Sadia Zafar

Modern Sociological Theories CIA II

Roll number 361

A REVIEW OF KARL POPPERS THEORY ON THE PROBLEM OF DEMARCATION

Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, take this as a sign that you have neither understood the theory nor the problem which it was intended to solve. Karl Popper, regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science of the 20th century, was a prolific theorist who proposed many ideas, from those on metaphysics and political philosophy to, what is the subject of discussion in this paper, philosophy of science. Popper attempted to deal with the problem of drawing a line between science and pseudo-science, what he later called the problem of demarcation. As one of the first critics of logical positivism, he put forth his idea of falsification in place of the logical positivist idea of verifiability. This principle of falsifiability, Popper believed, was the solution to the problem of demarcation which would help to distinguish between science which was based on an empirical method and pseudo-science which was grounded in a pseudo-empirical method that appealed to observation and experiment but did not come up to scientific standard, as was the case with astrology. WHERE KARL POPPER WAS COMING FROM: The atmosphere in which Popper was stimulated was the atmosphere in which Einsteins theory of relativity, Freuds psycho-analysis, Adlers individual psychology, and Marxs theory on history were popular topics of discussion. Popper couldnt help but notice how different Freud, Adler, and Marxs theories were from Einsteins. He doubted their claims to scientific status, noting that they, instead, resembled astrology. These theorists found verifications of the truth everywhere, which bothered Popper, who felt that the theorists interpreted each observation in light of the previous observation and at the same time counted it as additional confirmation. Unbelievers (like Popper) were made out to be those who did not see it either because of their class interest or because they were repressed. WHAT HE HAD TO SAY: Following from his unease over how easily Freud, Adler, Marx (and Poppers favourite the astrologists) could explain everything in terms of their theories, he wrote that it was easy to obtain confirmations or verifications for nearly every theory if one looked for confirmations.

Confirmations, Popper continued, should count only if they were the result of a genuine test of the theory. And every genuine test of a theory, in Poppers idea, was an attempt to falsify it. Testability is falsifiability and some theories are more testable than others because they take greater risks, like Einstein did with his theory of relativity, which could as easily have been disproved as it was proved. Astrology, on the other hand, is so vague that it can explain away anything, just like Freuds psychoanalysis and Adlers individual psychology. Another important, and in my opinion interesting, idea that Popper introduced was that of conventionalist twist or conventionalist stratagem. He observed that some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers for example by:
introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status.1

WHAT OTHERS HAD TO SAY: Given that Poppers theory was rather controversial, especially because it went against the common and widely-accepted approach of inductive reasoning, Popper had as many detractors and he had followers. His falsification approach has been criticised on many grounds, some of which I attempt to cover in this paper in some detail. Un-Falsifiable Statements: One of Poppers greatest critics, Grover Maxwell2 pointed out that 'All men are mortal' is a perfectly sound scientific statement which is not falsifiable. Similarly, the axioms of mathematics cannot be refuted. Popper did, however, much like the admirers he accused of engaging in conventionalist stratagems, amend his idea by proposing the two-sense theory to explain away the irrefutability of mathematics. He ideated that pure mathematics (3 + 3 = 6) cannot be refuted but when applied to the real world (e.g. 3 men + 3 men = 6 men), it becomes open to falsification.1

1 2

Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 33-39 Maxwell, G. (1962). The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities. In H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 3-27.

Negativity: One of the most troubling aspects of Popper's philosophy was his devout refusal to consider anything positive. He was invariably concerned with what was not, never with what was. This despite the fact that many theories were in fact positively confirmed. However, one cannot falsify a scientific theory without inference from observed instances. Interestingly, however much Popper might have rejected induction, his own method was dependent upon it. White Swan/Black Swan, Grey Swan: Popper believed that it was right to claim that universal generalizations, such as All As are B are shown false on the occasion of a single A that is not B. That a single negative instance would be sufficient to refute any universal proposition. Indeed, Australian black swans falsified the belief that all adult swans were white. Robert Matthews32proposes that theres a good reason scientists try to amass positive evidence for their theories. He says theres a grey swan because of which theories such as evolutionary change, multi-universes, string theory and the interior of black holes attain scientific credibility (despite being un-falsifiable) thanks to Bayesianism. Bayesian

analysis, a branch of probability theory that allows one to weigh evidence for various theories in order to assess which theory seems the most plausible, shows that seemingly implausible theories require a lot of evidence before they can be taken seriously. The Bayesian view also gives vague or contrived theories (such as the one that astrology and other pseudo-sciences are based on) that fit almost any data set a tough time in the quest for credibility. Feedback Loop: Karl Poppers demarcation criteria that statements, in order to be considered scientific, must be capable of being falsified is a necessary condition of science is not, in and of itself, a sufficient demarcation between science and pseudo-science. It becomes sufficient, however, when the requirement of feedback is added to it. If such statements are tested and found to conflict with verifiable, observable and repeatable empirical evidence, the statements or the premises upon which the statements were made must be re-examined and reformulated. No doubt, though, that Popper would see this is a conventionalist twist.
3

Matthews, Robert. (2008). Some Swans are Grey. The New Scientist, 198 (2655), 44-47.

In presenting his criterion of falsifiabilty, Popper implied that falsification of statements based on negative evidence is the only unequivocal means of creating feedback for the reformulation of scientific statements. In doing so, he glosses over the concept of confirming evidence as having a place in the determining of scientific knowledge. He does not address how corroborating evidence informs the body of scientific knowledge and contributes to the formation of new scientific statements for future testing. It is often the totality of such statements both negative in the form of falsification and positive in the form of corroborative that represents the current state of scientific knowledge. In sum, while Karl Popper broke new ground with his idea of falsification, critical rationalism (as he called his theoretical thinking) left much to be desired and largely failed to push scientific thinking to the turn he had envisioned.

REFERENCES: Dykes, N. (1999). Debunking Popper: A Critique of Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism. Reason Papers, A Journal of Interdisciplinary Normative Studies, Fall (24), 525. Retrieved July 30, 2012, from http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/philn/philn065.htm Gardner, M. (2001). A Skeptical Look at Karl Popper. Skeptical Inquirer, 25 (4), 13-14, 72. Retrieved July 31, 2012, from http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/gardner_popper.html Goldstein, R. The World Question Center. Edge. Retrieved August 1, 2012, from http://www.edge.org/q2008/q08_9.htm O'Hear, A. (ed.). (1996). Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press