Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) 33:185207 DOI 10.1007/s10781-005-0860-y M.

DAMATO

Springer 2005

THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES: AN INTERPRETATION " " " OF THE YOGACARA TRISVABHAVA-THEORY

" The trisvabhava-theory has been considered to be one of the characteristic theories of Yog"c"ra Buddhist discourse. This paper will a a " " " " : " examine that theory as it is presented in the Mahayanasutralamkara " " " (Ornament to the Mahayana Sutras; abbr. MSA) and its commentary, " " " " : " ": the Mahayanasutralamkara-bhasya (MSABh).1 The MSA/Bh refers " to the trisvabhava (or trilaksana) in a number of contexts, but there : : are three locations in which extended discussions of the three natures (or three characteristics) occur.2 While I will attempt to oer an exhaustive treatment of the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh, " incorporating every reference to the trisvabhava or trilaksana in the : : text, I will focus on the three locations in which that theory is most prominent. This paper will be divided into three sections: in the rst " " " " : " section I will oer a brief introduction to the Mahayanasutralamkara itself, placing the text in the wider context of Yog"c"ra discourse; in a a the second section I will present an exegesis of the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh, focusing on the contexts in which the theory is most fully elucidated; and in the third section I will oer an interpretation of the texts three-nature theory, relating the theory to the doctrines " " of mind-only (citta-matra) and representation-only (vij~apti-matra). n In short, according to my reading, the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh should not be interpreted as an ontological model simpliciter, but as a soteriologico-ontological model, identifying three progressive stages of ontological realization, culminating in the perfected, non-conceptually-constructing awareness of thusness.

When referring to both the verse-text and the prose commentary together, I will use the abbreviation MSA/Bh. In this paper, by the term the text I mean the MSA and the MSABh taken together, by the verse-text I mean the MSA, and by the commentary I mean the MSABh. 2 These may be found at MSA/Bh 11.1529, 11.3643, and 19.4856.

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" " " " " ON THE MAHAYANASUTRALAMKARA _

" " " " : " The Mahayanasutralamkara is a verse-text composed of some 804 verses, of which only 794 are extant in Sanskrit.3 This verse-text appears as an independent text only in the Tibetan canon. Normally the versetext is accompanied by (embedded in) an extended prose commentary " " " " : " ": known as the Mahayanasutralamkara-bhasya, which divides the text into 21 chapters. I date both the MSA and the MSABh to the fourth century CE (a bit more on this below). Two Sanskrit editions of the MSA/Bh are available: Levis edition of 1907 (French translation: 1911) and Bagchis edition of 1970, which is based on Levis edition but adds corrigenda to the text. In this paper, I will quote directly from Levis edition, since this is the earliest edition based on the most complete Sanskrit manuscript available. The MSA/Bh appears in the Chinese canon (Taish", 1604) and in the Tibetan canon (MSA: T"hoku catao o logue no. 4020; MSA/Bh: T"hoku 4026). There are also two Indian o subcommentaries to the text, both extant only in Tibetan.4 Various hypotheses have been oered regarding the authorship of the MSA and the MSABh. While I will not enter into that discussion here, I will indicate that I do not accept the (Chinese canons) attri_ bution of the MSA/Bh to Asanga, nor do I accept the (Tibetan canons) attribution of the MSA to Maitreya (whether or not he is taken to be a historical person).5 I believe that a careful analysis of the structure and contents of the text indicates that the received verse-text is at least partially a compilation. I hypothesize that earlier strata of the MSA were compiled, redacted, added to, and commented upon by one person. And I take the result of this process to be the received text of the MSA/Bh.6
Nagao (1958: xiii), following the Tibetan text, species that MSA, Chapter 10, is comprised of 15 verses, rather than Levis count of 14. According to this reading, the three lines of commentary to MSA 10.9 constitute an independent verse. Thus the verse-text would be comprised of 805 (rather than 804) verses. 4 " " " " " " The two Indian subcommentaries are the Mahayanasutralam kara-vrtti-bhasya of _ _ Sthiramati (T"hoku 4034; DT sems tsam MI 1b1283a7, TSI_ 1b1-266a7) and the o " " " " " i " Mahayanasutralam kara-t"ka of Asvabh"va (T"hoku 4029; DT sems tsam BI 38b6a o _ _ 174a7). These works may be considered subcommentaries in that they comment on both the MSA (verse-text) and at least parts of the MSABh (prose commentary). Sthiramati and Asvabh"va may be placed in the sixth century CE. a 5 It should be noted that all of the colophons of the MSA/Bh (including " those of the Tibetan and Chinese translations) identify the mahabodhisattva Vyavad"tasamaya as the composer of the text. a 6 These points are discussed more fully in Chapter 2 of my dissertation; see DAmato (2000).
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Regarding the MSA/Bhs place in Yog"c"ra literature, the fola a lowing points are worth noting. (1) In terms of structure, the MSA " precisely follows that of the Bodhisattvabhumi (BBh; ed. Dutt, 1966). But while the MSA and the BBh are nearly identical in structure, they are not as similar in their contents: although both discuss the same topics, the ways in which those topics are discussed often dier. For example, the BBhs chapter on awakening (bodhi) makes no mention of many of the terms and concepts found in the MSAs chapter on " that topic, such as the embodiments of a buddha (buddha-kaya) or the awarenesses of a buddha (buddha-j~ana). While some have n" _ thought that both the MSA and the BBh are by Asanga, I disagree. _ Although the colophon of the BBh identies Asanga as the composer of the text, both Hirakawa et al. (1973: viiix) and Davidson (1985: 23 and 25) point out that the two earlier Chinese translations of the BBh (Taish", 1581 and 1582) do not name any author. Furo thermore, Schmithausen (1969: 812) presents strong arguments for " " " the hypothesis that the Yogacarabhumi as a whole represents the work of a number of authors over a period of time. Thus there is no _ conclusive evidence that Asanga was the author of the BBh; rather, he may have been the nal redactor of the text, or perhaps the text _ later came to be associated with the Maitreya-Asanga complex. Given these considerations, and the fact that the BBh presents a less highly developed conception of buddhahood than the MSA, I think it is plausible that the BBh predates the MSA, and that the MSA derives its structure from the BBh. (2) The MSA is the text most often " " quoted by the Mahayanasamgraha (ed. Lamotte, 1973), and it is : quoted once by name. From the list of texts explicitly quoted by the " " Mahayanasamgraha, it may be inferred that the author of the : " " Mahayanasamgraha considers the MSA to be an authoritative text. : Since all of the traditional sources, including the colophon of the text _ " " itself, attest to Asangas authorship of the Mahayanasam graha, I _ _ think it is reasonable to identify Asanga as the composer of that _ text. And since Asanga quotes the MSA in the company of an _ authoritative group of texts, I would place the MSA before Asanga. To summarize, I would place the MSA after (an early recension of) _ _ " the Bodhisattvabhumi, but before the date of Asanga. Asangas date cannot be xed with certainty, but it may reasonably be hypothesized that he was active sometime during the second half of the fourth century CE or the rst half of the fth. Thus the MSA should be placed before that time, i.e., in the mid-fourth century CE. And since I take the MSA and the MSABh together as the work of one

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nal redactor/author, I would also place the commentary in the mid-fourth century. Considering the broader history of Yog"c"ra discourse, the a a " Samdhinirmocana-sutra has certainly been the most important and : " " " inuential s"tra for the Yog"c"ra, and the Yogacarabhumi is the u a a largest Yog"c"ra "stra, containing (in parts at least) some of the a a sa oldest extant Yog"c"ra material. If these two works are taken as a a representative of the rst phase of distinctly Yog"c"ra thought, then a a the second phase might be characterized by treatises that more systematically (i.e., in their entirety) present a Yog"c"ra point of view. a a Among the extant Yog"c"ra treatises of this second phase, the a a MSA/Bh is certainly one of the earliest (along with the Mad" " hyantavibhaga). I understand texts of this second phase to precede texts of the third, classical, phase of Yog"c"ra thought, represented a a _ by the works of Asanga and Vasubandhu.7 Thus I would identify the MSA/Bh as an important text in the history of Yog"c"ra discourse. a a In terms of its contents, the MSA/Bh may be described as a text primarily concerned with theoretical reections on issues central to the practice of the Mah"y"na. Put simply, the MSA/Bh is more a a a theory text than a practice text: it is more a reection on issues central to (its conception of) Mah"y"na Buddhism than an instruction a a manual for the attainment of specic Buddhist soteriological goals. The MSA/Bh does not, however, exhibit a particular concern with showing how the concepts and categories it employs are logically interrelated or with systematically working out their implications. Nevertheless, I think a careful analysis shows that the MSA/Bh does present a consistent discourse. We may get a better feel for the MSA/ Bh as a text concerned with theoretical reections on the Mah"y"na a a through examining its presentation of the three-nature theory.
" " " " " " " EXEGESIS OF THE TRISVABHAVA IN THE MAHAYANASUTRALAM KARA/-BHASYA _ _

The rst extended discussion of the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh occurs in the context of a group of verses dealing with the distinction " " between reality (tattva) and illusion (maya) (MSA/Bh 11.1529). These verses are preceded by two verses on the investigation of reality (dharmatatva-paryesti); the rst of these two verses (11.13) and its commentary state: _ _
To complete this picture of Yog"c"ra thought, other phases would certainly a a have to be added, including for example that of the Indian commentators (e.g., Dharmap"la and Sthiramati) and the distinctly Chinese phases. a
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tattvam yat satatam dvayena rahitam bhr"nte ca samnirayah a s : : : : s : akyam naiva ca sarvath"bhilapitum yac c"prapanc"tmakam/ s a a a : : : jneyam heyam atho viodhyam amalam yac ca prakrty" matam s : : : : a yasy"k"a-suvarna-v"ri-sadr" kle"d viuddhir mat"// a as sa s a : a : s Reality which is always without duality, is the basis of error, and is entirely inexpressible does not have the nature of discursivity. It is to be known, abandoned, and puried. It should properly be thought of as naturally immaculate, since it is puried from delements, as are space, gold, and water.

Here reality is said to be similar to space, gold, and water: it is naturally pure and deled only adventitiously. The next verse goes on to state that there is nothing else in the world besides this fundamentally pure reality. Thus at an ontological level the MSA/Bh posits that, even though it serves as the basis of error, reality is fundamentally pure. Thus we see a distinction between reality as it is in itself, and reality as it appears through error when it is adventitiously deled. The commentary to 11.13 aligns each of the three descriptions of reality oered in the verse with one of the three natures. Reality which is always without duality is the imagined " nature (parikalpita-svabhava): the imagined nature is without duality " because of its absolute non-existence (atyantam asatvat). Reality which is the basis of error is the dependent nature (paratantra" svabhava): the dependent nature is the basis of error because imagination occurs through it. And reality which is entirely inexpressible " is the perfected nature (parinispanna-svabhava): the perfected nature : simply does not have the nature of discursivity; it is inexpressible. MSABh ad 11.13 further states that the rst the imagined nature is to be known, the second the dependent nature is to be abandoned, and the third the perfected nature is to be puried. From this verse and its commentary we can see that the three natures are presented as a complete model of reality.8 The threenature theory presents reality in three aspects: as an erroneous appearance, as a basis of error, and as it is in itself. Keeping these points in mind, we may now turn to the verses on the distinction
8 It should be noted that this ontological model is appropriately placed in a " standard Mah"y"na context at MSA/Bh 14.34, which states that emptiness (unyata) a a s" fully understood is threefold: the emptiness of the imagined nature, the emptiness of the dependent nature, and the emptiness of the perfected nature. MSA/Bh 11.50 also " discusses three types of absence of nature (nihsvabhavatva), although there only the : parikalpita-laksana is specically mentioned. Furthermore, at MSABh ad 12.17 : : " the three natures are described as without an inherent nature (nihsvabhava). Thus the : MSA/Bh understands all three natures to be empty.

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" " between reality (tattva) and illusion (maya). In the rst verse of this group (11.15), the text characterizes unreal imagination and the error of duality:
yath" m"y" tath"bh"ta-parikalpo nirucyate/ a a a a u yath" m"y"-krtam tadvat dvaya-bhr"ntir nirucyate// a a a : : a a u yath" m"y" yantra-parigrh" : bhr"nti-nimittam k": tha-lost"dikam tath"bh"taa a a a : : as : : :a : tam parikalpah paratantrah svabh"vo veditavyah/ yath" m"y"-krtam tasy"m m"y"y"m a a a a : : a: a a a: : : : hasty-ava-suvarn"dy-"krtis9 tad-bh"vena pratibh"sit" tath" tasminn abh"ta-parikalpe s a a a a u :a a : dvaya-bhr"ntir gr"hya-gr"hakatvena pratibh"sit" parikalpita-svabh"v"k"r" veditavy"/ a a a a a a a aa a Unreal imagination is explained to be just like an illusion. Likewise, the error of duality is explained to be just like the eect of an illusion. Unreal imagination the dependent nature should be known to be just like an illusion something formed from a piece of wood or a lump of clay, for example, that has the mark of error, and is apprehended through magic. The error of duality the mode of appearance of the imagined nature, which manifests as subject and object in unreal imagination should be known to be just like the eect of an illusion the appearance of an elephant, a horse, or gold, for example, in an illusion, which manifests through the production of the [illusion].

" In this verse and commentary unreal imagination (abhuta-parikalpa) is said to be like an illusion, while the appearance of duality is said to be like the eect of an illusion. The trope of a magical illusion plays an important role in this group of verses.10 This trope is used because it allows for an important ontological distinction to be made, the dis" tinction between the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava) and the " imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhava). According to the commentary, two aspects of the illusion need to be understood: the illusion itself, and the appearance of unreal objects that are the eect of the illusion. The illusion itself is identied with unreal imagination, which is then equated with the dependent nature. The eect of the illusion (i.e., the appearance of unreal objects) is identied as the error of duality; this is the mistaken construction of the play of appearances into subject (the self or ego) and objects (which are taken to be external to the self or ego). This construction of appearances into
9 ": Note that the term akrti is only used by the text in this group of verses (11.15 29), and has been translated as appearance, in the sense of mere appearance. " " The term akara, however, is used in a number of places throughout the text, and may ": be translated as mode of appearance. Furthermore, while the term akrti has a " " negative connotation in the text, akara has a positive connotation e.g., MSA 9.2 " " n " identies buddhahood as the attainment of sarvakara-j~ata: an awareness of all modes of appearance. 10 " This trope also plays an important role in the Trisvabhavanirdea vv. 2734. s

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subject and object is equated with the mode of appearance of the imagined nature. Continuing with the trope of the magical illusion, the next verse (11.16) states:
yath" tasmin na tad-bh"vah param"rthas tathesyate/ a a : a : yath" tasyopalabdhis tu tath" samvrti-satyat"// a a : : a The non-existence of the [unreal object] in the [illusion] should be known as the ultimate [truth]. But the perception of the [unreal object] should be known as the conventional truth.

Here the text brings the categories of ultimate truth and conventional truth into play. It states that in ultimate truth, no unreal objects actually exist in the illusion; there is only the appearance of unreal objects. And the perception of those objects of unreal imagination is to be understood as conventional truth. The commentary also states that the duality of the imagined nature does not exist in the dependent nature: although conventionally the dependent nature does appear to have the characteristic of duality, in ultimate truth, the dependent nature is devoid of the duality of the imagined nature. A later verse (11.19) claries the relationship between existence and non-existence:
tad-"krti ca tatr"sti tad bh"va ca na vidyate/ a : s a a s tasm"d astitva-n"stitvam m"y"disu vidh" a a yate// : a a : The appearance of the [illusion] exists, but the object does not; therefore both existence and non-existence are attributed to illusions, etc.

Here the appearance of the illusion itself (earlier equated with the dependent nature) is said to be existent, but the objects that appear (earlier equated with the imagined nature) the dualistic constructions that are the eect of the illusion are said to be non-existent. So illusions and other such appearances have the characteristics of both existence and non-existence. The following brief chart summarizes the texts claims regarding unreal imagination and the appearance of duality:
unreal imagination metaphorically: the illusion itself ontologically: the dependent nature it exists conventionally appearance of duality metaphorically: the eect of the illusion ontologically: the imagined nature it does not exist conventionally (although it appears conventionally)

Again, two aspects are to be distinguished here. There is the occurrence of unreal imagination; unreal imagination does exist, just as an

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illusion itself may be said to exist; and unreal imagination is identied with the dependent nature in the MSA/Bhs tripartite ontological scheme. But there is also the appearance of duality, which is the false construction of unreal imagination into a distinct subject and distinct objects; this duality of subject and object does not actually exist, just as the objects which appear in an illusion do not actually exist; and the appearance of duality is identied with the function of the imagined nature. The nal verse of interest to us in this section is 11.17:
tad-abh"ve yath" vyaktis tan-nimittasya labhyate/ a a tath"raya-par"vrtt"v asat kalpasya labhyate// as a : a Just as in the absence of the [eect of an illusion] the manifestation of its cause is perceived, so too in the transformation of the basis the unreality of imagination is perceived.

"s ": Here the transformation of the basis (araya-paravrtti) is introduced into the discussion. According to the text, when the transformation of the basis occurs, the non-existence of imagination will be perceived. That is to say, when the transformation of the basis occurs, it will be understood that neither the conventional self or ego, nor the conventional objects which appear to the self or ego actually exist as such. They will both be understood to be constructions built up from the manifold play of appearances. This verse is interesting in that it links the three-nature theory to the process (or, better, set of related processes) known as the transformation of the basis. We will see this link claried further in the next relevant section of the MSA/Bh. The next extended presentation of the three-nature theory (here described in terms of the three characteristics) occurs in the context of a discussion of the indicator (laksana), the indicated (laksya), and the : : : " process of indication (laksana) (MSA/Bh 11.3643). In these verses : : the indicator is described in terms of the dependent, the imagined, and the perfected (paratantra, parikalpita, and parinispanna, respec: tively); the indicated is described in terms of the ve abhidharma " categories (vij~ana, rupa, caitasika, citta-viprayukta, and asamskrta); n" : : and the process of indication the process which allows for the association of the indicator with the indicated is described in terms " " of the ve stages of yoga (pa~cavidha yogabhumi). n The imagined characteristic (parikalpita-laksana) is explained at : : 11.3839. Here the imagined characteristic is said to be threefold: it is

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comprised of the sign of the conceptualization of objects in terms of " " " " discourse (yatha-jalpartha-samj~a-nimitta), the tendencies (vasana) : n" that arise due to that discourse, and the perception of objects (artha) that arises due to those tendencies. Thus the imagined characteristic is described as arising out of discourse: through discourse, objects are conceptualized, tendencies arise which are directed towards those conceptualized objects, and distinct objects are perceived. The perfected characteristic (parinispanna-laksana) is discussed at : : : 11.41. In this verse and its commentary the perfected characteristic is described in three ways: in terms of non-existence and existence it is non-existent due to the imagined nature of all phenomena, but existent in the absence of that imagination; in terms of non-pacication and pacication non-pacication refers to the adventitious nature " of the delements (agantukopaklea), and pacication refers to the s original purity of reality; and in terms of the absence of imagination the perfected characteristic does not have the nature of discursivity (nisprapa~cat" From these three descriptions we can see that the n a). : perfected characteristic is described in terms of the texts conception of reality itself: it is existent, originally pure, and without the nature of discursivity. This point is made even clearer in the rst line of the commentary to 11.41, which states that the perfected characteristic is thusness (tathat" a). The dependent characteristic (paratantra-laksana) is the object of : : perhaps the most interesting analysis in this group of verses. 11.40 and its commentary state:
trividha-trividh"bh"so gr"hya-gr"haka-laksanah/ a a a a : : : abh"ta-parikalpo hi paratantrasya laksanam// u : : : tatra trividh"bh"sah pad"bh"so rth"bh"so deh"bh"sa ca/ punas trividh"bh"so a a : a a a a a a s a a mana-udgraha-vikalp"bh"sah/ mano yat klistam sarvad"/ udgrahah panca vijn"naa a : a a :: : : a a a k"y"h/vikalpo mano-vijn"nam tatra prathama-trividh"bh"so gr"hya-laksanah/ a a: a : : : : dvit" gr"haka-laksanah/ ity ayam abh"ta-parikalpah paratantrasya laksanam/ yo a u : : : : : : : The threefoldthreefold appearance has the characteristic of object and subject; it is unreal imagination, which is the characteristic of the dependent. The threefold appearance is the appearance of words, the appearance of meanings, and the appearance of forms. Also, the threefold appearance is the appearance of mind, apprehension, and conceptual discrimination. Mind is that which is always deled. Apprehension is the ve sensory consciousnesses. Conceptual discrimination is the mental consciousness. The rst threefold appearance has the characteristic of the object; the second has the characteristic of the subject. This [threefoldthreefold appearance] is unreal imagination, [which is] the characteristic of the dependent.

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In this verse and commentary we see that the appearance of words, meanings, and forms (or referential objects) is understood as one aspect of the dependent characteristic (paratantra-laksana): it is the dependent : : characteristic considered under the aspect of an object. Considered under the aspect of a subject, the dependent characteristic is equated with the ve sensory consciousnesses, mental consciousness, and the deled mind. According to one standard Yog"c"ra model there are a a eight forms of consciousness in all: the six basic forms of consciousness (mental consciousness and the ve sensory consciousnesses); the deled mind (klista-manas) which serves as the basis of ego; and the store :: " consciousness (alaya-vij~ana) which serves as the basis of all other n" forms of consciousness. The subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic corresponds to the rst seven forms of consciousness. So from 11.40 and its commentary we may infer the following structure:
dependent characteristic (paratantra-laksana) : : object-aspect subject-aspect appearance of words mind (deled mind) appearance of meanings apprehension (ve sensory consciousnesses) appearance of forms conceptual discrimination (mental consciousness) [Note: these seven consciousnesses are based on the store consciousness]

In order to understand the full import of these verses, it is necessary to turn to a following section of the text, MSA/Bh 11.4449, which deals with the topic of liberation (vimukti). In this group of verses we see that liberation is equated with the transformation of the dependent characteristic. Verse 11.44 and its commentary state:
pad"rtha-deha-nirbh"sa-par"vrttir an"sravah/ a a a : a : dh"tur b" a ja-par"vrtteh sa ca sarvatrag"rayah// a : : as : a : a a a a: b" ja-par"vr tter ity "laya-vijn "na-par"vr ttitah /pad"rtha-deha-nirbh"s"n"m a : a a : a : a a as vijn"n"n"m par"vrttir an"sravo dh"tur vimuktih/sa ca sarvatrag"rayah r"vakaa a a: : : sa pratyekabuddha-gatah/ : The transformation of the appearance of words, meanings, and forms is the undeled realm; it is due to the transformation of seeds; and it is a universal basis. Due to the transformation of seeds, means due to the transformation of the store consciousness. The transformation of consciousnesses which have the appearance of words, meanings, and forms is the undeled realm, which is liberation. And it is a universal basis because this occurs for r"vakas and pratyekabuddhas sa [as well].

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This verse and its commentary state that liberation is the transformation of forms of consciousness which have the appearance of words, meanings, and forms; i.e., conscious modes of appearance which participate in dualistic conceptual constructions. The verse states that this transformation comes about through the transformation of seeds, which the commentary species as the transformation " " of the store consciousness (alaya-vij~ana). The term alaya-vij~ana, n" n" which has come to be closely associated with the Yog"c"ra, appears a a only a limited number of times in the commentary, and it does not appear in the verse-text at all. Here in the commentary to 11.44, as in the commentary to 19.49, the store consciousness is equated with seeds, as in the seeds that contribute to, and are contributed by, moments of deled consciousness. So when there is the transformation of these seeds of the store consciousness the result is a transformation of the object-aspect of the dependent characteristic. It may also be noted that this process viz., the transformation of the objectaspect of the dependent characteristic is said to occur for r"vakas sa and pratyekabuddhas, as well as for bodhisattvas. The next verse in this section discusses the transformation of the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic. 11.45 states:
caturdh" vait"vrtter manasa codgrahasya ca/ a s a : s vikalpasy"vikalpe hi ksetre jn"ne tha karmani// a a : : Due to the reversion of mind, apprehension, and conceptual discrimination, there are four supremacies: in not conceptually discriminating, in a eld, in awareness, and in action.

": According to the commentary the reversion (avrtti) of mind, etc. ": means the transformation (paravrtti) of them. Recall that the commentary to 11.40 had identied mind, apprehension, and conceptual discrimination as the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic, so here the transformation of this aspect of the dependent characteristic is described. 11.46 and its commentary discuss the four supremacies in further detail: the supremacies are said to begin on the eighth bodhisattva-stage, and the supremacy in a eld is said to be due to the complete purication of a buddha-eld. Thus it is clear that the transformation discussed here viz., the transformation of the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic is understood to occur only for bodhisattvas. Considering MSA/Bh 11.4446 together with 11.40 we may see that the dependent characteristic is clearly linked to the transfor"s ": mation of the basis (araya-paravrtti). Indeed, one important

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interpretation of the transformation of the basis in the MSA/Bh is the transformation of the dependent characteristic. As we saw above, the transformation of the appearance of words, meanings, and forms i.e., the object-aspect of the dependent characteristic is due to the transformation of seeds i.e., the store consciousness, which is the ground of the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic. And the transformation of the mind, apprehension, and conceptual discrimination i.e., the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic is itself understood as a transformation of forms of consciousness based on the store consciousness. Thus it may be seen that the transformation of the dependent characteristic both as object and as subject entails the transformation of the store consciousness. A further important point to note from this discussion is that the MSA/ Bh directly links the three-nature theory with an important concept "s ": for soteriological attainments viz., araya-paravrtti. Thus while the rst group of verses we examined above (11.1529) presents the threenature theory as an ontological model, this group of verses presents that theory as a soteriological model: the three natures here do not represent a model of reality as much as a model of stages of ontological gnosis that must be traversed in order to attain buddhahood. The nal extended discussion of the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh occurs in the context of a group of verses on thorough " " knowledge of the way things really are (yatha-bhuta-parij~ana) n" (MSA/Bh 19.4856). The rst verse of interest to us is 19.49, which states:
pratisth"-bhoga-b" : hi nimittam bandhanasya hi/ jam :: a : s"ray" citta-caitt"s tu badhyante tra sab" ah// as as a jak" : The sign of bondage is the dwelling, experience, and the seed. Mind and mental factors, along with their bases and their seeds, are bound.

In the commentary to this verse, the dwelling is identied as the " inanimate world (bhajana-loka); experience is identied as the ve sense-objects of forms, sounds, etc.; and the seed explained as the seed of the dwelling and of experience is identied as the store " consciousness (alaya-vij~ana). Mind and mental factors, along with n" their bases and seeds, are understood to be bound. And the seed of mind and mental factors is identied as the store consciousness. We may represent this verse and its commentary through the following chart:

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mind and mental factors whose seed is the store consciousness are bound to: the threefold sign dwelling = the inanimate world, whose seed is the store consciousness; experience = the ve sense-objects, whose seed is the store consciousness; seed = the store consciousness itself.

Viewing the verse and commentary in this way allows us to see the importance of the store consciousness to this interpretation. While it is the mind and mental factors which are bound to the threefold sign, when viewed in terms of their basis or source of origin, it is actually the store consciousness that is bound to itself. It is the store consciousness that is at the root of both the subjective aspect of experience (mind and mental factors) and the experience of objects (the threefold sign). The state of aairs described above is understood to obtain before the attainment of awakening. A following verse (19.51) which introduces the three-nature theory into the discussion describes how that state of aairs is brought to an end.
a tathat"lambanam jn"nam dvaya-gr"ha-vivarjitam/ a : : a : dausthulya-k"ya-pratyaksam tat-ksaye dh" a mat"m matam// a: :: : : : : a etena yath"-svabh"va-traya-parijn"n"t paratantra-svabh"va-ksay"ya samvartate/ a a a a : a : tat-parid" pitam/ tathat"lambanatvena parinispannam svabh"vam parijn"ya/ dvayaa a : a : : : gr"ha-vivarjitatvena kalpitam/ dausthulya-k"ya-pratyaksatvena paratantram/ tasyaiva a a : :: : : ksay"ya samvartate dausthulya-k"yasy"laya-vijn"nasya tat-ksay"rtham tat-ksaye/ a a a : a : : : a : :: Awareness whose object is thusness is free of grasping after duality and perceives the multitude of hindrances. In the destruction of that, there is the knowledge of the wise. What is pointed out by this [verse] comes about through thorough knowledge of the three natures as they are, in order to bring about the destruction of the dependent nature. The perfected nature is known through its object of thusness; the imagined [nature], through freedom from grasping after duality; and the dependent [nature], through the perception of the multitude of hindrances. So [knowledge of the three natures] is conducive to the destruction of [the multitude of hindrances]; [in the verse, the phrase] in the destruction of that means the destruction of the multitude of hindrances, which is the store consciousness.

Here it is explained that when the three natures are properly understood, the dependent nature will be brought to its termination. The notion of bringing the dependent nature to its end should be

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considered in the context of the verses discussed earlier (11.40 and 11.4446), where we saw that liberation was interpreted in terms of the transformation of the dependent characteristic. At 11.40 the dependent characteristic was understood to be composed of two aspects: the subject-aspect and the object-aspect. And the transformation of each of those aspects of the dependent characteristic was closely related to the transformation of the store consciousness. Here at 19.51 we also see that a close link is established between the dependent nature and the store consciousness (which is described in the verse as the multitude of hindrances). The dependent nature is said to be understood through perceiving of the multitude of hindrances.11 And when the three natures are thoroughly understood, the result will be the destruction of the dependent nature which is also explained as the destruction of the multitude of hindrances, or the store consciousness. This interpretation may be linked to 11.13 (discussed above) which states that the dependent nature is the basis of error and that it is something to be abandoned. An important point to be noted from this group of verses is that again we see that the three-nature theory is presented as a soteriological model: when the three natures are properly understood, the destruction of the store consciousness will be brought about. So here the three natures are not only presented as a model of reality, but also as a model of forms of gnosis directed towards the termination of the state of spiritual bondage. This interpretation of the three natures as forms of gnosis directed towards liberation may also be seen at 13.1, which links the three natures to the three standard entrances to liberation: the concentration of the emptiness of the imagined " " " nature (unyata-samadhi parikalpitasya svabhavasya), the wishlessness s" (apranihita) of the dependent nature, and the signlessness (animitta) : of the perfected nature.12
A link between the dependent nature and the multitude of hindrances may also be seen at MSABh ad 6.9, which states that the multitude of faults (doa-samcaya), s : which has the characteristic of hindrance (dausthulya-laksana), has its basis in the :: : : dependent nature. It should be noted, however, that the dependent nature is not mentioned in the Tibetan and Chinese versions of MSABh ad 6.9; see Levi (1911: 54), note 1. 12 The interpretation of the three natures as a model of forms of gnosis may also be seen at MSABh ad 19.77 and ad 19.78, which identify the understanding (bodha) of the three natures as a special understanding of bodhisattvas. And the link between the three natures and soteriological attainment may also be seen at MSABh ad 11.52, where the certainty that phenomena do not arise (anutpattika-dharma-ksanti) :" an important Mah"y"na realization is partially explained in terms of the three a a natures.
11

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" AN INTERPRETATION OF THE TRISVABHAVA

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One standard interpretation of the three natures may be given in the following terms. The dependent nature is the basis or substratum of reality; it is comprised of a dependently arisen, interconnected web of ever-changing representations, which are themselves empty of inherent nature. The imagined nature is the dependent nature when viewed through a matrix of conceptual construction; the imagined nature sees the dependent nature as comprised of distinct entities with enduring, inherent natures. The perfected nature, however, is the dependent nature viewed without the conceptual matrix of the imagined nature.13 The MSA/Bhs interpretation of the three natures, however, diers in a not insignicant way from what I have oered as the standard interpretation. Before turning to the specics of the MSA/Bhs alternate interpretation, I wish to emphasize that in the corpus of Yog"c"ra literature there is indeed strong support for the standard a a interpretation. In fact, it seems to me to be a solid interpretation of the three-nature theory as presented in the classical texts of Asanga and Vasubandhu. But that a particular interpretation of a theory has become dominant should not prevent us from noting and considering alternate interpretations found in our sources. As Sponberg has pointed out (1983: 98):
Any attempt to come to terms with the three natures is further complicated, however, by additional historical problems. Our confusion regarding the doctrine has arisen, For one presentation of what I am calling the standard interpretation, see Williams (1989: 8285) The conceptualized [imagined] aspect is the world as it is experienced by everyday unenlightened folk, the world of really existing subjects confronting really existing and separate objects. It is the realm of subjectobject duality . The ow of perceptions which forms the basis for our mistaken con" " structions is the dependent aspect . The Mahayanasamgraha describes it as the : support for the manifestation of non-existent and ctive things (2:2) . Overnegation is to deny the substratum [viz., the dependent] which really, ultimately " (paramartha) exists . The nal aspect is called the perfected aspect . It is said to be the complete absence, in the dependent aspect, of objects that is, the objects of " " the conceptualized [imagined] aspect (Mahayanasamgraha 2:4). Further textual : support for the standard interpretation of the three-nature theory may be found in " " : the Trimsika, especially v. 21cd (ed. Levi 1925: 39): nispannas tasya purvena sada : : " " " rahitata tu ya/The perfected is the perpetual absence of the former in that. As the commentary explains, the former means the imagined nature, and in that means in the dependent nature. According to one possible interpretation, the implication here is that the dependent nature exists as the substratum or basis of reality, which may be viewed improperly (in terms of the imagined) or realized for what it is (in terms of the perfected).
13

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in part, from the often unacknowledged fact that the various sources we employ present the doctrine in dierent stages of its historical development. It is understandably dicult to settle on one interpretation of the three natures when dierent textual accounts seem inconsistent.

I would agree with Sponberg that it is important to remain exegetically sensitive to our sources, and not to assume that every presentation of the three-nature theory found in Yog"c"ra literature a a should be read through the lens of one standard interpretation.14 Briey stated, the dierence between the MSA/Bhs interpretation of the three-nature theory and the standard interpretation is that the MSA/Bh does not emphasize the ultimate existence of the dependent nature. In the standard account oered above, the dependent nature is understood to be ultimately real since it is the basis or substratum of reality itself: although the dependent nature is empty of inherent nature, it does ultimately exist. In the MSA/Bh, however, the existence of the dependent nature is not ultimately armed (although it is, of course, conventionally armed). In discussing the non-duality of the ultimate, the commentary to 6.1 states that the ultimate is not existent because of the imagined and dependent characteristics, but it is not non-existent because of the perfected characteristic. This implies that the dependent characteristic does not ultimately exist. And in the commentary to 18.81, the dependent characteristic is said to be impermanent (anitya), as the imagined characteristic is declared to be. So here the dependent characteristic is not presented as the existent basis or substratum of reality, but rather is categorized with the (nonexistent) imagined characteristic. Also at 11.13, the commentary states that the dependent nature is to be abandoned (praheyam). Such a statement would be unreasonable if the dependent nature were understood to be the basis or substratum of reality, given that the ultimate goal posited by the text is assimilation to reality itself. Furthermore, the commentary to 19.51 states that thorough knowledge of the three natures brings about the termination of the dependent nature. Again, this would not be reasonable if the

Of course I intend this statement to apply to one operating in an exegetical mode; in a philosophical mode, one may construct arguments intending to demonstrate that some particular interpretation of the three-nature theory ought to be accepted, or ought to function as the lens through which other interpretations are assessed.

14

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dependent nature were understood to be the ultimate substratum of reality.15 So in the MSA/Bh, the dependent nature is categorized with the imagined nature, and is discussed in terms of the phenomenal or conventional aspect of reality. The dierence between the imagined nature and the dependent nature, according to the MSA/Bh, is that the imagined nature is conventional reality viewed through a matrix of conceptual construction, where the representations that appear are taken to be distinct objects with inherent natures; in the dependent nature, on the other hand, the representations that appear are understood to be themselves illusory. According to 11.16, in ultimate truth, there is not the existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature.16 In the MSA/Bh, the perfected nature is the only one of the three natures that is posited as ultimately existent. In the commentary to " 11.41, the perfected characteristic is equated with thusness (tathata), an important term for ultimate reality in the text. And in the commentary to 11.13, the perfected nature is said to be naturally puried (prakrtya viuddha) from delements, which is itself a characteristic : " s of ultimate reality, as described by the MSA/Bh. And at 9.78, the
15 " Further support for these claims may be found in the Samdhinirmocana-sutras : trope of the three natures in terms of having diseased vision, where the imagined is like the defects of clouded vision, the dependent is like the appearance of the manifestations of clouded vision. . . which appear as a net of hairs, and the perfected is like the unerring objective reference, the natural objective reference of the eyes when that persons eyes have become pure and free from the defects of clouded vision (trans. Powers 1995: 83; Tib., ibid.: 82, 84; cf. French trans. Lamotte 1935: 189; Tib., ibid.: 61). One possible implication here is that viewing things in terms of the dependent in terms of the manifestations of clouded vision must be abandoned. I do not claim that every statement about the three natures in the Samdhinirmocana may be interpreted in terms of denying the ultimate existence of : the dependent; after all, as Lamotte (1935: 25), May (1971: 276), Boquist (1993: Chapter 2), and others have pointed out, the s"tra is probably a compilation, and u seems to comprise dierent approaches to the three-nature theory. But Powers also translates the following relevant passage from a canonical commentary to the s"tra u " " " " the Arya-samdhinirmocana-sutra-vyakhyana (Peking 5845): :

The other-dependent character is produced by the power of other conditions but is not [produced] through its nature. Therefore since it exists merely [like] a magicians illusions in terms of conventional truths it is a lack of own-being due to being a lack of own-being in terms of production it is not an ultimate lack of own-being because it is not an ultimate truth. the thoroughly established {perfected} character is the ultimate. (trans. Powers 1995: 334, note 3)
16 Note that the claim, According to ultimate truth, x is not in y, does not entail that x or y must ultimately exist.

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perfected nature is described as ultimately existent (parama" " vidyamanata), while the imagined nature is described as non-existent. Also, the commentary to 19.79 equates the comprehension of the perfected with buddhahood; in that buddhahood may be understood as the awareness of thusness, here the perfected is again related to thusness. Furthermore, the commentary to 2021.6061 states that " " puried thusness (viuddha tathata) is the perfected (nispanna), which s : " is the ultimate (paramartha). So here it can be seen that the perfected nature is brought together with terms for ultimate reality. Therefore, according to the MSA/Bhs interpretation of the three natures, it is not the dependent nature that is ultimately real or that functions as the substratum of reality; rather, it is the perfected nature that is ultimately real. The following diagram may further help to clarify the MSA/Bhs interpretation of the three natures through showing how the three natures relate to the distinction between the conventional and the ultimate:
CONVENTIONAL REALITY (phenomena) reality improperly viewed in terms of conceptual construction and the subjectobject distinction: reality properly viewed as unreal imagination, as an illusion where apparent objects are not taken as real: ULTIMATE REALITY (thusness) non-conceptually-constructing awareness of thusness:

imagined nature

dependent nature

perfected nature

Again, it should be emphasized that conventional reality and ultimate reality are not taken to be distinct; conventional reality is reality as viewed from the perspective of sentient minds, while ultimate reality is reality as viewed from the perspective of buddha-mind.17
While I cannot, of course, enter here into the intricacies of Tibetan interpretations of the three natures, it is worth pointing out that the ontological status of
17

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Given that the three-nature doctrine pertains to dierences in perspectives on reality, it would be inappropriate to characterize this doctrine as a purely ontological model employed by the MSA/Bh. Rather, the texts three-nature doctrine is better understood as a soteriologico-ontological model: it is a model that identies stages of ontological gnosis that must be traversed in order to attain buddhahood. These stages of ontological gnosis may be specied in the following terms. Ordinary sentient beings confront reality in terms of a subjectobject distinction and thereby construct the ow of appearances into distinct entities with enduring natures; this is the level of the imagined nature. Then, when a sentient being comes to the realization that conceptually constructed entities do not themselves exist at all, but that the illusion which is the basis of these constructions (unreal imagination) does conventionally exist as an interdependent web of causes and conditions, that is the level of the dependent nature. Finally, when the termination of the illusion is brought about when the basis of the matrix of conceptual construction is abandoned
(Footnote 17 continued). the dependent i.e., whether it is to be understood as conventionally or ultimately existent is indeed a point of controversy addressed by Tsong kha pa in his treatment of the Samdhinirmocana-s" (see Hopkins, 1999: 153.; also see Hopkins, 2002: 233.). utra : For example, Tsong kha pa cites the following passage as one which he intends to refute: Imputational {imagined} factors do not exist as either of the two truths [ultimate or conventional]. The dependent-arisings of other-powered {dependent} natures of apprehended-objects and apprehending-subjects [which are dierent substantial entities] exist conventionally [and do not exist ultimately], like magical creations. The thoroughly established {perfected} nature is the ultimate, and its existence in the manner of naturelessness also ultimately exists. (trans. Hopkins, 1999: 156) Also, from reading Hopkins work, it is my impression that the Jo nang pa interpretation of the three-nature theory seems to be closer to my interpretation of the MSA/Bhs three-nature theory than Tsong kha pa is. In this connection, Stearns states that according to Dol po pa: The fully established [perfected] nature (parinispanna) is the state of ultimate : reality which can withstand rigorous and reasoned examination from the absolute point of view, and is empty of both the imagined and the dependent natures. In this way all the imagined and dependent phenomena are non-existent in reality, whereas the fully established [perfected] nature is fully established in reality, is never non-existent as the true nature of phenomena, and always exists in truth. (Stearns, 1999: 95) " " " " : " Stearns also points out that Dol po pa considers the Mahayanasutralamkara to be Great Madhyamaka, i.e., a text presenting the highest teachings (ibid.: 218, note 26).

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buddhahood, an unmediated awareness of thusness, is attained; this is the level of the perfected nature. The key, then, to understanding the doctrine of the three natures in the MSA/Bh is to interpret the doctrine in soteriologico-ontological terms: the three-nature doctrine is not a model of reality simpliciter; rather, it is a model of how reality is to be realized for the attainment of buddhahood. This interpretation of the three natures may be considered alongside the MSA/Bhs presentation of the doctrines of mind-only (citta" " matra) and representation-only (vij~apti-matra). The doctrines of n mind-only and representation-only have sometimes been understood as hallmark doctrines of the Yog"c"ra: it has sometimes been stated a a that the Yog"c"ra is metaphysically idealist because of the claim a a " that reality is nothing but mind (citta-matra) or nothing but representation (vij~apti-m" n atra). According to the MSA/Bh, however, the doctrines of representation-only and mind-only are not to be understood as ultimately valid, since in the end the goal is to realize that even mind does not exist.18 Thus in the context of our text, mindonly and representation-only (like the three natures) are better understood as soteriologico-ontological doctrines: they do not represent reality as it really is; rather, they identify stages of ontological gnosis that must be traversed in order to attain buddhahood. As with the doctrine of the three natures, we may chart out the stages of ontological gnosis according to the doctrine of mind-only or representation-only in terms of the distinction between the conventional and ultimate aspects of reality:
CONVENTIONAL REALITY (phenomena) reality improperly viewed in terms of the subjectobject distinction; mind as distinct from the objects that confront it: reality properly viewed as nothing-but-mind; all phenomena reduced to mind: ULTIMATE REALITY (thusness) not even mind taken to exist:
18

duality

mind-only

buddhahood

MSABh ad 6.69 states that a bodhisattva rst arrives at mind-only (citta" matra), but later realizes that even mind-only does not exist; and MSABh ad 11.47 states that a bodhisattva rst attains the realization of representation-only (vij~aptin " matra), but later does not even perceive the reality of that.

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As presented, we can see that the doctrine of mind-only is quite similar in form to the doctrine of the three natures in the MSA/Bh. But it may be interesting to note that the two doctrines are also similar in content. We may specify this similarity as follows. Regarding the rst element in each diagram, the imagined nature and duality, both are described in terms of the characteristic of subjectobject duality. Regarding the second element in each, the dependent nature and mind-only, we have already seen (at 11.40) that the dependent nature is interpreted as having two aspects, a subjectaspect and an object-aspect. We also saw that each of those aspects is understood to be caused by or grounded in the store consciousness " (alaya-vij~ana). Thus the dependent nature is interpreted in terms of n" the store consciousness which is the basis of mind.19 The doctrine of mind-only may be described as the view that reality is nothing-butmind, that all phenomena should be reduced to mind. If we understand the concept of mind to be linked to the store consciousness (as at MSABh ad 19.76), then we can see a link between mind-only and the dependent nature.20 At a more theoretical level, we may see that both the dependent nature (explained in terms of the store consciousness) and mind-only (according to which all phenomena are reduced to mind) are oered as psychological models for the interpretation of phenomenal reality. That is to say, both oer a mental explanation for what are understood to be the underlying processes of phenomenal reality: phenomenal reality is unreal imagination generated through the store consciousness, or phenomenal reality is nothing but mind. Finally, regarding the nal element in each diagram, we can see that the perfected nature may be related to the stage of buddhahood, wherein not even mind-only is taken to exist. The perfected nature is understood to entail a pure, unmediated awareness of thusness, which is equated with the attainment of buddhahood.21 While the MSA/Bhs presentation of the three-nature theory certainly brings together various terminologies and conceptual categories, I think a case may be made that the text does oer a consistent interpretation of the three natures. Again, the point I have attempted
19 The link between the dependent nature and the store consciousness is also made at MSA/Bh 19.51. 20 An indirect link between these two is also made at MSABh ad 13.19. 21 See MSA/Bh 9.4, 9.22, 9.56, 9.57, 9.81, 11.31, 11.41, 19.79, 2021.6061, and the discussion in DAmato ((2000), Chapter 7: Buddhatva).

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to emphasize here is that in the context of the MSA/Bh, the threenature theory is properly understood not as an ontological model simpliciter, but rather as a soteriologico-ontological model, a model presenting stages of gnosis that must be traversed in order to attain buddhahood an attainment which may be interpreted in terms of a non-conceptually-constructing awareness (nirvikalpa-j~ana) of thusn" " ness (tathata).
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" " _ " " _ " Bagchi, Sitansusekhar, ed. (1970). Mahayana-Sutralankara of Asanga. Darbhanga, Bihar: Mithila Institute. " Boquist, Ake. (1993). Trisvabhava: A Study of the Development of the Three-nature" " theory in Yogacara Buddhism. Lund, Sweden: University of Lund. " " " DAmato, Mario. (2000). The Mahayana-H"nayana Distinction in the i " " " " : " Mahayanasutralamkara: A Terminological Analysis. Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago. "s Davidson, Ronald M. (1985). Buddhist Systems of Transformation: Araya-parivrtti/: ": " " paravrtti among the Yogacara. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley. Dutt, Nalinaksha, ed. (1966). Bodhisattvabhumi. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research " Institute. Hirakawa Akira, Hirai Shunei, Takahashi So, Hakamaya Noriaki and Yoshizu Giei. ": (1973). Index to the Abhidharmakoabhasya: Part One: Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese. s Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kabushikikaisha. Hopkins, Jerey. (1999). Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism: Dynamic Responses to Dzong-ka-bas The Essence of Eloquence: I. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hopkins, Jerey. (2002). Reections on Reality: Dynamic Responses to Dzong-ka-bas The Essence of Eloquence: Volume 2. Berkeley: University of California Press. " Lamotte, Etienne, ed. and trans. (1935). Samdhinirmocana Sutra: LExplication des : Myste`res. Louvain: Universite de Louvain. _ Lamotte, Etienne, ed. and trans. (1973). La Somme du Grand Vehicule dAsanga " " (Mahayana-samgraha), 2 Vols. Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste de Lou: vain. Originally published in (1938). " " Levi, Sylvain, ed. and trans. (1907, 1911). Mahayana-Sutralamkara, 2 Vols. Paris: " " : " Librairie Honore Champion. " " Levi, Sylvain, ed. (1925). Vij~aptimatratasiddhi: Deux Traites de Vasubandhu: n " Vimatika et Trimika. Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion. :s :s " May, Jacques. (1971). La philosophie bouddhique idealiste, Asiatische Studien/ Etudes Asiatiques, 25, 265323. " " " " : " Nagao Gadjin. (1958, 1961). Index to the Mahayana-Sutralamkara, 2 Vols. Tokyo: Nippon Gakujutsu Shink"-kai. o " Powers, John, trans. (1995). Wisdom of Buddha: The Samdhinirmocana Sutra. : Berkeley: Dharma Publishing. Schmithausen, Lambert. (1969). Zur Literaturgeschichte der alteren Yog"c"raa a Schule. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft supplementa I, 811823. " " Sponberg, Alan. (1983). The Trisvabhava doctrine in India and China, Ryukoku " Daigaku Bukky" Bunka Kenkyujo Kiy" 22, 97119. o o Stearns, Cyrus. (1999). The Buddha from Dolpo. Albany: SUNY Press.

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" " Williams, Paul. (1989). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. New York: Routledge.

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