SYSTEM PROTECTING SCHEMES (SPS) INTRODUCTION: System protection schemes (also called remedial action schemes, RAS) are

designed to detect abnormal system conditions, typically contingency-relate (including large fluctuations in the voltage, frequency, power etc.), and initiate corrective action to nullify the consequence of the abnormal condition and provide acceptable system performance. Today in many parts of the world, SPS represents a good and viable planning alternative to extending transmission system capability as well the stability. Power systems have originally arisen as individual self-sufficient units, where the power production matched the consumption. In a case of a severe failure, a system collapse was unavoidable and meant a total blackout and interruption of the supply. But the restoration of the whole system and synchronization of its generators were relatively easy thanks to some of the protecting schemes at the transmission lines such as SPS. General structure of SPS system: The general structure of a typical SPS is as shown as below. SPS consists of three main parts i.e., the input which is the level of physical magnitudes & status of circuits breakers, decision making system which initiate some actions based on inputs and output/ action which may be generator tripping/ back down or load tripping. SPS are tailor made schemes & are normally sleeping systems which operate infrequently. The Control actions taken are predetermined & can be armed or disarmed depending upon system conditions.

General structure of SPS system

3.Classification of SPS system: According to the control variables the system is classified into two categories: A) Response based: this scheme is based on the measured electrical variables of the power system such as voltage, frequency, current etc. this scheme come into action when the measured value hit the desired trigger value of the system. The two most common response based types of SPS are under-frequency load shedding and under-voltage load shedding. B) Event based: Event-based SPS are designed to operate upon the recognition of a particular combination of events (such as the loss of several lines in a substation). Examples of Event-based SPS are below: Generation rejection Load rejection System separation Turbine valve control Load and generator rejection Out-of-step relaying Discrete excitation controls Dynamic braking Generator runback VAR compensation Combination of schemes Dependent factors for which SPS system incorporated: all the dependent factors mainly consists of the most common phenomenon called INSTABILITY whether it is natural or man made, there are some other factors too apart from instability which causes power system to undergo shutdown. Listed below are some of the above discuss factors : Frequency instability: frequency is one of the most important factor for system to be operated in stable mode, hence if change in this factor reach above or below the permissible range whole system get disturbed and lead to collapse of the whole power system. For correction of small deviation in frequency AGC(automatic generation control) is used for ex- like in hydro power plants if frequency of the grid goes high then there is change in load from the desired value to a low value by fast response of the governor system of the generating utility and vice versa if frequency goes low. When more severe disturbance exist like loss of generating station , loss of major load station, then emergency control system is used which are :

A) Tripping of generators B) Fast generation reduction through fastvalving or water diversion. C) HVDC power transfer control. D) Load shedding. Common practice in utilities is that most of the above actions are executed manually by a dispatcher/operator of the grid. Voltage instability: Voltage instability is basically caused by an unavailability of reactive power support in some nodes of the network, Lack of reactive power may essentially have two origins. Gradual increase of power demand which reactive part cannot be met in some buses or sudden change of a network topology redirecting the power flows such a way that a reactive power cannot be delivered to some buses. The increased values of loading are accompanied by a decrease of voltage (except a capacitive load). When the loading is further increased, the maximum load ability point is reached, from which no additional power can be transmitted to the load under those conditions. In case of constant power loads the voltage in the node becomes uncontrollable and rapidly decreases. However, the voltage level close to this point is sometimes very low, what is not acceptable under normal operating. Load shedding necessary to stabilize the power system subjected to any contingency from the selected range. Hydro plants according to there operating limits can also stabilize the voltage of the grid because such power plants have ability to absorb and deliver the reactive power to the connected grid. Transient angle stability: In case of transient angle instability, a severe disturbance is a disturbance, which does not allow a generator to deliver its output electrical power into the network (typically a tripping of a line connecting the generator with the rest of the network in order to clear a short circuit). This power is then absorbed by the rotor of the generator, increases its kinetic energy what results in the sudden acceleration of the rotor above the acceptable revolutions and eventually damage of the generator. Therefore the measures taken against this scenario aim mainly to either an intended dissipation of undelivered power: a) Reducing the mechanical power driving the generator. b) fast-valving, disconnection of the generator etc. SPS system requirements / needs for transmission system stability : 1. Communication architecture to support 2. Redundancy and data integrity 3. Sufficient bandwidth to meet the communication time constraints. 4. Communication system diagnostics/alarms Standards that meet the requirements include IEEE C37.94 N x 64 kbps communication) IEC61850 for Peer-to-peer communications interfaces (10/100MB Ethernet based).

Major SPS applied in INDIAN power system: S.no 1 2 3 Description Load shedding in SR and generation rejection in ER subsequent to tripping of HVDC Talcher-Kolar Bipole Load shedding and/or generation rejection within NR subsequent to tripping of HVDC Rihand-Dadri Bipole Generation rejection at Jhakri HEPS subsequent to tripping of one or more evacuating feeders from 400 kV Jhakri Load shedding in NR and/or generation rejection within NR as well as in ER subsequent to tripping of HVDC Balia-Bhiwadi Bipole Generation rejection at Wangtoo HEPS subsequent to tripping of one or more evacuating feeders from 400 kV Jhakri Identification/ in service since SPS_01_ER-SR (2006) SPS_02_NR (2007) SPS_03_NR (2010)

SPS_04_NR (2011)

SPS_05_NR (2011)

Note:It may be seen that out of the five SPS listed in table 2, three (SPS_01, SPS_02 and SPS_04) are related to the contingency of HVDC Bipole while the remaining two (SPS_03, SPS_05) are related to the contingency of high capacity AC transmission corridor. SPS for the reliable power flow/evacuation of 6*250MW NJHEP +3*100MW Baspa HEP: The total installed capacity of Jhakri and Baspa prior to the commissioning of Karcham Wangtoo HEPS was 1800 MW. Out of the four evacuating feeders that are in operation, two are towards 400 kV Nalagarh (144 km each) and two are towards 400 kV Abdullapur (180 km each). All four circuits are triple snowbird conductors and they are adequate for evacuating complete generation from Jhakri and Baspa. On 19-November 2009, 400 kV Jhakri-Abdullapur-I went under forced outage due to failure of GIS breaker of this line at Jhakri end. Jhakri HEP generating station is a Gas Insulated (GIS) substation with double bus and single breaker scheme. The damaged circuit breaker associated with 400 kV Jhakri-Abdullapur-I required import of components from abroad, that resulted in long outage of one out of four lines evacuating generation from this hydro complex. In the meantime, with only three circuits in service, the evacuation of full generation (1800 MW) from this area was highly unreliable and it was not fulfilling the N-1 criteria. Therefore in order to avoid spillage of water and to ensure secure evacuation of generation from the Baspa-Jhakri complex during peak hydro season, SPS_04_NR was designed as a contingency measure. The SPS envisaged automatic rejection of generation at Jhakri HEPS subsequent to the tripping of circuits downstream of 400 kV Jhakri. The scheme was commissioned before the beginning of the peak hydro period in 2010 and it also helped in avoiding spillage at Jhakri/Baspa. 400 Kv Jhakri-Abdullapur-I was restored on 06th April 2011.

What is N-1 redundancy/ criteria? N-1 criteria means that a process may continue to operate with the failure of the item or equipment and it will not have affect in the process continuity. The N-1 criteria require that all loads can be restored if any single component fails (i.e. N-1 components still available). Note: This does not mean that a short-term outage should occur, only that the load be quickly (definitions may vary on how quick) restorable. The outage may be long term i.e the loss of breaker (as in NJHEP-ABD-I).

SPS for reliable evacuation of 4x250 MW of Karcham Wangtoo HEP through the existing evacuation system of Jhakri-Baspa HEP: KWHEP is upstream project on the same basin of river Sutlej having a total capacity of 1000MW before commissioning of all the 4 units each of capacity 250MW some power (2*250MW because only two units were in full generation at that time) was transmitted through the jhakri-Baspa existing lines. For evacuating generation from Karcham Wangtoo, an additional double circuit quad conductor line from 400 kV Karcham to Abdullapur along with loop in loop out of 400 kV Baspa-Jhakri HEPS at 400 kV Karcham was planned. The LILO was completed in May 2011 and the 2x250 MW units of Karcham were also ready for synchronization in May/June 2011. However the commissioning of the new circuits from 400 kV Karcham to 400 kV Abdullapur was delayed due to various reasons. Therefore other alternatives was found which was to evacuate the power through the existing jhakri-Baspa line in order to avoid the spillage and peak demands at the grid end. The SPS scheme was designed for immediate dropping of generation at Karcham - Wangtoo HPS in case of tripping of any one of the downstream circuits emanating from Jhakri. The generation rejection at Karcham Wangtoo would also be carried out whenever the total evacuation from the complex exceeds 1800 MW with only three out of four outgoing circuits in service from 400 kV Jhakri. SPS for outage of + 500 kV HVDC Rihand-DadriBipole of 1500 MW capacity: The 2x750 MW HVDC Rihand-Dadri bipole is one of the major high capacity links between the pit head generating stations in south east part of northern region (NR) and the load centres in the North-western part of NR. It operates in parallel with other AC transmission lines Outage of this link results in overloading of the parallel AC network and low voltage in the Northwestern part of the NR grid. In the past tripping of this link had resulted in system separation within NR. Therefore in order to secure the system under contingency of the HVDC link, an SPS has been designed and implemented to carry out automatic generation rejection at thermal power stations located in South-east NR and load shedding at several locations in Northwest part of the NR grid. The commissioning of this SPS has facilitated higher loading of the East-West corridor within NR. For the purpose of load shedding the loads have been distributed in different groups say group- A, B, C & D in western part of the grid. Details of the corrective action logic for different cases are as explained :

cases Case1

Contingency
Tripping of any or both poles resulting in power order reduction by 750MW and above

Action 1 Immediately Shed Loads in Groups A, B, C & D.

Immediately Shed Loads in Groups C & D.

Case2

Tripping of any or both poles resulting in power order reduction above 500 MW but less than 750 MW

Action 2 Reduce generation at Singrauli/Rihand by 500 MW in the fastest possible time, --------------------------

Action taken in SPS_02_NR

Mock test of SPS taken in 2012 at NJHPS & KWHEP end: Line Tripped Normal Time difference between NJHPS & KWHEP 00:00:04:758

Panchkula -1 Event Tripped at14:26:11:482 in NJHPS end

Nalagarh -2

Event tripped at 14:32:01:976 in NJHPS end

A)Event normal at 14:26:16:482 in NJHPS end B)Event normal at 14:26:16:240 in KWHEP end A)event normal at 14:32:06:982 in NJHPS end B)event normal at14:32:05:336 in KWHEP end

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