Assignment

BP Texas City Refinery explosion

Industrial Instrumentation

BP Texas City Refinery explosion

On March 23, 2005, a fire and explosion occurred at BP's Texas City Refinery in Texas City, Texas, killing 15 workers and injuring more than 170 others. BP was charged with criminal violations of federal environmental laws, and has been subject to lawsuits from the victims' families. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration slapped BP with a then-record fine for hundreds of safety violations, and subsequently imposed an even larger fine after claiming that BP had failed to implement safety improvements following the disaster. The Texas City Refinery is the second-largest oil refinery in the state, and the third-largest in the United States. BP acquired the Texas City refinery as part of its merger with Amoco in 1998.It had an input capacity of 437,000 barrels (69,500 m3) per day as of January 1, 2005. The explosion occurred in an isomerization unit at the site, resulting in the deaths and injuries. According to a report issued after the accident, actions taken or not taken led to overfilling the raffinate splitter with liquid, overheating of the liquid, and the subsequent overpressurization and pressure relief. Hydrocarbon flow to the blowdown drum and stack overwhelmed it, resulting in liquids carrying over out of the top of the stack, flowing down the stack, accumulating on the ground, and causing a vapor cloud, which was ignited by a contractor's pickup truck as the engine was left running. The report identified numerous failings in equipment, risk management, staff management, working culture at the site, maintenance and inspection, and general health and safety assessments.

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Industrial Instrumentation

Explosion
The refinery had been in operation since 1934, but had not been well maintained in several years. Consulting firm Telos had examined conditions at the plant and released a report in January 2005, reporting of "broken alarms, thinned pipe, chunks of concrete falling, bolts dropping 60ft and staff being overcome with fumes", and the report's co-author stated "we have never seen a site where the notion 'I could die today' was so real". The refinery had also had five managers in the six years since BP inherited it in its 1998 merger with Amoco. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board investigating the incident found that operators had started up the raffinate splitter tower (which separates light and heavy gasoline components) of the ISOM unit (which increases the octane rating of gasoline) and begun filling it with hydrocarbon fluid (i.e., gasoline components) without beginning timely discharge of product. The operators started the tower while ignoring open maintenance orders on the towers instrumentation system. An alarm meant to warn about the quantity of liquid in the unit was disabled.

Once the lack of draw-down from the tower was recognized, operators opened the discharge valve. This worsened the problem, because the hot discharges passed through a heat-exchanger that pre-warmed incoming fluids. The resulting increase in temperature caused the formation of a bubble of vapor at the bottom of the raffinate tower that was already overly full and overheated. The tower burped the vapor bubble and the liquid above the bubble into the overhead relief tube of the tower. The relief tube was connected to a disposal system for relieved discharges. The particular type of disposal system serving the raffinate tower was a blowdown drum with an atmospheric vent stack, rather than an inherently safer and more environmentally sound knock-out tank and flare system. Because of the overfilling of the raffinate splitter tower and the burp of both vapors and liquids to the undersized blowdown drum with an atmospheric vent stack, a geyser-like emission of hot flammable vapors and liquids was expelled from the vent stack. A new white diesel pick-up truck, owned by a contractor, was parked near the blowdown stack. While BP operators were running to turn off furnace burners, to remove sources of vapor cloud ignition, the truck's owner returned to his truck and proceeded to crank the engine, in an attempt to move his new truck out of the area. Due to a high hydrocarbon content above the Upper Explosion Limit (UEL), the truck would not start. As the man continued to crank the engine, operators ran to him in an attempt to get him to stop. Once the hydrocarbon content in the surrounding air came down to the UEL, the truck provided the source of ignition for the Vapor Cloud Explosion. The people in the trailer located near the process unit's battery limit were holding a meeting, and were unaware of the ISOM's unit startup condition. The people on the side of the meeting table with their backs to the process unit were killed, due to blunt-force trauma. A number of people on the side of the table facing the unit survived the blast.

Aftermath
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Industrial Instrumentation

The CSB report found that BP had failed to heed or implement safety recommendations made before the blast. Among them were:

In 1991, the Amoco refining planning department proposed eliminating blowdown systems that vented to the atmosphere, but funding for this plan was not included in the budget. In 1992, OSHA issued a citation to Amoco for unsafe design of similar pressure-relief systems at the plant. However, Amoco successfully persuaded OSHA to drop this citation by relying on the less-stringent requirements in API Recommended Practice 521. In 1993, the Amoco Regulatory Cluster project proposed eliminating atmospheric blowdown systems, but again, funding was not approved. Despite Amocos process safety standard No. 6, which prohibited new atmospheric blowdown systems and called for the phasing out of existing ones, in 1997, Amoco replaced the 1950s-era blowdown drum/vent stack that served the raffinate splitter tower with an identical system, instead of upgrading to recommended alternatives that were safer. In 2002, engineers at the plant proposed replacing the blowdown drum/vent system as part of an environmental improvement initiative, but this line-item was cut from the budget, due to cost pressures. Also in 2002, an opportunity to tie the ISOM relief system into the new NDU flare system was not taken, due to a $150,000 incremental cost. During 2002, BPs Clean Streams project proposed converting the blowdown drum to a flare knock-out tank, and routing discharges to a flare. When it was found that a needed relief study of the ISOM system had not been completed due to budget constraints, the Clean Streams project proposed adding a wet/dry system to the ISOM instead. Between 1994 and 2004, at least eight similar cases occurred in which flammable vapors were emitted by a blowdown drum/vent stack. Effective corrective action was not taken at the BP plant.

As a result of the accident, BP said that it would eliminate all blowdown drums/vent stack systems in flammable service. The CSB, meanwhile, recommended to the American Petroleum Institute that guidelines on the location of trailers be made. OSHA ultimately found over 300 safety violations and fined BP $21 millionthe largest fine in OSHA history at the time.

Legal action
On February 4, 2008, U.S. District Judge Lee Rosenthal heard arguments regarding BP's offer to plead guilty to a federal environmental crime with a US$50 million fine. At the hearing, blast victims and their relatives objected to the plea, calling the proposed fine "trivial." So far, BP has said it has paid more than US$1.6 billion to compensate victims. The judge gave no timetable on when she would make a final ruling. On August 12, 2010, BP announced that it had agreed to pay $50.6 million of the October 30 fine, while continuing to contest the remaining $30.7 million; the fine had been reduced by $6.1 million between when it was levied and when BP paid the first part.

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Question2. Data Sheet of any home Appliance.

AC-310 TECHNICAL DATA SHEET of AIR CONDITIONER

Heating System Capacity
(@ 180F coolant, 60F return air, and 8 GPM) 122,000 Btu/hr / 35.6 KW

Cooling System Capacity (R134a)

ARI (95/80/67 & 50% RH)

83,000 Btu/hr (ARI Rating) / 24.3 KW 160,000 Btu/hr (IMACA Rating) / 46.8KW 2354 CFM / 4000 m3/Hr

Evaporator Air Flow Capacity

(@ 0 Static Pressure)

Condenser Air Flow Capacity

(@ 0 Static Pressure)

3532 CFM / 6000 m3/Hr

Compressor
Manufacturer and Model Number of Cylinders Drive Ratio (to diesel engine) Maximum Warranted Speed (RPM) Speed Range Weight Oil Capacity Refrigerant Unloading Steps CARRIER / 05K -24.4 cu in. (400 cm3) Four (4) Cylinders 1:1 2200 constant / 2500 intermittent 400 2200 RPM 108 Lbs / (49 Kg) 5.5 pints (2.6 liters) R134a 100% 50%

Condenser
Manufacturer and Model Number of Rows Number of Fins per Inch O.D. of Copper Tube (Enhanced) Fin Thickness (Aluminum) Number of Condenser Coils CARRIER 4 12 3/8 in. (9.525 mm) 0.007 in. (0.178 mm) 2

Condenser Fan
Manufacturer and Model Number of Fans Fan Diameter Flow Rate (Maximum, Each) CARRIER 4 12.25 in. (311 mm) 1500 m3/Hr (900 CFM)

Condenser Fan Drive Motor

Manufacturer & Model Horsepower Operating Speed (Maximum) CARRIER/SPEMONT 0.3 HP 2950 RPM Brushless/Ametek @24VDC 40,000 Hrs

Option Available: Expected Life:

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Question3. What are the Measuring instruments in home appliances?

Below is the list of measuring instruments used in home appliances: Name Electricity meter Microwave power meter Thermocouple Multi meter Level meter Inches Tap Timer Purpose measures the amount of electricity dissipated measures the power of wave frequencies in microwave oven measures control the temperature of iron measures voltage of Universal power system(UPS) control the level of water in water tank measures the length or distance note the time for given task

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