Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
College of Accounting
Chang, Yu-Cheng
Advisor: Lin, Su-Ming, Ph.D.
100 6
June, 2011
Thank all of you in my life, especially Prof. Lin, Helen Chu, Mr. and Mrs. Chang.
98 5 1
25% 20% 99
98
1. 98
2.
3.
4.
ii
Abstract
The Legislative Yuan of Republic of China changed Income Tax Act to reduce
income tax rate from 25% to 20%, which became effective in 2010.
reduction provided management with substantial incentives to defer income from 2009
to 2010, as a way to minimize tax costs. This study investigates whether earnings of
2009 were managed downwards in response to tax rate reduction, and examines which
types of firm are more likely to conduct earnings management.
Discretionary current accruals, which are estimated by Modified Jones Model, are
used as a proxy for earnings management.
Key words: earnings management, Modified Jones Model, tax rate reduction,
discretionary accruals, current accruals.
iii
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iv
1-1
............................................. 4
3-1
................................................ 29
3-2
................................. 31
4-1
...................... 32
4-2
4-3
.......................................... 34
........... 33
T ........................... 38
4-6
WILCOXON .............. 39
4-7
............................. 40
5-1
1987 .................................... 46
5-2
..................................... 48
97 6 30
98
98 5 1
25% 20%
99 5 12
99 5 28
20% 17% 343
16.5% 17% 22% 25%
100
3 5
98
20%
1-1
1-1
4
Healy & Wahlen (1999)
(stakeholders)
Scott (2009)
1. (Lending contracts)
Guidry et al.(1999)
2(8%)
2
3
62
7
Moyer (1990)
Cahan (1992)
accruals
8
economic circumstances
1. Healy Model
Healy (1985)
2.1.1
(2.1.1)
t 1, 2, T
heteroscedasticity
2.1.1
2.1.2
(2.1.2)
Healy Model
2. DeAngelo Model
2.1.3
(2.1.3)
10
DeAngelo(1986)
0
0
Healy (1983)
FORTUNE 200 1973 1980
-2.01%
(Benchmark)
Healy Model
DeAngelo Model 2.1.4
0
2.1.5
(2.1.4)
(2.1.5)
Kaplan(1985)
11
3. Jones Model
Healy Model DeAngelo Model
Jones(1991)
(2.1.6)
-1 -1
-1
-1
12
(2.1.7)
-1 -1
McNichols (2000)
McNichols (2000)
Dechow et al.(1995)
13
(Current Accruals)
(Non-current Accruals)
4
Manzon (1992)
Guenther (1994)
2.1.8
(2.1.8)
i t
i t
i t
98.5.27 51 1
1
14
Guenther
(1994)
2.1.9 2.1.10
(2.1.9)
(2.1.10)
2.1.11 2.1.12
(2.1.11)
(2.1.12)
15
(2.1.13)
( 1 K)
(DAP) DAP
2.1.14
(2.1.14)
16
2.1.16
(2.1.16)
PART
PART b
0 (b=0)
1.
2.
PART
PART
PART PART
PART
17
46% 34%
2.2.1
(2.2.1)
()
SIZE 1 0
DA
MGT
18
Scholes et al.(1992)
TRA 86
19
98 5 1
25% 20% 99 99 5
28 17%
99 17% 99 5
17% 98
20% 98 5
98
20%
20%5 98
98
(
)
20
YEAR98
98
ETR
98
98ETR 98
98ETR
21
98DEBT
Jones (1991)
(1994) 73 81
SIZE
SIZE 1
SIZE 0 Scholes et al. (1992)
98SIZE
23
Guenther (1994)
MGT
98MGT
24
(2.1.7)
Five models measuring nondiscretionary accruals are (1)The Healy Model, (2)The DeAngelo Model,
(3)The Jones Model, (4)The Modified Jones Model, and (5)The Industry Model.
25
(3.3.1)
i t
i t
i t
i t
i t
i t
2.1.8 3.3.1
(3.3.2)
i t
i t
i t
i t
26
(3.3.3)
i
i -1
i -1
3.3.4
(3.3.4)
t
Wilcoxon
3.3.5
27
(3.3.5)
98 YEAR981YEAR980
i
YEAR98
i
YEAR98
i SIZE 1
SIZE 0
YEAR98
i
YEAR98
3-1
28
3-1
DCACC
YEAR98
98 YEAR98=1
YEAR98=0
ETR
Y98ETR
YEAR98
DEBT
Y98DEBT
SIZE
YEAR98
SIZE=1
SIZE=0
Y98SIZE
YEAR98
MGT
Y98MGT
MGT YEAR98
29
858 95 96
98
1.
2.
3. 87
4. 98
5.
87
8
84
30
McNichols (2000)
87
85 95 86 95
98 98
99
3-2
3-2 a
20
12
47
29
45
38
68
12
34
15
19
37
10
40
16
13
49
22
39
11
11
57
36
19
96 97 98 263207 239
709
3-1
t Wilcoxon
4-1 a (n=3,474)
CACC
200,232
97,053
32,358
177,531
87,395
16,450
1,489
2,208
8,773
11,379
1,995,962
1,362,492
427,968
2,024,936
1,506,629
Minimum
-11,328,367
-11,528,106
-3,038,468
-10,823,320
-12,315,558
Maximum
56,061,183
37,425,027
15,298,904
62,725,005
24,644,907
Q1
-55,261
-76,410
-11,317
-39,652
-132,687
Q3
142,231
123,907
23,790
109,670
188,247
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
CACC
INV
32
316
4-2
Modela
Mean
Median
Minimum
Q1
Q3
Maximum
37139
10082
-2063853
-27549
69354
1952023
0.0855
0.0639
-2.1635
0.0401
0.2124
1.7496
0.2743
0.2154
0.0011
0.1052
0.3987
0.9945
i t
i t1 t
i 1 t
i t-1
33
4-3
4-3 a
Variable
DCACC(%)
ETR(%)
Debt(%)
SIZE
MGT(%)
Year
Q3
0.07
-0.04
8.19
-41.36
97 -0.03
-0.57
10.89
-66.23
98 -1.49
-0.83
9.12
-40.09
96~98b -0.49
-0.45
9.37
-66.23
96 14.18
12.42
13.29
78.06
97 15.56
12.7
16.38
98 12.57
9.75
12.34
96~98 14.04
11.61
14.00
96
7.49
4.65
8.62
62.98
0 12.76
97
7.34
3.07
8.67
35.76
0 13.41
98
7.08
3.19
8.54
31.68
0 12.18
96~98
7.31
3.91
8.60
62.98
0 12.72
96
0.25
0.43
97
0.24
0.43
98
0.24
0.43
96~98
0.25
0.43
96 21.10
17.43
13.40
3.91
97 22.79
20.10
14.07
3.00
98 22.35
19.78
14.30
1.52
96~98 22.01
19.42
13.90
1.52
96
SIZE1SIZE0
b
96 98 263207239
34
3.5 20.83
4-3 98
t 96 97 98 t 0.13
0.042.53 5% t 9 96 97
96 97 98
0 98
0 98 t
Wilcoxon
96 98 25%
14.04%
4-4
200
35
ETR
-0.08114
ETR
Debt
SIZE
MGT
(0.0948)b*
DEBT
SIZE
MGT
-0.05322
-0.13771
(0.1950)
(0.0128)**
-0.00009
-0.13043
0.17616
(0.4995)
(0.0173)**
(0.0021)***
0.01225
0.13811
-0.0411
-0.06962
(0.4216)
(0.0126)**
(0.2535)
(0.1303)
Debt
SIZE
4-4-2 97 (n=207)
DCACC
DCACC
ETR
-0.0143
ETR
MGT
(0.4190)
DEBT
SIZE
MGT
-0.03087
-0.13287
(0.3295)
(0.0282)**
-0.09554
-0.08534
0.2964
(0.0855)*
(0.1108)
(<.0001)***
0.03793
0.09076
-0.00486
-0.13127
(0.2937)
(0.0967)*
(0.4723)
(0.0297)**
36
4-4-3 98 (n=239)
DCACC
DCACC
ETR
-0.0132
ETR
Debt
SIZE
MGT
(0.4196)
DEBT
SIZE
MGT
b
c
0.14347
-0.12598
(0.0133)**
(0.0259)*
0.09027
-0.09753
0.18825
(0.0821)*
(0.0664)*
(0.0018)***
-0.09256
0.17942
-0.04402
-0.10384
(0.0769)*
(0.0027)***
(0.2491)
(0.0547)*
SIZE1SIZE0
p
****** 10%5%1%
4-4 10%98
DEBTSIZEMGT
(VIF)
37
t Wilcoxon
98 (96 97 )
t Wilcoxon 4-5 4-6
5%
(F value1.08Pr(>F)=0.5243) t 2.04 ( p 0.021)
(98 )
4-5 t
MEAN
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
98
470
0.0002
0.0947
-0.6623
0.8026
98
239
-0.0149
0.0912
-0.4009
0.2810
F value=1.08
t value=2.04
Pr(>F)=0.5243
Pr(>t)=0.021
Wilcoxon
4-6 (98 )
98 W
38
5% Z p 0.004
4-6 Wilcoxon
YEAR
YEARS97&96 470
YEAR98
239
MEAN
Std. Dev.
SUM of
Mean
Under H0
Scores
Score
0.0002
2578
166850
370
-0.0149
2578
84845
326
Z= -2.6515
Pr(< Z) =0.0040
t Wilcoxon 98
96 97
098
98
(98 )
98
4-7
39
4-7 a, b, c, d
Modele:
Intercept
YEAR98
ETR
Y98ETR
DEBT
Y98DEBT
SIZE
Y98SIZE
MGT
Y98MGT
a
p f
0.0067
0.65
0.2574
-0.0262
-1.52
0.0650*
-0.0004
-1.20
0.1151
0.0005
0.85
0.1970
-0.0458
-0.90
0.1850
0.1863
2.11
0.0176**
-0.0078
-0.77
0.2210
0.0280
1.55
0.0606*
0.0002
0.61
0.2720
-0.0007
-1.31
0.0961*
F 1.72Pr(>F)0.0799R20.0217
709
(VIF) 10
YEAR98 98 YEAR981YEAR980
ETRETR*YEAR98
*YEAR98
SIZESIZE1SIZE0
Y98SIZESIZE* YEAR98
MGT* YEAR98
f
p-value****** 10%5%1%
40
F1.72
Pr(>F)0.0799Durbin Watson 1.9
VIF 10
4-7
98 YEAR98 10%
98 (Y98ETR)
98 (Y98DEBT)
5%
98 (Y98SIZE)
10%
98 (Y98MGT)
10%
YEAR98
98
98
98 Y98ETR
1.
41
2.
Liu et al.
(2001)
Dechow et al.(1995)
3.
98
99
20%
42
98 Y98DEBT
98 (Y98SIZE)
98 (Y98MGT)
ETRDEBT
SIZE
MGT
43
85 95 96 98
Modified Jones Model
98
98
44
45
Chung (1998)1987
5-1
5-1 1987
1986
30%
36%
1987
29%
35.5%
1988
27%
31.5%
1989
25.5%
28%
1990
24.5%
28%
1991
23.5%
28%
1992
23%
28%
Chung(1998)
46
Chung (1998) 1986 1988 1986
1987
1986
1986
1987 1986
1986
1987 0.5%
47
98
12.3% 24% 34.3%
13.3% 25.6% 37% 41.9% 31.1%10
2010 11 4 2011
2011 Doing Business Report
11
5-2
5-2
Corporate effective income tax rate(%)
18.9
7.4
24.1
30.4
33
1
2
3
23.1
22
21.9
9.7
24.4
4
5
6
7
8
10.8
25.9
15.3
18.2
26.1
9
10
16
18
19
16.7
21
()
2009 (98 )
48
Spearson p 0.4051
(Closing a business)
49
98
99
98
50
86 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
D=0.370287
51
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