SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HELEN T. KALALO, RESPONDENT. DECISION SERENO, J.

: This Rule 45 Petition assails the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30473. The CA affirmed the Decision[3] and Order[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Manila, in Crim. Cases Nos. 04-230278-84, which had in turn affirmed the Decision[5] of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 11, Manila, in Crim. Case No. 372535-41. The MeTC acquitted respondent Helen T. Kalalo (Kalalo) of a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, or the Bouncing Checks Law, but ruled that she was civilly liable to petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the amount of ?71,009 representing the value of unpaid goods.[6] As culled from the records, it appears that respondent Kalalo had been a dealer of beer products since 1998. She had a credit overdraft arrangement with petitioner SMC whereby, prior to the delivery of beer products, she would be required to issue two checks to petitioner: a blank check and a check to be filled up with an amount corresponding to the gross value of the goods delivered. At the end of the week, Kalalo and an agent of SMC would compute the actual amount due to the latter by deducting the value of the returned empty beer bottles and cases from the gross value of the goods delivered. Once they succeeded in determining the actual amount owed to SMC, that amount would be written on the blank check, and respondent would fund her account accordingly.[7] In time, respondents business grew and the number of beer products delivered to her by SMC increased from 200 to 4,000 cases a week. Because of the increased volume of deliveries, it became very difficult for her to follow and keep track of the transactions. Thus, she requested regular statements of account from petitioner, but it failed to comply. [8] In 2000, SMCs agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated checks to cope with the probable increase in orders during the busy Christmas season, without informing her of the breakdown of the balance. She complied with the request; but after making several cash payments and returning a number of empty beer bottles and cases, she noticed that she still owed petitioner a substantial amount. She then insisted that it provide her with a detailed statement of account, but it failed to do so. In order to protect her rights and to compel SMC to update her account, she ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven checks she had issued to petitioner,[9] the details of which are as follows:[10] Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Date Amount Check No. 0012825 Sept. 16, 2000 P 62,200.00 0008250 Sept. 18, 2000 190,000.00 0012801 Sept. 25, 2000 190,000.00 0012802 Sept. 30, 2000 208,162.00 0012826 Sept. 30, 2000 62,200.00 0012823 Sept. 30, 2000 104,327.00 0012824 Oct. 14, 2000 104,326.00 TOTAL P 921,215.00 On 19 October 2000, instead of updating the account of respondent Kalalo, petitioner SMC sent her a demand letter for the value of the seven dishonored checks.[11] On 5 December 2000, and in the face of constant threats made by the agents of SMC,[12] respondents counsel wrote a letter (the Offer of Compromise) wherein Kalalo acknowledge[d] the receipt of the statement of account demanding the payment of the sum of ?816,689.00 and submitt[ed] a proposal by way of Compromise Agreement to settle the said obligation.[13] It appears, however, that SMC did not accept the proposal. On 9 March 2001, it filed a Complaint against respondent for violating the Bouncing Checks Law.[14] In the meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update her account. During trial, and after the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner finally complied. After tallying all cash payments and funded checks and crediting all returned empty bottles and cases, the Statement of Account showed that the net balance of the amount owed to petitioner

was P71,009.[15] Respondent thereafter recanted her Offer of Compromise and stated that, at the time she had the letter prepared, she was being threatened by SMC agents with imprisonment, and that she did not know how much she actually owed petitioner.[16] After trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, these cases are hereby dismissed and the accused is hereby acquitted of all the charges against her. However, it appearing that she still owes the private complainant, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the amount of P71,009.00 to private complainant.[17] As the right against double jeopardy prevented an appeal of the criminal aspect of the case, SMC appealed only the civil aspect of the MeTCs Decision to the RTC. Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to the larger amount of P921,215.[18] After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the RTC found no reversible error in the MeTCs Decision, dismissed the appeal of petitioner,[19] and denied the latters Motion for Reconsideration.[20] Dissatisfied with the RTCs Decision, SMC filed with the CA a Rule 42 Petition for Review, which was eventually dismissed by the appellate court.[21] Petitioner moved for reconsideration, to no avail.[22] SMC thereafter filed this Rule 45 Petition before this Court.[23] The Courts Ruling We deny the instant Petition and uphold the assailed Decision and Resolution of the appellate court. I The Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo. Petitioner argues that, in her Offer of Compromise, respondent unequivocally admitted her liability to private complainant-appellant duly assisted by her counsel.[24] We quote in full Kalalos Offer of Compromise addressed to petitioner: December 5, 2000 Mr. JOSELITO MANALO GENERAL MANAGER San Miguel Corporation Biglang Awa Street Caloocan City Dear Sir: My client, Ms. HELEN T. KALALO of No. 1055-A Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, hereby acknowledges the receipt of the Statement of Account demanding the payment of the sum of P816,689.00 representing her unpaid accounts. The reason why she was not able to pay her accounts on time is because she had great difficulty in collecting from the following wholesalers: 1) MRS. EVELYN R. MONTILLA/MINES & LYN General Merchandise 624 Chacon St., Tondo, Manila P413,444.50 amount of Pilsen, Red Horse and Grande Beers (full goods) P115,500.00 amount of empties. 2) Mr. DANIEL TOMAS/ MRS. FORTUNE TOMAS Ladies and Rum Gen. Merchandizing (sic) 1501 N. Zamora St., Tondo, Manila P150,000.00 amount of full goods, Pilsen and Red Horse beers.

She is respectfully submitting her proposal by way of Compromise Agreement to settle the said obligation: Advance payment for the empties: P11,500.00 Installment of P10,000.00 per month for the principal, then later on for the interest due. Considering the economic crisis, she is hoping that her proposal merits your kind consideration and approval. Very respectfully yours, SGD Vicente G. Villamil Counsel for Helen T. Kalalo[25] Contrary to petitioners contention, the aforequoted letter does not contain an express acknowledgment of liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of account, not the existence of her liability to petitioner. Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC cannot be considered as an admission of liability. In Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[26] we examined the reasons why compromise offers must not be considered as evidence against the offeror: First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to "buy his or her peace" without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication made toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited as a confession of weakness. Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by the parties making them. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is the distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual concessions. [27] (citations omitted) Petitioner further argues that respondents Offer of Compromise may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.[28] It quotes Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which states: Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. We do not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of Compromise dated 5 December 2000 was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March 2001 for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.[29] The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt. Finally, during the testimony of respondent and after her receipt of the Statement of Account from SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She explained that, at the time she had the letter prepared, the final amount owed to petitioner SMC was yet undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of imprisonment from petitioners agents. [30] The trial courts and the CA gave weight to her justification,[31] and we find no cogent reason to disturb their findings. We rule, therefore, that the Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo, nor can it be the basis of her liability to petitioner in the amount of P921,215. II SMC failed to prove that Kalalo is indebted to it in the amount of P921,215.

SMC claims that it is entitled to collect the amount of P921,215 representing the value of unpaid goods from respondent

Kalalo. It argues that the MeTC erred in ruling that respondent was liable to it to the extent of only P71,009, because the Statement of Account does not reflect the transactions covered by the dishonored checks, as it only covers cash transactions.[32] We find, however, that aside from its bare assertions on appeal, SMC failed to present any evidence to prove that cash transactions were treated differently from check transactions. Respondent correctly argues that if the check transactions were covered by other statements of account, petitioner should have presented evidence of those transactions during the proceedings before the lower court.[33] In any event, we cannot allow SMC to recover the amount of P921,215 from respondent, as it failed to prove the existence of the purported indebtedness. The records are bereft of any evidence, other than the dishonored checks, establishing the existence of that obligation. Checks, however, are not issued merely for the payment of a preexisting obligation. They may likewise be issued as a guarantee for the performance of a future obligation. In this case, it was sufficiently established that the dishonored checks were issued merely to guarantee the performance of a future obligation; that is, the payment of the net value of the goods after the value of the empty bottles and beer cases returned to petitioner were deducted from the gross value of the goods delivered to respondent. As to the amount of P71,009, both parties admit that the Statement of Account provided by SMC to respondent showed a liability of only P71,009. Respondent presented in evidence the Statement of Account, which petitioners witness confirmed to have come from SMCs accounting department.[34] We therefore rule that SMC failed to present enough evidence to prove Kalalos indebtedness to it in the amount of P921,215, but that respondents obligation to petitioner in the amount of P71,009 is unrebutted and supported by sufficient evidence. WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the appellate court, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30473 are herebyAFFIRMED. SO ORDERED

Andre L. D'Aigle Vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174181

DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.[1]

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Decision[2] dated March 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 which affirmed with modification the Decision[3] dated January 15, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL convicting petitioner Andre L. DAigle of the crime of Estafa. Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution[4] dated August 17, 2006 denying the Motion for Reconsideration[5] thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On June 5, 1997, petitioner was charged with Estafa before the RTC under the following Information:

That in, about and sometime prior to December 1996, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being then the Managing Director of Samfit Phils. received from said Samfit, Phils. for management, care and custody the following company properties: a) b) c) d) Electric transformer worth P16,500.00 Two (2) units of electronic boxes and two (2) units of computer boxes worth P490,000.00 Machine spare parts consisting of set of rack and pinion pair of bevel and gears MB-20-30 pair of meter gears 42 teeth set of gears 32 teeth gear bith bearing inserted 3 SL 20 bearings V plate one-way clutch one-way bearing CSK 20HC5 8 of LJ 34 bearings V type roller bearing 1 x 0 8 pieces of 6200 ZZE bearing with a total value of P12,765.35 [Equipment] and raw materials valued at P162,400.00

with a total value of SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE PESOS & 35/100 (P681,665.35) under the express obligation to use the same for a particular purpose[,] that is, exclusively for the machinery of Samfit Phils. but accused far from complying with his obligation with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his employer, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert the aforesaid corporate properties to his own personal use and benefit and despite several demands made upon him, accused refused and failed and still refuses and fails to return or account for the same to the damage and prejudice of Samfit, Phils., represented by its President, Mr. Arturo Parducho, in the aforesaid sum of P681,665.35. CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for pre-trial and trial on the merits.

During trial, the prosecution presented as its principal witness Arturo Parducho (Parducho), Director and President of Samfit Philippines, Inc. (SPI), a corporation primarily engaged in the manufacture of underwires for brassieres. According to him, petitioner was the former managing director of SPI tasked with the management of the company as well as the management, care and custody of SPIs personal properties. At the time that he was holding said position, petitioner was likewise a majority stockholder of TAC Manufacturing Corporation (TAC), an entity engaged in the fabrication of wire bending machine similar to that being used by SPI.[7] Sometime in November 1996, petitioner was divested of his duties and responsibilities as SPIs managing director[8] due to alleged conflict of business interest. Because of this, Parducho conducted an audit and inventory of SPIs properties and reviewed its financial statements, vouchers, books of account and other pertinent records. He also interviewed some of SPIs employees.[9] These revealed that several properties of SPI such as wire materials, electronic transformer, electronic and computer boxes, machine spare

parts, while still under the management, care and custody of petitioner, went missing and were left unaccounted for.[10] Further investigation revealed that some of SPIs wire bending machines, computer and electronic boxes were inside the premises of TAC. This was confirmed by Daniel Gutierrez, a former employee of TAC, who likewise admitted that TAC copied the wire bending machines of SPI.[11] In a letter dated January 14, 1997,[12] SPIs counsel formally demanded upon petitioner to turn over to SPI all its equipment under his care and custody. Ignoring the demand, petitioner was thus indicted with the present case. SPI also filed a replevin case against him for the recovery of the electronic and computer boxes. Subsequently, and by virtue of the Writ of Replevin,[13] an electronic box found inside TACs premises was recovered from petitioner while a computer box was later on surrendered to the Sheriff.

In his defense, petitioner alleged that his engineering firm TAC fabricated spare parts for SPI on a daily basis. Aside from this, it also did the repair and maintenance of SPIs machines. He also claimed that he had an understanding with SPI that TAC would support SPIs operation until its business standing improves. And since petitioner only had a 10% share in SPI, TAC would fabricate for it two additional machines valued at $60,000.00 each so that he could get additional 40% share therein. Under this set-up, Samfit UK would provide the micro stepping motors and motor drives as well as the control panels. However, petitioner was not able to finish fabricating the bending machines as he was dismissed by SPI. As a consequence, he filed a labor case against it before the Department of Labor and Employment.

Petitioner further claimed that SPI owes him about a million pesos for the repairs of its machines. While he admitted that SPIs electronic transformer, computer boxes and motor drives were recovered while in his possession thru a writ of replevin, he reasoned out that he did not return them to SPI after his dismissal because he intended to exercise his right of lien over them since he has properties which were still in the possession of SPI, collectibles amounting to P900,000.00, and unpaid one-month salary of P80,000.00. Finally, he denied having appropriated the computer boxes for his own benefit.[14]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution had established the guilt of petitioner for the crime of Estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315[15] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). It ratiocinated that the unjustified failure of petitioner to account for and deliver to SPI, upon demand, the properties entrusted to his care, custody and management is sufficient evidence of actual conversion thereof to his personal use. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision[16] rendered on January 15, 2001 reads: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sentences accused ANDRE D AIGLE to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusio[n] temporal as maximum; to indemnify private complainant in the amount of P191,665.35 and to pay costs. SO ORDERED.[17]

Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed to the appellate court.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals In a Decision[18] dated March 31, 2006, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed with modification the trial courts Decision, viz: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna (Branch 93), dated January 15, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL, is MODIFIED to the effect that appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects. SO ORDERED.[19]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[20] was likewise denied in a Resolution[21] dated August 17, 2006.

Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER-ACCUSED[S] MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF VALID REASONS/JUSTIFICATION. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, (RTCBRANCH 93, SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA), AND AT THE SAME TIME MODIFYING THE EXTENT OF THE PENALTY [IMPOSED] FOR THE CRIME ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED.[22]

Our Ruling

After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the petitioner vis--vis that of the respondent People of the Philippines (respondent), and in the light of the practically parallel finding of facts and conclusions of the courts below, this Court finds the instant petition partly meritorious. Concerning the first assigned error, the Court finds no cogent reason to sustain petitioners claim that the appellate court erred in denying his Motion for Reconsideration without valid reason or justification. The reason for the appellate courts denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is clear and simple, that is, after it made a thorough evaluation of the issues and arguments proffered in the said motion, the CA found that same were already passed upon and duly considered in its assailed Decision. This is very plain from the contents of the August 17, 2006 Resolution of the CA denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Undoubtedly, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied due to a valid reason and justifiable cause.

Petitioner also bemoans the fact that the dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision did not expressly mention that he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Suffice it to say, however, that a judgment is not rendered defective just because of the absence of a declaration of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the dispositive portion. The ratio decidendi of the RTC Decision extensively discussed the guilt of the petitioner and no scintilla of doubt against the same was entertained by the courts below. Indeed, petitioners guilt was duly proven by evidence of the prosecution. In any event, a judgment of conviction, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, is sufficient if it states: 1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; 2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or accessory; 3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and 4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived. We find that all of these are sufficiently stated in the trial courts Decision.

Anent the second assigned error, petitioner posits that the CA erred in affirming the said RTC Decision and in modifying the penalty imposed upon him since the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of estafa. He argues that Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC requires that the person charged was given juridical possession of the thing misappropriated. Here, he did not acquire juridical possession of the things allegedly misappropriated because his relation to SPIs properties was only by virtue of his official functions as a corporate officer. It is actually SPI, on whose behalf he has acted, that has the juridical possession of the said properties. Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand counters that the prosecutions evidence has fully established all the elements of the crime charged. Based on SPIs records, petitioner received from it various equipment of SPI on several occasions for the sole purpose of manufacturing underwires for brassieres. However after the conduct of an audit in December 1996, petitioner failed to properly account therefor. Petitioners arguments fail to persuade.

Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC: 1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return, the same; That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.[23]

2.

3. 4.

All these elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution.

Petitioner asserts that as majority stockholder of TAC, he entered into a business transaction with SPI wherein it would fabricate bending machines and spare parts for the latter. Under their agreement, SPI would provide the necessary components to be used in the fabrication as well as the electronic devices while work would be done at petitioners premises. Pursuant to this, petitioner admitted to having received from SPI an electronic transformer, electronic box and a computer box.[24] When petitioner, however, was not able to finish the work allegedly due to his dismissal from SPI, the latter demanded for the return of its properties. However, petitioner did not heed the demand and simply kept the properties as lien for his claims against SPI.[25] From petitioners own assertions, the existence of the first and fourth of the aforementioned elements is very clear. SPIs properties were received by the petitioner in trust. He received them for a particular purpose, that is, for the fabrication of bending machines and spare parts for SPI. And when SPI made a demand for their return after petitioners alleged dismissal therefrom, petitioner deliberately ignored the same. The Court cannot agree with petitioners postulation that he did not acquire juridical possession of SPIs properties since his relation with the same was only by virtue of his official function as SPIs corporate officer. As borne out by the records, the equipment subject matter of this case were received in trust by petitioner from SPI to be utilized in the fabrication of bending machines. Petitioner was given absolute option on how to use them without any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, petitioner acquired not only physical possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. As the Court held in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals:[26] When the money, goods or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. x x x

With regard to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the prosecution was able to prove this through circumstantial evidence. Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.[27] The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.[28] As mentioned, petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the properties of SPI which were received by him in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioners own personal use. Even if petitioner merely retained the properties for the purpose of preserving his right of lien over them, same is immaterial because, to reiterate, failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use. As correctly noted by the CA: We are not impressed by appellants excuse. We note that SPIs demand for the return of the properties subject of this case was made on January 14, 1997. At that time, appellant was no longer the managing director of SPI, he having been terminated from his position on November 19, 1996. This observation, coupled with SPIs demand for the return of its equipment and materials, show that appellant had lost his right to retain the said

properties and the fact that he failed to return or at least account for them raises the presumption of misappropriation and conversion. x x x[29]

Lastly, it is obvious that petitioners failure to return SPIs properties valued at P191,665.35 caused damage and prejudice to the latter.

In a last ditch effort to evade liability, petitioner claims that the controversy between him and SPI is an intra-corporate controversy considering that he was a stockholder of the latter. Such being the case, he avers that his conviction for estafa has no basis. Contrary, however to petitioners stance, by no stretch of imagination can the Court consider the controversy between him and SPI as an intra-corporate controversy. As correctly pointed out by the CA: Finally, we find no cogent basis, in law and in fact, which would support appellants allegation that the acts complained of in this case were corporate acts. His allegation without more that he had an agreement with Mr. Bernie Kelly of SPI to the effect that his (appellants) share in SPI would be increased to 40% in exchange for two bending machines does not give his act of retaining the properties a semblance of a corporate act. There is also no evidence that he acted on behalf of TAC Manufacturing Corporation, much less of SPI. Premises considered, we do not agree that appellants actuation should be considered as a corporate act, for which he claims he could not be held personally liable. x x x[30]

Regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses, the RTC found said witnesses to be credible and therefore their testimonies deserve full faith and credence. The CA for its part, did not disturb the trial courts appreciation of the same. It is a wellentrenched doctrine that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties.[31] Though jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of them obtain herein which would warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision. Thus, the Court accords deference to the trial courts appreciation of said testimonies. Accordingly, the RTCs finding of petitioners guilt, as affirmed by the CA, is sustained.

The proper imposable penalty

The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 but in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty (20) years imprisonment.

In the present case, petitioner poses no serious challenge to the amount involved which is P191,665.35. Since said amount is in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposable should be within the maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one

(21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor.[32] [A] period of one (1) year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed twenty (20) years.[33] Hence, sixteen (16) years must be added to the maximum term of the penalty of prision mayor. And since same exceeds twenty (20) years, the maximum term should be pegged at twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Applying now the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law which is prision correccional in its maximum to prision mayor in its minimum is prision correccional in its minimum to medium periods. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months x x x.[34]

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the CA correctly pegged the penalty in its maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusiontemporal but erred in imposing the minimum term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as same is beyond the lawful range. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 dated March 31, 2006 and August 17, 2006, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012] CHARLES GOTARDO, PETITIONER, VS. DIVINA BULING, RESPONDENT. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,[1] filed by petitioner Charles Gotardo, to challenge the March 5, 2004 decision[2] and the July 27, 2004 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV No. 76326. The CA decision ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son, Gliffze O. Buling. The CA resolution denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.[4] In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze.[5] For the parties failure to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings.[6]Trial on the merits ensued. The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.[7] The petitioner started courting the respondent in the third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last

week of January 1993.[8]The petitioner gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, such as on Valentines Day and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and took care of him when he was ill.[9] Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondents uncle, on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[10] The petitioner rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.[11] The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was pregnant.[12]When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the respondent.[13] They in fact applied for a marriage license.[14] The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a wedding reception and the bridal gown.[15]Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans.[16] The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry.[17] Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case.[18] The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.[19] When the petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child.[20]When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.[21] The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity,[22] claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.[23] During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondents motion,[24] granted a P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.[25] THE RTC RULING In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffzes filiation. It found the respondents testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., September 1993 in her direct testimony while last week of January 1993 during her cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the petitioners initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.[26] The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.[27] THE CA RULING In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the respondents testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioners counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioners allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a P2,000.00 monthly child support.[28] When the CA denied[29] the petitioners motion for reconsideration,[30] the petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari. THE PETITION The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTCs appreciation of the respondents testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity. THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT

The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in the respondents testimony was due to an incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and that the record is replete with evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover and that they had several intimate sexual encounters during their relationship, resulting in her pregnancy and Gliffzes birth on March 9, 1995. THE ISSUE The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTCs findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze. OUR RULING We do not find any reversible error in the CAs ruling. We have recognized that [f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. [31] One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[32] We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[33] In Herrera v. Alba,[34] we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.[35] We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.[36] We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.[37] In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.[38] Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.[39] On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy.[40] However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical assertions. The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondents direct testimony regarding their first sexual contact as sometime in September 1993 and her cross-testimony when she stated that their first sexual contact was last week of January 1993, as follows: ATTY. GO CINCO: When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you? A Third week of December 1992. Q And you accepted him? A Last week of January 1993. Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse? A Last week of January 1993.

COURT: A

What do you mean by accepting? I accepted his offer of love.[41]

We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having resulted from the failure of the respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory statements, the respondent explained that that portion of the transcript of stenographic notes was incorrect and she had brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former counsel) but the latter took no action on the matter.[42] Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered."[43] Evidently, the totality of the respondent's testimony positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has consistently asserted that she started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in September 1993.[44] Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.[45] Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.[46]Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.[47] It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.[48] In this case, we Sustain the award of P2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency ofthis case. WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004 decision and the July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

People vs Cabrillas x--------------------------------------------------------x DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: Minor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. Factual Antecedents For our review is the August 29, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00039 which affirmed with modifications the August 29, 2002 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Calbiga, Samar, in Criminal Case No. CC2000-1310, finding appellant Benny Cabtalan (Benny) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The Information[3] against Benny and his co-accused Adriano Cabrillas (Adriano) contains the following accusatory allegations:

That on or about the 11th day of July 1999, at nighttime which was purposely sought, in Barangay Laygayon, Municipality of Pinabacdao, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, and stab one Jesus Cabujat with the use of long bolos (sundang), with which both accused have provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the victim multiple stab wounds, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death. CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Two years after the incident, Benny was arrested in Las Pias City[5] while to date, Adriano remains at large. During his arraignment, Benny entered a plea of not guilty.[6] Trial thereafter ensued. Version of the Prosecution Prosecution witness Wilfredo Pacayra (Wilfredo) narrated that on July 11, 1999 at around 7:00 p.m., he went to the store of Susan Cabtalan (Susan) to buy salt. While thereat, Benny and Adriano asked him to join them in their drinking spree to which Wilfredo obliged. In the course of their drinking spree, Wilfredo noticed that Benny and Adriano had bolos, locally known as sundang, tucked on their waists. He also heard the two talking about their plan to assault someone that same night.[7] Sensing that something wrong would happen, Wilfredo left them and walked home.[8] Upon reaching his house, Wilfredo soon noticed Benny and Adriano circling the house of Jesus Cabujats (Jesus) daughter, Elena Raypan (Elena), which is just about two arms length away from his house.[9] Thereafter, the duo stood on a dark portion of the road.[10] Later on, he saw Jesus and his 9-year-old granddaughter Jonalyn C. Raypan (Jonalyn) walking towards the house of Jonalyns mother, Elena. Jesus stopped and turned towards a grassy area to urinate when suddenly, Benny and Adriano emerged from their hiding place. They held Jesus by his shoulders and alternately stabbed him. At that moment, Jesus shouted I am wounded, please help me because I was stabbed by Benny and Adriano.[11] Jesus then fell to the ground while Benny and Adriano immediately fled from the crime scene.[12] For her part, prosecution witness Jonalyn narrated that on the night of the incident, she fetched her grandfather Jesus from her Ate Susans house.[13] She and her grandfather walked side by side in going back to their house.[14] However, upon reaching the vicinity of their house, her grandfather went across the street to urinate. It was then that she saw Benny and Adriano on the same street.[15] She knew the two because Benny and her father are cousins while Adriano and her mother are also cousins.[16] She saw the two men take hold of her grandfathers arms, after which Benny stabbed her grandfather with a long bolo. She heard her grandfather say Donie, help me, I am wounded.[17] After that, Jonalyn saw Benny go home.[18] Elena also testified that when she heard her father shouting for help, she immediately went outside the house and saw Benny releasing her father. As she got nearer to Jesus, Benny and Adriano ran away.[19] When Elena asked her father as to who stabbed him, the latter replied that it was Benny and Adriano.[20]

Jesus was rushed to a hospital where he was pronounced dead due to multiple stab wounds.[21] His family spent P18,500.00 for his wake and burial. At the time of his death, Jesus was earning P1,000.00 a week as a farmer. A case for murder was accordingly filed against Benny and Adriano and a warrant was issued for their arrest which was, however, returned unserved since they could no longer be located. It appears that on July 13, 1999, at around noontime, Benny and Adriano escaped by ferryboat to Catbalogan, Samar.[22] Two years later, or on July 31, 2001, Benny was arrested in Las Pias City by virtue of an alias warrant of arrest.[23] Version of the Defense Benny testified that he was in his mothers house in the morning of July 11, 1999 until lunchtime. He then proceeded to the store of Susan in BarangayLaygayon and saw Adriano and a certain Manuel Cabigayan drinking tuba. He accepted their invitation to join in their drinking spree and stayed there until 6:00 p.m. Thereafter, he went home to Barangay Pilaon which was about three kilometers away. He reached his destination after walking for nearly an hour and no longer went out. He learned from his neighbors of the death of Jesus only the following day.[24] In the succeeding days, Benny went to Paraaque City after receiving a letter from his brother informing him of a job opportunity in the city as gardener.[25] Bennys mother, Gertrudes, testified that on July 11, 1999, she was in her farm in Barangay Laygayon, Pinabacdao, Samar, together with her husband and Adrianos mother, Pacita Ocenar. At around 9:00 p.m., Adriano arrived and confided to her that he attacked and injured a person in said barangay. The following day Adriano departed and was never seen again.[26] Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On August 29, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision[27] convicting Benny of the crime of murder. Discarding minor inconsistencies, relationship, and delay in testifying in court, it gave more credence to the testimonies of the prosecutions two eyewitnesses since their positive declarations that Benny and Adriano stabbed the helpless Jesus were never refuted. Besides, the ad mortem statement of Jesus that the two stabbed him would serve to cleanse any doubt on their responsibility.[28] Also telling is the fact that Benny and Adriano immediately fled to Catbalogan, Samar after the incident. The trial court appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery since the attack upon Jesus who was unarmed and unsuspecting was without any warning. It also found the existence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength as both Benny and Adriano held, subdued and attacked the 69-year-old defenseless Jesus. The trial court further held that conspiracy was evident since Benny and Adriano had common criminal intent and were united in its execution.[29] The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the prosecution [having] clearly established the guilt of the accused, BENNY CABTALAN beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of the crime of Murder, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death

by lethal injection, to pay the heirs of Jesus Cabujat the amount[s] of Php75,000.00 as civil liability; Php15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and Php10,000.00 in moral damages, to reimburse the amount of Php5,000.00 spent for the coffin; Php5,000.00 for the wake, although no receipts were presented for these last two expenses yet these are legitimate and reasonable amounts under the circumstances. Let the case against co-accused Adriano Cabrillas be sent to the archives without prejudice, and issue another alias order for his arrest as soon as possible. The Samar Provincial Jail Warden is ordered to proceed accordingly in so far as the continued detention of the herein accused and his eventual transfer to the National Penitentiary, and to inform this court in writing on the matter as soon as possible. The Acting Branch Clerk of court is advised to proceed accordingly. [SO ORDERED.][30]

The case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review, but same was later referred to the CA in accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo.[31] Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction through its August 29, 2006 Decision.[32] However, it did not anymore consider the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength as the qualifying circumstance of treachery already absorbed it.[33] Thus, the CA modified the penalty imposed upon Benny by reducing it from death to reclusion perpetua. Likewise modified were the amounts of damages granted to the heirs of Jesus. It disposed of the case in the following manner: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty is Reclusion Perpetua, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Jesus Cabujat Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to suffer accessory penalties attached to the offense committed. SO ORDERED.[34]

Assignment of Errors

Benny attempts to secure his acquittal by assigning the following errors: I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY QUALIFIED THE KILLING INTO MURDER.

II.

X X X X[35]

Benny insists that the evidence adduced to establish his culpability is not sufficient and credible. He posits that Wilfredo is not a credible witness because it took him three years to come out and reveal the identities of the alleged perpetrators without any adequate explanation for the delay. He likewise impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses since Wilfredo is a relative of the victims son-in-law while Jonalyn is a grandchild. In addition, Benny asserts that the prosecutions evidence is glaring with inconsistencies. According to him, Wilfredos testimony that he and Adriano took turns in stabbing Jesus is diametrically opposed to Jonalyns declaration that only he stabbed Jesus. Furthermore, the testimony of Elena that she inquired from Jesus who his assailants were is inconsistent with her own affidavit and that of her sister, Julita, as the affidavits indicated that it was Julita and not Elena who asked their father about the identity of his assailants. Benny therefore concludes that the prosecutions evidence is weak and cannot prevail over his defense of alibi. Moreover, he asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he killed Jesus in a treacherous manner, hence, he should not be held guilty of murder. Our Ruling The appeal lacks merit. Treachery attended the killing of Jesus, hence, the crime committed is murder.

Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, committed with any of the attendant circumstances enumerated in Article 248[36] of the Revised Penal Code, among which is treachery. There is no dispute that the killing of the victim in this case is neither parricide nor infanticide. The issue that must therefore be resolved is whether treachery attended the killing as to qualify the crime to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the victim might make.[37] The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.[38] Based on the account of the prosecutions eyewitnesses, there is no doubt that treachery was present. It was established that Benny and Adriano were in the crime scene prior to the incident. They hid in a dark portion of the road and assaulted Jesus with their bolos while he was urinating with his back to them. They even held him by his shoulders to render him defenseless and unable to resist the attack on him by his assailants. Wilfredo testified viz: Q. A. What else did you observe while the dogs were barking? While the dogs were barking, I saw two (2) persons who were [circling] the house of Elena Raypan, they were walking back and forth in front of the house of Elena Raypan. Were you able to recognize these two (2) persons walking back and forth near the house of Elena Raypan? Yes, sir.

Q. A.

Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. xxxx Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. xxxx Q. A.

Who were they? Benny Cabtalan and Adriano Cabrillas. How did you recognize them? Because the house was lighted. After they were going back and forth in front of the house of Elena Raypan, where did these persons go? They went to the dark portion of the road.

After they went to the dark portion of the road, what did you observe next? They just stood by [there]. After that what happened next? I saw Jesus Cabujat walking towards the house of Elena Raypan. Was he alone? He was accompanied by a child.

When you saw Jesus Cabujat walking towards the house of Elena Raypan, what did Jesus Cabujat do before going to the house of Elena Raypan? When Jesus Cabujat reached the place where the two persons Benny [Cabtalan] and Adriano Cabrillas were standing, Jesus Cabujat urinated.

xxxx Q. A. Q. A. xxxx Q. A. xxxx Q. xxxx A. Q. A. Q. He also stabbed the victim. Were you able to see the weapon used by Benny Cabtalan? Yes, sir. What was the weapon used? [H]ow about Adriano Cabrillas, what did he do? Who held the left shoulder of Jesus Cabujat? Benny Cabtalan. To what direction was he facing? He was facing towards the grassy area. What happened while Jesus Cabujat was urinating as you said? Thats the time when Jesus Cabujat was held on his shoulder.

INTERPRETER: The witness demonstrated that it was more or less 14 inches.

Q. A. xxxx Q. A. Q. A. Q. A.

That includes the handle? Yes, sir.

How many times did Benny Cabtalan stab the victim? Three (3) times. How about Adriano Cabrillas? Three (3) times also. From the first blow of Benny Cabtalan to the first blow of Adriano Cabrillas, how long did it take? It just happened so quickly; as the first one delivered his stab blow the other one also delivered his stab blow, alternately stabbing the victim. So, what happened to Jesus Cabujat? He asked for help and said: I am wounded, please help me because (I) was stabbed by Benny Cabtalan and Adriano Cabrillas. After he shouted what happened to him. After that he fell down. How about Benny Cabtalan and Adriano Cabrillas, what did they do when Jesus Cabujat fell down? When Jesus Cabujat shouted for help, that was the time the two (2) culprits [fled]. To what direction? To the route going to a farm.[39]

Q. A.

Q. A. Q. A. Q. A.

Jonalyn corroborated the testimony of Wilfredo on relevant details as follows: Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. xxxx When you x x x [reached] your house, what did your lolo do? He went across the street and urinated there and saw Benny also on the street. Was Benny alone? [There] were two (2) of them. Do you recognize the other one? Yes, sir. Who? It was Adriano. Do you know the surname of Benny? Cabtalan. How about Adriano, do you know the surname of Adriano? I cannot remember. Why do you know the surname of Benny Cabtalan? Because my father and his father are cousins. Benny and my father are cousins.

Q. A. xxxx Q. A. Q. A.

You saw them also in the street while your lolo was urinating so, what did Benny and Adriano do at that time? They held both arms of my grandfather.

And after holding x x x your grandfather, what did Benny do if any? They suddenly stabbed my lolo. With what? It was a long bolo.[40]

All told, Jesus was unaware of the imminent peril to his life and was rendered incapable of defending himself. From the suddenness of the attack upon Jesus and the manner it was committed, there is no doubt that treachery indeed attended his killing. The trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses usually remains undisturbed.

The trial and appellate courts reached the same conclusion that the testimonies of eyewitnesses Wilfredo and Jonalyn deserve credence as both narrated in a straightforward manner the details of Benny and Adrianos attack upon Jesus. Benny, however, still disputes the credibility of these witnesses by pointing out that Wilfredos testimony that he and Adriano took turns in stabbing Jesus differs from that of Jonalyn who stated that while the two assailants attacked Jesus in unison, it was only Benny who inflicted the mortal wounds. The Court, however, finds this inconsistency to pertain merely to the manner the fatal stab wounds were inflicted on Jesus. The materiality of the assailants exact position during their attack on the victim is a trivial and insignificant detail which cannot defeat the witnesses positive identification of Benny as one of the assailants. Besides, [i]t is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were [fabricated] and rehearsed.[41] Bennys assertion that Wilfredo is not a credible witness since he surfaced three years after the incident to testify for the prosecution also fails to impress. It is worthy to mention that the proceedings in this case was suspended for two years because Benny and Adriano left Pinabacdao, Samar and the warrant for their arrest could not be served on them. Also, deference or reluctance in reporting a crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. Delay in reporting a crime or an unusual incident in a rural area is well-known.[42] It is common for a witness to prefer momentary silence for fear of reprisal from the accused.[43] The fact remains that Wilfredo fulfilled his duty as a good member of society by aiding the family of Jesus when they were seeking justice. In the absence of other circumstances that would show that the charge was a mere concoction and that Wilfredo was impelled by some evil motives, delay in testifying is insufficient to discredit his testimony. The fact that Wilfredo and Jonalyn are related to the victim also does not diminish their credibility. While admittedly, Wilfredo is a relative of the husband of Julita, who is the daughter of Jesus, and Jonalyn is Jesuss granddaughter, relationship per se does not evince ulterior motive nor does it ipso facto tarnish the credibility of witnesses.[44] Mere relationship to a party cannot militate against the credibility of witnesses or be taken as destructive of the witnesses credibility.[45] What matters is that Wilfredo and Jonalyn positively identified Benny and Adriano as the assailants of Jesus and that they testified in a straightforward manner. These indicate that the two are telling the truth.

As to the inconsistencies in Elenas testimony and in her affidavit as to who asked her father the identity of the assailants, the same deserves scant consideration. It is settled that affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight.[46] The trial court therefore did not err in affording more credence to Elenas testimony given in open court despite her having previously executed an affidavit which was inconsistent with her testimony. To stress, appellate courts do not disturb the findings of the trial courts with regard to the assessment of credibility of witnesses. The reason for this is that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.[47] Bennys defense of alibi was properly rejected.

Alibi is the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove.[48] For this defense to prosper, proof that the accused was in a different place at the time the crime was committed is insufficient. There must be evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be within the immediate vicinity of the crime during its commission.[49]

Here, Benny did not satisfactorily demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the night of its commission. While he denies being at the scene of the crime when it happened, he claims to be within a reasonably near area which is his residence in Barangay Pilaon.[50] The murder of Jesus occurred in Barangay Laygayon, which is more or less 3 kilometers away from the place where Benny claimed he was in.[51] Benny testified that the distance between these two barangays can be covered in an hours walk.[52] Thus, even if he traveled by foot to another barangay, it was still not too far away to render it physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. Furthermore, Bennys alibi is uncorroborated. Courts may give credence to alibi only if there are credible eyewitnesses who can corroborate the alibi of accused.[53] In contrast, alibi becomes weaker in the face of the positive identification made by the witnesses for the prosecution, as in this case.[54] Benny cannot escape liability by imputing the crime to Adriano.

Bennys assertion that Adriano was solely responsible for the murder of Jesus is likewise undeserving of consideration. Such a claim is common among conspirators in their veiled attempt to escape complicity. It is a desperate strategy to compensate for a weak defense. We are not readily influenced by such a proposition since its obvious motive is to distort the truth and frustrate the ends of justice.[55] Besides, it is the victim himself who pointed to Benny as one of his assailants. Such statement of Jesus before his death is a dying declaration that is admissible in evidence against Benny.[56] A dying declaration is an evidence of the highest order; it is entitled to the utmost credence on the premise that no x x x person who knows of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. At the brink of death, all thoughts on concocting lies disappear.[57]

All told, the Court finds no reason to depart from the judgment of conviction rendered against Benny by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.

The Penalty and Award of Damages When the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.[58] Hence, the trial court should have no longer considered the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. And there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the proper penalty therefore is reclusion perpetua, it being the lesser penalty between the two indivisible penalties for the crime of murder which is reclusion perpetua to death.[59] Hence, we agree with the CA when it imposed upon Benny the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In addition, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346[60]provides: Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

Pursuant to the above provision, Benny is therefore not eligible for parole. As to the award of damages, the heirs are entitled to the following awards when death occurs due to a crime: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and, (5) temperate damages.[61] Civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime.[62] Hence, the Court modifies the civil indemnity awarded by the CA from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. We likewise increase the award for moral damages from P25,000.00 toP50,000.00 in accordance with the latest jurisprudence on the matter. Moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 shall be awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victims heirs.[63] As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family.[64] Moreover and with the finding of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, exemplary damages is correctly awarded but only in the amount of P30,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.[65] As regards actual damages, Jesuss daughter Julita testified that they spent P18,500.00 for burial and funeral expenses, though she was unable to present receipts to substantiate her claim. Where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be ascertained due to the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages in the sum of P25,000.00 may be granted, as it is hereby granted, in lieu thereof.[66] This award is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification.[67] The trial court and the appellate court are unanimous in not awarding loss of earning capacity to the heirs of Jesus for lack of basis. There was no error on their part since there was no documentary evidence to substantiate this claim. The testimony that Jesus

earned P1,000.00 a week can be used as basis for granting such an award only if he is either (1) self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in [his] line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.[68] Here, the prosecution did not offer proof that would determine whether Jesus was self-employed or a daily-wage earner. Thus, the exceptions to the rule cannot be applied in this case.[69] The heirs of Jesus are also entitled to an interest on all the awards of damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.[70] WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00039 that affirmed with modifications the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33, is AFFIRMED with further modifications. Appellant Benny Cabtalan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jesus Cabujat the following: (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (4) P 25,000.00 as temperate damages; and (5) interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid. SO ORDERED. Trinidad vs People x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

When there is no eyewitness to a crime, resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable.[1]

For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, dated July 1, 2010, of petitioner Romulo Trinidad (Romy) which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] dated October 12, 2009 and May 4, 2010, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the Decision[4] dated September 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

The following are the antecedent facts as found in the records:

Around 9 o'clock in the evening of October 16, 1998, the victim, Dominador Untalasco (Doming), a former bodyguard of the late ex-Mayor Clarence de Guzman, boarded the tricycle of Salvador Oaa (Salvador) at the Caltex

gasoline station going to Bagbag, Bauang, La Union. Upon arriving at the said place, Sonny Lubrica (Sonny), who was joining a bonfire with 5 other persons, flagged the same tricycle of Salvador. The act of Sonny angered Doming, thus the latter alighted from the tricycle and said, You are the one, you are blocking the way of the tricycles. Doming brought out a fan knife and slapped Sonny prompting the companions of the latter, except petitioner Romulo Trinidad, to scamper. Doming approached petitioner and said, You are one of them. Petitioner replied, I am not x x x one [of them], uncle. Thereafter, Doming slapped petitioner in the face and the latter said, You are boastful, uncle. Doming picked up a bamboo and hit petitioner on his left arm. Petitioner ran towards the east, while Doming chased him. Totoy Trinidad, father of petitioner, and Antonio Trinidad, went near the persons hiding behind the tricycle and asked them if Doming was armed, to which Sonny answered, Yes, he has a knife. Totoy went beside Salvador and told him to put off the light of his tricycle, which the latter did not follow. Thus, Totoy turned off the engine of Salvador's tricycle and headed towards the east shortly after Doming chased petitioner to the same direction.

Salvador went to the house of the Barangay Captain, but the latter was asleep, prompting him to go to the police station to report that Doming was in trouble. SPO4 Charlie Abuan, together with policemen Coloma and Cariaga, with Barangay Kagawad Rudy Sabado and Salvador, went to the scene of the crime and saw the bloodied body of the victim in a kneeling position with his forehead touching the ground. Five (5) persons were brought to the police station for investigation.

Meanwhile, petitioner and Antonio went to Eliseo Agno to ask him to bring them to town to surrender. At that time, Eliseo saw Antonio holding a samurai. Afterwards, Eliseo accompanied petitioner and Antonio to Rodolfo Sabado for the latter to drive them to Bauang Police Station, but was unable to do so because his vehicle was not available.

Based on the autopsy conducted by Dr. Bernando Parado, the victim died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock, hemorrhage, stab wound right auricle, multiple hack and stab wounds. The victim sustained 14 wounds on his front body with a total of 32 wounds consisting of multiple stab and hack wounds probably caused by a bolo or a knife.

As a result of the death of the victim, the latter's spouse incurred expenses for his funeral and church services with the total amount of P70,000.00.

Thus, an Information dated March 18, 1999 was filed against petitioner, Antonio Trinidad and Aurelio Trinidad for Homicide, which reads as follows: That on or about the 16th day of October, 1998, in the Municipality of Bauang, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and being then armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one

DOMINADOR UNTALASCO inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforementioned victim. That accused Aurelio Trinidad @ Totoy was previously convicted of a crime of Frustrated Homicide and he is undergoing parole. CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Upon arraignment, all the accused, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty. [6] Thereafter, the trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of Sonny Lubrica, Salvador Oaa, Eliseo Agno, Rodolfo Sabado, SPO4 Charlie Abuan, Dr. Bernardo Parado and Liberata Untalasco.

The defense filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence after the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Exhibits. The RTC, in an Order dated August 31, 2004, denied the motion of the defense for being filed out of time and directed the latter to present its evidence. However, the defense did not present its evidence.

Consequently, the RTC rendered a Decision dated September 28, 2004, finding petitioner and Antonio Trinidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, but acquitting Aurelio Trinidad, thus: WEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ROMULO TRINIDAD and ANTONIO TRINIDAD guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and hereby SENTENCES each of them to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum. To pay the heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally, the following amounts:

1. Php50,000.00 as death indemnity; 2. Php50,000.00 as moral damages to Liberata Untalasco; 3. Php33,100.00 as actual damages and to pay the costs. In the service of their sentence, the said accused shall be credited with their preventive imprisonment as provided for by Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The accused AURELIO TRINIDAD alias Totoy is ACQUITTED, on reasonable doubt. His cash bond in the amount of Php15,000.00 under O.R. No. 15994126 dated March 14, 2003 is cancelled and ordered released to his bondsman Francisca T. Tiquig, upon proper receipt therefor. SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved, petitioner and Antonio filed their appeal with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC with the modification that Antonio Trinidad be acquitted. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

FOR THE STATED REASONS, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 33) of Bauang, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2108-BG is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Antonio Trinidad is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. Thus, the cash bond posted for the provisional liberty of Antonio Trinidad is hereby CANCELLED. SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution dated May 4, 2010.

Hence, the present petition raising the following arguments:

a. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court since the evidence on record failed to support a conviction. b. The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not exclude the possibility that another person may have committed the offense. In its Comment dated February 8, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered with the following: THE ISSUES RAISED ARE MAINLY FACTUAL AND ARE THEREFORE NOT REVIEWABLE UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT. THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH WAS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN ACCORD WITH LAW, JURISPRUDENCE AND EVIDENCE. THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PETITIONER AS CHARGED.[9] PRESENTED WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT

Basically, petitioner insists that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because the circumstantial evidence presented during the trial is insufficient. According to him, he was not the only person who had a motive to kill the victim; thus, the presumption of innocence should be in his favor.

This Court finds no merit to the petition. Since petitioner was convicted on the basis of purely circumstantial evidence, this Court has to review the facts and to deliberate on the case with extra care, cognizant that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense, and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty of the guilt of the accused.[10]

The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[11] The corollary rule is that the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, [12] i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at

the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with any other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[13]

As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the following circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution was sufficient to convict the petitioner of the crime charged: 1. Accused Romulo Trinidad had motive to kill the deceased because during the altercation the latter slapped and hit him with a bamboo, prompting Romulo to get mad at the deceased; 2. Accused Romulo Trinidad was chased by the deceased eastward after the slapping and hitting incident; 3. Said accused was the last person seen with the deceased just before he died; 4. Moments later, after the police car went to the crime scene, accused Romulo Trinidad and Antonio Trinidad went to the house of Eliseo Agno asking [him] if he could bring them to town to surrender; Eliseo Agno saw Antonio holding a samurai; 5. Later, Eliseo Agno accompanied Romulo and Antonio Trinidad to the house of Rodolfo Sabado who had a vehicle, requesting the latter to bring the (2) accused to the police station to surrender; 6. Some of the wounds inflicted on the deceased were caused by a bolo or a knife. Accused Antonio was seen holding a Samurai just when he and Romulo decided to surrender the same night of the accident; 7. x x x; 8. The deceased sustained multiple stab/hacking wounds and contusions probably caused by two or three or more assailants using a knife or a bolo or even a stone; 9. In fact, accused Romulo and Antonio surrendered to the authorities the following morning, as shown in the [d]etention during the pendency of the [c]ase issued by Judge Romeo V. Perez, dated 17 October 1998, received by the jail warden x x x, before a warrant could be issued for their arrest; 10. The prosecution witnesses, Salvador Oaa, Eliseo Agno and Rodolfo Sabado, Jr. had no ill motive to testify against the accused.[14]

In his testimony, Salvador Oaa was able to positively identify Romulo to be present at the scene of the crime, thus: Q: Now what did the group of those having bonfire do when this Doming Untalasco got mad? A: Doming Untalasco went down from the tricycle[,] brought out a fan knife and slapped one of them. The others who were there stood up and ran away because they recognized him as they knew him personally, ma'am. Q: Do you know that person who was slapped by Doming Untalasco? A: Sonny Lubrica, ma'am. Q: What else happened after slapping one of the group? A: After the others in the group ran away, one of them was left behind who did not run, ma'am. Q: Who was that person who was left behind? A: Romy Trinidad, ma'am. xxxx

Q: What did he do? A: He told him[,] you are one of them, ma'am. Q: What did Romy do when this Doming Untalasco shifted his anger [on] him? A: He answered, I am not the one uncle, ma'am. Q: What did Doming Untalasco do? A: Doming Untalasco slapped Romulo Trinidad, ma'am. Q: What part of his body was hit? A: His face, ma'am.

Q: How many times did he slap the face of Romulo Trinidad? A: Once only, ma'am. Q: What did Romy Trinidad do when Doming Untalasco slapped his face? xxxx A: Romy Trinidad got mad and he uttered the word[s], you are boastful uncle. Q: What else happened after that? A: After that[,] because Romy Trinidad was hurt[,] he wanted to fight back, ma'am. Q: Why [did] you say that this Romy Trinidad also wanted to fight back? A: I felt [it] because he did not run and he wanted to fight back that is why I said that and[,] after that[,] Doming Untalasco was able to pick up a bamboo[,] which they were using in that bonfire[,] then he used it in hitting Romy Trinidad, ma'am. Q: Was Romulo Trinidad hit with that bamboo? A: Yes, sir. He was hit on the arm. x x x xxxx Q: What did he do after he was hit? xxxx A: Then Romulo Trinidad ran towards the east, maam. Q: How about Doming Untalasco? A: He followed him to the east[,] walking, maam. xxxx Q: Now, when you saw this Romy Trinidad and Doming Untalasco proceeded (sic) towards the east, what was their distances? xxxx A: I did not see it already because that part is already dark[,] then one man came near[,] maam.[15] (Emphases supplied)

The above testimony was corroborated by Sonny Lubrica, the latter confirming that petitioner had an altercation with the victim and that he was the last person seen with the victim immediately before the latter died, thus: Q: While having that bonfire [Mister] witness, do you recall any unusual incident? A: When we were having bonfire, a tricycle was approaching, ma'am. Q: Now, by the way, Mr. Witness, you said that you were having that bonfire at Robelo's residence. Where exactly in his residence were you having that bonfire? A: Near the road, ma'am. Q: And you mentioned a while ago that a tricycle approached you. From what direction did the tricycle come from? A: It came from the west proceeding to the east, ma'am. Q: And what happened after this tricycle was approaching your group, if any? A: It stopped, ma'am. xxxx Q: After the tricycle stopped, what happened next? A: The passenger alighted, ma'am. Q: And do you know who this passenger from the tricycle was? A: Yes, ma'am. Q: Who was he? A: Doming Untalasco, ma'am. Q: After he alighted from the tricycle, what happened next, if any? A: After he alighted from the tricycle, he said, Why, are you the people flagging down the tricycle here? and brought out his Batangas knife and then slapped me, ma'am. Q: After he slapped you, what happened next, Mr. Witness? A: I ran away, ma'am. xxxx Q: Where was Romy Trinidad at that time? A: Romy Trinidad was sitting down at the bamboo bench, ma'am. Q: So, you mean to say Mr. Witness that Romy Trinidad was with you during that evening of October 16, 1998 having that bonfire? A: He was not there at first, but when he was going home and he passed by us, we called him, ma'am.

Q: Now, you said that this Doming Untalasco slapped you. After that what happened next, if any? A: I ran away to hide near the house of Robelo, ma'am. Q: How about Romy Trinidad, where was he at that time Mr. Witness? A: He was there sitting down. He was left sitting down there, ma'am. Q: And do you know what happened between Doming Untalasco and Romy Trinidad?

xxxx A: What we saw, ma'am, because the place was dark, we saw him slapping Romy. Q: How far were you at that time from Romy and Doming when you saw Doming slapping Romy? A: About 5 arms length only, ma'am. Q: What happened after Doming slapped Romy? A: We saw them proceeding to the east. Romy was ahead of Doming who was following Romy. Romy then Doming were proceeding to the east direction, ma'am.[16](Emphases supplied)

The above testimonies show a positive identification of the petitioner as the last person seen with the victim. That, and the series of circumstances proven during the trial form an unbroken chain of events leading to the conclusion that petitioner was one of the assailants. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt.[17] Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction.[18]

Indeed, motive becomes material when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it.[19] As held in Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[20] motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element of the crime. However, motive becomes important when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive. [21] It is clear from the above testimonies that the victim had an encounter with a group of people in the street before all of them scampered and only petitioner was left behind. Thus, motive on the part of the petitioner has been established through the testimonies of the witnesses presented narrating the incident in which the victim slapped the petitioner and hit him with a bamboo stick before they went to the same direction.

Finally, absent any showing that certain facts of substance and significance have been overlooked by the trial court, or that its findings have been arbitrary, the conclusions it arrives at must be respected and its judgment based thereon affirmed.[22]

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, dated July 1, 2010, of petitioner Romulo Trinidad is hereby DENIED and the Decision and Resolution dated October 12, 2009 and May 4, 2010, respectively, of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision dated September 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, is herebyAFFIRMED.

People Vs Paler PEREZ, J.: The prosecution charged Jerome Paler (appellant Paler) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 10 th Judicial Region, Branch 12, Oroquieta City, with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 under the Information which states: That on or about the 22nd day of June 2004, at 6:00 oclock in the afternoon, in Barrientos Street, Barangay Layawan, Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to a poseur-buyer one (1) sachet of shabu in consideration of a marked 100-peso bill with serial number HW 257588 which was actually handed to and received by the said accused, and on the occasion of such buy-bust operation confiscated further from the possession of the accused another three (3) sachets of shabu placed in an empty pack of Winston cigarette which buybust operation resulted to the confiscation of a total of four (4) sachets of shabu all weighing 0.0565 gram.[1] (Emphasis supplied)

The Facts It was 22 June 2004, around 6:00 oclock in the evening. Appellant Paler was standing and conversing with a man in front of Golden Heart Videoke Bar in Layawan, Oroquieta City. Inside a car, parked about 12 meters away, seven (7) policemen in civilian clothes from the Provincial Anti-Crime Team (PACT), Misamis Occidental, were intently observing the movements of their informant who was the one conversing with the appellant.[2] Minutes passed. The police informant brought out a P100.00 bill from his left pocket and handed it to the appellant who took a sachet of white substance from a cigarette pack in exchange for the money.[3] Then, the police asset ceremoniously scratched his head,[4] long enough for the policemen to notice it. In seconds, the police emerged from the car, raced to the appellant and surrounded him. It was a buy-bust operation. Commotion followed. PO3 Rico Balbutin (PO3 Balbutin) met the police informant who acted as poseur-buyer retrieving the sachet of white crystalline substance; PO3 Balbultin then ran to the appellant to bodily search him. He recovered the marked P100.00 bill tacked in the appellants pocket and three (3) other sachets of suspected shabu hidden in the empty pack of Winston cigarettes.[5] Meanwhile, a certain PO2 Ramirez handcuffed the appellant, explained why he was being arrested and informed him of his constitutional rights. PO3 Balbutin handed the confiscated items to PO1 Clint Jill Gula (PO1 Gula), the PACTs evidence custodian, who brought them along with the appellant to the PACTs headquarters in Lower Lamak, Oroquieta City.[6] There, PO1 Gula marked the confiscated items with BB1 to signify the sachet sold to the poseur-buyer; JP2, JP3, and JP4, to signify the three sachets hidden in the empty pack of Winston cigarette. The team also entered the incident in the PACTs log book.[7] At around 8:45 oclock in the evening, after PO1 Gula prepared the request for the appellants urine test, the team proceeded to the provincial crime laboratory to subject the appellant to drug testing. Thereafter, the appellant was turned over to the Oroquieta City Police where he spent his first night in jail. On 23 June 2004, at around 8:30 oclock in the morning, in the presence of the representatives from the Department of Justice, media, and a public official,[8]PO1 Gula, retrieved the confiscated items already marked the previous night and made the inventory; a photographer also took pictures of them. The inventory report stated: Pursuant to Section 21 of RA 9165, a physical [inventory] and photographing of the items described below that were confiscated from the possession and control of one Jerome Paler y Lanit, 34 years old, married and resident of Barrientos Street, Barangay layawan, Oroquieta City during the buy bust

operation conducted on or about 221800H June 2004 at the aforementioned place by elements of this office, to wit: 1.) 2.) 3.) One (1) deck of shabu with marking BB1 which was bought during the buy bust operation. Three (3) decks of suspected shabu with markings JP2 to JP4 placed in an empty pack of Winston cigarette which were confiscated from his possession and control of said suspect. One (1) piece of one hundred peso bill with serial number HW257588 as marked money which was confiscated from his (Jerome) possession and control.

The said physical inventory and photographing were conducted at this office on or about 220830H June 2004 in the presence of the suspect/offender, from the media, from the Department of Justice and elected Public Official of said place.[9] (Emphasis supplied)

All of the witnesses signed the inventory report which was done in the presence of the appellant who was furnished with a copy thereof. The appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned. This is his version: The appellants Golden Heart Videoke Bar was to re-open on 22 June 2004. At around 6:00 oclock in the evening, while he and his live-in partner, Debbie Amil, were standing in front of the bar, waiting for customers to arrive, police officers PO3 Balbutin, Julito Candawan, Eilrred Ramirez and Allan Alvarico (Alvarico) alighted from a Tamaraw FX which was parked in front of the bar thirty minutes earlier.[10] The policemen approached and invited him and Debbie Amil to the PACTs headquarters to verify the report that Debbi Amil has a pending warrant of arrest. He heeded the invitation, trusting the police officers whom he personally knew and even considered as his friends. At the headquarters, however, PO3 Balbutin searched the appellant and even undressed him, finding in his possession his cashless wallet and an empty pack of Winston cigarettes. The police took his wallet,[11] while he kept holding the empty pack of cigarettes. The appellant and PO3 Balbutin proceeded to the latters office, also at the headquarters, while Alvarico tailed them. The appellant sat in front of PO3 Balbutins table, who put the pack of Winston cigarette on the table (now with three sticks of cigarette) while Alvarico stood beside him. The two police officers asked him about Debbie Amils warrant of arrest and informed him that he was to undergo drug testing. At that time, he claimed to have already stopped using drugs after completing in the previous year his rehabilitation from drug use. Before proceeding to the crime laboratory, PO3 Balbutin asked for the pack of Winston which the appellant was carrying; PO3 Balbutin pulled out from the pack of Winston three (3) sachets of shabu to the surprise of the appellant. He denied any knowledge about the shabu and claimed the sachets were planted. The appellants urine sample tested positive for drug use, and the chemistry report revealed that all the sachets of white crystalline substance confiscated from the appellant were Methamphetamine Hydrocloride or shabu. The RTC found the appellant guilty of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, a decision which the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed June 7, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 10th Judicial Region, Branch 12, Oroquieta City, in Criminal Case No. 1672, entitled People of the Philippines v. Jerome L. Paler of Barrientos St., Layawan, Oroquieta City, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[12]

Hence, this appeal on the following grounds: a. In giving full weight and credence to the unbelievable testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; and

b.

In convicting the appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[13]

The appellant contends that the prosecutions case against the accused-appellant is weak because the evidence does not measure up to the required quantum of proof to convict in criminal cases.[14] The Courts Ruling We affirm the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The appellant was convicted for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, which reads: Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00 ) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any such transaction.

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[15] The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. The testimonial and the documentary pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of its case against the appellant establish the presence of these elements. First, the identity of the seller was duly established. The police officers, PO3 Balbutin and PO1 Gula, positively identified appellant Paler as the same person from whom their asset purchased the sachet of shabu. PO3 Balbutin and PO1 Gula were both present at the entrapment and they witnessed the transaction between the poseur-buyer and the appellant. Second, the police officers saw the appellant handing the sachet to the poseur-buyer in exchange of the P100.00 peso bill that the appellant earlier received from the poseur-buyer. Not only did the police retrieve the shabu which was the object of the illegal sale, they also recovered three more sachets of shabu from the same empty pack of Winston cigarette, a fact which bolsters the prosecutions claim that the appellant indeed sold shabu to the poseur-buyer. To cast doubt as to the identity and integrity of the shabu, the appellant claims that the police officers failed to account for the chain of custody of the seized item alleged to be shabu. Contrary to the appellants defense, there is no break in the chain of custody of the seized item found to be shabu from the time the police asset turned it over to PO3 Balbutin, to the time it was turned over to PO1 Gula, the PACTs evidence custodian, up to its presentation to and photographing before the media, Department of Justice, public official, and up to the time that the shabu was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as follows: Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 reads: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her

representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied) Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, reads: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied) The testimony of PO3 Balbutin outlines the chain of custody of the confiscated items, i.e., sachet of shabu:[16] Q: A: And what if anything did you find on the body of Jerome Paler as a result of the search you made? I recovered the P100.00 bill marked money and one (1) empty Winston cigarette pack containing three (3) sachets of shabu. At that time, were you already sure that was shabu? We just suspected that was a dangerous drug or shabu. You said, you recovered from the possession of the accused the marked money, how was that marked money related which you recovered from the possession of the accused during the search to the marked money which you gave to your poseur buyer purposely to buy shabu in the entrapment operation? That was the same marked money sir. And what did you do with the marked money and the empty pack of Winston cigarette containing three (3) sachets of shabu? I immediately confiscated it.

Q: A: Q:

A: Q:

A: xxxx Q:

And in going to the PACT Office, who among the members of the team was in custody of the items confiscated? It is in the custody of PO1 Gula who is our evidence custodian. At the PACT Office, what if anything you did therein in relation to the incident? The incident was being reflected in the log book. Who recorded it? Me. Do you have your log book with you now?

A: Q: A: Q: A: Q:

A: xxxx Q:

Yes sir.

I have here an empty pack of winston cigarette, will you please examine this and inform this Honorable Court what relation has this empty pack of winston cigarette in relation to the empty pack of winston cigarette which you recovered from the possession of the accused, Jerome Paler during the incident? The same pack sir.

A: xxxx Q:

I noticed that in these sachets of shabu there are markings BB1, JP2, JP3 and JP4, who wrote these markings? PO1 Gula sir.

A: Court Q: A:

Why do you know that it was he who marked it? It is his customary duty, your honor that whatever evidence confiscated the evidence custodian will mark it. And what if anything did PO1 Gula do at the PACT office? He made a request for urine test for the two arrested persons. What else? He likewise put markings on the evidence confiscated sir. After the investigation, entering the incident in the PACT blotter, where did you bring Jerome Paler? We brought him to the Provincial Crime Laboratory for drug testing.

Q: A: Q: A: Q:

A: xxxx Q:

And from the Misamis Occidental Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, where did PO1 Gula and other members of the PACT together with Jerome Paler and Debbie Amil go? They went back to PACT Office. From the PACT Office, where did they go? From the PACT Office, we proceeded to Oroquieta City Police Station in order to turn over them. On the following day, that was June 23, 2004, what if anything did PO1 Gula prepare at the PACT Office? He prepared an inventory of the items confiscated and likewise the other members of the team contacted the supposed witness for the inventory.

A: Q: A: Q:

A:

Court: Will the defense counsel admit the existence of the inventory? A: We already admitted the existence of the inventory, your Honor. I think it was stated in the pretrial order, your honor. Only the existence, your honor.

xxxx Q: And when the representatives of the different sectors arrived at your office, the PACT Office, what did they do there? PO1 Gula withdrew the evidence confiscated and placed it on the table and in the presence of the witness, the items confiscated were being inventoried.

A:

xxxx Q: A: Q: A: Did the representatives and you sign the inventory of the items confiscated? Yes sir. After the signing of the inventory of the items confiscated, what followed next at your office? x x x [T]the photographer took a picture.

Plainly, the prosecution established the crucial links in the chain of custody of the sold and seized sachet of shabu, from the time it was first seized from the appellant, until it was brought for examination and presented in court. The identity, quantity and quality of the illegal drugs remained untarnished and preserved; hence, the integrity of the drugs seized remained intact. WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

MAGTIRA VS PEOPLE DECISION BRION, J.: Petitioner Elsa Macandog Magtira seeks in this petition for review on certiorari (filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) to reverse the decision[1] and the resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27252. The CA affirmed with modification the joint decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 148, that found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of estafa penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The records show that seven criminal informations for estafa were filed against the petitioner. Except for the amounts misappropriated and the private complainants[4] involved, the informations were similarly worded, as follows: That on or about and sometime during the year of 2000, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused received in trust and for administration from complainant x x x as contribution to a Paluwagan in the amount of x x x under [the] safekeeping of accused [Elsa] Macandog Magtira, with the express and legal obligation on the part of the accused to return and/or account for the same, but the accused far from complying with her obligation with intent to gain, abuse of confidence and to defraud complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to her own personal use and

benefit the said contribution (Paluwagan) and/or the proceeds thereof x x x and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the aforementioned amount.[5] The petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges.[6] Thereafter, the seven cases were tried jointly. The following facts were established: first, the petitioner was the custodian of the funds of the Paluwagan where the private complainants were members;[7] second, that demands were made against the petitioner by the private complainants for the return of their contributions in the Paluwagan; and third, the petitioner failed to meet the private complainants demand for the return of their contributions. During trial, the petitioner denied misappropriating the contributions of the private complainants. She claimed that she was robbed of the Paluwagan funds in the early afternoon of February 28, 2000. By way of corroboration, the petitioner presented a copy of an entry in the police blotter dated February 28, 2000 and the affidavits of five individuals attesting to the robbery.[8] From the evidence adduced, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime charged and declared: [I]t is clear to the Court that the accused is not disputing in all the cases that (a) sizeable amount of money belonging to different persons were received by her in trust or for administration, involving the duty to make a delivery thereof to the owners; (2) that there is a demand to her that same be returned but she cannot do so.[9] The RTC explained that while the robbery of the entrusted money is a valid defense against estafa, the petitioners evidence of the robbery was wanting. The RTC observed that the petitioners testimony was self-serving and inconsistent on some of the material details of the robbery. The RTC also noted the petitioners failure to account for and to deliver the contributions which were collected from the private complainants after the robbery. Finally, the RTC found that the petitioners credibility affected by her own demeanor of indifference during trial showed no semblance of worry or [of] being concerned [10] about the serious charges filed against her. Dissatisfied with the RTCs decision, the petitioner elevated her conviction to the CA which affirmed the findings of the RTC but modified the penalty of imprisonment imposed. The CA held: (1) In Criminal Case No. 02-1766 where the amount of the fraud is P85,000.00, the incremental penalty is six (6) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus six (6) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty. In Criminal Case No. 02-1767 where the amount of the fraud is P65,000.00, the incremental penalty is four (4) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus four (4) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as the maximum penalty. In Criminal Case No. 02-1768 where the amount of the fraud is P60,000.00, the incremental penalty is three (3) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus three (3) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to eleven (11) years of prision mayor maximum, as the maximum penalty.

(2)

(3)

(4)

In Criminal Case No. 02-1769 where the amount of the fraud is P34,000.00, the incremental penalty is one (1) year to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus one (1) year of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate penalty should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as the maximum penalty. In Criminal Case No. 02-1770 where the amount of the fraud is P85,400.00, the incremental penalty is six (6) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus six (6) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty. In Criminal Case No. 02-1771 where the amount of the fraud is P100,000.00, the incremental penalty of seven (7) years is to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus seven (7) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months ofprision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium, as the maximum penalty. In Criminal Case No. 02-1772 where the amount of the fraud is P153,000.00, the incremental penalty is thirteen (13) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided by the law. The penalty cannot go beyond twenty (20) years as the law provides that in no case shall the penalty be higher than reclusion temporal regardless of the amount of the fraud. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporalmaximum, as the maximum penalty.[11] (italics supplied)

(5)

(6)

(7)

The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration;[12] hence, the present petition. The Issue The ultimate issue for consideration is whether the petitioner should be held liable for the crimes of estafa. The petitioner argues that the CA and the RTC erred in rejecting her argument that no misappropriation of the Paluwagan funds was clearly established in the record. In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of the petition. The OSG maintains that the elements constituting the crime ofestafa with abuse of confidence had been fully established by the prosecutions evidence. The OSG insists that the petitioner failed to clearly prove by competent evidence her affirmative defense of robbery. The OSG also insists that the petitioners conduct in failing to inform all the members of the alleged robbery bolsters the circumstance of her misappropriation of the Paluwagan funds. Lastly, the petitioners misappropriation of the Paluwagan funds was substantiated by her failure to deliver the Paluwagan funds out of the contributions made by the private complainants after the robbery. The petitioner subsequently filed a reply, reiterating the arguments in her petition. The Courts Ruling We deny the petition for lack of merit. Preliminary consideration A preliminary matter we have to contend with in this case is the propriety of resolving one of the issues raised by the petitioner who has appealed her judgment of conviction by way of a Rule 45 review. A reading of the petition shows

that the petitioner raises both errors of law and of fact allegedly committed by the CA and the RTC in their decisions. First, we are called to determine whether a proper application of law and jurisprudence has been made in the case. Second, we are also called to examine whether the CA and the RTC correctly appreciated the evidence to which the two courts anchor their conclusions. As a rule, a Rule 45 review is confined to the resolution of errors of law committed by the lower courts. Further, in a Rule 45 review, the factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally held binding and conclusive on the Court.[13] We emphasize that while jurisprudence has provided exceptions[14] to this rule, the petitioner carries the burden of proving that one or more exceptional circumstances are present in the case. The petitioner must additionally show that the cited exceptional circumstances will have a bearing on the results of the case. The petitioner cites in this regard the alleged misappreciation of the evidence committed by the CA and the RTC. The petitioner contends that both courts disregarded her evidence, namely: the affidavits of five individuals and the police blotter. She argues that she should not be faulted for the non-presentation in court of the five individuals who executed the affidavits which attested to the robbery since she was then represented by a counsel de oficio. She also argues that both courts disregarded the evidence of her reputation of being a kind person of good moral character. She asserts that she delivered to the private complainants their respective shares in the Paluwagan funds prior to the robbery. She further argues that the conclusions of the CA and the RTC were contrary to the Courts ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals[15] where it held that estafacannot be committed through negligence or, as in this case, where the explanation by the accused raises reasonable doubt on whether the amount in question was misappropriated. After a careful study of the records, we find that the petitioners cited exceptional circumstances are more imagined than real. We find no compelling reason to deviate from the factual findings of the CA and the RTC in this regard. Misappropriation as an element of the offense of estafa connotes an act of using, or disposing of, anothers property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.[16] We have previously held that the failure to account upon demand for funds or property held in trust without offering any satisfactory explanation for the inability to account is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. [17] We have also held that the demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused to account are similarly circumstantial evidence that the courts can appreciate.[18] As the CA and the RTC did, we find no clear evidence establishing that the petitioner was actually robbed of the Paluwagan funds. In the first place, the five individuals who executed the affidavits were not presented in court. While the petitioner faults the counsel de oficio for their non-presentation in court, we find no proof that her counsel had been negligent in performing his legal duties. Incidentally, we also reject this line of argument for two other reasons: first, it was raised only for the first time in the present appeal; and second, it involves a factual determination of negligence which is inappropriate under a Rule 45 review. We additionally note from a facial examination of the affidavits that the affiants were not even eyewitnesses to the robbery; hence, their statements do not sufficiently prove the actual occurrence of the robbery. More importantly, the affidavits do not also establish with reasonable certainty that the petitioner was actually robbed of the Paluwagan funds. Moreover, we cannot give much credence to the police blotter whose contents were mainly based on the statements made by the petitioner to the police. If at all, it is evidence of what was entered, not of the truth or falsity of the entry made. We give due respect to the evaluation made by the RTC in this regard: Thus, there seems to be a discrepancy as to the time and number of persons (robbers) who entered the residence of the accused. Further, the accused claims that there was a policeman who went to her house who was called by her lessee (or lessor) but the accused cannot remember his name. But then, the accused never testified as to whether the policeman investigated the scene of the crime and some people in the vicinity. Surely at that hour, near such market, where there are people in the vicinity, people will notice strangers or other persons who enter the house of another or who leave the same whether in a hurry or not.

The accused even admitted that she was hesitant to report the matter to the police[.] Why was the accused hesitant? She claims that the robber warned her that he will harm her if she reports the incident. But immediately after the incident, the accused reported the incident, but nothing happened to her up to the present.[19] (underscoring supplied)

Besides, the petitioner failed to explain her failure to account and to deliver the Paluwagan funds arising from contributions made by the private complainantsafter the alleged robbery incident. On record are the positive and unrefuted testimonies of the private complainants that they remitted contributions to the petitioner even after the robbery. In other words, if the petitioner had in fact been robbed of Paluwagan funds, the robbery would not have affected the accounting and the delivery of the Paluwagan funds arising from the contributions made by the private complainants after the alleged robbery. As the records show, despite the continued receipt of contributions from the private complainants, the petitioner failed to account for, and to deliver, the Paluwagan funds. The Petitioners Conviction We now go to the crux of the present appeal and determine whether the evidence adduced warrants the petitioners conviction of the crime charged. The offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence has the following elements under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same[;] that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt[;] that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and there is demand by the offended party to the offender.[20]

(b)

(c) (d)

We find that all the above elements are present in the present case, having been established by the prosecutions evidence and by the petitioners own admissions. The first element was established by the evidence showing that the petitioner received various sums of money from the private complainants to be held in trust for them under the Paluwagan operation. The petitioner admitted that she was under obligation, at a fixed date, to account for and to deliver the Paluwaganfunds to the private complainants in the sequential order agreed upon among them. The second element was established by the evidence that the petitioner failed to account for and to deliver the Paluwagan funds to the private complainants on the agreed time of delivery. The third and fourth elements of the offense were proven by evidence showing that the petitioner failed to account for and to deliver the Paluwagan funds to the private complainants despite several demands made upon her by the private complainants. Each of the private complainants testified as to how they were prejudiced when they failed to receive their allotted Paluwagan funds. Given the totality of evidence, we uphold the conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged. The Penalty The decisive factor in determining the criminal and civil liability for the crime of estafa depends on the value of the thing or the amount defrauded.[21] With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the petitioner filed a manifestation[22] which showed the satisfaction of her civil monetary liability with six (6) out of the seven (7) private complainants.

Anent her criminal liability, the evidence shows that the amount of money remitted by the private complainants to the petitioner all exceeded the amount ofP22,000.00. In this regard, the first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the appropriate penalty if the value of the thing or the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00: 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. [italics ours]

As provided by law, the maximum indeterminate penalty when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 is pegged at prision mayor in its minimum period or anywhere within the range of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, plus one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 of the amount defrauded but not to exceed twenty years. In turn, the minimum indeterminate penalty shall be one degree lower from the prescribed penalty for estafa, which in this case is anywhere within the range of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.[23] Applying this formula, we affirm the penalty imposed by the CA as it is fully in accordance with the law. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the decision dated November 10, 2005 and the resolution dated January 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27252, finding petitioner Elsa Macandog Magtira GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of estafa penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALEX WATAMAMA Y ESIL, ACCUSEDAPPELLANT. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: On appeal is the March 5, 2010 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03295, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103, of Quezon City, finding appellant Alex Watamama y Esil guilty of violating Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.[3] The prosecution's version of the facts is as follows: At around 10 oclock in the morning of September 25, 2005, an informant reported to SPO2 Dante Nagera in the Quezon City Anti-Drug Action Center, PNP Central Police District, Quezon City Hall Compound, that a certain Alex was selling drugs in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City. SPO2 Nagera relayed the information to his superior P/Supt. Gerardo Ratuita who then formed a team consisting of SPO2 Nagera, PO3 Leonardo Ramos, PO1 Teresita Reyes, PO1 Alexander Jimenez, and PO1 Peggy Lynne Vargas to conduct a buy-bust operation. PO1 Vargas was designated as the poseurbuyer and was given two P100 bills which she marked with her initials PV.[4] At 12 noon of the same day, the buy-bust team arrived at Area A, Payatas, Quezon City. The informant accompanied PO1 Vargas to a house at No. 14 Rosal Street. Upon seeing appellant, the informant introduced PO1 Vargas to appellant as a shabu user. PO1 Vargas asked to buy P200 worth of shabu from appellant. When asked for payment, PO1 Vargas promptly handed appellant the two marked bills. Appellant pocketed the money then took out a plastic sachet containing 0.18 grams of shabuand gave it to PO1 Vargas. PO1 Vargas inspected the contents of the plastic sachet, then gave the prearranged signal that the transaction was consummated. Immediately, the other members of the buy-bust team surfaced and arrested appellant. The two marked bills were recovered when SPO2 Nagera ordered appellant to empty his pockets. Appellant was thereafter brought to the police station.[5]

At the police station, PO1 Vargas marked the confiscated shabu and turned it over to the station investigator Alex A. Jimenez. Jimenez prepared an inventory receipt which P/Supt. Ratuita signed. Thereafter, PO2 Ortiz brought the plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination.[6] Forensic chemist Leonard Jabonillo performed the examination and found that the contents of the heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking PV-09-25-05, weighed 0.18 grams and tested positive for methylampethamine hydrochloride or shabu.[7] On the other hand, appellant claimed that three men in civilian attire with handguns tucked at their waist suddenly barged in his house and arrested him. He was not shown any arrest warrant and nothing was found on him when the police frisked him at the police station. He added that PO1 Jimenez told him that if he wanted to be released he must reveal the identity of a big-time shabu supplier. He denied knowing any big-time shabu supplier and also denied selling shabu. He was then charged with illegal sale of shabu.[8] The RTC rendered a decision convicting appellant of illegal sale of 0.18 grams ofshabu and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000. On appeal to the CA, appellant argued that the arresting police officers failed to comply strictly with Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, since there was no proof that they conducted an inventory of the confiscated items, or even marked the same in his presence, or the presence of his representative or counsel, or a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected official. As aforesaid, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision. The CA found that the prosecution was able to establish every link in the chain of custody of theshabu from the moment of seizure to receipt for examination and safekeeping in the PNP Crime Laboratory to safekeeping for presentation in court. The CA further held that the marking and inventory of the shabu done at the police station was not fatal to the prosecutions case. Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that in case of warrantless seizures, the marking, inventory, and photograph may be conducted at the nearest office of the apprehending team as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The CA noted that PO1 Vargas adequately explained why the marking was not made at the place of confiscation since there was a crowd of people forming when appellant was arrested. Also, a photograph was taken but the digital camera was lost. The CA also held that the defect in the pre-operation coordination sheet with PDEA would not affect the entrapment operation. The CA explained that Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the lead agency in investigations and prosecutions of drug- related cases. It held that Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. Unsatisfied with the CA decision, appellant filed a notice of appeal before this Court, essentially questioning the noncompliance by the police with the procedure for the custody and control of seized prohibited drugs under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. He claims that the chain of custody was not established by the prosecution and prays for his acquittal. We agree with appellant. In all prosecutions for the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the existence of the prohibited drug has to be proved.[9] The chain of custody rule requires that testimony be presented about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized up to the time it is offered in evidence. To this end, the prosecution must ensure that the substance presented in court is the same substance seized from the accused. While this Court recognizes substantial adherence to the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations, not perfect adherence, is what is demanded of police officers attending to drugs cases, [10] still, such officers must present justifiable reason for their imperfect conduct and show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved. Here, however, they failed to meet these conditions.

The prosecution failed to show how the seized evidence changed hands from the time PO1 Vargas turned it over to the investigator up to the time they were presented in court as evidence. The prosecution did not adduce evidence on how the

evidence was handled or stored before its presentation at the trial. It is not enough to rely merely on the testimony of PO1 Vargas who stated that she turned the seized item over to the investigator who then prepared the letter of request for examination. There was no evidence on how PO2 Ortiz came into possession of the shabu and how he delivered the seized item for examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Neither was there any evidence how it was secured from tampering. Instructive is the case ofPeople v. Kamad,[11] where the Court enumerated the different links that the prosecution must endeavor to establish with respect to the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. We are aware that there is no rule which requires the prosecution to present as witness in a drugs case every person who had something to do with the arrest of the accused and the seizure of prohibited drugs from him. The discretion on which witness to present in every case belongs to the prosecutor.[12] Nonetheless, as a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while m the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.[13] In this case, the over-reliance on POl Vargas' testimony and the failure to present the investigator and P02 Ortiz are fatal to the prosecution's case. Since the failure to establish every link in the chain of custody of the drug compromised its identity and integrity, which is the corpus delicti of the crimes charged against appellant, his acquittal is therefore in order. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The March 5, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03295 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Alex Watamama y Esil is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, is hereby ordered to release the person of accused-appellant ALEX WATAMAMA y ESIL from custody unless he is detained for some other lawful cause/s. The Director, Bureau of Corrections, is hereby further ordered to REPORT to this Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from doing so. With costs de oficio.

PEOPLE VS VILLAFLORES BERSAMIN, J.: Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the commission of a crime and the identity of the culprit. Under review is the conviction of Edmundo Villaflores for rape with homicide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 128, in Caloocan City based on circumstantial evidence. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction with modification on February 22, 2007.[1] The victim was Marita,[2] a girl who was born on October 29, 1994 based on her certificate of live birth.[3] When her very young life was snuffed out by strangulation on July 2, 1999, she was only four years and eight months old.[4] She had been playing at the rear of their residence in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City in the morning of July 2, 1999 when Julia,

her mother, first noticed her missing from home.[5] By noontime, because Marita had not turned up, Julia called her husband Manito at his workplace in Pasig City, and told him about Marita being missing.[6] Manito rushed home and arrived there at about 2 pm,[7] and immediately he and Julia went in search of their daughter until 11 pm, inquiring from house to house in the vicinity. They did not find her.[8] At 6 am of the next day, Manito reported to the police that Marita was missing.[9] In her desperation, Julia sought out a clairvoyant (manghuhula) in an adjacent barangay, and the latter hinted that Marita might be found only five houses away from their own. Following the clairvoyants direction, they found Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack[10] inside the comfort room of an abandoned house about five structures away from their own house.[11] Her face was black and blue, and bloody.[12] She had been tortured and strangled till death. The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Solidum, who indicated that Villaflores might be the culprit who had raped and killed Marita.[13] The police thus arrested Villaflores at around 5 pm of July 3, 1999 just as he was alighting from a vehicle.[14] On July 7, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC the information charging Villaflores with rape with homicide committed as follows:[15] That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of one Marita, a minor of five (5) years old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with said Marita, against the latters will and without her consent, and thereafter with deliberate intent to kill beat the minor and choked her with nylon cord which caused the latters death. CONTRARY TO LAW. Arraigned on August 19, 1999, Villaflores pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[16] The CA summarized the evidence of the State in its decision, viz: After pre-trial was terminated, the trial proceeded with the prosecution presenting witnesses namely, Aldrin Bautista, Jovie Solidum, Manito, Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, SPO2 Protacio Magtajas, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, PO3 Rodelio Ortiz, PO Harold Blanco and PO Sonny Boy Tepase. From their testimonies, it is gathered that in the afternoon of July 3, 1999, the lifeless body of a 5year old child, Marita (hereinafter Marita) born on October 21, 1994, (see Certificate of Live Birth marked as Exhibit K) was discovered by her father, Manito (hereinafter Manito) beside a toilet bowl at an unoccupied house about 5 houses away from their residence in Phase 9, Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The day before at about noon time his wife called him up at his work place informing him that their daughter was missing, prompting Jessie to hie home and search for the child. He went around possible places, inquiring from neighbors but no one could provide any lead until the following morning when his wife in desperation, consulted a manghuhula at a nearby barangay. According to the manghuhula his daughter was just at the 5th house from his house. And that was how he tracked down his daughter in exact location. She was covered with a blue sack with her face bloodied and her body soaked to the skin. He found a yellow sack under her head and a white rope around her neck about 2 and a half feet long and the diameter, about the size of his middle finger. There were onlookers around when the NBI and policemen from Sub-station 6 arrived at the scene. The SOCO Team took pictures of Marita. Jessie was investigated and his statements were marked Exhibits C, D and D-1. He incurred funeral expenses in the total amount of P52,000.00 marked as Exhibit L and sub-markings. (See other expenses marked as Exhibit M and sub-markings). Two (2) witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum, came forward and narrated that at about 10:00 oclock in the morning of July 2, 1999, they saw Edmundo Villaflores, known in the neighborhood by his Batman tag and a neighbor of the [victims family], leading Marita by the hand (umakay sa bata). At about noon time they were at Batmans house where they used shabu for a while. Both Aldrin

and Jovie are drug users. Aldrin sports a sputnik tattoo mark on his body while Jovie belongs to the T.C.G. (through crusher gangster). While in Batmans place, although he did not see Marita, Jovie presumed that Batman was hiding the child at the back of the house. Jovie related that about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, he heard cries of a child as he passed by the house of Batman (Narinig ko pong umiiyak ang batang babae at umuungol). At about 7:00 oclock in the evening, Jovie saw again Batman carrying a yellow sack towards a vacant house. He thought that the child must have been in the sack because it appeared heavy. It was the sack that he saw earlier in the house of Batman. Among the first to respond to the report that the dead body of a child was found was SPO2 PROTACIO MAGTAJAS, investigator at Sub-station 6 Bagong Silang, Caloocan City who was dispatched by Police Chief Inspector Alfredo Corpuz. His OIC, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis called the SOCO Team and on different vehicles they proceeded to Bagong Silang, Phase 9 arriving there at about 2 o:clock in the afternoon of July 3, 1999. They saw the body of the child at the back portion of an abandoned house where he himself recovered pieces of evidence such as the nylon rope (Exhibit N) and the yellow sack inside the comfort room. The child appeared black and blue, (kawawa yong bata wasak ang mukha). He saw blood stains on her lips and when he removed the sack covering her body, he also saw blood stains in her vagina. The yellow sack that he was referring to when brought out in court had already a greenish and fleshy color. The sack was no longer in the same condition when recovered, saying, when asked by the Court: medyo buo pa, hindi pa ho ganyang sira-sira. There was another sack, colored blue, which was used to cover the face of the child while the yellow sack was at the back of the victim. He forgot about the blue sack when SOCO Team arrived because they were the ones who brought the body to the funeral parlor. He had already interviewed some person when the SOCO Team arrived composed of Inspector Abraham Pelotin, their team leader, and 2 other members. He was the one who took the statement of the wife of Edmundo Villaflores, Erlinda, and turned over the pieces of evidence to Police Officer SPO2 Arsenio Nacis who placed a tag to mark the items. When the SOCO Team arrived, a separate investigation was conducted by Inspector Pelotin. PO3 RODELIO ORTIZ, assigned at Station 1, Caloocan City Police Station, as a police investigator, took the sworn statement of Aldrin Bautista upon instruction of his chief, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, asked Aldrin to read his statement after which he signed the document then gave it to investigator, SPO2 Protacio Magtajas. During the investigation, he caused the confrontation between Aldrin Bautista and Edmundo Villaflores. Aldrin went closer to the detention cell from where he identified and pointed to Villaflores as the one who abducted the child. Villaflores appeared angry. SPO2 ARSENIO NACIS participation was to supervise the preparation of the documents to be submitted for inquest to the fiscal. He asked the investigator to prepare the affidavit of the victims father and the statement of the two witnesses and also asked the investigator to prepare the referral slip and other documents needed in the investigation. He ordered the evidence custodian, PO3 Alex Baruga to secure all the physical evidence recovered from the scene of the crime composed of 2 sacks. In the afternoon of July 3, the suspect, Edmundo Villaflores was arrested by PO3 Harold Blanco, SPO1 Antonio Alfredo, NUP Antonio Chan and the members of Bantay Bayan in Bagong Silang. PO1 HAROLD BLANCO of the Sangandaan Police Station, Caloocan City, as follow-up operative, was in the office at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 3, 1999, together with PO3 Alfredo Antonio and Police Officer Martin Interia, when Police Inspector Corpuz, as leader formed a team for them to go to the scene of the crime. They immediately proceeded to Phase 9. Inspector Corpuz entered the premises while he stayed with his companions and guarded the place. SPO3 Magtajas was already investigating the case. They were informed that the group of Aldrin could shed light on the incident. Blanco and the other police officers returned to the crime scene and asked the people around, who kept mum and were elusively afraid to talk. When he went with SPO1 Antonio Chan accompanied by councilman Leda to the house of Batman, it was already padlocked. They went to the place of SPO1 Alfredo Antonio nearby to avoid detection and asked a child to look out for Villaflores. Soon enough, a jeep from Phase 1 arrived and a commotion ensued as people started blocking the way of Villaflores, who alighted from the said jeep. The officers took him in custody and brought him to Sub-station 6 and SPO3 Nacis instructed them to fetch his wife. He was with police officer Antonio Chan and they waited for the arrival of the wife of Villaflores from the market. When she arrived, it was already night time. They

informed her that her husband was at Sub-station 6 being a suspect in the killing of a child. There was no reaction on her part. She was with her 3 minor children in the house. She went with them to the precinct. When Sgt. Nacis asked Mrs. Villaflores if she knew anything about what happened on the night of July 2, initially, she denied but in the course of the questioning she broke down and cried and said that she saw her husband place some sacks under their house. He remembered the wife saying, noong gabing nakita niya si Villaflores, may sako sa silong ng bahay nila, tapos pagdating ni Villaflores, inayos niya yong sako at nilapitan niya raw, nakita niya may siko, tapos tinanong niya si Villaflores, ano yon? Sabi niya, wala yon, wala yon. The wife was crying and she said that her husband was also on drugs and even used it in front of their children. She said that she was willing to give a statement against her husband. Their house is a kubo the floor is made of wood and there is space of about 2 feet between the floor and the ground. She saw the sack filled with something but when she asked her husband, he said it was nothing. She related that before she went outside, she again took a look at the sack and she saw a protruding elbow inside the sack. She went inside the house and went out again to check the sack and saw the child. It was Sgt. Nacis who typed the statement of Erlinda Villaflores which she signed. He identified the sworn statement marked as Exhibit X and sub-markings. PO1 SONNY BOY TEPACE assigned at the NPD Crime Laboratory, SOCO, Caloocan City Police Station also went to the crime scene on July 3, 1999 at about 2:50 in the afternoon with Team Leader Abraham Pelotin, at the vacant lot of Block 57, Lot 12, Phase 9, Caloocan City. He cordoned the area and saw the dead child at the back of the uninhabited house. She was covered with a blue sack and a nylon cord tied around her neck. There was another yellow sack at the back of her head. He identified the nylon cord (Exhibit N) and the yellow sack. He does not know where the blue sack is, but he knew that it was in the possession of the officer on case. The blue sack appears in the picture marked as Exhibits S, T, and R, and was marked Exhibits T-3-A, S-1 and R-2-A. Thereafter they marked the initial report as Exhibit U and sub-markings. They also prepared a rough sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO report 047-99 marked as Exhibit V and the second sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO report 047-99 marked as Exhibit W. DR. ARNEL MARQUEZ, Medico Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory with office at Caloocan City Police Station conducted the autopsy on the body of Marita upon request of Chief Inspector Corpus. The certificate of identification and consent for autopsy executed by the father of the victim was marked as Exhibit G. He opined that the victim was already dead for 24 hours when he conducted the examination on July 3, 1999 at about 8 oclock in the evening. The postmortem examination disclosed the following: POSTMORTEM FINDINGS: Fairly developed, fairly nourished female child cadaver in secondary stage of flaccidity with postmortem lividity at the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nailbeds are cyanotic. HEAD, NECK AND TRUNK 1) Hematoma, right periorbital region, measuring 4 x 3.5 cm; 3.5 cm from the anterior midline. 2) Area of multiple abrasions, right zygomatic region, measuring 4 x 2.2 cm, from the anterior midline. 3) Abrasion, right cheek, measuring 1.7 x 0.8 cm, 3 cm from the anterior midline. 4) Area of multiple abrasions, upper lip, measuring 4 x 1 cm, bisected by the anterior midline. 5) Contusion, frontal region, measuring 6 x 4 cm, 6.5 cm left of the anterior midline. 6) Punctured wound, left pre-auricular region, measuring 9.2 x 0.1 cm, 11.5 cm from the anterior midline. 7) Ligature mark, neck, measuring 24 x 0.5 cm, bisected by the anterior midline.

8) Abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 0.7 x 0.4 cm, 6 cm from the Posterior midline. 9) Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 1.2 x 0.8 cm, 6.5 cm from the posterior midline. There are multiple deep fresh lacerations at the hymen. The vestibule is abraded and markedly congested, while the posterior fourchette is likewise lacerated and marked congested. The lining mucosa of the larynx, trachea and esophagus are markedly congested with scattered petecchial hemorrhages. Stomach is full of partially digested food particles mostly rice. Cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation. There were multiple deep laceration at the hymen and the vestibule was abraded and markedly congested while the posterior fourchette was likewise lacerated and markedly congested, too. It could have been caused by an insertion of blunt object like a human penis. The cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation, in laymans term, sinakal sa pamamagitan ng tali. The external injuries could have been caused by contact with a blunt object like a piece of wood. The abrasion could have also been caused by a hard and rough surface. He prepared the Medico Legal Report No. M-250-99 of the victim, Marita _____ marked as Exhibit H and sub-markings. He issued the death certificate marked as Exhibit E. The anatomical sketch representing the body of the victim was marked as Exhibit I and sub-markings. The sketch of the head of the victim was marked Exhibit J. The injuries on the head could have been caused by hard and blunt object while other injuries were caused by coming in contact with a hard or rough surface. There were also punctured wounds which could have been caused by a barbecue stick or anything pointed. The ligature mark was congested and depressed. On cross-examination, among others, he explained the stages of flaccidity which is the softening of the body of a dead person. The first 3 hours after death is the primary stage of flaccidity and after the third hour, the body will be in rigor mortis and after the 24 hours, it is the secondary stage. The victim could have been dead at least 9 oclock in the morning on July 2. As regards the multiple lacerations of the hymen, it is possible that two or more persons could have caused it. The CA similarly summed up the evidence of Villaflores, as follows: EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES, testifying in his behalf, denied the charge of raping and killing the child saying he did not see the child at anytime on July 2, 1999. At around 10:00 oclock in the morning of July 2, 1999, he was at the market place at Phase 10 to get some plywood for his Aunt Maring. His Aunt called him at 8:30 in the morning and stayed there for about 5 hours and arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon. His Aunt was residing at Phase 10 which is about a kilometer from his place. His residence is some 5 houses away from the place of the child. He knows the child because sometimes he was asked by the wife of Manito to fix their electrical connection. He corrected himself by saying he does not know Marita but only her father, Manito. He denied carrying a sack and throwing it at the vacant lot. He was arrested on July 3, 1999 and does not know of any reason why he was charged. He has witnesses like Maring, Sherwin, Pareng Bong and Frankie to prove that he had no participation in the killing. On cross-examination, among others, he admitted being called Batman in their place and that Aldrin and Jovie are his friends. They go to his house at Package 5, Phase 9, Lot 32 in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. They are his close friends being his neighbors and they usually went to his house where they used shabu (gumagamit ng bato). At 42, he is older than Aldrin and Jovie. He knew Marita who sometimes called him to his house to fix electrical wiring. He also knew his wife, but does not know their children. On the night of July 2, Aldrin and Jovie went to his house. He was arrested on July 3 in a street near the precinct while walking with his wife. They came from Bayan. His wife works in a sidewalk restaurant. Two of his children were in Phase 3, the other two were in his house and two more were left

with his siblings. When he was arrested, he was carrying some food items which they brought in Bayan. They did not tell him why he was being arrested. He saw his wife once at Police Station 1 before he was brought to the city jail. Aldrin and Jovie harbored ill feelings against him because the last time they went to his house he did not allow them to use shabu. He admitted using shabu everytime his friends went to his house. He is not legally married to his wife. She visited him for the last time on July 19, 1999. He denied that the door of his house had a sack covering neither was it locked by a piece of string. He has not talked with the father or mother of the child nor did he ask his wife for help. He just waited for his mother and she told him, they will fight it out in court, ilalaban sa husgado. On re-direct he said that Aldrin and Jovie often went in and out of his house. His bathroom is in front of his house. SHERWIN BORCILLO, an electronic technician and neighbor of Edmundo Villaflores told the court that the charges against Villaflores were not true, the truth being, that on the night ofJuly 2, 1999 he saw Aldrin and Jovie at the back of his house holding a sack containing something which he did not know. They were talking to Batman and offering a dog contained in the sack and then they left the sack near the comfort room outside the door of the house of Batman. They came back and took the yellow sack. He followed them up to the other pathwalk and then he went home. The following day he learned that Villaflores was being charged with the killing of Marita. At first, he just kept quiet because he thought Villaflores should be taught a lesson for being a drug user, but later when he had a drinking spree with his father and uncle, he told them what he knew because he could not trust any policeman in their place. He told them what really happened and they advised him to report the matter to the barangay. So he went to the purok and made a statement in an affidavit form. He executed the Salaysay in the presence of their Purok secretary and barangay tanod. It was the Purok secretary who gave him the form. He saw Aldrin and Jovie about midnight of July 2, 1999. There was also another person with them, one Jose Pitallana, who is the eldest in the group and considered their Amo-amo. In his affidavit, he said: Ako ay lumabas ng bahay at sinundan ko siya at nakita ko si Jose na tinalian ng nylon and bata. Tapos po ay may narinig po akong kung sino man ang titistego sa akin ay papatayin ko, basta kayo ang saksi sa ginawa in Batman. He said he was sure that the sack contained the child because he saw the head of the child, it seemed like she was staring at him and asking his help. He executed the statement after the arrest of the accused. He did not go to the police station to narrate his story. He made his statement not in the barangay hall but only at their purok. On cross-examination, among others, he said that on July 2, 1999 he left the house at about 11:00 oclock in the morning to go to school in PMI at Sta. Cruz, Manila. He did not see Batman, nor Aldrin, or Jovie about noon time of July 2. He arrived home at about 8:00 oclock in the evening because he passed by the Susano Market in Novaliches to see his mother who was a vendor there. They closed the store at about 6:30, then they bought some food stuffs to bring home. He was not sure of the date when Batman was arrested. He admitted that Batman is his uncle being the brother of his mother. His uncle is a known drug addict in the area. He usually saw him using shabu in the company of Jose Pitallana, his wife, Aldrin and Jovie. After he was informed that his uncle was arrested, he did not do anything because he was busy reviewing for his exam. He did not also visit him in jail. After he made his statement, he showed it to their Purok Leader, Melencio Yambao and Purok Secretary, Reynaldo Mapa. They read his statement and recorded it in the logbook. It was not notarized. He had no occasion to talk with Aldrin and Jovie. Jose Pitallana is no longer residing in their place. He did not even know that Aldrin and Jovie testified against his uncle. He never went to the police to tell the truth about the incident.

As earlier stated, on May 27, 2004, the RTC convicted Villaflores of rape with homicide, holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt. [17] The RTC decreed: Wherefore, the Court finds accused Edmundo Villaflores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping and killing Marita and hereby sentences him to the Supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P75,000.00, moral damages in the sum of P30,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum of P20,000.00, and to pay the cost if this suit, to be paid to the heirs if the victim.

The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to bring the accused to the National Penitentiary upon receipt hereof after the promulgation of the decision. Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review. SO ORDERED. On intermediate review, the CA affirmed the conviction,[18] disposing: WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 128 finding the accused Edmundo Villaflores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide is affirmed with modification in the sense that (a) the death penalty imposed by the trial court is commuted to reclusion perpetua and the judgment on the civil liability is modified by ordering the appellant to pay the amount of P100,000.00 civil indemnity, P75,000.00 moral damages and P52,000.00 as actual damages. Issues Villaflores now reiterates that the RTC and the CA gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide because the State did not discharge its burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged. In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide was established beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence. Ruling We sustain Villaflores conviction. I Nature of rape with homicide as a composite crime, explained

The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound crime under Article 48, supra, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate information. Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides: Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1) a) b) c) d)

By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: Through force, threat, or intimidation; When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstance mentioned above be present. xxx

Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. xxx When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. xxx

The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the composite crimes of attempted rape with homicide and rape with homicide. In both composite crimes, the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of rape. As can be noted, each of said composite crimes is punished with a single penalty, the former with reclusion perpetua to death, and the latter with death. The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are crucial in determining whether the crime is a composite crime or a complex or compound crime. The phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, the offense the offender originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. The indivisibility of the homicide and the rape (attempted or consummated) is clear and admits of no doubt. In contrast, the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine. To understand what homicide may be covered by the phrase on the occasion of the rape, a resort to the meaning the framers of the law intended to convey thereby is helpful. Indeed, during the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act No. 8353, the legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape to refer to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, orduring the commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as the killing is linked to the rape, became evident, viz: Senator Enrile. x x x I would like to find out, first of all, Mr. President, what is the meaning of the phrase appearing in line 24, or on the occasion? When the rape is attempted or frustrated, and homicide is committed by reason of the rape, I would understand that. But what is the meaning of the phrase on the occasion of rape? How far in time must the commission of the homicide be considered a homicide on the occasion of the rape? Will it be, if the rapists happen to leave the place of rape, they are drunk and they killed somebody along the way, would there be a link between that homicide and the rape? Will it be on the occasion of the rape? Senator Shahani. x x x It will have to be linked with the rape itself, and the homicide is committed with a very short time lapse.

Senator Enrile. I would like to take the first scenario, Mr. President: If the rapist enters a house, kills a maid, and rapes somebody inside the house, I would probably consider that as a rape on the occasion of. Or if the rapists finished committing the crime of rape, and upon leaving, saw somebody, let us say, a potential witness inside the house and kills him, that is probably clear. But suppose the man happens to kill somebody, will there be a link between these? What is the intent of the phrase on the occasion of rape? x x x xxx Senator Shahani. Mr. President, the principal crime here, of course, is rape, and homicide is a result of the circumstances surrounding the rape. So, the instance which was brought up by the good senator from Cagayan where, let us say, the offender is fleeing the place or is apprehended by the police and he commits homicide, I think would be examples where the phrase on the occasion thereof would apply. But the principal intent, Mr. President, is rape.[19] II The State discharged its burden of proving the rape with homicide beyond reasonable doubt

As with all criminal prosecutions, the State carried the burden of proving all the elements of rape and homicide beyond reasonable doubt in order to warrant the conviction of Villaflores for the rape with homicide charged in the information.[20] The State must thus prove the concurrence of the following facts, namely: (a) that Villaflores had carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) that he consummated the carnal knowledge without the consent of Marita; and (c) that he killed Marita by reason of the rape. Under Article 266-A, supra, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. Maritas Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit K) disclosed that she was born on October 29, 1994, indicating her age to be only four years and eight months at the time of the commission of the crime on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal knowledge of her by Villaflores would constitute statutory rape. We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide, because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself killed. Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of Court also allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the culprit.[21] Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence.[22] To be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a felon free. [23] The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence, no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.[24] Nor has the quantity of circumstances sufficient to convict an accused been fixed as to be reduced into some definite standard to be followed in every instance. Thus, the Court said in People v. Modesto:[25] The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence is well set out in the following passage from People vs. Ludday:[26] No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz: Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5) In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered several circumstances, which when appreciated together and not piece by piece, according to the CA,[27] were seen as strands which create a pattern when interwoven, and formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with homicide. We concur with the RTC and the CA. The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following. Firstly, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand (akay-akay) at around 10:00 am on July 2, 1999,[28] leading the child through the alley going towards the direction of his house about 6 houses away from the victims house.[29] Secondly, Marita went missing after that and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless body on the following day.[30] Thirdly, Solidum passed by Villaflores house at about 3:00 pm of July 2, 1999 and heard the crying and moaning (umuungol) of a child coming from inside.[31] Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his house carrying a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned house where the childs lifeless body was later found.[32] Fifthly, Manito, the father of Marita, identified the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered the head of his daughter(nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time he discovered her body;[33] Manito also mentioned that a blue sack covered her body.[34] Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed between the abandoned house where Maritas body was found and Villaflores house, because his house had a rear exit that enabled access to the abandoned house without having to pass any other houses.[35] This indicated Villaflores familiarity and access to the abandoned house. Seventhly, several pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned house, like the white rope around the victims neck and the yellow sack, were traced to Villaflores. The white rope was the same rope tied to the door of his house,[36] and the yellow sack was a wall-covering for his toilet.[37] Eighthly, the medico-legal findings showed that Marita had died from asphyxiation by strangulation, which cause of death was consistent with the ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries including abrasions, hematomas, contusions and punctured wounds. Ninthly, Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood from her genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body tested positive for spermatozoa.[38] And, tenthly, the body of Marita was already in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of her cadaver at 8 pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal findings indicated that such stage of flaccidity confirmed that she had been dead for more than 24 hours, or at the latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999. These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has brought to us a moral certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide. As to the rape, Marita was found to have suffered multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, injuries that Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the medico-legal officer who had conducted the autopsy of her cadaver on July 3, 1999, attributed to the insertion of a blunt object like a human penis. The fact that the vaginal and periurethral smears taken from Marita tested positive for spermatozoa confirmed that the blunt object was an adult human penis. As to the homicide, her death was shown to be caused by strangulation with a rope, and the time of death as determined by the medico-legal findings was consistent with the recollection of Solidum of seeing Villaflores going towards the abandoned house at around 7 pm of July 2, 1999 carrying the yellow sack that was later on found to cover Maritas head. Anent the identification of Villaflores as the culprit, the testimonies of Solidum and Bautista attesting to Villaflores as the person they had seen holding Marita by the hand going towards the abandoned house before the victim went missing, the hearing by Solidum of moaning and crying of a child from within Villaflores house, and the tracing to Villaflores of the yellow sack and the white rope found at the crime scene sufficiently linked Villaflores to the crime.

We note that the RTC and the CA disbelieved the exculpating testimony of Borcillo. They justifiably did so. For one, after he stated during direct examination that Villaflores was only his neighbor, [39] it soon came to be revealed during his cross-examination that he was really a son of Villaflores own sister. [40] Borcillo might have concealed their close blood relationship to bolster the credibility of his testimony favoring his uncle, but we cannot tolerate his blatant attempt to mislead the courts about a fact relevant to the correct adjudication of guilt or innocence. Borcillo deserved no credence as a witness. Also, Borcillos implicating Solidum and Bautista in the crime, and exculpating his uncle were justly met with skepticism. Had Borcillos incrimination of Solidum and Bautista been factually true, Villaflores could have easily validated his alibi of having run an errand for an aunt about a kilometer away from the place of the crime on that morning of July 2, 1999. Yet, thealibi could not stand, both because the alleged aunt did not even come forward to substantiate the alibi, and because the Defense did not demonstrate the physical impossibility for Villaflores to be at the place where the crime was committed at the time it was committed. The CA reduced the penalty of death prescribed by the RTC to reclusion perpetua in consideration of the intervening enactment on June 24, 2006 of Republic Act No. 9346.[41] Nonetheless, we have also to specify in the judgment that Villaflores shall not be eligible for parole, considering that Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 expressly holds persons whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act not eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended. The awards of damages allowed by the CA are proper. However, we add exemplary damages to take into account the fact that Marita was below seven years of age at the time of the commission of the rape with homicide. Article 266B, Revised Penal Code has expressly declared such tender age of the victim as an aggravating circumstance in rape, to wit: Article 266-B. Penalties. xxx. xxx The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: xxx 5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old; xxx Pursuant to the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.[42] The Civil Code permits such award by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[43] Granting exemplary damages is not dependent on whether the aggravating circumstance is actually appreciated or not to increase the penalty. As such, the Court recognizes the entitlement of the heirs of Marita to exemplary damages as a way of correction for the public good. For the purpose, P30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages,[44] for a lesser amount would not serve genuine exemplarity. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on February 22, 2007 finding and pronouncing EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO guilty of rape with homicide, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, namely: (a) that he shall suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended; (b) that he shall pay to the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals; and (c) that all the awards for damages shall bear interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision. The accused shall pay the costs of suit. Emilia Lim vs. Mindanao Wines and Liquor Galleria DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.: Acquittal from a crime does not necessarily mean absolution from civil liability. Despite her acquittal from the charges of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) or the Bouncing Checks Law, the lower courts still found petitioner Emilia Lim (Emilia) civilly liable and ordered her to pay the value of the bounced checks, a ruling which was upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its June 30, 2006 Decision[1] and November 9, 2006 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 64897. In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Emilia prays for the reversal and setting aside of the said rulings of the CA. She contends that since her acquittal was based on insuffiency of evidence, it should then follow that the civil aspect of the criminal cases filed against her be likewise dismissed. Hence, there is no basis for her adjudged civil liability. Factual Antecedents Sales Invoice No. 1711[3] dated November 24, 1995, as well as Statement of Accounts No. 076[4] indicate that respondent Mindanao Wines and Liquor Galleria (Mindanao Wines) delivered several cases of liquors to H & E Commercial owned by Emilia, for which the latter issued four Philippine National Bank (PNB) postdated checks worth P25,000.00 each. When two of these checks, particularly PNB Check Nos. 951453[5] and 951454[6] dated October 10, 1996 and October 20, 1996, respectively, bounced for the reasons ACCOUNT CLOSED and DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS, Mindanao Wines, thru its proprietress Evelyn Valdevieso, demanded from H & E Commercial the payment of their value through two separate letters both dated November 18, 1996.[7] When the demands went unheeded, Mindanao Wines filed before Branch 2 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Davao City Criminal Case Nos. 68,309-B-98 and 68,310-B-98 against Emilia for violations of BP 22.[8] During trial, the prosecution presented its sole witness, Nieves Veloso (Nieves), accountant and officer-in-charge of Mindanao Wines. She testified that Emilia has been a customer of Mindanao Wines who purchased from it assorted liquors. In fact, Sales Invoice No. 1711 covered the orders made by Emilia from Mindanao Wines and these orders were delivered by the latters salesman Marcelino Bersaluna[9] (Marcelino) to H & E Commercial in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. For the same, Marcelino received the four PNB checks and accordingly endorsed them to Mindanao Wines. Out of these four PNB checks, two were already paid, i.e., one was collected while the other redeemed in court.[10] With regard to the bounced PNB Check Nos. 951453 and 951454, Nieves claimed that upon her instructions Marcelino went to H & E Commercial more than 10 times to collect their value. But since his efforts were in vain, two demand letters were thus sent to Emilia which were duly received by her as the same were signed by the recipient of the letters.[11] . On cross, Nieves admitted that she neither saw Emilia issue the checks nor accompanied Marcelino in delivering the orders to H & E Commercial or in collecting the unpaid checks.[12] Asked about the corresponding sales order covering Sales Invoice No. 1711, she acknowledged that the sales order was unsigned and explained that sales orders of customers are handled by the Credit and Collection Department of Mindanao Wines.[13] After the prosecution rested its case, Emilia filed a Demurrer to Evidence[14] claiming insufficiency of evidence. She asserted that not one of the elements of BP 22 was proven because the witness merely relied upon the reports of the salesman; that the purchases covered by Sales Invoice No. 1711 were unauthorized because the corresponding job order was unsigned; and that it was never established that the bank dishonored the checks or that she was even sent a notice of dishonor. Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities In its December 10, 1999 Order,[15] the MTCC granted the Demurrer to Evidence. It ruled that while Emilia did issue the checks for value, the prosecution nevertheless miserably failed to prove one essential element that consummates the crime of BP 22, i.e., the fact of dishonor of the two subject checks. It noted that other than the checks, no bank representative testified about presentment and dishonor. Hence, the MTCC acquitted Emilia of the criminal charges. However, the MTCC still found her civilly liable because when she redeemed one of the checks during the pendency of the criminal cases, the MTCC considered the same as an acknowledgement on her part of her obligation with Mindanao Wines. Pertinent portions of the MTCC Order read: The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 must concur before one can be convicted of this offense. Since one element is wanting, it is believed that the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The Court,

however, opines that the accused is civilly liable. There is evidence on record that an account was contracted. She should, therefore, pay. WHEREFORE, the demurrer to evidence is granted and these cases are ordered DISMISSED. Accused, however, is adjudged to pay complainant the total amounts of the 2 checks which is P50,000.00, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the date of notice which is November 18, 1996 until the amount is paid in full; to reimburse complainant of the expenses incurred in filing these cases in the amount of P1,245.00, and to pay attorneys fees of P10,000.00. SO ORDERED.[16]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Dissatisfied that her acquittal did not carry with it her exoneration from civil liability, Emilia appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 13. Emilia contended that since the MTCC dismissed the criminal cases on the ground of insufficient evidence, the civil aspect of the criminal cases should likewise be automatically dismissed. She argued that the court may only award damages for the civil aspect of BP 22 if the criminal cases have been dismissed on reasonable doubt upon proof of preponderance of evidence. The RTC was not persuaded by Emilias contentions. The RTC clarified that the MTCC dismissed the criminal cases based on reasonable doubt and not on insufficiency of evidence. And while the prosecution failed to prove criminal liability beyond reasonable doubt, Emilias indebtedness was nonetheless proven by preponderance of evidence, the quantum of evidence required to prove the same. Thus, the RTC declared in its January 5, 2001 Order[17] that: The prosecution however had established that the accused had issued the checks subject of these cases. The accused had impliedly admitted that she was the maker of the checks subject of [these] case[s] when she redeemed a third check from the complainant. In fact, the accused had never categorically denied having issued the checks subject of these cases. When the accused filed the Demurrer to Evidence, she had hypothetically admitted the evidence presented by the prosecution to be true, and this includes the allegation of the prosecution that the accused issued the checks subject of these cases for value.[18]

Thus, it dismissed the appeal, viz: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal of the accused in these cases is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. SO ORDERED.[19]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals Undeterred, Emilia filed before the CA a Petition for Review[20] still insisting that the MTCCs dismissal was based on insufficiency of evidence and that same pertains to both the criminal and civil aspects of BP 22. She reiterated that there was no basis for the civil award made by the MTCC since the prosecution failed to show evidence of her civil liability and that a court can only award civil liability in cases of acquittals based on reasonable doubt and not on insufficiency of evidence. In its June 30, 2006 Decision, the CA emphasized that even if acquitted, an accused may still be held civilly liable if a) the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt or b) the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil. Just like the RTC, the CA ruled that the dismissal of the criminal cases against Emilia was expressly based on reasonable doubt, hence, she is not free from civil liability because the same is not automatically extinguished by acquittal based on said ground. The CA further declared that even granting that her acquittal was for insufficiency of evidence, the same is still akin to a dismissal based on reasonable doubt.

Respecting the factual conclusions of the lower courts anent Emilias civil liability, the CA noted that Emilia had never denied issuing the subject checks for value which, in themselves constituted evidence of indebtedness. Moreover, she failed to refute the prosecutions evidence when she filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The CA therefore affirmed the assailed Order of the RTC except that it deleted the award of attorneys fees, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 13, Davao City, affirming in toto the Order of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Br. 2, Davao City as to the civil liability of Emilia Lim, is hereby AFFIRMED with the sole modification that the award of attorneys fees in favor of the Respondent is DELETED. SO ORDERED. [21] On Motion for Reconsideration,[22] Emilia asserted that by granting her Demurrer to Evidence based on insufficiency of evidence, the MTCC acknowledged that there is absolutely no case against her. She alleged that the preponderance of evidence required in determining civil liability does not apply to her as she never presented any evidence at all, implying that in such a determination, both parties should have presented their respective evidence for the purpose of ascertaining as to which of the evidence presented is superior. The CA, however, rejected the motion in its Resolution[23] dated November 9, 2006. It held that insufficiency does not mean the total absence of evidence, but that evidence is lacking of what is necessary or required to make out her case. The CA explained that the MTCC acquitted Emilia because the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was insufficient to convict her of BP 22. However, the extinction of the civil aspect does not necessarily follow such acquittal. The CA also disregarded Emilias argument that a preponderance of evidence should be a comparison of evidence of the opposing parties as such interpretation would lead to absurdity because by simply refusing to present evidence, a defendant can then be easily absolved from a civil suit. Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of errors: 1) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE AWARD OF CIVIL LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS A NULLITY FOR LACK OF DUE PROCESS, APART FROM THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A JURIDICAL PERSON OR IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT BECAUSE THE GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL WAS FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AND NOT ON REASONABLE DOUBT, THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES CARRIES WITH IT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CIVIL CASES DEEMED INSTITUTED THEREIN. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO PIECE OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT MAY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT TO PROVE CIVIL LIABILITY.[24]

2)

3)

4)

In sum, the core issue in this petition is whether the dismissal of Emilias BP 22 cases likewise includes the dismissal of their civil aspect. Our Ruling The petition lacks merit.

Emilias allegations that she was denied due process and that Mindanao Wines is not the real party in interest do not merit our attention as these were never raised for resolution before the courts below.

Emilia claims that she was deprived of due process when the courts below declared her civilly liable. In support of this, she cites Salazar v. People[25] wherein it was held that a court cannot rule upon the civil aspect of the case should it grant a demurrer to evidence with leave of court since the accused is entitled to adduce controverting evidence on the civil liability. Emilia likewise contends that Mindanao Wines is not a juridical person, it being a single proprietorship only and thus, not the real party in interest in this case. We note, however, that Emilia had never invoked before the courts below the ruling in Salazar. Neither did she specify in her pleadings filed therein whether her demurrer was filed with or without leave of court. It is only now that Emilia is claiming that the same was filed with leave of court in an apparent attempt to conform the facts of this case with that in Salazar. The same goes true with regard to the questioned locus standi of Mindanao Wines. Emilia likewise did not raise in her pleadings filed with the RTC or the CA that the civil aspect is dismissible for lack of cause of action because Mindanao Wines is not a juridical person and thus not a real party in interest. In fact, the courts below all along considered Mindanao Wines as the plaintiff and the trial proceeded as such. Obviously, these new issues are mere afterthoughts. They were raised only for the first time in this petition for review on certiorari. Never were they presented before the RTC and the CA for resolution. To allow Emilia to wage a legal blitzkrieg and blindside Mindanao Wines is a violation of the latters due process rights: It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.[26] For this reason, the said issues do not merit the Courts consideration.

Notwithstanding her acquittal, Emilia is civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where x x x the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required[27] in civil cases. On this basis, Emilia insists that the MTCC dismissed the BP 22 cases against her not on the ground of reasonable doubt but on insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the civil liability should likewise be extinguished. Emilias Demurrer to Evidence, however, betrays this claim. Asserting insufficiency of evidence as a ground for granting said demurrer, Emilia herself argued therein that the prosecution has not proven [her] guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[28] And in consonance with such assertion, the MTCC in its judgment expressly stated that her guilt was indeed not established beyond reasonable doubt, hence the acquittal.[29] In any case, even if the Court treats the subject dismissal as one based on insufficiency of evidence as Emilia wants to put it, the same is still tantamount to a dismissal based on reasonable doubt. As may be recalled, the MTCC dismissed the criminal cases because one essential element of BP 22 was missing, i.e., the fact of the banks dishonor. The evidence was insufficient to prove said element of the crime as no proof of dishonor of the checks was presented by the prosecution. This, however, only means that the trial court cannot convict Emilia of the crime since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of such proof of dishonor does not mean that Emilia has no existing debt with Mindanao Wines, a civil aspect which is proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence. Emilia also avers that a courts determination of preponderance of evidence necessarily entails the presentation of evidence of both parties. She thus believes that she should have been first required to present evidence to dispute her civil liability before the lower courts could determine preponderance of evidence. We disagree.

Preponderance of evidence is [defined as] the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[30] Contrary to Emilias interpretation, a determination of this quantum of evidence does not need the presentation of evidence by both parties. As correctly reasoned out by the CA, Emilias interpretation is absurd as this will only encourage defendants to waive their presentation of evidence in order for them to be absolved from civil liability for lack of preponderance of evidence. Besides, Emilia should note that even when a respondent does not present evidence, a complainant in a civil case is nevertheless burdened to substantiate his or her claims by preponderance of evidence before a court may rule on the reliefs prayed for by the latter. Settled is the principle that parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.[31] Lastly, we see no reason to disturb the ruling of the CA anent Emilias civil liability. As may be recalled, the CA affirmed the lower courts factual findings on the matter. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, will not be disturbed.[32] Also, [i]t is a settled rule that in a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of [Court], only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.[33] Moreover, it is well to remember that a check may be evidence of indebtedness. A check, the entries of which are in writing, could prove a loan transaction.[34] While Emilia is acquitted of violations of BP 22, she should nevertheless pay the debt she owes. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The challenged June 30, 2006 Decision and November 9, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64897 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

PEOPLE VS SAMOY ABAD, J.:

This case is about the reliability of the identification of the accused involved in a robbery with homicide case three years after the commission of the crime. The Facts and the Case The Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor filed a case for robbery on the highway[1] against accused Jonathan Valencia, Glenford Samoy, and Leodigario Israel before the Aparri Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Criminal Case VI967. Edmund Addun and Johnny Ventura (Johnny) testified that on the morning of December 27, 1997 they left Tuguegarao City for Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, with Rodolfo Cachola, Canuto Forlaje, and Melencio Ventura (Melencio) to buy pigs. They rode a small Isuzu Elf truck with Johnny on the wheel. They were on errand for spouses Edwin and Elizabeth Cauilan, their employers, who bought and sold hogs. When the group reached the boundary of Barangay Logac, Lallo, Cagayan and Barangay Iringan, Allacapan, Cagayan, three armed men, which included accused Glenford Samoy and Leodigario Israel, flagged them down. One carried an M16 armalite rifle, the second a .45 caliber pistol, and the third a .38 caliber pistol. The accused ordered those on the truck to alight and hand over their money. Melencio, who was in charge of buying the hogs for their employer, immediately handed over the P60,000.00 he had with him. The accused then ordered their captives to get their things from the truck and go up the mountain. When they hesitated, one of the accused fired his gun. This prompted the captives to run for their lives, except Addun who closed his eyes because of a gun aimed directly at him. The accused fired three warning shots to stop those who where running away. When the latter did not heed the shots, the accused fired directly at them, seriously wounding Melencio while slightly hurting Johnny and Forlaje. The robbers then fled to the mountain. Although the robbery victims brought Melencio to the hospital, he was pronounced dead on arrival. The accused, on the other hand, denied having taken part in the commission of the crime. Accused Samoy claimed that when the robbery took place, he was helping out in the wedding preparations of a cousin. He was unable,

however, to attend the wedding on the next day because of a hangover he got from drinking the night before. Accused Israel, for his part, claimed that he was planting rice in a farm all day on December 27, 1997. He left home early in the morning and returned home in the afternoon. On July 1, 2003 the RTC found both Samoy and Israel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and meted out to them the penalty ofreclusion perpetua. The RTC held that the accused committed only one act of robbery and that the prosecution was unable to prove that they organized themselves to commit robbery on the highway. The RTC likewise held them solidarily liable to Melencios heirs in the sum of P1,260,000.00 for loss of earning capacity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The RTC also ordered the accused to return the P60,000.00 taken during the robbery to the spouses Cauilan. Both accused appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00328 but Samoy escaped from prison on October 5, 2004, resulting in the dismissal of his appeal. On June 4, 2010 the CA affirmed the RTC decision with respect to Israel. In addition, it ordered him to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity andP20,000.00 more for loss of earning capacity to correct a discrepancy in computation. The Issue Presented The only issue presented is whether or not the CA, along with the RTC, erred in finding that accused Israel committed robbery with homicide in company of others. The Ruling of the Court Accused Israel assails the manner by which Johnny and Addun identified him. Three years had passed, he said, before they identified him at the trial as one of the robbers. Israel argues that his physical appearance had surely changed through those years, rendering Johnny and Adduns identification of him inaccurate. Israel also pointed out that the RTC and the CA failed to take into account the witnesses emotional imbalance, caused by the terrible experience they went through, making their testimonies altogether untrustworthy. The Court disagrees. Contrary to the theory of the accused, victims of criminal violence are more likely to observe and remember their appalling experience rather than ignore and forget them. [2] Three years are not too long. Such victims are able to recall the faces of and the body movements unique to the men who terrorized them. [3] Parenthetically, the robbery in this case took place in broad daylight, the assailants were not wearing masks or hats, and the frightening episode lasted for several minutes. The offenders tried before fleeing to send their victims up the mountain after robbing them. Accused Israel claims that the CA improperly ignored inconsistent testimonies regarding the question of whether or not he wore sunglasses during the robbery. But the fact is that Addun and Johnny categorically identified him as the robber among the three who was armed with a .45 caliber pistol. That one of these witnesses had the impression that Israel wore sunglasses could not diminish the strength of such identification. For his part, all that Israel could claim is that he could not have been involved in the robbery since he was planting rice elsewhere when it happened. But Israels house was just near the Maluyo highway, giving him an easy access to any public transport which could bring him to the Logac junction. He was not able to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. [4] Thus, in the absence of any improper motive to incriminate Israel, the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses must prevail over his mere denial and alibi. The RTC and the CA were likewise correct in finding accused Israel guilty only of robbery with homicide, not of robbery on the highway as defined in P.D. 532. Conviction for the latter crime requires proof that several accused organized themselves for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately, preying upon innocent and defenseless people on the highway.[5] Here, the prosecution proved only one act of robbery. WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirety the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00328 dated June 4, 2010.