City of Manila v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Domingo G.R. No.

71159 November 15, 1989 FACTS: Irene Sto. Domingo buried her husband in a lot at the North Cemetery, which was leased to her by the City of Manila for a period of fifty years. Full payment of the rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by the said receipt which appears to be regular on its face. Believing in good faith that, in accordance with Admini strative Order No. 5, Series of 1975, of the City Mayor of Manila, prescribing u niform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, etc., subject Lot in which the mortal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo were laid to rest, was leased to the bereaved family for five (5) years only, i t was certified as ready for exhumation. The authorities of the cemetery authori zed the exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the remains of the late V ivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery. Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that when the plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls Day in their shock, consternation and dismay that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Indignant and disgusted over such a sorr owful finding, Irene Sto. Domingo lost no time in inquiring and was told that th e remains of her late husband had been taken from the burial lot in question. ISSUE: Whether the operations of the cemetery is a corporate or proprietary function of the City HELD: Yes. The operations of the City of Manila of the cemetery are a corporate functi on. The North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Healt h Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same are under th e charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The City of M anila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispos itions of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975. With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt t hat the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute t hat the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obliga tions arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parti es. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. FIRMEG.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991Fa cts: A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macari oNieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dumptruck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including LaureanoBania Sr. died asa result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying d egrees of physical injuries.On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instit uted a compliant for damagesagainst the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver,respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the a foresaid defendants filed a ThirdParty Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.Petitioner filed its answer and raised affi rmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, pr

escription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.Respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme ordered defendants Municipality of San Fernando,La Union and Alfredo B islig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeralexpenses.Private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every court,including respondent court, has the inherent power to amend and control its processand or ders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion whenit d eferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amountin g tolack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss. Ruling: Non-suability of the state. The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI,Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without i tsconsent."Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.Municipal corpor ations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the Statewhen th ey are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy thesovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in theperforman ce of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and besued ."Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the app licablelaw and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable do es notnecessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be hel d liable if itdoes not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by th e mere fact that thestate has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does wai ve its sovereign immunity,it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, i f it can, that the defendant is liable."Anent the issue of whether or not the mu nicipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liabil ity of the municipality depends on whether or not thedriver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.Dual capa city of LGU.Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In onethey exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and whil e in the performance of theduties pertaining thereto, their acts are political a nd governmental. Their officers andagents in such capacity, though elected or ap pointed by them, are nevertheless publicfunctionaries performing a public servic e, and as such they are officers, agents, andservants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private,proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not aspublic agencies. Their o fficers and agents in the performance of such functions act inbehalf of the muni cipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for thestate or so vereign power."It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suab le because theircharters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Neverthel ess, they aregenerally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge o f governmentalfunctions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in aproprietary capacity.In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he wason his way to the Naguilianri ver to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of SanFernando's municipal s treets."In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the pe rformance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of t he Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties ortasks pertaining to his office.We already stressed in the ca se of Palafox, et al vs Province of IlocosNorte, the DistrictEngineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction ormaintenance of roa ds in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of theaccident are admit tedly governmental activities."After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at theconclusion that the municipality cannot be held l iable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in t he discharge of governmental functions

Torio v. Fontanilla G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978 FACTS: On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Reso lution No. 159 whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta cel ebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed cr eating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn organ ized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages , one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan Jose Macaraeg supervised the construction of the stage. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramati c part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who w as at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilla was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day. The heirs of Vicente Fontanilla filed a complaint with the Court of First Instan ce of Manila on September 11, 1959 to recover damages. Named party-defendants we re the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Municipal Council in 1959. Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sove reign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governme ntal functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The defendant councilors in turn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the mana gement of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable f or damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exer cised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. RTC dismissed complaint but CA reversed the trial court's decision and ordered a ll the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fo ntanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages: P1200.00 its attorney's fees; and the costs. ISSUE: Whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal counci l under Sec. 2282 of the Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised Administrative Code is a governmental or a corporate or proprietary function of the municipali ty HELD: The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public, governmental or po litical on the one hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Go vernmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the po wers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislat ive, judicial public, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are exerc ised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those wh ich are ministerial private and corporate. This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the lia bility of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons. If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the munici pality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, 10 nor from its office rs, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that th ey did not act wantonly and maliciously. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal cor poration can be held liable to third persons ex contract or ex delicto. The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civi lly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall with

in the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil acti ons for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. ... (Dillon o n Municipal Corporations, 5th ed. Sec. 1610,1647, cited in Mendoza v. de Leon, s upra. 514) Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. - fiesta may be held in each municipality n ot oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council A fiesta s not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefore, except whe n, for weighty reasons, such as typhoons, foundations, earthquakes, epidemics, o r other public ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case i t may be held at a later date in the same year, by resolution of the council. This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta ev en if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the ge neral welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive tes t. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the none theless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of publi c schools, jails, and the like which are for public service. The findings of the respondent appellate court that the facts as presented to it establish negligence as a matter of law and that the Municipality failed to exe rcise the due diligence of a good father of the family, will not disturbed by Us in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion or a gross misappre hension of facts. Liability rests on negligence which is "the want of such care as a person of ord inary prudence would exercise under the circumstances of the case. Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liabili ty under the c that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipa lity acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuel a" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctr ine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liabl e for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks. ...when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of ser vants or agents, a cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation. If the corporation appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove the can hold them resp onsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the corpo ration in its local or special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agen ts or servants, and the maxim of respondent superior applies. The Court of Appeals held the councilors jointly and solidarity liable with the municipality for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code which provides that d any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employ ee refuses or neglects, without just cause to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief at the latter. PREMISES CONSIDERED, We AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals inso far as the Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned (L-30183), and We absolve the municipal councilors from liability and SET ASIDE the judgment against them (L-9 993) Moday v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 107916 February 20, 1997 FACTS: On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initia te the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-P

ls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo an d transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are s till available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a peti tion for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the Regional Tr ial Court at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. On March 6, 1991, public respondent mu nicipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the government's best interest for public resp ondent to be allowed to take possession of the property. Regional Trial Court granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land. The lower court held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure t o declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was den ied by the trial court on October 31, 1991. CA affirmed RTC s decision. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subjec t property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motor pool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a mu nicipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. HELD: Yes, the municipality man expropriate private property despite the disap proval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the ins tant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to l ocal governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public us e and there must be just compensation. The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is n ot disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the loca l Government Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated . The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, a s expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Munic ipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity t o promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. B lg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitione rs' property. Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate Court 147 SCRA 447 FACTS: The facts of the case are not in dispute. On February 4, 1964, while then incumb

ent Governor Rene Espina was on official business in Manila, the Vice-Governor, Priscillano Almendras and three (3) members of the Provincial Board enacted Reso lution No. 188, donating to the City of Cebu 210 province. owned lots all locate d in the City of Cebu, with an aggregate area of over 380 hectares, and authoriz ing the Vice-Governor to sign the deed of donation on behalf of the province. Th e deed of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by Mayor Ser gio Osmea, Jr. The document of donation was prepared and notarized by a private la wyer. The donation was later approved by the Office of the President through Exe cutive Secretary Juan Cancio. According to the questioned deed of donation the lots donated were to be sold by the City of Cebu to raise funds that would be used to finance its public improv ement projects. The City of Cebu was given a period of one (1) year from August 15, 1964 within which to dispose of the donated lots. Upon his return from Mani la, Governor Espina denounced as Legal and immoral the action of his colleagues in donating practically all the patrimonial property of the province of Cebu, co nsidering that the latter's income was less than one-fourth (1/4) of that of the City of Cebu. To prevent the sale or disposition of the lots, the officers and members of the Cebu Mayor's League (in behalf of their respective municipalitie s) along with some taxpayers, including Atty. Garcia, filed a case seeking to ha ve the donation declared illegal, null and void. Governor Espina, apprehensive t hat the lots would be irretrievably lost by the Province of Cebu decided to go t o court. He engaged the services of respondent Garcia in filing and prosecuting the case in his behalf and in behalf of the Province of Cebu. Garcia filed the complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation with an app lication for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which application was granted on the same day, August 6, 1965. On June 25, 1974, a compromise agr eement was reached between the province of Cebu and the city of Cebu. On July 15 , 1974, the court approved the compromise agreement and a decision was rendered on its basis. For services rendered in Civil Case no. 238-BC, CFI of Cebu, respo ndent Pablo P. Garcia filed through counsel a Notice of Attorney's Lien, dated A pril 14, 1975, praying that his statement of claim of attorney's lien in said ca se be entered upon the records thereof, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. To said notice, petitioner Province of Cebu filed through couns el, its opposition dated April 23, 1975, stating that the payment of attorney's fees and reimbursement of incidental expenses are not allowed by law and settled jurisprudence to be paid by the Province. A rejoinder to this opposition was fi led by private respondent Garcia. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, then presided over by Judge Alfredo Marigomen, rendered judgment dated May 30, 1979, in favor of private res pondent and against petitioner Province of Cebu, declaring that the former is en titled to recover attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit and fixing the amount thereof at P30,000.00. Both parties appealed from the decision to the Cou rt of Appeals. In the case of private respondent, however, he appealed only from that portion of the decision which fixed his attorney's fees at P30,000.00 inst ead of at 30% of the value of the properties involved in the litigation as state d in his original claim On October 18, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirm ing the findings and conclusions of the trial court that the private respondent is entitled to recover attorney's fees but fixing the amount of such fees at 5% of the market value of the properties involved in the litigation as of the date of the filing of the claim in 1975. Both parties went to the Supreme Court with private respondent questioning the fixing of his attorney's fees at 5% instead o f 30% of the value of the properties in litigations as prayed for in his claims. ISSUE: Whether Atty. Pablo P. Garcia is entitled to attorney s lien? HELD: Yes, the Court applied a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a muni cipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable val ue of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general

power to contract. The doctrine of implied municipal liability has been said to apply to all cases where money or other property of a party is received under s uch circumstances that the general law, independent of express contract implies an obligation upon the municipality to do justice with respect to the same. The petitioner cannot set up the plea that the contract was ultra vires and still re tain benefits there under. Having regarded the contract as valid for purposes of reaping some benefits, the petitioner is estopped to question its validity for the purposes of denying answerability. Actually it was Governor Espina who filed the case against Cebu City and Mayor Osmea. Garcia just happened to be the lawyer ; Still Atty. Garcia is entitled to compensation. To deny private respondent com pensation for his professional services would amount to a deprivation of propert y without due process of law. Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA251 SCRA 421 (1995)G.R. No. 120865-71Fact s: Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainab ledevelopment, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Author ity." Issue: Whether or not R.A. 7160 and the Local Government Code of 1991 repealed R.A. 485 0,which established the LLDA Held: No, since it has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Codeof 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the e nactment of alater legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to hav e repealed a speciallaw. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for aparticular case or class of cases, is not repeale d by a subsequent statute, general in itsterms, provisions and application, unle ss the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,although the terms of the general l aw are broad enough to include the cases embracedin the special law."Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the specialstatute s hould prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the gene ralstatute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absenceof special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is beca use implied repealsare not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of thelegislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequentgeneral law by mere implication. Villanueva v. Castaeda G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 FACTS: There is in the vicinity of Public market of San Fernando, Pampangga a strip lan d what is commonly known as talipapa. The petitioner claim that they have the ri ght to remain and conduct business in the area by virtue of a previous authoriz ation granted to them by municipal government while the respondent deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal consideration on public prope rty. Municipal Council of San Fernando adopted Res. No. 218 authorizing 24 membe rs of Fernando United Merchant and Trader s Association to construct permanent stags . The action was protested while the case is pending, the council adopted Res. No. 29 which declared the subject area the parking place and as the public plaza, impl iedly revoking Res No. 218. The decision was apparently not enforced, the petiti oner is not evicted the Associations of Concerned Citizen and Consumer of San Fe rnando, Pampanga filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Res. 29 to restore the subject property to its original and customary use as a public pla za. Vicente A. Macalino, as officer in charge of the Office issued resolution to demolish the stalls in the area. Issue: Whether public plaza is susceptible for contractual obligation Held:

A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lea se or any contractual undertaking. Article 1271 states that communal things that ca nnot be sold because they are by their nature outside commerce of are those for public use, such as plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains etc., The peti tioner has no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and canno t insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contract.