Journal of Indian Philosophy (2006) 34: 513 DOI 10.

1007/s10781-005-6045-x KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

Springer 2006

" ON THE LANGUAGE OF NAVYA-NYAYA: AN EXPERIMENT WITH PRECISION THROUGH A NATURAL LANGUAGE

Daniel Ingalls one of the very few Western Sanskritists ever interested in Navya-ny"ya once wrote: a
Navya-ny"ya is written in the most formidable style of Sanskrit, a style which a seems to delight in technical terms and breathtaking compounds. What holds for India holds also for the West. The average Englishman cannot pronounce, let alone understand, a page of the Principia Mathematica.1

It may be added that, as the language of symbolic logic was applied to other disciplines in the West, so was also the language of Navyany"ya in India. a But the analogy seems to end here. Ingalls hastened to say:
For all the similarities of subject matter and spirit, the structures of symbolic logic and Navya-ny"ya are radically dierent. They dier not only as wholes; the diera ence permeates each detail of the architecture.2

The explanation for this dierence is not far to seek, and it had been emphasized by Ingalls himself elsewhere:3 while the new logic of the West followed the mathematical model, the new logic of India followed the linguistic model. The latter did not construct an articial language (kunstliche Sprache), consisting in a system of symbols, as did the former; instead, fully exploiting the extraordinary power of abstraction of the Sanskrit language and the acute linguistic theories developed by the ancient Indian linguists, it created a language of its own, which is not articial in the strict sense but which is free from many of the ambiguities of ordinary language a language which even the best knowers of Sanskrit must learn. Navya-ny"ya operates with the natural (Sanskrit) language. a Its variables are expressed by pronouns, as in ordinary language. Its technical terms, despite their peculiarity, are words of the ordinary
1 2 3

Ingalls (1968: XVIII). Ibid. Ingalls (1954).

KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

language, invested with new meanings. The dierent shades of meaning it expresses by using the suxes -ka- and -"ya- ultimately go i back to the meaning that of possession which is attached to those suxes in the ordinary language.4 Abbreviations such as " " dh"mat for dh"mavattvat (in vahniman dh"mat X has re, because it u " u u " has smoke) are explainable by reference to a semantic theory developed by the ancient linguists.5 Unnatural abstracts such as gotvatva cow-ness-ness, ghatatvatva pot-ness-ness are based on a : rule of Sanskrit grammar. As I. M. Bochenski already observed, the language of Navya-ny"ya, like that of the ancient and scholastic logic a of the West, is an abstraction from the natural language.6 _ Let us take a fairly simple example from Ganges as Tattvacin" : tamani (14th century), the basic text of Navya-ny"ya. What is traa " ditionally regarded as the conclusive denition (siddhantalaksana) of : : " Invariable Concomitance (vyapti, literally pervasion) is formulated there as follows: " " " " " avapratiyogipratiyogyasamanadhikaranayatsamanadhiraranatyantabh" : :" " " " " tavacchedakavacchinnam yan na bhavati tena samam tasya sama: : " " : nadhikaranyam vyaptih Invariable Concomitance is the fact that A : : shares a locus with B, which is not delimited (determined) by the delimiter of the counterpositiveness to a constant absence sharing a locus with A but not sharing a locus with the counterpositive. For the convenience of translation, the variables A and B have been put in place of the pronouns yad and tad in the original. Among the technical terms used, the most important is avacchedaka delimiter the Navya-ny"ya texts are covered with the dust of a avacchedaka (avacchedka-dh"li). This and other technical terms, in u dierent combinations, make what appears to be a system of linguistic notations7 or a system of cliches;8 however, their use is not mechanical; in dierent contexts, they have dierent meanings or dierent shades of meaning. In our text itself, in the phrase pratiyo" " gitavacchedakavacchinnam yan na bhavati which is not delimited by : the delimiter of the counterpositiveness, avacchedaka and avacchinna are employed in two dierent meanings. Strictly speaking, it is the " pratiyogita counterpositiveness, i.e. the abstract property residing in
"" The sux -ka- is used as samasanta at the end of Bahuvr" compounds. hi See Bhattacharya (1977: 105 n. 9). The point was recently discussed by Claus Oetke, with a basic misunderstanding, it seems: Oetke (2003: 59 n. 2). 6 Bochenski (1996: 16). 7 Dasgupta (1922: 308). 8 Ingalls (1951: 2).
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" ON THE LANGUAGE OF NAVYA-NYAYA

the counterpositive (pratiyogin), the positive counterpart of the " absence (abhava), which is delimited (avacchinna) by its delimiter (avacchedaka) the abstract, uncommon property which is known as " the determinant (viesana) of the counterpositive (viesanataya s : : s : : " " " : prat"yamano sadharano dharmah). Such abstract, uncommon propi : erties are vahnitva reness, ghatatva potness, gotva cowness, etc., : which are the reasons for the application (pravrttinimitta) or delimiters of the property of being the primary meanings (aks " yatavacchedaka) of the words vahni re, ghata pot,, go cow, and : so on. When the author says that something in the present case, the " object to be established (sadhya) is not avacchinna by the delimiter of the counterpositiveness to the absence, he means to say that it is not determined by the delimiter, which, by implication, is not the delimiter of the property of being the object to be established " " (sadhyatavacchedaka). The whole conception was derived from the linguistic speculations " given rise to by P"ninis s"tra V,1,119: tasya bhavas tvatalau, and a: u " particularly by K"ty"yanas varttika 5 on this s"tra: yasya gunasya a a u : " "  " bhavad dravye sabdaniveas tadabhidhane tvatalau.9 But there are also s other, non-linguistic meanings in which the term avacchedaka is employed.10 _ Now, the precision of Ganges as denition can be measured against a " similar denition given by Manikantha, author of the Nyayaratna and : :: _ " " " one of Ganges as forerunners: pratiyogisam" adhikaranatyantabhavetan" : " " " " " " arasvasamanadhikaranatyantabhavapratiyogina saha s" anadhikaranam " " :" : yam yasya tad eva tasya vy" aptir ucyate the fact that a certain entity : shares a locus with what is not the counterpositive of a constant absence which shares a locus with itself (=that entity) and which is other than a constant absence sharing a locus with its counterpositive that is, indeed, called the Invariable Concomitance of that entity. In the case of the inference The mountain has re, because it has smoke (parvato vahnim" dh"m" for instance, one could take as constant absence an u at), sharing a locus with the Reason (hetu) smoke (dh"ma) the absence of u all res apart from the mountain re, and the object to be established, re (vahni), would be the counterpositive of each of these absences. The denition, therefore, would not apply to this true inference. To solve _ this problem Ganges a introduces the concept of avacchedaka: although
" : See Bhattacharya (1977: 130). Cf. Mathur"n"tha, Tattvacintamanirahasya II: 593: a a " paksatavacchedakasya paksavacakaprthiv"padaakyatavacchedakasya prthiv"tvasyeti i s i : " : " " yavat. 10 See Bhattacharya (1977: 113, 1979: 187 n. 74, 1980: 319 n).
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KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

the counterpositives of the constant absences of dierent kinds of re are this and that re, the counterpositiveness residing in this and that re is not delimited by the generic property reness (vahnitva), which is the delimiter of the property of being the object to be established.11 This idea becomes even clearer if the negation is shifted from the delimited (avacchinna) to the delimiter (avacchedaka), as, e.g., in Raghun"thas reformulation of the denition (15th century): a " pratiyogyasamanadhikaranayadr"paviistasam" adhikaranatyant" u s:: an " ab: :" " " " havapratiyogitanavacchedako yo dharmas taddharmavacchinnena yena " " kenapi samam samanadhikaranyam tadr"paviistasya taddharmavacu s :: : " " " : : " chinnayavannir"pita vyaptih the fact of sharing a locus with a thing u " " : whatsoever (B), delimited (=determined) by a property which is not the delimiter of the counterpositiveness to a constant absence sharing a locus with a thing (A) determined by a certain form but not sharing a locus with its counterpositive that is the Invariable Concomitance of that thing determined by that form (A), Invariable Concomitance which is described by the totality of B delimited (=determined) by that property.12 Here the Reason also is made more precise: tadr"paviista deteru s:: mined by a certain form, i.e. determined by the delimiter of the " property of being the Reason (hetutavacchedakaviista) in order to s:: avoid further diculties. And quantiers, universal and existential, " " are explicitly used: yavat all, yena kenapi samam with a thing whatsoever. " But the expression pratiyogitanavacchedaka which does not delimit the counterpositiveness, still left a loophole: when one infers re from smoke on the mountain, there is, e.g., absence of kitchen re " i (mahanas"ya-vahni), and reness (vahnitva), the delimiter of the " " property of being the object to be established (sadhyatavacchedaka), is a delimiter of the counterpositiveness to this absence, along with " i the property of being related to the kitchen (mahanas"yatva) and the " i property of being kitchen re (mahanas"yavahnitva). There is thus " non-pervasion (avyapti) of the denition to this true inference (or, strictly speaking, to the Invariable Concomitance the object of the denition which resides in the Reason).13 Dierent solutions were oered. One of them (that oered by Jagad" a, 16th century) was: the counterpositiveness should be s
11 12 13

See Bhattacharya (1980: 279280). See Bhattacharya (1977: 101102). See Bhattacharya (1978: 99 n. 3).

" ON THE LANGUAGE OF NAVYA-NYAYA

dierent from what is delimited both by the delimiter of the property of being the object to be established (e.g. reness, vahnitva) and by what is other than it (e.g. the property of being related to the kitchen, " i " " " " mahanas"yatva) sadhyatavacchedakataditarobhayavacchedyabhinna. This, in turn, raised a problem, however. Rather than saying X has " re, because it has smoke (vahniman dh"mat), one could say X has u " the locus of an object of true knowledge, because it has smoke "s " " (prameyarayavan [or prameyavatvan] dh"mat), re being the locus of u " an object of true knowledge, reness (vahnitva). Now, the delimiter of " " the property of being the object to be established (sadhyatavacchedaka) is here the property of being the locus of an object of true "s knowledge (prameyarayatva or prameyavattva), i.e. object of true knowledge (prameya),14 and what is other than an object of true knowledge is unknown (aprasiddha) according to Ny"ya realism, a which holds that the whole of the real is an object of true knowledge. To solve this problem, the common meaning of what is other than the delimiter of the property of being the object to be established was " ": abandoned and two dierent technical (paribhasika) meanings were " " " proposed: (1) tadvisayitvavyapakavisayitaka what describes a : : content-possessor-ness which is non-pervader of its own content" possessor-ness; (2) yena r"pena sadhyatavacchedakatvam tena r"pena u : " u : : " " tadanavacchinnaprakaratavacchedaka delimiter of a determinantness which is not delimited by the delimiter of the property of being the object to be established under the very form in which it is the delimiter of the property of being the object to be established. The rst meaning is to be explained as follows: In every true knowledge there " is the content-possessor-ness (visayitva, visayita) of an object of true : : knowledge (prameya); but in every true knowledge, there is not, e.g., the content-possessor-ness of potness (ghatatva). Consequently, the : " content-possessor-ness of potness, etc., is non-pervader (avyapaka) of that of an object of true knowledge; and, in this sense, potness, etc., which describe (nir"paka)15 the content-possessor-ness of potness, u etc., are other than an object of true knowledge. The second meaning is this: In the inference in question, it is as object of true knowledge (prameya) that object of true knowledge is the delimiter (avacchedaka) of the property of being the object to be established. " Now, the determinant (prakara) in the knowledge X has a pot
See n. 5 above. It is in this sense that the sux -ka- is employed here. See, e.g., Guha (1979: 221222), and, on nir"paka, ibid.: 138. u
15 14

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KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

(ghatavan), for instance, is the pot (ghata), and the delimiter of the : " : " " determinantness (prakarata) residing in the pot is potness (ghatatva). : One may say, it is true, that the determinantness residing in the pot is delimited by object of true knowledge as potness, inasmuch as potness is an object of true knowledge; but it is not delimited by object of true knowledge under the form object of true knowledge. In this sense, potness, etc., are other than object of true knowledge. What is other than the delimiter of the property of being the object to be established is not, therefore, unknown.16 In this second meaning, there is also a hint of the formalism which was the subject of a previous paper in this Journal.17 Here is an example of how, over centuries, Navya-ny"ya sought a more and more logical precision, without going beyond the bounds of the natural (Sanskrit) language. Cumbrousness could not be avoided in this procedure. At the last stage, as we have seen, the language became particularly cumbrous. And, there again, the second meaning can be further claried by introducing the avacchedaka of the property of being the delimiter of the property of being the object to " " " be established (sadhyatavacchedakatavacchedaka), and the concept of " " " " nir"paka describer: sadhyatavacchedakatavacchedakadharmavacu " " " " " chinna ya sadhyatavacchedakanisthavacchedakata tadanir"pita ya u " " :: " " " prakarata tadavacchedakadharma the property delimiting a determinantness which is not described by the delimiterness residing in the delimiter of the property of being the object to be established, which delimiterness is delimited by the property delimiting the property of being the delimiter of the property of being the object to be established.18 Thus, in the case of the inference X has the locus of an object of true knowledge, because it has smoke, the delimiter of the property of being the delimiter of the property of being the object to be established is the property of being an object of true knowledge (prameyatva). Delimited by it is the delimiterness residing in the delimiter of the property of being the object to be established, object of true knowledge (prameya). Not described by this delimiterness is the determinantness residing in the pot, etc., in such knowledges as X has a pot. And it is the delimiter of this determinantness, potness, etc., which is to be understood as what is other than an object of true knowledge.
16 17 18

On all this see Bhattacharya (1977: 105106). Bhattacharya (2001). Bhatt"c"rya (1933: 9). : :a a

" ON THE LANGUAGE OF NAVYA-NYAYA

11

But Navya-naiy"yikas also know how to exploit the subtleties of a the Sanskrit language to express their thoughts precisely and concisely. Here are a couple of examples: Raghun"tha raises an objection against his own denitions of the a fact of having a locus dierent from that of the counterpositive (pratiyogivaiyadhikaranya),19 which is part of the denition of : " Invariable Concomitance (vyapti): they do not apply in the case of the true inference Time possesses a pot, because it is the Great Time " " " " (kalo ghatavan mahakalatvat) an inference which Raghun"tha does a : " not explicitly formulate but leaves to be deduced from his very careful use of the terms. It is impossible says he, referring to those denitions that the counterpositiveness to an absence occurring in the Great Time locus of the Reason property of being the Great Time " " (mahakalatva) with which the counterpositive is not related through " the relation delimiting the counterpositiveness (pratiyogitavacchedakasambandha), be delimited by the temporal relation : " (kalikasambandha), which delimits the property of being the object to : " " be established (sadhyatavacchedakasambandha); or that the property : of being other than that with which the counterpositive is related through this relation exist in the Great Time. All occurrent (vrttimant) entities occur in the Great Time through the temporal relation. As for non-occurrent (avrtti) entities such as empty space " "s (akaa, gagana), that with which they would be related through this relation is unknown, and, consequently, that with which they would not be related through this relation is equally unknown; for an absence cannot be known without the counterpositive being known. Thus there is no absence with the counterpositiveness delimited by the temporal relation, which occurs in the locus of the Reason with which the counterpositive is not related through the relation delimiting the counterpositiveness. An absence such as that of a pot, by " inherence (samavaya), for instance, may full this condition; but its counterpositiveness is not delimited by the relation delimiting the property of being the object to be established. In the same manner, there is no absence of which one can say that its counterpositive is not related through the temporal relation with the Great Time. In other words, the property of being that with which the counterpositive is not related through the temporal relation does not exist in the Great Time. But, instead of expressing the fact in this way, using the compound pratiyogyasambandhitva property of being that with :
19

See Bhattacharya (1995: 375 n. 1), and 401402 (Summary).

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KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

which the counterpositive is not related, Raghun"tha says yat a pratiyogisambandhi tadanyatva property of being other than that : with which the counterpositive is related, in order to emphasize that the property of being that with which the counterpositive would not be related through the temporal relation is unknown.20 An attempt is made to counter this objection by reformulating the denition of the fact of having a locus dierent from that of the counterpositive: one no longer speaks of a locus of the Reason with which the counterpositive is related or not related through the relation delimiting the property of being the object to be established, but of a counterpositive which, through the relation delimiting the property of being the object to be established, does not occur (avrtti) in what is a locus of the Reason. Now, although that with which empty space, counterpositive of the absence of empty space, would not be related through the temporal relation is unknown because that with which it would be related through this relation is itself unknown, the absence of the fact of occurring in the Great Time through the temporal relation a fact which is known for all occurrent (vrttimant) entities is known for empty space, which is non-occurrent (avrtti).21 The absence of empty space is thus an absence which has a locus dierent from that of the counterpositive. These subtleties inevitably escape the notice of the modern interpreters of Navya-ny"ya who do not take the trouble to read the ancient a traditional commentaries as, for instance, Erich Frauwallners misunderstanding of the latter passage shows.22
REFERENCES

" " " " i Bhatt"c"rya, V. (1933). Vivrti on the Siddhantalaksana. In Mahamahopadhyaya-Sr": : : :a a i _ s " " " " s " Gangeopadhyayaviracitam Siddhantalaksanam, Sr"-Raghunathairomaniviracitaya : : : : " i " : " " " is " " " " D"dhitya Sr"-Jagad"satarkalamkarakrtaya Jagad"ya Nyayacarya-Tarkat"rthai i i i " " " " i " s" " Sr"-Vamacaranabhattacaryakrtaya Vivrtya Sr"-Guruprasadaastri-Vyakaranaca :" " : :: " " taya D"pikaya Mahamahopadhyaya-Sr"-Kal"an " s" " " " "  i " is _ rya-Daranacarya-Nyayaastrikr " i s " "
20 " Cf. Gad"dhara: 352 (Chowkhamba), and 707 (Bibliotheca Indica): gaganadya " " abhavapratiyoginas tena sambandhena sambandhir"papratiyogyaprasiddhya tena u : : " " sambandhena pratiyogyasambandhitvasiddhim (asambandhitvaprasiddhim, Biblio: : : : : " theca Indica) sphut"kartum pratiyogyasambandhitvasyety anabhidhaya yat pratiyog:i : : " " " isambandhi tadanyatvasyeti asamasenabhidhanam. : 21 Cf. id.: 355 (Chowkhamba), and 713 (Bibliotheca Indica): tatpratiyoginah kali: " " " " kasambandhenadhikaranaprasiddhya tadanadhikaranaprasiddhav (thus Bibliotheca : :" :" " ": " " " " " " Indica) api vrttimati prasiddhayah kalikasambandhena mahakalavrttitaya abhavasya : " tatra prasiddhatvat. 22

Frauwallner (1970: 187). See Bhattacharya (2005: 230 n. 42).

" ON THE LANGUAGE OF NAVYA-NYAYA

13

" " " karabhattacaryaviracitaya Vivecanaya ca samullasitam. Samp"dakah Sr" :: " " : a : -Gurupras"das "str" V"r"nas" Sr" ajasth"na-Samskrta-K"lej-Grantham"l"y"h prathaa a . a a : : -R" a a a a a: : mam kusumam. : " Bhattacharya, K. (1977, 1978, 1980, 1995, 2005). Le Siddhantalaksanaprakarana du : : : _ " : Tattvacintamani de Ganges a avec la D"dhiti de Raghun"tha Siromani et la T"ka de i a : :i " Jagad" a Tark"lamk"ra. Journal Asiatique CCLXV, 97139; CCLXVI, 97124; s a : a CCLXVIII, 275322; 283, 373406; 293, 213244. Bhattacharya, K. (1979). Les arguments de Jagad" a pour etablir la parole comme s  ": "s " " " moyen de connaissance vraie (pramana), Sabdaaktiprakaika, karika I-V avec le s commentaire de lauteur lui-meme. Journal Asiatique CCLXVII, 155189. Bhattacharya, K. (2001). A Note on Formalism in Indian Logic. Journal of Indian Philosophy 29, 12, Minoru Hara & David Pingree (eds.), Ingalls Festschrift, pp. 1723. Bochenski, I.M. (1996). Formale Logik. 5th ed. Orig.: Freiburg/Munchen: Verlag Karl Albert 1956. Dasgupta, S. (1922). A History of Indian Philosophy I. Cambridge: University Press. Frauwallner, E. (1970). Raghun"tha Siromani (2. Fortsetzung). Wiener Zeitschrift a : fur die Kunde Sudasiens und Archiv fur indische Philosophie XIV, 161208. a a a a a s Gad"dhara Bhatt"c"rya: K"m"khy"n"tha Tarkav"g" a & others (eds.), Tattvaa : :a a " : " " cintamani-D"dhiti-Vivrti (Gadadhar"). Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1910 . (Biblioi i theca Indica); Vindhyes var" Pras"da Dvived" and others (eds.), Varanasi,  a  Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series. 2nd ed. 1970. _ " : Ganges a Up"dhy"ya: Tattvacintamani, K"m"khy"n"tha Tarkav"g" a (ed.), Part II a a a a a a a s " (Anumanakhanda), with the Commentary of Mathur"n"tha Tarkav"g" a, Tattvaa a a s :: " : cintamanirahasya. Calcutta: Asiatic Society (Bibliotheca Indica), 1892. " Guha, D.C. (1968/1979). Navya Nyaya System of Logic (Some Basic Theories & Techniques). Varanasi: Bh"rat" Vidy" Prak"s an; Second revised edition. Delhi: a ya a a Motilal Banarsidass. " Ingalls, D.H.H. (1951). Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic. Cambridge, Mass. (Harvard Oriental Series 40). Ingalls, D.H.H. (1954). The Comparison of Indian and Western Philosophy. Journal of Oriental Research, Madras. 22(for 1952-3, publ. 1954), 111. Ingalls, D.H.H. (1968). Preface to Guha. Jagad" a Tark"lamk"ra: see Bhatt"c"rya, Bhattacharya. s a : a : :a a _ Mathur"n"tha Tarkav"g" a: see Ganges a Up"dhy"ya. a a a s a a Oetke, C. (2003). Indian Logic and Indian Syllogism. Indo-Iranian Journal 46, 5369. Raghun"tha Siromani: see Bhatt"c"rya, Bhattacharya, Frauwallner, Gad"dhara. a a : : :a a

Department of Indology University of Bonn Bonn Germany E-mail: kamaleswar@hotmail.com