Art. 882.

The statement of the object of the institution, or the application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention. That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation. (797a) Modal Institution: one where the testator states 1) the object of the institution, or 2) the purpose of application of the property left by the testator, or 3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. Mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee, but it does not affect the efficacy if his rights to the succession, differing on this respect from condition. In general it is obligatory, except when it is imposed for the benefit of the heir or legatee himself. According to Manresa, the condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. In (72) Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals, The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants; The widow or widower; Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; Other illegitimate children referred to in Art. 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another. In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. The father or mother of illegitimate children of the 3 classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. (807a) The fact of being a compulsory heir imposes no obligation to accept or receive the legitime. Kinds of compulsory heirs: 1. Primary: those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary CHs. 2. Secondary: those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary CHs 3. Concurring: those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary CHs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring CHs. Noble V. Noble 18 SCRA 1104; Dec. 17, 1966 J. Barrera: FACTS: Don Vicente Noble died in 1959. The notarial will he executed in 1957 was presented for probate wherein Juan

Noble was designated as executor. Maria Noble, claiming as the illegitimate child of the deceased born out of an illicit relationship between the latter and Lucia Sinag in July 22, 1923, opposed the probate of the will. She prays for the disallowance of the will and be declared as the only surviving illegitimate daughter or in the alternative, in case the will be probated, the institution of heirs made therein be declared null and void. Simultaneously, she filed a motion asking for permission to present evidence on her alleged filiation, stating therein that she is in continuous possession of status of a child of the late Don Vicente Noble by the direct acts of the latter and/or his family, and that she has in her favor evidence and/or proof that the deceased is her father. This motion was opposed by Judge Noble on the ground that the claim was in effect an Action for Compulsory recognition, and that since it was brought after the death of the putative father, and when she was already of majority age, the right to bring the same has already prescribed. CFI: admitted the will for probate and the claim of Maria had been barred by prescription. HELD: Art. 887: In all case of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. Filiation must be acknowledged by the alleged parent, for if the mere fact of paternity of the supposed father is all that is needed to be proved, that would pave the way to unscrupulous individuals taking advantage of the death of the presumed parent who would no longer be in the position to deny the allegation. In this case, what is intended to be proved is simply the supposed naked paternity of the deceased. Her allegations merely claimed that she is the child of the deceased, which is a ground for compelling recognition. It is necessary to allege that her putative parent had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment is essential and is basis of her right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative parent. Acknowledgement is the basis of the right of a spurious child to enjoy the successional rights.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. October 8, 1985 FACTS: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada. In 1983, Upton sued her asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no community property. From denial of that motion, she went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband, held binding upon the latter. RULING: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe

respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (871) The purpose of reserva troncal is to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would have otherwise remained therein. Its principal aim is to maintain a separation between the paternal and maternal lines, so that the property of one line may not pass to the other, or through them to strangers. Elements of Reserva Troncal: 1. descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister 2. the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the descendant 3. the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of the relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant. The parties to the reserva troncal should all be of legitimate relations. No reserva will exist in favor of illegitimate relatives; nor are natural and illegitimate ascendants bound to reserve. Padura vs. Baldovino FACTS: Padura died and in is will left properties in favor of son by 1st marriage, kids by 2nd marriage and surviving spouse Son by 2nd marriage died single and w/o issue and left his mother as his sole heir Including land inherited from father (reservable property) daughter by 2nd marriage died, leaving her children as her heirs (Baldovinos) son by first marriage died and was survived by legitimate children (Paduras) Upon the death of surviving spouse, Baldovinos and the Paduras took possession of the reservable properties ISSUE: WON the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to a share twice as large as that of the share of half bloods HELD: Yes RATIO: Art 1006 on intestate succession: brothers and sisters of the full blood are entitled to a share double that of the half blood Purpose of reserva troncal: assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista) Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives to whom the property should be returned; but w/in that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify

Edroso vs. Sablan Facts: Pedro inherited 2 parcels of land at his father's death. When he died unmarried and without issue, the 2 parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother who applied for the registration of the lands. The uncles of Pedro opposed the registration. Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan. Issue: WON the lands in question are required by law to be reserved Held: YES "The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded." (Civil Code, art. 811.)

Pedros mother inherited from him these 2 parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them intact for the claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the 3rd degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of Art. 811 of the CC? The person required by article 811 to reserve has the rights of use and usufruct. He has the right to dispose of the property reserved, although under a condition. The legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do. The relatives within the 3rd degree in whose favor the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; they have no title of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. Lacerna vs. Vda. De Corcino, 1 SCRA 1227 Facts: Lands described in the complaint belonged originally to Bonifacia Lacerna. Upon her death, they passed by succession, to her only son, Juan Marbebe, who soon died intestate, single and without issue on February 21, 1943. Jacoba Marbebe, as half sister of Juan Marbebe, on his father's side, is his sole heir, which is contested by the first cousins of Juan on his mother side, based upon the theory that, pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, establishing what is known as "reserva troncal", the properties in dispute should pass to the heirs of the deceased within the third degree, who belong to the line from which said properties came, and that since the same were inherited by Juan Marbebe from his mother, they should go to his nearest relative within the third degree on the material line, to which plaintiffs belong, not to intervenor, Jacoba Marbebe, despite the greater proximity of her relationship to the deceased, for she belongs to the paternal line. Issue: WON Jacoba Marbebe, as half sister of Juan Marbebe, on his father's side, is his sole heir, as or whether the first cousins of Juan on his mother side, have a better right to succeed him, to the exclusion of Jacoba Marbebe, Held: Article 891 applies only to properties inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an ascendant from a descendant; the lands in dispute were inherited by a descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna. Said legal provision is, therefore, not in point, and the transmission of the aforementioned lands, by inheritance, was in accordance with the order prescribed for intestate succession, particularly Articles 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, pursuant to which a sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other sisters or brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters, excludes all other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong to the line from which the property of the deceased came.

Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. (818a) Mateo vs. Lagua 29 SCRA 864, October 30, 1969 FACTS: Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donors name. In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages. On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondents name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan. The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined

area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Ciprianos other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being inofficious. HELD: Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial courts order of dismissal sustained. Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donees share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents. Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity; (2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property of which the testator has not disposed; (3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes place; (4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this Code. (912a)

In Rodriguez et. al. vs. Borja et. al., it states that in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.