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x P x x x P
S
i n i
e
= ,.... ,
2 1
( ) ( ) ( )
[
= e e
=
n
j
j j
S
n i n i
x P x x P
n n
1
1 1
1 1
,......, ...... ,....,
(1)
It is convenient to introduce the following notation:
For the strategy n tuple ) ,..... (
1 n
x x x = then this can be
written as, ) ........ , , ,.... (
1
'
1 1
'
n i i i i
x x x x x x x
+
= . This
means that the player i has in x replaced the strategy
i
x by
'
i
x . Now equation (1) can be written as,
( ) ( ) ( )
j
n
j j
j
S S S S
i i i
x P x P
i i i i n n
[
= = e e e e
= =
=
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
....... ...... .....
(2)
Definitions:
Anon-cooperative game { } { } ) ( = I
e e I i i I i i
P X , I, , in
which the sets of players is I , the set of strategies for
player i is
i
X and the payoff to player i is given by
R X P
I i
i i
[
e
: , Here the sets
i
X could be taken to be
sets of pure or mixed strategies. If the
i
X to consist of
mixed strategies then I is called the mixed extension of
the original pure strategies. A mixed strategy n - tuple
( ) , , ,.....
1 i i n
X x x x x e = is an equilibrium point of an
n person non-cooperative game I if for each
, 1 , n i i s s and
i i
X x e
'
, ( ) ( ) x P x x P
i i i
s
'
.
Theorem 2: A mixed strategy n -tuple ( )
n
x x x ,.....
1
= is
an equilibrium point of a finite game I if and only if for
each player index , i ( ) ( ) x P x P
i i i
s (3)
for every pure strategy.
Theorem3: For any mixed strategy n -tuple
( )
n
x x x ,.....
1
= each player , 1 , n i i s s possesses a
pure strategy
k
i
such that ( ) 0 >
k
i i
x and
( ) ( ) x P x P
i
k
i i
s . (4)
5. LIFETIME EXTENSION FOR NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
In game theory, players are picking their own strategies
simultaneously. Any finite n person non-cooperative
game I has at least one mixed strategy equilibrium
point. By using Nash equilibrium condition every player
tries to maximize their utility. In the game theory no
player is getting benefit by changing their strategy until
other player changes their strategy. The set of strategy
and the corresponding utilities is a foundation of Nash
equilibrium. Every player should show their best response
of their strategy, which results in Nash Equilibrium.
Let us consider non-cooperative n person game in which
each player or each node I i e has exactly two pure
strategies, either 1 =
i
(node1) or 2 =
i
. The payoff
is,
( ) ( ) ( ) I i P
i j
j i i n i
e =
[
=
, , 1 ) ,..... (
1
(5)
Where is the kronecker given by
( )
=
=
otherwise
if
j i
j i
0
, 1
,
(6)
If node i uses a mixed strategy in which pure strategy 1 is
chosen with probability ) ( I i p
i
e , then
1
1
2 1
1
+
=
n
i
p ,
I i e and for 3 , 2 = n this is the only equilibrium
point.
Proof: For node1, if , 1
1
= then
1
P = 0 unless
, 2 ......
2
= = =
n
in which case . 1
1
= P If , 2
1
=
then
1
P = 0 unless , 1 ......
2
= = =
n
in which case
2
1
= P similarly for other players also. Consider now the
mixed strategy n -tuple ( )
n
x x x ,.....
1
= , where
) 1 , (
i i i
p p x = for n i s s 1 and
i
p is the probability
of choosing 1 =
i
.
From the above observation we obtain,
[ [
= =
+ =
1 1
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) (
j
j j
j
i i i
p p p p x P (7)
Also
( ) 1 ) 1 (
1
= =
[
=
i
j
i i i
if p x P (8)
( ) 2 2
1
= =
[
=
i
j
j i i
if p x P (9)
According to theorem 2, A mixed strategy n tuple
( )
n
x x x ,.....
1
= is an equilibrium point of a finite game
I if and only if for each player index i ,
( ) ( ) x P x P
i i i
s for every pure strategy
i i
S e .
x is an equilibrium point iff
[ [ [
= = =
+ s
i j
j i
i j
j i
i j
j
p p p p p ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( and
[ [ [
= = =
+ s
i j
j i
i j
j i
i j
j
p p p p p ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2 for every
I i e .
I nt ernat i onal Journal of E mergi ng Trends & Technol ogy i n Comput er Sci ence (I JE TTCS)
Web Site: www.ijettcs.org Email: editor@ijettcs.org, editorijettcs@gmail.com
Volume 1, Issue 2, July August 2012 ISSN 2278-6856
Vol ume 1 , I ssue 2 Jul y-August 2 0 1 2 Page 2 1 3
Rearranging equation (1), then
[ [
= =
s
i j
j i
i j
j i
p p p p ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( this can be
simplified as,
[ [
= =
s
i j
j
i j
j
p p 2 ) 1 ( (10)
Similarly rearranging the (2) gives
) 1 ( ) 2 2 2 (
[ [
= =
s +
i j
j i
i j
j i
p p p p
) 1 ( 2
[ [
= =
s
i j
j
i j
j
p p (11)
From equation (3) and (4) it follows that x is an
equilibrium point if and only if,
[ [
= =
=
i j
j
i j
j
p p 2 ) 1 ( for every I i e (12)
For 3 2or n= the system of equation (5) has no solution
with any 1 0or p
i
= , but for 4 = n these are several such
solutions, for example . 0 , 1
3 2 4 1
= = = = p p p p If
5 > n , we can find the solutions with
0 , 1
3 2 4 1
= = = = p p p p , and the remaining
i
p n 4 arbitrary. To complete the analysis suppose
1 0 < <
i
p for every I i e .
Considering the equation (12) for , , l i k i = = where
then l k , =
[ [
= =
=
i j
j
i j
j
p p 2 ) 1 ( and
[ [
= =
s
l j
j
l j
j
p p 2 ) 1 (
Let
[ [
= =
j j
p B and p A ) 1 ( ,since
1 0 < <
i
p for all i
Then the expression can be written as
l l k k
p
B
p
A
p
B
p
A 2
1
,
2
1
=
Since 0 0 = = B and A , then
l k
p p = , but k and
l where arbitrary, so that every player or every node use
the same mixed strategy in x . Equation (12) can be
rewritten as ,
1 1
2 ) 1 (
=
n n
p p , by solving p can be calculated as,
p p
n 1
1
2 ) 1 (
=
) 2 1 ( 1
1
1
+ =
n
p
1
1
2 1
1
+
=
n
p (13)
6. LIFETIME EXTENSION ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a non-cooperative game
lifetime extension algorithm. In order to implement the
algorithm, on the one hand, the node i receives the sum
of interference power ( )
[
e = =
n n
S
j
n
j j
j
x
1 1
and on the
other hand, the lifetime of sensor node increased by twice
according to the equation (9).When a node want to send
data message, it will search its information table and
compute its transmitting power according equation (2),
then send the power value to sink node, iterate this
process until reach Nash Equilibrium.
7. SIMULATION RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
The proposed algorithm has been simulated and validated
through simulation. The sensor nodes are deployed
randomly in a 100x100 meters square and sink node
deploy at the point of (50, 50), the maximum transmitting
radius of each node is 80m, other simulation parameters
are displayed in Table 1. In this section, we first discuss
utility factor and pricing factors influences on
transmitting power, then evaluate the algorithm of NGLE
algorithm and compare it with other existing algorithm.
Table1: Simulation Parameters
Parameters Value
Transmission Range 250 m
Network Area 100 x 100
Number of Sensors 50-100
Packet rate 5 pkt/sec
Packet size 50bytes
Radio Bandwidth 76kbps
Transmitting Power 75mW ( 270J)
Receiving Power 36mW (129.6J)
Power Consumption in Sleep
mode
100 W (0.36 J)
Sending and Receiving Slot 50msec
Type of mote Mica2
Inital energy of sensor node 2KJ
Energy Threshold E
thd
0.001mJ
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Network Lifetime
Number of Rounds
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
N
o
d
e
s
A
li
v
e
LEACH
LEACH-M
HEED
REER
Figure 1: Network Lifetime of Sensor Networks
I nt ernat i onal Journal of E mergi ng Trends & Technol ogy i n Comput er Sci ence (I JE TTCS)
Web Site: www.ijettcs.org Email: editor@ijettcs.org, editorijettcs@gmail.com
Volume 1, Issue 2, July August 2012 ISSN 2278-6856
Vol ume 1 , I ssue 2 Jul y-August 2 0 1 2 Page 2 1 4
The network lifetime for each simulation is showed in
Figure 1. These curves are showing that lifetime of
network for various routing protocols after 500 rounds,
about 27% of nodes in the network are alive in the
proposed REER routing protocol, but 1%,5% and 7% of
nodes are alive in existing protocols LEACH, LEACH-M
and HEED respectively. So the network lifetime is
increasing about 73% with using of our model and
algorithm.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Average Delivery Delay
Transmission Rate (Packets/Second)
A
v
e
a
r
g
e
D
e
l
i
v
e
r
y
D
e
l
a
y
(
m
s
e
c
)
LEACH
LEACH-M
HEED
REER
Figure 2: Average Delivery Rate with various
Transmission Rate
Figure 2 shows the average delivery delay with increasing
transmission rate. The average delivery delay means the
average time delay between the instant the source sends a
packet and moment the destination receives this packet.
When the transmission rate is 1 packet per second, we
can see that the average delivery delay of LEACH,
LEACH-M is lower than the proposed REER protocol
and HEED. This is because LEACH is always tries to
discover a high speed path for forwarding packets. Since
the transmission rate increases, the average delivery delay
of LEACH increases significantly. This is because
congestions occur at the intermediate nodes in LEACH.
In the proposed protocol, when the packets reaches at
destination, the relay or intermediate nodes have a lower
forwarding probability than normal nodes by using
multiple strategy. In the forwarding node selection game,
the probability that a great amount of packets are
forwarded by the same node is relatively low. Thus, the
average delivery delay of our protocol does not
significantly increase with an increase in transmission
rate.
Figure 3 shows the energy consumption of the four
protocols. For LEACH, LEACH-M and HEED protocols,
the source always selects the node closest to the
destination in the neighbor set. However, normally the
closest node is the local superior decision, not the global
optimal decision. This has been proven by lemma 2. For
our protocol, in the forwarding node selection game, if
some node has a lesser angle with the line formed by
source and destination, it has the high probability to be
the forwarding node. Thus, the proposed REER protocol
consumes less node energy for transmitting data between
the nodes.
Figure 3: Energy Consumption with various
Transmission Rate
Figure 4: Packet Delivery Ratio with various
Transmission Rate
Figure 4 shows the packet delivery ratio of proposed
protocol is compared with existing protocols. The plot
infers that the proposed REER protocol has better
performance than LEACH, LEACH-M and HEED. With
the increase of transmission rate, LEACH, LEACH-M
and HEED always forward packets along the relay nodes
by perimeter approach. This leads to a high probability of
packet congestion around the relay node. In REER
protocol, since the process of forwarding node selection is
a game process, the source has lower probability to make
the same candidate gain too much benefit from the game
process. This is the reason the packet delivery ratio of our
protocol does not significantly decrease with the increase
of transmission rate.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a game theory for extending
sensor network lifetime. In the process of network
initialization, we use the connectivity property of nodes to
determine the connectivity of nodes that can be forward
any packets to its neighbour nodes. This approach
improves the transmission success rate and decreases the
Energy Consumption
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
20 40 60 80 100
Transmission Rate (packets/Second)
E
n
e
r
g
y
C
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
(
m
J
)
REER
HEED
LEACH-M
LEACH
Packet Delivery ratio
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
20 40 60 80 100
Transmission Rate (packets/Second)
P
a
c
k
e
t
D
e
l
i
v
e
r
y
r
a
t
i
o
(
%
)
REER
HEED
LEACH-M
LEACH
I nt ernat i onal Journal of E mergi ng Trends & Technol ogy i n Comput er Sci ence (I JE TTCS)
Web Site: www.ijettcs.org Email: editor@ijettcs.org, editorijettcs@gmail.com
Volume 1, Issue 2, July August 2012 ISSN 2278-6856
Vol ume 1 , I ssue 2 Jul y-August 2 0 1 2 Page 2 1 5
transmission delays of packets. In the aspect of setting up
the routing path, we consider the residual energy. We
conclude the forwarding probability and payoff function
of forwarding participants. Finally, the Nash Equilibrium
exists when it is assume for minimum and maximum
threshold for channel condition and power level. By
using Non cooperative game theory the network lifetime
is extended, that is after 500 rounds 27% of node are alive
where as 1%,5% and 7% of nodes are alive in existing
protocols LEACH, LEACH-M and HEED respectively.
So the network lifetime is increasing about 73% with
using of our model and algorithm.
In our future, we plan to implement our algorithm in s
real application scenario to verify the effectiveness in the
real world. Also, in this paper, we assume that all nodes
are stationary. There are some application scenarios
where we need the nodes to be able to move. In such a
case, we will need to consider the nodes mobility in our
future work.
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