JOSE LINO LUNA, petitioner-appellant, vs. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, respondent-appellant; SERVANDO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent. G.R. No.

L-13744, November 29, 1918 Law: Section 21 of Act No. 1582 - Conduct of elections. At all the elections held under the provisions of this Act the polls shall be open from seven oclock in the morning until five in the afternoon, during which period not more than one member of the board of inspectors shall be absent at one time, and then for not to exceed twenty minutes at one time Facts: Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando de los Angeles were candidates for the office of Governor of the Province of Rizal. The election was held on June 6, 1916 and the canvassing of votes resulted to the following: Rodriguez with 4,321 votes; Luna with 4,157 and; de los Angeles with 3, 576. Rodriguez having said to receive majority of votes was proclaimed the winner. Luna filed an election protest before the Court of First Instance of Taytay. In the municipality of Taytay, Judge McMahon found from the evidence that 50 ballots cast for Eulogio Rodriguez should not have been counted for him, and ordered that number of votes deducted from his total. In the municipality of Binangonan, he found that the inspectors did not close the polls at 6 o'clock p.m., and that a large number of persons voted after that time, and directed that the total vote of Eulogio Rodriguez should be reduced by the number of such votes, without ascertaining how many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna. By deducting the said votes in the municipality of Taytay and those cast after six o'clock p.m. in the municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon concluded that Jose Lino Luna had received a plurality of the legal votes cast at said election and ordered the provincial board of canvassers to correct its canvass accordingly. From that conclusion both parties to the contest appealed. Issues: (1) What is the effect of holding the polls open after the hour fixed for closing the election? (2) What is the effect of assistance rendered by the inspectors of the election to incapacitated persons, without first requiring of such persons an oath to the effect that they are incapacitated to prepare their own ballots? (3) What is the effect of a failure on the part of the authorities to provide proper voting booths? Held: 1. It has already been established in Supreme Court decisions that the rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The polls should be opened and closed in strict accord with the provisions of the law. Voters who do not appear and offer

to vote within the hours designated by the law should not be permitted to vote after the time for closing the polls has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter is prevented, during the voting hours, from voting, and is not permitted to vote by reason of the failure of the inspectors to do their duty, then, certainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither such votes nor the entire vote of the precinct should be annulled simply because some votes were cast after the regular hour. 2. In the case of Paulino vs. Cailles (R. G. No. 12753, 37 Phil. Rep., 825) that the ballots of incapacitated persons who voted without taking the oath or were assisted by one inspector alone, or by two belonging to the same party, should not be counted if such ballots could be identified. We further held that, in the absence of fraud, all of the ballots of the precinct should not be invalidated by the mere fact that the inspectors did not comply with their duty. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in an election for a violation of the law for which they were in no way responsible and which they could not prevent The incapacitated persons mentioned in said section above noted are usually persons who are unable to acquaint themselves with the provisions of the law. They are, therefore, absolutely dependent upon the advice and counsel of others. Generally, they have no idea whatever as to the form and requirements in casting their ballots. Their ignorance, however, does not relieve them from their responsibility under the law, nor from the effect of their failure to comply therewith. 3. In the present case, while there is some conflict in the evidence, and while the proof clearly shows that the booths were not constructed in strict accordance with the provisions of the law, we are of the opinion that a large preponderance of the evidence shows that the booths were constructed (defectively perhaps) in a manner which afforded each voter an opportunity to prepare his ballot in absolute secrecy. The officers, however, should be criminally held liable but the votes cast therein remain in the absence of fraud.

BENEDICTO LAMBONAO, petitioner-appellant, vs. ALFREDO O. TERO and DANIEL B. VESTAL, respondents-appellees. G.R. No. L-23240, December 31, 1965 Law: Section 31 of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 180 - Certificate of candidacy for only one office. - No person shall be eligible unless, within the time fixed by law, he files a duly signed and sworn certificate of candidacy, nor shall any person be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and, if he files certificates of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. (C.A. 357-26) Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for municipal councilor of Anahawan, Southern Leyte in the elections of November 12, 1963 along with the respondents. Alfredo Tero and Daniel Vestal were proclaimed elected to the office of municipal councilors by the municipal board of canvassers on November 21, 1963. Petitioner alleged that he received the next largest number of votes and that respondents are ineligible for said positions because their certificates of candidacy, filed on September 12, 1963, were not in fact signed nor ratified by them but by somebody else, who forged their signatures therein. A petition for quo warranto was filed by the petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte which the court dismissed for lack of cause of action. Issue: Whether or not the signing of the certificate of candidacy by the candidates is a mandatory requirement by law. Held: Yes. The Supreme Court held that Section 31 of RA No. 180 is a mandatory provision. As regards election laws, however, it is an established rule of interpretation that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory, after the elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate. As stated in the case of Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez (39 Phil. 208), the court said that when the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest voter is expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.. There are, certain requirements of the law, affecting the vote, which have been considered by this Court as of a mandatory character until the ballot is placed in the ballot box, but we have held that the validity of the count cannot be questioned, nor the vote stricken out after the ballots had been placed in the ballot boxes, simply for non-compliance with such provisions. Moreover, the court said that the defects in the certificates of candidacy of respondents should have been questioned by petitioners on or before the election and not after the will of the people has been expressed through the ballots.

DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers of Mindanao, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents. G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1989

Law: Republic Act No. 6734 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO Facts: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 6734 on the following grounds: 1) R.A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement 2) R.A. 6734 provides for the unconditional creation of the ARMM and not through the mode of a plebiscite as provided in the Constitution 3) The Constitution provides that ARMM shall be approved by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite by all voters residing in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A. 6734 says by a majority or votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite and only those provinces and cities where a majority of votes cast in favour of the Organic Act shall be included in the Autonomous Region. R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the Constitution 4) R.A. 6734 includes provinces and cities which do not have the same cultural and historical heritage and other relevant characteristics needed for admission to the ARMM 5) R.A. 6734 violates constitutional guarantee on freedom of exercise of religion as some its provisions run counter to the Koran 6) The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of power to the ARMM is contrary to the constitutional mandate that the creation of the autonomous region hinges solely on the result of the plebiscite 7) R.A. 6734 says only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. This provision, Abbas claims, is contrary to the Constitutional mandate that, No province city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established with the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the units directly affected. (Art. 10, Sec. 10, 1987 Constitution) Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional.

Held: No. The contentions of Abbas are without merits. The court laid down the following points. 1. R.A. 6734 as an enactment of Congress is superior to Tripoli Agreement and being a subsequent law would be amendatory of the latter. It is also the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. 2. Section 13 of transitory provisions of R.A. 6734 provides for the manner in which the plebiscite will be held. 3. What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units. For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose. 4. It is not for the Court to decide on the wisdom of the law concerning the inclusion of provinces and cities which petitioner claims should not be included in a plebiscite because it is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. 5. As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. There is no actual controversy yet as to any violation of freedom of religion 6. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government. 7. The power of the President to merge administrative regions is inherent in his power of general supervisionover local governments. Besides, administrative regions are not territorial or political regions. The requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions. Examples of administrative regions are Regions I to XII and the NCR

RODOLFO DUMAYAS, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF CARLES, PROVINCE OF ILOILO and FELIPE BERNAL, JR., respondents. G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001 Law: Sections 234, 235, 236 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) Facts: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the position in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998 synchronized elections. During the canvassing by the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts of Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged violation of Secs. 234, 235, 236 of the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws; acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law committed in precinct nos. 61A, 62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan during the casting and counting of votes. Respondent Bernal, Jr. denied the allegations and submitted joint affidavits of the members of the different Boards of Election Inspectors for the said precincts stating that that the elections in their respective precincts starting from the start of the voting to its closing, to the counting of votes and to the preparation and submission of election returns were peaceful, clean, orderly and no acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion and similar acts prohibited by law was exerted on anybody including the voters and members of the BEIs. The MBC denied petitioners objections and proceeded with the canvass which showed respondent Bernal garnering more votes than the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election returns from 3 precincts and directed the MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and then, to proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate. Private respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division with the COMELEC en banc. The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal filed an urgent motion to declare void petitioners proclamation. The duly proclaimed Vice-Mayor Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed an action for quo warranto against petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo. Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel Bernals motion for reconsideration and motion declaring void petitioners proclamation on the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said motion when he filed quo warranto action. The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, annulled the petitioner Dumayas proclamation and constituted a new MBC. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality. Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set aside the COMELEC en banc resolution. Issue:

1.) Should respondent Bernal, who was named as petitioner in the quo warranto proceedings commenced before the regular court, be deemed to have abandoned the motions he had filed with respondent Commission? 2.) Whether or not the COMELEC was correct in including in the canvass the election returns of the contested precincts? Held: 1.) The Supreme Court held in the negative. As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a preproclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason for this rule is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding, so as to prevent confusion and conflict of authority. Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain exceptions, as where: (a) the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper remedy; (c) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (e) the proclamation was null and void. An examination of the petition filed primarily by Vice-Mayor Betita with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City reveals that it is neither a quo warranto petition under the Omnibus Election Code nor an election protest. It appears to be in the nature of an action for usurpation of public office brought by Betita to assert his right to the position of Mayor pursuant to the rules on succession of local government officials contained in the Local Government Code. 2.) The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence presented by the petitioner to prove the alleged irregularities were the self-serving contracts of his watchers and inspectors. Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegations that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their face appear to be regular and without any physical signs of tampering. The election irregularities cited by the petitioner would require the presentation of evidence which cannot be done in a preproclamation controversy which is summary in nature.

JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999 Law: Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code - Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and midday of Election Day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission. Facts: On March 24, 1998, Jose Pempe Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections. Three days after, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Pempe which was granted. The Comelec further ruled to disqualify Jose Pempe Miranda. On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose Pempe Miranda. During the election, petitioner garnered more votes than private respondent. Abaya then filed a disqualification case against Joel Miranda for void substitution. After a motion for reconsideration, COMELEC granted Abayas complaint. Hence, this petition. Issue: 1.) Whether the annulment of petitioners substitution and proclamation was issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 2.) Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Held: 1. On the matter of jurisdiction, there is no question that the case at hand is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Comelec. As held in Herrera vs. Baretto (25 Phil. 245 1913), Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of

jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over the subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. 2. A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had avalid certificateof candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called substitute to file a new and original certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

GREGORIO V. GAERLAN, JR., petitioner and appellee, vs. LUIS C. CATUBIG, respondent and appellant. G.R. No. L-23964, June 1, 1966 Law: Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 170 as amended - xxx the elective members of the Municipality Board shall be qualified electors of the city, residents therein for at least one year, and not less than twenty-three years of age. xxx Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 2259 - No person shall be a City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, or Councilor unless he is at least twenty-five years of age, resident of the city for one year prior to his election and is a qualified voter. Facts: In the 1963 elections, among the registered candidates for councilors in the eight seat City Council of Dagupan were Gregorio Gaerlan and Luis Catubig. The latter obtained the third highest number of votes and was proclaimed one of the elected councilors while the former lost his bid. Gaerlan went to the Court to challenge Catubigs eligibility for office on the averment of non-age. Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the time he presented his certificate of candidacy on September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and 22 days; on election day, November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and 24 days; and at the time he took his oath of office as councilor on January 1, 1964,3 he was 24 years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether his age be reckoned as of the date of the filing of certificate of candidacy, or the election date, or the date set by law for the assumption of office the - result is the same. Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age. The judgment held Catubig ineligible and declared his seat vacant. Catubig appealed and alleged that the question of age eligibility should be governed by R.A. 170 and not by R.A. 2259. Republic Act No. 484 amending Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950 whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959, nine years later. Issue: Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan City Charter, as amended, has been repealed by Sec. 6 of R.A. 2259 Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. A special law has been repealed or amended by one or more subsequent general laws which are dependent mainly on the legislative intent enacting the latter. The members of the Congress intends to amend or repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof. Section 1 of R.A. 2259 makes reference to all chartered cities in the Philippines, whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act the cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires and Tagaytay, and Section 4 contains a proviso exclusively for the City of Baguio, thus showing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said Act are subject thereto. The only reference to Dagupan City in R.A. 2259 is found in Section 2 stating that voters in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly

precluded to vote for provincial officials. Since Dagupan City is removed from the exceptions of R.A. 2259, it stands to reason itself that its charter provision on the age limit is thereby repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by what the legislative body has expressly ordained. It is accordingly held that respondent is disqualified on the ground of non -age because at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the election, and at the time he took his oath of office, he was below the age of 25 years.

MATEO CAASI, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents. G.R. No. 88831, November 8, 1990 Law: Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code - Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having. e.) xxx any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. Facts: Merito Miguel was sought to be disqualified for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of 18 January 1988, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, and on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan. That he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2 February 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on 18 May 1987. The COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr. held that the possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States Held: Miguels immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrants (not a visitors or tourists) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently (See Question 21 of Miguels application). To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any elective office. Absent

clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on 18 January 1988, he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

ROBERTO R. MONROY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE DEL ROSARIO, respondent. G.R. No. L-23258, July 1, 1967 Law: Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 - Candidate holding office. - Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Facts: Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with the Commission on Elections. Three days later, or on September 18, 1961, petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. The Commission on Elections, per resolution, approved the withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961, respondent Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question. A suit for injunction was filed by petitioner against the respondent in the CFI of Rizal which held that petitioner had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed. It was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not petitioner ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed on September 15, 1961. Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code providing that Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy," makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. As held in Castro v. Gatuslao, 98 Phil, 94, 196: The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents. G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996 Law: PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725 - PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS Section 39 of Local Government Code of 1991 - Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. Facts: Private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. Petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines, and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. The Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division. When the votes were counted, Frivaldo turned out to be the candidate with the highest number of votes. Lee then filed a supplemental petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. The Comelec en banc directed the provincial board of canvassers to proclaim Raul Lee as the winning of the gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon. Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted. As such, when the said order dated June 21, 1995 of the Comelec was released and received by Frivaldo, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation of Frivaldo as governor. In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor, not Lee, should occupy said position of governor. The Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, not having garnered the highest number of votes, was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, having garnered the highest number of votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon.

Issue: 1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? 2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon? 3. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence? Held: 1. The Court held in the affirmative. Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. PD 725 is still a good law because it has not been expressly repealed by any subsequent law. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995, the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. 2. No. The court explained that its first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands. 3. No. The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. As held by the court in Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will, and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, Lee is a second placer, just that, a second placer.