility. I think the South Korean side was always very realistic and never misled us that they didnt see unification on the table. I think the Americans tended to have a more optimistic view with no basis really in terms of out of this might come some long-term channels of communication and context, but not unification.
OSTERMANN:
Just a quick follow-up. I still think theres a disconnect here in the room or in the narrative between the concerns by the president that Mr. Kim talked about and your perceptions at the time. I also want to push further on the issue that Professor Woo raised in terms of American concerns about losing control of the process at some point. If you look at the European dimension of this, there were, of course, in due course a number of concerns on the part of Kissinger about Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik and ulterior. So your sense was that this was not at all the case, certainly not in this early phase, with regard to Korea?
Im not completely sure about a disconnect between President Park, or South Korean concerns about normalization, and that if somebody looked at all of this while we never saw it as a major issue at the time, you could see that a prudent South Korean government would identify this, however you want to say it, threat. So I think there was not any particular disconnect.
ODONOHUE: OSTERMANN: You were aware of those concerns?
30
ODONOHUE:
Not the specific ones he mentioned, but that the South Korean government and President Park had very much on his mind the American relationship which was central in security terms, and that the situation in East Asia was in a dynamic period of change, but that was driven by the Nixon Doctrine, China, and the fact that we did withdraw a division. This was an era in which the South Korean government could see that over time the Americans, at least their ground presence, might disappear. And indeed, a couple of years later we actually recommended something close to that.
SCHAEFER: Another question for the American participants just to spin this a bit
further. The DPRK considered the American presence in South Korea the main obstacle to reunification of the peninsula on Northern terms. If there was any way to get the Americans out of the South, one should pursue that by whatever means. Now, there was a huge elation among the North Korean leadership after the Kissinger visit to Beijing, the first secret visit. Was the United States at the time aware that North Korea and China were very close? Everything Kissinger, or any other American official, said about Korea was conveyed by the Chinese to the North Koreans, perhaps with a certain interpretation, a certain spin, which led the North Koreas particularly in the second half of 1971 to really believe that the U.S. at some point would almost completely withdraw from Korea. And were you aware that actually Kissinger made some statements to Zhou Enlai in this regard which really indicated that the West sooner or later would completely withdraw from Korea? Were you aware that the North Koreans had the impression from the Chinese that the U.S. withdrawal from Korea might be impending?
ODONOHUE: The answer to that is that Kissinger always saw the troop presence
as being something in the China context. I dont think he looked at it in terms of the Korean context particularly. But I think that in that period you did have a certain sense that the U.S. ground presence was going to be there for a finite period, and that wasnt tremendously controversial. One division had gone, another division might be going in a few years. I dont know of any American who ever conceived of a complete U.S. military withdrawal, and I cant imagine that because Korea was so important in a variety of ways, not the least Japan. But the
31
I think the South Korean side

was always very realistic and never misled us that they didnt see unication on the table. I think the Americans tended to have a more optimistic view with no basis really in terms of out of this might come some long-term channels of communication and context, but not unication.
troop presence was an element in Kissingers dialogues with the Chinese, I would say to that level a few of us know. I only knew it because of [Ambassador] Habib.
LEE: Well, let me tell you this observation: until the Guam Doctrine and the normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing, North Koreas traditional commitment to the U.S. troop withdrawal was to keep the U.S. out of South Korea, I mean a hard-line approach, attacking the U.S. in a harsh manner. But in the aftermath of the rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, North Korea made a quick change by trying to pat the U.S. out of South Korea. North Korea came up with the idea of inter-Korean dialogue as a means to soothe Washington to the effect that the U.S. conceded favorably the idea of troop withdrawal. So for some time, North Korea was observed resorting to that approach, but it did not take long for North Korea to change again back to the harsher stance. Id like to add that it was more the peace process in Paris over the Vietnam War than the Guam Doctrine that made people in South Korea very restive and concerned about the credibility of the U.S. security commitment. Because it was in this peace process in Paris that, as Mr. Kim pointed out earlier, the Viet Cong were accepted by the United States as a legitimate counterpart in a dialogue. As Mr. Kim learned from the conversation he overheard at the Blue House, they were wondering about the possibility of the underground organizations like Unification Revolutionary Party being picked up by the United States as a legitimate counterpart for negotiation. So that was the kind of concern which was building up in the minds of many South Koreans at the time which led them to think about opening up a dialogue sort of things between the two Koreas.
I do think one of the things that American participants have omitted is the fact that this was a time when the Vietnam situation was one that would have caused our allies in the region a good deal of concern. Things clearly were not going well and talks were going on. I think it would have been a great stretch, though, beyond that to have the idea that the Americans would ever think of any of the groups in South Korea as appropriate parties to talk with. But certainly the atmosphere in general of U.S. weakness, the Vietnam situation had on everyones mind would have been a reasonable factor for Koreans to have in mind.
PICARD:
32
THOMPSON: Yes, I certainly agree. I think that Dr. Woo asked about how we reviewed the economic differences, and I think from our perspective South Korea was already a tiger moving forward. From what we knew of the Korean populace, they were interested in securing what they had achieved economically and building. And you had these big signs about the export campaign and all that, rather than a lot of concern about security. The security was I think of great concern because the Koreans did not want to lose the economic gains and it would have been so nice to keep the security situation static so that the Koreans could work on their economic progress. Dr. Lee mentioned Ulsan. I had the great fortune of going to Ulsan with our visiting Ambassador to Japan, Mr. [Robert] Ingersoll, and my connection was that the vice president of the shipyard down there was Danish with his crew and my wife and I spoke Danish, so Mr. Chung Ju-yung came to arrange the visit and we had a very nice visit down there. It was very impressive what was happening with using the steel from Pohang and building an empire which we still have today of course. So in short, I think thats how we regarded it, that the security concerns, as I think Dr. Lee said, were secondary to the economic concerns, and the idea that there would be so much discontent politically or security-wise didnt really strike us as central because it was all dependent on the economic situation.
That said, however at the time when we began the dialogue with North Korea, the North Korean economy was really at its peak and the North Korean economy began to decline only thereafter. At the outset North Korea appeared to really believe that the North Korean economy was way ahead of us, but in the course of the dialogue, they realized that that situation was already upside down, and thats one thing. And for another, although an official from the United States never came to South Korea with any influence with regard to inter-Korean dialogue, by the early 1970s there already were people like Selig Harrison [a Washington Post reporter] and Jerome Cohen [an American academic] who began performing the role of spokespersons for North Korea and coming to Washington with suggestions that the United States pressure South Korea to be more responsive to North Koreas peace offensives and things like that.
LEE:
33
So in due course, these people began raising their voices to the extent that, by the time when President Carter was inaugurated president, Jerome Cohen was figuring in as an information person to an extent, right or wrong, he was the person behind Carters withdrawal platform. So outside of the government, there were quite a few people who were literally exercising some measure of influence in U.S. policy toward South Korea and the Korean Peninsula. Earlier Professor Woo had raised questions regarding economic disparity, the differences between South and North Korea, so I would like to address that. There were certain seismic changes that occurred in the inter-Korea dialogue mechanism. This was due to the following. We had initially held the talks in Panmunjeom and later we had decided to hold talks in the different cities of Seoul and Pyongyang, and thats when the shift started. The suggestion that we should hold talks in Seoul and Pyongyang came from us. This was the order that came down from President Park directly. The first preliminary meeting for the Red Cross was held on September 20 at Panmunjeom and the second preliminary meeting had occurred on September 29, also at Panmunjeom. At the second preliminary meeting at Panmunjeom on September 29, we had suggested that we should hold talks on a rotational basis between Seoul and Pyongyang. There was something called Joint Break that was suggested by North Korea at Panmunjeom during this second preliminary meeting. So during this Joint Break we actually brought our goods from the respective sides, so for South Korea we brought radios and other consumer electronics that we had produced and from North Korea they brought silk and blankets and some rice wines. So when this Joint Break activity was taking place, President Park actually drove to Panmunjeom right outside of where the meetings were being held. I went to President Park with the gifts from North Korea and I had explained to him that these were the activities that were taking place and this is how much progress we were making. When I presented the president with the gifts, he actually thoroughly inspected the gifts. For example, as to the silk blanket, the president actually tore the blanket to see whats inside and also put light towards part of it and also smelled the blanket. And as to the wines, he opened the wines and tasted some of them for himself.
D. KIM:
34
At the time the president had quite a few people with him and his entourage had included Chung Ju-yung of Hyundai Construction, and also the president of Sambu Construction, and the mayor of Seoul, and he had asked around to see how they felt and how these North Korean items compared with South Korean items. After inspecting the items, the group came to a conclusion that the items produced in North Korea were inferior to those of South Korea, so the Republic of Korea was making better products we concluded. So President Park was very satisfied with the conclusion and he had mandated that it would be our priority to make sure that the future meetings would be held on a rotational basis between Seoul and Pyongyang. And he had mentioned at the time that water flows from higher ground to lower ground and in the process of flowing there might be some disturbance of the water, but the fact that it flows from high to low does not change. So at the time there was the president of Hyundai Construction, and this was the time period when we did not have highways between Panmunjeom and Seoul, there were only country roads. So we decided that we would build a highway that runs all the way from Panmunjeom right into the heart of Seoul. We built a road first and as we had built a road between Panmunjeom and Seoul, North Korea also decided that they would build the same between Panmunjeom and Pyongyang. The construction took one year. And so the initial stage of the talks between the Red Cross took a little longer because of the road, but thats the preliminary meeting had resulted in the rotational visits. So as we did rotational visits between South and North Korea, as we saw one another in economic terms, the focus shifted from military to economics. What we saw was that there were highways being built and there were high-rises being built also and both the Daedong River and Han River were being cleaned out and being reconditioned. So we were trying to show off to one another and this was an economic competition in a sense, and I think thats where the disparities started becoming much clearer. I think thats how we came to this point that the economic disparity started back then and now its much clearer. Shin: This question will be directed to U.S. diplomats. In 1971, North Korea tried to deliver a message to the U.S. through Romania. Did you know that this had taken place? And a follow-up question on that would be, what message was it and
[ ] As we saw one another in economic terms,

the focus shifted from military to economics. [ ] we were trying to show off to one another and this was an economic competition in a sense, and I think thats where the disparities started becoming much clearer. [ ]
35
In the 1970s, North Korea

was trying to employ such countries as Romania and other Eastern European countries to convey the North Korean message to Washington, saying that the international situation is running in favor of North Korea, that the United States should consider favorably the idea of withdrawing troops from South Korea [ ] what was the U.S.s reaction if there was one? In 1972, perhaps in April or May, [North Korean Foreign Minister] Pak Seongcheol went to Seoul and suggested that there should be a South-North Korean Joint Communiqu and then at the time KCIA Director Lee Hurak responded that our situation in South Korea was fairly complicated, and also our meetings were being held in the dark and the U.S. was not in the know so we would prefer that we do not let the U.S. know. So the questions are really directed at Mr. Lee and Mr. Kim from Korea. Now at some point the Korean government talks with the U.S. CIA and in particular with Mr. [John] Richardson,who was the director in Korea [1971-1973], at the time, and there seems to have been a certain close working relationship that had developed between the two. So what were your impressions, Mr. Lee and Mr. Kim, as far as the North Korean agents are concerned? Did they really think that South Korea was not consulting the U.S. or how did they feel about the relationship that South Korea had with the U.S. as far as the Inter-Korean dialogue was concerned?
LEE:
I will respond to that regarding the second part of your question. I was involved in that portion of the dialogue of the time, and I dont know where you obtained the information from the meeting between Lee Hurak and Pak Seongcheol. Lee Hurak said exactly that. It was May 29 through June 3 when Pak Seongcheol visited Seoul secretly on behalf of [Kim Il Sungs brother] Kim Yeongju who could not make it to Seoul in spite of the invitation from the Southern side, because Kim Il Sung at that time was already beginning to give a hard time to Kim Yeongju in favor of Kim Jong Il. In the meeting which took place in Seoul, Lee Hurak kept saying that South Korea was independent of the United States. Obviously in response to North Koreas continuous charge that South Korea was a crony of the United States, Lee Hurak kept telling the North Koreans that Park Chung Hee and the South Korean government were independent of the United States. So beyond that, it was merely a kind of rhetoric. And so I dont think he told Pak Seongcheol that he was keeping this dialogue a secret from the United States. I dont think that that was the way he said that, although he kept on saying that we are independent, we do not rely upon the United States, things like that. In the 1970s, North Korea was trying to employ such countries as Romania and other Eastern European countries to convey the North Korean message to
36
Washington, saying that the international situation is running in favor of North Korea, that the United States should consider favorably the idea of withdrawing troops from South Korea, things like that. These Eastern European countries were taken advantage of as the conduits of such messages which North Korea wanted to continue to convey to Washington, DC. I was involved mostly with inter-Korean dialogue and so I do not really know too much about U.S.-Korean relations at the time.
KIM: ODONOHUE: Until I read the telegrams, I had not noticed the Romanian effort,
SIGNING CEREMONY FOR JULY 4 DECLARATION
but I think as Mr. Lee summed it up, over time in a variety of ways North Korea has tried seriously or less seriously to establish a direct link to the United States to the exclusion of South Korea. And in reading that, it looked to me like that was just another one of the myriad approaches that were made.
HONG: As far as the U.S. government was concerned, after having reviewed the doc-
uments, I can tell that the U.S. government also wanted a channel, a dialogue to be established with North Korea. I think this started sometime towards the end of the 1960s. This happened on August 27, 1973, in China. North Korean diplomats visited the U.S. Liaison Office in China. Contact between the diplomats is very important and a sensitive topic, so my understanding is that the White House had approved of the contact as well as the Blue House. North Korea had expended quite a bit of effort in establishing communication with the U.S. in various ways, so my question would be, what did you think in the U.S. of the reason, impetus or motivation, as to why North Korea was trying to so hard to establish a channel of communication with the U.S.? And what did the U.S. government think they were trying to communicate?
ODONOHUE: First of all, our view had been that North Korea, as part of its basic policy, was constantly working to establish a direct channel to the United States without the South Koreans, and that was a constant theme, up until even now, that we saw as their major effort. In that period for a lot of reasons, we were changing our UN policies, and we were trying to bring them in for a variety of tactical reasons that you would want to talk to them. But in essence, none of these
37
really ever amounted to much. I think there was a later period when there were more serious efforts that again didnt amount to anything, but were more serious than the one you described. But essentially, our view was that we would not be caught at a negotiating table without the South in that period. And on the other hand as part of this whole dynamic in which you had the UN, and the South and the North were talking, these things meant there was probably a more relaxed view, and it wasnt a period in which we would be aggressively turning off North Korean contacts and policy. We just had no interest, our policy was supportive of the South and I think over the years President Park probably was mildly surprised at how resolute we were in support.
LEE:
A very short comment. I think North Korea made no bones about the fact that, when they talked about the direct dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington, the objective was two-fold, a peace treaty between the two sides in addition to troop withdrawal. And on these two themes, I had been of the understanding that the United States administration had continued to hold fast to the position that the issue of a peace treaty was something between the two Koreas as against troop withdrawal is something between the United States and South Korea. So because of these two declared positions, there was no room for direct contact between North Korea and the United States.
ODONOHUE: We also believed that it was part of the constant North Korean effort to marginalize the South. In other words, deal with the Americans, they really run the country; the South doesnt count. So we saw that as another element in what they were proposing. PERSON:
You mentioned that the U.S. would not be caught at the negotiating table without South Korea. At that time, yes.
ODONOHUE: PERSON:
Was this a lesson learned from the direct talks held over the return of the crew of the U.S.S. Pueblo?
38
No. Pueblo negotiations were done up in Panmunjeom as a military exercise to get the troops back. That didnt have that connotation. That was a period of intense strain because of the Blue House incident, in which President Park, as he often did, took a situation and used it to press for greater U.S. support. At the time of the Pueblo, we had immense concerns. At the time of the Blue House, our first reaction, unfortunately, had been to urge no response. Well, that the South would accept, but we forgot to express our concerns about President Parks survival. So coming from that, he had the American side on the defensive. Out of that, strategically, it was a watershed in that the United States, after that process, adopted a policy of modernization of the ROKs forces. Before that you had essentially a World War II static force. Because of that, and the North Korean tensions over the previous years, we really moved to a much more active program in support of strengthening this out.
ODONOHUE: LEE:
By the time of the Pueblo incident, South Korea was very seriously pushing to retaliate against North Korea, but Washington was trying to restrain South Korea. So that, I think, was bearing upon the way Washington was reacting to Pueblo incident. So much so that Washington kept the Pueblo incident as an issue within the context of the armistice agreement. That was the way I recall that.
ODONOHUE: The only thing I would slightly differ on is that the South Korean side took a very strong stance, but first of all, without our agreement, we didnt think they would take any military action, and secondly we thought to a degree that it was tactical to keep the pressure on us to respond to their needs. THOMPSON: I just wanted to make a comment that in general theres a distinction between a technical contact and a policy contact, and there were occasions, I was involved in one of them, where if there happened to be a North Korean overture we would be interested in gaining some intelligence about the other side, but that didnt mean that we were inaugurating any kind of relationship. So quite often I would say that if there were one of these many approaches that Ambassador
39
HONG SEUKRYULE
ODonohue mentioned, that yes, we literally did not turn our backs in every case, but there was no policy directive there at all. I just wanted to make that distinction. I did have one instance at a subsequent post where in a public observance I did have a conversation with a North Korean about non-substantive issues and Washington was interested in my pursuing that just for intelligence purposes, but not to suggest to the other side that we were having a dialogue, so Im sure that took place elsewhere. In light of the Nixon Doctrine, in the 1970s perhaps there was a shift in U.S. policy, but its not really clear to us whether there was an intentional shift. But I think beginning towards the end of the 1960s, there was somewhat of a shift in the U.S. policy towards North Korea as far as the U.S.-North Korean relationship was concerned, and I think that may have been somehow reflected by the Nixon Doctrine and the follow-up events that had occurred. The Blue House raid and also the Pueblo incident of 1968 showed there were strategic differences between the U.S. and Korea. Also, we can see from the documents, which we have in front of us, that the U.S. had requested the South Korean government to be more flexible in its approach towards North Korea. We have the transcripts from the subcommittee at which time [Stuart] Symington was the Chair. This was the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. This is a transcript from September 13, 1970, and at the Subcommittee Meeting, the transcript shows that the U.S. had suggested that South Korea have talks with North Korea. And also in this Subcommittee hearing we could see that there was a possibility, in the minds of the U.S., that it was actually South Korea rather than North Korea that would create some sort of a military conflict on the peninsula. Now when it comes to the South and North Korean dialogue that took place, there had been some talks and questions as to who initiated that dialogue, and in a bigger picture perhaps its not as important who initiated such, but I think its
RYOO:
40
important for us to shed some light on the flow of events that had occurred and that led up to the actual dialogue taking place. The U.S. perhaps was not actively involved in the talks being held; however, I think the U.S. had provided a certain framework in which the talk had to be held and this would include the rapprochement between the U.S. and China as well as the Nixon Doctrine. So there was a role that was definitely played by the U.S. in the inter-Korean dialogue and this is something that we need to shed more lights on. So my question would be to the U.S. diplomats who had worked in the field. Not just what was shown on the surface as the result of certain talks that were held within, but I really want to hear about what took place internally, what went on and who were the people who were involved in the decision-making, what were the discussions about and what were your impressions of things to come about as you made these decisions?
ODONOHUE:
In our various discussions in Seoul with Lee Hurak,

with President Park and others, it was really them telling us what they were doing. Nothing they were doing caused us any problems. From our point of view, it was very easy to be supportive.
Well first of all, in terms of the period, say 1967 through 1969, that was a period in which the military tensions were at their highest at any point since the end of the Korean War. It was not a period when the United States looked at dtente. You had had numerous incidents across the DMZ. You had the Pueblo, the attack on President Park. In 1969 you had the U.S. reconnaissance plane EC-121 shot down. From 1968, the United States embarked on a major modernization program of the ROK armed forces, so this is a context were talking about. As I had mentioned earlier, throughout this period, partially because of the UN and the tremendous diplomatic drain that was going on each year for what was eventually going to be a losing cause of isolating the North, and this general sense of dtente, among officials there was a general sense that the South should participate in it. In the concrete sense, this showed up in discussions and planning for the UN sessions. However, in looking at it, and our Korean friends can talk it much more authoritatively, our view was that President Park saw East Asia as in a period of significant change that posed real threats to South Korea. Because of the Nixon Doctrine, China, and South Vietnam, from our perception, President Park responded essentially to be sure he had control of this issue. It was hardly us telling him; it was rather he himself, the case throughout our relationship with him being sure that he was not boxed in or simply became a pawn in the process.
41
This was a Korean show

from start to nish and they kept us informed as the cable trafc shows. We had very little in trying to guide it, and one of the reasons for that was we did not look at it in terms of Korean unication. What we thought was going on here was at best some humanitarian alleviation of the situation by the families and so forth.
So as far as thats concerned our role, as far as the South was concerned, was in a secondary sense very important; the United States had to support them and that was in our terms a given. In our various discussions in Seoul with Lee Hurak, with President Park and others, it was really them telling us what they were doing. Nothing they were doing caused us any problems. From our point of view, it was very easy to be supportive. In terms of possible outcomes, the South side was always very realistic with us about what they were doing and what was likely to be accomplished, i.e., except for a few of the humanitarian things, not much. We probably were slightly more optimistic with no basis in the sense that we saw out of it not unification, but maybe there would be some of these long-term links that over time would be useful. But in terms of sitting down and planning tactics, the South was running that show. We were completely supportive.
HERSHBERG: Just one very brief inquiry primarily to the Americans but also to the Korean side. The Ambassador just mentioned in passing South Vietnam. Id just be curious if any of you had any comment on the broader relevance of the waning of the Vietnam War during this period. And the reason I raise it is that the impression had been given in some accounts that during the Johnson Administration in particular, the South Korean participation in the war in Vietnam gave Seoul a great deal of leverage on relations with Washington because they could always hint at withdrawing those troops which the Johnson Administration highly valued. As the U.S. role in Vietnam diminished during this period, does that lead to a lessening of South Korean leverage on Washington and in general, how important is the Vietnam War in the broader relationship? Is it peripheral or is it evolving from very important to far less important? PICARD: Let me just return to the question before about the talks and the American role or concern or guidance that might have been given in this period of 1971 to 1973. I would certainly second what Ambassador ODonohue said. This was a Korean show from start to finish and they kept us informed as the cable traffic shows. We had very little in trying to guide it, and one of the reasons for that was we did not look at it in terms of Korean unification. What we thought was going on here was at best some humanitarian alleviation of the situation by the
42
families and so forth. That conceivably would be a good thing if it could come out of it, otherwise it did not loom very large in the overall set of issues that the desk in Washington and the embassy were concerned about. There were a lot of other things going on during that period, everything from what later came to be called Koreagate, a concern about what the Korean CIA was doing in Washington, the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping, the Declaration of Martial Law, and the reorganization of the Korean government thereafter. These were things that the U.S. government was focusing on and was concerned about. The North-South talks were interesting and encouraging and fit into the overall merging pattern of dtente, but this wasnt a central driving force in U.S.-Korean relations at the time. On Vietnam I am probably speaking more out of ignorance than information, but while we certainly wanted the Korean troops to stay, it didnt seem to me that it gave the Koreans a great deal of leverage.
ODONOHUE:
Well, there was leverage, but it was all economic. When we first negotiated with the Koreans in 1963 or 1964, or whenever it was, the Korean economic role in Vietnam was viewed as a very modest one. Over time it became one of the driving elements in the modernization of the Korean economy. You had Korean companies that, I think one of them packed furniture, then went out and found out that they could compete in an international environment. So it has the economic leverage, certainly, trying to get more each time was an aspect, and at the very end of course it was sort of keeping them there so that they didnt get out prematurely from our point of view. But somehow or another, the Korean domestic situation in this whole period bubbled, and that had a significant role. But somehow or another the Korean forces in Vietnam didnt ever seem to be part of our equation in how we dealt with the Park government outside of keeping them there.
WILLIAM STUECK
LEE: Regarding the question raised by Professor Ryoo, I think that particular pas-
sage that Professor Ryoo quotes from the Symington Subcommittee record should be evaluated against the backdrop and also in the context of the time during which there were such major outbursts of military provocations from the North Korean side. I mean the commando raid against the Blue House and also the massive landing of North Korean commando troops in the fall of 1968, and the seizure
43
[ ] The Vietnam situation gured very

prominently in bearing upon South Koreas response to North Korea, as well as South Koreas response to the development of the relationship between the United States and China. South Korea was really concerned about the implications of this new development [ ]
of the Pueblo, and also the downing of the EC-121 the following year. Because of this, the South Korean government was trying to pursue a very hard-line stance against North Korea, even preparing certain military capabilities to put to use in a retaliatory attack. So Washington was trying very hard to restrain the Park government, to dissuade the Park government from resorting to any drastic military actions. And that reference to encouraging South Korea to think about engaging in a direct dialogue to North Korea should be evaluated as part of the U.S. effort to restrain the South Korean government in that particular timeframe. Around that time, the Vietnam situation figured very prominently in bearing upon South Koreas response to North Korea, as well as South Koreas response to the development of the relationship between the United States and China. South Korea was really concerned about the implications of this new development, particularly for one reason. At that time, South Korea was maintaining 50,000 troops in Vietnam, and depending on the outcome of the negotiations, South Korea too had to create in the troop withdrawal process, in which case it had to involve tens of thousands of troops which were going to create a hell of a problem to the South Korean government to make accommodations for this troop withdrawal. The fact that Washington was proceeding without the sufficient amount of prior consultation was creating so much of a concern on the part of South Korea.
C. KIM:
I wanted to just raise one question referring to the regional context that sort of dovetails with this conversation. In our discussion so far theres been very little reference to Japan. Im wondering based on some of the documents in the reader that allude to real fears on the part of the South Korean government in the wake of the Nixon Doctrine of some of the security burdens being shifted to Japan, the fears that this would be recommended by the United States and that Japan would then assume a larger role in Asia Pacific. Id like to ask whether this was a real concern, whether there were grounds for such fears, and to see if any on the Korean or American side could shed light on the way in which Japans role was perceived in this shifting geopolitical context. Again, this isnt speaking in terms of any particular knowledge of anything. However, overall in that period, the Japanese tended to view the United
ODONOHUE:
44
SHIN JONGDAE
States as responsible for security. They didnt want headaches connected with it. So it would have been very unrealistic on our part to have expected much. Japan already, in a sense, had allowed the UN command to exercise access in that, so there was no likelihood in that period of the Japanese playing a role. Now, what was interesting indeed in that period and before, when you talk to the Japanese about Korean security, from their perspective you would have thought you were talking about a peninsula off Antarctica. It was that was our responsibility. This changed dramatically, perhaps before, but certainly in the Carter period with the second division announcement. That really bothered them. They saw this as impacting their security. Essentially from that time, we showed a much more active interest. Now it was not troops or that sort of thing, which they couldnt do, but in the sense that it highlighted that the American presence was not the given that they had thought, and it led to a much more active Japanese involvement in security dialogue. I was in the embassy in Tokyo for the two years or so before coming to work on Korean affairs, and I would just second the view that insofar as anyone who was following Japan at that time was concerned, the idea that anything having to do with Korea could be turned over to Japan was not in anybodys thinking, and certainly was not in the Japanese. If you were following the Japanese view you couldnt even have talked to them about this.
PICARD: THOMPSON: Youve seen in the documents that Washington wanted a study of what the possible reactions would be regarding a change in the UN command and they wanted to know what Japans reaction might be. I was in a discussion with our ambassador, and Im pretty sure Ambassador ODonohue and Ambassador Habib said that you know Japan might have some concern about eventual Korean unification because they might think that a united Korea could get the best of them.
45
Panel III
Inter-Korean Dialogue and the DPRKs Relations with Allied Countries
Chair: James Person Provocateurs: Bernd Schaefer, Ryoo Kihljae

PERSON:
On to discussion about North Koreas relations with its allies. But before I turn things over to our two provocateurs, there were some questions about the 1971 election.
STUECK: From the documents, I was impressed how comfortable the Americans appeared to be with Kim Dae-jung in the early 1970s, especially in light of later developments. So Im wondering if we could hear from the Americans about perceptions of Kim Dae-jung at that time and also perhaps from the Koreans as to their perceptions of the American perception of Kim Dae-jung at that time. ODONOHUE: I was not there for the election itself. Of course, later events were much more dramatic in terms of his kidnapping. The Americans always had a very relaxed and very positive view of Kim Dae-jung. We saw him as a politician who probably more than any other opposition politician had a politically creative mind. We didnt see policies he espoused as being very harmful. We were always content, I mean, with President Park winning. It was not an issue of us favoring him over President Park. When they moved to the Yushin Constitution,3 we saw that as being driven in some part by President Parks desire not to run against Kim Dae-jung again. To say that we accepted the Yushin Constitution would be wrong; we were told about it about twenty-four hours in advance and in effect it was done.
47
PANEL III: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE AND THE DPRKS RELATIONS WITH ALLIED COUNTRIES
We played an immensely active role in the immediate aftermathIm talking about in the hoursof Kim Dae-jungs kidnapping. Indeed, we probably played the key role in trying to save his life initially. After that, it was more the Japanese. At every level of government, and at the senior levels of the military, we had one message which was: he must be alive. Ambassador Habibs instruction was dont argue about the facts, just have a very simple message. In the first 12 or 18 hours, we were extremely active. Later the Japanese became more active, since it was an incident in Japan and the Korean-Japanese relationship came to the fore. From my perception, from the Japanese point of view, if Kim Dae-jung had been kidnapped anywhere but Japan, it wouldnt have bothered them. After Kim was back in the country, our approach was what you might call an implicit quid pro quo in that we did not try to see him in that period. That came only later. But we always saw him as a political leader and opposition leader, and we were struck that if you looked at the Korean domestic political scene from 1971 to, wherever you want to pick it, the end of the Chun [Doo-hwan] [President of South Korea, 1980-1988]or the Roh [Tae-woo] regime [1988-1993], how preoccupied the Korean leadership was with barring Kim Dae-jung from power. Until at least Kim Young-sam, whether it was President Park or the brief inner period before the Chun government came in, there was a lot of hand-ringing that went into how do you hold an election that Kim Dae-jung wont win, and then Chun of course putting him back in the pokey and threatening him. In that whole period we saw Kim Dae-jung, as you might say, the indigestible political element on the scene, but a man with whom we always maintained whenever he was availablefriendly and good relations. This had nothing to do with the fact that President Park and others saw a relationship that would threaten their legitimate hold on power. We did feel that it would be a lot better if they tried keeping him out of jail. So that is where we were and when he later came to power, he was an older man and once again we essentially supported the efforts with the North. I would say the United States relationship with him had always been one of some admiration for his personal qualities. We viewed of him as Koreas most creative politician, and at least twice we were the protectors of his life.
48
LEE:
You know Kim Dae-jung ran against Park Chung Hee in 1971 and lost to Park Chung Hee by a margin of 1,000,000 votes. It was definitely a milestone event in the evolution of the inter-Korean relations in the context that in the immediate aftermath of the military takeover in 1961, 4 General Park made any debate, any talk about reunification a taboo. He literally banned any discussion in any manner on the reunification issue because of his belief that any discussion on this reunification issue was a distraction, posing hindrances to his effort to make economic development. So much so that until 1971 South Korea was practically without any debate on North Korea, nor on reunification, but Kim Dae-jung broke that taboo by coming out and raising several issues on reunification like a four power guarantee for reunification and public debate on the issue of reunification and things like that. The fact that he lost that election by a margin of only 1,000,000 votes meant that the ban on debate on reunification was lifted and that opened the door for progressive political forces to come up with alternative voices about the issue of reunification. In the years following the 1971 election, the issue of reunification became one of the top issues in South Korea. So the 1971 presidential election in a great way altered the whole landscape and that is the significance of the 1971 election that I think we should pay attention to.
General Park made any debate,

any talk about reunication a taboo. He literally banned any discussion in any manner on the reunication issue because of his belief that any discussion on this reunication issue
PERSON: We now turn to the topic of North Koreas relations with its allies. In a conversation I had with Mr. Thompson, he used an expression that stuck with me. He said that constructing an understanding of the history of this period using these documents is like crossing a river using small stones. I thought that was quite interesting. This is particularly the case when looking at North Koreas relations with its communist allies. We do have some 60,000 pages of documents from the archives of North Koreas former communist allies but its still a challenge to write the history of North Koreas relations with those allies. SCHAEFER:
was a distraction, posing hindrances to his effort to make economic development.
Ill try to be as provocative as I can be. We have a lot of questions now for Mr. Mitov and I want to make it short to give you a lot of time to respond. I would just choose a few questions regarding the motivation of North Korea to engage in inter-Korean dialogue and then ask a few questions about the dialogue itself. With regard to the motivation, I would like you to address the role of China
49
and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1971 and how you and your other colleagues, the other socialist ambassadors in Pyongyang, viewed Chinese-North Korean relations in 1971. Another question on motivation is connected to Vietnam. Did you see any role for the events in Vietnam and Indochina with regard to progress for socialist revolution in South Vietnam compared to a lack of progress of revolution in South Korea and how did this serve as a reference, as a contrast or even as a competition for North Korea and Kim Il Sung that as a socialist country North Korea had to gain some resolve in the South and how this came in with regard to motivation for inter-Korean dialogue to achieve Korean reunification? Finally something which has been addressed many times here, did you see any North Korean perceptions of a widening economic gap between South Korea and North Korea, making it urgent for North Korea to try almost everything to achieve reunification in this period? I remember many East German files where you have references to the fact that the North Koreans didnt want to admit that South Korea had achieved economic successes by itself. They claimed that the Japanese were building up South Korea. They clearly saw this as a major threat to reunification was this to continue because the economic gap was widening. And finally a few questions about the dialogue itself. How did you and your colleagues in Pyongyang rate the information policy of North Korea? To what extent did you feel informed by the North Korean leadership and the North Korean Foreign Ministry about the policies of North Korea with regard to reunification and inter-Korean dialogue? Another question, how would you assess the North Korean confidence in achieving reunification through those reunification talks? In documents I have seen, North Korea comes across at least for a while in 1971 and 1972 as extremely confident if not over-confident that they will achieve unification on its own terms. I would like to hear your impression whether you shared that impression, or whether you had a different impression. Finally, did you see any major concern that North Korea was conducting a sort of bourgeois reunification policy and was in grave danger of giving up MarxismLeninism and trying to achieve non-socialist reunification which might put the socialist system in North Korea in danger, or did you see it differently?
50
RYOO: I think there were some concerns that perhaps the conflict on the Korean Peninsula would actually expand into a broader region of Asia. Towards the end of the 1960s, we had the Pueblo and other incidents, and these provocations gave a lot of concern to the many who were involved. In a 2008 critical oral history conference, held here at the Wilson Center, we were able to look at some Soviet documents. One of these Soviet documents was a record of a Central Committee meeting where Mr. Brezhnev asked What are our comrades doing in North Korea? So there was some amazement on their part as well. After having passed through this period of aggression in the late 1960s, we come to the early 1970s where we had inter-Korean dialogue. This seems to bring about a somewhat better relationship between the two Koreas. I would think that the Soviet Union and other countries in Eastern Europe would have welcomed this better relationship between the Koreas. I wonder if that was indeed true. Mr. Mitov, when you look into the interest that the Eastern European countries had taken in the Korean Peninsula, what were your thoughts as you saw the dialogue take place between the two Koreas? In the 1970s, we have seen, South Korea expanded its economic relationship with Western European countries as well as Japan. North Korea was expanding its economic relationship with Western European countries as well as Japan and also the same holds true for the Soviet bloc countries, including Bulgaria, Poland, and East Germany. In 1975 North Korea pronounced a moratorium on its debts and this was apparently targeted towards Western European countries. I wonder if that also included Eastern European countries. And the third question that I have would be, in March of 1974 a meeting of the Supreme Peoples Soviet was held in North Korea and at the time the decision was made to make the offer of a peace treaty offering with the U.S. My question would be, was the Soviet bloc aware of this offering or suggestion? PERSON:
LEE HURAK
Before Mr. Mitov answers his questions, I know Dr. Lee has an additional question.
I have two questions. It was during a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Lee Hurak in November 1972 that Kim Il Sung first mentioned the idea of a Korean
LEE:
51
The idea of unifying the peninsula

in the form of a confederation, was discussed between Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung in 1973. As the record of the meeting indicates, the desire of the North Korean leader was to achieve this following the North Korean model.
confederation. Then in 1980, at the time of the KWP [Korean Workers Party] Sixth Party Congress that North Korea made an official proposal for a confederal unified democratic Korea as a formula for unification. That said, Id like to ask Mr. Mitov if, in your personal view, this idea of confederal unified Korea can practically be the basis of negotiated settlement of the unification between the two Koreas? I would like to point out that I have brought with me a shorthand summary that was dictated and personally approved by the then leader of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov.5 Immediately after his visit to North Korea in October of 1973, this shorthand summary was disseminated to a limited number of people for official use. Now this document is accessible to you in its entirety of twenty-one pages. And I would like to mention that answers to four of the questions that were proposed can be found in this conversation between the Bulgarian leader and Kim Il Sung. The question was whether the embassies in the North Korean capital were informed of the conversations with the South Korean side. We were not informed in advance. I was the only person at my embassy to know because I listened to Radio Seoul using a portable radio and earphones on a regular basis. I listened to Radio Seoul all the time, so I was informed and our embassy knew about the discussions. So I received information that way. The situation was a little different a few years before, at the time of the Pueblo incident, when we were informed by the North Koreans and assured that this issue would be resolved in a peaceful way and that there would be no intervention. At that time too, I was in Pyongyang. Some of the embassies indeed evacuated the families, the wives and the children of the staff working in the embassies because they felt that an attack was imminent. Our embassy was the only one that did not evacuate the women and the children. The idea of unifying the peninsula in the form of a confederation, was discussed between Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung in 1973. As the record of the meeting indicates, the desire of the North Korean leader was to achieve this following the North Korean model. As you can read in the transcript, during the meeting, he expresses the opinion that South Korea must be plucked from Japans grasp. He also said that South Korea must reduce its army and we will reduce ours, and concluded that without an army, the people will rise up themselves.
MITOV:
52
This indicates that Kim Il Sung viewed the confederation as a first step towards revolutionary unification with the help of the poor levels of society. The continuation of this conversation confirms this without a doubt. Kim said to Zhivkov that our idea is a political struggle, which aims to prove to the people of South Korea who is a traitor and who is a patriot. If a more democratic power is established in South Korea, we will not put up the slogan for this confederation. We will simply call for a revolution.
LEE:
I find it amusing that Mr. Mitov listened to South Korean radio to be informed. I heard the same story from Chinese diplomats as well. I was speaking to the leaders of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party years ago, and they told me that while they were in North Korea stationed in Pyongyang, they had to listen to South Korean radio broadcasts and watch South Korean television broadcasts to be informed about developments both inside North Korea and outside North Korea.
STUECK: Did the North Koreans know you were listening to South Korean radio? That kind of surprises me. Certainly they didnt want their own people listening to South Korean radio. MITOV: This is a very interesting question because as a matter of fact it was forbid-
den to listen to South Korean radio and if anybody was caught there were serious consequences. All the radios were sealed in such a way that there could be no access, and I personally had a small Japanese radio with an earphone. I lived in the dormitory with two North Korean students. So every time they saw me with this little transistor radio and having the earpiece in my ear they would approach me and they would say, our party forbids us to listen to this radio, and then I would say in turn, well, my party doesnt forbid me. My party allows me to listen. But one day the person, the student that criticized me the most, I saw him one day with the earpiece in his ear and he had fallen asleep. So I very carefully took the radio with a handkerchief and then woke him up and I told him, Now I will go to the director, and I will tell the director what you are listening to. So from that point onward even when I was not listening to the radio he would be the one to
53
take turn listening to it and he would inform me of what he had heard and he would inform me of what was going on in South Korea.
OSTERMANN: Mr. Mitov, I wonder if you could just give us a sense of being part of the diplomatic community in Pyongyang in the early 1970s, who you interacted with in the North Korean government, who you interacted with closely or less closely among your fellow socialist diplomats and allies, and perhaps take us a little bit into the daily life of a diplomat in the late 1960s in the period that then proceeds immediately our period of discussion here. MITOV:
Before returning in 1973 as a diplomat, I was in Pyongyang as a student in 1968 and 1969. I was studying history at the time and Id like to point out that many of the other students from the [North Korean] military leadership and political leadership had enrolled themselves as students there as well. I had just arrived when the Bulgarian volleyball team arrived and when they arrived they asked me to join them to take a picture. That picture was published in one of the leading newspapers. Until then, any time the North Koreans saw a white person they would point out to him and they would say a Russian man, a Russian person. So anyway, I was a foreigner, a new person, a Bulgarian, who gained prominence just by appearing in the newspaper. The reason Im saying all this is because many of those fellow students from North Korea subsequently assumed leading positions in the military circles or in the political leadership. During the 1970s, I returned and worked as a diplomat in Pyongyang, as Third and Second Secretary at the Bulgarian Embassy. This gave me an opportunity to take direct part in important events concerning Bulgarian-Korean relations, events and high-level meetings, which involved issues and problems of a wider context, besides the specific bilateral relations between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. For example, the problems that were discussed and the relations between Bulgaria and North Korea also covered more comprehensive issues, such as the common, coordinated policy of the socialist countries in the United Nations, the overall security system in Asia, the cooperation within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Again turning to the conversation between Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung, you
54
B. DONOVAN PICARD
can see that bilateral meetings also included discussion about collective security in Asia, and coordinated actions and mutual foreign policy of socialist countries. Even though Todor Zhivkov pointed out [to Kim Il Sung] the advantages of developing not only the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and North Korea, but also including the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) in initiatives in the international arena, and that Korea should not isolate itself from the USSR and the Socialist CommunityKim Il Sungs response was that the DPRK must demonstrate self-reliance. Todor Zhivkovs position on these issues was undoubtedly coordinated with Leonid Brezhnev and, one can assume, that in the case of the 1973 meeting, the Bulgarian leader played the role not only of Bulgarias leader, but also as Brezhnevs diplomat. From the exchange of opinions it becomes clear that there was a distance between Kim Il Sung and Leonid Brezhnev, a distance that [Kim] maintained respectfully but had no desire to overcome. This is an important detail which is significant for the unification of Korea. Pyongyangs isolationist policy and its positions did not allow a wider circle of countries and participants in world politics to influence it on the Korean issue, to integrate it in the process of dtente between the East and the West, and in the context of reducing the opposition between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in a number of regions to find a solution for Korea as well. North Koreas policy of complete isolationism was also evident in Todor Zhivkovs proposal for the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea to be integrated into the COMECON, which would expand the mutual economic assistance and would contribute to the development of industry in the country. This issue was left without a specific response with the explanation that the Democratic Peoples
55
The Korean Workers Party did not express

a clear position on Chinas disagreements with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the provocations with armed forces along the Chinese-Russian border, and the rapprochement between China and the United States. [ ]the North Korean leader limited himself to evaluating Chinas policy as incomprehensible [ ]
Republic of Korea would remain an observer in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. In conclusion, the opposition of both countries across the 38th parallel could not be accepted as part of the general opposition between the East and the West in the 1970s. Neither the USSR, nor the socialist countries and members of the Warsaw Pact could exert the necessary influence, or conduct a coordinated policy with the DPRK to help direct the Korean issue towards one resolution or another. Pyongyangs position remained unchanged in their asserted isolationism towards all countries, including countries with identical social systems.
XIA:
I have two questions for Mr. Mitov. During your first time in Korea from 1967 to 1969, were you aware of the severe problems in the relations between China and North Korea? The second question is during your two stays in Korea, did you have any contact with the Chinese diplomats there, any talks or things like that?
MITOV: There were problems between North Korea and China at the time. There was a situation in North Korea with lack of coal and China was withholding the import of coal. It was a difficult situation that was later resolved. The Korean Workers Party did not express a clear position on Chinas disagreements with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the provocations with armed forces along the Chinese-Russian border, and the rapprochement between China and the United States. As you can see from the 1973 conversation between Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader limited himself to evaluating Chinas policy as incomprehensible, adding that even if he disagreed with it, North Korea would react by keeping our mouths shut, as Kim Il Sung himself put it. In answer to your second question, while I was a student there, there were several Chinese students. I had regular contact with the students. At the time, Kim Il Sung suggested that there should be an international student body president and that president should be Chinese. However, at the time a group of twenty Albanian students arrived, so having so many Albanians they became the majority among the international students and as a result I was chosen to be president of the
56
student body of the international students, and following that we had a falling out with the Chinese students.
OSTERMANN:
Can I just follow up on Bernd Schaefers question once more whether you could tell us anything about the perception at the time of the SinoAmerican rapprochement that we discussed earlier today and its effect on North Korean leadership to the extent that you in Pyongyang and from Sofia were able to discern that impact?
Diplomats would gather together and they

would speak about hunting and other various activities whereas I mingled with the people and I acquired valuable information. As in the Pueblo incident, I was informed by a high standing North Korean ofcial. He told me not to worry; dont you worry, everything will be ne.
The North Korean side did not view it in a very positive light. I cannot speak about later events because I have moved away from those events. I had many face-to-face meetings with the North Koreans and ordinary people as well. I would often go hunting and I would speak with the random people that I met, but truly the ordinary people, they did not feel that unification was possible with the presence of American forces in South Korea.
MITOV: PERSON: PARK:
We have a question from Dr. Myung-lim Park from Yonsei University.
I have several questions for Mr. Mitov. You served as a diplomat to Pyongyang during a critical period in inter-Korea relations. This was a time of great reversals in inter-Korean relations, especially as the economies of the two Koreas had reversed. When did the North Korean leadership, including Kim Il Sung, become aware of this great reversal in their national power? I would also like to ask about the power transfer from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il. At that time, Kim Jong Il was appointed as the successor to Kim Il Sung. From the perspective of a diplomat, did you know anything about the two Kims sharing power or about the transfer of power? Also, what was North Koreas perception and understanding of the international dtente? Finally, I have a question about the constitution change. At that time, North Korea revised its constitution from the prime minister system to the presidential system. Did you learn from the North Koreans their intention or some strategy behind the constitutional change?
57
MITOV: You raise very interesting questions and very important ones. Unfortunately, I did not follow this constitutional issue, so I cannot be helpful with information on this topic. I was in North Korea until 1974, but it is wrong to assume that the North Korean leadership informed the socialist countries at the time about what was going on. This was a wrong assumption. We were isolated. We were kept in isolation, and we were not informed on the part of the North Korean leadership, and also we would get information from outside sources or through personal contacts. None of the other ambassadors or diplomats knew Korean at the time. Diplomats would gather together and they would speak about hunting and other various activities whereas I mingled with the people and I acquired valuable information. As in the Pueblo incident, I was informed by a high standing North Korean official. He told me not to worry; dont you worry, everything will be fine. I also would like to point out that while I was at the embassy there I worked as Second Secretary; I did not work as ambassador, so a lot of the information that was transmitted only reached the Ambassador. It was not transferred further down the line. And there is a Balkan trait, I dont know if it is a Balkan trait or not, but people tended to think that if somebody knew the language that person had somehow connections with the North Korean spy organizations and Kim Il Sung and others, and they viewed him with suspicion. But many of the high-level officials at the embassy were deaf mutes without those of us who spoke the language and those of us who served as interpreters. So again speaking about the leaders of the embassy and in Pyongyang for instance, just to give you a sense of the situation at the time, there was a case when Park Chung Hee spoke on Seoul radio about problems that were very important. Instead of the ambassador letting me listen in to what was being said on Seoul
58
radio in order to better acquaint myself and get more information about the problems that were discussed, the ambassador told me, No, you dont listen to the radio, you go with my wife and interpret for her when she goes to the dentist. This is the type of problem we had unfortunately. Shortly thereafter, I voluntarily left my service in North Korea because I did not want to be perceived as a spy. I did not want to be perceived as a puppet in somebody elses hands. I went to work as counsel in Odessa. Later it was determined that I had no connections and did not engage in subversive activities of any kind, it was clarified that I had no connections with North Korean secret organizations.
PERSON: We have some time left in this panel, so lets perhaps turn to the breakdown of talks and reasons given for the breakdown of talks. Perhaps we can start with Dr. Lee and Mr. Kim describing the situation in late 1973 and then especially after the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung and what effect that had. This of course is given as the pretext for the breakdown in talks. LEE:
[ ] The North Koreans began to realize

that whereas they wanted to use these dialogues as a means to weaken the anti-communist orientation of South Korean society, on the contrary, the
As you said, the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung was a pretext North Korea used to justify their decision to make a departure from the dialogue. But the suspension of dialogue was destined to come because of the two different objectives that the two Koreas pursued. As soon as the Red Cross Talks and North-South Korean Committee meetings began, the North Koreans began coming up with a variety of suggestions which went out of the context of the talks. For example, in the context of the Red Cross talks, the South Korean side suggested that the humanitarian issue be pursued by adopting the methodology of the [International Committee of the Red Cross] in Geneva. But the North Koreans came up with the suggestion that the issue be pursued by allowing those individuals from separated families to freely come to each others side and search for their separated family members on their own. Then they followed that up with the suggestion that the two sides exchange publicity personnel to explain to the people on the other side about the activities of the tracing service and to conduct searches for the separated family members being sought. And that is not even the important part; the important part was that in suggesting that these publicity personnel be dispatched to the other side, they [were to] be given full freedom of speech and
continuation of the dialogue was helping South Korea become more anti-communist, [ ] so [they] quickly began feeling disillusioned about this continuation of dialogue.
59
LEE HURAK AND PAK SEONGCHEOL
freedom of movement while in the other side of Korea. And in doing that, South Korea in particular should take legal measures such as abolition of the National Security Law and dissolution of certain anti-communist government agencies and organizations, things like that, to ensure the freedom of movement of these publicity personnel while in South Korea. Then they began concentrating on issues such as the abolition of the National Security Law. So the solution to the separated families was not in itself an objective that they pursued by coming to the Red Cross talks. On the other side of the political dialogue conducted within the context of the North-South Coordinating Committee, as soon as this Committee was started, [the North Koreans] came up with the suggestion that the Committee be reorganized and expanded. The two sides would be represented in that expanded committee by between five to thirty representatives of about sixty or so political parties and social organizations, in addition to certain individuals, on the condition that in the case of South Korea, those who had espoused anti-communist beliefs be banned from being allowed to participate in the expanded version of the committee. So in other words, their aim was to use the avenue of dialogue as a means to create certain conditions in the South conducive to the kind of revolution that they had pursued. The South Korean side, by contrast, was confining itself to pursuing the kind of rapprochement between the two Koreas in a commonsense manner. In due course, as changes multiplied, the North Koreans began to realize that in terms of economic development, South Korea was already far ahead of North Korea. Secondly, the North Koreans began to realize that whereas they wanted to use these dialogues as a means to weaken the anti-communist orientation of South Korean society, on the contrary, the continuation of the dialogue was helping South Korea become more anti-communist, so to speak. So the North Koreans quickly began feeling disillusioned about this continuation of dialogue. That was becoming quite evident already sometime into the middle of 1972. By the turn of the year 1973, North Korea was very conspicuously losing interest in any further continuation of the dialogue. Then, in August of that year, the case of Kim Daejung kidnapping took place. Toward the end of the month, the North Koreans issued a statement in the name of Kim Yeongju in his capacity as co-chairman of the North-South Coordinating Committee. It said that because Lee Hurak,
60
who was acting as his counterpart, was the leader of a band of gangsters in South Korea, and therefore unworthy of being the counterpart in negotiation with the North Koreans, they were suspending talks both in the Coordinating Committee and in the Red Cross.
STUECK: Im sorry Mr. Lee but Im going to be a little bit provocative here. I find your description of North Koreas position to be perfectly plausible. What I find a little bit less so is that South Korea didnt have its own agenda regarding the possibility of interaction between South Korean families and North Korean families. Are you really saying that the ROK government, the Park regime, didnt have an agenda regarding the family exchanges that went beyond the humanitarian? LEE: I thought we are going to discuss that subject tomorrow morning, the politi-
cal dimension. I would rather reserve for tomorrow mornings session if I may.
SCHAEFER:
Its also a domestic dimension question. So if thats true, why did President Park in October 1972 have to come up with those emergency measures? And why did you need the Yushin Constitution if it was obvious that North Koreas strategy was going to fail and you said unification talks were making South Korea more anti-communist? If thats all true, why did President Park somehow feel in October of 1972 that he was losing control of certain segments or elements of society, and why did you have emergency rule and the Yushin Constitution? The North Korean narratives are of course different. They say the breakdown was not the Kim Dae-jung abduction, which was a pretext, but they said in 1972 that we were completely surprised by President Park instituting the emergency measures of the Yushin Constitution, which made no more sense because then basically it would be lost if we had no more chance to achieve what we had in mind. Would you mind if I respond to that tomorrow morning? Ill be looking forward to it.
LEE:
SCHAEFER:
61
SHIN: I have two questions for Mr. Kim Dasool and perhaps even Mr. Lee. Earlier
you had spoken on this issue so I need to just confirm and verify if I heard it correctly. You mentioned that during the Red Cross talks, North Korea had insisted that these talks be held in Panmunjeom and it seems that President Park was the one who had insisted and was able to see it through that the talks would be held on a rotational basis. Can I understand it that in the beginning, North Korea and President Park actually had different perspectives as to where the meetings would be held? If thats correct please confirm. Also, as far as the Red Cross talks are concerned, there was a certain point where the talks were not going anywhere, so for a long time we were not able to make any progress. Can I say that this was basically because Pyongyang wanted to have some time to prepare the city for the talks to be held, and also to have the highway laid rather than as the excuse which was given by Pyongyang that there would be some difficulties, including circles of friends rather than just intimate relatives as the people who would be included in the reunions. Could that be true?
KIM: As to the first question, yes, it is correct that it was us, South Korea, who had
insisted and put a lot of emphasis on having a rotational basis for the meetings. As to your second question, its partly correct in that North Korea came out and said that there were some issues, including the circle of friends, as the people who were prospective people to be met, and also there were some concerns about freedom of movement as North Korea had suggested, but thats not the whole thing. There were some concerns about Seoul and Pyongyang being prepared for these meetings to be held. So the starting point was actually quite different from North Korea and South Korea. The agenda for our August 12 Red Cross talks was to be the reunion of the divided families, but North Korea came out and stated that the meeting should not be about the divided families, but should be a political meeting. Thats what they had wanted from the beginning. Our understanding as far as the motive that North Korea had in their political meeting talks was that North Korea was intending to have South Korea become South Vietnam, in fact, basically wanting to have North Korean agents freely infiltrate South Korean society and free infiltration required the free mobility of these people, and Red Cross talks were in fact a pretext to allow for a freedom of
62
movement of North Korean agents in South Korea. So basically, North Korea was looking to weaken the anti-communist stance that the South Korean society had at the time. So the Red Cross talks stalled for quite a while because South and North Korea had different objectives. As stated earlier, South Korea wanted to have a reunion of divided families, but North Korea had their objectives of basically infiltrating South Korean society and North Korea wanted to find ways to have more underground organizations in South Korea and also their liberation front to be more active in South Korea. So when we go through the North Korean intentions, of course it was hard for us to come about having an agreement on anything. So there came certain clandestine meetings in which we had discussed how to separate the two. If you want to talk politics, we can talk politics in a separate meeting. So this is what actually had taken place and once we were able to reach an agreementthat the politics would be made a separate agenda from the Red Cross agendawe were able to break out of the stalemate.
SHIN: Actually perhaps my question was not focused enough because I really wanted
During the 1960s and 1970s,

North Korea had an ultimate goal that was to be carried out in three phases. The rst phase was to revolutionize internationally. The second phase was to revolutionize South
to ask you about the circle of friends. Why did the issue of circle of friends surface, was it because North Korea wanted to have some more time to prepare Pyongyang or was it because, just as you had stated, that they had other ulterior motives? Yes, thats correct. The way I see it, buying time was not the objective when they brought up this idea of circle of friends. North Korea really wanted to turn South Korea into a South Vietnam and now that talks had stalled for about a year, North Korea was in the meantime able to build the roads that were needed and also we were able to have a separate group known as a Coordination Conference which would allow for these political dialogues to be held.
KIM: LEE:
Korea. Finally, the third phase was to revolutionize North Korea so that North Korea would become the hub of all revolutions.
Let me supplement with an observation. When North Korea came to Panmunjeom, what they tried to do was not necessarily the humanitarian dialogue in the context of Red Cross talks in the pure sense of the word. They were trying to engage South Korea in a political dialogue in the context of the United Front strategy, so that was the reason why they came up with the suggestion in de-
63
Through this June 23 declaration,

we indicated to the world that South Korea was willing to open its doors to other communist countries including, North Korea and countries in Mideast, in other parts of Asia as well as Africa, and that South Korea was ready to normalize relations with any of these countries should they choose to.
termining the agenda. In addition to families, they tried to add friends in addition to relatives, and also they insisted that in determining the agenda, South Korea accept the reference of free movement in the setting of the agenda. So that was the reason why it took such a long time in having the agenda fi xed in the framework of the preliminary talks. As Mr. Kim observed, it was not necessary only because of the construction of the road, but also because of the difficulties in arriving at an agreement over the agenda which took such a long time, which actually was more than a year.
OSTERMANN: A question for Mr. Kim on South Korean understanding of North
Korean policymaking and intentions at the time. Looking back in light of what we know today, how good was your intelligence on North Korea? You suggested your understanding at the time of motives behind the talks on the part of North Korea. I wonder if you could elaborate on that and assess, looking back on how South Koreas understanding holds up today in light of what we now know and in light of the new sources and documents that have come out since. How good was your understanding of North Korea back in the early 1970s? During the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea had an ultimate goal that was to be carried out in three phases. The first phase was to revolutionize internationally. The second phase was to revolutionize South Korea. Finally, the third phase was to revolutionize North Korea so that North Korea would become the hub of all revolutions. When I went to Pyongyang in 1972, I recall seeing this slogan hanging on the main streets that said that we should make sashimi out of the American imperialists. So from the three revolutionary paths that North Korea was pursuing, you can see turning South Korea into a communist country was one of the more important ones. So the three revolutionary paths were the objectives that North Korea was pursuing, and our objective at the time in South Korea was to break through the three revolutionary paths that North Korea had and to dispel any attempts by North Korea to achieve their objective. For example, in their first path of international revolution, North Korea pursued Asian and African countries as well as South American countries that were part of the non-aligned movement and through alliances with these non-aligned
KIM:
64
countries, North Korea tried to overcome the imperialism of the U.S. South Korea, of course, had to counterattack the North Korean path that was taken. This was symbolized in our June 23 Declaration [of 1973].6 Through this June 23 Declaration, we indicated to the world that South Korea was willing to open its doors to other communist countries including, North Korea and countries in Mideast, in other parts of Asia as well as Africa, and that South Korea was ready to normalize relations with any of these countries should they choose to.
OSTERMANN:
Maybe this was just the diplomatic answer to my question. It was really more methodologically about how you derived the information and your assessments of North Korean motives in the early 1970s. If you can speak to that in a general sense it would be of interest.
LEE: Let me respond to your question.
To a large extent, we had to rely upon the North Korean publications, documents, and materials which had a lot of North Koreas intentions and strategies and tactics. In addition to that, we had to rely upon the information that we were collecting through the pro-North Korean communities in Japan, as well as through other countries friendly to North Korea, which mostly belonged to the non-aligned movement. Also, we had other means of obtaining information through North Koreans captured by us or North Koreans who defected to us. So these are the roots through which we were collecting this information which we later corroborated into our evaluations of North Koreas intentions and strategies. And to supplement some of the explanations that Mr. Kim gave to you a while ago, which is an officially proclaimed North Korean strategy in dealing with not only South Korea, but also the United States, which is a strategy to tear limbs away from the body. This was a strategy that North Korea used to describe their intention to isolate the United States from the rest of the world. They regarded Europe, South America, Asia, and Africa as the limbs of the United States. Their strategy of tearing limbs apart from the body meant somehow isolating the United States from the rest of the world, including Asia, South America, Africa, and Europe. That also had the application to South Korea as well, which meant they were trying to isolate the South Korean government from other societal forces.
65
RYOO KIHLJAE
That is where their concept of the United Front strategy figures in. When they came up with the Red Cross talks, their intention was to use the Red Cross dialogue talks as a means to isolate the South Korean government from international society. That was mostly their intention, but in due course, they had to begin to understand, to realize, that that strategy was not paying off. Then they began to quickly lose interest in going any further with the dialogue. I think weve come quite a bit on the topic of allies of North Korea. During this time period, North Korea was reaching out to the U.S. and Japan to establish contact with them, and at the same time, South Korea was reaching out to China and also towards the Soviet Union. According to the documents that we were able to review, and not just the June 23 Declaration, the South Korean government had reached out to China and to the Soviet Union. To a certain extent, South Korea sought some help from the U.S. in reaching out to China and the Soviet Union. The interesting thing is that the two countries had reacted to South Koreas overture rather differently. The Soviet Union seemed somehow more receptive of the South Korean overture. In fact, there are some records in the Korean government which indicate that in Sweden there were contacts between South Korean diplomats and Soviet diplomats and this apparently had occurred on multiple occasions. However, China seems to have been rather negative in reacting to the overture by South Korea. My question would be open to the floor to all the diplomats; why was it that there was such a disparity in the reception by the two countries to the overture by South Korea?
HONG:
66
LEE:
Let me comment on that. Between the United States and China, there used to be what was referred to as Warsaw talk or Warsaw Dialogue between Alexis Johnson and Wang Bingnan which lasted between 1954 or 1955 through 1970-something. It was not actually a dialogue at all. Sometimes they met and they remained silent until they departed, or sometimes one side talked only while the other side simply listened. And other times they sat down for a couple of hours without anybody speaking at all. So it was not necessarily anything which we may refer to in the context of a dialogue. That was something which is quite typical of the Cold War era. So what you are explaining in terms of those contacts between South Korea and Russia, USSR and China was something which could be likened to those type of encounters. To a certain extent, in its initial stage the North-South dialogue was also quite similar to that. It was falling short of being referred to in the context of a dialogue. So at the time of the Warsaw meeting there was reference of talking to the world and during the initial stage of the inter-Korean dialogue we talked about speaking on different wavelengths. Its not a two-way dialogue; its sort of a one-way dialogue, because the two sides had respectively their own objectives which did not actually need to be together. So until the event of Nordpolitik, or northern diplomacy, of the Roh Tae-woo government, I dont think there had been any meaningful interactions between South Korea and the USSR, nor between South Korea and China. So trying to make a comparison between those two sets of encounters appears to me to be rather meaningless. It was only after the 1988 Olympics that meaningful dialogue began being developed between Seoul and Moscow and between Seoul and Beijing. I think that should be how we should understand the context of those relationships. I am feeling quite negative to giving that much significance to whatever encounters that had transpired during the timeframe in the 1970s or earlier than that. Could I follow up with this thought? A further question on this would be, how did you assess at the time Chinas role with regard to North Korean policymaking?
OSTERMANN:
67
LEE:
Chinas role in that timeframe was giving full-hearted support to North Korea. China was struggling very hard to establish itself diplomatically. China did not have that much leverage to figure it into that context of international diplomacy. China was literally unprepared to respond to approaches if there were any coming from Seoul. I think that is how things stood at that time.
XIA: I just want to add some footnotes to the dialogue that you just had. I received
a number of recently declassified Chinese documents two days ago. Theres one which might add something to this panel because this panel discusses the DPRKs relations with allied countries. This document is actually the minutes of the conversation between Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung during Kim Il Sungs April 18, 1975 visit to Beijing. Let me read a little bit. Its Chinese, but Ill try to translate it into English. Kim Il Sung was having a conversation with Mao when he went to visit Mao at his residence. Kim Il Sung said, After I return to Korea in May I will go to Romania, Algeria and Mauritania. There might be other countries, but Im not sure at this point. Then they engaged in small talk, and Kim Il Sung basically says, I am going to Algeria because the President of Algeria, [Houari] Boumedine, is the chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. So Mao said, Boumedine is a very clever guy and Kim Il Sung responded, Well, he has been very supportive of us. Then Mao asked, Why dont you go to Albania? China had a problem with Albania by this time because Albania was against Chinas rapprochement with the United States. Kim Il Sung responded, Well, I have not decided yet. Albania has normal relations with us. We improved our relations recently. Mao then said, Well, thats good. Albania doesnt like Vietnam. They dont like us either. We invited Nixon. They dont like that. They are unhappy. Acting surprised, Kim Il Sung then asked, Albania? And Mao said, Yes. Kim Il Sung said, Is Vietnam not happy either? Mao responded, Vietnam is very unhappy. Kim Il Sung said, I believe that the Vietnamese dont understand your revolutionary diplomacy.
68
Mao said, We invited Nixon. We invited Kissinger. Kissinger is a very bad guy. Nixon is good. Kim Il Sung said, Maybe Kissinger is a little cunning. You invited Nixon. We actually support you. Later I also delivered a speech supporting the Chairmans revolutionary diplomacy. Mao said, We basically want to use Nixon in order to get in touch with the American people. Kim Il Sung said, Very good. They have embargoed China for several dozen years. Now this is a great victory. We understand. Why are they unhappy? I dont understand. Mao said, They are not happy but now a little better. Kim Il Sung responded, I said at that time that this is a great victory for China. China didnt go to ask America. Its a great victory. Mao said, I told Nixon to come to us. Kim Il Sung said, This is a great victory. Your victory is our common victory. We should celebrate. I dont know why they dont understand you. I actually talked about this issue with Premier Zhou.
LEE: XIA: LEE:
What year was that? This is April 1975.
In July 1975, Kim Il Sung spoke to Tokuma Utsonomiya, a member of the Japanese diet. During this meeting, he said that now that the war in Indochina war was coming to an end with Vietnam the victor, it is now the turn of the Korean Peninsula; we may follow-up with a war of national liberation. That was the timeframe when Kim Il Sung was very upbeat, relishing the aftermath of the victorious Vietnamese winning the war. Actually when Kim Il Sung went to Europe, he also went to Bulgaria. He had a long talk there with Todor Zhivkov. His conversation with Zhivkov no longer reflects the sentiments that you just told us about, because apparently when he was in China, Kim Il Sung got the impression that China would not support Koreas military adventurism to follow the example of
SCHAEFER:
69
In April, Kim Il Sung was invited

to Beijing where he almost openly sought Chinese support for another war of national liberation conducted in the Korean Peninsula, but China was very reluctant.
Indochina. When he is in Bulgaria, Kim explains in detail why Korea is not Vietnam, why South Korea does not work like South Vietnam. He provided a lot of reasons, including geography, strategy, etc., and explains that it makes no sense for North Korea to carry out an armed struggle in South Korea. Th is is the summer of 1975, so its a few months after his visit to Beijing when he apparently realized this, and makes it pretty clear. He actually apologizes because it was impossible. Still, it was impossible to replicate the Vietnamese triumph in South Korea. The Inter-Korean rivalry at that time was a microcosm and condensed symbol of the East-West bloc confrontation. Did you have close consultations with the United States both before and after meetings with the North?
PARK: LEE: Well, in those days we continued to have dialogue with American diplomats both in Seoul and in Washington. It was about the time when North Korea was already into several years of playing games of one against another between China and Russia. So by the time the Vietnamese War was coming to an end in 1975, North Korea was very close to China. North Korea was rather cool with the Soviet Union. So as was pointed out, in April, Kim Il Sung was invited to Beijing where he almost openly sought Chinese support for another war of national liberation conducted in the Korean Peninsula, but China was very reluctant. But later in Bulgaria, Kim Il Sung appears to have begun changing some of his remarks. SHIN:
I would like to add further to what Mr. Lee had stated earlier. It is correct that on April 18 1975 Kim Il Sung had visited Mao Zedong along with O Jinu. And at the time, Kim Il Sung had indicated to Mao Zedong that the timing was ripe for us to unify the Korean Peninsula by force. However, two months after this meeting had taken place from June 2 to June 5 1975 in Bulgaria, in a meeting with Mr. Zhivkov, Kim Il Sung states that we will not be the one to first attack South Korea because of certain issues involving the geography and the military preparedness of South Korea. So Kim Il Sung at this point concedes and says that there will not be unification by force.
70
So this is the same person making two different remarks and the two remarks are quite opposite of one another, very paradoxical you could say. But I think actually the latter, the second one was closer to the truth. If I may take a guess as to why Kim Il Sung had made these two statements, I would say this was really a strategic statement made to China, because if Kim Il Sung were to let China know that he had given up on unification by might, then perhaps the leverage that North Korea was able to exercise or have towards China, and also towards the Soviets, may have become shorter and not as strong as before. So my guess would be that this was a politically motivated strategic statement.
LEE:
Well, I dont think Kim Il Sung was that contradictory in speaking to different audiences in that timeframe. Even when he was speaking at the Chinese State Council dinner, he did not directly refer to armed aggression of the South. What he said was there was going to be a situation becoming more favorable for the revolutionary upheaval in South Korea. And he said that when this occurs in South Korea, we are not going to be standing by; we will intervene. And then he followed up with the remark that if a war is going to occur on the Korean Peninsula again, the only thing that we will lose would be the military demarcation in exchange for unification. So if we take all the context, he was clearly referring to the military solution for the unification of Korea when he was speaking not only to Zhivkov, but he was also speaking to [Nicolae] Ceauescu of Romania and also to Tokuma Utsonomiya. And he kept on speaking about the South Korean situation where he saw the revolutionary situation becoming riper, so much so that he was looking forward to seeing a revolutionary upheaval in South Korea, at which time North Korea was not going to be idly standing by. So I think that is a very consistent remark that he kept on repeating in that timeframe. What would have suggested to Kim Il Sung that the situation was becoming ripe for revolution?
PERSON:
LEE:
On a number of occasions Kim Il Sung was very specific in remarking that now that the war for national liberation in Vietnam was coming to a close, where
71
North Vietnam is turning out to be victorious, achieving unification, its now the turn of the Korean Peninsula where this war for national liberation can be fought for the ultimate accomplishment of unification.
PERSON: So theres no real evidence of the situation becoming ripe for revolution
in the South? No, in his conversation with Zhivkov and Ceauescu he was very explicit about the reason why he thought so favorably about the ripening of the situation in South Korea.
LEE: SCHAEFER:
Unfortunately, the only source we have about Kim Il Sungs visit in April of 1975 to Beijing is this banquet speech where he said exactly that sentence: If war breaks out we have nothing to lose but the DMZ. And also this line, the revolutionary tide in Asia is high. But, of course, what is suspicious is the timing of the visit. It was a very unusual, a very high profile visit to China, which hadnt happened for many years before, takes place after the fall of Phnom Penh and before the impending fall of Saigon. What we can say at least is certain is that they were trying to explore with China options for the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately in these snippets of conversations, we dont have anything about that in there. But if at some point, the transcript or more snippets from the talk between Mao and Kim Il Sung came out, we might know more about that. I also agree with Mr. Lee, its not quite contradictory, but when he is staying in these Eastern European countries, he elaborates, and I think if you read the text he almost apologizes for why he has not actually succeeded. This is something which youll find in many of the Eastern European documents, that Kim Il Sung really felt under some pressure, and I think its true that he was under pressure to explain to himself and maybe also to his leadership why South Korea was no South Vietnam. So South Vietnam really was a major challenge in that the Vietnamese were successful and Kim Il Sung was not successful, so he really had to come up with all kinds of reasons why it would not work. And in his talk with Zhivkov, we have a lot of arguments outlined.
72
GEORGI MITOV
Just two points. Number one, during this period, there was a reassessment going on in United States intelligence circles regarding the military strengths or the military balance on the peninsula. It doesnt culminate until 1978 or 1979, but it certainly had begun in 1975. According to the early 1970s assessment in the United States, there was pretty much a balance between the two sides. But by 1975, there was a reevaluation that had begun in the United States that led to the conclusion that there in fact was not a balance; North Korea had a distinct advantage over South Korea. The second point is, if all of this is correct, and if the KCIA knew something of this [the U.S. ressassment] at the time, it makes their response to the turmoil of 1979, both before and after the assassination of Park, much more explicable in terms of their desire to repress it [the U.S. ressassment].
STUECK: LEE: Correct me if Im wrong, but to my recollection, the reevaluation of the mili-
tary balance of power in the Korean Peninsula by the U.S. administration began after the inauguration of President Carter. It was what we call bean counting, which had begun being used as a means of reevaluating North Koreas military strength, and that began after the inauguration of President Carter because the U.S. military establishment was in opposition to Carters troop withdrawal commitment. So the Pentagon began undertaking this reevaluation of the military balance of the Korean Peninsula with the use of bean counting which resulted in assessing North Korean military capability to be a lot stronger than the previous result of reevaluation. Thats the way I recall.
ODONOHUE: Well, I think were talking about overlapping events. They had started the bean counting. One thing to remember is that this was premised on
73
North-South Korea. The American component still gave the advantage. In other words, it wasnt that North Korea could beat South Korea with American forces. So its focus was on an abstraction, but an important one. I think what we then had with Carter coming in was part of the approach in terms of withdrawing the division and compensating South Korea militarily. And so you did go into this other thing which was putting together a package which would be a part of the withdrawal. As I remember, a reasonable amount of the package was delivered despite the fact that the second division hadnt yet withdrawn.
LEE:
Are you referring to the composition package? For the Second Division, yes.
ODONOHUE: LEE:
I mean the composition package for, vis--vis Second Division pullout?
ODONOHUE: Yes. LEE:
That took place in 1977. Yes.
ODONOHUE:
STUECK: Im sorry, I was involved in the memoir of a person who was directly involved in the intelligence study in Washington. His name is James Young and at the time he was the assistant military attach in Seoul, but in 1975, he was with DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and he was one of the key figures in doing the bean counting. And its clear that although the study was ongoing, it began well before Carter, it was very far along, and then Carter of course wasnt aware of this before he got into office and the fi nal report didnt come until maybe sometime in 1978 and maybe in 1979, but the trend was already towards ODONOHUE:
They were overlapping events.
74
STUECK:
Yes, right. And the other thing you have to understand too is that the discussion of the possible withdrawal of the Second Division preceded Carter. We tend to forget this, that really there was a discussion either in the summer of 1975 or 1976 in which Kissinger was involved, in which Philip Habib actually proposed the withdrawal of the Second Division and Kissinger blocked it, so this all preceded Carter.
ODONOHUE: Yeah, actually the proposal was to go to a brigade originally. Youre
right. The idea of withdrawing the Second Division was viewed as sort of inevitable over an indefinite timeframe and the study related to what it would mean.
75
KIM DALSOOL
Panel IV
Inter-Korean Dialogue and the Domestic Politics of the Two Koreas
Chair: Ryoo Kihljae Provocateurs: Shin Jong-dae, James Person

RYOO:
In this session, we will hear the veterans speak about the domestic politics of both Koreas during the 1970s. Both Koreas underwent dynamic and significant political changes [during this period]. First I will give the microphone to Shin Jong-dae of the University of North Korean Studies.
SHIN: I would like to start by referring to a document from the Bulgarian Embassy in Pyongyang which shows that on October 15, two days prior to the announcement of Yushin on October 17, South Korea notified North Korea that the Yushin Constitution would be announced. So there were two meetings that apparently took place on October 16 and October 18. In one of these meetings, Director Lee Hurak sent a message to Kim Yeongju of North Korea. In this message, delivered through Director Lee, President Park suggested that he would like to see unification happen on the Korean Peninsula. However, it was apparent that most, or a large portion of the Korean populace did not want unification, and as such, it was necessary to take emergency measures in South Korea. The message went further to state that President Park would like to see the dialogue continue and the measures that were being taken by the South Korean government should not be mistaken as a sign that South Korea did not want any further talks. That was how the message was sent. So the way I read the situation is that as far as Yushin was concerned, it was important that the inter-Korea dialogue continue before and until Yushin became more of a fi xture in South Korea. And for the South Korean government, inter-
77
PANEL IV: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF THE TWO KOREAS
Korean dialogue was, in a way, a tool for ensuring that Yushin could become a success. So given this situation, it seems that the joint communiqu that was produced as a result of South-North Korea dialogue seems to have reflected most of the desires of North Korea, and it seems that after Yushin, South Korea took a more defensive posture rather than the other way around. This, I would say, was attributable to the very fact that the South Korean government was trying to bring about Yushin. So, my first question is whether it is true that South Korea became more defensive as a result of what had occurred. My second question refers to the conversations Kim Il Sung had with [Nicolae] Ceaucescu, president of Romania, during 1972. A presidential election had taken place in South Korea during April of 1971, and in reference to the election, North Korea expressed their view that everything they had wanted to say in regard to peaceful unification on the Korean Peninsula had been very well said by candidate Kim Dae-jung. So the document expresses [North Koreas] full support for Kim Dae-jung, and expresses North Koreas wish to ensure that there would be continued isolation of President Park. Part of that attempt had been to bring about eight items as a precondition for unification on the Korean Peninsula. From the documents, I was able to see that North Korea had made up their strategy and that the strategy was to continue pursuing inter-Korean dialogue and peaceful unification [in order to]be able to find ways to isolate the dictator, President Park, from the international community as well as from the South Korean people. The documents further go on to state that by isolating the dictator from his people as well as from the international community, that although the presidential election in 1971 ended in failure for the opposition party, the next presidential election would be successful for the opposition party and that the person that they wanted [Kim Dae-jung] would be in power. After that, there was the Joint Communiqu of July 4, 1972. After the Joint Communiqu was announced, the opposition party came out and said, we do not fear aggression from the North, so we no longer need to have the National Security Law or the presence of American troops on the Korean Peninsula. So when you see the flow of events that occurred, the North Korean strategies actually seem to have been fairly effective during this time.
78
Also, in December 1971, President Park announced a state of emergency and the reason was because there was an increasing threat from North Korea. Thats what the president had stated and his government had stated. In response, the opposition party came out and said the president and the ruling party was using the nations security as a hostage and that they were actually abusing the security of the peninsula for their own interests. Thats what the opposition party was claiming. However, when you look back, in light of all these documents that we have been able to refer to, and in light of what I have stated thus far, it seems that President Park was well aware of the background and the objectives that North Korea had, and the infiltration by North Korea into South Korea had been quite well known. President Park was actually quite knowledgeable. Having said this, I would like to know if it was truly as I have described. Are the documents correct the way I have read them?
PERSON:
I have some questions about the North Korean constitution. In 1972, North Korea enacted the so-called Socialist Constitution which named Kim Il Sung president. This constitution was seen by many to institutionalize the Suryeong system, or the chieftain system, although its origins can be traced to 1967 when the monolithic system was first introduced. I would like to know how much South Korea knew about this constitution in advance. We know from the Bulgarian document mentioned by Professor Shin that South Korea informed North Korea of its plans to declare martial law ahead of the Yushin Constitution. Were the North Koreans as forthcoming with information about domestic changes? Was there much discussion about to the plan to enact this new constitution? Were there channels of communication to discuss domestic politics? This could be directed to both Dr. Lee and Mr. Kim. We can start with that and then Ill follow up with additional questions.
LEE:
I think the subjects that are being discussed now take us to a very sensitive area and I think there is need for me and some of the others to be somewhat careful so we do not depart from the facts. So let me address these issues with as much prudence as possible. Let me address the simpler question first asked by Mr. Person. Regarding the constitutional amendment which North Korea undertook
79
XIA YAFENG
in late 1972, we did not know of this in advance because in North Korea, the constitution was very confidential information. They treated it very confidentially, so much so that it was difficult for us to obtain the contents of the constitution. So much so that when this constitutional amendment took place in North Korea, it took us quite a long time before we were able to obtain the content of those amendments. And as it relates to that constitutional amendment of 1972, I think the question is about the possibility that because of the existence of the NorthSouth dialogue along the political track within the context of the North-South Coordinating Committee, I think Mr. Person is finding it suspicious that there had been some kind of a prior consultation between the two Koreas regarding this constitutions amendments and what they were supposed to be about. That did not take place at that time. There was no prior consultation between the two sides. We came to know of the constitutional amendments posthumously, so I dont think there is any further need to discuss it in the context that the constitutional amendments having taken place in North Korea late 1972 and the Yushin constitutional amendment in South Korea were some products of inter-Korean exchanges. That was not the case, so lets settle that there. Now, regarding the first item of Dr. Shins questions. Yes, the record is accurate that one day prior to the announcement made by the government about the dissolution of the National Assembly and the governments move to amend the constitution, which took place on October 16, North Korea was notified, as pointed out there [in the document]. Actually Jeong Hongjin, with whom I was working, met Kim Deokhyeon, his counterpart, in Panmunjeom and conveyed a sort of message explaining exactly what the record mentions; that South Korea was now dissolving the National Assembly and taking the process toward a constitutional amendment, which is not intended to antagonize North Korea, but a means to create conditions more favorable for the inter-Korean dialogue. But that message did not contain the contents of the constitutional amendment. Explanations about the constitutional amendment were not relayed to North Korea until several days thereafter. Having said that, we must understand, as we discussed yesterday morning, that the initiatives of the two Koreas taken in 1971 and 1972 that brought about the initiation of the inter-Korean dialogue came from both sides. I said that North Korea did that proactively and South Korea did that reactively in response to
80
changes in the international situation, which is correct. At that time, South Korea was feeling very anxious, suspicious about the intentions of Washington, so much so that South Korea felt the need to somehow come up with some ways to be prepared, or if not, to counter, whereas North Korea was more upbeat. North Korea was finding the overall international situation more favorable to them in its pursuit of unification. So as the records coming from the communist countries point out, Kim Il Sung and North Korean leaders were rather aggressive in coming forward for the dialogue. Clearly, with that optimism North Korea could take advantage of the dialogue as a means to penetrate into South Korea and work toward certain conditions and patterns by which North Korea could see reductions in the negative or antagonistic sentiment in South Korea toward North Korea. Thats the reason why they came up with those preconditions like some changes of the law and dissolution and abolition of different institutions and agencies, things like that, as preconditions. And the [North Korean] constitutional amendment of 1972 was characterized by such changes as observed, elevating the status of Kim Il Sung from that of premier to president. And you know it may sound ironic, but as the two Koreas began engaging in dialogue, the calling of the two leaders, President Park as against Premier Kim Il Sung, was found very unfavorable to the North Koreans. You know they began talking about a confederation scheme. Kim Il Sung spoke about that in his meeting with Lee Hurak in November of 1972, that maybe the two Koreas initially agree to a unified confederation formula. Kim Il Sung said things like, Well, I may not seek the office of prime minister. But the North Korean people were very sensitive about the fact that whereas Park was referred to as President Park, Kim Il Sung was referred to as Premier Kim. So that was one of the driving causes of the [North Korean] constitutional amendment in 1972. Now let me come back to another dimension. As was pointed out, South Korea did convey to the North Koreans its intention to revise the constitution. Why South Korea did that, in order for us to understand that, I need to give you a general observation of the political circumstances in South Korea then. The North-South dialogue of the early 1970s was largely pushed by Lee Hurak rather than President Park Chung Hee. At that time, Lee Hurak was in his third term and there were some measure of political uncertainties as to what would happen
But the North Korean people

were very sensitive about the fact that whereas Park was referred to as President Park, Kim Il Sung was referred to as Premier Kim. So that was one of the driving causes of the [North Korean] constitutional amendment in 1972.
81
thereafter. And I do not know if President Park himself had an intention to move toward extending his stay in power by that timeframe, but it was Mr. Lee Hurak who began nurturing the idea of looking for an opportunity to create an environment for President Park to continue to remain in his office. So it was sometime around the early part of 1972 when Mr. Lee Hurak tasked some people to go abroad to countries like Argentina, Taiwan, and Spain to conduct studies and research on how the power systems in those countries where lifetime presidents or lifetime heads of state had been constitutionally institutionalized. So it was, I think it began in 1971, and when Lee Hurak began launching his efforts to open up a dialogue with North Korea, Lee Hurak, being a very clever person, I have a strong impression that he struck up the idea that there might be the possibility of this inter-Korean dialogue and quickly hooked up to his desire that there be in due course a constitutional amendment allowing the president to continue to be elected as the president of the country, republic. So as he was looking forward to taking steps for the Yushin Constitution and he felt it possible that this inter-Korean dialogue could be taken advantage of to rationalize or justify this political restructuring, so much so that you know in 1972 after the exchange of secret visits by Lee Hurak and Pak Seongcheol, the two sides began moving toward a joint statement which culminated with the July 4 Joint Communiqu. At this time, when our side tossed out the idea of reaching an agreement in the form of a joint statement, the North Koreans immediately came back with the suggestion that the statement be built around the three basic principles for unification, which the North Koreans had been talking about for a long time independent unification, peaceful unification, and national unity. I was among many working-level people who were opposed to allowing these principles inserted into that statement at that stage because I and others felt that if those principles were allowed to be admitted, then it would almost without fail open up a way for differences in interpretation which would make it difficult for the dialogue to move forward. But Lee Hurak insisted that those be accepted, so the process did not take long and toward the latter part of June the statement was almost about ready. So on July 4, the two sides announced that they had agreed to this Joint Communiqu.
82
Actually at first the North Koreans wanted Lee Hurak to come to Pyongyang and use Pyongyang as the venue for the announcement of the Joint Communiqu, but some different opinions were raised in South Korea. And Lee Hurak too was rather reluctant to go to Pyongyang and make the announcement in Pyongyang for many reasons. You know that it might have been propagandistically taken as an advantage by North Korea, things like that. So after the announcement of the Joint Communiqu, Lee Hurak immediately began taking steps for the Yushin Constitutional Amendment. So much so that by the time that the government was to announce the dissolution of the National Assembly on the 16th of October, one of the things which that very much captured the attention of Mr. Lee Hurak and others in South Korea was the fear that North Korea might react to the constitutional amendment negatively. Then the constitutional amendment movement might run into political storms. So the delivery of that message on October 15 followed by the explanation about the contempt of the constitutional amendment that took place thereafter were a reflection of the desire on the part of the South Korean people to prevent North Korea from reacting negatively to this political process in South Korea. And mysteriously, North Koreans did not react negatively because of two reasons. First, North Koreans were very optimistic that this constitutional amendment was yet another piece of South Koreas activity reflecting the fact that South Korea was in a very defensive position. And there was still hope that as the dialogue continued, dialogue could pose as a bridge for North Koreas move to instigate revolution in South Koreathat the revolution would be carried across the DMZ into South Korea, and they were still hopeful that the dialogue could be utilized as the bridge. And secondly, North Korea was taking this as an opportunity to come up with their own version of constitutional amendment in which Kim Il Sung was being promoted, elevated, to the status of president. So this, among other reasons, set the stage for those two political events to take place, the constitutional amendment in South Korea and another constitutional amendment in North Korea toward the end of 1972. Let me stop there. During the inter-Korea dialogue, I had worked mostly with the Red Cross and Mr. Lee on the other hand had worked on the Coordination Committee, so as far as political motives or political operations are concerned, I would say that Mr.
KIM:
After the announcement

of the Joint Communiqu, Lee Hurak immediately began taking steps for the Yushin Constitutional Amendment.
83
I was actually shocked to see

how bad the railroads and road conditions were [in North Korea], and I was even more shocked to see that many of these railroads were in disrepair and that they had been neglected for so long. Another example would be the forestry of North Korea, they did not have trees and it was a shock to me that the mountains would not have trees.
Lee has the better information among the two of us. So what I will say in regards to the political nature of the dialogue would be really a supplement to what Mr. Lee has said. However, I will take several different perspectives, so there might be a slight variation in our explanations. I spoke about this yesterday. There was the Joint Communiqu of South and North Korea on July 4, 1972, and after the Communiqu was announced there were rotational visits to Seoul and Pyongyang and these rotational visits were very, very important. After the announcement of the Communiqu, from the fall of 1972 and leading up to the stoppage of the talks in 1973, we had a one year window where we held many discussions. And as far as the Red Cross was concerned, we had about seven meetings altogether, rotating between Seoul and Pyongyang. And as far as the Coordination Committee was concerned, we had about five meetings altogether. Now when you look at the make-up of the people who were involved in these discussions, you would see that these people were very high-ranking officials from both the South and North Korean regimes. This was many years after the Korean War had broken out and, after a few decades, when both sides had a chance to look at one another, they were actually in shock on both sides. The first shock that happened was between the U.S. and China, and then the second shock would come from these [inter-Korean] meetings. And I would say the magnitude of the shock that was felt on both sides of the DMZ was about the same as the magnitude that was felt during that time of the two bigger countries. For example, I was actually shocked to see how bad the railroads and road conditions were [in North Korea], and I was even more shocked to see that many of these railroads were in disrepair and that they had been neglected for so long. Another example would be the forestry of North Korea, they did not have trees and it was a shock to me that the mountains would not have trees. And also for the chemicals that were used, in South Korea most of the chemicals were petrol-based, so we would produce vinyl from petrol-based chemicals. However, North Korea was producing vinyl from coal-based chemicals which were quite outdated. So I can only imagine that the North Koreans had an equal magnitude of shock when they visited South Korea. What I think they may have seen was the highways that we had in South Korea and the industries that we had, and I am pretty sure that they saw with their
84
own eyes how fast we were moving economically and also how efficient we were. Prior to their visit to South Korea, Im pretty sure that they felt that the South Korean government was merely a puppet government of America and that once the Americans pulled out from the Peninsula, that this would actually mean a death sentence for the government of South Korea. But what they actually came and saw were all these highways that were running through South Korea and also there were anti-tank defense devices and other infrastructures such as the airbases which would stay even after the withdrawal of the Americans. Also if you recall during the Korean War it only took a few days for the North Koreans to push South Koreans all the way down to Daegu and Busan, and this was mainly due to the Soviet tank and because the South Korean Army did not have any anti-tank devices or measures. So what we did in South Korea was, when the North Korean representatives visited South Korea, we would ensure and intentionally have these items exposed to their eyes so that the defense mechanisms and defense infrastructure would be seen by their own eyes. So through these exchanges between South and North Koreans we were able to actually change our perspectives and we came to break out of our preconceptions that we had. Following these talks, there was Yushin in South Korea and then there was a chieftain system, or Yuil system [in North Korea]. As far as South Korea was concerned, the priority was security. National security was the number one priority. Now this was necessary because from our visit to North Korea, we came to realize that all the infrastructure of North Korea was outdated and due to their socialist system, we came to realize that military was the foremost important thing and the whole society had been militarized in North Korea and as such we felt it necessary to prepare for them. So a good comparison would be that towards the end of the Second World War there were the kamikazes of Japanese and the Japanese had these people who would be piloting their planes into U.S. ships, and we felt that the North Koreans had the same attitude towards the war that would be carried out on the peninsula if there were to be one. And adding further to the concerns was the fact that the demands that were made by North Korea during the Red Cross and also in the Coordination Committee meetings were akin to having South Korea disarm itself. So when you think of all these things that were happening, Yushin became necessary and
85
thats why the Yushin came about in South Korea. In South Korea, we had Yushin and in North Korea we had a new system which would be a monolithic system known as Yuil, and in that monolithic system, they had a new constitution which was discussed briefly here. The important parts about this constitution in North Korea is that, first, Kim Il Sung became the Chieftan, or Suryeong, of North Korea and secondly and perhaps quite important as well is that the capital of Korea had changed from Seoul to Pyongyang, so prior to the new constitution, in the North Korean Constitution, Seoul had been the capital of the Peninsula. And as far as North Korea is concerned, as indicated to you earlier yesterday, they were following the three revolutionary paths. If the three paths were completed, then it would lead to the unification of the Korean Peninsula under communist party rule and that Kim Il Sung would eventually become the head of the communist party and the Peninsula and that Kim Il Sung would rule in Seoul. Through the exchanges that we have had thus far, I believe this indicates that there was a change in the attitude that Kim Il Sung was taking towards the revolutionary path to be taken. So what was happening in North Korea? We have China and the Soviets who had been the backers of North Korea, but now North Koreans saw that China was in the midst of rapprochement with the U.S. And South Korea apparently was a lot stronger and better prepared than North Koreans had initially thought, so North Korea came to realize that unification by might would not work anymore and so they abandoned the idea that unification would come through might, and Pyongyang, by establishing a monolithic system, would pursue a dynasty of their own. Apparently thats what the thinking of North Korea and, in particular, Kim Il Sung had been. And the very proof that this dynastic succession was in the mind of Kim Il Sung through this new constitution is as follows. I believe it was in March of 1973 when Kim Jong Ils post had been changed. Before he was in the Propaganda Section and then he was moved to the Partys Guidance Section, so the Partys Guidance Section basically meant that this man was beginning to get groomed to become the successor of Kim Il Sung.
STUECK: I may have missed something, but I didnt follow the logic of Mr. Kims
presentation in one sense, that is, you talked about how your contact and that of
86
AMBASSADOR SUN JOUNYUNG
your colleagues with the North shocked you in terms of northern backwardness, and the North Koreans of course had contact with the South and saw the South was surging ahead. That would explain to some extent the constitutional reform in North Korea, but it wouldnt logically, to me, explain Yushin. You suggested at one point that Yushin can be explained by the contacts with the North. If the South was more confident of its advancement over North Korea internally as a result of the contact with North Korea, why would that lead to Yushin?
KIM: The question seems to be whether Yushin was intended to extend the regime of Park Chung Hee, or was it a reaction towards North Korea so that the security of South Korea would be guaranteed. My perspective would be that as far as what President Park may have intended in terms of his own regime, I do not know what his intentions were. And so although I dont know the precise intentions of President Park, what I can say is as follows: we looked at North Korea and we realized that the North Korean economy was nowhere near where we had thought it might be. However, it is also true that North Korean society had become much more militarized, so the military became the foremost concern for North Korean society as a whole. At the time you have to remember that there was the Vietnam War and South Vietnam was falling, so with the demise of South Vietnam, it was felt that there was some sort of a crisis in South Korea. And when this crisis was looming with the militarization of the North Korean society, it became very necessary for the South Korean government to prioritize itself and make sure that security became the foremost concern and topic and objective of the regime. And also, at the time we had the Nixon Doctrine, which seemed to indicate that there was a distinct possibility that the U.S. would continue to withdraw its
87
When it came to the issue

of the Yushin revitalization reform, it was very much the initiative of Director Lee Hurak rather than President Park. President Park, as I understood, knowingly remained silent, so to speak, leaving Director Lee Hurak to take whatever initiative he was taking.
troops from the Korean Peninsula, and it then became necessary therefore that the South Korean government find its own ways to protect itself.
SCHAEFER: I want to thank Dr. Lee for this wonderful statement you gave which
I think confirms many things which you can find in the records, particularly with the North Korean interpretation of this entire thing. I have two follow-up questions for you. About this meeting between Kim Il Sung, Lee Hurak and the delegations between both Koreas on November 3, 1972, this was of course a couple of weeks after the constitutional amendment and Kim Il Sung apparently regarded this as his really last chance to achieve a sort of change in the entire situation. By then, North Korea had already realized that the constitutional amendment and the emergency rule in the South was working very much against North Korea. They were very angry about it, but they didnt say it publicly at the time because they said we dont want to shut the door which is still open just a little bit and we dont want to be the ones to close it but the last chance of this meeting. Since you were at this meeting, how did you recall the atmosphere, and particularly the attitude of Kim Il Sung? Because afterwards, when Kim Il Sung talked to the Soviet ambassador, he was still optimistic in a way, saying I made so many proposals, and once these proposals become known in South Korea, people will immediately rise up and overthrow Park Chung Hee because I came up with a wide array of very good proposals. And the second question, you portray Lee Hurak basically as the guy who put all the strengths behind the dictatorial system and the presidency for life. Of course you didnt want to say that, but it almost comes across as if Park Chung Hee was merely a puppet of Lee Hurak. So what was Park Chung Hees own contribution towards becoming president for life? Did he fully agree with Lee Hurak? Did he commission Lee Hurak to find a way how to install the presidency or was he rather indeed passive and Lee Hurak being the active proponent of the system?
STUECK: I have a follow-up to Mr. Kim. You mentioned in your response to my question that you were more aware of the militarization of North Korean society as a result of your visits to North Korea. I wonder if you would be more specific on that.
88
LEE:
Let me respond to some of the points this way. In understanding the background in those days behind some of these developments, I think we have the need to make a distinction between the humanitarian dialogue in the context of Red Cross talks and the political dialogue in the context of North-South Korean Committee. I think I may say it this way, the Red Cross talks were more in response to the changes in the international situations highlighted by things like the Guam Doctrine and things like that. Whereas the political dialogue in the context of the North-South Korean Committee was more motivated by political needs felt by some people in President Parks government, then which was headed by Mr. Lee Hurak. And at the time I think I had many conversations with Director Lee Hurak, and Im speaking on the basis of the memory of the conversations that had transpired between me and Lee Hurak in those days. Obviously, Director Lee Hurak had in mind the need to respond to the changes in context of the international situation, but at the same time, he was obviously trying to take advantage of this opening in inter-Korean relations in the context of the political dialogue as a means to justify a certain political process that he had in mind. When it came to the issue of the Yushin revitalization reform, it was very much the initiative of Director Lee Hurak rather than President Park. President Park, as I understood, knowingly remained silent, so to speak, leaving Director Lee Hurak to take whatever initiative he was taking. So much so that President Park knew that Director Lee Hurak was pushing very hard for the July 4 Joint Communiqu. That is my understanding which I can relate to you. And regarding the first part of the question that Mr. Schaefer put forth, as I said repeatedly earlier, Kim Il Sung was very proactive and Kim Il Sung was very optimistic that this dialogue was going to bring North Korea advanced opportunities in pursuing the kind of unification that they were pursuing, that is, creating conditions in South Korea more favorable for the kind of revolutionary takeover of South Korea. That said, around the turn of the year from 1972 to 1973, I think, there was a major reconsideration, a major reassessment of the overall situation in Pyongyang and when the year 1973 dawned, North Korea began harboring an increasing number of questions and suspicions as to whether this dialogue was necessarily
89
KIM IL SUNG AND LEE HURAK
giving North Korea any such advantages. They were realizing that South Korea was not the South Korea that they had assumed it to be, both in terms of economic development and also in terms of whether South Korean society was that unstable to the extent that North Koreas pursuit of revolutionary takeover might carry over. And North Korea began realizing that that was not the case and North Korea began waking up to the reality that North and South Korea were already showing a reversal in economic development. South Korea was way ahead. And as Mr. Kim observed, one of the surprising views that we had on the political track was that the members of the delegation participating in the NorthSouth Korean Committee were hauled from Gaesong to Pyongyang by helicopter, which gave us an expanded scope of visitors. And as we saw from the helicopter down, we were literally surprised by the barrenness of the landscape. It looked very much like some parts of the Middle East, you know, no trees at all. And then we were surprised to find not only the barrenness, but economic backwardness, you know. We were taken to shopping stores and the general products which were displayed there looked like those products of ours during the 1940s, and quantitywise, there was such a scarcity. No North Koreans came to wake up to the reality that even in terms of well, you know, some of the records here show Kim Il Sung telling Eastern European comrades about North Korea having made such an economic advancement and Kim Il Sung is sounding so upbeat and saying that if the South Korean people wake up to the reality then the South Korean people will find more drawn to the cause of the revolution, things like that. But that goes through changes around the turn of the year from 1972 and 1973. I think that much I can say.
KIM:
I believe your [Bill Stuecks] question was asking for specifics as to the militarization of North Korean society. The first thing we need to keep in mind is that just because North Korea was poverty-stricken it does not mean that they would not terrorize or become aggressive through military might. The very reason why North Korean society had become militarized can be traced to the four big principals for militarization. The four principles for militarization, although Im not going to go into details, started in 1962 and lasted until 1972 in North Korea.
90
And as a result of the four principles, North Korean society had gone through fundamental changes. All industries and all private lives became changed. A four-point military doctrine was the doctrine that was pursued. All jobs in North Korea and even in the civilian sector would be given military names and so there would be platoons as well as battalions and smaller companies, et cetera. And the targets that were given to civilians would be in terms of military terminologies, such as, we will take a certain hill. Also, beginning in 1970, North Korea launched a six-year plan, so each six-year plan would be followed with certain targets, and the six-year plan became much more militarized and militaryoriented when Kim Jong Il started taking a more active role in the party. So all economic and industrial activities in North Korean society were really a military exercise. So its literally impossible for us in a free society to even imagine what it means to have a society that is so militarized.
STUECK: So I sense from your answer that youre not saying that your trips through North Korea created this perception of militarization, but it was a result of your awareness of a North Korean program or programs since 1962. I just want to make sure we understand that. KIM: Well, documentation, although important, they do require imagination and they do not measure up to what you see with your own eyes. Ill give you an anecdote. While I was in Pyongyang I was invited to a dinner at which wine was served. I was invited by a very high-ranking official of the Korean Workers Party and he gave me a ride in his car and the car was speeding away so fast I actually wondered in amazement how this car could be driving so fast. Do they not even have traffic laws? And also when our group was visiting Pyongyang, during the mornings we would take rides out to the meeting sometimes and we would occasionally see certain students, usually elementary students perhaps, heading towards their school and we noticed that these students were marching with one another. Such anecdotes abound.
91
LEE:
There was actually a book authored by the last East German ambassador to North Korea which has plenty of descriptions of North Korea as being a highly militarized society.
OSTERMANN: I just wanted to underline the importance of Bill Stuecks question
and differentiation between the general understanding of developments in Korea and specific impressions you gained from specific trips and meetings. Historically thats for later historians to use, but I think that it is important to be as specific as possible. In that same vein, I would in fact like to follow-up and push a little further along the lines of Bernd Schaefers questions again about the atmosphere of the November meetings with the North Koreans, because that is the kind of information that is not captured in the documents. To the extent that you can help us contextualize the documents with your impressions of the encounters with the North Koreans and whatever insight that may shed on the North Korean attitude would be very helpful and significant.
MOON: My question is a follow-up also to Mr. Lee. I would just like some clarification. When you refer to North Koreas intentions in participating in the talks or inter-Korean dialogue, one of the things you mentioned was that the North felt it had an advantage over the South given the various geopolitical conditions. Im trying to figure out here the different reasons or the end outcomes that North Koreans might have wanted out of this. On the one hand, things you said seem like they might have looked at the talks as a way to do fact-finding about South Korea. What kind of a state is South Korea in, in order for the North to push its revolution along? I dont recall whether it was you or Mr. Kim who kept emphasizing this desire to push the revolution further into South Korea. So was this partly to do fact-finding about, is South Korea ready? Was it partly to show off North Koreas superiority, and yet that backfired? And when you referred to having the South Korean people realize that the revolution would make sense, are you referring to participating in inter-Korean dialogues as a propaganda method toward the South Korean public? I cant believe that the leaders would have bought that kind of an assumption, so all of these things were mentioned and I want to
92
get an idea of what kinds of timelines and priorities, and each factor might have played or might not have played. My question is from a different angle. Regarding the succession of Kim Jong Il in North Korea and the designation of such, is there any relationship with the South-North Korean dialogue? Was this succession plan somehow a result or somehow designed because of the dialogue? It is true that during the early 1970s, when the dialogue was taking place that Kim Jong Il was on the rise to become successor, but just because two things had happened around the same time does not mean that there was a causal relationship. However, I do think there is a causal relationship which is definitely a possibility given the following, for example, on October 17 we had Yushin proclaimed in the South and on October 23 we had the Fifth Plenum of the Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers Party. And during the Partys Plenum the socialist constitution was amended and also the Party members certificates were exchanged. When you say that the certificate of Party members were being exchanged, this basically required a review of each Party member to recognize their tendencies and also to make personnel changes if necessary. Also, according to the biography of Kim Jong Il, which was recently published, it indicates that on October 23, 1972, Kim Jong Il was promoted. So by tying together the two different events, and to be clearer, Kim Jong Il became a member of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party on this date, this goes hand-in-hand with the inter-Korean dialogue that was occurring around the time. So I must say that there must have been some sort of relationship between the dialogue and the succession plan that was being carried out. This question is really posed to everyone.
HONG: LEE:
It was the view of the Central Intelligence

Committee that Kim Yeongju was still the number two man in the North Korean political structure, and he was regarded potentially as a possible heir to Kim Il Sung.
Let me respond to the question that Professor Hong raised with regard to Kim Jong Ils rise to power. You know the whole process of grooming Kim Jong Il as the hereditary successor began way before that timeframe. Kim Jong Il graduated from Kim Il Sung University in 1964 and upon graduation he instantly joined the Korean Workers Party and became an instructor in the Cultural Department where after several years he established himself as an expert, specialist in propaganda and agitation, which is a very important part of controlling the population. Then in 1972, there was the Central Committee meeting where Kim Jong Il was
93
Kim Jong Il should have had

quite a lot to do with the inter-Korean dialogue and Kim Jong Il, beginning from the timeframe of early 1970s, was literally performing as crown prince regent. He was being touted as a partisan center in the fashion Stalin had been during the late years of Lenin [ ]
elevated to the status of Deputy Director. Then there was another secret Central Committee meeting in the fall of 1973 when he was promoted to the status of one of the secretaries. Now, the North-South dialogue began in that timeframe, 1971-1972-1973, and around the turn of the year from 1971 to 1972, there was a movement under the table between the two Koreas to have Mr. Jang Giyeong, who used to be the deputy prime minister and economic planning minister of South Korea and formerly the publisher and president of Hankook Ilbo, sent to Pyongyang at the invitation of Kim Il Sung. But in January of 1972, Mr. Lee Hurak changed his mind and instructed Jeong Hongjin to suggest to Pyongyang that he, as director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, go to Pyongyang instead of Jang Giyeong on the condition that his counterpart be Kim Yeongju. And this proposal was made because at that time it was the view of the Central Intelligence Committee that Kim Yeongju was still the number two man in the North Korean political structure, and he was regarded potentially as a possible heir to Kim Il Sung. Surprisingly, North Korea said yes. So Lee Huraks visit to Pyongyang became consummated where Kim Yeongju showed up to have a couple of meetings prior to Lee Huraks meeting with Kim Il Sung, but that was the last time we saw Kim Yeongju. During the meetings between Lee Hurak and Kim Il Sung, Lee Hurak asked Kim Il Sung to send Kim Yeongju down to Seoul for a return visit. Kim Il Sung said, No, he cannot do that and I am going to send another trusted comrade of mine on behalf of Kim Yeongju. And when Lee Hurak inquired who that was, Kim replied that he was going to send Pak Seongcheol down there as a proxy of Kim Yeongju. Lee Hurak said, No, no, no, we do not agree to that. We want to have Kim Yeongju in Seoul, still believing that Kim Yeongju was the number two man. And Kim Il Sung replied, We cannot do that because Kim Yeongju is an ailing person and Kim Yeongju met you in spite of his bad health, but you should receive Pak Seongcheol instead of him. We later found out that there was very delicate timing with Kim Jong Il, who won in a race for power against his uncle. The two had been involved in a very heated rivalry for several years and around that time Kim Yeongju turned out to be the loser and he had to go to the countryside and that was the last time that he publicly showed up.
94
So that said, you know Kim Jong Il should have had quite a lot to do with the inter-Korean dialogue and Kim Jong Il, beginning from the timeframe of the early 1970s, was literally performing as crown prince regent. He was being touted as a partisan center in the fashion Stalin had been during the late years of Lenin and then Kim Jong Il was leading the Samdae Hyongmyong Undong, the Three Revolutions Movement. This was small groups dispatched all across the country to supervise things directly to report to Kim Jong Il. So we cannot simply rule out the possibility that Kim Jong Il was discreetly involved in the early phase of the inter-Korean dialogue in the 1970s and to back that up we experienced very interesting things in those days. Whenever North Koreans came to Seoul, this guy Kim Deokhyeon was busy collecting movies, videos, and tapes of music, you knowSouth Korean songs. And when we asked him why you are so interested in collecting these things he said it is for the beloved instructor, and he talked about Kim Jong Ils film and music library. Kim Jong Il was very much involved in that phase of dialogue. I think I can testify to that much.
RYOO:
Did Mr. Kim Deokhyeon say Beloved Leader?
LEE: Beloved Instructor, Chinaehaneun Jidoja, which is Kim Jong Il, not Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung is Widaehan Suryeong (Great Leader), and Kim Jong Il is Chinaehaneun Jidoja. RYOO: LEE:
Did you feel anything strange when he said that?
No, no, and my counterpart in the political dialogue was Jang Geumcheol in his capacity as northern spokesperson, and he was known to report directly to Kim Jong Il at that time. So Kim Jong Il was very much in the loop. But didnt you still believe that Kim Yeongju was successor?
PERSON:
LEE: Kim Yeongju was gone byafter the secret visit to Pyongyang by Lee Hurak,
Kim Yeongju was nowhere to be seen.
95
PERSON:
Did you know that your interlocutors were referring to Kim Jong Il when they used the term Beloved Instructor? Sure. Did they actually say Kim Il Sungs son?
LEE:
PERSON: LEE:
Yes. Beloved Instructor is a reference exclusively to Kim Jong Il. And you knew this at that time?
PERSON: LEE:
Sure, sure. Did they actually say Kim Jong Il?
PERSON:
JAMES PERSON
LEE:
No, no Beloved Instructor. But was it clear who that was in reference to at the time?
PERSON: LEE:
Sure. To answer Dr. Moons question, Kim Il Sungs objectives were very clearly elaborated in his conversations with the leaders of East European leaders in that era, which are compiled here, which says that Kim Il Sung was, well, he was saying that he was not considering the invasion of South Korea, but he was looking forward to seeing a revolutionary situation to unfold in South Korea and he was very optimistic because of the unfolding of the international situations, which is very clearly elaborated in his remarks to those leaders. Mr. Kim was very elaborate about explaining about that, but North Korea in those days was very much obsessed with what they called the South Korean revolution. The initial part of the ultimate takeover of the entire Peninsula undertaken on North Korean terms is a communist takeover, and this South Korean revolution requires the consolidation of three revolutionary forces, which means developing North Korea as the base of the revolution and strengthening the revo-
96
lutionary force in South Korea and securing improved ties with the international revolutionary forces. These are the three revolutionary forces. And in doing that in the early 1970s, Kim Il Sung was very optimistic that South Korea was ripe for this kind of development. But as the dialogue went on, they began to realize that that was not exactly the way things stood at the time, so North Korea began feeling frustrated and then North Korea began backtracking from early 1973.
OSTERMANN:
I wanted to bring our American colleagues into the conversation here and I think weve had some very exciting accounts from the South Korean side this morning. I wonder if Ambassador ODonohue or Mr. Thompson or Mr. Picard would care to comment on their knowledge and awareness at the time of these developments that were discussed. To what extent was there consultation between the ROK and the Americans in Seoul or in Washington on these matters? Or anything else you care to comment on in terms of the subject in the discussion this morning.
RYOO: And also I would like to ask Ambassador Mitov, who was there at the time
in North Korea, to comment on North Korean domestic politics, especially with regard to Kim Yeongju and Kim Il Sung, and even Kim Jong Il.
PERSON: I have two specific questions. Christian asked our American colleagues
to discuss the amount of information being shared, and I have two specific questions about information-sharing. One, were you extended the same courtesy of the North Koreans who were notified in advanced about Yushin? How much time did you have to prepare for this? When were you informed about Yushin? Two, were you aware of the Beloved Instructors succession at this early stage or was it much later? I dont remember seeing that in the INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] reports. It seems South Korean intelligence was already aware of the succession. Did they share this information with you?
ODONOHUE:
Ill focus on Yushin. In terms of North Korea at that time, all of our information, particularly on the negotiations, was derived from the South side. With regard to Yushin, very obviously, one of the basic objectives was to neu-
97
tralize us. We were not told in any fashion earlier; it was a day before that we were informed and in a manner which was designed to allow us not to respond; or, to put it differently, not to be able to mount any opposition. I assume that the Korean side came from the view that we were not going to like it. So we did take a negative stand, but I dont think we were surprised, and as the public aspects of it unfolded, our opposition or our stated opposition had no real impact. In terms of our own assessment at the time, I very much appreciate Mr. Lees comments because I think this is a fuller picture on the South Korean side than we had [at the time]. First of all, our view was that President Park wanted to in effect perpetuate himself in power. He did not want to go through what he had gone through in the election in 1971 again. Our view was that certainly, the NorthSouth, but maybe even more the regional situation did figure in it [the Yushin Constitution], but we saw it and as it later unfolded, as really being directed to control a domestic scene. It neutralized political opposition and, as I said, perpetuated the presidents power. We did not have the picture that Mr. Lee has given so well of Lee Hurak. By the way, I dont dispute that at all. As I said, we had more a sense of the President driving it, but that was not based on anything other than our assessments. Our view was that it [Yushin] was a mistake because the President of South Korea was already running an authoritarian government. The President already had sufficient powers to control the situation and in reaching beyond that, he was sowing the seeds for future difficulty. But we had essentially a fairly passive view from then on, and the South Korean authorities had calculated that this would be the case. They had to live with us being opposed, but on the other hand, in the short-term tactical sense, it didnt have much impact. As the events unfolded, as I said, we always had the sense that it did relate to a degree to the regional situation in the North-South talks. But as it unfolded over the succeeding months, and then obviously dramatized by the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung, we did see it as far more directed to getting control of the domestic situation and establishing a regime in which a very strong authoritarian cast would be given to what had already been an authoritarian government but one that had some breathing space. We didnt have any great problem with the government before then, meaning it was authoritarian, but we thought there was a little room for the press, there was a little room for the opposition,
98
JAMES PERSON
and that it worked. The kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung was an immense mistake. It dramatized how the domestic preoccupation was such a part of it, and Mr. Lees explanation, in terms of Lee Hurak, was very, very interesting and compelling, and then again, with the kidnapping he overreached. That would be my comments on that.
BRAZINSKY: I want to follow-up. Im just curious, ten years earlier when Park Chung Hee first seized power through a military coup, the Kennedy administration had really pressured him to hold free elections. With the Yushin system, basically free elections were abrogated and the Nixon Administration basically seemed to sit back. Im wondering if you see the difference in policies at these two times as a reflection of differences between the Kennedy administration and the Nixon administration, or is it an acknowledgement that the United States was just less influential in South Korea at the time and couldnt do as much? ODONOHUE:
It was different. I happened to be there in the 1960-1964 period. Essentially, at the time of the coup we opposed it. Very quickly for a variety of reasons, our policy changed to be one of endorsing and supporting President Park. One aspect in terms of the quickness of it was the fact that the Kennedy administration had just had a fiasco in the Bay of Pigs. Our charg was left hanging. He didnt know what our policy was, but he could read in the newspapers the constant criticism of him, so our policy became one of support for Park. Now we always have this built-in question of democratic institutions, but what really drove us in 1963 was a preoccupation about internal stability. At that time you had factionalism within the military which was being reflected in the government and there was an immensely unsettled period in which our thrust was to have
99
[ ] in 1972 when the Yushin

Constitutional Amendment and the dissolution of the National Assembly occurred, you know, I dont think the United States was that opposed at the outset. The rift between Washington and Seoul, in a sense, began to take shape after March 1973 when priests and certain civic leaders staged an assembly demonstration at Myeongdong Cathedral.
elections and in effect get the military out of politics. But this had nothing to do with President Park and the fact that military men were going to take off their uniforms. It was really to get the military out so that every political crisis didnt get reflected domestically, so that drove it very strongly. We were always in favor of moving to a civilian government and as I said, the civilian government they moved to, i.e., President Park, continuing those in the military who were going to be,wanted to be, politicians, government officials, that wasnt our problem. President Park to everyones surprise, including ours, had a very close run with Yun Boseon, the opposition candidate, but nonetheless the American side was very relaxed about him winning. We were very relaxed about how the situation evolved. We had a constant theme always in terms of easing up, being more democratic, but what really drove us and probably in terms of the elections where you could really see we put immense pressure on, was really the perception that they had to do it for stability. Let me respond to your point very briefly. You know at the time of the military takeover in 1961, I dont think the United States condoned it at the outset. Well actually, if Prime Minister Jang Myeon was accessible to the commander of the U.S. forces, then I think there was enough room for the military coup to have been crushed because at that time, General McGruder was trying to use his forces to put it down. But Jang Myeon was in hiding, inaccessible, so after a few days the American side had to take it as fait accompliand then that was followed by two days of very hard negotiations between General McGruder and Kim Jong-pil, who was the force behind the coup. And one of the serious questions raised by General McGruder at the time was whether this coup leader was leftist leaning or rightist leaning and many people were suspicious that they were socialists, or left leaning, but Kim Jong-pil assured General McGruder that they were going to be committed to free democracy. So after two days of negotiations, General McGruder said that he would be reporting to Washington that there was no way of opposing to this. Now, in 1972 when the Yushin Constitutional Amendment and the dissolution of the National Assembly occurred, you know, I dont think the United States was that opposed at the outset. The rift between Washington and Seoul, in a sense, began to take shape after March 1973 when priests and certain civic leaders staged
LEE:
100
an assembly demonstration at Myeongdong Cathedral. And the government began cracking down, equipped with martial law and also emergency measures, and these were steps which really began pushing the two countries apart from each other. And interestingly, North Korea too was not reacting negatively to this Yushin reform at the outset. It was the following year when they began asking questions. We had a meeting of the co-chair people of the North-South Coordinating Committee in late October, immediately in the wake of the Yushin Constitutional Amendment in Panmunjeom. Pak Seongcheol was there, I was there, Lee Hurak was there. Pak Seongcheol raised many questions to which Lee Hurak answered in such a way that he was doing all he could do to quiet down North Korean suspicions. Then sometime after the turn of the year in 1973, North Korea began raising voices against that and when we met at the second or third meeting in Pyongyang in March 1973, they were categorically castigating what was developing in South Korea. So, many players were literally caught by surprise and it took some time for the players to come up with positions of their own.
ODONOHUE: I would say that our initial response was a very negative one, but it showed up in terms of disassociation. I think a point you were making was that actually the situation was very different, and in 1972 the United States was not going to play the role we played in 1963. After that initial statement, and as I said, disassociation, which when you looked at it, it didnt mean much more than what was happening, except with regard to the recommendation about moving ahead with troop withdrawal which was never acted on. But the United States by that time did not see itself playing the kind of role that we not desired but had to play from 1961 through 1963. PICARD: Just a couple of observations on, basically, the degree to which the South
Korean government kept the United States informed both on the developments, very interesting developments, that Dr. Lee has described in North Korea and also on their own political plans in 1972. I was in Washington on October 16 and because I was the junior officer in the Korean office, I came in early every day and
101
looked through the cables that had come in overnight to see if there was anything that the director needed to be informed of right away. And somewhere down in the pile of cables that had come in overnight was a cable from Ambassador Habib describing his interview with the Prime Minister. Obviously this was something that got everybodys attention, but certainly we had no warning of it and we were very active that day in Washington with Dr. Kissinger and others trying to decide what the right response would be. Ambassador Habib of course all along knew what the right response would be and told us in no uncertain terms what it should be and that was basically the response that was adopted which Ambassador ODonohue described. The second thing that I found very interesting, especially about the comments both from Mr. Kim and Dr. Lee about what was going on in North Korea, was that we were very much in the dark on any of the internal developments in North Korea. We were doing whatever we could to follow this, but whatever we could was not very much and we certainly werent getting any great assistance, I can tell you, from the South Korean government, who was following it very closely.
THOMPSON:
I have a question with regard to Kim Il Sungs reaction to the economic surprises that they observed in the South. Obviously this was not a surprise at some level because there was open intelligence. They could get the magazines and movies and so forth from other sources than South Korea about South Korea. And also the two block members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission could go to Seoul and observe the shops and so forth, and Im sure Mr. Mitov can enlighten us as to whether this was shared with the group in Pyongyang and also with the North Koreans. My impression is that the elites which might have consisted only of Kim Il Sung found it useful to obscure this information in dealing publicly both with their domestic audience and with the world audience so that even when this information was obtained by the North delegation the leadership would continue to say that the people in the South are oppressed and poor and dont have anything. But obviously at least Kim Il Sung would have known the truth about the economy and so much of this was a charade in my opinion, and I would appreciate comments from the South Koreans about that.
102
LEE: I will be very brief. I think I can respond to your question by relating to you
the kind of very interesting observation that we had been making of North Korea. South Korea is an open society that produces so much information, whereas North Korea is a closed society where there is such an absence of information. But it is surprising for us to find that North Koreans have such a distorted view of us and I have been wondering why, and I think I have at least part of the answer. You know, when North Koreans think about the outside world, it is not the kind of firsthand understanding, but their view of the outside world is formulated by the kind of process of evaluation which is undertaken by the party specialists based on the kind of form of evaluation unique to them. So the outcome of the evaluation is what led them in the direction of misconception about the outside world. I think that has been very conspicuous in most cases. So their views of the outside world are found very much out of the context of reality.
RYOO: Thank you for your brief response. We are now out of time for this session.
103
B. DONOVAN PICARD
Panel V
The Two Koreas and the United Nations
Chair: Sun Jounyung Provocateurs: James Hershberg, Hong Seukryule

SUN:
I present to you a chronology of some of the events which had taken place during the designated period, which are interrelated in one way or another. The Nixon Doctrine in 1969, which was followed by the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from South Korea, and then the PRCsChinasreturn to the United Nations in October 1971 and the assumption of the position as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In February 1973, the South Korean government formally announced its abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine. And then in June 1973, President Park Chung Hee announced the so-called June 23 Declaration, whereby South Korea proclaimed that it would seek diplomatic relationship with states having different political ideologies and/or social orientations, and also a willingness to have both Koreas enter the United Nations as separate entities. And of course, the next day Kim Il Sung rejected South Koreas offer to enter the United Nations as separate entities, because that would, from North Koreas perspective, perpetuate the division of the Korean Peninsula. And theres one event which is very meaningful: the offensive made by North Korea on multilateral fronts rather than on bilateral fronts. That is to say, late in 1973, North Korea applied for membership in the UN specialized agency, the WHO [World Health Organization], but the South Korean government was not prepared for such a sudden offensive coming from North Korea, so the South Korean government was convinced that the monopoly of South Koreas membership in specialized agencies would continue even though the challenges from North Korea came. But without knowing the rules of procedure at the time, at the
105
PANEL V: THE TWO KOREAS AND THE UNITED NATIONS
final stage, the USSR proposed a secret vote, so South Korea was caught off-guard, and then the admission of North Korea to the WHO was realized. That was really a serious blow and a shock to the South Korean government, which did not know that North Korea would come forward on the multilateral organization front. Furthermore, if I am to be brief, in 1975 so many things happened at the same time or consecutively: the U.S. was pulling out from Vietnam, the collapse of South Vietnam took place in the Spring of 1975, then North Korea was admitted to the Non-Aligned Movement at the Coordinating Committee of the NonAligned Movement in the wake of the fall of South Vietnam, and then North Korea moved forward and became a full member of the Non-Aligned Movement, while South Korea was defeated in at the Lima, Peru meeting. And for the first time in the history of the United Nations, two resolutions, respectively, representing South Koreas position and North Koreas position, two resolutions were adopted at the United Nations. Of course this was an anomaly and at the same time represented the change of the situation in favor of North Korea in the wake of the fall of South Vietnam and the admission of North Korea to the Non-Aligned Movement. So I will stop here and I would like to invite Professor Hershberg to be the first provocateur. My assignment is to be a provocateur on issues relating to the United Nations and the Korean question. I also want to use the United Nations issue as sort of a stand-in for the international system and the international context in which this Korean story takes place and to raise also a couple of broader issues for the participants who were focused very much on the Korean subject. This is a very emblematic representative example of something that pops up repeatedly throughout the Cold War, and now in teaching and writing of Cold War history, of a regional dispute or crisis that takes place in the context of broader Cold War issues. And its obviously a mistake to simply attribute what happens in a regional context to the East-West relationship, or in this case, to triangular relationships, but also it is myopic simply to focus on regional dynamics while not examining its interrelationship with the Cold War and broader international affairs dynamics. Yet it is a sort of vacuous truism to say theyre both important. The challenge is to
HERSHBERG:
106
understand the relative weight and the interaction between these different levels of understanding, these different narratives of history. And so moving to the United Nations, as a sort of a stand-in for the broader Cold War and triangular relationship context of this story, I would be very interested if some of those who were deeply involved in the Korean story would comment on how much weight Cold War historians should give to the Korean dynamic as compared to the broader international affairs context. Is this a development in terms of the Korean-Korean dialogue and some of the other shifts in that relationship that would have taken place anyway regardless of some of the more dramatic breakthroughs in terms of the Sino-American opening and the emergence of the more full-blown U.S.-Soviet dtente? Or did these take place more or less solely in the context and as a result of the Sino-American shock in the summer of 1971, and closely related to developments on that broader sphere? Also, I think the most fascinating story or moment in this United Nations story is President Parks new approach of June 23, 1973, reversing decades of policy and supporting the idea of joint membership for North and South Korea. Theres another source that I just want to point out to you, anyone who was in Washington or in the United States would remember that the entire country was obsessed with something very different which probably accounts for how little general attention was played to this. This was the same week that John Dean began testifying before the Irving Committee on the Watergate Affair and the country was entirely riveted. However, Alexander Butterfield did not reveal the existence of the White House tapes until two weeks later, July 14, 1973, to be specific. So it would be very easy to check the very detailed outlines of the White House tapes to see to what extent there was any discussion in the White House of President Parks very dramatic policy shift. Those tapes should exist. Whether they penetrated Richard Nixon or Henry Kissingers consciousness if they were discussed would be very interesting. Now, of course, this brings to a broader issue the question of the Park initiative and why it failed. When I teach Cold War History classes I tell my students who werent lucky enough to have lived through the Cold War like many of us were that if they wanted to feel what the Cold War felt like there are only two places left to do really it; one is Korea and one is Cuba. Those confrontations, of course, were
107
not resolved during the dtente period, but both have fascinating stories largely hidden of attempts to normalize those disputes or at least U.S. relations, both with Cuba and North Korea. And of course that would have been the effect to some extent of North Korea accepting that initiative. And one thing that would be fascinating to explore further is to get more Soviet and Chinese sources to see, did they automatically back Kim Il Sungs rejection of Parks initiative? I mean within ten hours the documents show Kim rejected that, talked only about North Korea joining the United Nations as part of a united Korea. Implicitly he confessed error because eighteen years later of course the two Koreas did join the United Nations at the end of the Cold War. Was this a matter of disagreement? Was this a matter of discussion? Of course its hard to tell what was going on inside the black box of Pyongyang, but there is a record of the Soviets and to some extent the Chinese not being thrilled with everything that Kim Il Sung was pushing. It would be fascinating to see if that was the case. And theres another interesting context to raise, which is the story of divided nations during the Cold War and UN membership. Now of course Parks initiative takes place in the context of the German-German agreement for the two Germanys to enter the UN and that is fascinating to compare. But also sort of a footnote to the Vietnam War is that in 1957 the Soviet Union proposed simultaneous entry into the UN for both South and North Vietnam, and Hanoi was absolutely furious at this and the Soviets had to back pedal and drop the proposal. Did they learn a lesson? Did they not even question this? In other words should this be regarded in the Soviet bloc as a missed opportunity for North Korea to gain the international legitimacy, in some respects, that it craves to this day, and has said as indicated is its main objective? That brings another provocation to all of the participants, especially the Koreans; what did the United Nations mean at this point? When the story starts, the U.S. view in 1970-1971 is that the Korean issue isnt even something that they want to come up in the UN. They talk of it as the Oh hell, not again subject in the UN. They view it as not anything that is relevant. In fact, during this period obviously the United Nations Command and UNCURK [UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea] fade away.
108
ODONOHUE: HERSHBERG:
The United Nations Command has not faded.
Well, to some extent; it is recognized as being less and less relevant compared to the bilateral alliance and obviously the Korean War memories are fading. To what extent does the UN membership really matter? Is it a symbolic issue? Is this a serious background or just a peripheral issue especially to the Korean participants? Finally, to the Koreans it would be fascinating to know more about Parks initiative in June 1973. Did he take it because he was confident that the North Koreans would reject this? In one conversation with Marshall Green I believe he indicates that Kim will probably reject this but that is not a true expression of how he feels. Was this taken, in other words, for tactical reasons in order to justify the more hardline policies of Seoul or was it taken for genuine strategic reasons believing that this would be a good way to move forward in the context of the changed regional and international setting? In other words, how should we understand Parks flexibilitygenuine or tactical in this respect? I think Ill leave it here for some issues both to understand what is happening in Seoul but also especially for Ambassador Mitov, was this something that was truly a consensus on the communist side? No one wanted to be more soft line than Kim. Or was this something that was actively disagreed with but it was felt that there was no alternative but to go along with Kims hardline rejection of this idea about joint dual membership? Thank you.
LEE HURAK AND PAK SEONGCHEOL
My question is directed to the veteran diplomats from the U.S. and centers on the importance the U.S. placed on the discussions that were held in the UN regarding the entry of South Korea along with North Korea. Leading up to 1973, on an almost annual basis, Korean issues were dealt with and discussed on the UN floor; however, it does not seem as if there was any particular year in which Korean issues surfaced as being important. Although not dealt with at length, I dont think Korea had been a trivial issue either on the UN floor. For example, in 1972, it seemed that the U.S. was reluctant to discuss the Korean issues in the UN.
HONG:
109
Documents show that in 1972 [Chinese Premier] Zhou Enlai had insisted strongly that Korean issues be dealt with in the UN and in response Kissinger indicated that the U.S. had an upcoming presidential election in November of 1972. So looking into the mind of Kissinger, perhaps he felt that discussing Korean issues in the UN could somehow have some sort of an influence on the presidential election in the U.S. Having said that, my question would be how much importance did Korean issues really hold if this was to be discussed in the UN? The second question relates to the June 23 Declaration in Korea. In the June 23 Declaration, the South Korean government had suggested that there would be a simultaneous entry of the Koreas into the UN. What was the response from the international community at the time? Now the decision by the South Korean government to even suggest that the South and North Koreas together enter the UN was a very difficult decision, because even as late as in the 60s anyone who had suggested anything close to it would be sent to prison. But I personally dont think that the simultaneous entry of South and North Koreas into the UN was received all that warmly by the international community. And looking at the voting records of the UN, as Ambassador Sun had indicated, in 1974, the records show that both for and against North Korea seems to come out fifty-fifty. And even as late as 1975 there was a resolution in support of North Korea which had passed the UN. So in light of what had taken place I think that perhaps it was not received all that warmly by the international community when simultaneous entry had been suggested.
SUN:
One thing we have to bear in mind in discussing the United Nations issue for that period is that since Korea was not a member of the United Nations, the United States was inevitably playing the leading role.
HERSHBERG: Just very briefly precisely on this issue I think arguably the most important document on the U.S. position is a document from August 24,1973, a memorandum from Henry Kissinger to the Secretary of State, who would be himself a few weeks later:7 Regarding the simultaneous admission of both Koreas to U.N. membership we should try to persuade South Korea to press its campaign less vigorously in order to avoid stimulating the opposition to make greater efforts in support of a hostile resolution on the UNC [United Nations Command] and
110
U.S. Forces in the ROK. The U.S. should be prepared to give modest support to the ROKs efforts to secure simultaneous admission in order (a) to support our Korean ally, (b) to avail ourselves of the tactical leverage this issue can provide against possible opposition efforts to press for a hostile resolution on the UNC and U.S. Forces in the ROK. The point being, I dont think there was any serious domestic political component, even though the 1972 election was of course the most overriding thing, but the Korean issue was not on the public radar scope during this period.
LEE:
I think one of the important things that we should bear in mind in discussing the issue of dual admission by the two Koreas into the United Nations, as proposed by the June 23 Declaration, was that this June 23 Declaration enunciated by South Korea was rather a defensive and reactive exercise. Its not a proactive and its not an offensive exercise. I think that is one thing which we should give consideration to.
ODONOHUE: I think in this whole period, in the UN context, the United States and Korea were seen as receiving less support. There were several aspects to it; one was the dtente in the sense of you should have both sides in, and so each year we were both expending more energy for a result that was in a sense defense of the status quo. We even had at one point the term non-automaticity, which was the effort to get the item off the agenda. These were, I think fair to say, all tactical. And as Mr. Lee said at the time, I dont remember us seeing the presidents announcement as profound, but rather a development as the South realized it should show more flexibility. I think the Kissinger memo is really a tactical one, then; how do you manage this issue in which we saw eroding support for our position? So from my perspective, and Don [Picard] or Ward [Thompson] might have different views, it was an annual exercise taking immense energy for a result that at best lasted twelve months and you were back there again. And President Parks gesture was one that took the South Korean side to a position that was far more defensible rather than a breakthrough.
111
LEE:
One other point, this was the time when Non-Aligned Movement was in full swing and the Non-Aligned Movement was more under the control and influence of China. The United States was rather very limited in influencing the Non-Aligned Movement, so much so that the Non-Aligned Movement nations accounted for quite a number of votes, because of which the Republic of Korea had to fi nd a situation more in its favor when the debate in the UN took place.
ODONOHUE:
And we were finding our traditional lives less enthusiastic, more ready to move towards recognizing both. So in this period I think our whole approach was a tactical one. The concerns Secretary Kissinger expressed related to a concern that there would be a concerted effort to highlight the U.S. forces in Korea, which we didnt want, and the UN command at the same time we were ready to bring UNCURK to its end. But as I said in that period, this was heavily a tactical-related to how do you get the votes, what makes sense, can we get the issue off the agenda so we dont have to do these things.
I want to pick up on what Ambassador ODonohue said but from a slightly different direction. First of all, I recall Dr. Lees comment about perceptions. Im no historian, but my impression is that diplomats deal very largely in perceptions. If you look through the documents our reporting is of not so much the facts, but of peoples and nations perceptions of the facts. I contributed to quite a lot of these voluminous papers and others during my career, but I had a different experience when I went to work for the Intelligence and Research Bureau, which Mr. Picard also worked for at some point. We were taught in writing a specific document for the Secretary of State and the President to start with a conclusion, whereas most of your work is you build-up to the conclusion. So we start with the conclusion. If I could analyze this situation, the conclusion that we wanted to reach was that the treaty relationship between the United States and South Korea was firm, unassailable, unalterable, because our objective, our goal was security as was that of the government of South Korea. However, I think the government of South Korea had some doubts, even about how long the United States would remain, because there was quite often mention of great powers shifting their inTHOMPSON:
112
terests and perhaps marginalizing this whole area, so I can understand that there was some concern. So we look at the different aspects that you build out from when you come to this core value, which Ambassador ODonohue mentioned, the presence of U.S. forces, not necessarily connected to the treaty relationship, but very, very important from the point of view of the government of the ROK. And then the United Nations Command; building out the armistice relationship, the machinery, the operational control of Korean forces, which is important in a lot of respects that we dont have to go into right here, and then the special relationship that Korea had with the United Nations, which included in many ways the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea. And finally you get out far enough to come to the Korean question in the United Nations. All of this was to a certain extent dispensable because basically were talking about the assurance of security which could be realized with the treaty relationship and everything else is adjustable. But as Ambassador ODonohue said, these other factors were very, very important, and so we were putting a lot of resources into the Korean question trying not to upset these outer bastions if you will, so that we could preserve the UN command even though you concede from the documents that we quite often were talking about adjustments to the United Nations Command. We would prefer and Im sure Dr. Kissinger would have preferred not to have to get to those questions because that would cause a lot of confusion. And in my time at the embassy, I worked very closely with the working-level of the Foreign Ministry in assessing the relationships of every country that had a bearing on this question, doing vote tally, coming up with strategy and tactics for how to keep a certain country from changing its position away from supporting the ROK to supporting the DPRK and so forth. It was wearisome that it was a lot of investment for a very small return. Nonetheless, it was important. We certainly supported the Korean effort in this and there are, as Dr. Hershberg said, a lot of documents that arent there, and I would expect in the future there would be more documents available especially perhaps reflecting the new Secretary of States position, Dr. Kissinger, who did have a personal interest in this particular question and thats not really reflected here.
113
HERSHBERG: If I could just follow-up on that and for other Americans, was there another Kissinger back channel that is not reflected in the documents to Seoul? Or was he content to leave this to the State Department, even William Rogers State Department, to handle the issue until he became Secretary of State? ODONOHUE: No. My impression is that this was solely a tactical issue of how do
we get out of it.

HERSHBERG: I just mean more broadly, was there another channel? ODONOHUE: No. When I say no, the answer isI am actually fairly sure on this onehe was responding to what the Department of State was proposing rather than coming out with an edict. I may be wrong on that, but thats my impression.
You know this was a time when the U.S.-ROK relationship was to a certain extent, it was pretty flawed by the intervention of the U.S. Congress because of the uneasiness which looked quite prevalent in South Korea. South Korea tried to secure some kind of avenue through to the United States Congress and so much so that it somehow influenced the overall context of the U.S.-ROK relationship and that had, if I am correct to remember, some spillover influence over the context of the UN diplomacy as well. I may be wrong, but and in addition to that, let me add to that the kind of observation I think I remember I had at that time. During the early years of the 1970s, I maintained some relationship with the State Departments INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research], and the overall impression I had was the INR was not necessarily that much in favor of and in support of South Korea vis--vis North Korea. There was a mood that I felt that INR was very sympathetic, most sympathetic with North Korea. One example, there was a North Korean flag hung on top of the door leading to the [Laughter] Do you remember that? You had the North Korea flag hung above the door. [Laughter].
LEE: PICARD:
This is really provocative. You are the real provocateur.
114
LEE:
That sounded provocative.
PICARD: That was pretty provocative. Absolutely not. Nobody would be surprised to hear me say that, but I am saying it from a pretty clear recollection, from my time at least in INR which I guess was in 71-72, some point in 72. First of all I should say that INR was not terribly influential in the whole development of the U.S. policy and certainly even to a young officer going from INR working on Korean Affairs to the Office of Korean Affairs in the Regional Bureau it was like night and day. So no, the main observation I would offer of North Korea from the INR perspective in those days was that we were very puzzled about what was going on there. We could tell a little bit about the economic developments, but not very much about the political developments and whatever we knew or the best of at least what we knew came from you [the South Koreans]. THOMPSON:
Well, that having been said, I think, Donovan, youre selling yourself a little short. I call attention to a document that he wrote in December 1971. I thought it was very perceptive and pointed out that the North-South, SouthNorth context was a double-edged sword in effect for both sides as weve heard from Dr. Lee and the other speakers. In terms of the North Korean flag [laughter], I think what American analysts try to do is get inside the heads of the people that we are studying, the nations that we are studying, and I can say that if you had visited me when I was a Marine Corp intelligence officer at war with Vietnam you would have found a Viet Cong flag on my wall because, I think it was the famous Chinese strategist who said, Youve really got to know the enemy, and we were very proud of being able to do that. It does not indicate our position except that we tried to maintain objectivity and thats why we can fund such a large bureaucratic element as INR and also the policy planning council that Ambassador ODonohue was on because our leaders need objective reports, and you dont even always get those from our embassies.
I think the location, the position of the flag is very important [laughing], where you put the flag [is very important]. You know when I went to Iran during
SUN:
115
the Iraq-Iran War in 1988, I was staying at the former Hilton Hotel. Of course at the time the name of the hotel was changed to an Iranian name, but I found the American flag being used as a doormat. [Laughter] But Dr. Lee suggested that the North Korean flag was hanging above the door, thats a problem, thats a problem.
SCHAEFER:
MAO ZEDONG AND RICHARD NIXON
May I change the subject a little bit. I would like to raise a question to Dr. Lee about the South Korean proposal of simultaneous accession of both Korean states with the United Nations and just elaborate just a little bit on what I found in East German files, because the German case obviously was one of the models because both German states acceded to the United Nations in 1973. What you can find in the East German files of course is a lot of discussion actually of the different concepts of nation which in this case communist Germany and communist North Korea had. They were almost completely opposite. I mean the East German position was that there are two German nations, one socialist East German nation and one capitalist and purist West German nation divided forever, completely separate. The North Korean notion of course was that there was only one nation indivisible. It is led by North Korea. South Korea is just occupied by puppets pulled by American strings and once the Americans are out, it of course will be unified. But at least they had an absolutist and very consistent concept of the nation which they also followed through in 1972 with the inter-Korean dialogue and when they dealt with the communist allies. So the North Korean concept of the nation is actually much closer to the West German capitalist nation concept and the East German concept is much closer to the South Korean concept. The East Germans were very defensive about the nation. South Korea also appeared to be rather defensive. North Korea took a very offensive position. So it was very clear that North Korea would never accept to accede to the United Nations with South Korea together and they made it very clear and the Soviet Union and China actually supported it. Of course both of them were on the Security Council, so there was no way that the South Korean proposal would come through. Then my question is, when President Park came up with that [proposal] I mean it was absolutely clear that this was a losing proposition. It would never
116
have any chance. Of course it could be a political move to put North Korea on the spot, but in a way it also backfired. So why did South Korea really think at that point it made sense, political sense or even tactically, to come up with a proposal which certainly would get defeated and maybe even get South Korea on the spot as being the defensive part of the Korean nation, not the offensive part like the North Koreans? Well, you know, although the exchange of summit meetings between the two Germanies took place in 1970, it was in 1972 when the two Germanies concluded the basic agreement. So the two-Germany formula was not used as a benchmark when we had the initial round of inter-Korean dialogue in the early 1970s. The two-Germany formula was picked up as a benchmark in the early 1990s when the Roh Tae-woo government began pursuing northern diplomacy. Even at the time, the Republic of Korea was falling a little bit short of fully accepting the two-Germany formula because whereas the two-Germany formula was accepting a two-sovereign German states concept, we were falling short of reaching that even when we agreed to the inter-Korean basic agreement, the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchange and Cooperation. We picked up the expression that the relationship between the two sides of Korea is a relationship in the process of unification. We did not give any descriptive description of what that relationship was. So I think that is a point which is necessary to be pointed out.
LEE: SCHAEFER: LEE:
What about 1973? Why did South Korea propose it in 1973?
Well, the June 23 Declaration was a maneuver, a tactical maneuver to prevent certain things from happening. So we were not confident that we were going to be able to penetrate into the Non-Aligned Movement and we were aware of the fact that the United States had a limited influence over that area. So we were not we were trying to leave the United Nations, make a departure from the United Nations. So the June 23 Declaration was not aimed at achieving certain things; it was more aimed at preventing things from happening.
117
CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN
Let me ask Ambassador Mitov a question. The impression I got after I read the verbatim transcript of the conversation between Kim Il Sung and Zhivkov was that what Kim Il Sung said was this; while he spoke about confederation, it was not so much the confederation in itself as it was revolution in South Korea. So his talking about confederation was bait, so to speak, to bring revolution to South Korea. Am I correct?
MITOV:
Yes, that is correct.
STUECK: Were kind of running short on time and one thing that has not appeared so far in our discussion in this session is the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung. It strikes me that its a very important event in this time period and I wonder if we could get the perspectives of Mr. Kim and Dr. Lee on what was going on with that event, especially who was behind it within the ROK and why. SUN:
On the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung. Yes of course it is in one form or another related to the United Nations, right.
You know I think it is a matter of fact that Mr. Kim Dae-jung, as he was resisting the Yushin Constitutional Amendment and Yushin takeover, chose to remain away from the country. And as he was staying outside of the country he somehow got himself into an association with North Koreans. Actually when he went to Japan shortly prior to his kidnapping, he was scheduled to participate in a certain convention sponsored by the pro-North Korean elements in Japan where he was supposed to make some kind of a speech whose content was later known
LEE:
118
to us, which was pretty much in such a way that he was aligning himself with North Korea. So that was I think one of the major mistakes that Mr. Kim made at that time. But the abduction of Kim Dae-jung had actually little to do with inter-Korean relations, although that kidnapping was picked up by North Korea to justify North Koreas departure from the inter-Korean dialogue. But aside from that, Mr. Kim Dae-jungs abduction had little reason to be related with the development of interKorean relations, although North Korea used it as an excuse to justify its decision to make a departure from the dialogue.
SUN:
[ ] the abduction of Kim Dae-Jung

had actually little to do with inter-Korean relations, although that kidnapping was
Mr. Kim do you have any comments on Kim Dae-jungs abduction? not much I can say on this topic.
picked up by North Korea to justify North Koreas departure from the interKorean dialogue.
KIM: There is STUECK:
How about the personalities within the regime, the Park regime? You placed emphasis on Lee Hurak as an initiator. Any comment on that?
LEE: I dont think this is based on any official version or explanation, but my ob-
servation of that timeframe leads me to say this: the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping had its origin with an earlier political development, the General Yun Pilyong incident. You know General Yun Pilyong was commanding general of the garrison command. He was detained by the investigative authorities, and then it was later known that it was more directed against Lee Hurak than against Yun Pilyong.After the Yushin Constitutional Amendment, Mr. Lee Huraks stature rose very high, and then, according to some explanations, President Park began feeling suspicious or ill at ease with the rise of Mr. Lee Huraks stature politically. So that provided the background from which the arrest of General Yun Pilyong originated. Then following that arrest of General Yun Pilyong and his interrogation, Lee Huraks role as the director of the KCIA was fundamentally reduced to a large extent, so much so that he was unable to secure access to President Park. So it was during that timeframe when the KCIA was under the instruction of Director Lee that it began making reports on the activities of Kim Dae-jung at regular meetings
119
After the Yushin Constitutional Amendment, Mr.

Lee Huraks stature rose very high, and then, according to some explanations, President Park began feeling suspicious or ill at ease with the rise of Mr. Lee Huraks stature politically.
which were held every Thursday, a National Security Review Meeting presided over by President Park. And in each round of the sessions there was the report that Kim Dae-jung was doing this and that and Kim Dae-jung was aiming at creating a provisional government opposed to President Parks government and abroad. So much so that after repeated reporting of this nature, according to some explanations, Director Lee came to conclude that he had enough signs from President Park condoning his taking action to pick up Kim Dae-jung in Tokyo. So that is one explanation. Director Lee decided to do that as a means to win back President Parks favor, but it did not work that way.
SUN:
So Lee Hurak was still the director of the KCIA, not the ambassador in Tokyo?
LEE: No, he was the director of the KCIA. SUN: LEE:
When did he go to Japan?
Well, he was dismissed as the chief secretary to the president in 1969, and then he went to Japan as ambassador. Then he got back to Seoul toward the end of 1970, appointed as director of the KCIA. I have a quick question about North Koreas decision to discontinue this dialogue with South Korea. Of course it was followed by the June 23 Declaration in South Korea and Kim Dae-jungs kidnapping, but actually, as Dr. Dongbok Lee has testified, Kim Dae-jungs kidnapping was just used as a pretense. I want to ask the American diplomats or the Korean participants, why do you think North Korea stopped talking to South Korea and why was there a change? Was it a change of grand strategy or maneuvering tactics?
WOO:
ODONOHUE: I think that the American side really would think that Mr. Kim and Mr. Lee would have a far more concrete view. I think our own view at the time was that it had worn its welcome or had really ground to a halt already. But in terms of concreteness, we were completely dependent on the South side for their
120
picture. And I would put it that we never felt that they, the Koreans, told us everything, but that everything that they told us tended to be correct.
LEE:
North Korea was unhappy with the June 23 Declaration and inter-Korean dialogue was clearly used by President Park for the production of the June 23 Declaration, so much so that North Korea began realizing that the Inter-Korean dialogue was taken advantage of by the South Korean side in blunting some of the North Koreas diplomatic advances. So it was in March 1973 when North Korea issued a very strongly worded statement denouncing the June 23 Declaration. North Korea quickly began losing interest in continuation of the dialogue so the dialogue became dormant without certain regularly held meetings being held for some time. Then the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping occurred and North Korea instantly picked it up to issue Kim Dae-jungs statement, dated August 28 that year, denouncing South Korea and expressing North Koreas intention to make a departure from the dialogue.
KIM: Well,
the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung had been quite a shock and was very upsetting to the Korean people. On the one hand however, there were certain people in South Korea who felt that when Kim Dae-jung was so closely aligned and perhaps even controlled by North Korea and that he wanted to establish a government in exile, so it was correct that he was abducted. On the other hand, we had the South Korean people who felt that this was morally reprehensible that the political enemy who had ran against President Park during April of 71 should be abducted. So the criticism was mounting internally as well as externally, especially in international community against President Park. And also President Park was harshly rebuked by Washington on this kidnapping. So at this juncture as indicted to you before during my testimonies, that through the rotational basis of exchanges that were taking place with North Korea, North Korea was quickly losing its interest in continuing the dialogue with South Korea. And with the amending of the socialist constitution in North Korea during December of 1972, it seems apparent that Kim Il Sung had made up his mind that there would be a dynastic succession in North Korea. So at this time, Kim Il Sung felt that rationalization of this dynastic
121
With the amending of the socialist constitution in

North Korea during December of 1972, it seems apparent that Kim Il Sung had made up his mind that there would be a dynastic succession in North Korea.
succession would be quite difficult even for his own regime in North Korea, and he felt that there was a need to heighten the tension on the Peninsula. So I think when Kim Dae-jungs abduction had taken place this was a great excuse for North Korea to engage in a very big offensive effort to perhaps even knock out the regime of Park in the South, so this was an offensive that was taken by North Korea. We can tell what was on the mind of North Korean government by looking at the events that ensued the stopping of the Inter-Korean dialogue. There were additional underground tunneling by North Korea and also there was the axe incident at Panmunjeom on August 8.
LEE: Can I pose a question to the American colleagues with regard to the Kim Dae-jung case? You know after his release from the kidnappers in 1973, Mr. Kim Dae-jung had continuously been putting up the argument that while his life was at risk in the course of the abduction, he had his life saved by the intervention of the United States. And I dont understand, I dont think I have any hard evidence supporting the intervention of the U.S. authorities, although I remember having heard Don Gregg on one of the social evenings that he had somehow been involved in that aspect, but I do not know what kind of a role the U.S. played at that time. ODONOHUE: I can describe it. The DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] and I were
together talking at about 6 oclock one evening and our DCM in Tokyo called and reported he had these reports. Ambassador Habib immediatelywell as soon as he got a little bit more informationhad almost every one of us in action. He told the military to approach their military counterparts; Don, to approach his; I was sent to talk to Bud Hahn to get a message to the prime minister. The ambassadorif it wasnt that evening, it was the next morningtalked to the chief secretary, and the message he wanted us to send was a very simple one: Kim Dae-jung must not be killed. Part of his instructions were, dont get into arguments about people explaining to you that it wasnt them, just very simply get this message across. The Korea Desk prepared a very strong statement which the press officer used the next day. From our point of view the message was that he must not be killed.
122
Then as it unfolded beyond that immediate period, when Kim Dae-jung appeared on the streets and the government in effect signaled that he was going to stay quietly at home, then our role tended to fade. Then the Japanese began to speak less about Kim Dae-jung than the insult to the Japanese people of him having been kidnapped in Japan. Our role after that was that we accepted we were not going to try to force access to him. You know what you describe is more diplomacy, but one of the interesting points of argument that Mr. Kim has been raising is that he heard his kidnappers talking about taking his life. And then thereafter he heard the noise, sound of helicopter propellers and later he came to know that that was the helicopter flown by the U.S.
LEE: ODONOHUE: Ive heard the story; I certainly couldnt confirm it and I cant imagine where the helicopter would have come from.
The message he wanted us

to send was a very simple one: Kim Dae-Jung must not be killed.
Sun: We didnt know that at the time the U.S. military was such an efficient force.
ODONOHUE: Well, they were off the coast of Japan as he describes it. So as I said I certainly cant confirm it and Ive heard this story, but I never quite contemplated how you were going to get an American helicopter where they were located. LEE:
Mr. Kim [Dae-jung] had a couple of remarks which sounded quite weird; like he was introducing himself to some of the audiences that he was a brother of Jesus Christ, you know, things like that. A religious context.
ODONOHUE: THOMPSON:
I just wanted to go back to the question of the fall of dtente and the end of the North-South talks because the last document that weve been provided here is our report on the meeting that was called because of the sinking of the North Korea fishing boat. And the meeting was held in Panmunjeom and after that Dr. Lee Dongbok announced the results of the meeting which were
123
inclusive, and then we reported that you referred to the North as the puppet regime. And since we both are here, Im wondering, were we correct in placing some significance in the fact that you used the term puppet regime, and was this really the final death melt for the North-South talks.
LEE:
I do not remember having called North Korea a puppet. I dont think I have ever done that, but let me tell you a little bit about that sinking incident. Our navy did sink the North Korean fishing boat and then caught hold of eleven or nine fisherman, and we took them ashore. And because it was found that that sinking was an accident, a mistake, as I recall our people and the authorities tried to somehow persuade these fishermen to decide in favor of remaining in South Korea. The captain of the fishing boat decided to remain, his name was Oh, but the rest of the fishermen were telling us that they were going to go back [to North Korea]. So I think authorities spent some time, maybe a couple of months to show them all the juicy things of South Korea. They were taken around the country and they were taken to some families of the same origin. We have North Korean people, refugees in South Korea. So each of them entered into some kind of ties with some of these families and they were returned. And in some of the families when each of these fishermen visited before returning to North Korea, the families tried to give them some gifts and they almost unanimously wanted to have some gold, so they were given gold rings. How many I dont know, but maybe several of them, and they had them stowed in their underwearin the belt so they could hide them when the returned to North Korea. But when they were turned over to the North Korean side in Panmunjeom they disrobed and left everything that they were wearing in the neutralization conference room. So the rings did not make it to North Korea. And then about two months later they appeared on North Korean television to conduct a group televised interview. And each of them, when asked, came up with three major accusations. One was that they found people starving in South Korea, so much so that there were beggars all around. Secondly, they found South Koreans so fond of wrist watches, so much so that when they were taken ashore after the sinking of the ship the South Korean people took their wristwatches and the South Korea officers were seen
124
having several wristwatches on their arms. And thirdly, when they were taken to the Myeongdong area, which is the busy downtown area, they saw many South Korean girls working as prostitutes in the service of American soldiers. And we analyzed them and found out that when they were taken around South Korea they were surprised mostly by three scenes First, when they were taken to restaurants there was such a long list of menus and they found that South Koreans in the restaurants would order first and pay later, so much so that the abundance of food was something which struck them most. Secondly, when they were taken to department stores they saw that in each of the watch shops watches were in abundance. And thirdly, when they were taken to the Myeongdong area they saw many young girls wearing short skirts leaving their legs exposed. Before they were sent back to North Korea, they were asked some questions about their observations while in South Korea and they cited these three things as the scenes that impressed them the most. Now we came to conclude that after their return to North Korea they had been subjected to interrogations about what was their feeling having been in South Korea and they appeared to have come up with three observations. And then they were told to say what they said in the television interviews.
SCHAEFER:
I just wanted to add something to the end of the talks because I think it is important for the record. I think its pretty clear from the Eastern European documents that by mid-November or late-November at the latest it was clear for the North Korean side that the talks would go nowhere, but this was due to the emergency measures and Yushin, not to other reasons. But they were also pretty clear that they do not want to be the ones looking to be the ones closing the talks, so we do not want to shut the door. But they were just basically waiting for the first opportunity when the door could be closed with a face-saving measure by putting the blame on the South. So I think the talks were dead by the end of the November and then the final opportunity for North Korea came with the Kim Dae-jung abduction.
SHIN:
The fact that the dialogue had stopped I think is problematic if you were try to put a finger on it and say that this was somehow related to a South Korean
125
domestic situation, such as the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung. For example, we have the record of the discussion held between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in regards to the UN admission in 1973, and the discussion is very short actually, in comparison to the discussions that were held in 1971 and 1972. So in 1973 what we can tell from the exchange between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai is that China was no longer willing to be the spokesperson for North Korea. Somehow it was more reluctant to discuss issues with Kissinger. And as to North Koreas position, North Korea did not come to inter-Korean dialogue for the purpose of bettering the relationship between South and North Korea, but North Korea was trying to find ways to have the American troops withdraw from the Korean Peninsula. However, as time had passed North Korea came to realize that their efforts were being foiled. So whereas North Korea was in effect trying to piggyback on the dtente that was taking place between the U.S. and China, they came to realize that it would not work that way and that they would have to do the work themselves. Thats why they decided that it would be better for North Korea to engage the U.S. directly rather than through China. And so the incidents that had occurred domestically in South Korea, like the June 23 Declaration or the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung, these were just a pretext as has been discussed in this room and so they were not the cause for the halting of dialogue.
SUN:
I thank all of you for your active participation. This is the end of our panel.
OSTERMANN: Let me just also thank on behalf of the Wilson Center Ambassador
Sun for chairing this session. I think we all owe a round of applause to the translators for getting us through this. I think we had a day and a half of very productive discussions. A good measure for me is that Bill Stueck took a lot of notes and scribbled away I think more than your average conference notes. That is a good sign for me that we had productive sessions. It was mentioned that we gained some insights on North Korean perspective as well. In the end, were still missing authentic North Korean voices and documents at the table. I think we had an historic conference here and this group will probably not get together again in this formation, but I hope that future conferences of this sort will also include North Korean scholars and perhaps officials someday.
126
Thank you all so much. Thank you especially to the eye witnesses and the veterans for sharing their insights, to the scholars for posing good questions, to my team and James Person above all for assembling these important documents. Thank you again also to our partners at University of North Korean Studies. Thank you.
NOTES
1 The Paris Peace Talks began in 1968 between representatives of the United States, the Republic of Vietnam, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and sought to establish peace in Vietnam. 2 During the Liberation Day speech of August 15, 1970, Park Chung Hee proposed a new unification policy and peaceful competition with North Korea. 3 Seeking to augment presidential power and remove term limits, Park Chung Hee proposed the Yushin Constitution in October 1972. A heavily rigged plebiscite approved the constitution on December 27, 1972. 4 On May 16, 1961, Park Chung Hee and other officers from the Republic of Korea army staged a military coup and seized power, overthrowing the Second Republic of South Korea. 5 See Document No. 22 in the Document Appendix. 6 The official title of the June 23 Declaration was the Seven-Point Declaration for Peace and Reunification 7 See Document No. 21 in the Document Appendix.
127
GEORGI MITOV
Document Appendix
DOCUMENT NO. 1
[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1970, 54. doboz, 81-108, 002584/3/1970. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balzs Szalontai]
December 12, 1970 Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. [] On November 21st of this year, the departing Bulgarian ambassador, Cde.[Comrade] Misho Nikolov [emphasis in the original], left for home for good. [] The utterances which the Korean leadersin sequence: Kim Il Sung, general secretary of the KWP CC [Central Committee] and chairman of the DPRK Council of Ministers; Pak Seongcheol, member of the KWP Politburo and second vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers; Kim Donggyu, member of the KWP Politburo and CC secretary; and Heo Dam, member of the KWP CC and foreign ministermade in the presence of the departing Bulgarian ambassador were particularly important, partly because these statements were made on November 18, 19, and 20, respectively, i.e., only a few days after the end of the 5th congress of the KWP, and they covered various important questions of internal and foreign politics which had been left unmentioned, or covered in a conspicuously brief way (and in a rather debatable perspective), at the Korean party congress []. On November 18th, Comrade Kim Il Sung [emphasis in the original] received Comrade Ambassador Nikolov for a farewell visit. [] [Kim Il Sung:] Comrade Ambassador, please tell Comrade [Bulgarian leader Todor] Zhivkov that when the relationship of
129
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
these two allied [Communist] Great Powers was good, the Koreans were relaxed, but when their relationship deteriorated, the situation of the Korean people became very difficult. It is very difficult to regulate our relations with our two big allies without offending any of them in the process. We, Koreans, make great eff orts not to off end any of our elder brothers. We Koreans, on our part, intend to reinforce our contacts with both elder brothers on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and during this process we do not intend to please any of them to a greater extent than the other [emphasis in the original]. [] Following the signing of the armistice, different and contradicting views and tendencies appeared in our party, but we overcame them. Due to similar circumstances, a few fraternal parties found themselves in a difficult situation in 1956. Here the situation did not degenerate to such an extent as in other countries, because the membership of our party remained united. Our experiences have proven that one should not weaken the education of the party membership and the youth, not even for a single moment, because otherwise both the party membership and the youth will fall victim to the enemy [emphasis in the original]. [] When the KWP and the government of the DPRK insist on solving the Korean question, they do not want to make the international situation more difficult. The KWP does not want a world war to break out because of Korea [emphasis in the original]. [] The outbreak of a war between South Korea and the DPRK may indeed result in the involvement of their allies, which would mean the start of a new world war. We, Koreans, do our best to keep the solution of the Korean question within the confines of Korea, or rather that of South Korea. Comrade Ambassador, please tell Comrade Zhivkov: if we use sharper words now and then, this does not mean that we give up the idea of peaceful unification [emphasis in the original]. In our opinion, the most important element of our efforts for [achieving] a solution is [our effort to facilitate] the growth of the South Korean revolutionary forces and carry out the South Korean revolution. In our view, the essence of the solution is the following: the South Korean people should overthrow Park Chung Hee, seize power, and start negotiations with the DPRK about the peaceful unification of the motherland. We do not want to, and will not, negotiate with Park Chung Hee, because he is a national traitor, a servant of American imperialism. Up
130
to now he has invariably rebuffed every proposal of ours to establish contacts [between the two Koreas]. Park Chung Hees latest proposal to establish certain contacts between South and North is nothing but a deceitful electioneering trick used in the campaign preceding the South Korean presidential elections of 1971. If Kim Daejung, the presidential candidate of the oppositional New Democratic Party, wins next years presidential elections, we will negotiate with him. Although Kim Dae-jung is also an anti-Communist, his public as well as unofficial plans are the following: creating a democratic power structure in South Korea, guaranteeing the democratic rights of the population, establishing contacts with the Soviet Union and China, initiating talks with the DPRK about peaceful unification, and pursuing a neutralist foreign policy. And if all this can be realized, it will be indeed unnecessary to wage war to solve the Korean question. [] Certain people may disapprove and fail to understand our triple slogan, independence, self-reliance, and self-defense [emphasis in the original]. Certain people happen to think that the DPRK does not need support and assistance, or they think that by using this slogan, we want to keep the foreign assistance from our people. But this slogan is not directed against the fraternal countries [emphasis in the original]. When we announced this slogan, we had the South Korean situation in mind, because the South Korean people does not know proletarian internationalism. By using this slogan, we want to detach the South Korean people from the USA and Japan. This slogan already has many supporters in South Korea. Recently it was the South Korean students who raised this slogan, making a declaration in which they demanded that the USA cease interfering in the internal affairs of South Korea. We consider the revolutionizing of the South Korean masses an important task. [] [Pak Seongcheol:] It appears to us that a few foreign comrades do not sufficiently understand us [emphasis in the original]. They give us the following advice: we, Koreans, should practice greater self-restraint. Certain people are of the opinion that, for instance, we should not have sunk the South Korean patrol boat No. 56, we should not have captured the Pueblo, we should not have shot down the American EC-121 spy plane, and so on. But this is demagoguery based entirely on misinformation and illusions about the USA. We do have to react to the provocative steps taken by the enemy, and we must firmly defend our achievements.
131
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
On November 20th, Foreign Minister Heo Dam [emphasis in the original] gave a farewell dinner in honor of the departing Ambassador Nikolov and his wife. [] [Heo Dam:] A few foreign comrades misinterpret our struggle against revisionism, of which our leader spoke at our 5th party congress [emphasis in the original]. Some of them already asked whom Comrade Kim Il Sung meant by speaking about revisionists. It is clear that Comrade Kim Il Sung meant, and spoke about, the revisionists of our country. This is also revealed by the fact that this subject was covered in the chapter on party work, rather than in the chapter on international activity. [] (Heo Dam did not tell that to the Bulgarian ambassador, but Kim Yangseon, the deputy head of the International Liaisons Office of the [Korean Workers Party] CC, told the Soviet ambassador, whom he informed about the results of the congress, that the revisionist elements criticized at the congress were, above all, Pak Geumcheol, Yi Hyosun, Kim Doman, and Pak Yongguk, who had been replaced before or in the wake of the party conference held in 1966. At the time of their dismissal, the first was a Politburo member and CC secretary, the second a Politburo member and the head of the South Korean department of the CC, the third the deputy head of the CC department for agitation and propaganda, and the fourth the head of the International Liaisons Office of the CC.) Some of them even asked whether Comrade Kim Il Sung had had the Soviet Union in mind when he spoke about the struggle against revisionism, Heo Dam continued. We replied that this was not the case! After all, in the report [of the congress] there was no such term as modern revisionism, the term that the Chinese habitually use when they castigate the Soviet Union. The recent development of Korean-Chinese relations has raised doubts in some foreign comrades, [inspiring them to ask] whether we want to worsen our relations with the Soviet Union [emphasis in the original]. I can say, Heo Dam emphasized, that this will never happen! [emphasis in the original] We strive to improve our relations both with China and the Soviet Union. [] Jen Sebestyn (ambassador)
***
132
DOCUMENT NO. 2
[Source: Archives of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 43/1971. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe]
Minutes of Conversation on the Occasion of the Party and Government Delegation on behalf of the Romanian Socialist Republic to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Pyongyang, June 10, 1971 Participants to the talks: - On the Romanian side: Comrade Nicolae Ceauescu, Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the State Council of the Romanian Socialist Republic (RSR), Ion Gheorghe Maurer, member of the Executive Committee of the Permanent Presidium of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (CC RCP), President of the Council of Ministers, Manea Mnescu, member of the Executive Committee of the Permanent Presidium, Secretary of the CC RCP, VicePresident of the State Council, Dumitru Popa, member of the Executive Committee of the CC RCP, first secretary of the Bucharest Party City Committee, Mayor of Bucharest, Ion Iliescu, deputy member of the Executive Committee, secretary of the CC RCP, George Macovescu, member of the CC RCP, first deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Aurel Mlnan, Romanian Ambassador to Pyongyang, Emilian Dobrescu and Constantin Mitea, deputy members of the CC RCP, councilors of the CC RCP. - On the Korean side: Comrade Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party (KWP), President of the Ministers Cabinet of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), Choe Yonggeon, member of the Political Committee, Secretary of the KWP CC, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Peoples Assembly, Kim Il, member of the Political Committee, Secretary of the CC KWP, First Vice-Premier of the Council of Ministers, Pak Seongcheol, member of the Political Committee of the CC KWP, Second Vice-President of the Ministers Cabinet, O Jinu, member of the Political Committee, Secretary of the
133
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
KWP CC, Joint Chief of Staff of the Peoples Army, Yang Hyeongseop, alternate member of the Political Committee, Secretary of the KWP CC, Jeong Juntaek, alternate member of the Political Committee, Vice-President of the Ministers Cabinet, Heo Dam, member of the Political Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kim Yeongnam, member of the Political Committee, First Deputy of the Foreign Section, Chief of the CC KWP, and Kang Yeongseob, Ambassador of the DPRK to the RSR. [] [Comrade Kim Il Sung]: The problem, in general, is unification. There are some people who blame us for abandoning the unification of the country through peaceful means. We did not give up this option, this is actually our guiding principle. If we dont manage to unify the country by peaceful means, we dont envisage another solution. The main problem in South Korea and the things that have to be solved there are supposed to be the responsibility of the South Koreans. The way to solve this problem in South Korea depends on the concrete circumstances and on the respective opportunities. That it will be peaceful, that it will be revolutionary or not, all this depends on the growing revolutionary impetus in South Korea. We do not want to force anything; we dont want to rush things, because we cannot exert any pressure. South Korea is linked to Japan through agreements; they signed such agreements with the Americans as welland these are military agreements. We have friendship and mutual assistance agreements with the Peoples Republic of China and with the Soviet Union. The outbreak of a conflict between the North and the South will definitely involve the Soviet Union and China, as well as Japan and the United States. If we are not careful enough, we could trigger a global-scale war out of an Asian conflict. The peoples of the world will not welcome this and they dont want this to happen; neither the Peoples Republic of China nor the Soviet Union wants to get involved in such a confrontation. To our mind, the South Koreans are not more willing to enter such a clash; Americans dont want to continue this fight. The Americans let us know that its not their intention to fight the Koreans again. They transmitted their intention through Podgorny. We then asked Podgorny to tell the Americans that we didnt want it either, but to be careful and keep away from us, because if they create situations like Pueblo and EC-121, then we are entitled to capturing them or to shooting them down. We keep our business to our territory, we dont do it in the waters of the
134
United States of America. Its obvious that unless they came into our territorial waters, we couldnt have captured or sunken their vessels. There are other comrades that blame us for increasing tensions in the region, but we are telling you that we dont need something like that. If we are asked about the probability of war, we could say yes, such a probability exists. If there hadnt been the conflicts we mentioned, if vessels like the Pueblo hadnt crossed into our territorial waters, if American spy planes like the EC-121 [had not flown over our territory], we of course would not have reacted like that. When Comrade Podgorny came and told us this, we advised him that instead of telling us that we were increasing tensions in the region, he should go and talk to the Americans and tell them to stop acting like they had. Should the Americans withdraw from South Korea, there wouldnt be any reasons for such incidents, because the South Koreans do not have the material and military basis for such things, and therefore, the main reason for such a conflict would not exist. Regarding the existence of the danger of a war, the reason is just one: the presence of the Americans in South Korea. They know we neighbor the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet Union and that we are close with other countries of the world, so they wouldnt dare to do anything, especially because they have the experience of the past war. If the Americans pull out of South Korea, the possibility of a war becomes limited. Except for this, what other danger is there? There would be that of Japanese militarism. The Americans have had the sad experience of a war with us; they have the one in Vietnam too and they can only envisage technical support for the South Koreans but they dont even consider the human casualties involved. Nixon said that the place of Americans in South Korea should be taken over by the Japanese. Concerning the revival of Japanese militarism, there are many elements pointing to it. We have a lot of materials proving it. I dont have the time and I dont intend to present them to you. Sato made his intentions to dominate and rule over the territory of South Korea clear on several occasions. Park Chung Hee is considering taking advantage of the Japanese and getting economic and military assistance on their backs and when he feels ready, he will attack North Korea. This is his mindset, in his subconscious. In his mind, a certain plan emerged, namely to defeat communism and to unify the country. Therefore, this would be the plan of Park Chung Hee. But the problem should be put this way: can communism be defeated? I think this is impossible. He himself
135
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
admits that for the time being, communism cannot be defeated. He is making 7- or even 8-year plans regarding the development of the economy, the strengthening of the army, and then, when he feels more powerful than the North, he will pursue the unification of the country. In other words, unification is not possible now. When will it be possible? He says that it will be possible when the South is more powerful than the North economically and militarily. My opinion is that this is only a dream of his. I dont know what he is thinking; does he imagine that we will be sleeping and not developing in the meantime? Therefore, we can say that we didnt get scared by his slogan to defeat communism and unify the country. What we salute is the successful fighting against fascism that is currently taking place in South Korea, for democracy and for the democratization of the entire social life. It is likely that Park Chung Hee will be overthrown and genuine democracy will be established. There has been a strong fight for democracy in South Korea in recent years. We are aware that this fighting cannot be successfully completed through elections, because Americans are in South Korea and there is the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Under these conditions, even the democratization process is hard. Of course, the possibilities for democratization will increase if the Americans withdraw. In the past years, there have been several attempts in the South. In 1959 there were some slogans for the unification of the country and for the creation of a progressive party. This was the case back in the day of Rhee Syngman when the Progressive Party took part in elections and lost by a margin of a few hundred thousand votes. Following the election fraud in 1959, students went out in the streets to protest. On April 19 1960, students riots took over the entire country, which led to the overthrow of the Rhee Syngman government. Mr. Chang Myeon took over his position. He realized he couldnt govern in the same manner as Rhee Syngman and then he turned a little bit more democratic. In those circumstances, the students and the youth exerted some pressures from within, started asking for visits to Panmunjeom and to ask to meet with representatives of the North in there to discuss the problem of the unification of the country. The Americans became aware of the danger and organized a military coup, which resulted in the assumption of power by none other than Park Chung Hee. In the South Korean Constitution, it is stipulated that the president in office cannot run for president more than two times in a row. Park Chung Hee modified the Constitution and ran for president for a third time. In this situation, opposition parties boycotted
136
the elections and then he ran in the elections by himself. Although he managed to modify the Constitution, he said he could relinquish his position at any given time; however the recent elections proved otherwise. Opposition parties joined forces and formed a democratic fronta progressive one, a front for the defense of democracy. Students organized themselves, all mass organizations did so. Therefore, a powerful united front was formed, so as to eliminate Park Chung Hee and to elect another president. In this context, Kim Dae-jung emerged as the president of the new Progressive Party. He even had some good slogans, which resembled our position regarding the unification of the country. He promised that if he became president, he would solve all conflicts in the area and he would advocate the unification with the North; secondly, he would reform the police force and the internal intelligence apparatus; he would reduce military forces and he would install a civilian government; he would reduce the penetration of foreign investments, he would protect and even stimulate the development of national capital. Concerning foreign policy, he would like to have good relations not only with the United States and with Japan, but to establish relations with the Peoples Republic of China and with the Soviet Union too. He offered wide democratic possibilities to all mass and community organizations in South Korea. There was only one thing missing from his platform: the pull out of the Americans from South Korea. In spite of it, his platform managed to mobilize the South Korean population. It was even feared that Park Chung Hee would lose the last months election. In these electoral circumstances, in the city of Seoul, the new candidate managed to get 80% of the votes; he got many votes in the countryside too, but eventually when Park Chung Hee saw that his presidency is under threat, he mobilized the police and the army and falsified the results of the election, winning by a margin of 1.2 million votes. After the presidential election, the parliamentary elections took place. Within these elections too, the electoral fighting was very strong. It was likely again that Park Chung Hee won a minority of the votes, but he proceeded with the falsification of the elections again. During the parliamentary elections, Park Chung Hee got 113 votes while the democratic forces got 89 votes. Judging from all these, it ensues that the fight for democracy is growing more and more powerful in South Korea. Over a period of almost two months, students and the youth in general got involved into bitter fights, going out in the streets and protesting.
137
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
What could be the conclusions from what has been said until now? If the Americans continue to stay in South Korea, victory through elections is not possible. For this reason, the problem of the unification of the country is linked to this issue. In conclusion, it can be said that, in the absence of the Americans in South Korea or of any other foreign forces, the South Korean people could install a democratic progressive government, through its own forces, and the establishment of such a government would draw us very close to each other, so that, without fighting, we could unify the country. It is not that we dont want it. We believe this can be achieved once the Americans are gone, excluding the possibility that the Japanese replace them. Actually, the Japanese are infiltrating into South Korea by other means, such as the Japanese investments in South Korea. Sato was the one to enjoy the victory of Park Chung Hee in the presidential elections the most. Park Chung Hee was a general in the Japanese army during the Japanese occupation. For this reason, he is very well regarded by Sato. Sato declared that he would be present on the July 1st ceremony for the presidential re-inauguration of Park Chung Hee. At Seoul [National] University and at other higher education institutions, on the occasion of a plenary session, a declaration against the participation of Sato at the ceremony was released. This is the situation in South Korea. Regarding the support of revolutionary activities in South Korea, regarding unification, you are aware of the declaration adopted recently at the Supreme Peoples Assembly of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. Should Park Chung Hee be overthrown, we will be able to discuss the unification of our country with anyone who desires this. This is the current situation. The evolution of the situation in South Korea depends on the struggle of democratic forces; on the [struggle of the] South Korean people. Among the population of South Korea, the spirit of hatred against the Americans has taken root and is spreading. Should the revolutionary forces in South Korea intensify, the ones that are more likely to intervene are not the Americans, but the Japanese. Between 1894-1895, the Sino-Japanese war took place; between 1904-1905 the Japanese-Russian war took place. In those circumstances, a peasant uprising took place. The 1894 riot was the biggest one in history. Within the Korean leadership back then, there were three groupsI am referring to the feudal leadership: a pro-Japanese group, a pro-Chinese group and a pro-Russian group. So, since 1894, there has been this attraction towards the three parties. In these conditions, the Japanese were called for help to suppress the peasant uprising; the pro-Chinese group asked for Chinas
138
help and this sparked the Sino-Japanese war. The current situation in South Korea can be compared to the one back then. Even if the Americans pull out, a South Korean rebellion would be suppressed by the Japanese. In 1969, Sato released a televised interview through which he expressed his desire to have the Japanese replace the Americans in the surrounding areas in Asia. He made a similar statement in September 1970 too. Moreover, Sato declared that since the Americans are cutting back on their military forces in South Korea, there is no alternative [for South Korea] but to accept Japan as the security guarantor. I wont talk for too long about these tendencies in Japanese militarism, but I would like to tell you that the Japanese conceived, together with the South Koreans several action plans. One of these is the Three Arrows Plan; there is also a Flying Dragon Plan, the Yellow Bull Plan. You must be aware that these are military plans. Currently, the Japanese are carrying out various military preparations, drills, in similar conditions to what the South Koreans are doing, with land forces, air forces and navy. Moreover, they built a strategic highway between Busan and Seoul so that they can more easily get from the South of Korea to the 38th parallel. The Japanese Joint Chiefs of Staff is in South Korea. Except for these high-rank visits, there are frequent visits of Japanese military cadres of all sorts to South Korea. Concerning the penetration of foreign capital in South Korea, it is estimated that approximately 20% of the total foreign investment capital is Japanese. It can be stated that the Japanese will reserve their right to defend the capital they invested there. According to some estimates, 3,000-5,000 Japanese soldiers are in South Korea; they investigate the battle ground and, according to certain maps, they examine the best possibilities for carrying out battles. I could state that but for the present dictatorship, should an uprising occur, the greatest danger for South Korea currently is the Japanese. There were statements that if the Americans allow the Japanese to take over South Korea, the Japanese would offer South Korea twice as much in military assistance as the Americans had. It is common knowledge that any American withdrawal from South Korea will be made in close connection with the Japanese. Sato has an agreement with Nixon in this respect. For this reason, we decisively fight against Japanese militarism. Of course, Japanese militarism cannot be mistaken for the entire Japanese people. We dont want to mis-
139
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
take it for the year 1894, [or] 1905, to mistake the people from back then with the present people, the level from back then with the current level. Of course, the situation in the years I referred to cannot be compared with the situation nowadays. Nowadays we have the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China and so on. The situation changed radically. We must be aware that just like with Federal Germany, which is a menace for Europe, Japan is a menace for Asia. Of course, in the future, we will improve our means for fighting against Japanese militarism. In general, these are the problems I wanted to discuss with you regarding the situation in South Korea. Of course, if they are of interest to you and if you want us to, we could provide you with documentary materials so as not to extend our talks now. How do you think we should proceed? Should we continue our discussions now or should we take a short break and then discuss bilateral relations and some aspects of the international situation? Comrade Nicolae Ceauescu: Lets take a short break. []
DOCUMENT NO. 3
***
[Source: National Archives and Records Administration]
Secret (Translation) Seoul, September 16, 1971 My Dear Mr. President, I would like to bring to your attention, through this personal letter, my views on matters of great concern for the Government and people of the Republic of Korea, especially in connection with the recent rapid changes in international situation and your forthcoming visit to Peking. In the light of such changing international situation and the prevailing mood of dtente, your decision to make a journey to Peking is considered a most important
140
and a significant one, and my government has welcomed it in the hope that it will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and further, to the building of a lasting peace in the world. Although it is anticipated that primarily matters concerning communist China and the United States will be discussed during your meeting in Peking, we are deeply concerned about the speculation arising in certain quarters that Korean questions may be put forth by the Chinese communists. We note that you have already made it officially clear that your [sic] seeking a new relationship with Red China will not be at the expense of old friends, and in view of the traditional close bonds of friendship and solidarity existing between our two countries, I have no reason to fear any decision being made on Korea without prior consultation with my government. What I do hope is that if any important discussion on Korea is anticipated during your visit to Peking, it might do well to have a thorough exchange of views between our two governments before your departure. As I have mentioned above, the world today is undergoing great changes with a strong trend for relaxation of tension. However, the north Korean communists, contrary to such world trend, are persistently following their policy of communizing the whole of Korea by force, and are relentlessly carrying out armed provocations and infiltrations against the Republic of Korea. It is well-known to us that such policy has been overtly supported by communist China. Despite new international currents, the Chinese communists are showing no signs of change in their attitude towards north Korea; in fact they are making clear their intent to further strengthen the military capabilities of the north Korean communists, as evidenced by the military grant aid agreement concluded as recently as 6th of this month between the military leaders of both sides. Under such circumstances, tension continues to run high on the Korean peninsula, posing a great threat to the security of the Republic of Korea. I cannot but emphasize again that, in order to forestall recurrence of war and ensure the security of the Korean peninsula, it is essential that our mutual defense system be strengthened, modernization programs to upgrade the combat capabilities of the Korean armed forces be expedited, and that the United States military and economic assistance to Korea be maintained at an adequate level. In particular, I consider the maintenance and eff ective implementation of the existing
141
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty to be indispensable to the defense and security of the Republic of Korea. We note with serious concern that one of communist Chinas aims is to have the United States withdraw its forces from Korea and elsewhere in Asia. The existing defense system between our two countries, needless to say, is purely for defense purpose. Therefore, the presence of the United States forces in Korea constitutes the most effective deterrent against the recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula. Likewise, the presence of the United Nations Command is to fulfill the United Nations objective and responsibility of maintaining the peace and security of the Republic of Korea. As such, the Red Chinese claim for what they call the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea should in no case be accepted. At this opportunity, I would like to assure you that the government and people of the Republic of Korea are directing their utmost efforts to the achievement of a selfreliant defense posture, with firm determination and readiness to assume, within their growing capability, more of the responsibility for their defense and security. But you will agree that Korea, as a developing country, needs a considerable length of time to do this. In this context, I trust that, at this juncture, the United States, not only as a most important Pacific Power but also as our closest ally, will continue to play a major role in safeguarding the peace and security of Asia. As you are already aware, the government of the Republic of Korea is devoting its sincere efforts to attain national unification by peaceful means. In this regard, it is vital to foster conditions conducive to peace on the Korean peninsula, if any such efforts are to bear fruit. If Red China really seeks easing of tension and rapprochement, it should, fi rst and foremost, desist from its military assistance to strengthen the north Korean communist forces and support for their policy of unification by force. Instead, it should exercise its influence upon the north Korean communists to help ease tension on the peninsula. I hope that my brief explanation of our position above has served to further your understanding of the important problems facing Korea at this time. I solicit your support and cooperation, and once again wish that your journey to Peking will bring about results that will go a long way in contributing to a durable peace of the world.
142
With best wishes for your continued good health and happiness. Sincerely, /s/ Park Chung Hee President His Excellency Richard M. Nixon President of the United States of America Washington, D.C.
DOCUMENT NO. 4
***
November 1, 1971 Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. [] On October 8th, the Soviet ambassador unexpectedly traveled to Moscow, from which place he returned on October 26th. On October 30th, he visited me, and informed me about the following: A [North Korean] delegation headed by Pak Seongcheol had traveled to Moscow. Deputy Foreign Minister Li Manseok and Kim Yangseon, the deputy head of the International Liaisons Office of the [Korean Workers Party] CC, were also members of the delegation. There were also experts traveling with the delegation. They spent
143
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
two days in Moscow. On the request of the Koreans, Comrade Brezhnev had talks with the delegation. The essence of what was said by Pak Seongcheol is the following: I) According to the Korean leaderships evaluation, the influence of the rightist parties is considerably decreasing in South Korea, [whereas] the strength of the opposition parties has substantially increased. This is clearly shown by the electoral results, the growth of the movement of progressive forces, and the actions of the student movement. Park Chung Hee is becoming more and more isolated. II) The DPRK must take advantage of this situation so as to compel the South Korean [political] forces to accept the peaceful unification of the motherland. The DPRK has worked out a number of measures with regard to that. 1) In the international sphere, they take advantage of every opportunity and occasion to recruit as many supporters for their policy of peaceful national unification as possible. As far as possible, they intend to make use of the UN and other international organizations, too. Through political and diplomatic means, they want to bring great international pressure to bear on the USA in order to achieve the withdrawal of its troops and the abrogation of the U.S.-South Korean military treaty. 2) They want to make Japan understand that the U.S. presence in South Korea and Japan as well as the South Korean-[Japanese] treaty hinders the unification of the motherland. They want to achieve the abrogation of the treaty. 3) They turned to the Soviet Union with the direct request that [the USSR] should try to achieve the aforesaid results [in the course of its negotiations] with the USA and Japan. 124 S[ebestyn]
DOCUMENT NO. 5
***
144
January 20, 1972 Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in Poland to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. [] On the basis of the information received from the deputy head of the competent main department of the F[oreign] M[inistry], I report the following: [...] The Korean comrades indefinitely postpone the date of national unification, but at the same time they initiate a dialogue with the leaders of the South Korean regime. Their demands are limited to insisting on the withdrawal of foreign troops. They do not consider it necessary to emphasize that the USA should cease supporting the South Korean regime. [...] 16 Pintr
DOCUMENT NO. 6
***
[Source: PolA AA, MfAA, C 1080/78. Obtained for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer and translated for NKIDP by Karen Riechert]
GDR [German Democratic Republic] Embassy to DPRK Pyongyang, 13 March 1972 Note on a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the USSR Embassy, Comrade Kurbatov, on 10 March 1972 in the GDR Embassy During the conversation there was an exchange of opinions on the following questions:
145
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
The DPRK Position on the Nixon Visit to Beijing and Its Influence on the Situation in Korea Based on a written draft, Comrade Kurbatov asserted the DPRK reaction demonstrates how the Korean leadership is very content with the result, in particular with the inclusion of the Korean Problem into the [Shanghai] communiqu between China and the United States. It [Korean leadership] is very pleased with the support of the DPRK Eight-Point-Proposal and the demand to dissolve UNCURK1. The Korean leaders think that the Chinese maintained a firm position on Korea. As Rodong Sinmun writes, the Korean leadership is viewing this as a great assistance by the fraternal Chinese people. During Nixons actual stay in Beijing, the Koreans stated how the DPRK position was laid out in Kim Il Sungs speech from 6 August 1971. Nixon would not arrive in Beijing as a victor but as the defeated. This Korean position had been reiterated in the [Kim Il Sung] interview with [the Japanese newspaper] Yomiuri Shimbun [in January 1972]. The Nixon visit was interpreted as forced upon the American president. This way the Korean side assisted Chinas policy and agreed to the discussion of the Korean question in the talks. In its publications, the Korean leadership attempts to hide from its people the parallel interests of China and the United States. It is pursuing its nationalist course and fails to notice the anti-Soviet aspect of rapprochement between the Chinese leadership and the United States. The Korean leadership asserts that China is a socialist power, stands firm on the basis of proletarian internationalism, and so on. The Korean leaderships position consists entirely of a course of pragmatism. In their policy toward the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Korean leaders are increasingly guided by pragmatic considerations. They are eager to achieve Korean unification primarily with Chinese assistance. It became evident that, in preparation for the talks with Nixon, Chinese leaders were not interested in tensions on the Korean peninsula (like, for instance, during the declaration of a state of national emergency in South Korea). The Chinese were successful in moving the Korean leadership from its entrenched position. The inclusion of the Korean question into the talks in Beijing, which had occurred with the full knowledge of the Koreans, speaks to new elements in relations between DPRK and China and to new aspects in the Chinese leaderships policy towards the DPRK. The Chinese increasingly take matters to solve the Korean question into their own hands.
146
Kim Il Sungs visit to Beijingwhich allegedly did not occur in early February according to the official versionserved the purpose of finalizing the exact joint position on the Korean question for the talks with Nixon. Also the stay of a group of Koreans in Beijing in close regular contact with the Chinese side further demonstrated the increased stability of relations between both sides. The Korean side denies a visit by Kim Il Sung to Beijing. Yet Chinese diplomats do not express denials but indicate how permanent consultations are possible, and a visit must not have been unusual. It can be assumed that the Koreans and Chinese recently had another exchange of opinions about the Nixon visit. The [Rodong Sinmun] editorial of March 4 seems to be an indication for that. It can be expected in this context that steps will be taken to create a favorable situation for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. The Korean leadership views this as its main objective in the near future. Information exists according to which the Korean leadership has been continuously informed by secret material about the course of negotiations with Nixon. The talks with him in Beijing proved that China and the United States have common interests and want to resolve Asian and other problems without the Soviet Union. He [Kurbatov] also referred to differing assessments of the Nixon visit by DPRK and DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam]. I thanked Comrade Kurbatov for his presentation and informed him in turn about the evaluation of the Nixon visit by our Embassy. Note: A comparison of the text of the [Shanghai] communiqu between China and the United States and the published version in the DPRK press shows that it was printed almost verbatim with only few omissions: The last sentence in the first paragraph, the third paragraph, the term Republic [of] Korea, and the last paragraph. Conversation of Comrade Brezhnev with Foreign Minister Heo Dam in Moscow Here Comrade Kurbatov remarked that Comrade Heo Dam told Comrade Brezhnev that the DPRK will assume a new position towards Japan. There are also new elements in Japans attitude towards the DPRK. Another aspect of the talks with Comrade Brezhnev were Comrade Heo Dams statements concerning the United Nations. The DPRK, according to Comrade Heo Dam, is expecting from the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to support and defend DPRK positions in the U.N. The PR
147
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
[Peoples Republic of] China would stand up and support the DPRK there as well. Comrade Heo Dam continued how it would be positive if the socialist countries will act in the U.N. in a coordinated and identical fashion with Chinas positions. The issues of Japan and the U.N. were not included in the Joint Message [of USSR and DPRK on the visit]. Comrade Brezhnev just listened to the statements on Japan and remarked about the U.N. that this question warrants close study. Comrade Kurbatov stated furthermore that currently the Soviet Union is excluding an attack by the South against the North. On DPRK-PRC relations Comrade Heo Dam noticed the improvement of relations, though it had not occurred at the expense of DPRK relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Moreover, Comrade Heo Dam said in his talk [with Brezhnev] that the Chinese side will be fully informed about what the Korean side expressed in its talk with the Soviet comrades. Although it is an important question, there had been no [Korean-Soviet] consultations about party relations [KWP-Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CPSU] on this level [Brezhnev-Heo Dam]. Later Ambassador Sudarikov will inform more extensively about the Heo Dam visit. Some Aspects of KWP Activity in the Communist World Movement Based on a written draft, Comrade Kurbatov made the following remarks: In 1971 and 1972 the KWP continued relations with communist and workers parties. It participated in party congresses of several parties and practiced exchanges of delegations. It invited delegations from different parties to the DPRK. As before, the KWP builds its party relations on a bilateral basis and refrains from multilateral cooperation. It increases its efforts to summarize the ideology of Juche into a comprehensive system and declares Kim Il Sungs Juche ideology as the only basis for party activities. The 5th Party Congress pushed through a petit bourgeois, nationalist line contradicting socialist development. These nationalist tendencies and the strengthening of relations with China have increased some negative tendencies in the communist movement and in KWP relations to the communist and workers movement. Despite official KWP declarations about the need to build relations with individual parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, by its actual activities in the international communist
148
movement, the KWP is contradicting Marxism-Leninism with the nationalist Juche ideology, and proletarian internationalism with autonomy and independence. The KWP leadership does not consider the experiences of the communist world movement, and it does not follow the collectively agreed decisions of fraternal parties. Instead it praises Kim Il Sung as an eminent leader of the communist and workers movement and praises him as a genius of the revolution. The KWP is guided by his works where he provided wise analysis of the features in the current international situation. It is guided by Kim Il Sung as a leader of the anti-imperialist forces because his ideas accelerate the demise of imperialism and guide the world revolution on the path of victory. Kim Il Sungs works, his statements during internal meetings with foreign party officials, and his published speeches invite the assumption that he has a negative view of theory and practice of the construction of socialism and communism in the Soviet Union and the socialist fraternal countries. Apparently he sees the path to socialism in the DPRK as the only correct and exemplary one for other countries. For instance, he declared in a conversation with the delegation of the leftist party of Swedish communists visiting the DPRK that he does not agree with the CPSU course to develop the Soviet Union as a peoples state, since in his opinion such leads to a weakening of the dictatorship of the proletariat. According to Kim Yeongnam, Deputy Head of the [International] Department IV in the [KWP] Central Committee, who based his statement on the sayings of Kim Il Sung, individual countries where the proletariat has risen to power cannot ignore the facts of a danger of imperialist aggression and the restoration of capitalism through encirclement by the international capital, before communism will be eventually established on a global scale. Based on Kim Il Sungs ideas, Korean propaganda is currently leading a broad campaign that defines all parties as supporters of revisionism which do not agree with positions of Kim Il Sung on questions like the personality cult, dictatorship of the proletariat, class struggle, and so on. In this context a couple of embassies from the socialist countries have reached the conclusion that such a campaign leads to the development of camouflaged anti-Sovietism in the DPRK. All this said and considered, the appeals by the Korean leaders for unity and closeness of the communist movement are just declaratory in nature, dishonest, and they are not corroborated by practical measures. The tendency becomes ever clearer that the KWP leadership does not focus on the unity of the communist world move-
149
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
ment but aims at the revolutionary peoples of the world, of which the so-called united front of the revolutionary people in Asia constitutes the core (Korea, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos). Th is approach testifies to a gradual departure from the class position of proletarian internationalism for a transition towards a nationalist, pragmatic position. In this context internal Korean propaganda has begun to claim that the socialist countries have lost their revolutionary spirit and therefore can currently serve only as a material base for the struggle of the revolutionary peoples. In public propaganda this position was to be found in somewhat modified form in the Rodong Sinmun article Let Us Defend the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Proletarian Democracy. As the KWP is counting China among the revolutionary countries, and based on the ideological and political closeness of positions [between DPRK and PRC], we have to conclude that the KWP is on the path to solidify party relations with China. Since 1971 they exchange party delegations. Korean propaganda welcomed the assignments for the struggle by the so-called 9th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as the implementation of the so-called Cultural Revolution. A Rodong Sinmun article celebrating the 50th anniversary of the CCP claimed, After the Cultural Revolution, the CCP turned into an even purer, steeled and strong party. The KWP and PRC have established contacts and organize informational changes. In the DPRK the Chinese journal Hongqi continues to be circulated. In pursuing its own goals, the KWP leadership does not pay attention to the antiSoviet aspects of Chinas foreign policy. At the same time it comes close to Chinese positions, as it showed in particular concerning the events in Sudan, India/Pakistan and the Middle East. Recently the KWP has increasingly activated its relationship with the Party of Labor of Albania. So far, DPRK efforts have not resulted in desired Korean reactions on the Albanian side, they only activated bilateral relations on the state level. For the occasion of important anniversaries they exchanged congratulations to underline traditional and friendly relations. The most active development of relations is the one with the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) on a nationalist base and under the labels of autonomy and independence of the parties. Contacts between KWP and RCP are activated according to an agreement from 1971.
150
KWP participation in the party congresses of the fraternal parties in 1971 (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, GDR, Poland, Soviet Union) has not resulted in progress of relations between the parties. The gatherings were used by the KWP leadership as a podium to propagate its special positions in front of the international communist movement, namely to emphasize autonomy and independence of parties as the base for their mutual relations. The KWP leadership is departing from an exchange of experiences and delegations with the fraternal parties. For instance, despite respective agreements there were no party officials sent in 1971 for vacations in our respective countries. The KWP leadership pays close attention to the tendencies of parties that deviate from the documents of [the international communist and workers parties meeting] 1969 [in Moscow]. It is anything but coincidence that after the 1969 Moscow meeting, certain parties have paid visits to the DPRK (Sweden, Spain, Norway, Italy, and Reunion). In its relations with the parties of capitalist countries, the KWP leaders aim to, in our opinion, influence these parties according to KWP policy and use them as a vehicle to establish diplomatic relations. We must pay close attentionand this is a dangerous phenomenonthat the KWP might establish relations with pro-Chinese separatist groups. For the first time ever, a congratulatory telegram to the KWP was published by the Communist Party of Thailand, which is completely in sync with Chinese positions. An important vehicle to increase influence abroad is the propagation of Kim Il Sung ideas through dissemination of his works and the founding of circles. Recent observations show that more attention is paid to those circles. They attempt to include communists in them in order to create permanent organizations. The Korean leadership tries to gain increasing ground through ideological infiltration into the international communist and anti-imperialist movement. There are ever more publications of congratulatory telegrams to Kim Il Sung with praises of his personality. Those congratulatory telegrams and messages cannot hide their Korean authors. Among other things, they want to manipulate the Korean people into believing that the entire world is studying the works of Kim Il Sung. The slide of the Korean leadership into the nationalist Juche ideology, the proclamation of this ideologys universal character, and its dissemination abroad, creates an ever growing danger for the socialist community of states and the communist world
151
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
movement. It requires us to pay increasing attention and to hold consultations between our parties how to approach and deal with these KWP activities. I thanked Comrade Kurbatov for his statements and expressed that we are in agreement about the assessment of KWP activities in the International Communist Movement. Note A public demonstration of DPRK-PRC relations are facts like how the PRC Embassy in France organized a friendship meeting when on 25 February the DPRK Mansudae Ensemble visited France (telegram of 29 February 1972). When the ensemble arrived in Geneva on 8 March, it was welcomed at the train station by, among others, the Chinese ambassador to Switzerland and employees of the Chinese Embassy. In the evening of the same day the Chinese side hosted a reception in Geneva in honor of the ensemble (telegram of 10 March 1972). 60th Birthday of Kim Il Sung on 15 April At the end of our conversation, Comrade Kurbatov asked whether the GDR will give a present to Kim Il Sung or wants to award him an order. This is a very problematic question and the [Soviet] embassy has so far not reached a result in its discussions. Here I remarked that so far I only know that we are preparing a congratulatory letter. My personal opinion: A present should have symbolic character, if a present will indeed have to be given. Comrade Gensicke, attach of our Embassy, also attended this conversation. Merten Acting Ambassador CC 1x Far East Department [Foreign Ministry] 1x Central Committee, Department IV 1x ZID [Foreign Ministry Central Information Service] 1x Embassy, Political Department
***
152
DOCUMENT NO. 7
[Source: South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive. Translated for NKIDP by Song Jihei]
Date and Time: March 16, 1972 10:00-11:05 Location:Panmun-gak, Panmunjeom Details:
NORTH:
I have accurately delivered Director Lee Huraks message to Comrade Kim Yeongju, the director of organization and guidance at the Central Committee of the Party. Director Comrade Kim Yeongju in principle agrees to the issues you mentioned. We will accept Representative Jang Giyeong and his assistant Jeong Taeyeon according to the process and method you wish. We will also clearly provide a memorandum regarding safety assurance signed by Comrade Director of Organization and Guidance when we greet them. We believe it is preferable that we mutually dont describe detailed positions in the memorandum. You should address the memorandum to Director Kim Yeongju and we should address it to Director Lee Hurak. The detailed schedule for your delegate and his assistant will be planned with sufficient consideration of your delegates opinion and we also have no objection that the schedule should be discussed between Mr. Jeong and Kim Deokhyeon when it is confirmed and whenever changes are made. Comrade Director of Organization and Guidance Kim Yeongju mentioned that people hope that the South and the North reach a peaceful resolution on the SouthNorth issues, and also that it is very important to accelerate the Red Cross meeting. However, our meeting is even more important. The best procedure will be to facilitate conversation first and then solve the nations issue of peaceful reunification. Comrade Director of Organization and Guidance, Kim Yeongju, in principle, welcomes your suggestion to send your delegate and his assistant to the North on April 25th, and also mentioned that the dates between April 1st to 11th is more efficient for us. Director of Organization and Guidance Comrade Kim Yeongju mentioned that we will have a modest celebration for Premier Kim Il Sungs sixtieth birthday. Premier Kim Il Sung prohibits any political event on April 15th. Therefore, we have not invited any visitors from foreign countries and are not expecting any event.
153
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
The circumstance is completely different from what it is currently being discussed in the media. In fact, our schedule is expected to be more complex after April 15th. Around April 25th, we have May 1st [event] and are expecting some foreign visitors. Therefore, we will be busier during this period. That is to say, you will be able to meet with Comrade Director Kim Yeongju and other comrades if you visit between the dates of April 1st to 11th. I propose we meet tomorrow afternoon or during the morning the day after tomorrow regarding this issue. When we meet, please provide us with a response regarding this. I could directly phone comrade Director Kim Yeongju from this location to report [your response] and receive a conclusion. This is the end of the official message. You just mentioned that our meeting is even more important than accelerating the Red Cross meeting. What do you mean by our meeting?
SOUTH:
It refers to the meetings such as the ones between Mr. Jeong and Kim Deokhyeon and visits from Representative Jang Giyeong. In other words, it refers to our meetings that are processed aside to the Red Cross meeting.
NORTH: SOUTH: What is your response to the issues that I mentioned as personal opinion when we met on the 14th? I assume you have reported my personal opinion to Director of Organization and Guidance, Kim Yeongju. (Read through notes.) NORTH:
I have indeed reported what you described as your personal opinion to Comrade Director of Organization and Guidance, Kim Yeongju in person. Kim Yeongju, director of organization and guidance welcomed it, mentioning it is as a good idea. He mentioned that he is willing to meet with Director Lee Hurak if he is the one with President Parks deepest trust. He mentioned, if so we will be able to solve the issues most quickly through a direct approach. However, regarding the meeting location, he stated we should reconsider since there is no reason to travel to a third country when we have sufficient places that are quiet and appropriate to meet within our country. When the two officials meet, it seems there are sufficient issues to be discussed.
154
SOUTH: I personally believe it is quite difficult to hold the meeting within the country in terms of maintaining confidentiality. When the high-level officials determine to meet, Director of Organization and Guidance, Kim Yeongju must visit us or Director Lee Hurak must cross over to the North somehow. However, considering the current circumstances, they must pass through Panmunjeom and there are quite a number of hardships in the process in terms of confidentiality. In order to maintain confidentiality, the officials must stop over at a third country to visit Seoul or Pyongyang. In this regard, a third country will be an appropriate location. Anyways, Mr. Kim and I should make cooperative efforts to promote a meeting for the high-level officials. When we move on to discussing it in detail, we could both examine the issue of where to hold the meeting. NORTH:
Did you also report to Director Lee Hurak on the statement that you mentioned as your personal opinion?
I certainly did. I have reported to him in detail even on the conversations that we discussed as personal opinions along with the official discussions. Director Lee Hurak also provided positive remarks regarding the meeting between Director Lee Hurak and Director of Organization and Guidance, Kim Yeongju. Have you reported to Director of Organization and Guidance, Kim Yeongju on my personal suggestion regarding Mr. Kim and I exchanging visits between Seoul and Pyongyang with permissions from high-level officials?
SOUTH: NORTH:
I have not reported regarding the issue [to Director Kim Yeongju].
SOUTH: Please report to him on the issue and provide us with a response when we meet next time. I believe it will be very helpful if Mr. Kim visits Seoul to meet with Director Lee Hurak in person, and also if I visit Pyongyang to meet with Director of Organization and Guidance, Kim Yeongju. If we listened to the [high-level] officials messages in person and report to the supervisors in person, it will be very helpful for the high-level officials to meet with each other. President Jang Giyeongs visit to the North is only a part of exchanging conversation. The two of us (Kim Deokhyeon and Jeong Hongjin) will be able to provide more practical functions.
155
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
NORTH:
If Mr. Jeong will visit, when would it be?
SOUTH: In this case, it can happen much faster. We could enable Mr. Kim and I to visit Seoul and Pyongyang with ease, couldnt we? The reason for us to set President Jangs visit on April 25th was because we considered your schedule but also because we considered President Jang Giyeongs health so that he is able to make the visit during the end of April when it is warmer. The date was set as it is also because President Jang Giyeong himself needed some time to prepare. NORTH: SOUTH:
Then lets meet tomorrow (12th) again.
Let us meet at the Freedom House on the 12th. Since we have the Red Cross working-level meeting tomorrow, I will confirm the time when the meeting finishes. Let us plan on around 13:30 to 14:00 roughly.
DOCUMENT NO. 8
***
Meeting with Director of KCIA Lee Hurak (1) Date and Time: April 19, 1972 13:43-14:30 Location: KCIA Directors Office, 19th Floor, Government Complex, Seoul Participants:
SOUTH
LEE Hurak - Director of Korean Central Intelligence Agency LEE Cheolhee - Acting Deputy Director of Intelligence Service, Korean Central Intelligence Agency JEONG Hongjin - Director of Conference Management, Conference Office, Korean Red Cross
156
NORTH
Kim Deokhyeon - Chief Officer of the Political Bureau, Central Committee, Korean Workers Party
SOUTH: NORTH: SOUTH: NORTH:
Welcome. It is unfortunate that it started to rain as you arrived. How is President Park? How are Premier Kim and Director Kim Yeongju?
Id like to deliver Director Kim Yeongjus regards along with his letter of confidence and a personal letter. (Confirmed the letter of confidence)
SOUTH: NORTH:
Comrade Director of Organization and Guidance Kim mentioned he does not have a particular message since Mr. Jeong Hongjin visited and spoke with him. He mentioned that hed appreciate if you could provide us with many good remarks.
Ive heard all about the things discussed through comrade Jeong Hongjin. Director Kims thoughts were completely in accord with my thoughts. I believe I have the feeling not because I heard about it. It is because we [both] belong to the whiterobed race. While there may be some repetition, Id like to speak to you frankly about what I think. There are clearly some politicians in both the South and the North who hope for our reunification promoted through military force. It is also a fact that both the South and the North have been building war preparations for the past 20 years. There are some people in the South who wish for a northward reunification using military force. In such a case, it may be possible that we triumph and reach reunification. Moreover, I believe there are some people who wish to use armed force in the North as well and it may be possible to achieve reunification through the invasion of the South. However, if we reunify through a war again, Hicheon Factory in the North and Ulsan Second Industrial Complex or the oil refinery in the South will be devastated and our people have to go back to the point before the Korean War.
SOUTH:
157
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
I feel responsible for the circumstance as I am in charge of a section of the government. The North has a Communist system and the South has a capitalist system. The systems are different to both extremes. Therefore, reunification requires a sufficient amount of time and effort. Nonetheless, we cant sit still and wait for reunification to happen. We must promote non-political exchanges. We have established the Red Cross meetings as a step towards these exchanges. We should conduct the conversation between Director Kim Yeongju and me as the both of us are well acquainted with the highest-level officials thoughts. I believe it is best that Director Kim and I take on such tasks on our own back. Instead of remaining indifferent until we achieve reunification, we should exchange [material matters] and interchange [non-material matters] if we can. I suggest that we need to get rid of any discomfort in our peoples social lives even prior to our reunification. There are two ways in order to achieve this objective, First is for Director Kim Yeongju and me to meet after drawing our opinions closer through working-level meetings. The other is for Director Kim Yeongju and me to meet in person first to speak openly and then hold working-level meetings. I will study the issue. However, I hope Director Kim Yeongju has a chance to examine the issue as well. To summarize, 1. We must initiate political meetings in order to achieve reunification as soon as possible; 2. We should exchange officials and communications on the economy even before we solve the issues with political reunification; 3. In order to promote this objective, Director Kim Yeongju and I should hold meetings. North: You have mentioned that there are two methods. You have mentioned the first is to hold working-level meetings and the other is for the two [high-level] officials to meet first and discuss the issues openly. Comrade Director Kim Yeongju stated the latter is very much desired. I endorse the idea that we meet first and then hold working-level meetings. We shall so proceed.
SOUTH:
158
NORTH:
I will accurately report Director Lees statement [to Director Kim].
SOUTH: In the letter, you mentioned that you will entrust the date of visit to me. I will deliver the answer through Comrade Jeong later. NORTH: The international circumstance is changing rapidly. We must meet as soon as possible. Please notify me the preferred date of your visit. The two high-level officials must meet to find a desired solution for the South and North misunderstandings and peaceful reunification of our motherland. If you are unable to visit during April, we would like to have another official who President Park trusts to visit us. Among them we would like to have Mr. Jang Giyeong visit. When Mr. Jang Giyeong visits, Second Vice-Premier Pak Seongcheol will meet with Mr. Jang Giyeong. He [Director Kim Yeongju] stated the best would be Director Lee Hurak visiting us. SOUTH: Even after Mr. Kim Deokhyeons departure, I will contact [you] through Comrade Jeong in the near future. NORTH:
Would you be able to answer us if you could visit us soon during April?
SOUTH: I would like to visit you soon. Of course, it is best that I visit. Anyways, I will
try to remain within the range of what Mr. Kim Yeongju had planned. The details include the possibility of who will visit [whether I will visit or someone else will visit] and also when to visit. Mr. Kim Yeongju is occupied in many tasks, isnt he?
NORTH: He is occupied with a number of tasks. However, he is looking forward to discussing issues with Director Lee Hurak. SOUTH: I was previously told that you are quite occupied during AprilYou also have
the May Day events

NORTH:
We both had different reasons then.
SOUTH: Even within the government, there are some people who support the idea that we force one-sided suggestions [to the North]. I am arguing to avoid it from happening.
159
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
We shall not force one-sided suggestions. Such things (one-sided suggestions) rather get in the way of achieving reunification. In order to coincide with the prevailing opinion in the international community, [forcing] one-sided suggestions is to be avoided.
NORTH:
In order to solve such issues, the two high-level officials ought to meet as soon as possible.
SOUTH: Very well. It is the most urgent task among our nations historic assignments.
North: It is true. We must resolve the misunderstanding and distrust between the South and the North. We should resolve what we can and we should pass over the things we can. This is what comrade Director of Organization thinks.
SOUTH: I am able to tell because I sympathize with him. Even without a long conversation, Ive become aware of what you think. Although it may be somewhat uncomfortable, we must meet face to face to talk openly and it will lead to finding solutions to our issues. NORTH: Comrade Kim Yeongju wishes for an unconstrained procedure without diplomacy. He is also well acquainted with the Premiers intention. For instance regarding the defamation issue, we are able to solve it soon. SOUTH: Although we were unable to reach an agreement on the agenda you previously proposed, the media has changed quite a lot for the past three days, dont you think? NORTH: SOUTH: NORTH: SOUTH:
I was very glad to listen to the [change in the] media. It is a short distance [from the North] to Seoul, isnt it? It is very close indeed. I am deeply touched.
Anyways, I believe Mr. Kim has visited and accomplished the tasks for Mr. Kim [Yeongju]. Although it is short, I hope you take a good rest. I will speak with you again tomorrow if there is anything I forgot or anything Id like to add. We, people of
160
the same motherland, were set apart because the 38th parallel divided us. Anyways, please take a good rest.
NORTH: I consider I am at my own home. SOUTH:
You do not need to be concerned. Lets say this out loud. Mr. Kim is a Communist and I am a capitalist. Will it work even if someone tries to brainwash us? Mr. Jeong, show them as it is. We should meet tomorrow at 18:00. Since we have the Indonesian CIA Director visiting us today, Mr. Kim and I should have dinner together.
DOCUMENT NO. 9
***
Meeting with Director of KCIA Lee Hurak (2) Date and Time: April 20, 1972 17:00-17:35 Location: KCIA Directors Office, 19th Floor, Government Complex, Seoul Participants:
SOUTH
LEE Hurak - Director of Korean Central Intelligence Agency LEE Cheolhee - Acting Deputy Director of Intelligence Service, Korean Central Intelligence Agency JUNG Hongjin - Director of Conference Management, Conference Office, Korean Red Cross
NORTH
KIM Deokhyeon - Chief Officer of the Political Bureau, Central Committee, Korean Workers Party
161
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
SOUTH: NORTH:
Does Mr. Kim have anything else to ask? There is nothing more.
would like to clarify one more time. Director Kim Yeongju mentioned that he would prefer my visit to occur during April. However, since today is April 20th, it is somewhat too close in hand. Also, there are some personal reasons. Therefore, Id like to visit during the beginning of May. In such case, I will notify you at least a week ahead. Frankly speaking, I have determined to visit the North solely based on my trust for comrade Director Kim Yeongju. Nonetheless, we must study how we can avoid the future historians speaking of my visit as a careless journey. Mr. Jeong should study this matter. I couldnt care less about such a matter. However, you should examine what [kind of] memorandum I should accept [to make the visit] in regards to the administrative procedure. Comrade Jeong should discuss this with Mr. Kim Deokhyeon. Mr. Kim might or might not remember this. However, when I suggested that Mr. Kim Yeongju and I meet in a third country, Mr. Kim Yeongju mentioned it is better that we meet at a domestic location. Afterwards, he added we could meet in the country or also outside the country. When I suggested meeting at a third country, what I had in mind was that we must jointly announce our issue in order to avoid giving the impression that one [actively] proposes and the other [submissively] accepts. The details of our announcement should include who and who met from when to when at where to discuss the South-North issues. As a result, we have agreed to the following in pursuit of our nations peaceful reunification. We will each make our best effort to utilize our influence in attaining what we have agreed.
SOUTH: I
1. We will initiate the negotiation for our nations reunification in the near future; 2. As a part of the negotiation, we should facilitate the exchange in human and material resources and in communication. Once we present such a joint-statement, the spokesperson for our government officially announces that the government welcomes the agreement. This was my original plan. Now that we are shifting the location to Pyongyang, I am not certain how we should apply thisI am speaking without any concealment that it was the main reason I suggested meeting at a third country.
162
Director Lee Hurak in the South and Director Kim Yeongju in the North, the two of us endeavor ourselves as the flag-bearers of peace, it will be solved peacefully. If we are unable to provide our influence [in solving the issue], and when we fall to the challenge of those who argue for solving the issue through force, the result can be fatal since there are extremists in each society and organization.
NORTH:
I greatly appreciate your candid statement. I will accurately report [to Director Kim] without omitting a single word. When Director Lee visits Pyongyang, we will be able to achieve some good results.
SOUTH: The issues that we have are tasks that need to be handled. I expect there will be troubles on both side when handling such tasks. However, regardless of what people say, I believe if we strive with sincere patriotism, the opposing party will eventually understand us. When I visit Pyongyang, you should not consider me as a foreigner and treat me as a foreigner. NORTH: We will welcome you with our heart. When we return, we will start prepara-
tions to greet you as a guest of the state. South: You shouldnt do that. We should never be involved in a war. In the South, I will be the advocate [for not having a war], and on your side, Director Kim Yeongju should take the role. Although there may be some hardship in the peaceful resolution of our issues, we must never hastily engage in a war. Regarding the issue, comrade Director Kim Yeongju also clearly mentioned that not engaging in a war is highly desired.
NORTH: SOUTH:
During the Korean War, the South was largely destroyed. The North was likewise, correct? In terms of destruction, the North was worse. The population in Pyongyang then was about 400 thousand. There were 500 thousand bombs dropped on Pyongyang city. Only two buildings (one of them was Hwashin Department Store, built by the Japanese) survived the bombing. Not only that, but all the factories were destroyed.
NORTH:
163
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
SOUTH:
You dont need to mention destruction. I have watched a documentary film on the Korean War today. I have not only seen the destruction the war resulted but also the distress people experienced due to the war. We must prevent such an event from happening, and there has to be people working to stop this. The media [in the South] speaks about your intent to invade the South. There are people on our side arguing for a solution using force. I am quite certain there are some people who argue the same on your side. Whoever attempts to make it happen, we must oppose the idea to solve our issue with force and stop such unfortunate event from happening. I would like to stress one more time. If we experience a war at the current time, it will be not at all like the war we experienced 20 years ago. I am especially anxious about having the shape of our land intact.
NORTH:
We have repeatedly mentioned that we have no intent to invade the South. While you may be unable to trust it, you will be able to when you meet with Comrade Kim Yeongju. It is not an issue of trusting or not. Regardless of which society you look at, there are always [a group of] extremists. Especially you should not trust what the military men say. Regardless of whether they are from the South or the North, military men always speak confidently [even when they are unsure].
SOUTH:
***
DOCUMENT NO. 10
164
GDR Embassy to DPRK Pyongyang, 9 June 1972 Note On Information from DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Li Manseok, on 8 June 1972 for the Ambassadors of the European Socialist Countries (except Albania) (content already reported in telegram of 9 June 1972) Comrade Li Manseok had invited us to provide the following collective information. Orally, he informed us extensively about the historic course of the Red Cross Organization talks between the DPRK and South Korea: They had begun on 20 September 1971 at the initiative of the DPRK in accordance with the DPRKs course of peaceful and independent unification. The South Korean side had to agree to these talks following domestic and external pressure. During the entire course of talks the South Korean side applied delaying tactics. Yet the patience and perseverance of the DPRK in defense of the justified national interest of the entire Korean people led to a certain interim result. In order to reach a final agreement on the proposed agenda for substantial content negotiations, the preparatory meetings were interrupted through confidential expert negotiations that took place in the time between 21 February and 5 June 1972. The most recent expert meeting resulted in the following agreed upon agenda for the content negotiations: 1. Research and transmission of addresses and the fate of family members and relatives scattered over the North and the South; 2. Implementation of free visits and free reunions between family members and relatives scattered over the North and the South; 3. Implementation of free postal exchange between family members and relatives scattered over the North and the South; 4. Re-integration of family members and relatives scattered over the North and the South on the base of declarations of free will; 5. Other questions to be resolved on humanitarian grounds. The expert talks stretched over some time as the South Korean side wanted to propose another course through its delaying tactics. The South Korean side desired to have the first reunion between such family members and relatives in Panmunjeom, or another
165
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
location to be decided under control of the Red Cross organization. Also the exchange of letters should be conducted under supervision of the Red Cross. The DPRK, however, demanded all along to have free visits and free reunions at a location to be chosen by family members and relatives themselves. During the course of meetings the South Korean side finally ran out of arguments and agreed to the correct argumentation of the DPRK. With the agreement on a proposal for a joint agenda the confidential expert meetings have now ended. During the next, the 20th meeting of the preliminary talks scheduled for 16 June 1972 this joint proposal must now be finally confirmed. Those preliminary meetings also have to decide on the composition of delegations and the date for the first meeting of content negotiations, as well as on additional procedural matters. The DPRK wants to start the content negotiation as soon as possible to minimize the suffering of the people and to serve as a springboard to unification. The DPRK is expecting further delaying tactics by the South Korean side, but it will continue also in the future to display patience and perseverance. Swift progress on this question now depends entirely on the South Korean positions. USSR Ambassador Comrade Sudarikov thanked me for this information in the name of the ambassadors present and asked for a continuation of this form of information policy. He wished the Korean comrades the best to achieve their just objectives. Addendum Comrade Li Manseok did not mention that the DPRK also had made concessions during the course of negotiations. In our assessment, this applies in particular to the fact that the term friends was eliminated from the original DPRK proposal of family members, relatives and friends. During all our recent conversations, in the Foreign Ministry as well as in the KWP Central Committee department, the Korean comrades showed vivid and concrete interest on how visits are organized between West Germany and the GDR, as wells as between West Berlin and the GDR. They asked straightforward whether the same extent of visitor traffic between West Berlin and the GDR is also organized between the GDR and West Germany, and the GDR and West Berlin. I explained the political reasons still advocating against a wide extension of the latter direction of visitor traffic. I expressed our principled and cautious approach on this issue. The Korean com-
166
rades always responded that they desire completely free mutual traffic. Ambassador Sudarikov told me during a conversation that Kim Il Sung had once used this metaphor: White is easily colored over red, yet it is much harder to color red on white. There is no doubt that the DPRK comrades are harboring certain illusions on the question of unification in general, as well as on the issue of visitor traffic. Obviously we support through our remarks and statements the more realistic DPRK position to the fullest extent and wish for its success. Henke Ambassador CC Please see back! [page not provided]
DOCUMENT NO. 11
***
GDR Embassy to DPRK Pyongyang, 4 July 1972 Note on Information provided by DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Kim Yongtaek, on 3 July 1972 for the Ambassadors and Acting Ambassadors of Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Romania, Hungary, and the GDR at 20:40 hours in the DPRK Foreign Ministry The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs released important information on the problem of Korean unification. Reading from a written manuscript, he made the following statements:
167
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
The problem of unification of the country has to be solved without any interference from outside, without foreign forces, with the forces of the Koreans alone, and in a peaceful manner. Party and government of the DPRK have focused all their efforts in this direction and recently achieved important results through contacts and meetings. He [Kim Yongtaek] defined the Red Cross talks in Panmunjeom as unofficial contacts with South Korea on a low level. With the agreement on an agenda their first phase has come to a certain conclusion. Between 2 and 5 May 1972 Lee Hurak, head of the South Korean intelligence service, visited the DPRK and had talks with Kim Yeongju (Note: brother of Kim Il Sung). Among other things, during his visit he was also received by Kim Il Sung. From 29 May to 1 June 1972 Pak Seongcheol, and not Kim Yeongju, visited Seoul and talked to the intelligence chief [Lee Hurak] and Park Chung Hee. The three principles of unification were instantly agreed upon, and they will be publicized at an appropriate time. Afterwards there was another meeting where a joint declaration was agreed to become public simultaneously in the DPRK and in South Korea on the 4th of July 1972 at 10:00 hours. Yet prior to this publication, the DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister emphasized, the Foreign Ministry wants to inform the ambassadors of the fraternal countries. Then Kim Yongtaek provided more details of the joint declaration: 1. The unification of the fatherland is supposed to occur on the basis of the agreed upon three principles: a. The problem must be solved without any interference from outside with the Korean peoples own forces; b. Unification must be implemented without any arms involved, it has to be realized in a peaceful manner; c. Notwithstanding all the ideological and other differences of the political systems, national unity, and a great, unified nation, is supposed to be created.
168
2. An atmosphere of mutual good faith and trust has to be created. Thus all slander and military provocations have to cease in order to exclude a sudden military incursion. 3. There was a complete accordance of opinion that exchanges between North and South Korea shall be opened up on all areas and levels. 4. Both sides will work towards the success of the Red Cross talks. 5. There was an agreement about the installation of a direct phone line between Seoul and Pyongyang to exclude a military attack and to solve all upcoming operational questions. 6. In order to increase speed in implementing the points mentioned above, in particular the unification of the fatherland on the basis of the agreed principles, a committee for coordination and guidance shall be established with Kim Yeongju and Lee Hurak as chairmen. 7. Both sides are convinced that the points agreed upon reflect the will of the people and shall be realized. The declaration was signed by Kim Yeongju and Lee Hurak. Comrade Kim Yongtaek continued: The agreement became reality since the South Koreans have adopted the correct course of the DPRK government. It is correct since it represents the path to victory. The joint agreement can become a turning point for the unification of the fatherland. Despite the agreement there are still many issues unresolved, and the struggle for the solution of the problems is complicated.
169
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
Deputy Foreign Minister Comrade Kim Yongtaek requested to inform our governments as soon as possible about the above-mentioned issues. He voiced the expectation for even stronger support of the struggle of the Korean people for the unification of the country. Note: On 3 July our Embassy was invited to a press conference for 4 July at 10:00 hours to be held by the 2nd Deputy of the Prime Minister, Pak Seongcheol. Merten Embassy Counselor CC 1x Foreign Ministry, Far East Department 1x Central Committee, Department IV 1x ZID 1x Embassy/Political Department 1x MA Comrade Grnberg
DOCUMENT NO. 12
***
July 10, 1972 Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. In reply to a question, the South Vietnamese [NLF] ambassador, who paid me a farewell visit on [July] 8th, stated, among others, the following: 1) In his view, the North Korean-South Korean joint declaration is as harmful to the existing but weak South Korean revolutionary forces as useful it is for relaxing the tension on the Korean Peninsula, because it disarms [the revolutionaries].
170
2) In his view, for the time being the joint declarations benefits primarily Park Chung Hee, reinforcing his position. Comment: it is possible that this is not merely the personal opinion of the South Vietnamese ambassador but also the opinion of Vietnam, under the present difficult circumstances in Vietnam. The South Vietnamese ambassador also emphasized that they, the Vietnamese, had supported the idea of [finding] a peaceful solution for the Korean question from the very beginning, and they also would like to solve their own Vietnamese question by peaceful means, but only in a principled way, without yielding of their principles. The North Korean-South Korean joint declaration makes one think that the North yielded of its principles, but this issue requires further analysis. 137 K.
DOCUMENT NO. 13
***
July 13, 1972 Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry. [] The 8-point proposal that the DPRK had made on 8 April 1971 has demonstrably undergone incessant changes up to mid-1972, and in matters of principle, at that. There is a qualitative change in the new proposals, namely, that the DPRKin contrast with its earlier demandsno longer makes the withdrawal of the American troops a precondition of a peaceful settlement (because these [troops] will depart anyway, sooner or later), it does not demand the immediate dissolution of UNCURK [United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea] (because, in any case, the cancellation of the commissions work can be achieved only
171
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
in the UN), and it is ready to negotiate with Park Chung Hee and his colleagues (because this is only a transition period, as the influence of the opposition forces is growing in South Korea). [] (In the fall of 1971, Pak Seongcheol, [during his visit] in Moscow, proposed to abrogate the Soviet-Korean treaty [of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance]; the Soviet side, of course, could not approve this [idea].) In the spring of this year, the leaders of South Korea also came forward with new proposals for national unification. The new element of these proposals was that the Republic of Korea attached an important precondition to national unification, namely, that the North should renounce armed [unification] as a solution, and declare that it would not attack the southern part of the country. [] In the spirit of limited withdrawal, the USA has reduced the strength of the troops it is stationing in South Korea, but at the same time it sent more advanced military equipment there, and supported the South Korean stabilization [by providing the ROK] with economic assistance. This undoubtedly yielded several results: along the Demilitarized Zone, in the first line, the South Korean army has wholly taken over the position of American troops, its military potential has increased, and at the same time living standards have also increased. [] Chinas involvement in the efforts aimed at solving the Korean question may also be motivated by the following objective: this way China seeks to demonstrate that there is no need for collective security in Asia[a conception] initiated by the USSRsince it is possible to achieve a solution, or at least break the logjam, in some Asian questions without [creating such a collective security system], only the superpowers must cease their control over, and interference in, other countries (quoted from a recent speech of Zhou Enlai). [] In the press of the developed capitalist countries, but also in the press of the developing countries, one can frequently find statements which hold the Korean agreement up as a model for the DRV and the PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government of
172
South Vietnam]. The Saigon regime makes particularly great efforts to use this diversionary maneuver in its attempts to disarm the Vietnamese revolutionary forces. [] Sndor Etre
DOCUMENT NO. 14
***
[Source: Diplomatic Archive, Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soa. Record 28, File 1705. Pgs 114-123. Translated for NKIDP by Sveta Milusheva]
Information regarding: New developments concerning the issue of the uniting of Korea and relations between the DPRK and South Korea, August 16 1972 For official use! Information The 38th parallel, determined by the world powers as a temporary dividing line of the military activities of the Soviet and American troops, with the goal of accepting the surrender of the 200,000 Japanese army in Korea, after World War II, and especially after the three year Korean War (1950-1953), turned, in fact, into a border between the two countries with different societal and political structure, created on the territory of the country in 1943, [countries] which did not recognize each other, and both were laying claim to represent of the entire Korean populationthe DPRK and the Republic of Korea, whose governments had placed, and continued to place the issue of reuniting the country as a main task of their internal and foreign political activities. The position of the South Korean government, declared repeatedly and not changed in the course of almost 20 years, boils down to reuniting through holding common elections throughout the whole country under the observation of the United Nations. The proposals of the DPRK government are diametrically opposed to this position. Their essence is the focus on the solving of the Korean issue without foreign in-
173
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
tervention, independently, on peaceful democratic ground and the formation of a united central democratic government through holding of free common elections in the southern and northern parts of the country, after the withdrawal of all foreign armies from the South Korean territory. Standing on fundamentally different poles, after the three-year Korean war between the DPRK and South Korea, all contacts and connection were cut off, and their official positions on the issue of reuniting the country had more of a propagandistic goal, as opposed to tangible value and were mostly aimed at the countries, aiding one or the other side in the examining of the Korean issue in the UN. During the 60s, the governments of the North and South brought forward an unofficial plan, unachievable in practical terms, course towards preparations for the reuniting of the country through military force. The term in a peaceful way and through democratic means was deprived of all substance and was used solely as a propagandistic slogan. The South Korean administration called for a march toward the North and a reuniting through victory over communism, and in the DPRK one could not think about a peaceful reuniting with the presence of the aggressive troops of the American imperialism in South Korea and todays puppets./Kim Il Sungreport of the CC of the KWP at the 5th congress of the KWP./ The main efforts in both parts were aimed at the modernization of the military and the building of solid defense systems, eating up the greater part of the annual budgets of both governments, raising the combative and moral spirit of the soldiers and officers, and the training and arming of the whole population. These mutually irreconcilable policies were accompanied by constant incidents along the DMZ, the sending of individuals and groups with the goal of spying, and the constant sustaining of tension on the Korean peninsula. The past 1971 year was characteristic with certain changes and the appearance of new moments in their positions on the issue of reuniting the country and their mutual relations. Without ceasing their hostile policies, in different statements of officials from the North and the South, a readiness was expressed for establishing direct contacts, organizing meetings and carrying conversations. Of course, these statements in the preliminary stages contained many prerequisites, which at the beginning of the present year formed into two main [ones]:
174
- the South Korean government to renounce its orientation towards foreign powers for the reunification, and - the DPRK governmentfrom its plans of achieving reunification through military force. The international setting which has changed and the general tendency for reducing tensions in the whole world, the disapproval on the side of the USSR and other socialist countries, including China, finding itself in the process of improving relations with the USA, of the policies for reunification of Korea through military force, and also the presence of American troops in South Korea, compelled the DPRK government to give up /for the moment/ its military ventures and to raise again as a primary plan the peaceful and democratic way for the reunification of the country, which was imbedded in the foundation of the policies of the peaceful advance, conducted by the DPRKs government during the present year. While in the proclamation of the Supreme Peoples Council of the DPRK to the people of South Korea on April 13, 1971, expressing in 8 points the official position of the government of the DPRK on the issue of the reunification of the country, it is underlined that we are ready to resolve peacefully the issue of reunifying the country through negotiations between the North and the South, in the event that after the removal of Park Chung Hees puppet faction in South Korea, a real peoples rule is established, or a patriotic democratic figure comes to power, already in Kim Il Sungs speech on August 6th there is talk of readiness for negotiations, including with Park Chung Hees ruling Democratic Republican Party. These changes were confirmed by him during the interview with the chief editor of the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun, in which it was expressed the DPRKs readiness also to conduct a political meeting of the parties for a peaceful resolution of the Korean issue and for the simultaneous annulment of the agreements of the DPRK with the USSR and the PRC and of South Korea with the USA and Japan, in regard of removing them as a hindrance on the path to reunification. In answer to the questions of the correspondents from the newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun on January 10 this year, Kim Il Sung proposed the transformation of the truce agreement in Korea into a peace treaty between the North and the South, which in fact established the beginning of the policies of the peaceful advancement for the reuniting of Korea. Later during the talks that Kim Il Sung had with correspondents from the newspaper the New York Times on May 26, it was pointed out
175
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
that the differences between the North and the South should not be an obstacle in the realization of national unity and the reunification of the homeland. Of course, the return to the peaceful way of reuniting the country can be qualified as a tactic move of the DPRKs government, with which it also aims to convince the USA and the South Korean government of the unsoundness of the fears about aggression of the North towards the South so that it might contribute to the hastening of the withdrawal of American troops while waiting for a more suitable time, when the process of carrying out the reunification would not cause international complications. The changes in the South Korean government position can also be considered tactical. Facing the impregnable fortress and the armed people of the DPRK on one side and the danger from the withdrawal of the American troops and the reduction of American military aidon the other, the South Korean government was basically forced to find ways of reducing the tension between the two parts, which would give it time and opportunities to finish the process of modernizing the South Korean army, which had fallen behind in comparison with the DPRKand which was necessary for the maintaining of the military balance on the Korean peninsula after the withdrawal of the American troops from South Korea. It was forced to make some contacts with the North and to accept, even though just for appearances for now, the principle of independence for the reuniting of the country. At the same time, though, with the goal of straightening the internal regime, at the end of the last year, 1971, a state of emergency was announced in South Korea, and a law for emergency measures for the defense of the country was passed, which gave unlimited powers and opportunities to Park Chung Hee to deal with his inside adversaries and to hold centralized, under his direct watch and leadership, talks with the government and the representatives of the DPRK. The first contacts between the North and the South were established through the Red Cross organizations during the second half of 1971. As the South Korean telegraph agencies report, at a press-conference on August 12, 1971, the president of the Red Cross organization of South Korea, Choe Duseon, proposed a meeting of representatives from the organizations of the Red Cross in the North and South so that the Korean families separated for the last 20 years can be helped. The government of South Korea immediately expressed its full support of the proposal, and two days laterso did the DPRK.
176
After 5 meetings of messengers for mutual exchange of letters, on September 20, 1971 in Panmunjon, the first round of preliminary negotiations was started. Right at the very beginning of the conversations between the five-member delegations of the two organizations, the place for the main negotiations was agreed on alternating between Pyongyang and Seoul. The installation of two direct telephone lines between the two points in Panmunjon was also agreed upon. After 19 preliminary meetings the principle agreement of the two parties concerning the agenda of the main negotiations was reached, and was presented to a group of experts for finalizing. With the conclusion of the experts work, which took place behind closed doors, on the 20th round of preliminary talks, the daily agenda of the main negotiations was decided on, which included the following issues: 1. Tracing the addresses and clarifying the fate of the separated members of the families and relatives, and letting them know of this. 2. Establishing a free mutual visit and a free meeting of the families and relatives. 3. Establishment of a free correspondence between the separated members of the families and the relatives. 4. Bringing together the separated families by their own free will and desire. 5. Other issues subject to a humanitarian solution. At the 23rd round of the negotiations the date of the opening of the main negotiations was agreed onAugust 5th this year, and the makeup of the two delegations and the accompanying experts were also agreed on. It was decided that the two delegations would be made up of 7 members, headed by the leaders of the organizations of the Red Cross of the two countries or by one of their deputies and [there would be] 70 experts. At the moment when the conclusion of the preliminary talks was expected, during the 24th round, the DPRK delegation came out with an additional proposal for the invitation and participation during the first two meetingsin Pyongyang and in
177
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
Seoul, of representatives of the political parties and the public organizations of the North and South, which was met with reserve by the South Korean delegation. [The proposal] made impossible the opening of the negotiations on the already agreed on dateAugust 5th, and it was used to pressure the South Korean delegation for the specifications of the place of the first meeting. The two unagreed issues, along with other such, subject to specification were put forth again for review by the group of experts, who after a couple of meetings were able to achieve a certain amount of agreement, stated in the 25th round of the preliminary negotiations on August 11th this year. It was announced that the first meeting of the main negotiations would take place on August 30th this year I Pyongyang, and the secondin Seoul on September 13th. In the DPRK as well as in South Korea, the negotiations between representatives of the Red Cross organizations are considered as a first step on the road to reuniting the country. The second step towards this goal was unexpected to the world public, as well as to the Korean people just. On July 4th this year at 10 oclock in the morning at press conferences in Pyongyang and Seoul, as well as in the press and on the radio stations in North and South Korea, a Joint Statement of the South and North was announced, a result of visits to the DPRK /2-5 May 1972/ of the head of the South Korean CIA, Lee Hurak and his conversations with Kim Yeongju and Kim Il Sung and the visit of Pak Seongcheol to Seoul /29 May-1 June 1972/ and his conversations with Lee Hurak and Park Chung Hee. The first point of the agreement determines the three main principles based on which the reunification of the country will be realized, namely: 1. independently, without the support of foreign powers, without interference from the outside; 2. in a peaceful way without the use of armed forces and 3. regardless of differences in the ideology, the ideals, and the system.
178
In the DPRK the authorship of the above three principles is ascribed to Kim Il Sung, who, according to the bulletin of the CC of the Red Cross organization in the DPRK on July 20th this year, feels a pain in his soul more than anyone, because of the tragic circumstances of the divided country. In South Korea, the propaganda qualifies the Joint Proclamation as a result of Park Chung Hees efforts and policies for a peaceful and independent reunification of Korea. Without a doubt though, is the fact that the elaboration and agreement of the above principles are a result of the policies implemented by the governments of the two parts, identical in form, particular, with a heavily nationalistic character, and the concessions and acceptance of the mutual conditions: the independent principleby the South and the peaceful pathby the North. The shared nationalistic features were also underlined by Kim Il Sung in his talk with correspondents from the American newspaper, Harrison Salisbury and John Lee of the The New York Times on May 26th this year. He stated that, lately the South Korean leaders, although only in word, talk about self-initiative, independence and self-defense, and about the desire for the independent reunification of the country. If this is looked at positively, it can be said that it has something in common with our ideas about independence, self-dependence, and self-defense. In reality, in both the DPRK and South Korea an active ideological brainwashing of the population is carried out in the spirit of Juche/self-dependence, independence and self-defense/, against submission to foreign influence. These nationalistic traits, in practice, have a very controversial character. They are placated when the ingenuity and greatness of Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee is being proved, accordingly in North and South Korea, and are completely forgotten when the receiving political, military, economic, and other aid from third countries is an issue. This is confirmed, as well, by the third principlethe achievement of the great national consolidation, independently from the differences in the ideology, the ideals, and the system, or as it is underlined in South Korea, on the basis of the national Juche ideology, which in fact replaces the class principle with the national and foresees joint existence in the ideology. In the following six separate points of the agreement are included the issues agreed on between the two countries: -- not to offend or attack one another;
179
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
-- to restrain themselves from armed provocations; -- to undertake active measures for the prevention of sudden violent outbreaks; -- organizing of a multilateral exchange in different areas; -- to collaborate for the Joint Proclamation and the realization of the independent peaceful reuniting; -- to support and contribute to the faster, successful conclusion of the negotiations of the Red Cross; -- to establish a direct telephone line between Pyongyang and Seoul; -- to form a Committee for regulation of the question between the North and the South and others. Both countries began the fulfillment of the promises taken up through the joint agreementmainly technically, on the day after it was published. In the press and on the radio the two countries stopped hurling abuses at Park Chung Hee and Kim Il Sung. Announcements have not appeared concerning armed incidences and breakings of the dividing line. According to a South Korean radio station in Seoul, during negotiations an agreement was signed for the establishment of a direct telephone line between the work cabinets of Kim Yeongju and Lee Hurak, which can be used only by them or by three people designated by them, every day, except on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. But there have not yet been seen any real changes in the internal political activities of the two governments in the spirit of the principles of the Joint Proclamation, which puts under suspicion their actual value. The announcement of the mutual visits and the fact of the signing of the agreement were a surprise for the South Korean people as much as for the diplomatic circles in Pyongyang. Already the next day after its announcement though, the newspapers, the radio, and the television shows were full of messages about the huge interest of the people from the North and South for its complete approval. The optimism of the Korean people regarding the issue of reuniting the country was also expressed repeatedly by the representatives of the Korean public at their meetings with representatives from different countries. According to agencies in South Korea, the agreement between the North and the South was met by the South Korean people with great excitement as a sensational piece of news.
180
The reaction of the opposition New Democratic Party was and still is somewhat different, seeing in the Joint Proclamation a certain amount of danger for the isolation of South Korea and insisting with the South Korean government for inside reforms and the change of all laws on the basis of the principles of reunification, revoking the state of emergency, and reducing the tension on the Korean peninsula with the help of the USA, Japan the Soviet Union, and China, which would provide the opportunity for consolidating the power of the country and achieving the reunification independently, through a peaceful way and on democratic principles on the basis of the South Korean social system. The changes which have taken place in the relations between the North and the South found a reaction among the world public as well. The press of the fraternal socialist countries reflected the agreement and the press conferences of Pak Seongcheol and Lee Hurak held in Pyongyang and Seoul in broad announcements, without taking a specific stance on the agreement. The Romanian leaders sent a telegram to Kim Il Sung and Choe Yonggeon, in which they expressed full support of the agreement. George Marshe also sent a telegram to Kim Il Sung. The reaction of China was the strongest where the press, together with detailed information, published a lot of its own materialarticles and commentaries supporting the agreement. The Joint Proclamation is met with a certain amount of reserve and restraint by the representatives of the GDR and the DRV embassies. The German and Vietnamese comrades see in it elements that are contradictory to the principles of the policies carried out by them concerning relations with the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] and South Vietnam. The reaction of the capitalist countries is also different. The governments of the USA, England and other western countries welcome the agreement and again express their support for the South Korean government. The Japanese government acted in a more reserved manner. In spite of the signed Joint Proclamation, the DPRK and South Korean governments continue to express their two different approaches towards review of the Korean issue in the United Nations. The DPRK insists on the review of the Korean issue at the 27th session of the UN, stemming from the desire for a discussion of the questions concerning the withdrawal
181
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
of all foreign troops from the South Korean territory and the dismissing of the UN Commission on Korea, statement of obligation by the rest of the countries for noninterference in the internal affairs of the Korean people in the process of reuniting Korea and accepting according resolutions. Th is position of the DPRKs government is dictated most of all by its desire for complete change of the interpretation of the Korean issue, from one connected directly to international security, to an issue of purely internal national character whose resolution has to be fulfi lled by the Korean people themselves without any foreign intervention. The South Korean government, on its part, conducts policies directed towards not allowing the Korean issue to be included in the daily agenda of the 27th session of the UN, considering that discussing the Korean issue willescalate the argument around Korea and cause negative impact on the development of the negotiations between the South and North. The South Korean government builds its position based on its fear of the possible acceptance of a resolution at the UN session that requires the dismissal of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and the withdrawal of the American troops from South Korea. In confirmation of such a conclusion are the efforts of the South Korean administration to ensure the continued long-term presence of American troops in South Korea which is also one of the proofs about its formal attitude toward the principle of independent, absence of foreign intervention reunification of Korea imbedded in the Joint Proclamation.
***
The changes in the positions of the governments of the DPRK and South Korea on the issue of reuniting the country and in their mutual relationship for the moment are undoubtedly positive move in reduction of the tension on the Korean peninsula and for the peaceful resolution of the Korean Issue, which is met with approval by both the Korean people and by the all of the progressive mankind. At the same time though, the existing contradictions between the propagandistic nature of the three principles for the reunification of Korea which are the base of the Joint Proclamation between the North and the South on one side, and the internal and international actions of the two governments aimed at mutual elimination and absorptionon the other hand, throw some doubt on achieving quick and significant
182
progress in the development of the issue of reuniting Korea and in regarding relations between the two parts. Prepared by: /Z. Yanakiev/ Pyongyang, 16 August 1972
DOCUMENT NO. 15
***
GDR Embassy to DPRK Pyongyang, 15 September 1972 Note on Information Provided by Head of 1st Department of DPRK Foreign Ministry, Comrade Kim Jaesuk, about 1st Main Negotiation of Red Cross Committees from DPRK and South Korea on 12 September 1972 Th is information was provided to ambassadors and acting ambassadors of several socialist countries (among others Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Mongolia, Hungary, Cuba) simultaneously in territorial departments concerned [in DRPK Foreign Ministry].
Main elements of the information were as follows: - The 1st Main Negotiation was a victory for the course of Comrade Kim Il Sung, and a result of the peace offensive by party and government.
183
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
- The peace offensive was started last year to create favorable conditions for the realization of South Korean revolution and the unification of the fatherland. - In his historical speech of 6 August 1971 Kim Il Sung declared the DPRKs willingness to negotiate with all political parties and associations of South Korea, including the [Democratic] Republican Party, in order to launch the peace offensive. - The DPRK wanted to achieve by this peace offensive: to thwart the Nixon Doctrine which intends to have Asians fight Asians and, in our case, Koreans against Koreans; to counter efforts by the U.S. imperialists to modernize the South Korean puppet army, to further divide Korea and turn South Korea into a military base; to thwart the further penetration of South Korea by the Japanese imperialists; to prevent further negotiations between South Korea and the U.S., respectively between South Korea and Japan, that were to serve the purposes mentioned above. Another objective of the peace offensive is the elimination of fascist repression in South Korea. - The South Korean puppet regime has attempted, using the pretext of alleged DPRK plans for a march on the South, to increase the fascist repression against the South Korean people. - The DPRK has no intentions whatsoever to march on the South. This is supposed to be proven to the South Korean people. At the same time the South Korean government apparatus must be deprived of the pretext to suppress the people and the democratic forces. The growth of revolutionary forces in South Korea ought to be strengthened as soon as possible. In order to achieve such, the repressive measures and anti-communist hysteria by South Koreas reactionary circles must be stopped. With its peace offensive, the DPRK wanted to open the door between North and South in order to influence the South Korean people in the spirit of the ideas of the DPRK and thus achieve democratization in South Korea. - The South Korean puppet clique was forced - to agree to the proposal of preliminary Red Cross negotiations;
184
- to sign the joint declaration containing the three principles; - to agree to hold the 1st Main Negotiation of both Red Cross Delegations in the city of Pyongyang. On DPRK Positions in Red Cross Negotiations, especially the 1st Main Negotiation: - The DPRK will do what it can to lead the Red Cross negotiations toward success. - Through negotiations and the proposed exchange of peoples visits between the South and the North a base for the unification of the country ought to be created. It is intended to have meetings between representatives of parties and public associations in addition to the Red Cross delegates. In contrast, the South Korean side wants to limit the Red Cross talks only to the discussion of humanitarian issues in order to buy time. - More than 80 percent of the participants in South Koreas Red Cross delegations are members of the intelligence service. They pursue tactics to cheat the world, to support U.S. imperialisms policy of aggression, and to achieve a victory over communism. Therefore the preliminary negotiations were this tedious, and these intentions also influenced the main negotiation. - The DPRK proposed to invite to the negotiations members of the respective advisory team which, in the North Korean case, is composed of representatives from various parties and mass organizations. After initial resistance, the South Korean side agreed to form advisory teams according to this composition. The South Korean insisted neither to enter this agreement in the official documents nor make it public. - Furthermore, the South Korean side attempted to turn the 1st Main Negotiation into an expert meeting. On this question the DPRK position also prevailed. With a speech given by a member from the South Korean advisory team, the South Korean side itself created the opportunity that representatives from the advisory teams could give speeches during the negotiation.
185
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
- A number of receptions and sightseeing visits were arranged for the delegation members. This was reported all over the world, even in the press and broadcasts of South Korea. Thus the South Korean people were informed of the participation of the democratic forces from the North in the 1st Main Negotiation. - During the entire course of negotiations, the DPRK was eager to solve the entire problem according to the ideas of Juche. - Meeting a request from the South Korean side, its delegates were given the opportunity to visit Kim Il Sungs birthplace, the cradle of the revolution. They also visited the new residential quarter in Pyongyang and a primary school. To influence the South Koreans in an anti-imperialist and national spirit, the delegation was shown the revolutionary opera Sea of Blood and the movie The Flower Girl. They also watched a performance by the Pyongyang Ensemble. On Successes Achieved Through the 1st Main Negotiation: - The superiority of the social system in the Northern part of the country, and the desire of its people for peaceful unification, was clearly proven to the South Korean people. - The attempt by South Korean agencies to influence the DPRK people with phrases about freedom was thwarted. - It worked to tie the Red Cross negotiations closely to questions concerning the unification of the fatherland. This is evident by the fact that South Koreas opposition parties already demand from the Park Chung Hee clique the South Korean advisory team should include representatives from other parties and social organizations. - The members of the South Korean delegation recognized the political-ideological unity within the Northern population. They rally monolithically around the party and Kim Il Sung as their leader. - Some of them stated, General Kim Il Sung is a great personality and unprecedented in Korean history.
186
- The course of KWP and General Kim Il Sung was acknowledged as correct. One has emphasized that the planning economy of the DPRK is more successful than the free economy in the South. - South Korean delegates could convince themselves [by seeing the North] of the lies spread about the DPRK in Southern coverage. - The DPRK people displayed a high level of class conscience during the presence of the South Korean delegation. They welcomed the delegation without enthusiasm but friendly, and during encounters they performed very uniform and conscious. On Further Perspectives of Red Cross Negotiations: - The Red Cross negotiations are a fierce battle between socialism and capitalism. - The DPRK does not live under illusions that these negotiations will run without problems. It is completely up to the South how long they will last. The DPRK is interested in their quick conclusion. - The DPRK will continue its peace offensive. Future Red Cross negotiations will be held once in the DPRK and once in South Korea. - The South Korean side will certainly do everything to delay negotiations. They fear the economic, political and military strength of the DPRK. - The Three Principles, as it became clear during the main negotiations, are a proper foundation for a peaceful and independent unification of the country. Comrade Kim [Jaesuk] used the opportunity to thank the governments of the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia for their support of the DPRKs struggle. The DPRK has high expectations for further support on questions of the independent and peaceful unification of the country.
187
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
Note: This information was read out from a manuscript and must be considered as uniform DPRK official playbook language, as other conversations held on different levels demonstrate.
Helga Merten 3rd Secretary of Embassy CC: 1x Foreign Ministry 1x Central Committee, Department IV 1x ZID [Foreign Ministry] 1x Embassy
DOCUMENT NO. 16
***
[Source: Romanian Foreign Ministry Archive. Obtained for NKIDP by Mircea Munteanu and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe]
Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceauescu and the economic delegation from the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea September 22, 1972 The following comrades took part in the discussions: Ion Gheorghe Maurer, member of the Executive Committee of the Permanent Presidium of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (CC RCP) and President of the Council of Ministers; Ion Patan, deputy member of the Executive Committee of CC RCP, VicePresident of the Council of Ministers, President of the Romanian delegation within the intergovernmental advisory commission; Stefan Andrei, Secretary of the CC RCP, and Radu Constantinescu, Vice-President of the Governmental Collaboration and Economic and Technical Cooperation Commission.
188
The Korean delegation is composed of the following comrades: Jeong Juntaek, alternate member of the Politburo of the Korean Workers Party Central Committee, Vice-Premier of the Cabinet of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, President of the Korean delegation within the intergovernmental advisory commission, dealing with economic and technical relations between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, head of the economic governmental delegation, Yi Giseon, Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Economic Cooperation, Bang Giyeong, Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, and Kang Yeongseob, Ambassador of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea to Bucharest. The talks started at 11:30 and they ended at 13:40.
COMRADE NICOLAE CEAU ESCU:
How are you feeling in Romania?
COMRADE JEONG JUNTAEK: We are grateful for the attention we have received from the party and state leadership of Romania; we are feeling very well. Our beloved leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, is very grateful for the good state of our relations in all respects. I would like to thank you, Comrade Maurer, above all, for the warm welcome you offered us. Upon our departure [from Pyongyang], our beloved leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, asked us to give you, Comrade Maurer, and all other comrades, his warmest regards. COMRADE NICOLAE CEAU ESCU: I would like to thank you for these warm greetings, to express my satisfaction with the good relations between our countries, between our parties, and to wish you a pleasant stay in Romania. COMRADE JEONG JUNTAEK: Thank
you. I have a message for you, Comrade Ceauescu, from Comrade Kim Il Sung. I would like to explain the content of this message to you, but as we are under the constraint of time, our secretary will read a translation provided by the embassy. (The text of the translation is read; it is attached to the minutes of conversation.)
COMRADE NICOLAE CEAU ESCU: I would like to thank you for this message and I would like to ask you to give Comrade Kim Il Sung, upon your return to the moth-
189
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
erland, a warm greeting on my behalf, on Comrade Maurers behalf, and on behalf of other comrades, and also [give Comrade Kim Il Sung] our best wishes.
COMRADE JEONG JUNTAEK:
I would like to thank you and assure you that I will send him everything you requested.
I regret the fact that we couldnt hold the meeting until now, and I understand the problems which Comrade Kim Il Sung is currently facing and we hope that we will find the right time to hold this meeting. Upon my departure, Comrade Kim Il Sung asked me to inform you in detail about his planned visit to Romania. As you already know, Comrade Ceauescu, the president of the Supreme Peoples Assembly, Comrade Choe Yonggeon is bedridden with a serious illness that prevents him from working. The head of the Organizational Division is not feeling so well so he is also working less. Therefore, Comrade Kim Il Sung is faced with a situation where he has to work extremely hard, on both party and state affairs. As far as the Council of Ministers is concerned, a share of the tasks have been assigned to Comrade Kim Il, but its again Comrade Kim Il Sung who has to solve a great deal of the problems [of this division]. What is more, his health is also not perfect, and for this reason, his doctors recommended that he not take long trips, such as the one to Romania. In this respect, Comrade Kim Il Sung asked me that, when I meet you, I send you his regrets for not being able to make this trip now. At the same time, he told me he was looking forward to visiting the Socialist Republic of Romania, to meeting you and other members of the party and state leadership.
COMRADE NICOLAE CEAU ESCU: I understand that there are various problems; such problems occur all the time; we have problems as well. I would like to wish Comrade Kim Il Sung good health. I hope that his doctors recommendation is not too serious; doctors tend to exaggerate! COMRADE JEONG JUNTAEK: We too want it to be an exaggeration made by his doctors.
Comrade Kim Il Sung also asked me to convey his deepest feelings of gratitude to you, to the party and state leadership and to the Romanian government for your full sup-
190
port that you are giving us in our struggle to unify the motherland. The active support we are receiving from Romania, from the Romanian Communist Party and from the Romanian government is truly important for our struggle. For this reason, once again, I would like to express the gratitude of our leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, our party and state leadership and our government for this support.
We are pleased by the initiative taken by Comrade Kim Il Sung, by the Korean party and state leadership in the direction of peaceful reunification of the North and South. you.
COMRADE JEONG JUNTAEK: Thank
COMRADE NICOLAE CEAU ESCU: Of course, we appreciated this initiative; we congratulated you on it, as we believe that the approach you adopted is particularly important not only for Korea, but also for international politics. We understand that the international proletarian movement [and] solidarity between socialist countries must be applied in real life in the form of supporting the policy carried out by a party and a government with a view to solving its problems in favorable conditions. COMRADE JEONG JUNTAEK:
Thank you. It is for this reason that we highly value the support we received in the discussion about the reunification of the motherland, from the Romanian Communist Party, from the Romanian people. For this reason, I was tasked by our party and state leadership to offer you and the other members of the party and state leadership in Romania a detailed account of the problems posed by the reunification of the motherland. I am asking for your opinion [on this]. The brief we have for you is rather long and we have translated it in Romanian; in order to save time, we suggest having the secretary of our delegation read it to you in Romanian. I agree. you. He will read it in Romanian.
As instructed by Comrade Kim Il Sung, our party secretary general, I would like to inform you about the most recent measures adopted by the Central Committee of our
191
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
party regarding the problems raised by the peaceful and independent reunification of our motherland. First, I will briefly inform you about the activity of our party so far, directed at the reunification of the motherland and then, more concretely, about the latest measures we adopted. As you know, it is the twentieth anniversary from the end of the war in our country and from the signing of the armistice. Nonetheless, the problem of reunification is not solved to this day. After signing the ceasefire, we adopted a series of measures directed at the issue of reunification of the motherland, and we forwarded a series of equitable and fair proposals to the South. But the puppet government in South Korea did not take these proposals into account and shut its doors [to us]. In the meantime, we exerted a lot of effort to strengthen the revolutionary forces in South Korea. In 1955, we suggested that revolutionary forces in South Korea run peacefully in elections against the clique of Rhee Syngman, to see which one the people prefer. At that time, the Workers Party could not run in elections, because it was banned and it wasnt strong enough. Afterwards, the Progressive Party in South Korea restructured itself as a centrist party. The Progressive Party managed to rally a lot of people [to support it]. Above all, a lot of intellectuals joined it. In 1956, the so-called presidential elections in South Korea took place. Then, the leader of the Progressive Party, Cho Bong-am, launched the motto of peaceful reunification, which reflected the will of the people and thus, he posed a challenge to Rhee Syngman. Cho Bong-am got a lot of votes in this election. He couldnt win because of the retaliation and rigging of votes carried out by American imperialists and by the puppet government in South Korea. There was a 500,000 difference between the votes obtained by the two candidates. Afterwards, the Americans and the puppet government of Rhee Syngman arrested and killed Cho Bong-am, since the peaceful reunification of the motherland was the approach of the Communist Party, and they forcibly dismantled this party. Afterwards, we found out that even the secretary of Cho Bong-am was an American spy. With the intensification of the struggle of the people of South Korea, the Socialist Mass Party emerged in 1960. This one too was a centrist party. But this party did not have strong relations with the workers and the peasants; on the contrary, it attracted mostly intellectuals. The popular uprising for the overthrow of Rhee Syngman in April 1960 was led, behind the scenes, by the Socialist Mass Party. Rhee Syngman was
192
crushed in battle, but they couldnt take the reins of political power from his hands. Then, the Americans suggested that Mr. Chang Myeon be president as a middle ground solution, so that he promotes so-called democratic governance. Under the leadership of the Socialist Mass Party, the youth movement gained momentum. The youth and South Korean students joined ranks, mobilized under the motto lets go to the North, come down Southward, and lets meet at Panmunjeom and they fought for this motto. Through this motto, they made their voice heard and they asked for the peaceful reunification of the motherland. In these circumstances, Park Chung Hee organized a military coup on May 16, 1961. The Socialist Mass Party was eventually defeated and dismantled. The leader of this party was thrown in jail, and according to the so-called law of political brotherhood some tens of thousands of party members were arrested. Afterwards, a semi-legal party emergedthe Revolutionary Party for Reunification. Currently, there is this organization in South Koreathe Revolutionary Party for Reunification. Of course, it does not have too many branches; there are regional committees and local committees only in the more important cities. The respective comrades did not keep this all secret; they did not work properly, which led to losses in some organizations, and to the arrest of some cadres. The party committee in Seoul was dismantled; the same thing happened to the party committee in the South Jeolla province. We have some organizations of our party in South Korea, but because of the intensification of fascist and terrorist governance towards these organizations, they cannot operate in a sustainable manner. The struggle in South Korea is very hard. In these circumstances, we ask ourselves a very important question: how can we increase and mobilize the revolutionaries and revolutionary organizations in South Korea? We cant wage war in South Korea. We signed a military treaty with the USSR and with the Peoples Republic of China and South Korea signed one with the United States. If we start a war in South Korea, it can turn into a world war. Up until now, we used a wide range of methods in South Korea, but we have achieved nothing. In these circumstances, we cant wage war. What should we do? Taking the current situation into account, we thought the best thing to do is to launch a peaceful offensive. Currently, the New Democratic Party in South Korea is following a somewhat progressive line. The New Democratic Party has its branches in [all] regions and districts
193
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
and it is rather big. According to the Constitution of South Korea, the President cannot be elected for two terms. Park Chung Hee was forced to change the Constitution so that he could be elected several times. Opposition parties in South Korea, including the New Democratic Party, have fought against the measure to change the Constitution adopted by Park Chung Hee. We tasked our illegal branch in South Korea to support this struggle. Democratic forces in South Korea organized a Popular Advisory Committee for the Defense of Democracy, while young students organized the National Union of Young Students for the Defense of Democracy and thus they fought a consistent campaign [against that decision]. Nonetheless, the Park Chung Hee clique managed to change the Constitution without the consent of opposition parties, during the night, at 3:00 AM, only with the participation of members of Parliament from the Democratic Republican Party. For this reason, the opposition parties in South Korea were forced to run against Park Chung Hee again in the elections. With a view to supporting the struggle of the people in South Korea and of opposition parties, we convened the Supreme Popular Assembly and we suggested the eight points regarding the reunification of the motherland. Kim Dae-jung became the candidate nominated by the New Democratic Party and by other opposition parties and started his bid against Park Chung Hee. Of course, we are aware he cant win the elections, but his candidacy gave us the opportunity to measure the real strength of the population in South Korea. In other words, we could tell who and to what extent is supporting the peaceful reunification of the motherland. At the same time, Kim Dae-jung launched the motto peaceful reunification. He said that if he took power, reunification would be carried out in a peaceful way, the army would be cut down, the army reserves for regional defense would be dismantled, the South Korean army would be withdrawn from South Vietnam, foreign relations will be expanded beyond America and Japan, to include the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China and other countries. He launched some good mottos. For this reason, he received 70% of the votes in Seoul. The Park Chung Hee clique carried out a series of frauds and did not open the voting booths until a week later, being very worried [about its competitor]. Kim Dae-jung could not win the elections, losing by a margin of 900,000 votes. In South Korea, the army and the police had more than 1 million votes. If Park Chung Hee had not received these votes, he wouldnt have won. Then the struggle for the election of members of the National Assembly began. After the elections, the New Democratic Party had 89 seats; the Democratic Republican
194
Party had 113 seats, which meant that the Park Chung Hee clique could not have won more than two thirds of the vote. Since he didnt win more than two thirds, he cannot modify the Constitution again and get elected president for a fourth time. Although Park Chung Hee stood in power, the population in South Korea scored significant victories in the struggle embodied in these elections. The population in South Korea gained the right to freely express its opinion on the matter of peaceful reunification of the motherland. On the occasion of these elections, Park Chung Hee understood that the elements opposing [the way] South Korean society looks now are quite strong, and that the situation became too complicated for him to get elected in the foreseeable future. This was a terrible psychological blow for Park Chung Hee. While Park Chung Hee was facing this impasse, Comrade Kim Il Sung clearly showed, in his speech on August 6th last year, that we are ready to have contacts at any time with all political parties, including the Democratic Republican Party, with all social organizations, and with all personalities in South Korea. After our new proposals, the population in South Korea together with other peoples of the world raised their voice to support us. The Park Chung Hee clique participated in the talks between the Red Cross organizations in North and South Korea, being pressed by internal and international public opinion to do so. They thought we wouldnt accept talks on the line of the Red Cross organizations. Putting the issue of political negotiations aside, we agreed to holding talks on the line of the Red Cross organizations, an idea they proposed. They suggested we discuss only the issue of separated families, but we proposed the free circulation of families, relatives and friends between North and South. Currently, there are 200,000 people on our territory who used to be part of the voluntary army organized during the war, on the territory of South Korea. Most of these people studied in our universities. South Koreans know that we are highly trained in political and economic affairs. When free circulation is enforced, it is detrimental to them, and as a consequence, they refuse this measure. For this reason, we have been pressing for one year to introduce this matter on the negotiations agenda. Eventually, they agreed to enforce the freedom of reciprocal visits. The freedom of circulation and the freedom of visits are one and the same thing. After talks between Red Cross organizations in the North and the South began, the South Korean population raised its voice more and more, demanding peaceful reunification. Worried by this situation, the Park Chung Hee clique declared a
195
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
state of national emergency. We always carried out a peaceful offensive, while they always proposed we meet in secret, putting aside the preliminary talks between Red Cross organizations. They suggested that we contact them only and not other political parties in South Korea. We took those opportunities, however, to establish contacts with other political parties and organizations in South Korea. Worried by this, the Park Chung Hee clique suggested we meet only with them. They proposed a meeting with the head of our Organizational and Coordination Section to be held abroad. We asked why meet abroad, when we have such a beautiful country; [I told them that] if you want to meet us, we could do it in Pyongyang, Gaesong or Wonsan. After our suggestions, they accepted to come to Pyongyang. Afterwards, Lee Hurak, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency in South Korea came to Pyongyang, at the beginning of May this year. When he met the head of our Organizational and Coordination Section, he said he was tasked by Park Chung Hee to solve some of the frozen problems between us. The head of our Organizational and Coordination Section told him that we were against them because they wanted to invade us, benefiting from the protection of AmericanJapanese imperialists. The head of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency replied that they were afraid we would invade them. The head of our organizational and coordination section told Lee Hurak that even if South Korea was not under the protection of American-Japanese imperialists, we would still not invade them. Communists never attack first. Lee Hurak said that in the future, they will stop serving the interests of American-Japanese imperialists. The head of our Organizational and Coordination Section asked him why they are fighting against their brothers in South Korea. We are not attacking South Korea so why are they retaliating against their brothers? Afterwards, Lee Hurak asked to meet Comrade Kim Il Sung, the secretary general of our party. Comrade Kim Il Sung received him. Comrade Kim Il Sung told him that since they dont want to invade us, we should proceed with the peaceful reunification of the motherland. Comrade Kim Il Sung, the secretary general of our party, told him: we are completely independent. The Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China are our allies but they dont interfere with our internal affairs; the Soviet army withdrew a long time ago and the Chinese volunteers, also, were pulled out of our
196
country. But you continue to have American troops; you should do something to have them withdraw. Moreover, you must resist Japanese militarism, because [if you dont] South Korea will become Japans colony. He recalled real facts when, in 1897, Japan, faced with a rebellion of the South Korean peasantry, brought its army to South Korea under the pretext of defending the properties of its citizens. Comrade Kim Il Sung told him that if they allow Japanese in South Korea, the same situation can occur. If Japanese militarists enter South Korea, the youth and the South Korean population will fight against them, and we will support them. Lee Hurak swore in front of the president of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Kim Il Sung, that he wouldnt be a traitor neither now nor in the future. Lee Hurak also said that he would legalize the Communist Party and would release political detainees from prisons. Comrade Kim Il Sung said that when all those promises have been achieved, peaceful reunification would be possible. After creating the confederation between North and South, we would hold general elections. This is the second point of the three principles for the reunification of the motherland. Lee Hurak agreed with this one as well. Then Comrade Kim Il Sung told Lee Hurak: now, there is the difference between regimes we have a socialist society, while you have a capitalist society. In South Korea you dont have monopolistic capitalists, but you have predatory capitalists. We are against predatory capitalists and reactionaries which are selling our country. We are not against good faith national capitalists. I believe we will defend our socialist society while you will defend your regime. We cant impose a socialist regime on South Korea, but you shouldnt take any measures either to put our regime in jeopardy. The nature of the South Korean regime will be decided by its people. In spite of these regime differences, we are one nation, lets not act against each others interests; lets reunite our nation, look for things we have in common through cooperation between the North and the South. This is the essence of the second point of our three principles. Comrade Kim Il Sung said it is very important to proceed with the reunification of our nation so that together we can resist the maneuvers aiming at splitting the Korean nation. By allowing different regimes to exist, they should, above all, unite to achieve independent reunification [sic], to resist the interference of outside forces. We should establish economic and cultural ties. In addition, Comrade Kim Il Sung told him that North Korea can supply South Korea with heavy industry products and raw materials and, in return, it is eager to receive light industry products. Then economic coopera-
197
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
tion will be on the right track. Kim Il Sung told him this: you have economic ties with the United States and Japan; why cant you have economic ties with us? Comrade Kim Il Sung told him that if they agree to the three principles that we proposedindependence, peaceful reunification and great national unity, then we can exchange opinions with a view to peaceful reunification. Afterwards, on behalf of the head of our Organizational and Coordination Section, Comrade Pak Seongcheol, the second vice-president of the Council of Ministers, went to Seoul, at the end of May. We thus had our first meeting with our enemies after 27 years. For this reason, we decided to tackle simpler problems. We assigned three tasks to Comrade Pak Seongcheol. First, he was tasked to get Park Chung Hee to agree with the three principles for the reunification of the motherland. Second, he was tasked to get the South Korean side to agree to the creation of the Committee for Coordination between the North and the South on political, military, economic and cultural problems. Third, he was tasked to get a joint statement released. The South Koreans agreed to the three points we proposed. Having these three tasks in mind, Comrade Pak Seongcheol left for Seoul and met with Lee Hurak and with Park Chung Hee. During the discussions they had there, Park Chung Hee said he supported the three principles proposed by President Kim Il Sung and he agreed to the creation of the Committee for Coordination between the North and the South. He said, nonetheless, that he couldnt agree to release a joint statement; Comrade Pak Seongcheol had a draft of the joint statement with him. Park Chung Hee told Comrade Pak Seongcheol that the internal situation in South Korea was very complicated, while the North is very united. If in Pyongyang, President Kim Il Sung asks for a certain thing, it gets done; while in the South, even if he asks for something, it still doesnt function too well. Park Chung Hee said that the army is the most dangerous element, because the United States is in charge of the South Korean army, and Japanese militarism has penetrated the South Korean army. There are many frictions in the South Korean army. Park Chung Hee said that he preferred that these contacts between the North and the South remain secret from the United States, basically asking us to keep the secret of our contacts. For this reason, they could not agree to a joint statement.
198
After Comrade Pak Seongcheol came back to Pyongyang, the South Korean side told us that it agreed to release a joint statement. As a consequence, on July 4th we released the joint statement to the public and we exchanged the signed documents. We repeatedly discussed this problem in the Central Committee particularly because it was not an easy matter. We dont know if these contacts were imposed by the South Koreans, by the Americans or by the Japanese. We do know that other South Korean political groups agreed to meet us, including the Prime-Minister, Kim Jong-pil. But Lee Hurak said he had preferred we had had these contacts only with them and not with others as well, but we didnt give our consent on this matter, and we wanted to meet with other political parties, including the brotherhood in Park Chung Hees party. The population in South Korea warmly greeted the release of the joint statement, strengthening the trend in favor of the reunification of the country. With the release of the joint statement, Lee Hurak held a press conference, whose content was not too bad. He made one negative statement. When he was asked by journalists whether he thinks of UN troops as foreign troops, he said no. After the release of the joint statement, the South Korean National Assembly started its session, which gave the opportunity to opposition parties to ask lots of questions, such as, Why is it that you can go to North Korea and we cant? The Head of the Central Intelligence Agency went there and we cant go! Why havent you discussed such important issues with other political parties as well? Moreover, the opposition parties asked Park Chung Hee to cancel the state of national emergency, as the Communist Party had no plans of invading South Korea, and to order foreign armies to withdraw as they have no business in this country. Our purpose was that through the joint statement to mobilize the South Korean population even more in the direction we wanted. Initially, the Americans said they supported the Joint Communiqu, but after a few days, when the trend in favor of reunification of the motherland gained momentum within the South Korean society, they said that the American army will not withdraw from South Korea and it will accelerate its plans to modernize the South Korean army. Kim Jong-pil started saying gibberish that it was only because of Park Chung Hee that Lee Hurak went to North Korea, while others cannot go there, and that Park Chung Hee cant end the state of national emergency because the Communist Party cannot be trusted and its unclear what its next move would be.
199
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
What upset us the most was the killing of three members of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification; retaliation against this party has increased since the release of the joint statement. We have thus pointed out for you the most important events that took place since the release of the joint statement. Now I would like to tell you a few things about the major goal that we pursued through our peaceful offensive. Comrade Kim Il Sung, the Secretary General of our party, said that the goals of our peaceful offensive can be summarized in three points. First, the South Korean matter cannot be solved only through underground [illegal] struggle. Therefore, the ranks of revolutionary forces must quickly increase, so as to unblock the situation between the North and the South, and democratize South Korean society. There are many people in South Korea who want peaceful reunification. There are many progressive personalities. If we manage to prevent Park Chung Hee from turning the country into a fascist one, then this would lead to strengthening democracy and increasing the ranks of revolutionary forces in South Korea. Second, [we aim] to expose the devious propaganda of the minority clique in the South, [which claims] that we want to invade the country. The puppet government in South Korea has absolutely no reason to stifle opposition parties and the South Korean people; it has absolutely no right to let South Korea be invaded by the US army and by Japanese militarism. Third, [we aim] to expose the maneuvers of American imperialism, which came up with the so-called Nixon Doctrine regarding the permanent division of Korea and the continuation of the fighting between Koreans. Currently, in South Korea, the New Democratic Party is taking the right steps so as to address a congratulatory speech at the second meeting of the actual talks. This time we arranged things in such a way so as to allow the Democratic Republican Party to organize a reception. In these circumstances, the New Democratic Party insists on organizing the reception and it is very persistent in this respect. If we fight properly, we can persuade Park Chung Hee to accept the creation of the confederation. In our view, the creation of the National Supreme Committee is feasible, so as to allow the two social regimes in the North and in the South to exist as they are now. The President of the Committee would be appointed by rotation, on an equitable basis. This is our first principle.
200
Secondly, if we extend our talks, it is likely that at the next presidential elections, Park Chung Hee is eliminated and the position of president is occupied by the New Democratic Party. But, to our mind, the New Democratic Party is heavily penetrated by spies sent by Park Chung Hee, which are doing their best to split the party. In any case, if we intensify our struggle, then it is possible that the next elections are won by the New Democratic Party. However, this can give rise to a more important problem: we must not provoke the Americans and the Japanese, as they can stage another coup. There are factionalists within the camp of Kim Jong-pil and Park Chung Hee, and they dont get along so well, yet both of them want to win our hearts. To our mind, they felt that in the foreseeable future, an event will occur, and the international situation will unfold in our favor, and that within Korea, the trends for reunification are gaining momentum. Currently, all South Korean officials are saving money, stored in banks abroad, such as in the United States or in Japan and so on, which shows that they are all getting ready to leave the country. The most important [objective] is to get the population to ignore Park Chung Hee, and to get him to face even greater difficulties. It is only then that he will listen to what we are saying, to our proposals. Today, the Park Chung Hee clique is serving nice words on a plate to socialist countries in an attempt to get out of the delicate situation in which they find themselves. In this respect, Park is establishing commercial ties with the so-called immoral states. For this reason, our request is that socialist countries reject his offers, and, on the contrary, threaten him even more. It is only through this effort that South Korea will abolish the state of national emergency and will accept the confederation we suggested. If democratization in South Korea is achieved, and the activity of all political and social organizations is legalized, then the Revolutionary Party for Reunification will be able to strengthen its ranks even more, and at the same time, strengthen all revolutionary forces. It is only then that we will be able to create a democratic unified government, through free general elections in both the North and the South. We have a long way to go to achieve this. A particularly important issue at this point in time is the removal of the UN mandate from the American troops deployed in South Korea. This can only be achieved through the struggle of the South Korean people. At the same time, the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea must be dismantled, as
201
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
it carries out a yearly report which contains the most appalling propaganda against us. For this reason, we believe that socialist countries must act with a view to dismantling the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and to remove the UN mandate from the American troops deployed in South Korea. If both problems cant be solved at the same time, then lets solve at least one of them. If the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is dismantled and the UN mandate is removed from the American troops deployed in South Korea, then this entire frenzy in South Korea for the United Nations Organization will disappear. To our mind, American troops will immediately leave South Korea. The Americans are not withdrawing because they fear that we will attack the South Koreans or that Park Chung Hee will embark on an adventurous path. Moreover, the US is also afraid of Japanese occupation. At the same time, the US wants to stay in South Korea, to use the South Korean army in South Vietnam. Currently, the Americans and the South Koreans are doing everything in their powers to prevent the UN from discussing the Korean matter, saying that since the North and the South are finally talking; discussing this matter will become an obstacle in the way of reunification. We are in favor of discussing this matter in the UN forum, thus creating the conditions and eliminating all the obstacles in the way of reunification of the Korean nation by Koreans themselves. We believe we should continue our fight at the UN, even if we lose in the voting process, because we believe its not a good thing to capitulate in front of your enemies. We are sure that you will vote in our favor at the UN, supporting our fight. These are the rationale, the scope, and the prospects of the peaceful offensive pursued by our party for the independent reunification of the homeland. Needless to say, this will be a difficult fight, but we will continue fighting in the future with all our firmness to achieve the independent and peaceful reunification of the country, a policy designed by our beloved and respected leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung. We are convinced that we will be victorious in our fight. Once more, we express our conviction that, in the years to come, as you have done it in the past, you will support and actively help our fight for the just cause.
Thank you for the attention with which you followed
my presentation.
202
COMRADE NICOLAE CEAU ESCU: I would like to thank you for this detailed presentation of problems and efforts relating to the peaceful reunification of Korea. In the spirit of our good relations and of the solidarity that links our parties and our countries, Romania will continue to fully support [you], including at the United Nations. We agree with your judgment that some actions which may lead to military intervention are not acceptable and should not be pursued, since the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China and the United States of America may become involved with dear consequences for the entire world. For this reason, we believe you adopted the right approach: to do anything possible for a peaceful, political solution, and we can notice, indeed, that the possibility to do so is there. Of course, since yours is a political struggle, it requires time and effort, but this is the kind of struggle in which the people will win and it will take you to victory. We only want to wish you good luck in this very important political endeavor. COMRADE JEONG JUNTAEK: Thank you very much for your kind words. We believe
the reunification of the motherland cant be achieved in any other way but through a peaceful political struggle. As you said, our struggle for reunification will be a long one, and a very hard one. We regard it as a struggle between socialism and capitalism, between revolution and counter-revolution, between patriots and traitors, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. We regard it as a continuation of very fierce class struggle. The puppet government in South Korea is doing everything in its power so as, together with American and Japanese imperialists, to obtain economic superiority. They are striving to achieve this but they will not manage to. In the 27 years that have passed since the liberation of the country, we took on the path of socialism, and they took on the road that transforms the country into a colony of the United States.
COMRADE NICOLAE CEAU ESCU: Like any other struggle, yours too has a series of objectives, but the progress of international politics favors socialism and progressive forces. So your endeavor is unfolding in favorable circumstances. Of course, the struggle may be a long-term one, but results can be achieved more rapidly; it also depends on the efforts of the internal forces and the ones from the South, as well as on the international balance of powers. But we believe the current circumstances are favorable so that through this struggle, positive results are achieved. As far as Romanias problems are concerned, I will briefly discuss a few issues.
203
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
Of course, the main objective of the party and of the people is the success of the 5-Year Plan. We organized the National Congress of the party in July this year, when we established new measures to fulfill faster the tasks imposed by this 5-year plan. Currently, we are working on creating the necessary measures, including a supplementary plan, to insure the fulfillment of these tasks in the best conditions [possible]. Therefore, I can tell you that as far as industry is concerned, everything is going well, we already have a surpassing of the Five Year Plan in the first and a half years, and that there are real conditions to achieve even greater successes in the following years. In agriculture too, in spite of all climate hardships, we will have a good harvest this year, especially the grain harvest. Therefore, there are successes and good prospects in our economy, both in industry and agriculture. I know you are planning on visiting some of our sites; I guess the other comrades told you that I wont talk too much about these topics. As far as international problems are concerned, it must be noted that compared to our discussion with Comrade Kim Il Sung, we have achieved an improvement in our relations with socialist countries and things are going generally well. Our party is doing everything it can to normalize relations and to have relations as good as possible with all socialist countries and to contribute to the normalization of relations between all socialist countries. At the same time, of course, we are making sure to respect the principles that you already know, from our discussion with Comrade Kim Il Sung, and thus to establish our cooperation efforts on the basis of these principles, of respect for national independence and sovereignty, equality of rights, non-interference in internal affairs. We estimate that the prospects for having success in this respect are good, provided all socialist countries, each for its own, show willingness and do their best to allay and eradicate divergences, to cooperate. In any case, we will behave in this way. As you already know, since the visit of Comrade Kim Il Sung, there were many changes on the international arena, but they are of the nature that we already discussed. The unfolding of events proves that the influence of socialist countries and of socialism in general, of anti-imperialist forces has increased; [it also proves] that the path to cooperation and dtente is gaining momentum on the international arena. Of course, it is again a matter of struggle and establishing new relations on the international arena; if the imperialist principle of use of force and dictate is to be eliminated,
204
then it will be the result of anti-imperialist struggle, which, of course, will be mainly carried out by socialist countries. Of course, we held in high regard the visit of US President Nixon to the Peoples Republic of China and the beginning of the rapprochement between the United States of America and the Peoples Republic of China. The unfolding of events will prove that this is in the interest not only of both countries, but also of all peoples who are in favor of independence, in favor of the principle of full equality of rights. Moreover, we held in high regard the visit of US President Nixon to Moscow, the discussions he had there and in general, and the impact of this visit on the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this case too, the unfolding of events will prove that the agreements they reached are addressing the interests of both the two countries and of all other countries which favor independence and the principle of equality between all states. To our mind, there is still one danger, namely the illusion that international problems can be solved only through contact between these two countries. This impression would pose a great danger to the successful fight against imperialism, to the effort to create new relations on the international arena. We believe that a successful new policy can be achieved only through the intensification of the effort of all socialist countries, of all anti-imperialist forces, through the active participation of all peoples to international aff airs, that in any problem, for example, the peaceful reunification of Korea, it is still a matter of class struggle, of anti-imperialist struggle at the international level, which requires an intensification of the efforts of all anti-imperialist forces, above all of socialist countries, of communist and workers parties, of national liberation movements and all other democratic and antiimperialist forces. We are aware that the capitalist world itself is experiencing significant changes, that the dominant position of the United States of America has diminished as the result of the more assertive position adopted by the Common Market, of the Federal Republic of Germany, and of Japan in Asia, which prove to be quite strong competitors for the US and that eventually the more intense this competition and the more emerging forces, the more likely the success of the effort to establish a new international order. This makes it necessary to develop ties and to collaborate with other countries of the world, not only with the states that favor independence, with developing countries, but also with developed capitalist countries. Therefore, in this context, and starting
205
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
from these judgments on the changes that have occurred on the international arena, Romania believes it is necessary to intensify the efforts of all socialist countries on the international level, to actively participate in the resolution of great problems which have plighted humanity today, because it is only in this way that we can have the certainty that these solutions will be in the interest of all peoples, in the interest of the cause of peace and cooperation, of equality of rights for all nations. I dont want to linger on these issues for too long. If you comrades dont mind, we should go eat and then continue some of these discussions over a meal.
you very much. I would like to thank you for your warm welcome, for your presentation of the internal issues that concern you, for talking to us about your foreign policy concerns, as well as for your support for our struggle for the reunification of Korea.
Before leaving, I raise one more issue to your attention: giving you a mandate on one of the problems raised by our party and state leadership to be sent to the Socialist Republic of Romania. As I already mentioned, the puppet government in South Korea, benefiting from the help of American and Japanese imperialists, is doing its best to strengthen its position, politically, economically and militarily. We are paying a lot of attention to the problem of reunification of the homeland, as we consider the fight for reunification a very serious one, and we are ready and willing to overcome any kind of hardship posed by the enemy. In the 27 years that have passed since the country was liberated, we have scored a number of successes. The lifestyle of our society is very strong and it has a very strong penetrating force within the South Korean population, yet we are not satisfied with the results of our activities in this respect. Comrade Kim Il Sung repeatedly indicated to our party and our people that we must not rely only on the superiority of socialism and on the fact that we have achieved certain successes, but we must do everything possible to correct those mistakes we are still making. He pointed out that even if its just small mistakes, we must do our best to correct them. Owing to our socialist order, we have solved the main problems related to lifestyle: food, clothing, and housing. Starting with this year, we will introduce mandatory education until the 10th grade. The entire population is relying on free medical insurance. Our society is obviously superior, but in order to prove the superiority of our social order
206
in all aspects, we have a lot to do. For this reason, we want to proceed in such a way so that those visiting our country, meaning those from South Korea visiting our country, come naturally to us and embrace socialism. Comrade Kim Il Sung showed that we had to build socialism while being confronted with imperialism, that we had significant defense expenses, and for this reason we are facing a lot of hardships lifestyle-wise. For instance, our light industry does not meet the demands of the population. Therefore, Comrade Kim Il Sung said there are smaller problems lingering, which require all our attention if we want to solve them. For this reason, upon my departure, I was tasked by my government to ask the Romanian Communist Party for help in this respect. Concretely speaking, we would like to import light industry products from you or equipment to mass-produce consumer products, given to us as credit, which we will start paying off only in 1976. We approximated it to be around 50 million rubles, to be paid back in three years after 1976.
This is a very serious issue as you know; Romanias situation is not very good right now, after several years of draught and then after being blighted by floods. Of course, we will have to discuss this request with the leadership of our party. In any case, consumer goods are impossible for us to supply. If there is anything we can do in terms of equipment, [we will do it], but we need to analyze this problem. In any case, you will be given an answer by the time you leave; the leadership of the party will discuss this.
I would like to thank you, Comrade Nicolae Ceauescu. We are aware that this is a problem whose solution is not an easy one. In any case, even if you helped us with a smaller amount, it would still be important for us.
DOCUMENT NO. 17
***
[Source: Diplomatic Archive, Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soa. Record 28, File 1717. Pgs. 33-40. Translated for NKIDP by Sveta Milusheva]
207
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
Information concerning: 1. The rst conference of the co-chairs of the Committee on regulation of the issues between North and South Korea, which was held on October 12th in the Panmunjeom area, and 2. The announcement of martial law in South Korea on the 12th of this month. October 19, 1972 For internal use Today, the ambassadors of the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia, as well as the acting [ambassadors] of Poland and the GDR were summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Kim Jaebong, read the information, printed in advance in Korean, concerning the issues stated above. He stated the following: On October 12th, the first conference of the representatives of the Committee on regulation of the issues between the North and the South was held, and on the 12th this month, Park Chung Hee declared martial law in South Korea. I asked for the present meeting with you in order to inform you on these issues. First, I would like to discuss the issue of the first conference of the representatives of the Committee on regulation of the issues between the North and the South. It was held in Panmunjeom by South Korean request. From our side, because of Comrade Kim Yeongjus health condition, the Second Vice Chair of the Cabinet of the Ministries, Comrade Pak Seongcheol participated, and from South Koreathe Chief of the Central Intelligence BureauLee Hurak. The conference took place three months after the publication of the Joint Proclamation of the North and the South on July 4th this year. The Joint proclamation, based on the three principles of the beloved and respected leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, found warm response and support amongst the political parties and people of South Korea. Their aspirations for a peaceful reuniting of the motherland and the struggle against the fascist dictatorship, for the seizure of democratic rights and freedoms, grew stronger. After the first, and especially after the second, round of the main negotiations between the delegations of the Red Cross, the feelings of respect towards the beloved and respected leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, grew amongst the South Korean people. Kim
208
Il Sungs Juche ideas and the successes achieved in the socialist construction of the Northern part of the Republic spread quickly amongst the South Korean population. These changes in South Koreas situation caused dismay and confusion among the American imperialists and the Japanese militarists. The South Korean reactionaries, resorting to hypocrisy, in the conditions of the established relations between the North and the South, were the first to begin the campaign against us, speeding up the military preparations and increasing their anticommunist activities. At the first conference we were able to expose this campaign, insisting on ending the attacks toward the DPRK and the anticommunist activities, in the conditions of the negotiations being carried out between us. As we have already stated more than once, the dialogue between the North and the South and the struggle for the reunification of the motherland represents a struggle between patriots and traitors, a struggle between internationalism and servility, between progressivism and reactionism, between socialism and imperialism. In so far as the struggle for a peaceful reunification of the motherland is a class struggle, we sharply denounce the essence of the South Korean reaction. At the conference, right after the greetings, the business work began with a speech by our representativeComrade Pak Seongcheol. In his speech he criticized sharply the fact that South Korea has not adhered to the obligations which it assumed with the Joint Proclamation between the North and the South, in the period from July 4th until this very moment. By pressing the other side, we exposed many facts pointing at when and what Park Chung Hee, Kim Jong-pil, and Lee Hurak have said separately. Our criticism at first did not please the South Korean representatives. Two questions were put forth by our side: - Will we walk together towards a peaceful reunification, or will we talk against communism? If you want us to walk together, you need to give up your anticommunist campaign. - If you do not give up the anticommunism, is there any sense for us to continue the dialogue? Since our criticism was sharp and effective, Lee Hurak agreed with it. He stated that he was doing everything possible to abide by the principles of the Joint Proclamation, that he ordered the ending of the anticommunist campaign, but
209
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
because of the extremely complicated system, it was hard for him to control the execution [of that order]. In answer, Comrade Pak Seongcheol stated: -Fine, but here the issue is not what the common people say. This is being said by leaders such as Park Chung Hee and Kim Jong-pil. How should we understand this? To which Lee Hurak answered: that he held no blame. - You say that the UN is not a foreign power. Why do you think that? asked Comrade Pak Seongcheol. - Yes, the UN is not a foreign power! Lee Hurak emphasized again. - That means said Comrade Pak Seongcheol that the American troops in South Korea standing under the UN flag are also not a foreign power. But the UN regulations forbid the placing of troops in foreign territories. - If the issue is put forth so said Lee Hurak you are right. During the talks the following fact was cited by us: On the day of the 15th anniversary since the creation of the puppet army of South Korea, Park Chung Hee stated that he would fight for the reunification of the country on the basis of the free democracy. We take this to mean that this is trying to impress on us that the reunification has to occur on the basis of the imperialist order. Therefore, how should we interpret the principle independent from differences in ideology, ideals and system? Doesnt this mean anticommunism? To what was stated above, Lee Hurak answered that when he was writing Park Chung Hees speeches, he always excluded the words on the basis of the free democracy and that that was written by the journalists. Wanting to transfer the blame from himself to others, he emphasized that he did not think this way. Right away we criticized such activities, pointing out that it did not matter who wrote the speech, the essence of the issue is made up of the fact that Park Chung Hee says it. How can the dialogue between the North and the South continue, asked Comrade Pak Seongcheol, if your leaders make such statements! Lee Hurak accepted our criticism, admitted his mistakes concerning the issues stated above, that the UN was not a foreign power and about the anticommunist statements, but he underlined that he was not responsible for Kim Jong-pils words. Because Lee Hurak admitted his mistakes, we did not put forth other questions.
210
The South Korean side put forth the issue concerning the makeup of the Committee on the regulation, to which we answered that we had already given our proposals, but if the South Korean side had some comments, we are ready to discuss them. The South Koreans proposed that the Committee be made up of five representatives from each country. We stated that we had nothing against such a proposal. At the conference it was agreed that the specific issues on the makeup of the Committee on the regulation would be examined at the following conferences. During the talks, Lee Hurak put forth the question what is the system of confederation? meaning, Comrade Kim Il Sungs explanations. Comrade Pak Seongcheol answered that the confederation foresees the creation of a high-ranking national committee made up of representatives from the North and the South for the preservation of the order that is in place in the two parts, which would act together on foreign and internal issues. If the makeup of the Committee on regulation is expanded, asked Lee Hurak, can it not lead to a confederation? To this question we answered that in the future this is possible, but the issues connected with the will of the masses need to be resolved on a democratic basis. At the end, Lee Hurak stated that everything was clear to him and he asked that in the future we trust him, that we do not lead a war between us, that we exist together and that we develop the contacts for a peaceful reunification of the country. At the conference it was agreed also that the following meetings of the leaders take place in Pyongyang and Seoul. It was decided that the second conference would take place on November 2nd in Pyongyang and the thirdafter November 20th this year in Seoul. With this ended the first conference of the representatives of the Committee on the regulation of issues between the North and the South. But on October 15th, through the direct telephone line, the South Korean side proposed a meeting between representatives for communication on October 16th. Our representative met with the deputy representative of South Korea. As requested by Lee Hurak, the South Korean representative asked that the following be brought to the attention of Comrade Kim Yeongju: The reunification of the country has to occur at all costs during the leadership of Kim Il Sung and during the power of Park Chung Hee, meaning during the 70s.
211
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
It was also underlined that during the first conference of the representatives, South Korean [representatives] did not understand well the critique expressed by us, but while listening to the recording of the conference, they understood everything, and they ascertained their rightness and reached the conclusion that on their part they need to undertake some measures. Our representative was interested in what these measures were. Then the South Korean representative said that Park Chung Hee and Lee Hurak desire the reunification of the country, but they had many opponents. That is why some measures were necessary for the establishment of order in the country. [He] stated that on October 12th a statement would be published, and he asked that it be listened to carefully on our part. He also asked, if we had comments on it, to present them to South Korea. On October 12th, one hour before the publication of this statement, they informed us from Seoul by telephone that at 19 oclock an Emergency Statement from Park Chung Hee would be released on the radio, and they asked that we listen to it. At the end they proposed a new meeting of the representatives for the communication between the North and South on October 18th. With relation to the content of the statement, I think that the comrade ambassadors are acquainted with it and I will not pause. The meeting proposed by South Korea took place yesterdayOctober 18th. The South Korean representative expressed Lee Huraks request that the following be released to Comrade Kim Yeongju: At the beginning of the 70s in the ambient setting of Korea some changes took place. The bipolar relations between the USSR and the USA changed. At the same time, changes took place also in relations between the USA, USSR, PRC and Japan. With these circumstances we consider that the national issue needs to be resolved independently, without the support of foreign powers. In this spirit was the Joint Proclamation between the North and the South on July 4th this year. After the publication of the proclamation, in South Korea many groups sprung up, as opponents of its principles. Many of them are accusing us of breaking the Constitution. In spite of this, we wanted to adhere to the proclamations obligations, but because of the strong opposition, we did not have the chance to fully control the situation. As a result of this we received Kim Yeongjus critique. The present State of National Emergency Statement has as its goalthe modification of the Constitution.
212
The current Constitution was created on the basis of the bipolar system, in anticommunist spirit, without considering the issue of reunifying the country. The South Korean representative stated that for the Emergency Statement the USA and Japan were informed just two hours before its proclamation. They opposed it. The South Korean representative also emphasized that in South Korea they have decided to institute the Juche system, in the spirit of the national self-determination, raised by the Prime Minister Kim Il Sung. Although the USA and Japan were against the principles of independence in South Korea, they desired the creation of a new system. After the South Korean representative was carefully listened to, our side put forth the question: Why was a state of emergency and martial law announced, why are you going towards a new system? It was answered that due to the strong opposition, the internal issues in South Korea cannot be resolved along the normal path. That is why the South Korean leaders were forced to establish martial law in order to modify the Constitution without chaos and disorder in the country. He also added that in Park Chung Hees State of National Emergency Statement there were no points that affected or offended the DPRK. Again a request was made for expressing of our comments and proposals on the statement. It was underlined that there was a wide range of reactions in South Korea towards the statement and martial law. The right wing said that these measures are aimed towards us, others asked where this statement is heading, yet others [said]dont these measures represent a retreat from the dialogue between the North and the South? others said that this is a procommunist coup, and others [asked] doesnt this statement lead along the path towards right wing? etc. The South Korean representative stated that in the new proposed Constitution a clear fi xation on the issues of the reunification of the country and the creation of a national assembly is expected, which would be able to guarantee the peaceful dialogue between the North and the South. He underlined that with the modification of the Constitution they aimed to lead talks between the North and the South based on law. The changes of the Constitution, he stated, do not mean the repudiation of talks, on the contrarytheir energizing. He again requested, as ordered by Lee Hurak, that everything said by him be reported to Kim Yeongju.
213
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
The political committee of the CC of the KWP examined this issue, analyzed it, but has not yet come out with a final decision. According to the facts at our disposal, it can be said that the situation in South Korea is very complicated. After the announcement of the Joint Proclamation between the North and the South on July 4th this year, the pursuit of a peaceful reunification quickly grew in South Korea. The activity of the oppositionist parties became energized. Many activists appeared, raising their voices for reunification. This brings dismay and scares the leading South Korean circles. According to facts which we have, after the Joint Proclamation, about 90 people, actively devoted to reunification, were arrested in South Korea. Theres no question that the South Korean leaders are reactionaries, and that the South Korean economy goes through big hardships. The medium and small businesses are ruined. The yields in agriculture are also bad. Currently, Park Chung Hee is putting into practice the Saemaeul movement / New village/, which greatly resembles Chiang Kai-sheks old reforms in China and it has nothing in common with the movement in our country for the construction of cultural villages. In South Korea the villagers are forced to build new villages. This leads to the springing up of new kulaks and corruption. In this setting more and more desire and hope grow for a socialist order, sanctioned in the North part of the Republic. The population is very happy and actively struggles for the reunification. The students spirits rose. Until the publication of the Joint Proclamation, the student movement was at a standstill, but later it became active. Park Chung Hee is most afraid of the actions of the masses and the students. And on this basis, after the establishment of martial law in the country, the activities of the parties were outlawed and the institutes were closed. Why did Park Chung Hee announce martial law in the country? We look at his goals in two instances. The first instance can be reduced to the following: Park Chung Hee thinks that in the circumstances of established political contacts and the holding of political discussions, the emergence of other political parties is possible, which would also ask to take part in the dialogue between the North and the South. In the present moment the
214
proportion in the talks is 1:1, but provided that another political party participates in them, the proportion would change in our favor to 2:1. That is why Park Chung Hee is trying to prohibit all political parties, in order to secure his long-term stay in power and so that he can solely lead talks with us. Park Chung Hee is afraid of the war and wants to lead the dialogue with the DPRK for a peaceful reunification, alone. And that is why, by announcing martial law, he says that a system needs to be created that would allow an active dialogue between the North and the South and a joint existence with us. The second instance depends on the goal of receiving more credit from the USA and Japan. In words Park Chung Hee talks about independence. But what independence can he implement? Through martial law, he will ask for more loans from the USA and Japan. As I already said, in the political Committee of the CC of the KWP, the situation in South Korea was examined and analyzed. A fi nal decision has not been made yet though. Among other things, I would like to let you know that in the present moment Park Chung Hee is afraid even of his own army. According to facts that we have, when he announced martial law, Park Chung Hee prohibited all flights of military airplanes. All members of the armed forces were prohibited to leave the military bases, and for those who were on home leaveto leave home. All movements of military divisions were also forbidden. The question arises, what will our position be in connection to the situation that was created? It is impossible for us to not undertake something because that would mean that we would be closing our eyes to the repressions of the South Korean population. If we are quiet, South Korea could turn into an anticommunist country. In connection to the situation that was created, we foresee two measures: First: An article with which to prove that the repressions taking place under the mask of the peaceful reunification are wrong. The article will clarify that the words peaceful reunification means the peaceful participation of very large circles of masses. The more people participate in this process, the better. That is why the suppression of the movement for a peaceful reunification is wrong. Second: In the name of all the political parties and public organizations a statement will come out, condemning the prohibition of political parties in South Korea.
215
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
The Union of students will also come out with a statement in connection to the closing of universities. The materials will be in a discreet tone. In Park Chung Hees statement there is an issue that deserves attention. He says that these measures need to be approved at the referendum. But if the referendum is without success, that will mean that the South Korean people do now want the dialogue between the North and the South. In that case, we will search for new measures for the reunification of the Motherland. At the end I ask you comrade ambassadors to bring to the knowledge of your party leadership the contents of this present information. Ambassador: /Y. Georgiev/ Pyongyang, 19 October 1972 Typed in three copies 1. for the CC of the Bulgarian Communist Party 2. for the Ministry 3. for the file
***
DOCUMENT NO. 18
[Source: PolA AA, MfAA, C 6855. Obtained for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer and translated for NKIDP by Karen Riechert]
GDR Embassy to DPRK Political Department Pyongyang, 23 October 1972 Note on an Information given by the 1st Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK,
216
Comrade Kim Jaebong on 19 October 1972 in the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the Embassies of Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and the GDR during 17:00 and 19:00 hours Present: The Ambassadors of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Hungary, the Polish Acting Ambassador, Comrade Merten (Ambassador Comrade Everhartz was away in Hamheung) and further diplomats from these embassies. Based on a written manuscript, Comrade Kim Jaebong gave a information about the 1st Meeting of the co-chairmen of the Coordination Committee North-South on 12 October 1972 in Panmunjeom and about the declaration of emergency and state of war in South Korea on 17 October 1972. Comrade Kim Jaebong stated the following: As Kim Yeongju, Head of the Organization and Instruction Department of the KWP Central Committee, was unable to participate in the [Coordination Committee] talks due to his health, negotiations were led by Comrade Pak Seongcheol, 2nd Deputy Prime Minister, and on the South Korean side by intelligence chief Lee Hurak. During the three months since the publication of the Joint Declaration North-South with its three principles of unification outlined by Comrade Kim Il Sung, a movement toward consent has developed with different parties, various groups, and among the people of South Korea. Efforts for peaceful unification have increased, and the antiimperialist, anti-fascist struggle in South Korea is on the rise. Especially after the 1st and 2nd Main Negotiations of the Red Cross Committees, an ever growing feeling of respect and veneration towards the venerable and beloved leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, was on display among the South Korean people. The revolutionizing influence of Juche and the positive example of socialist construction in the Northern part of the Republic steadily grew. The South Korean authorities use disingenuous tactics, they run a defamation campaign against the DPRK, they are leaning on foreign powers, they enforce military preparations and anti-communism. The objective of the DPRK during the negotiations was this: To criticize the South Korean side fiercely in order to stop their despicable machinations behind the scenes.
217
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
As already known, the dialogue North-South and the struggle for peaceful unification is both an offensive and defensive battle. It is a battle between defenders of the nation and traitors, between juche and deference, between the united revolutionary forces of internationalism and the united forces of the bourgeoisie, between capitalism and socialism. Given the fact that the struggle for peaceful unification is in essence a class struggle, it was required to criticize the policies of the other side. Pak Seongcheol who spoke first criticized the non-compliance with the Joint Declaration of 4 July 1972 by South Korea and bolstered this criticism with many examples. He proved when, where, and with what statements, Park Chung Hee, Lee Hurak and Kim Jong-pil acted in South Korea in violation of the principles from the Joint Declaration. Pak Seongcheol asked the following alternative questions to Lee Hurak: Do you want to support, together with us, the peaceful unification, or do you want to continue anti-communism? If you want to join forces with us, then there must be no more anti-communism. If anti-communism continues to exist, then where will your policy lead to? Lee Hu-Rak, who got confused by the force of the evidence, had to recognize this. He stated that he had actively supported compliance with the Joint Declaration. However, due to the complicated domestic structures of South Korea and its society, there was no chance to control the implementation of his instructions with regard to anti-communism. Pak Seongcheol: What you are telling us here, is actually stated by a close confidant and personal friend of Kim Jong-pil. You are after all no ordinary people but those who govern South Korea.
LEE HURAK:
I am innocent. You assert the United Nations is not an external force. We do
PAK SEONGCHEOL:
not understand that.

LEE HURAK:
The United Nations is indeed not an external force.
218
PAK SEONGCHEOL: The American forces in South Korea act in the name of the United Nations and serve in South Korea under the U.N. flag. Isnt that an external force? The Charta of the United Nations prohibits interference in internal matters. LEE HURAK:
If you pose the question that way, then the criticism is justified.
PAK SEONGCHEOL: At the 15th Anniversary of the foundation of the South Korean army, Park Chung Hee declared that Korea ought to be unified on the basis of a free democracy. This means that he wants to impose the capitalist order upon us. Since we agreed to achieve the unification of the nation without taking into account the differences in our systems, how can his statement be reconciled with this principle? This is anti-communism. LEE HURAK:
I acknowledge that mistakes have been made. When I wrote speeches for Park Chung Hee I did not use such words. It is very likely that journalists added such lines to reports on their own.
PAK SEONGCHEOL: What kind of dialogue is this when Park Chung Hee speaks on one hand in the spirit of anti-communism, and on the other hand supports the dialogue between North and South? LEE HURAK:
I cannot assume responsibility with regard to the statement that the United Nations does not constitute an external force, and that unification ought to occur on the basis of free democracy, as well as for other words of Kim Jong-pil. After this exchange, there were discussions about the establishment of the Coordination Committee. Our proposals had already been turned in earlier. So we were interested to hear what the South Korean side was thinking about them. The South Koreans suggested to have a Coordination Committee with five members from each side. We stated that we do not mind, and the number of members is actually of not much relevance. We agreed to return to the problem of the levels to be represented in the Coordination Committee later on.
219
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
Lee Hurak posed the question, with reference to a quote from Kim Il Sung, what we actually envisage by a confederation? Pak Seongcheol replied that, under preservation of the different systems in North and South, a Supreme National Committee should be established with a unified position in public and the task to solve internal questions through joint effort. If you would expand the Coordination Committee, would it serve as a nucleus for the establishment of a confederation?
LEE HURAK: PAK SEONGCHEOL: There is the possibility to do it this way. Yet important is a statement of will from the masses that have to decide this question on a democratic basis. LEE HURAK: I have understood everything. You should trust me. I am in favor of not to fight against each other in the future but live together in coexistence between both systems.
It was agreed to hold the next meetings of the co-chairmen in turn in Pyongyang and in Seoul. The 2nd meeting will be held on 2 November 1972 in Pyongyang, the 3rd on 20 November 1972 in Seoul. On 15 October there arrived a proposal from South Korea via telephone to convey a meeting between representatives from North and South on 16 October. The meeting took place. The South Korean representative asked to submit the following messages to Kim Yeongju: 1. We want to achieve unification at any cost as long as Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee are still personally in power, i.e. during the 1970s. 2. The content of the North Korean speeches during the 1st Meeting was not fully comprehended. After repeated listening to the tapes, we can now say that the criticism voiced [by the DPRK] is justified. We have committed mistakes. Therefore it is necessary to launch new measures from our side. We asked: What kind of measures?
220
The South Korean side responded: Park Chung Hee and Lee Hurak want to unify the country. Yet many in South Korea are against this. Therefore order must be established. On 17 October Park Chung Hee will publish an important declaration to which North Korean should listen to attentively. If it has comments, it can ask questions about it. Then Comrade Kim Jaebong continued: One hour before the publication of Park Chung Hees declaration there came a phone message from South Korea that it will be made public at 1900 hours. Also it was proposed to have a meeting on 18 October. On 17 October the extraordinary declaration of Park Chung Hee about the state of emergency became public. On 18 October a meeting between representatives from North and South Korea took place. The following message was transmitted from Lee Hurak to Kim Yeongju: The situation in Asia has very much changed in the seventies. In particular there are changes in the bipolar system USA-USSR, and also in relations between the four powers USA-USSR-China-Japan. Given these circumstances, we hold the opinion that we have to solve the national question through our own means without the reliance on the United States and Japan. That is the reason why the Joint Declaration of 4 July was published and the dialogue between North and South began. After this declaration became public, there were many groups formed in South Korea that were against it. There have been many accusations against the government that the Joint Declaration has violated the [South Korean] constitution. This was behind Kim Yeongjus criticism of the current disturbances in South Korea against the line of peaceful unification. The opposition existing in South Korea has interfered with the implementations of obligations [from the Joint Declaration of 4 July]. The extraordinary declaration [of 17 October] to impose a state of emergency aims at changing the constitution. The current constitution was written under the influence of a bipolar situation. It is based on a doctrine of anticommunism, and there are no options for compromise.
221
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
The current South Korean constitution does not correspond to the peaceful unification of the country. Therefore we want to adapt the new constitution according to the new conditions. The United States and Japan are against these intentions. Yet we have nonetheless made the decision to solve these questions on the basis of Juche and in the spirit of the principles of national self-determination. Although the United States and Japan are against this self-determination, we still have the intention to create a system that serves the purpose of dialogue between North and South and which will have a President in its center after the amendment of the constitution. We asked this question: Why was the state of emergency and of war declared? What kind of new system is this supposed to be? The response from the South Korean side: Since our domestic questions are irresolvable by normal means, we want to guarantee the drafting and acceptance of a new constitution through a state of emergency. Th is way we avoid chaos in our country. When we draft a new constitution, we have to ascertain that no new misunderstandings occur. If you have questions about this, we are ready to answer them. [end of quote] Currently there are many opinions in South Korea. The rightist elements think those emergency measures are directed against them. Others do not know where this 17 October declaration will lead South Korea. There are questions whether this might be a pro-communist turn and non-abandonment of dialogue [with the North]. There are also discussions whether this new development might signal a turn toward the right. The new constitution is said to fully address the question of unification. A National Assembly is supposed to be established that could guarantee a peaceful dialogue between North and South. There are intentions to amend the constitution in such a way that it will serve as a legal basis for the process of dialogue. Amending the constitution does not mean to abandon dialogue but to enforce it. The Political Committee of the KWP Central Committee has examined and analyzed all aspects of the situation in South Korea. So far we have not arrived at final conclu-
222
sions. For now we can say, however, that the current situation in South Korea is very complicated. After the publication of the Joint Declaration, aspirations of the South Korean masses for peaceful unification have grown. Activities by the opposition parties and within the population increased. This is unsettling for the South Korean government. They are afraid. According to our information, after the publication of the Joint Declaration of 4th of July, 90 progressive cadres were arrested in South Korea. Anti-communism continues to exist. The South Korean economy is currently facing major problems. Small and medium businesses are going bankrupt. The agricultural situation is bad. There will be a poor harvest. Peoples suffering is on the rise. Currently Park Chung Hee pursues the so-called the New Village Movement. This movement is about the forced creation of new villages. Peasants are putting up resistance against it. The implementation of agricultural reform has resulted in a numerical increase of large landowners, as well as in corruption and so forth. Currently the situation in South Korea is similar to old China under Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi]. Therefore the hope for socialism like in North is growing among the South Korean people. Up to the publication of the Joint Declaration there was a standstill in the students movement. After the 4th of July the movement became jolted again. Park Chung Hee is much afraid of the opposition parties, the peoples masses and the students. Th is is why parliament has been dissolved, the activities of all political parties have been suspended, and the universities have been closed. After the 19th of April, Park Chung Hee has implemented a militaristic-fascist upheaval. At the end of last year a state of emergency was declared. Now a state of war has been added. Why did Park Chung Hee declare a state of emergency and of war? Park Chung Hee thinks the opposition parties will go against him if, in the current situation, he wants to have dialogue and political meetings with us just on his own. [If opposition parties would join], then the score in those meetings would not be 1:1 but 2:1 in favor of the North. This is why the opposition parties, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press have been abolished and Park Chung Hee is establishing a one man rule.
223
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
This is an enforcement of militaristic-fascist dictatorship, an attempt to repress the revolutionary movement, and to secure the further stay of Park Chung Hee in power. This way he will have the monopoly to conduct the dialogue with us, and the score is back to 1:1. Park Chung Hee fears a military conflict. Therefore he wants to solve the unification question peacefully. His objective is to create a system that is favorable to dialogue and peaceful unification. Park Chung Hee is acting from an autonomous position. However, what kind of autonomy does he have if, on the other hand, he is dependent on the United States and Japan and wants to receive their aid. Park Chung Hee is afraid of his own army. By declaring state of war, he barred all airplanes from flying over South Korean territory. Military employees were barred from leaving the barracks. Those on leave were prohibited from moving around. All army movements have been banned. What is now our position? If we do not do anything, it will mean we are closing our eyes to the repression of the people [in South Korea]. Therefore we must not remain passive. If we stay passive, we remain silent in the wake of South Korea becoming anti-communist. We will take up the two following measures: 1. We publish an article in our newspaper and prove that repression of the South Korean people under the pretext of peaceful unification is unjustified and wrong. The more the masses will participate in peaceful unification, the better. 2. There will be a statement published in the name of all political parties to unmask the reasons behind the dissolution of the South Korean parliament. A similar statement is supposed to be issued in the name of the students of North Korea concerning the closing of universities in South Korea. In all that, we will conform to the polite form common so far.
224
Park Chung Hees extraordinary declaration contains an interesting passage we will have to analyze in the near future: Our measures will lead up to a referendum. If the new constitution will not be accepted, it will mean that the South Korean people do not want the dialogue between North and South. Then it will be necessary to look for new steps toward unification. In conclusion, Comrade Kim Jaebong asked everybody in the attendance to forward this information to the politburos of their respective parties.
Signed: Gensicke, Attache Initialed: Merten CC: 1x Comrade Fischer [Deputy Foreign Minister] 1x Comrade Markowski [Central Committee, Department IV] 1x Comrade Schneidewind [Foreign Ministry, Far Eastern Department] 1x Comrade Grunert [Foreign Ministry, ZID] 1x Embassy, Political Department
***
DOCUMENT NO. 19
[Source: Translated for NKIDP by Song Jihei] Conversation with Kim Il Sung
Date and Time: Nov. 3, 1972 10:15-12:20 Location: Pyongyang Government Building Participants: From Seoul
225
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
LEE Hurak - Co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee JANG Giyeong - Assistant to the co-chairman (IOC Committee and former Vice-Premier) CHOE Gyuha - Assistant to the co-chairman (Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs) KANG Indeok - Assistant to the co-chairman (KCIA Director for Office 9) JEONG Hongjin - Assistant to the co-chairman (KCIA Director of Negotiation and Settlement) LEE Dong - Spokesman for the co-chairman From Pyongyang KIM Il Sung KIM Il - 1st Vice-Premier PAK Seongcheol - Deputy Co-chairman KIM Jeong-lin - Secretary of Central Committee, Korean Workers Party YU Jangsik- Assistant to the co-chairman (Deputy Director of Organization and Guidance Department and Director of External Affairs, Korean Workers Party) LEE Gyeongseok - Assistant to the co-chairman (Cabinet Secretary) HAN Ungsik - Assistant to the co-chairman (Cabinet Secretary) KIM Deokhyeon - Assistant to the co-chairman (Chief Officer of the Political Bureau, Central Committee, Korean Workers Party)
NORTH (KIM): SOUTH (LEE):
Is President Park doing well and is healthy? Yes, he is very well and healthy. He also requested that I deliver his
regards. I am very pleased to meet you again, Director Lee. Also, it is my first time meeting with Mr. Jang and Mr. Choe, but I am well aware of your names. I planned to meet you in the afternoon. However, I had to rearrange the schedule due to other arrangements. Lets have a conference in the afternoon. How is the harvest in the South?
NORTH (KIM):
226
SOUTH (LEE): We have had good projections but suffered some damage towards the end due to the cold weather. NORTH (KIM): We generally have two harvests a year in the North. The South also has two harvests in most areas, is that right?
That is correct. We must settle with organizing the South-North Coordinating Committee. As I mentioned to Vice-Premier Pak, I believe there has been significant progress in the South-North relations since the July 4th Joint Statement. We need to reach a consensus on organizing the South-North Coordinating Committee. During our previous meeting, Premier Kim mentioned, We cant expect we solve the issues at once. We must study them with the lapse of time and take care of the simpler matters one by one. My research on the issues is generally based on your remarks.
SOUTH (LEE): NORTH (KIM): There has been a significant progress after that statement. I met people who Ive never met before. Last time we had four guests and we have more guests this time To my mind, we should reach an agreement regarding the Coordinating Committee Since Director Lee is here, we should reach an agreement during your visit and start resolving more practical issues next time. How about we discuss the issue in the afternoon meeting?
Since the premier has mentioned so, Im certain the Vice-Premier will do as you suggest.
SOUTH (LEE): NORTH (KIM): The Coordinating Committee is very advantageous in solving the issues of our nation. Nevertheless, we do not need to be impetuous. A number of people in the world dislike us being reunified. Since early times, the great powers have ruled over small nations by splitting them apart. Looking through history and philosophy books, it appears that the great powers have been quite distrustful. Korea is located in the midst of China, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States. Thus, I imagine that outwardly they say they want us to reunify but in their hearts, many of
227
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
them dont. Its easier to control [us] when we are divided. We must reach reunification by any means. Some even call us different people when we are in fact the same. For example, people in Germany called themselves Germans under Hitlers rule. Now they argue that they are different nations. We believe in Marxism, so how shall we define our people? People with common language, writing system, culture, and history shouldnt be split into two nations. Our people shouldnt belong to two nations. Although its imperfect, King Sejong developed our own writing system in order to filter out the Chinese alphabet, and greatly contributed to the advancement of our culture. We share the same writing system, history and Korean blood. Why should we be divided? If we let this continue, our people could split into two. I recently spoke to the people who came from Japan that we shouldnt tolerate them to speak only Japanese and no Korean. There are people who try to connect with Japan. The Chinese are quite odd people. It is being said the Yuan and Qing took over China. In fact, China has been taken over by the Han. Chinese are quite difficult to assimilate. The Joseon people are quite frail in this sense.We somewhat lack strength in this. Nonetheless we hold on to the heart even when abroad. In this sense, the bloodline is not that simple. The Japanese Colonialists attempted to change our family names, saying Japan and Korea are one . They ruled over the Joseon people for 36 years, but they failed to assimilate us into Japan. Our nation should not be divided. If one diverges from us, he deserves to be declared a traitor. When Director Lee first came to the North, I spoke highly of you being brave and heroic. Once you have come to the North, shouldnt you prove to the world that our people cannot be divided? Liberalism? Socialism? Which one is better? We should sort out the virtues, dispose the vice, and select the strengths What is the confrontation for? I heard some media in the South call this a confrontation with dialogue. Confrontation means to compete with each other, [and] people from the same nation confront each other. Competition results in winners and losers. We shouldnt win or lose, dont you think? I believe there are some differences in the sentiment of the word. It seems you are disturbed by the word confrontation. In the South, confrontation does not necessarily relate to winning and losing.
SOUTH (LEE): I need to clarify one misunderstanding.
228
What it means is to do our best to make something a success. Id like to point out that the word confrontation does not carry a negative nuance. Regardless of whether you call it competition or peaceful coexistence, two nations may coexist but there cant be coexistence within one nation. We shouldnt argue with each other over liberalism and socialism. Competition within one nation is unnecessary as it merely measures the superiority between two systems.
NORTH (KIM):
Please deliver my words to President Park. We need to fi x the misunderstandings if there is any. Anyhow, we must cooperate [hap-jak]. 2 The Coordinating Committee should focus on cooperation rather than regulating military confrontation, defamation and aspersion. My faith is in the cooperation of the South and North. We should put ourselves together. Of course, the tasks wont be accomplished at a stretch. Lets start one by one. We should cooperate in sports, culture, and also economy. I have thought about a number of things for us to cooperate on at the present time. Anyway, through the process of economic cooperation [and moving on to] political and cultural [cooperation], we will be able to develop a further understanding of each other, and it will be beneficial in pursuing the goal of our nation. For instance, the North has abundant underground resources. We recently discovered iron ore deposits. There are several billion tons. The Japanese, who came before to seek iron ore, only saw the surface of it.
SOUTH (LEE):
Where did you find that much?
NORTH (KIM): It was also because the Japanese did not yet have developed technology
at the time. In any case, the Japanese were not even halfway through with iron ore. We found hundreds of millions of tons in Gaecheon and several more billion tons in Pungsan. Its about ten billion tons altogether. We have plenty of iron ore. Our concern is that we cant drill deep enough since for now we can only excavate about four to five hundred meters
NORTH (KIM IL):
We can currently dig down to 1,000 meters.
229
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
NORTH (KIM):
Right, now it is 1,000 meters underground. We need equipment to dig as deep as 2,000-3,000 meters but the equipment is awfully expensive. We also need about two hundred thousand geological researchers, but we only have around a hundred thousand. How good is the quality?
SOUTH (LEE): NORTH (KIM):
The quality is over 30%. Its about 70% when separated. The quality is outstanding. We trade iron ore with Japan and China. We exchange iron ore for coke. There is plenty amount of iron ore. We also found nickel. Lets work cooperatively.
SOUTH (LEE):
It is best to proceed with easier tasks and leave more difficult tasks for later, as you previously mentioned. Economic cooperation is also included in the function of the Coordinating Committee. It is said something well begun is half done. I believe the Coordinating Committee will be organized soon to process things step by step. Let us develop a cooperative project.
NORTH (KIM):
SOUTH (LEE): The development itself is not that significant. However, the issues you have mentioned will be solved gradually. NORTH (KIM): We have plenty of issues to cooperate. For instance, about five to six million tons of pollock and sailfin sandfish travel to our coast annually, but we are capable of fishing five hundred thousand to six hundred thousand tons at the most. Im not certain about the depth but the large mass of pollock that crowds in is about three thousand meters wide and five thousand meters in length, according to the fishermen. If the fishermen of the South and North cooperate, we are capable of fishing much more.
Fishing is a seasonal business that lasts for about a month. We are now capable of fishing only about 10%. The scientists researching marine resources say catching about
230
50% of pollock will not damage the population of pollock. In other words, fishing 250 thousand tons of pollock is acceptable. Wont it be mutually beneficial if the fishermen from the South and North worked together? Lets cooperate in fishing as well. The South has developed light industry and manufacturing industry, and the North has developed heavy industry We decided to focus on machine industry since long ago. Since we have abundant iron ore, we produce tractors and automobiles to export to our neighbors. We have a big market. We can have a prosperous life promoting machine industry. Although there have been significant advancements, we are yet at a beginning stage. Still, there is some gap to compete in the capitalist market. South-North cooperation is desirable. We can also divide work. It will greatly reduce each others burdens. As a result, we will prosper having no need to envy others. I heard that the South is actively developing many industries. However, I wonder, is the South capable of further advancements without developing the resources in the North? Of course, you could import from other countries, but is it necessary to import resources when your closest neighbor has abundant resource? We need to cooperate one step after another in order to develop trust. Words cant tell ones true intention. If the Coordinating Committee has this task in the item, we ought to start from that specific task. Indeed, we must proceed with the tasks one by one as the projects that Premier Kim mentioned are included in the Coordinating Committees projects rather than [emphasizing the] organization of the Committee itself.
NORTH (KIM): SOUTH (LEE): I am well aware.
We should put [the projects] in action. Lets work on a wide range of projects. Cooperation in culture is an integral part as well. One word could have multiple meanings. If the separation continues, we could separate into two nations. Language, writing system Kim Dubong who stayed in Yanan, had an argument with us regarding our writing system. Reforming the writing system is what you studied and it will leave honor to
231
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
you, but in fact it will encourage a division of our nation. Thus, we rejected writing system reform. He proposed to reform our writing system similar to Latin. Exchange in science That is the reason why I support cooperation than exchange. Scholars in the South are more knowledgeable of what we are not familiar with. Likewise, our scholars may be more familiar what the scholars in South have less knowledge of. In order to develop industries, we will also need cooperation in the sphere of science. The mass media call it confrontation with dialogue, competition with dialogue. However, it is now the time for us to cooperate. Since we have initiated a conversation, the Coordinating Committee should refrain from doing all talk and no action
SOUTH (LEE): Listening to your remarks, Premier Kim, it is exactly the same as what President Park has in mind. President Park always mentioned that we will prosper when the South and North become one. We could develop Geumgang Mountains, go sightseeing in Mt. Geumgang, and visit Busan afterwards. When we put our efforts together, we will be able to display our might even without political integration. Since President Park and Premier Kim have similar thinking, the cabinet members around the President and the Premier must work hard to promote what you have in mind. SOUTH (JANG): I SOUTH (LEE):
heard President Park remarking the exact same thoughts, likewise.
For instance, we purchase the iron ore at Pohang Jonghap Jecheol 3 from Australia for roughly eleven dollars per ton. If the North could supply the same resource, tariff barrier is abolished. How beneficial is that? Id be delighted if President Park has same thoughts. It is perhaps a good time for us to cooperate. We will have understandings instead of misunderstandings. When the South and the North cooperate, all the issues will vanish.
NORTH (KIM): SOUTH (LEE): If
the athletes had came together and participated as a unified team in the last Olympic games, we could have better displayed the power of our nation to the international world, I believe.
232
NORTH (KIM): We are then truly invincible. Our football team came back yesterday from a game in India. India has four hundred million people and we only have twenty-five million but we were winning by 7 to 0. Then the Indian audiences cheered for more goals. We won by 9 to 0, eventually.
Was it basketball? It was not soccer. We had a match with West Germany and we were winning by a goal. The referee must have been bribed. We lost a point due to a penalty [shot]. Then he called for extra time but our team refused. We lost the game because he counted our refusal as a withdrawal. When we went to the Soviet Union, the Soviets [told us that they] also lost 6 to 0 with West Germany but with Chinese team it is the Chinese team, isnt it? They won by 4 to 0. What does a large population matter? When we unite, we can defeat all. Our nation is strong and our people are full of fight. We should form a unified team for the next Olympic Games. We should also participate as a unified team in international competitions prior to the Olympics.
SOUTH (LEE): SOUTH (JANG): We
can cooperate in cheering even at the moment.
NORTH (KIM): Cooperation, from economic to cultural, and political cooperation, it is not much of a complicated issue. What is socialism? Nasser is known for his support for socialism. So are Somali and Sukarno. In fact, they were all nationalists mistaken for socialists. Our socialism doesnt know the Russians quite well. Before the war, we hardly mentioned socialism. We developed socialism after the war. We published a thesis in April 1955. The Soviets and the Western world laughed at us because we wanted to adopt socialism. They derided us saying socialism has to be after industrial development. In fact, we were devastated in ashes due to the war. Middleincome farmers, wealthy farmers and small business owners all became penniless. We were already through with land reforms like in the South. An advanced country will not allow a feudal ownership of land Since everyone is penniless, we needed to pull together. Then we discussed how and came up with a cooperative farming system. Thus we asked the people to choose among 1. Labor exchange fields, 2. Co-owned
233
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
labor fields, and 3. Possessions combined fields. In the cities, the small business owners had empty hands and naked fists. 4 Therefore, the state had to lend them money, and we decided that loaning a sum of money to a group is more efficient than lending particles to individuals. It is how we came up with a production cooperative community. Now, we only have socialist-owned and state-owned [properties]. We did not replicate the Russian system by rote. We didnt experience major tragedies, for instance beheading the wealthy farmers as in Virgin Soil Upturned (Sholokhovs work). That is the reason why I believe in Juche. If we didnt cooperate then, the development of current date was quite impossible. Because we irrigated the land without the distinction of ownership, we now have 7 billion m2 of rice fields5.
SOUTH (LEE):
In the South, we have about 20 billion m2.
NORTH (KIM): Socialism is not a big threat [to cooperation between the North and South]. I would avoid giving you a lecture on socialism. In any case, we can progress from economic cooperation to political cooperation at any time. SOUTH (LEE):
As you have mentioned, we should expedite simpler assignments and take time with more complicated issues. We should work together under this principle. I have one concern. Politics, culture and society, none of these are completely independent from one another. In order to resolve this issue, that issue will come into conflict We must loosen the tension between the South and the North. For we are uncertain of when we might have a war, we have significant burdens in military expense. The burdens in military expense need to be the first issue for us to solve. The South receives 250 million dollars in foreign aid but we have no foreign assistance. It is a lot of pressure for us. We need to take care of this issue first. Why would the U.S. support South Korea and for what would they continue the support? If political issues are not taken care of, there is not going to be any more chance in the future for us to progress. We should reduce the military expenses and promote peaceful operations. We produce guns, and you import them from overseas. We need political cooperation in order to solve this issue as well. Guns are not like food in a sense that it cant be consumed. So what will unused guns become of? Prior to all, we need to cooperate instead of attacking each other and decrease the military expenses.
NORTH (KIM):
234
Also regarding the issue federation, we must proceed with a primary form of a federation to the international community, leaving the system in the South and the North as the way it is. It will lead us to clearing up all issues. We will need a common name externally. Do we want to join the UN as a divided country? No, I would never. Even when the South attempts to, you cant join the UN because we can veto. We could maintain as two countries domestically but to the outside world, we should become one country. The Republic of Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea We can also come up with a new name. The Confederal Republic of Korea sounds reasonable. Under the agreement, we could co-chair the federation. This way we will be able to raise the nations dignity. Thats how we will raise dignity domestically. Lets study this. I meant to mention this when I meet with President Park but I decided to speak to you since we are running out of time. Without the tension loosened, we wont be able to solve the problems.
SOUTH (LEE): Shouldnt we consider the South-North Joint Statement a peace agreement? What matters is the will to conform to the statement. While President Park is in the office, there is no need for you to be occupied in producing guns. The federation issue is also very complicated that it requires a multi-dimensional research. I once read about your stance towards federation, Premier. President Park has also mentioned previously about the need of a board of representatives until we are finally reunified. All in all, we will need to study more. NORTH (KIM): You tend to separate the matters but we look at the matters interlinked. We call it dialectical materialism. For us, it is difficult to separate the matters individually. The exchange of dispersed family members through the Red Cross Societies Even though it may seem like a simple issue, it is not indeed. For example, Lee Beomseok, the chief South Red Cross delegate, has an aunt in the North. I asked them if they wanted to meet. However, the aunt didnt want to meet her nephew. Why was it? Her sons and daughters have to make their careers but she was worried that it may hurt her childrens careers if people learned that her nephew is a high-ranking official in the South. Im certain there are many people with similar concerns in the South. If people worry that finding dispersed family could harm them, and thus, change names and tell lies to find dispersed family members, it is never a simple issue.
235
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
We are accused of linking politics, and you tell us that you are disappointed. Nevertheless, we must make sure that no one suffers any harm. At a factory, I met a man whose father left for the South. I asked him if he wanted to meet his father. He answered, he wouldnt meet his father because he did wrong, and if he did right, he will call him father. I asked him if he really meant it and he answered yes. We must be able to take care of the [South-North] issues considering related matters. Now that we opened up, we shouldnt reversely close the door. Who would blame Kim Il Sung or President Park anymore? Our thoughts and your thoughts can be different. The initial philosophy can be different. For us, everything is interconnected. You observe matters as separate. Individual matters can be solved in parts. Nonetheless, do the other matters follow? We can draw closer the differences in thoughts. The military issue The South has about seven hundred thousand and we have about four hundred thousand to five hundred thousand. Why do we need such a number for? We only need about hundred thousand from South and another hundred thousand from us as strategic unit. Even in the case of Japanese invasion, two hundred thousand is enough.
We will need some in the Amnok River as well.
Exploiting underground resources, economic and political cooperation, and decrease in military expenses
SOUTH (LEE):
That is exactly the reason why we are organizing the Coordinating Committee. We will open the doors one by one.
NORTH (KIM): I heard that President Park hopes that we will be reunified in the 80s. Then I will be 70 [years old], and President Park will be around 67-68 [years old], right? SOUTH (LEE):
What he intended to say is that we will eventually be reunified in the 80s through economic and cultural exchanges. Even if we have some delays, aiming for the 80s will give us some time.
NORTH (KIM): Director Lee mentioned that I shouldnt take newspapers seriously but
we ought to pay attention to what they say.
236
SOUTH (LEE): I am confident that these conversations bear significant meaning. I came to Pyongyang to listen to Premier Kims thoughts, and Vice-Premier Pak came to Seoul to hear President Parks thoughts When your remarks are drawn closer to your intents, things will proceed with one accord. SOUTH (JANG):
Yes, I suppose there are correlations. [I suppose we will reach] Political cooperation enabled through economic cooperation Assuming that we proceed successively taking the material correlations into account, when do you expect we will be able to be reunified, Premier?
can right away. We can reunify even within a month. Only if we are determined, we are able to reunify right after this moment. [We will] Invoke a martial law one after another We are afraid of nothing. How long do you project it will take, presuming that we have a successful transition from economic cooperation to political?
SOUTH (JANG): NORTH (KIM): If President Park and I have our wills put together, it can happen in a day. Its because President Park and the people in power are suspicious of us. We should all leave the doubts behind. SOUTH (JANG):
NORTH (KIM): We
A new form of federation will also require some time to fully unify
as a country.
NORTH (KIM): Frankly speaking, I dont want to become the chairman when we reunify. I want to write philosophy. I havent even finished writing books [on the ideas that I have in mind] We should dismiss thinking about who will control over whom from our minds and unite as a nation. If we think negatively and behave reluctantly, it is impossible for us to reach solidarity. It all depends on your understanding. Without being concerned about time, lets have lunch together, hold proper discussions and leave after signing the treaty in the afternoon. SOUTH (CHOE): There cant be a treaty between us.
It should be [called] a statement.
237
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
NORTH (KIM): Please convey my messages to President Park that we are not impatient. Its been a year since the Red Cross Conference and half a year since the Joint Statement. It is time for us to show some achievements externally. Lets start with cooperation. Lets start with economic and cultural cooperation. SOUTH (LEE):
Since President Park thinks the same way, the methods will be quite
simple.
NORTH (KIM):
Lets cooperate. The military issue We should cut down on the expenses. There is excessive burden upon military expenses. Decreasing the military burden is related to the increase in political trust.
SOUTH (LEE): In fact, it is the possibility of a military conflict that brought about the current state. The South and North mutually agree on the need to reduce military expenses. However, in the South there is no such word as cooperation (hap-jak). I understand what you intend. We can promote cooperation of your intent in various fields including economic, culture and society. We ought to pour our efforts into promoting such cooperation.
We, the assistants to President Park, will discuss the matter with your assistants, and seek to resolve the issues as soon as possible.
NORTH (KIM):
Why did you schedule your visit for such a short time? Is it all done when you publish documents and make announcements? You should stay longer so that we have sufficient time for conversation and to connect.
SOUTH (LEE): My job as the head of the KCIA is to arrest ex-communists.
The KCIA is a crucial government agency responsible for national security. I was determined to visit because I believed reconciliation between South and North is as important as arresting communists for the pursuit of national security. It is a disgrace for our nation if we close the door after we open it. We need to widen the door to raise our nations dignity.
238
NORTH (KIM): I fully trusted you, as you are the one who arrests communists. I distrust Mr. Jang and Mr. Choe. I have a greater trust and respect for you Director Lee, since the person who captures communists has come to cooperate with the communists. Director Lee has a tremendous responsibility in our nations reunification and it is an honor for our nations future.
That is why I called you a hero. I could give you the honor as a part of the people of this country. Kim Yeongju, the director of organization and guidance, is suffering from vegetable neurological disorder,6 and it seems it cannot be cured easily Kim Yeongju intended to visit Seoul to meet with President Park and hold discussions when he recovers He will be better by December or the next new year. Director Kim Yeongju is planning on a courtesy visit. I could certainly send my brother to the South since Director Lee has visited us. Hes [so sick that he is] unable to do his work. I will send him to the South to meet with President Park. It is best that we cooperate. By the way, I heard someone named Shin Sangcho speaking to the media. He argued we should not reunify. He said if the South and North reunify, we will have to kill five million people each. Then he asked how we can we unify considering such casualities. Thus, I called the chief of general staff and asked how much casualities we expect. He answered that the number is definitely less than five million. Many people want to interrupt our reunification. We both have to avoid those journalists. If we want to cooperate, we shouldnt be against communism. We will offend each other and eventually fight against each other. We will be repeating the confusion [that occurred] during the Rhee Syngman [era]. We shouldnt make any anti-communist movements. Since Director Lee expressed the initiative, please visit us often. We may not be able to provide a great deal in the way of hospitality, but we can sure share a bowl of rice. The foreigners are going to be astonished if we cooperate in fishing and in developing underground resources.
SOUTH (LEE):
Thank you for your time whenever I visit Pyongyang. Why shouldnt we?
NORTH (KIM): Lets speak frankly if there is any misunderstanding.
239
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
SOUTH (LEE): Id be happy to see more people developing an understanding through the successful organization of the Coordinating Committee. It is better than my delivery of your thoughts.
Bring more company when you visit next time. Im very pleased to have Director Lee, who is in charge of arresting communists. Th at means you have a strong desire for our reunification. Please speak frankly if there is any misunderstanding. It is time we cooperate instead of merely talking.
President Park and Premier Kim have very similar philosophy. The theme of their thinking is almost identical. We should cooperate in fishing and mining underground resources.. What is your price for iron ore in the international market? Its five pounds per ton.
NORTH (KIM IL):
NORTH (KIM): When the congressmen from Japans Liberal Democratic Party visited, I told them we have nothing for sale to you. The iron ore and hard coal (anthracite) we have... We do not wish to be your resource provider or consuming market. We want one-on-one trade. During the Khrushchev [era], we were asked to join the COMECON but we turned down the offer. If we merely export resources, well only be left with abandoned mines. You must import our machines. We want machines versus machine and resource versus resource trade. That is why we didnt join the COMECON. If they dont import from us, then we wont trade. The Soviets still purchase thousands of machines from us. We told them, you be the college students and we will be little children still growing up in kindergarten. We trade with the Soviet under the condition that we export machines and resources and import coal, coke and petroleum. China buys iron ore from us and brings us coke.
In the North, chemical industry still runs by coal. We run the industry by petroleum.
SOUTH (LEE):
240
NORTH (KIM):
Petroleum access is highly limited to us. Carbite has some electricity losses but we can produce it independently. We extract synthetic fiber from coal and carbite. Wouldnt that raise the cost the production cost?
Whats bad about having a slightly higher production cost, as long as we produce with what we have We have expanded the current vinylon capacity from thirty thousand tons to fifty thousand tons.
SOUTH (LEE): Coal, limestone and synthetic fiber sounds like a significantly high production cost. NORTH (KIM): The production cost may be high. However, we are completely selfsufficient. We produce with what our own resource Lunch seems to be ready. Allow me to guide you to the dining area.
***
DOCUMENT NO. 20
[Source: AQPPSH, MPP Korese, D 1, V. 1973. Translated for NKIDP by Enkel Daljani]
To the First Secretary of the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee Comrade Enver Hoxha Tirana Dear comrade Enver Hoxha,
241
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
Seeing with great delight how the brotherly relations of friendship and cooperation between the parties, governments, and peoples of our two countries are developing well from one day to the next, I send to You, and through You, to the ALP, the Government, and the Albanian people our most heartfelt greetings. I would like to express to You, the CC of Your party, and the Government our deepest gratitude for the fact that in the international area, including at the UN, Your country is waging an active campaign in support of the great cause of our people for the reunification of our fatherland, and has taken the necessary measures to show its strong solidarity and support for the letter we have sent to the parliaments and governments of all the countries of the world, approved in the second session of the Supreme Peoples Assembly of the Fifth Legislature of our country. I take this chance to express my desire to inform You, and through You the CC of Your party and the Government of Your country, on the situation that has lately been created in our country in relation to the five point program for the peaceful reunification of the country that we recently published. Over time the division of Korea causes ever more pain and suffering to our people, which during its thousands-of-years old history has always lived as a single people, and also creates problem for the issue of the preservation of peace and security in Asia and the world over. The United States of America has been for 28 years now imposing the division of the territory of the country and the breakup of our nation to our people, and now by using their two-faced tactics they are trying to urge Koreans against Koreans, to consolidate the division of Korea for eternity, and to fabricate two separate Koreas. Following the letter, these machinations of the USA, the South Korean officials are working hard toward a confrontation between the South and the North; they are placing all their forces to the increase of their military capacity, and are continually using intrigues to for the eternalizing of the division of the country. Lately they have gone so far as to make the plans for the creation of the two Koreas their policy ant to openly announce a course of division for the country. Due to all these facts and despite our continuous attempts for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country, we do not see at the moment the necessary progress in the talks between the South and the North; the previously miraculous perspectives for the reunification of the Fatherland that were presented to our nation
242
a year ago when the Joint Declaration of the North and the South was proclaimed are now becoming darker by the day. At a time when inside the country, and outside, one can see the unusual tendency for the eternalizing of the division of the country, based on the sincere aspiration for overcoming the present difficulties and on the desire to accomplish as soon as possible our national aspirationthe peaceful reunification of the Fatherlandon June 23 of this year, we, once again proclaimed our program for the peaceful and independent reunification of the country: First, we propose to liquidate the situation of the military confrontation and the elimination of the tensions between the South and the North. The liquidation of the situation of the military confrontation and the elimination of the tensions between the South and the North is at the moment the most pressing and key issue to the necessity for the removal of misunderstandings and lack of trust, the deepening of the understanding and trust between the North and the South, the creation of an atmosphere of a great national reunification, the amelioration of the atmosphere between the North and the South, and the achievement of the peaceful reunification of the country. For as long as the knife remains hidden under the jacket, it will not be possible to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and to successfully solve the problem of the cooperation and interchange between the North and the South. That is why as a first step toward the peaceful reunification of the country, we have approached more than once the authorities of South Korea with proposals for a freeze to the increase of the armed forces and the armament race between us, for the removal of all the foreign troops, the reduction of the armies and the armaments, a stop to the delivery of armaments from abroad, and the conclusion of a peace agreement. Secondly, we have presented the proposal for the achievement of multileveled cooperation and for trade between the North and the South in the different fields of politics, military arts, diplomacy, economy, and culture. We think that the initiation of the multileveled cooperation and trade between the South and the North has a great importance for the eventual re-linking of the national relations that have been cut, for the amelioration of the relations between the North and the South, and the creation of the necessary premises for reunification. We reiterated once more that the South Korean officials should not rely on external forces, but should, instead, accept the development of the economy in the interest of
243
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
our entire nation through the course of mutual exploitation of the natural resources of the country and the achievement of the national cooperation in all the fields. Thirdly, we proposed giving to the various layers of the population of the North and the South at large the chance to take part in the patriotic, national process in the name of the reunification of the Fatherland. We think that as long as the reunification of the Fatherland is a cause that must be exclusively solved on the basis of a common willingness of the entire people of the North and the South Korea, the dialog between the North and the South should not be limited only to the circle of the representatives of the authorities of the South and the North, but must be brought down to the level of the entire nation. For the same reason, we proposed the gathering a great National Assembly comprised of various layers of the population, political parties, and social organizations of the North and the South, the free discussion of the issues, and the solution, through it, of the issue of the reunification of the country according to the will and desires of our people. Fourth, we proposed once again the establishment of a confederation of the South and the North under the name of a single statethe Confederate Republic of Goryeo. The gathering of the great National Assembly and the achievement of the great national consolidation, and the establishment on this basis of a confederative system, all the while keeping for a determined time the two different systems that exist in the North and in the South, is considered by us as the most rational course for the achievement of the reunification of the country. We have proposed that should a confederative system comprised of the South and the North be established, this confederative state be called the Confederate Republic of Goryeo, bringing back the name of Goryeo, which is widely known to the world as the only state that has existed in the territory of our nation. Fifthly, we have presented the proposal that the North and the South operate jointly in their foreign relations with the intention of preempting the consolidation of the division and the eternal separation of our nation into two Koreas. Our nation, a single nation, which during our thousands of years of history has existed and continues to exist as a single culture and a single language, cannot be left to live separated into two parts.
244
We think that for the preemption of an eternal division of the country into a northern and a southern part, we must also jointly take steps in the field of the foreign affairs. In the field of the international relations with other countries, we are also resolutely opposed to every attempt to exploit them for the fabrication of two separate Koreas. We insist that the South and the North should not become separate members of the UN, and think that if they want to become members of the UN before the achievement of the reunification of the country, we must enter as a single state, with the name of a single statethe Confederate Republic of Goryeoonly after the establishment, at the very least, of a confederative system But we are also of the opinion that, aside from the issue of the membership in the UN, whenever the issues related to Korea are included in the daily agenda or are discussed at the UN, the representative of the DPR of Korea, as a directly interested party, should be invited to take part. We also think that all of our proposals are acceptable to all; they are the most rational and the most practical proposals that represent the immediate aspiration of the entire people of Korea, who seek to stop the division of the country, to completely improve their life, to improve the relations between the South and the North, and to achieve as soon as possible the reunification of the country and to further the cause of the dayindependence and peace. Now it has become easily clear who sincerely desires peace and reunification in Korea, and who really desires war and division. I express my confidence that Your party, government, and people will pay a great deal of attention to the present situation in our country and will take active measures of various forms in support of the new course of the government of the DPR of Korea for the achievement of the reunification of the country without any interference from abroad, in an independent way, on a democratic basis, and in a peaceful way. I express my conviction that the close relations of friendship and cooperation that we have established between the parties, governments, and peoples of our two countries, will in the future, as in the past, be strengthened and developed ceaselessly on the basis of the principles of Marxism Leninism and of the proletarian internationalism. I wish You with all my heart good health and new successes in Your work in general.
245
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
Friendly greetings, The General Secretary of the Central Committee of The Korean Workers Party Kim Il Sung Pyongyang, on July 7, 1973
DOCUMENT NO. 21
***
[Source: National Archives and Records Administration]
August 24, 1973 Memorandum for: The Secretary of State Subject: Strategy of the Korean Question in the U.N. General Assembly The President has reviewed your July 31, 1973, report on your talks with ROK President Park and other leaders in Seoul. The President has decided that we should proceed on the Korean question in the UNGA in accordance with the following strategy. -- Our basic objective should be to minimize the risk of a major confrontation in the UNGA, while preserving our essential policy position on the U.N. Command (UNC) and UNCURK. -- We should seek to have the UNCURK report recommending termination of the organization submitted as soon as possible. We should not favor a formal UNGA resolution on the report, however, unless the Communist side attempts to have UNCURK terminated with prejudice to its past activities, or unless necessary to retain the initiative on UNCURK.
246
-- Our objective is to defeat any moves at this UNGA aimed at terminating the UNC. We should, therefore, undertake immediate representations to all potentially responsive UN members setting forth this position and explaining the substantial differences between the UNC and UNCURK. -- Regarding the simultaneous admission of both Koreas to U.N. membership, we should try to persuade South Korea to press its campaign less vigorously, in order to avoid stimulating the opposition to make greater efforts in support of a hostile resolution on the UNC and U.S. Forces in the ROK. The U.S. should be prepared to give modest support to the ROKs efforts to secure simultaneous admission in order (a) to support our Korean ally, (b) to avail ourselves of the tactical leverage this issue can provide against possible opposition efforts to press for a hostile resolution on the UNC and U.S. Forces in the ROK. The proposal for simultaneous admission should be phrased in a way that does not seem to impose U.N. membership on North Korea. At the same time, our effort both as regards simultaneous admission and the UNC/U.S. forces should be keyed to deal effectively with the level and character of challenge that may be raised by the opposition. In addition to the above, a study should be prepared presenting options and related scenarios on the following questions, and should be submitted for the Presidents consideration no later than August 30: How we might prevent the UNC and U.S. forces in the ROK from becoming the center of a full-blown debate in this falls UNGA. How we might prevent the opposition from mobilizing majority support for UNGA action against the UNC and U.S. forces in the ROK. How both legally and institutionally we could protect the continued effectiveness of the Armistice Agreement and the Military Armistice Commission, assuming a major attack on the UNC. (signature) Henry A. Kissinger
***
247
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
DOCUMENT NO. 22
[Source: From the personal archive of former Bulgarian diplomat Georgii Mitov. Translation from Bulgarian by Donna Kovacheva]
Memorandum of Conversation between Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the State Council of Bulgaria, and Kim Il Sung, President and Secretary General of the North Korean Workers Party 30 October, 1973
RE: SOME ASPECTS OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH COMRADE KIM IL SUNG
First of all, I would like to point out that during our visit to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, our delegation was bestowed with extraordinary attention and hospitality. As our Korean comrades pointed out (and our comrades at the Embassy in Pyongyang confirmed later), they had not hosted a similar reception for another delegation in recent years. From our statement below it will become clear that the great hospitality and attention shown to us was, to a great extent, addressed towards the Soviet Union. I will cover some aspects of our conversations with Comrade Kim Il Sung at the official meeting of the two delegations, and more specifically, of the conversations between the two of us on the train, on our way from Pyongyang to the town of Hamheung and back. I am relaying these conversations in brief and from memory. The conversations between us were lengthy: the first conversation on the train lasted three hours and the second one about two hours and a half. I will cover some of the issues that we discussed with Comrade Kim Il Sung: 1. On the issue of dtente of the international situation, the transition from the stage of Cold War towards peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems.
248
I spoke about this issue during the official meetings between the two delegations and, later, during my face-to-face talks with Comrade Kim Il Sung. The task I had assigned myself was: to explain that the policy of peaceful coexistence, which we, brotherly, socialist countries conduct now, is a class, internationalist policy; a policy that coincides with the key interests and the struggle of the international communist and labor movement, of the workers class across the world, the national liberation movement, that the policy of dtente creates favorable conditions for expanding the global revolutionary process, gives and will continue to give, positive results on all continents on our planet. I pointed out that it was this situation, indeed, that created an opportunity to end the war in Vietnam, the Middle East, etc. I pointed out that the assertion of this policy and its practical results are a major victory for our socialist countries, for the progressive part of mankind, a victory gained in the course of struggles lasting decades. I pointed out the role of the Soviet Union in this regard, the great significance of the Soviet Unions peace program adopted at the XXIV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and the personal merit of comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. My statement visibly impressed Comrade Kim Il Sung. At the end of the official meetings, he stated that they approved of this policy and after our conversation, he had learned certain things and understood them better. 2. On relations with China and Chinas leadership The second issue that we discussed with Comrade Kim Il Sung was about the relationship with the Peoples Republic of China and the Chinese leadership. At the official meeting between the two delegations, I spoke briefly about the issue of our relations with the Chinese. I only spoke about what their embassy was doing in Sofia, and pointed out that they were trying to establish pro-Chinese groups in Bulgaria. We provided them with a contingent for these groups from the Secret Service and they were established. But after some time, we told the Chinese that we should no longer play a game of hide-and-seek, that these were no pro-Chinese groups of any kind, but employees of our secret service, and that this game should stop. Now, the Chinese embassy in Sofia is gathering and exchanging information with the American
249
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
and other diplomatic missions in Sofia and leading a policy of discrediting Bulgaria in front of other diplomatic missions. In my face-to-face talks with Comrade Kim Il Sung, however, I spoke in detail about the Chinese issue, pointing out the following: On the neutrality of our Korean comrades in their discord with the Chinese Communist Party and the Peoples Republic of China: I pointed out that by adhering to neutral positions on the Chinese dissent with the communist movement, in principle, this means support of the policy and the dissident activity of the Chinese, practical approval of the anti-Soviet policy conducted by the Chinese leadership. This could push the Chinese towards most dangerous steps with unpredictable outcomes for the smaller countries in Asia. Such a position means departure from the policy of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. On the Chinese theory of so-called super states, the division of the world not into socialist and capitalist states, but rather into big and small states, into white and colored: I pointed out that this theory is anti-Marxist and is taken from the ideological arsenal of imperialism, that the Chinese are using it as a tool in their struggle against the Soviet Union. You cannot put the Soviet Union and the USA on one plate. On the Chinese thesis about the socialist imperialism of the Soviet Union, the threat from the North, and the Chinese provocations along the Soviet-Chinese border: China points out as enemy number one not imperialism, but the country of Lenin, the first socialist country in the world. This was also openly expressed at the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. No threat from the North exists. It is a fact that China used weapons against the Soviet Union, that it constantly launches provocations against the Soviet Union. The talks about the threat from the North are demagogy. The Chinese need them for internal consumption and to play around with the imperialists. It is difficult to understand why China did not accept even one of the numerous specific proposals made by the Soviet Union for regulating and normalizing Soviet-Chinese relations.
250
On the practical alliance of the Chinese with the most reactionary forces in the international arena: In support of this, I pointed out a series of facts: Zhou Enlais appeal towards the Americans not to withdraw their troops from the Far East; the diplomatic relations between Peking and Franco; the expulsion of Allendes Ambassador from Peking, the practical support of the military junta in Chile, the support that the Chinese render to the reactionary forces in many countries in dealing with the communists, etc. In conclusion on this matter, I summarized that we were talking not about some Chinese-Russian dispute, but about principle ideological and political disagreements between Chinas leadership on one side and the socialist community and the international communist movement as a whole on the other; and that the policy of the Chinese leadership was contrary to the collective policy developed by the brotherly parties for unification of the anti-imperialist forces. Comrade Kim Il Sung responded on the issue about their relationship with China as follows: Wehe saiddo not agree with Chinas policy. It is incomprehensible to us. It is incomprehensible to us why they speak about Soviet socialist imperialism, that there is socialist imperialism in the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union there is no socialist imperialism and there is no socialist imperialism at all. We do not share Chinas idea about the two super-states. We do not agree with their theories, which they spread in the past as well, about the blooming of all flowers, the contradictions in socialist society, the peasant communities, the Cultural Revolution, etc. During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese set up along our border, which is 1,300 km long, loud speakers and they broadcast propaganda against our country day and night. The population along the border could not sleep. My son visited a village along the border at the time. When he came back he said, Dad, I could not sleep a single night. When the Chinese launched a military provocation along the Soviet border along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, they launched a military provocation in our country too (he mentioned the name of the river and the village, but I could not remember them). The story that Kim Il Sung told was the following: In this village we had soldiers and
251
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
armed villagers (along the border our people bear arms), about 50 people; and the Chinese penetrated into our country with 100 armed soldiers and officers. I was out in the country at the time (on Saturdays and Sundays I usually go out in the country and I read,) and they told me about this infiltration by the Chinese soldiers. I gave instructions to our people to let them in and not to shoot at them straight away. But, if they tried to advance further into our territory and carry out actions, our people were to block their way and capture at least five of them alive. The Chinese solders, however, penetrated into our territory and after that withdrew, without undertaking any action. There were similar, less significant, incidents in other places along the border too. I was in China last year. The reason for my visit was to meet with Sihanouk. The invitation was also from the Chinese. They groomed me at length against the Soviet Union. In the end, I told them that to us, the Soviet Union, the Soviet people are our brothers-in-arms, just as you, Chinese, are our brothers-in-arms. China is a big country and they believe that they can exist and fight on their own. They do not recognize the international communist movement. We have a saying: Mountains have high and low peaks, but people are the same. (I dont know if the interpreter interpreted it correctly. He was Korean.) Chinas policy in relation to the events in Chile is incomprehensible to us. Now, after the military juntas coup dtat, there are three embassies of socialist countries still remaining: those of China, Rumania, and Albania. I dont know the situation with the Vietnamese Embassy. After the Cuban Embassy, our embassy in Chile was the second one against which the military junta carried out provocations and made the future work of the Embassy impossible. Chinas establishing diplomatic relations with Francos Spain is also incomprehensible to us. We do not have a neutral policy towards China. But because of our specific situation, we are just keeping our mouths shut. There is a front against us in the South. If we open our mouths, that means to open up a second front. China is all around us. We have a small border with the Soviet Union. In the country, among the party and the people, we do not disseminate their theories and their views. We print out some of their speeches, they print some of ours. But, we do not publish in the press what is contrary to our policy, we delete it. In the course of our face-to-face conversation, Comrade Kim Il Sung pointed out several times: we do not have a neutral policy towards China; we do not intend to maintain such a policy in the future either. We do not disseminate their concepts
252
inside our country. I believe you are right in maintaining an open struggle against the Chinese. But you have to understand us and our situation here, in this region of the world. I raised the question: How do you, Comrade Kim Il Sung, see the future? Isnt there a danger for the nationalist, chauvinistic, super-state, and adventurous policy of Chinas leadership to bring about most unpredictable consequences aimed against the smaller countries and nations in Asia, and sacrifice their interests in favor of the superstate goals of Peking? Isnt there a danger everything that is most holy to you and to your people to be destroyed and desecrated tomorrow? To this question, Comrade Kim Il Sung answered: Nobody knows that will be tomorrow. That is possible and we keep track of it. That is why we teach our people against subservience to other countries. In our country, we aim this not against the Soviet Union, but against China. China has influence in our country. Our language has many Chinese words in it. When we discussed the Chinese issue, Comrade Kim Il Sung pointed out: This is my understanding on this issue. This is our policy. And this is not my understanding only. You, comrade Zhivkov, you see the people in our delegation, these are young people. They think the same as well and keep the same in mind in everything they do. 3. On collective security in Asia I took the initiative on this topic and spoke first, keeping in mind that Comrade Kim Il Sung could get carried away and express views that are incorrect. What I said was basically the following: What does it mean to talk about collective security in Asia at this stage? At this stage, it is only an idea launched by the Soviet Union. By no means does it mean that this idea is to be achieved tomorrow. This is a task for the future, a task for the time yet to come. To turn it into a material force, the idea for collective security in Asia must become a collective task of the Asian people and it must be outlined in a program.
253
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
The Soviet comrades, too, comrade Brezhnev, and you understand that the situation in Asia is very complicated, it is more complicated than in Europe and the idea for collective security in Asia will not be realized that quickly. But we, as Marxists-Leninists, are interested in developing this process, to eliminate the opportunity for generating military conflicts on the largest continent on earth. Moreover, after World War II, most military conflicts are in Asia and there is a danger for this continent to become a region of sharp and constant tension, serious conflicts and military clashes. Without this process of establishing collective security in Asia, I dont see how it would be possible for North and South Korea to unite. This development will change the ratio of forces in favor of the democratic forces, of socialism; it will give an opportunity to the Asian people to rise up in arms under more favorable conditions. On the issue of collective security in Asia, Comrade Kim Il Sung stated that until now they had not spoken out neither in support of the idea, nor against it. We have not published anything in the press on this issue. First of all, we would like to clarify what our Soviet comrades have in mind and what they propose in relation to this idea initiated by Comrade Brezhnev. I spoke with Comrade Polyansky on this issue several years ago as well, and with Comrade Novikov during the celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. But they spoke in general terms, they did not tell me anything specific. That is why we want to clarify these issues before we take a stance. Let the Soviet comrades send us a letter and explain the essence of the ideaalong party or government linesor send us other materials about it. In relation to this, I told him that because we are on the Balkans, we deal more with Balkan and European problems, but apparently this case is about the following: the realization of this idea, the development of a program for its implementation will include the following key areas:
254
First, it will guarantee the independence and sovereignty of all countries on the Asian continentlarge and smalltheir independent development, without foreign intervention; Second, it will further strengthen and develop the progressive and democratic regimes in most Asian countries; Third, it will bring about the elimination of foreign imperialistic military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops on this continent, and it is well-known that the foreign troops and bases are the American troops and bases; Fourth, in the future it will open wider opportunities to speed up the revolutionary process on this continent, in all Asian non-socialist countries; Fifth, it will also create, as I had pointed out previously, more favorable conditions for the unification of North and South Korea. We should not harbor any illusions that the unification of Korea will take place without speeding up the process of Asian security. I pointed out that the Chinese are against this idea, because, according to them, it was directed against them and was aimed at surrounding them. This, however, is not true, because China, as one of the largest countries in Asia, will have to take part in the system of collective security as well. In the end, Comrade Kim Il Sung stated that, as comrade Zhivkov had pointed out, this was a difficult issue, he agreed with what was said, and concluded that it had to be developed further. 4. On the coordination of our actions in the international arena During our conversations with Comrade Kim Il Sung we spoke at length about the issue of coordinating our actions in the international arena and in the area of economic cooperation. The key issues that I pointed out in this regard were as follows: Korea should not isolate itself from us, from the socialist countries, from the Soviet Union and, on key issues, coordinated unified actions in the international arena should ensure. Bilateral cooperation between the countries alone is not enough. It is important, however, it cannot ensure coordination and alignment of our actions and initiatives in the international arena. I pointed out that I understand the situation of Korea
255
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
right now. But despite this, you should find ways and forms for such coordination. I pointed out that for them, too, coordination was extremely necessary. I pointed out that it was of utmost importance for them to maintain coordination with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, especially between him and Comrade Brezhnev. In this regard, establishing constant personal ties and consultations between comrades Brezhnev and Kim Il Sung would play a crucial role in favor of socialism, in favor of our common cause and, in particular, in favor of Korea. In this connection, I spoke in detail about comrade L. I. Brezhnev as a communist, as a leader, and a comrade. In principle, Kim Il Sung did not object to what I said. However, there were some nuances in the explanation he gave later. What did he say in essence on this issue? For example, he said the following: We were supposed to meet with Comrade Brezhnev last year, but because he was very busy this meeting did not take place. This year I had to go to Moscow to meet with comrade Brezhnev. But, because of the meetings with representatives from the South, and because of the circumstance that the Politburo prohibits me from travelling by plane, I did not meet with comrade Brezhnev (the reason for this decision of the Politburo of the Korean Workers Party was the plane crashas I remember, an IL-18in which all passengers died, among them prominent Korean actors). Comrade Kim Il Sung suggested the idea that this meeting with Comrade Brezhnev take place somewhere in the middle between Pyongyang and Moscow. Further, Kim Il Sung explained that he shared my views. But in their conditions they had to take into account many factors. We have to demonstrate independence from the point of view of the South as well. Otherwise we will give reason to the South Koreans to attack us, to carry out speculative actions on our country. In the course of my conversations with Kim Il Sung, he made the following statement twice: Please tell comrade Brezhnev that I am not a revisionist; that I have not detached myself from the Soviet Union; that I will never be an opportunist and traitor. Ever since I was 16 years oldnow more than 45 yearsI have been in the revolutionary movement. I have about 5 more years of active work left. I will not disgrace myself, I will not discredit my revolutionary activity. He told me about his life and revolutionary activity at length and how he had faced death many times. The Soviet Union has helped us in the past; it is helping us now as well. And I will not become an opportunist, an anti-Soviet and a traitor.
256
When we left Pyongyang, on our way from the residence to the airport, he asked me once again to convey his personal greetings to Comrade Brezhnev and to state on his behalf that he was not going along with the Chinese, that he thinks highly of the Soviet Union, and that he will remain loyal to the Soviet Union. 5. On the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the economic cooperation with the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea After the tour of the country and the visit to several factories and plants, I pointed out the great successes of North Korea. Once again I convinced myself of the great successes achieved by the Korean comrades, of the hard work of the Korean people. I pointed out that we, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, have great respect for Korea, that for us, Korea is a brotherly, socialist country. I pointed out that we, in Bulgaria, also have achieved success in the development of the economy. But, taking into consideration the times in which we live, the vigorous development of the scientific and technical revolution, and the circumstance, in these conditions, our socialist countries, especially smaller countries like the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and Bulgaria, cannot develop all areas of industry. Even the Soviet Union cannot afford to do this. Under these conditions we need to go resolutely towards economic integration and introduction of state-of-the-art technologies in manufacture. Each of our countries needs to specialize in areas for which it has the most favorable natural conditions and labor resources. I gave him the example with Bulgaria and Cuba, where with our help and that of the COMECON countries, major metallurgical capacities will be built for the production of nickel of which Cuba has in abundance. Such economic integration with our countries, and especially with the Soviet Union, would allow Korea to develop its production capacities and become the first, or the second, country (after Japan) in the development of its economy, and the first country in improving the standard of living of its people in Asia. I pointed out that they have a lot of natural resources, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, coal, etc., water encompassing the coast of your peninsula, and so on. Economic integration would also create most favorable conditions, besides shipbuilding, to develop some other areas of machine building as well. That would have great economic significance for the future of Korea.
257
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
In relation to that, Kim Il Sung stated that he understood the issue. He spoke several times in detail about what they had built with the help of the Soviet Union and some socialist countries. He said that they did not want to engage with Japan which reached out to them with proposals all the time for the exploitation of Koreas natural resources. But he did not give a specific answer to my proposal the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea to engage more closely with COMECON. He pointed out that they had an observer at COMECON, and turned to a member of their delegation, an candidate member of the Political Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Choe Jaeu, and said that they needed to discuss the issue further for additional steps for joint activities with COMECON. He told me that they were thinking about the issue. In relation to this, he pointed out that the economic integration, the specialization between the socialist countries gave an opportunity to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, in turn, to specialize and cooperate with our socialist countries on a bilateral basis. When I discussed these issues, I took the opportunity to inform Kim Il Sung about the basic areas of enhancing socialist economic integration and improving the work of COMECON in the light of our last meeting in Crimea. 6. On the unification of Korea and the confederation between North and South Korea When Comrade Kim Il Sung spoke about the unification of Korea, I asked him if he could elaborate more specifically on how a confederation would look like, if it was formed in the near future. Because the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea is a socialist country, and South Korea, even though it does not have major monopolistic corporations, is a capitalist country. Apparently, the prototype of a unified Korea in the future would not be South Korea, but the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. How would a confederation look like between a capitalist and a socialist country? In connection with this, Kim Il Sung said the following: The issue is whether the two systemsthe socialist and the capitalist systemcan exist in one country. There is a contradiction: on the one side we have socialism, and on the other there is capitalism. The issue is, what must we do so that South Korea does not become a colony of
258
Japan and a permanent base of American imperialism? The goal is to pull South Korea away from this danger. Our first task is to pull South Korea away from Japans grasp and eliminate Americas military bases along the way to the confederation. We cannot agree to give up socialism. Along with raising the issue of establishing a confederation, we are consciously changing the name of our constitution. We made it socialist to strengthen the achievements of socialism in our country. The confederation, for the creation of which we will insist, will be the retention of both forms: of their independence in domestic policy and joint activity in the area of foreign policy. I can point out the following example: the name and the actions of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea as a socialist country will remain the same; South Korea will also keep its name as the Republic of Korea, and above both governments there will be a joint body which will act on behalf of the confederation only in the area of foreign policy. This, however, will not cover domestic policy; in this regard, both countries will act independently. I think that this is the only right approach. If they listen to us and a confederation is established, South Korea will be done with. South Korea will have to reduce its army, we will reduce ours too. But this will bring about the elimination of the reactionary regime in South Korea, because without an army the people, themselves, will rise. That is why, in reality, the South Koreans do not accept our proposals at all. The goals of this slogan can be achieved because the patriots of South Korea, the democratic forces there, the people who want this unification, will understand that the traitors are, indeed, the ruling establishment in South Korea, and the patriots are the communists in North Korea. I believe we will not fail, we will not lose. Our cooperative farmers will not allow the landowners to come back to power. Many peasants from South Korea, when
259
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
they see how our cooperative farmers live, will want to establish such cooperative farms there too. The political goals we are after with the confederation are: not allowing Japanese imperialism in South Korea, elimination of the US military bases in South Korea, and increasing our influence among the people of South Korea. Of course, if we are weak, raising up such a slogan would be dangerous for us. In reality, the achievement of this political slogan would be a difficult task, because the American enemy is not stupid, the Japanese are not stupid either. Our idea is a political struggle, aimed at proving to the population of South Korea who is a traitor and who is a patriot. If a more democratic power is established in South Korea, then we would not bring up the slogan for this confederation. We will simply call the revolution. 7. On the struggle with the faction group in the Korean Workers Party One of the issues that Kim Il Sung spoke about dealt with, as he put it, the struggle against the faction group in their party. This is related to the period after the Patriotic War of the Korean people. He explained this factionary activity of some party leaders with the fact that they had split over the issue how to use the assistance provided by the socialist countries and mainly by the Soviet Union, amounting to a total of 500 million current rubles whether to use it for importing commodities for general consumption of Korean people who were starving then, or for creating production capacities. The factionaries were of the opinion to import consumer goods, and Kim Il Sung and the others--for using it to build production capacities, industrial plants. He spoke in detail about the activity of factionaries during that period. He pointed out that after they were expelled from the Central Committee and from the party, they thought that they would defect to South Korea. They took measures to prevent that, but instead they defected to China and were there till this day. This deteriorated their relations with China at the time, and because of it they did not send a delegation to the 8th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. He said that after that, Khrushchev and Comrade Brezhnev stated that Kim Il Sungs position for industrialization of the country was correct.
260
These are the key aspects of our conversations with Kim Il Sung. From the beginning of our face-to-face conversations he informed me that he was talking to me openly, as he had never spoken to with anyone else before. At his insistence we extended our visit by one day. Apparently, he wanted to have an opportunity to have a lengthy conversation. From the first day until the very end while we were in the country, in the factories, the young pioneers palace, and elsewherehe was with us all the time. So far as the Bulgarian-Korean relations are concerned, I believe that after our visit, there will be better opportunities to develop these relations further. The Korean ambassador in Sofia told some comrades that Kim Il Sung had called him before our visit and told him that they needed to develop the economic and other relations with Bulgaria on wider front. Kim Il Sung told me that it would be reasonable, after establishing a joint economic committee for cooperation to establish a committee for the exchange of experience, that they would like to study in detail our experience and apply it in Korea. The public events of our delegation, our meetings with the workers, the visits to the factories, companies, etc., were widely covered in their press and radio broadcasts. My speeches at the mass meetings in Hamheung and Pyongyang, the toasts at both receptions were published in full text with no omissions. The mass meetings in Hamheung and Pyongyang were broadcast on Korean television and radio. Kim Il Sung made an interesting toast at our reception immediately before we left. He expressed his high appreciation of the visit of our delegation consisting of party and government officials. According to him, the visit of our delegation of party and government officials of the Republic of Bulgaria to Korea was a historic event that opened a new stage in the relations of friendship and cooperation between the parties, governments and people of both countries, Korea and Bulgaria, based on the principles of Marxist-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. I believe that the visit of our delegation consisting of party and government officials in Korea was a useful one. 30 October 1973 Ulan Bator T. Zhivkov
261
DOCUMENT APPENDIX
NOTES
1 UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. 2 hap-jak: Kim continues to use the word while the delegation from South avoids the use of this word. Lee later tells Kim that the word is not used in the South. 3 The former name of Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO). 4 : jeok su gong gwon = have no financial capability. 5 In the original document, jeongbo, is used. Jeongbo is a Korean unit of measuring a rice field. 1 jeongbo = 9917.4m 6 : North Korean medical term.
262
Index
Albania, 56, 68, 150, 241-46, 252 Atomic weapons, 17 Bay of Pigs, 99 Blue House Raid (1968), 12, 39, 40, 43 Brandt, Willy, 30 Brezhnev, Leonid, 51, 55, 144, 147-48, 248-60 Bulgaria, 54, 151; and Ambassador to Pyongyang, 129, 132; and documents from archives of, 173-83, 208-16, 248-61; and Embassy in Pyongyang, 54, 77, 79; and Kim Il Sungs visit to, 69-70; and relations with DPRK, 51, 55; and Todor Zhivkovs visit to DPRK, 52 Cambodia, 9, 15, 150 Carter, Jimmy, 18, 34, 45, 73-75 Ceauescu, Nicolae, 71-72, 13340, 188-207 China. See Peoples Republic of China (PRC) Choe Duseon, 7, 16, 20, 176 Chun Doo-hwan, 27 Chung Ju-yung, 33, 35 Cohen, Jerome, 33-34 Cold War, 67, 106-8, 248
COMECON, 28, 54-55, 240, 257-58 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 148-49, 249, 256. See also Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Cuba, 107-8, 252, 257 Czechoslovakia, 188 Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), and 1972 Socialist Constitution, 69, 93, 121; and commandos, 43; and economy of, 27, 33, 87, 187; and foreign trade of, 51, 55, 230, 240, 257-58; and foreigners living in, 54, 56; and industry in, 198, 207, 231, 257; and militarization of, 85-88, 90; and railroads in, 84; and relations with the PRC, 67-69, 126, 132, 134, 146, 148, 150, 249-53; and relations with the USSR, 28-29, 56, 70, 108, 132, 134, 146, 148-49, 172, 197, 240, 252, 256-58; and relations with the United States, 19, 35-40; and spies of, 12; and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 64-65, 68, 106; and views of Kim Dae-Jung, 78, 121, 131, 137, 194-95;
and views of the opposition in ROK, 131, 136-37, 144, 172, 186, 194, 199-200, 223; and views of Park Chung Hee, 130-31, 144, 193-196; and views of ROK-Japan relations, 50, 52, 131, 134-40, 184, 197-207, 224, 259-60; and views of ROK economy, 28-29, 214, 223; and U.S. troop withdrawals from ROK, 32, 37-38, 144-45, 147, 171-72, 176, 182, 197, 202, 243, 255; and views of U.S.-PRC rapprochement, 6, 32, 50, 56-57, 68, 86 Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 9, 71, 108 Dialogue, and breakdown of, 59-60; and economies of the DPRK and ROK, 33-35, 57, 84, 90, 102-3; and humanitarian issues, 12-14; and initiation of, 19-21; and international context of, 20-21, 66-67; and KCIA views of, 12-13, 15-17; and DPRK abandonment of, 59, 61, 129; and DPRK motivations for, 8-9, 78, 80-81, 89-90; and Park Chung Hee, 14-15; and role of DPRKs allies, 5253, 57-58; and role of United States, 9, 28-30, 41-43; and rotational visits, 35, 62-65;
and Socialist Constitution, 79-81; and ROK motivations for, 8-9, 16-19, 24, 80-81; and splits within the DPRK leadership, 7-8, 10, 12; and unification, 26-28, 30, 52-53; and Yushin, 77-82, 85-86, 101. See also divided families; July 4 Joint Communiqu; June 23 Declaration; North-South Coordinating Committee; Red Cross Divided families, 7, 12-14, 62-63, 165-66. See also Red Cross East Germany. See German Democratic Republic Eastern Europe, 36-37, 51, 90; and documents from, 72, 125 EC-121 reconnaissance plane, 41, 44, 131, 134-35 Gaesong, 90, 196 German Democratic Republic, 51, 116, 166-67; and documents from, 14552, 165-67, 167-70, 183-88, 216-25 Guam Doctrine, 9, 15, 32, 89. See also Nixon Doctrine Habib, Philip, 7, 45, 102; and reaction to kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung, 48, 122; and relationship with Henry Kissinger, 25, 32, 74-75
263
Hallstein Doctrine, 105 Harrison, Selig, 33 Heo Dam, 132, 147-48 Hungary, documents from, 12932, 143-44, 144-45, 170-71, 171-73 Hyundai Construction, 35 Indochina, 9, 50, 69. Ingersoll, Robert, 33 Jang Geumcheol, 95 Jang Giyeong, 15, 94, 153-56, 159, 226 Japan, 31, 69; and economic relations with the two Koreas, 51; and Kim Dae-jung, 48, 11820, 123; and Korean security, 44-45, 50; and DPRKs living in, 24, 65. See also Jochongryeon Jeong Hongjin, 80, 94, 155, 157, 226 Jochongryeon, 24, 65. See also Japan Johnson, Alexis, 66 Johnson, Lyndon, 42 Juche Ideology, 148-51, 186, 209; and ROK, 179-80, 213, 21718, 222 July 4 Joint Communiqu (1972), 36, 78, 82-84, 89, 185, 199; and DPRK views of, 168-69, 243; and ROK noncompliance with, 217-18; and ROK views of, 221-23; and Vietnamese views of, 170-71 June 23 Declaration, 64, 66, 105, 126, 243;
and DPRK views of, 120-21; and United Nations, 107, 110-11, 117 Kennedy, John, 99 Khrushchev, Nikita, 28-29, 240, 260, Kim Dae-jung, and 1971 election, 49, 195; and American response to kidnapping of, 48, 122-23; and American views of, 47-49; and opposition candidacy, 49; and exile of, 118-20; and kidnapping as DPRK pretext to end dialogue, 59, 61, 120-21, 125-26; and kidnapping of, 43, 9899, 118; and Lee Hurak, 119-20; and DPRK, 78, 118-19, 121-22; and DPRK assessments of, 131, 137, 194-95; and United Nations, 118 Kim Deokhyeon, 80, 95, 153-55, 159, 162 Kim Gyewon, 23 Kim Il Sung University, 93
133-140, 189-92; and Nikita Khrushchev, 28-29; and peace treaty, 175-76; and revisionism, 132; and revolution in ROK, 72-72, 89-90, 96-97, 118; and socialism, 205-6; and ROK political parties, 16, 184, 195; and Suryeong system, 79, 81, 86; and Three Principles of Reunification, 178-79, 20809, 217; and Todor Zhivkov, 52-56, 69-72, 118, 129-30; and United Nations, 105, 108, 202; and Vietnam War, 69-71; and views of the PRC, 56; and views of U.S.-PRC rapprochement, 15-16, 14647; and views of ROK economy, 102-3; and visit to the PRC (May 1975), 9-11, 68-72 Kim Jong Il, 36, 57, 86, 91, 93-97 Kim Jong-pil, 100, 199-201, 209211, 218 Kim Yangseon, 132, 143
policy, 25, 74-75, 102; and United Nations, 110-114; 246-47; and visits to the PRC, 15, 24, 31-32, 68, 110, 126 Koreagate, 43 Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), 7, 13, 23, 73; and inter-Korean dialogue, 12-13, 15-17, 94; and Lee Hurak, 119-20 Korean Federation, 51-53, 118, 211 Korean War (1950-1953), 1, 8485, 173-74; and Armistice Agreement, 39, 113, 130, 192, 247; and devastation of, 158, 163-64; and memories of, 109; and DPRK advance during, 41 Korean Workers Party (KWP), and analysis of ROK, 214-15, 223; and Central Committee of, 93; and factionalism within, 260-61; and Fifth Party Congress of, 93, 129; and Kim Jong Il, 93; and officials of, 91; and plane travel, 256; and relations with other fraternal parties, 148-52; and Sino-Soviet split, 56; and Sixth Party Congress of, 51-52 Laos, 150 Lee Beomseok, 235 Lee Hurak, and as Director of KCIA, 23; and dialogue with DPRK, 7, 36, 81-82, 101, 169; and Jang Giyeong, 15; and July 4 Joint Communiqu, 82-83, 89, 178;
Kim Il Sung, 50, 153; and as soft-liner, 7-8, 10; and as President, 81, 83; and cult of personality, 148-52, 179, 186-87, 217; and document of conversation with Lee Hurak, 225-41; and document of conversation with Todor Zhivkov, 248-61; and dynastic succession, 121-22; and Enver Hoxa, 241-46; and Germany, 166-167; and Kim Yeongju, 36, 94-96; and Korean Confederation, 211, 220; and Lee Hurak, 12-13, 29, 5152, 81, 88, 94, 168, 197-98; and Nicolae Ceauescu, 72,
Kim Yeongju, 178, 180, 212-14, 220-21; and as co-chairman of North-South Coordinating Committee, 60, 169; and health of, 94, 208, 217, 239; and Kim Il Sung, 94-95; and Kim Jong Il, 36, 95-97; and meetings with Lee Hurak, 168, 178, 180; and ROK documents on role in inter-Korean dialogue, 15355, 156-61, 161-64 Kim Yeongnam, 134, 149 Kissinger, Henry A., 30, 107; and role in crafting Korea
264
and Kim Dae-jung, 99, 11920; and Kim Yeongju, 77, 153-55, 168, 180; and meeting with Kim Il Sung, 15, 51, 81, 88, 94, 168, 19697, 226-241; and meetings with Kim Deokhyeon; 156-64; and meetings with Pak Seongcheol, 198-99, 208-214, 217-221; and North-South Coordinating Committee, 28-29, 60; and relationship with Park Chung Hee, 10, 30, 82, 88; and relationship with the United States, 10, 36, 42; and visit to Pyongyang, 94-95, 155, 196; and Yushin Constitution, 8283, 88, 98 Li Manseok, 143, 165-6 Mao Zedong, 11, 68, 70 Myeongdong Cathedral, 101 Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), 102 Nixon Doctrine, 16-17, 19, 25, 40-41, 44; and DPRK, 184, 200; and ROK, 13-14, 19, 24-25, 31, 41; and troop reductions, 86-88, 105 Nixon, Richard, 25, 68-69, 107, 135, 139, 143; and visit to the PRC, 6, 15, 24, 68,-69, 146-7, 205 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 64-65, 68, 106, 112, 117 Nordpolitik, 67 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 55 DPRK. See Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK)
North Vietnam. See Democratic Republic of Vietnam North-South Coordinating Committee, 60, 80, 101, 2267, 229-32, 236, 240 Nuclear weapons. See Atomic weapons. O Jinu, 70, 133 Ostpolitik, 30 Pak Seongcheol, and visit to USSR, 143-44, 172; and negotiations with ROK, 36, 82, 94, 101, 131, 168, 198-9, 208-11, 217-20 Panmunjeom, 35, 136, 155, 193; and Red Cross meetings, 34, 61, 166, 168; and inter-Korean negotiations, 20, 34, 63, 80, 101, 208, 217; and negotiations over the USS Pueblo, 39; and Axe Murder Incident, 122; and return of fishermen, 123-4 Paris Peace Talks, 14, 127 Park Chung Hee, and 1971 election, 47-49, 194-95; and assassination attempts, 12, 39, 41, 73; and Blue House meetings, 17, 23, 35; and his regime in the 1960s, 19, 49; and his regime in the 1970s, 10, 15, 79, 87, 121; and July 4 Joint Communiqu, 178-80; and June 23 Declaration, 105, 107, 109, 111, 116, 121; and letter to Richard Nixon, 140-43; and negotiations with DPRK, 12-14, 30, 34, 61-62, 81, 108, 159, 168, 172, 226, 229, 232, 235-40;
and relations with the United States, 31, 36, 38, 42-44, 246; and relationship with Lee Hurak, 81-82, 88-89, 119120, 154; and the Yushin system, 61, 77, 89, 208; and views of U.S.-PRC rapprochement, 24, 41; as viewed by DPRK, 78, 88, 130-31, 135-39, 144, 175-76, 186, 193-96; as viewed by the United States, 98-100, 107 Peace Treaty, 8, 10-11, 38, 51, 176 Peoples Republic of China (PRC), and Albania, 68; and inter-Korean dialogue, 116, 181; and Kim Il Sungs visit to, 9-11, 68-72; and DPRK, 37; and DPRK assessments of, 9, 56, 67, 126, 230, 240, 24953, 260 and rapprochement with the U.S., 5-6, 205; and ROK, 13-18, 24, 41, 44, 66-67, 141-42; and the Non-Aligned Movement, 112; and the USSR, 5, 132, 147, 250-51; and the U.S., 31 Phnom Penh, 9, 72 Pohang Steel Mill, 29, 33, 232 Porter, William J., 10, 33, 131 Radio Seoul, 52-53, 58, 212 Red Cross, 7, 13-17, 20, 30, 34, 59-65, 84-85, 89; and references to in documents, 153-56, 158, 16569, 176-80, 183-88, 195-96, 217, 235, 238. See also divided families Republic of China. See Taiwan
Republic of Korea (ROK); and 1971 election in, 47-49, 78, 98, 131, 137, 194-95; and declaration of martial law, 43, 79, 101, 208-16; and economic comparisons with the DPRK, 26-31, 33-35, 50, 57, 60, 84, 90, 102-3; and economy of, 18-19, 33, 43, 49, 51, 84-85, 135-36; and intelligence on DPRK, 64-65, 97, 102-103, 115; and Ministry of National Defense, 10; and mistrust of United States, 17-18, 24-25; and DPRK infiltration into, 12, 17, 62-63, 79, 141; and relations with communist bloc, 64-67, 105; and relations with the United States, 18, 25-26, 41, 43-44; and sinking of DPRK fishing vessel, 123-24; and state of emergency in, 61, 77, 79, 88, 101, 125, 146, 176, 181, 196, 199-201, 21213, 217, 221-23; and troop modernization plan, 39, 41; and U.S.-PRC rapprochement, 23-25; and U.S. troops stationed in, 31-32; and U.S.-DPRK relations, 38-40 Republic of Vietnam, and DPRK, 50, 62-63, 69, 72; and ROK troops, 194, 202 and ROK, 41-42, 87, 106; and the Korean Peninsula, 170-173, 181 Reunification, and the PRC, 146; and inter-Korean dialogue, 6, 26-28, 42, 50, 89, 158, 16263, 168-69, 178-79; and Japan, 45; and Kim Dae-jung, 49, 78, 137;
265
and Kim Il Sung, 70-71, 81, 86, 89; and DPRK strategies for, 9, 11, 16, 50, 52-53, 57, 78, 81-82, 134, 144-45, 157, 168, 175; and Park Chung Hee, 49, 77, 135-36; and peaceful, 130-31, 144, 153; and ROK strategies for, 14, 19, 142, 157; and Three Principles of, 16869, 179, 185, 187, 197-98, 208-9, 217; and United States, 30-31, 138 Richardson, John, 10, 36 Road construction, 35, 63-64 Rodong Sinmun, 146-47, 150 Rogers, William, 114 Roh Tae-woo, 48, 67, 117 Romania, and as U.S.-DPRK intermediary, 35-37; and conversations between Kim Il Sung and Nicolae Ceauescu, 71, 78; and DPRKs briefings, 167; and Kim Il Sungs visit, 68; and relations with the DPRK, 150, 181; and visit of DPRK delegation, 188-192, 203-7; and visit to the DPRK, 133 Saigon, 72, 173 Seoul, 86; and Olympic Games (1988), 67, 232-33; and DPRK impressions of, 29; and rotational visits to, 34-36, 62, 84, 155-56, 177-78, 220 Sihanouk, Norodom, 15, 252 ROK. See Republic of Korea (ROK)
South Vietnam. See Republic of Vietnam Suryeong system, 79, 81, 86 Symington, Stuart, 40, 43 Tokuma Utsonomiya, 69, 71 Truman Doctrine, 16 Ulsan Industrial Complex, 29, 33, 158 Unification Revolutionary Party, 18, 32, 193, 200-201 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and collective security, 253-54; and inter-Korean relations, 51, 148; and relations with the PRC, 56, 250-53; and relations with DPRK, 28-29, 56, 70, 108, 132, 134, 146, 148-49, 172, 197, 240, 252, 256-58; and relations with ROK, 6667, 131, 137; and relations with the United States, 205; and revisionism, 132; and United Nations, 108, 116, 147; and World Health Organization, 105-6; See also Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) United Nations (UN), and DPRK views of, 105, 148, 199, 202, 210-11, 218-19; and dual admission of East and West Germany, 108, 116; and dual admission of South and DPRK, 105, 107-11, 116, 235, 245; and dual admission of South and North Vietnam, 108; and General Assembly, 106, 182, 246-47; and June 23 Declaration, 107,
110-111, 117; and Kim Dae-jung, 118; and Kim Il Sung, 105, 108, 202; and role of PRC, 105, 126; and U.S. views of, 28-29, 3738, 41, 246-47; and UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), 108, 112-13, 136, 146, 172, 202, 246-47; and United Nations Command (UNC), 45, 108-9, 112-13, 142, 202, 246-47 United States (U.S.), and contact with the DPRK, 19, 35-40; and dtente with the USSR, 107; and rapprochement with the PRC, 5-6, 13-14, 16, 21, 32, 41, 50, 56-57, 68, 86; and troop presence in Korea, 18, 31-32, 34, 45, 73-75; and Vietnam War, 5, 16, 32, 42, 87 United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 10, 36 United States Congress, 40, 114 United States Department of State, 25, 114; and Ambassador to Korea, 7, 25, 32, 45, 48, 102, 122-23; and Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 97, 112, 114-15; and Embassy in Seoul, 25, 27; and Liaison Office in Beijing, 37; and Office of Korean Affairs, 25, 115, 122 USS Pueblo Incident, and DPRK, 52, 58, 131, 134-34; and ROK, 40-41, 44, 51; and U.S.-DPRK negotiations,
38-39 Viet Cong, 16, 18, 32, 115 Vietnam War, 5; and U.S.-ROK relations, 16, 32, 42 and ROK, 87 Wang Bingnan, 66 Warsaw Pact, 55-56 Warsaw Talks, 66-67 Watergate, 107 World Health Organization (WHO), 105-6 Young, James, 74 Yuil System, 85-86 Yun Boseon, 100 Yun Pilyong, 119 Yun Seokheon, 24 Yushin Constitution, and inter-Korean dialogue, 77-82, 85-86, 101; and Lee Hurak, 82-83, 88, 98; and Park Chung Hee, 61, 77, 89, 208 Zhivkov, Todor, and Kim Il Sung, 69-72, 129-30; and visit to DPRK, 52-56, 118, 248, 253, 255, 261 Zhou Enlai, and Henry Kissinger, 31, 110, 126 and Kim Il Sung, 11; and Korean security, 172, 251
266
History and Public Policy Program

Critical Oral History Conference Series

The Rise and Fall of Détente On The Korean Peninsula, 1970-1974

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

The Rise and Fall of Détente On The Korean Peninsula, 1970-1974

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

Christian F. Ostermann / James F. Person, eds.

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

Panel IV: Inter-Korean Dialogue

105 129 263

Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

KATHARINE H.S. MOON is Professor in the Department of Political

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

JAMES F. PERSON is coordinator of the Wilson Centers NKIDP and a pro-

SHIN JONG-DAE is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies,

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

Christian F. Ostermann and Ambassador Sun Jounyung

This is very much a historical conference.

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

AMBASSADOR DANIEL ODONOHUE

Chair: Christian Ostermann Provocateurs: Bernd Schaefer, Hong Seukryule

PANEL I: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE IN THE ERA OF DTENTE

ZHOU ENLAI AND RICHARD NIXON

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

PANEL I: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE IN THE ERA OF DTENTE

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

South Korea was more ill at ease working

PANEL I: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE IN THE ERA OF DTENTE

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

PANEL I: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE IN THE ERA OF DTENTE

Kim Il Sung apologized for the January 21, 1968 incident.

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

PANEL I: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE IN THE ERA OF DTENTE

South Koreas decision

both have follow-up questions.

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

PANEL I: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE IN THE ERA OF DTENTE

In 1971 people in South Korea,

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

PANEL I: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE IN THE ERA OF DTENTE

Beginning in the 1960s, President Park

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

PAK SEONGCEHOL AND LEE HURAK

PANEL I: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE IN THE ERA OF DTENTE

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

I dont think its really

Purely inter-Korean context, yes.

on this particular issue?

Chair: William Stueck Provocateurs: Gregg Brazinsky, Woo Seong-ji

If you want to respond to that directly, wed be happy to have that.

PANEL II: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE AND U.S.-ROK RELATIONS

President Park had asked the undersecretary repeatedly

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

PANEL II: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE AND U.S.-ROK RELATIONS

The one thing that seems to be constant

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

PAK SEONGCHEOL AND PARK CHUNG HEE

PANEL II: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE AND U.S.-ROK RELATIONS

I vividly remember that in his conversation with Director Lee Hurak

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

PANEL II: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE AND U.S.-ROK RELATIONS

North Korean visitors to South Korea

THE RISE AND FALL OF DTENTE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 1970-1974

PANEL II: INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE AND U.S.-ROK RELATIONS